

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-99-36-T

IN TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before: Judge Carmel A. Agius, Presiding
Judge Ivana Janu
Judge Chikako Taya

Registrar: Mr Hans Holthuis

Date Filed: 18 June 2003

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RADOSLAV BRĐANIN

PROSECUTION'S SUBMISSION OF STATEMENT OF EXPERT
WITNESS PURSUANT TO RULE 94 *BIS*

The Office of the Prosecutor:
Miss Joanna Korner

Counsel for the Accused Brđanin:
Mr John Ackerman
Mr David Cunningham

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1. Pursuant to Rule 94 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("Rules"), the Prosecution hereby files the unsigned report of its expert witness Dr. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin entitled "Propaganda in Bosnia-Herzegovina - An analysis of official documents and selected Serbian mass media in Bosnia-Herzegovina" ("Report"). (Annex A). The Report was disclosed to the Defence on 17 June 2003. The Prosecution undertakes to file a signed copy of the report immediately upon receipt of same.
2. Although the Report has been written by Dr. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin together with Dr. Marjan Malešić the Prosecution only intends to call Dr. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin as a witness. The *Curriculum Vitae* of Dr. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin is attached to this motion as Appendix B.
3. Due to the Trial Chamber informing the Prosecution on 11 June 2003 that its case had to be concluded by 1 August 2003, and the witness is unavailable from mid-July, the Prosecution intends to call the witness on 9 July 2003, but only if the Defence wish to cross-examine the witness.
4. The Prosecution is aware of the fact that Rule 94 *bis* (B) of the Rules states that the opposing party has 30 days from the date of disclosure of the expert witness statement, to file a notice indicating whether it accepts the expert witness statement or it wishes to cross-examine the expert witness. However, for the above mentioned reasons, the Prosecution would kindly ask the Defence to waive the 30 day time period and to advise, within ten days, whether it requires the witness for cross-examination.

Joanna Korner
Senior Trial Attorney

Dated this eighteenth day of June 2003
At The Hague
The Netherlands

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APPENDIX A
TO
PROSECUTION'S SUBMISSION OF STATEMENT OF EXPERT
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PROPAGANDA IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - An analysis of official
documents and selected Serbian mass media in Bosnia-
Herzegovina

(research report)

Dr. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatini

Dr. Marjan Malešič

Ljubljana,

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INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia commissioned a content analysis of official documents of Republika Srpska, Autonomous Region of Krajina, certain municipalities and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and a content analysis of selected electronic and printed mass media, i.e. Krajina Television Banjaluka, Serbian Television Pale, Radio Prijedor, Radio Sanski most, Javnost, Glas (Glas srpski), and Kozarski vjesnik. The task of the researchers at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, was to analyse the content of official documents and mass media and to establish the connection between the propaganda activity and the events that took place on the ground. A special attention was given to the role played by the indicted persons Radoslav Br•anin and Momir Tali• in this process.

The researchers examined the material that the ICTY made available for us and from this we made a selection of articles/TV and radio shows in which the indicted persons Radoslav Br•anin and General Momir Tali• played an important role, either by giving a statement or an interview or by being a subject of news report referring to their (or the bodies' they chaired) activities. In addition, in order to gain the understanding of the general media climate in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, our analysis also included other newspaper, TV and radio items, mainly interviews with important political, spiritual and military leaders, war reports and commentaries. Those items were selected randomly. The research of mass media covered a period from January 1992 to December 1992, with an emphasis on the period from April 1992 to September 1992, while the research of official documents covered a period from July 1991 to February 1993.

The research report consists of brief theoretical framework of propaganda, which enabled us to accomplish the content analysis of the above listed documents, printed and electronic mass media items. The theoretical framework is followed by the findings of the analysis of mass media items and official documents provided by ICTY and selected by the sampling method. The reports on propaganda spread by television, radio and newspaper Glas is followed by a depiction of the role played by Radoslav Br•anin and Momir Tali• in these media. In Javnost and Kozarski vjesnik the indicted persons do not appear or do not play a significant role. At the end of the research report, we offer some general conclusions and a chronology of selected events created on the basis of analysed material.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK¹

Serious analysis of contemporary propaganda is a complex undertaking primarily because of the use of the mass media in the dissemination of propaganda. This is further complicated by the fact that the introduction of new technologies results in new channels of public media, which demand specific and new methods of utilisation - a factor which has always been of great significance for propaganda.

In the study of how propaganda in the Bosnian Serbs media has affected the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following elements are of particular interest: (1) propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, propaganda and religion, propaganda and history), (2) the use of language for propaganda purposes, (3) the context of propaganda, (4) propaganda organisation and propagandists, (5) the public, (6) the level of source criticism; (7) iconography, (8) compatibility of visual and textual information, (9) (de)construction of national memory, (10) designation of "the Other", (11) routine lies, (12) collective (and selective) memory loss, (13) classic (hard) propaganda, (14) anti-propaganda, (15) accusations of the opponent and (16) conspiracy theory. As a general rule, the foregoing elements should not be divorced one from another, although to a certain degree such a separation is

¹ We define propaganda as a planned, deliberate and systematic effort directed at formulating perceptions, manipulating facts and organising behaviour so as to provoke a response from the people that is in line with the intentions of the propagandist.

essential for the sake of analysis. Instead, they should all be viewed in the context of their interlinked and mutually complementary character.

Propaganda and Ideology

Jowett and O'Donnell (1986:154) quote Kecskemeti, who claims that any ideology promoted by propaganda presents the general public with a comprehensive, conceptual framework for dealing with or attempting to understand both social and political realities. In adhering to the procedure for placing an ideology within a given context, the analyst observes the situation from various angles, sets of persuasions and values, behaviours and attitudes. He also observes the modes of those perceptions and reflections which are the basis on which consensus is built and norms are created; these norms dictate what is desirable and what is not. The propagandist's main goal is that the people accept the ideology he presents them with.

Splichal (1975:7) believes that the bourgeois and the industrial revolutions were crucially important factors in the emergence of propaganda, and especially for its vigorous development. Linked with the first of these revolutions is the appearance of mass ideologies, while the second heralded the advent of mass communication. The initial and obvious link between ideology and propaganda occurred during the French Revolution (1789) and from that point onwards this link has remained the very foundation of propaganda. Splichal points to Ellul and Domenach (1975:13) who believe that the existence of social (national) myths and ideologies are preconditions for the development of propaganda, or rather, that in order to develop, propaganda demands an ideologically saturated environment; the entity that we have studied, Bosnian Serbs' para-state has found its ideology in nationalism. Great myths serve to knit a people together through a commonly perceived vision of the future.

Within such a context it is important not to overlook the role of religion and the reinterpretation of history. Both of these factors appear to play key roles in the formulation of propagandist communications about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the general public. In addition to religion itself - and in this particular case we are speaking about Roman Catholicism, the Orthodox Church, and Islam - the role of an individual's awareness of belonging to a particular civilisation is also highly

significant, although this awareness is frequently the result of a specific religious attitude.²

In the formulation of propagandist communications the role of the interpretation of history, myths and nationalism³ is equally important. On the same lines, Eyal (1992:82) concluded that the Balkans are characterised by a highly dangerous combination of conflicts determined by exclusive territorial demands and historical claims which have more recently been clad in new nationalistic ideologies. In a territory whose borders often shift and where the historical justification for such moves depends on the starting point of the main actors concerned; every nationalistic demand is, by definition, to the detriment of another people. This situation is exacerbated by the tendency displayed by some peoples in the Balkans to alter historical and national arguments to fit the present set of circumstances.

According to Eyal (ibid.), the historical experience of the Balkans has had two additional consequences. Firstly, it has created an obsession with history, a science which, in these parts, is by no means a purely academic discipline, but rather a highly active political instrument that is often, indeed regularly, utilised by government officials. Every historical episode is reinterpreted or falsified, time and time again, in order to serve current, dominant official needs. During the war in Croatia, the Serbian leadership consistently revived the experience of the Serbian population during WWII, using it as a justification for their fight against the Croats who, on the basis of historical experience and through Serbian reinterpretation of history, were branded as a genocidal people. On the other hand, there were attempts in Croatia to reinterpret history by downgrading the level of the evil perpetrated by the Pavelić Ustasas against Serbs and others in Croatia. The reinterpretations are, however; partially justifiable, since in the ex-Yugoslav regime (i.e., in the former common state) many true historical facts were deliberately ignored, which resulted in historical events being tailored to suit particular needs. Thus, the vicious circle is closed.

The Context of Propaganda

As well as apostrophising the fact that we are dealing with a pre-war and war situation, all the foregoing provides us with an insight into the context of propaganda. Effective propaganda is related to the dominant mood of the times, and it is therefore vitally important that we truly understand the climate of the times. We

² For more on this subject, see Huntington (1993).

³ For more on this subject, see Schlesinger (1991) and Giddens (1991).

must remain finely tuned to events and to the way in which they are interpreted by the propagandist: is he speaking about peace, national rights, human rights? Does a particular mood prevail among the general public? With this in mind, it is absolutely essential that one comprehends the historical and mythological context of the region, or rather, that one is familiar with the chain of past events which have occurred in that region.

The Use of Language

Another element which has proved to be a powerful propaganda tool is language. The use of verbal symbolisation can generate a sense of power. By using such verbal symbols, a person invests himself with a certain power, a characteristic of propaganda being hyperbole.

In terms of its use, propaganda is also related to emotive language and presentations, although some of those utilising propaganda believe that an impassioned message is more effective, or that emotive propaganda is more effective, if aimed at semi-literate people. We are therefore of the opinion that it is of great importance to study the characteristics of the target segment of the population, and how that segment is structured.

Splichal (1975:55-57) suggests that propaganda employs and relies upon special language strategies and tactics: (1) polarisation of values (black and white presentations of reality); (2) face-value acceptance of the information provided (calling on supposed common experience; intentions and prejudices); (3) the use of the target group's own jargon as "proof" of mutual affiliation; (4) references to specific authorities and persons in authority, and making apparent analogies; (5) using what is ostensibly the language of reason (linking various claims to selected inter-subjective, confidential conclusions, causes and bodies of evidence).

Within such a context, we are also able to speak of the use of slogans and different labelling for purely propaganda purposes (Wilson, 1992: 312-313). The aim of slogans is to coalesce a mass of people in a single, common emotion, whereas the aim of labelling is to make people form opinions while disregarding the "evidence" on which such opinions are based. The propagandist addresses two of man's basic instincts: hatred and fear. Odious appellations are applied to individuals, groups, peoples or races - to all those regarded by the propagandist as deserving of condemnation or rejection.

In his analysis of propaganda strategy, Hundhausen (1975:60) also refers to the use of language. This strategy depends for its success on a permanent state of confrontation with the opponent, while the applicable tactics include those of discouragement, deliberate silence, and confusion; the use of false manoeuvres; knowingly disseminating false claims, and the use of various symbols and words which have the same meaning, but which more intensely influence the masses. It

was probably with this in mind that LeBon said (1895) that reason and evidence can never stand up to certain words and statements; it is for this reason that it is politically profitable to revise old words that have unpleasant connotations for the masses who are the target of propaganda.

Iconography

There is yet another technique employed in the arousal of emotions through the process of subconscious transfer or associations, and that is the use of icons. Here, we are speaking about visual symbols of authority, designed to provoke certain emotions. When studying the subject of propaganda, one has to establish the existence of the iconographic designation of authority, or its non-existence, and to define the aspect of the omnipresence of this particular type of visual presentation. The iconography constantly surrounding a politician or a military commander links him directly with the values personified by that iconography.⁴

Propagandists and the Structure of a Propaganda Organisation

Although it is no easy task to define the structure of a propaganda organisation merely on the basis of research on propaganda in the public media, one conclusion is inescapable: a successful propaganda campaign results from a strong and centralised authority which continually broadcasts a consistent message. Consequently, propaganda as a discipline has a powerful and centralised leadership with a hierarchy common to other large organisations. Its structure also ensures the articulation of specific aims and the means for their realisation; it has at its disposal a selection of the media through which to disseminate propaganda messages. Understanding a propaganda organisation is made easier, however, when individual propagandists are identified. In this case; the propagandists are the representatives of the sides involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

General Public

Needless to say, any analysis of propaganda must include an analysis of the targeted segment of the general public. It may be safely assumed that, in order to be effect-

ive, the method of idea propagation must be adapted to the characteristics of the intended audience. Accordingly, it is the political culture of the target group which determines the propaganda tactics to be employed. The potential effectiveness of propaganda depends on the segment of the public that is chosen. The traditional propaganda target group is the general public. This aspect is of particular relevance to our research, which deals with propaganda disseminated through the mass media. Modern propaganda methods target smaller groups within the population, including special interest groups, cultural elites, certain strata of society, and even individuals - especially those who formulate public opinion within their own environment.

It is vital for the propagandist that he achieves a response from the public. Acts of communication are most effective when they reflect existing opinions, convictions or inclinations. An effective propagandist utilises prevailing persuasions or convictions in order to manufacture a train of thought which corresponds to the relevant predispositions of the targeted segment of the public. Thus, the objective is not to engineer a change in political loyalties, or in racial, religious or any other deeply imbedded persuasions, rather to retune feelings about those matters. Propaganda messages are better received and achieve a better response if the target audience feels as if the ideas have come from within them.

The aim of the propagandist is to channel existing patterns of behaviour and attitudes. If any changes should occur during the process, they depend on a number of factors. We will assume that the public which is the subject of our analysis is not particularly sophisticated and that it is prepared to accept, in the name of certain higher (national) interests, major changes in the prevailing set of values, norms and attitudes - changes which are suggested by the authorities and through the media. Hence, we can imagine the possibility for dramatic changes in how the parties to the war treat each other through the media, regardless of whether they are directly or indirectly involved in the fighting.

Equally important for a thorough study of propaganda is an analysis and understanding of the accepted norms of any given group. These norms have their origins

⁴ As our previous analyses have shown (Malešić 1987: 185), the Serbs frequently used their old coat-of-arms, which includes, among other things, four "C"s (C is S in Cyrillic letters) that are interpreted as Samo sloga Srbina spašava ("only unity saves the Serbs").

in group affiliation and are, therefore, the result of the persuasions and values accepted by the members of that group.

Group norms can be based on a variety of foundations, depending on the particular common interest which binds a group together. However, we could be concentrated on groups whose basis is a common culture. Socio-psychological research on the dynamics of individual groups shows that people remain loyal to a group even when that group makes decisions which are not in keeping with its norms and persuasions. It goes without saying that the propagandist takes full advantage of such conformism.

People's reactions to propaganda communications may be assessed by studying public opinion and monitoring public behaviour. It has been found, for example, that in their letters to newspapers, or in their statements to TV journalists, people are apt to echo the lines of reasoning and use the same terminology which propagandists have "marketed" through the media.

Source Criticism

Yet another element that should be analysed in the study of propaganda is the sources of information. Here, special attention has been paid to the credibility of those sources and how credibility is utilised. It can safely be said that even a very credible source can be used selectively, and therefore manipulated. People are inclined to seek both information and direction from authority figures.⁵ Of particular importance in initiating a change in people's behaviour is the use of the opinion of an established expert. Once a certain source is accepted as credible when dealing with a single issue or a given problem, it is no difficult task to deal with other problem areas by using that same source. Consequently, one absolutely vital factor is the readiness with which people are inclined to accept and trust the source of certain information.

Bearing in mind the fact that we are dealing with propaganda disseminated through the mass media, we will focus on the frequency with which, criteria by which, and

⁵ The example of the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1993 in Serbia is very interesting in this regard. According to an opinion poll organised by the "Medium" Agency on April 9, 1993, as many as 70 percent of Serbian public were strongly against the plan. However, following the government's announcement of its change in attitude, and its subsequent vigorous promotion by the media, the percentage of those opposed to the plan fell to a mere 20 percent in just eighteen days (Milinkovi• 1997: 176). Similarly, •olovi• (quoted by Milinkovi•, *ibidem*) holds that the average media consumer receives timely suggestions from electronic media as to "what he should think" and he regards the media more like "political traffic lights" than as a mean through which he obtains objective information.

methods through which local, foreign, and Bosnian-Herzegovina sources of information are used in Bosnian Serbs' printed mass media. The assumption is that the aim of the propagandist is to reduce to the absolute minimum the number of available sources of information, in order to reduce the number of possible interpretations of certain event.

Classic (hard) propaganda

Classic (hard) propaganda uses visual presentation and verbal description of enemy's atrocities to rouse the emotions of the audience and to mobilize it. Close-up TV shoots of mutilated victims, rows of civilian victims and military casualties, rows of coffins, discovered mass graves and live TV coverage of mass funerals were the most frequent cases used in propaganda activities on the territory of former Yugoslavia (Maleši• 1997).

Routine lies

Routine lies are carefully chosen and then frequently disseminated throughout the mass media. The propagandist constantly repeats false facts and figures, until they are publicly accepted as truth. The constant repetition in influential mass media gradually transforms the lie into the "truth", more precisely, it functions as a truth in a certain public.

We will also include in our model the study of the compatibility of visual and textual information (relationship between text and picture), (de)construction of national memory (abandoning "old" norms and values and introducing "new" [nationalistic] ones), designation of "the Other" ("us" and "them"), collective (and selective) memory loss (ability to forget the facts and figures which do not fit into one's image), anti-propaganda (negative reaction on the media activity of the opposite side and of the "neutral" media), accusations of the opponent (direct blame of the opposite side for the situation on the ground) and conspiracy theory (external forces selfish plans influence the situation of a subject in conflict).

Table: A model for a study of propaganda

Elements	Connection to propaganda message
1. Propaganda and ideology a) nationalism b) religion c) (re)interpretation of history 2. Routine lies 3. Collective and selective memory loss 4. Classic (hard) propaganda 5. Anti-propaganda	Direct connection to propaganda message

6. Accusations of the opponent 7. Conspiracy theory	
8. Use of language 9. Source criticism 10. Iconography 11. Compatibility of visual and textual information 12. (De)construction of the national memory 13. Who is "the Other"	Indirect connection to propaganda message
14. Context of propaganda 15. Public 16. Propagandist and the structure of propaganda organisation	Environment of propaganda (message)

The existence of a theoretical model of propaganda makes it feasible to study 'propaganda reality' in Republika Srpska. As it is evident from the model sketch, some elements of the model directly relate to propaganda messages, others relate indirectly, and still others concern the propaganda environment. All elements of propaganda model are interrelated and compatible. In our analysis, we will focus on some most relevant elements, especially those that are directly and indirectly related to the propaganda message, while the propaganda environment itself surpasses the purpose of this analysis. On the other hand, some additional elements could be found in the analysed material.

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ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SERBIAN MASS MEDIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Javnost

»Javnost«⁶ is a weekly newspaper that first appeared on 19 October 1990 in Sarajevo and was proclaimed the »newspaper of the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina«. Javnost was published rather regularly throughout the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or at least during the period covered by our analysis. It was almost entirely concerned with the war, with its content including interviews, particularly with politicians, historiographers, artists and soldiers, and numerous detailed reports on wartime events. The reports comprised commentaries, while traditional commentaries were not as frequent as it is usual in weekly newspapers. Almost every page featured a photograph and/or a cartoon. Our analysis covered 146 articles from 30 issues of Javnost that appeared in the period from March 14 to December 26 1992, with the special stress being on the period between April 1992 and September 1992. We have analysed Javnost and checked the most crucial elements of the propaganda model in the continuation of this research report.

⁶ In the issues of Javnost analyzed here Momir Talić and Radoslav Brčić were not mentioned.

The link between propaganda and ideology (nationalism, religion and reinterpretation of history) was a very important understructure of propaganda messages conveyed by Javnost. The newspaper held the opinion that Serbs should get rid of the misconception that today they fight war in the same way as they did in the past, with their traditional enemies i.e. Catholic clericalism and the politics of the great world powers, and that this struggle was going to end in the same way as it did in the past. In summary, Javnost offers the following answers to the question of what Serbian national question actually implies:

- Serbs do not want to live in a country that is governed by the interests of the great powers and European Catholic clericalism, but in a country that rests on ethnic and historical rights.
- the Serbian national question does not imply the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and if Yugoslavia cannot be the state of citizens, then, by the same token, neither could be its regions.
- Serbs reject all attempts by diplomatic missions and intelligence services of the great world powers to mould the undeveloped public opinion towards the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia.
- Serbs will not consent to the destruction of Yugoslavia which is presumably a model for the destruction of the Soviet Union i.e. Russia.
- The Serbian national question rests on respect for international law and democratic principles, while the EU, in resolving the crisis, clearly violates the provisions of international law in the interest of Germany and Catholic clericalism (Javnost 74, March 28 1992, Šta poslije Jugoslavije/What after Yugoslavia).

For the third time in the 20th century, and under the most unfavourable internal and external conditions, the Serbs are forced to build for themselves a new country – free, democratic, and civilized community (Javnost 74, March 28 1992, a letter by Dobrica •osi• to the Congress of Serbian intellectuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina). With regard to this, Javnost appeals for as just as possible partition and division lines between the three ethnic communities within Bosnia-Herzegovina (Javnost 86, July 11 1992, Bosna iz tri djela; Bolja valjana dioba nego loša zajednica/Bosnia consisting of three parts; a proper division is better than bad community); Javnost 74, March 28 1992, a letter by Dobrica •osi• to the Congress of Serbian intellectuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina). When organizing their new country and society, the Serbs must

reconcile the principle of the unity of Serbian nation with the principle of democratic polycentrism. The Serbian nation remains the only positive force that keeps the idea of a democratic Yugoslav community still alive. The backbone of the new country will be Serbian national unity because there is no other force on the horizon which could do that. In Bosnia-Herzegovina only three nationally-delimited parts can guarantee a minimum of democracy in the future. The Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina should establish political, economic and cultural links with other Serbian regions, while Serbia and Montenegro play the role of the heritage of Serbian unity in this respect (Javnost 97, October 17 1992, Kraj jednostranim ustupcima/No more unilateral concessions).

Serb intellectuals sent a message through Javnost that Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina face the point of a historical milestone and new fateful solutions. They demand unity of the Serbian territory in former Yugoslavia that should be realized through as firm as possible ties between constitutive units (Javnost 74, March 28 1992, a letter by Dobrica •osi• to the Congress of Serbian intellectuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Javnost 75, April 4 1992, Srpski brod...i bez Jugoslavije/Serbian ship....even without Yugoslavia). Through the interviews with politicians, historians and artists, Javnost calls for the unity of Serbian national organism and occasionally for purges inside the Serbian national body itself, if protagonists fail to support the Serbian issue strongly enough (Javnost 75, April 4 1992, Sve naše zablude/All of our delusions).

According to Javnost, the Serbs are a nation that has never reached for another's property but they know how to respect and defend their own (Javnost 81, June 6 1992, Srpska klica feniksica/Serbian seed of phoenix). Serbs and Montenegrins have to endure this last battle or they will all be killed (Javnost 83, June 20 1992, Ovo je naš poslednji rov/This is our last trench). Serbs are like slaves who plod along a river's bank towing for others the ship towards calmer waters at the mouth of the river. Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina only wish to defend their existence and the right, which they have as one of the constitutive nations, to decide on their own what their country's organization will be (Javnost 76, April 26 1992, Zaustavite satanizaciju Srba/Stop the satanization of Serbs). The SDA must recognize that there is no other solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina but division along ethnic lines. Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina will never consent to live under the treatment of a national minority, will never relinquish their historical authenticity and independence (Javnost

92, August 29 1992, Bez Srba nema rješenja/Resolution not possible without Serbs; Javnost 98, October 24 1992, Rat neprirodnih saveznika/The war of unnatural allies). The best solution would be the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbs and Croats (Javnost 95, September 19 1992, Namnožili se izdajnici/The number of traitors swells; Javnost 94, September 12 1992, Stvarno i nemoguće/The realistic and the impossible). The conflicts in the “former Bosnia-Herzegovina are neither class nor territorial conflicts, but ethnic and religious ones, so what is needed is not to separate territories but nations in conflict. We do not accept any solution that is not based on ethnic principles” (Javnost 94, September 12 1992, Srbi su pobijedili i u ovom ratu/Serbs won this war as well). It is in our interest to establish peace and preserve the borders of Republika Srpska. “The border is where a Serbian man is” (Javnost 94, September 12 1992, Međina je tamo gdje je Srbin/The border is where a Serbian man is).

Serbs are fighting a ‘holy battle’ for survival. Serbs must keep together in one close formation, they have to fight against Fascism, Ustashas, ‘Green Berets’, and war profiteers. The centre of Serbian statehood today is Srpska Republika Bosnia-Herzegovina, which forms the nucleus of the process through which a new, big Serbian country is being formed (Javnost 89, August 9 1992, Gaulajter novog poretka/“Gauleiter” of the new order). The Serbs in these regions will live together, or, if they do not live in harmony, they will be brought to the point at which they become a historical – nothing (Javnost 98, October 24 1992, Vrijeme srpskog opstanka/The time of survival for Serbs). The army of Republika Srpska has a holy mission to defend the Serbian nation. The Serbs are a holy nation and it is better to be their ally than their enemy. “The Serbian nation will come out a nation who has sacrificed itself not only in defence of its own dignity and survival, but in defence of the humankind in general. It will be – the holy nation” (Javnost 100, November 7, Srbi – sveti narod/Serbs – the holy nation).

An important role in the propaganda business is played by historical parallels, or reinterpretation of history (e. i. Javnost 74, March 28 1992, Šumadija case, a series). In the view of Javnost, as early as the time of Austria-Hungary, the regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not choose means in its attempts to marginalize Serbs politically and culturally and thus make the process of their denationalization as smooth as possible. Javnost exploits the tragic experience of Ustasha concentration

camp Jasenovac during WWII and looks for parallels with contemporary events in Krajina with the purpose of instilling fear in Serbs (Javnost 74, March 28 1992, Jasenovac – nikad više/Never again Jasenovac). It claims that, ever since the occupation of Bosnia in 1878, blood spilling and aggressions have been the ways of Catholic clericalism whenever it meddled in the Balkans, and that the same happened in Slovenia (seizure of control over the borders) and in Croatia (adoption of the new Constitution) in 1991. Javnost featured a series based on unknown records of historical events, or rather massacres of Serbs committed by Muslims/Turks or Croats. The purpose of this series was to discredit the opponent and mobilize own ranks for war (“bitter is the fate of a brother who is without a brother”); (Javnost 75, April 5 1992, Teško bratu bez brata/Bitter is the fate of a brother who is without a brother).

Javnost concludes that even Hitler did not support the Muslim state, while Muslims, whenever in the past they tried to achieve a greater autonomy with their domination, stained their hands with Serbian blood (Javnost 88, July 25 1992, Ni Hitler nije bio za muslimansku državu/Hitler himself was not in favor of a Muslim state). The political conflict between the Muslims and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in 1912 after the Turks were defeated near Kumanovo, and from that time on Muslims, whenever they've had a chance, pursued anti-Serbian politics.

The 20th century is the century of genocides against the Serbian nation. In this century Serbs are the victims of genocide for the third time. The politics led by Europe and the US, of preventing Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina from living together with Serbs in other parts of former Yugoslavia, is simply a revival of the politics commenced by Vienna of the Habsburg era (Javnost 100, November 7 1992, Repriza crno-žute politike/A revival of black-yellow politics).

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has a religious dimension as well, so it is not surprising that religious topics are often used for propaganda purposes. Eastern Orthodoxy is presented as a peaceful and tolerant religion, while Catholicism and Islam are called intolerant, militant and aggressive (Javnost 76, April 26 1992, Vera kao zakon/Religion as a law; Javnost 96, October 3 1992, Alija opet Ilija/Alija is Ilija again). The Muslims are accused of setting up a Muslim republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The state such as the one advocated by Alija Izetbegović cannot co-exist with any form of non-Islamic political institutions, as Izetbegović stated himself. “History does not know any genuine Islamic movement that was not a political

movement as well" (Javnost, May 9 1992, Zločin dozvoljen i – obavezan/Crime allowed – and compulsory). Muslims operate on the long-term basis, all means are allowed, while those who are non-obedient face execution. In order to forestall a peaceful settlement of the borders between ethnic territories, and in order to preserve the unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina at any cost, the Muslim side continually provokes new military conflicts.

Throughout history Islam has had a destructive effect on the organism of the Serbian nation (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Razaranje srpskog bića/The destruction of Serbian organism). This fact should not be used to blame Islam but primarily Serbs themselves. How else to explain such a strong renouncing of their own nation, history and statehood found in Serbs who converted to Islam? This assertion of Javnost is in line with the thesis according to which the majority of Muslims in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina are Serbs by origin, who were Islamicised by the Turks during their long domination over these regions (Javnost 96, October 3 1992, Alija opet Ilija/Alija is Ilija again). Alija Izetbegović advocates big Muslim federation that would embrace all key regions of the world, while all countries that are not led by Muslims would be its enemies (Javnost 80, May 30 1992, Hoće islamsku federaciju/They want Muslim federation).

Related to the conspiracy theory are accusations of the Vatican, repeated several times, that it attempts to remodel the world after the Catholic ideal and in the spirit of the doctrine of the 'Catholic Multi-national'. The Vatican makes way for Germany to penetrate the Adriatic through Slovenia and Croatia in which anti-Orthodox and anti-Serbian sentiments are obvious (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Katoličko preureenje sveta/Catholic reorganization of the world). A stake is being prepared for non-obedient Orthodox Christians. Some writers even believed that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a war of religions. But a Muslim state cannot be created against the interests of the two nations that possess a high level of national identity (Javnost 88, July 25 1992, Visoka cijena previsokog cilja/A high price for a goal set too high). Muslims are Allah's servants, and their religious fanaticism stirs the flames of war.

Accusations of the opponent make one of the important propaganda elements in Javnost. As early as March 1992 the newspaper accused SDA of making preparation for war, then of setting up a Bosnian army and sending Muslims to Islamic countries

for military trainings (Javnost 72, March 14 1992, Ko naoružava Muslimane/Who equips Muslims with arms). In doing this, the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina are allegedly supported by the Muslims from the Serbian region of Sandžak (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Legalizovanje tuđe i sumnjive vojske/Legalization of suspicious foreign forces). Izetbegović and the EC are accused of trying to set up a unitarian state at the expense of the rights of Serbs and their interests – in such a state Serbs would be a national minority (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Nastavlja se teror nad Srbima/Serbs continue to be terrorized). Serbs propose that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a confederation, which they call the “Serbs’ minimum”, and if this is not accepted, they are going to declare Serbian republic (Srpska Republika) within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Izetbegović promised to even sacrifice peace for his foolish religious ideas, so road bandits, armed surprise attacks and mining of monuments do not come as a surprise. When Izetbegović realized that he could not drive the Serbs into his country using a stick, he replaced the stick with the weapons, outlawed them and declared them an external factor and a foreign body (Javnost 76, April 26 1992, Država koje nema/A state that does not exist). Izetbegović announced war to those who stand in the way of a sovereign and inseparable Bosnia-Herzegovina. Izetbegović wages war against Serbs and against negotiations, but on the other hand there is no doubt that Muslims did not know where Izetbegović was leading them. Javnost detected a coded message in which Izetbegović ordered Muslim extremists to cross the Drina river into Serbia (Javnost 96, October 3 1992, Pale Balkan i Europu/They are burning down the Balkans and Europe).

Bosnian army is composed of criminals, foreign mercenaries, and the mujahedin from Muslim and other countries (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Legalizovanje tuđe i sumnjive vojske/Legalization of suspicious foreign forces; Javnost 104, December 12 1992, Vrtlog vjerskog fanatizma/The whirlwind of religious fanaticism). In addition, there are Croatian para-military units. The most fervent are Sandžaklije (people from Sandžak region), the most professional are Libyans, and the most fanatic Iranians. The Muslim side incessantly sows terror (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Muslimanska strana zavodi terror/The Muslim side employs terror). “In their “dance of death” Muslim fundamentalists stage-managed in detail the Sarajevo “massacre”. Their goal was clear: to mobilize the greatest possible support for their jihad policy in this degenerated world” (Javnost 80, May 30 1992, Jihad bez granica; Sve za Jihad/Jihad without frontiers; everything for jihad).

The representatives of the EC are also discredited. They, ostensibly inadvertently, divulge important information and data about the enemy (Serbs) to the Croats (Javnost 86, July 11 1992, "Kolji, nije ti brat"/Slaughter him, he is not your brother). The international community must prevent 'criminal solidarity' between Tudjman and Izetbegović following the signing of the 'military pact', which the Serbs see as a "dark plan to destroy the Serbs" (Javnost 88, July 25 1992, Uklanjanje krunskog svjedoka/Removing the key witness). George Bush, the ex-American president, is a war criminal, and he committed crimes in Panama, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. But "he, like Adolph Hitler, will not be prosecuted, because everything was carried out in the interest of big world tyrants" (Javnost 100, November 7 1992, Ratni zločinac – or Buš/George Bush, a war criminal).

Every issue of Javnost is brimming with conspiracy theory cases. The world and European power elite should ensure for the Serbs the same rights they want to ensure, at any cost, for the constitutive nations of this country – that is the right of self-determination. If not, they should find for the Serbs a place where they could move, or ask them to commit collective suicide (Javnost 72, March 14 1992, Pravo na državu/Right of having one's own state). Foreign forces split us apart in the name of their own peace and their own interests (Javnost 80, May 30 1992, Srbi nisu parijeh/Serbs are not pariahs; Javnost 74, March 28 1992, a letter by Dobrica Ćosić to the Congress of Serbian intellectuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Javnost 73, March 21 1992, Buk stečajnih upravnika/Bogey trustees in bankruptcy). In the name of a new European order they determine our identity and borders. Secret services of the large countries of Europe, America and the Muslim world support this adventurous play with arms, which is continually imposed on Serbs. If Serbs accept another dictate, they will be left without the right to make political, monetary and cultural links with their brothers in Serbia and Montenegro. Even the Yugoslav People's Army is reproached for being inert and not responding adequately to the increasingly more frequent attacks by the 'Muslim and Croatian para-military units' on their barracks.

The two main centres of the conspiracy against the Serbs are Germany and the Vatican (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Katoličko preureenje sveta/Catholic reorganization of the world; Javnost 82, June 13 1992, Hoće još dve države, Ubijanje Srba i istine/They want additional two states, Killing the Serbs and the truth; Javnost 99,

October 31 1992, Zlo dolazi utabanim stazama/Evil comes along beaten paths). The Vatican proposed Vesna Bosanac and Djuro Njavro from Vukovar for the Nobel prize for peace, which means that the Catholic Multi-national helps sadists who in fact deserve the "Nobel prize for death" (Javnost 75, April 4 1992, Nobelova nagrada za smrt/Nobel Prize for death). Javnost wonders whether Pope John Paul II is a human being or an evil clad in papal robes (Javnost 78, May 16 1992, •ovjek ili •avo pod papskom odorom/A man or an evil clad in papal robes). The Holy See allegedly maintains that the Serbs should be outlawed, and increasingly bigger hatred is stirred against the Serbs. John Paul II has asked UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to use all available means to realize the wishes of the Vatican, while the Pope's representative in OSCE has demanded that the culprits for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (i.e. Serbs) be exposed before the eyes of the world public. The Pope mobilizes spiritual force for the military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the detriment of Serbs. The Vatican dreams about occupying Serbia. An anti-Orthodox agreement between Catholics and Muslims is being worked out behind the Vatican walls supported by the Pope. The Vatican organizes a prayer for the destruction of Serbs (Javnost 86, July 11 1992, Molitva za uništenje Srba/Prayer for the destruction of Serbs).

As regards Germany, Javnost writes as follows: "Today's Germany is only apparently a democratic country, while in essence it is a pseudo-democratic country in which freedoms are limited by a special kind of dictatorship" (Javnost 75, April 4 1992, Centar zavjere – Njema•ka/Germany – the center of the conspiracy). Modified variants of Fascism have been appearing in Europe. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the EU and the US want to drive Serbia, once again, into a conflict with the Serbs outside Serbia, this time with the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is evident from OSCE declaration and from the message by the US. It clearly follows from this that the keys to peace and war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are in the hands of Izetbegovi• and his western sponsors. In short: the Vatican-German coalition splits the Serbian ethnic territory. Even Warren Zimmermann (the ex-US ambassador in Yugoslavia) reportedly said: "We will soon be tearing Serbia apart like macaroni" (Javnost 96, October 3 1992, Organizacija poraženih nacija/Organization of defeated nations; Javnost 98, October 24 1992, Ostvaruje li se recept dugotrajnog ratovanja/Is the formula of protracted war being realized?).

The party to the conspiracy are also Muslim countries, for whom Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a big Islamic experiment (Javnost 83, June 20 1992, Svetski islamski experiment/Global Islamic experiment; Javnost 86, July 11 1992, Etni•ka bomba za Evropu/Ethnic bomb for Europe; Javnost 100, November 7 1992, Oružje na mala vrata/Weapons through the back door; Javnost 103, December 5 1992, Udar po civilizaciji/An attack on civilization). The west in general is also involved, and it prepares for the military intervention against Serbs even though the Serbs are the

victims of the genocidal war waged against them across the whole territory of ex-Yugoslavia. "Today when the whole educated world is against us wanting to wipe out all traces of the Serbs on the planet, you (Serbian soldiers in Herzegovina, MM⁷) are the future pride of a new, more just world that will be ashamed of having been on the wrong side of history" (Javnost 95, September 19 1992, Više od metka, plašimo se pjesme/We fear a song more than a bullet).

Javnost also participates in counter-propaganda by which we mean the criticism of other Yugoslav and foreign media coverage and polemicising with their viewpoints. The presumed lack of understanding of the 'Serbian question' on the part of other countries could be condensed in one question posed by Javnost, namely: "does the world care about the truth at all?" (Javnost 72, March 14 1992, Krojenje tupim makazama/The tailor uses blunt scissors) The real and the media war is waged against the Serbs – "modern versions of Goebbels perform their tasks and designate Serbs and Serbia using Bolshevik epithets" (Ibidem). Lies are being disseminated under the pretence of truth, while certain journalists do not miss any occasion to spit out their hatred towards everything that is Serbian, without giving arguments or citing sources (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Nastavlja se teror nad Srbima/Serbs continue to be terrorized). Some people use pressures, blackmailing and media torture to influence the conscience of those people who see Yugoslavia as their only home country (Javnost 74, March 28 1992, Okrutnosti bosanskog kruga/Cruelty of the Bosnian circle). According to the Croatian media, Croatian forces liquidated the gang of Chetniks, unarmed civilians in fact; Serbian-Communist soldateska⁸ were killed at the frontline, rather than JNA troops. The latest product of the propaganda war has thus been born (Javnost 75, April 4 1992, Ritam zločina/The rhythm of crime). According to Javnost, once disinformation is successfully placed, denial is a job for the naïve.

The world media are called by Javnost to end the satanization of the Serbs (Javnost 76, April 26 1992, Zaustavite satanizaciju Srba/Stop the satanization of Serbs), while domestic (Croatian and Muslim media) are called to stop publishing "lies", for example, that "the aggression has been committed against our sovereign country" (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Nastavlja se teror nad Srbima/Serbs continue to be terrorized). Bosnian politics stands behind "one of the most cruel armies in the

⁷ When a point is required to be expanded or clarified the authors have in brackets noted their initials (MM or SB) and then their comments.

⁸ A derogatory term that roughly translates as a "mob of soldiers".

history of the propaganda war - Radio Television Sarajevo. It is armed to the teeth, it is ideologically and politically differentiated down to the most miniscule national particle, and it elevated to unimaginable heights its product - war horrors in Bosnia-Herzegovina" (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Legalizovanje tuđe i sumnjive vojske/Legalization of suspicious foreign forces).

The Eurovision exchange service in Geneva is accused of not wanting to accept a report about the slaughter of Serbs on Kupres (Javnost 78, May 16 1992, Ostaće zapisano/It will stay in the records). They rejected it for fear that the truth will come to light. Even Radio Belgrade is accused that in its commentaries it suggests that "Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina should have immediately acquiesced to death" (Ibidem). The Serbian media are blamed for censorship so in Belgrade itself the truth about their own nation is suppressed (Javnost 103, December 5 1992, Novine najcrnjeg naroda/The newspapers of the worst nation). Some Serbian journalists failed to realize that they should stand by their own people (Javnost 83, June 20 1992, Vodi se vjerski rat/This is a religious war).

The Vatican propaganda fully supports those who, stimulated by the EC and others, stirred the flames of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Radio Vatican leads the way and through its program for Catholics in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina it incites people against the Serbs, while its propaganda is increasingly stronger, its hatred increasingly more virulent, and its pointing at Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina increasingly more expressed (Javnost 78, May 16 1992, •ovjek ili •avo pod papskom odorom/ A man or an evil clad in papal robes; Javnost 79, May 23 1992, San o okupaciji Srbije/Dreaming the occupation of Serbia).

Javnost often resorts to classic (hard) propaganda, which is mostly verbal but often also supported by photographs. Ustashes left behind them mutilated hostages. On entering houses we saw slaughtered children and victims with their throats slit open and eyes gouged out (Javnost 72, March 14 1992, Oči zgasle na Vukovaru/Eyes closed in Vukovar). People in Sarajevo are slaughtered daily, and the only reason is them being Serbs - Sarajevo is the town of butchers. Serbs are killed and tortured en masse, and their houses are burned down (Javnost 79, May 23 1992, Ostajte ovdje/Stay here; Javnost 96, October 3 1992, Jevrejima je bilo bolje/Jews were in a better position). The refugee Serbs from Goražde are living monuments to hell. Some

cannot utter a word – just tears and cries; others have no tears to cry anymore. Javnost published twice the same photo in which, presumably, a mujahedin fighter holds a severed head. The first time it was published (Javnost 96, October 3 1992, Krvavi pir novih Osmanlija/The bloody feast of new Osmanli Turks), the photo had no caption and there was no source cited, but it was accompanied by the text saying that Serbs are impaled, that their limbs are cut off, they are slaughtered and burnt alive. The second time it was published (Javnost 106, December 26 1992, Povratak u pe•inu/Back to the cave) the source was not cited again, but there was a caption that read: "Serbian head - the trophy of a mujahedin", while the accompanying text ran: "impaling, grilling, crucifying, severing of heads, throwing men, women and children to wild animals in cages ... all of these are crimes known to the history of crimes." Another photo, showing a "mutilated Serbian soldier", was published twice (on 21 November and 12 December 1992). Both cases point to the incompatibility of texts and pictures in war reports. Serbian heroes are burnt at stakes. "Skulls and parts of bones poke out from under the pile of burnt logs" (Javnost 100, November 7 1992, Loma•a za junake/Stake for the heroes).

Given the context of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and taking into account known facts, it seems that propaganda performed by Javnost includes routine lies as well, particularly about individuals and activities of the opposite side. For example Ejup Gani• is said to have ordered the killing of Alija Izetbegovi• over the radio waves (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Gani•: Ubijte Aliju/Gani•: kill Alija), while the latter is said to have asked for political asylum in Turkey where he intended to flee (Javnost 77, May 9 1992, Pobegao bi u Tursku/He would flee to Turkey). On another occasion it is claimed that Alija intended to flee to Switzerland. SRNA has reported through Javnost unconfirmed news that Ejup Gani• personally was in command of the forces which massacred the Serbs in Skenderija. He allegedly requested, word for word: "Kill Serbs and soldiers without mercy, skin them, roast them! The Serbian beasts will not walk the streets of Sarajevo.... Juka (Prazina, MM), now is the time to show what you know! Just wipe them out." Juka Prazina's answer presumably was: "Don't worry, chief, it will be as you said and even worse will happen to this Serbian scum...." (Javnost 78, May 16 1992, Gani•: Ubijajte bez milosti/Gani•: kill without mercy). Similarly, SRNA published the 'news' allegedly coming from Bundestag, that for four years Hans Dietrich Genscher was a spy for the East German intelligence service. SRNA has come across "irrefutable facts" that Genscher in advance promised

certain parts of Serbia and Macedonia as a gift to certain countries (Javnost 78, May 16 1992, Genšer 'poklanja' dijelove Jugoslavije/Genscher 'gives away' parts of Yugoslavia). It appears from subsequent events (Izetbegović didn't flee to Turkey or Switzerland, Izetbegović and Ganić were good and close collaborators throughout the war and after it, parts of Serbia were not given to Macedonia), that those news were lies.

Javnost presents the news of the existence of concentration camps for Muslims and Croats as the latest media bomb intended against the Serbs and persists that the Serbs do not run such camps, meaning that the international public opinion has been deceived (Javnost 89, August 9 1992, Nagrada za pronalazača logora; Medijsko ubijanje Srba/Reward for the discoverer of camps; Media killing of the Serbs). One notorious lie is that only Serbs are the victims of war and that they are forced to defend themselves, while "others" (Muslims and Croats) continually provoke and attack them.

Conclusion

Analysis showed that Javnost disseminated extensive and intense propaganda in which the messages with nationalistic, historical and religious content were in the forefront. An exceptionally important place in the spreading of propaganda was accorded to the conspiracy theory and classic propaganda techniques. The elements of propaganda presented in the theoretical introduction to this analysis, are interrelated and intertwined in Javnost's propaganda approach – the most typical are links between nationalism, history and religion, and between conspiracy, accusation and counter-propaganda. An important role is played by classic propaganda and dissemination of 'routine lies'. The propaganda messages rely on a typical pattern, which glorifies Serbs, their interests and national character, and launches the thesis that all Serbs are threatened, that they have to defend themselves and unite in a common country. In this war Serbs were presumably building a new country. Nationalism is presented as a prerequisite for democratic society. Javnost presents the Serbian nation as a holy nation. The Serbs are the victims of genocide for the third time in the twentieth century. The only solution for the Serbs lies in the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Eastern Orthodoxy is a tolerant religion, while 'Catholic clericalism' and Islam are intolerant, militant and aggressive.

The whole world plots against the Serbs, they are the victims of the emerging 'new world order', and particularly the victims of the Vatican's and Germany's interests related to the Balkans. Javnost accuses Serbia's opponents, presents them as evildoers and criminals, and in so doing it occasionally resorts to completely irrational arguments.

Serbs can no longer live together with 'others' – Muslims and Croats. The international media manipulate the public opinion, they do not care about the truth but try to 'satanize' the Serbs. Javnost attacks even the media in Serbia blaming them for not being sufficiently supportive of the 'Serbian issue', even though our previous analyses showed that at that time the Serbian media were brimming with pro-Serbian and anti-Croatian and anti-Muslim propaganda. Classic propaganda is mainly verbal but it is often accompanied by the photos of war horrors – for example, a mujahedin fighter with a severed head in his hand, a mutilated soldier, mutilated civilians, skulls and bones, burnt bodies and numerous coffins with the remains of the dead.

Propaganda messages are often accompanied by specific iconography and cartoons. The icons used for affirmative purposes are the symbols of the Serbian para-state, Orthodox religion and military symbols, with the messages reading 'Only unity can save the Serbs', 'God protects the Serbs' and stressing of Serbian military superiority. Icons with a negative prefix, which appear in corresponding contexts, are the Catholic and Islamic religious symbols and rituals, which obviously stir negative emotions in Serbs. The cartoons often include Muslim crescent and Croatian 'chessboard', occasionally coupled with European stars. Once Serbs conquered the territories they wished, Javnost started to advocate negotiations and peace hoping to formalize their military achievements in this way. In relation to this, it strictly referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 'former' or 'past' state. The term Muslims is strictly not capitalized, which conveys a message that Muslims are a religious community and not a nation⁹, or in other words, that Muslims are Serbs or Croats that were Islamicised by the Turks in the course of the several centuries of their rule in those regions.

⁹ In Serbian, the names of religions and religious communities are not capitalized.

The language used by Javnost was hyperbolic, full of exaggeration, emotional, dramatic and Manichean (black and white presentation of reality). The sources of information used were mainly Serbian and sometimes unknown. The opposite side and foreign sources were used exclusively as a basis of counter-propaganda, and served as a means to reinforce propaganda messages of Javnost.

It is practically impossible to expose the structure of the propaganda organization solely on the basis of media analysis, but it is obvious that Javnost apportioned most space to politicians, historians, artists, particularly writers and painters, and soldiers. Some of them (Radovan Karadžić, Milorad Ekmečić, Brana Crnčević, Momo Kapor, and Aleksa Buha) gave several interviews to Javnost during the period analysed here and/or contributed several articles. Soldiers are mostly portrayed as Serbian heroes (Željko Ražnjatović Arkan, Savo Dotlić Sanković, Ratko Mladić, Slavko Lisica, Miroslav Vještica), even though some of them were later indicted for war crimes.

Glas

Glas is a daily newspaper founded by the Municipal Assembly of Banjaluka. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Glas was the only daily newspaper in the region of Srpska Republika Bosnia-Herzegovina. In summer 1992 the editorial staff of Glas estimated that Glas had »a readership of several tens of thousands« (Glas, August 10 1992, Optužba bez dokaza je kleveta/Indictment without a prove is a calumny). During the war, and especially during the period covered by our analysis, Glas appeared regularly. It mostly handled local and regional issues, mainly those related to the war in the region, and to a lesser extent also wider. The newspaper is full of short reports on wartime events. Quite regularly Glas carried the interviews with politicians and officials of various ranks, while commentaries were rare. The texts are accompanied by photos. They sometimes show scenes of war, while scenes of horror are published rarely, mostly at the end of the analysed period (September 1992). Cartoons do not appear in Glas. Glas had editions in Cyrillic and Roman alphabet until mid September 1992, afterwards it was published only in Cyrillic. Our analysis includes 202 articles that appeared from 5 January 1992 to 30 September 1992.

Glas carried substantially fewer and less forceful propaganda messages than Javnost, which was analysed using the same model for the study of propaganda. Glas was also rather critical of negative phenomena in its social, economic and political

environment, and of their protagonists¹⁰. In contrast to Javnost, Glas published the viewpoints of the opposite side in the conflict, if only from time to time.

On 25 September 1992 Glas was renamed Glas srpski (Serbian Voice) and became a Republika Srpska daily (before it was an ARK daily). The change in the editorial policy as a consequence of that decision is more than evident. Scenes of war horror were published more frequently, while classic (hard) propaganda in general and accusations and discrediting of the opponents, started to prevail in war reports. The examples that corroborate this conclusion will be described in the pages to follow.

The link between propaganda and ideology is present in Glas, i.e. nationalism, religion and reinterpretation of history. An attack on the Serbian wedding procession¹¹, which could be understood as a trigger for war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was described as an "aggressive attack on Serbian dignity... The killings, wounding, and burning of the Serbian flag in Sarajevo show what lies in wait for the Serbs in the independent and unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina" (Glas, March 3 1992, Osu•ujemo zlo•in fundamentalista/We condemn the crime of fundamentalists; 02029656). As early as the initial stages of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs advocated, through the propagation of nationalism, the idea of confederative Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the Serbian nation would be sovereign within its ethnic territories and would have the possibility of connecting the Serbian part of confederation with Yugoslavia (Glas, March 15 1992, Razlike postoje razkola nema/Differences exist but there is no split, 00951918), even at the cost of war if necessary. "Bosnia-Herzegovina must be torn apart at its national seams" (Glas, March 21 1992, Nikada više zajedno/Never again together; 02029706). "Serbs must create their own, Serbian country in which Serbs will decide about their fate on their own. [...] Serbs can be neighbours with other nations, but never again can they live

¹⁰ Among other things Glas published a well-grounded suspicion that on the night between 12 and 13 June 1992 Mi•e from Tesli• have taken to an unknown place and killed more than thirty persons who were held in the Public Security Station in Tesli•. Glas criticized the judicial authorities to set them free (Glas, July 23 1992, Zloglasni 'Mi•e' na slobodi/Notorious Mi•es set free; 02112710).

¹¹ On March 2, 1992 the Serbian wedding procession was attacked in Sarajevo. One Serbian national was killed and consequently, the tensions between Muslims and Serbs in Sarajevo were growing. Next day, the barricades were erected and some rumours were spread about fighting between Muslims and Serbs. However, the war officially broke out on April 5, when

together with them" (Ibidem) The Serbian national question may only be resolved integrally and by no means partially. The situation within the Serbian nation has never been better: "today all Serbs are of the same mind" (Glas, March 15 1992, Razlike postoje razkola nema/ Differences exist but there is no split; 00951918). There is no disharmony among Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only option is a "hard-line Krajina option". Krajina is a "Piedmont" of Serbian people (in the second half of the 19th century the Italian provinces united around Piedmont to form the Italian state, MM), and the capital of a new country should be Banjaluka (Glas, July 24 1992, Banja luka mora prevazi•i sebe/Banja luka must surpass itself; 02112713; Glas, July 25 1992, Srbi se moraju ujediniti/Serbs must unite; 02112717; Glas, August 3 1992, Zahtjevi bez pokri•a/Unsecured demands).

Glas suggested that for the third time in this century the Serbian people face big trials and big dangers. The nation is again threatened with spiritual and physical extermination, while its biggest enemy could be 'disharmony among Serbs' rather than an external enemy (Glas, June 23 1992, Za slogu i jedinstvo Srba/For the harmony and unity of Serbs, 02112591). Obviously, the main goal of the Serbian political and military elites in July 1992 was to establish borders of the "republic" and defend the "liberated" territories. As early as August, they began to advocate peace and agreements about borders, because they were evidently satisfied with what they "liberated". In September, they wanted to establish 'a state without frontiers' with Knin Krajina, and they signed a Protocol on common educational, health, procurement, information, fiscal and tax systems. They also wanted to have the same political systems and 'state symbols' (Glas, September 25 1992, Država bez granica/State without frontiers).

Glas also reinterprets history and draws parallels with the present describing in details the plans by the Independent Croatian State (NDH) during WWII to exterminate Serbs: one third should be killed, one third converted to Catholicism, and one third deported to Serbia. During WWII there were reportedly around 500 sites of Ustashes' crimes against Serbs in the Krajina region with 80,000 Serbs killed there altogether. A number of them were killed in concentration camps in Croatia. Serbs were tortured and killed in 700 ways. Around 250,000 Serbs were converted to Catholicism with the blessing of the Vatican and Catholic clerics. By making historical parallels, Glas transposes the experiences from WWII to 1992: The crimes were committed by Ustashes, the name that Serbs use in 1992 when referring to Croats. The main thesis behind this reinterpretation and exaggeration is that the referendum

an accelerating spiral of violence prompted President Izetbegovi• to mobilize Territorial Defence Forces (Maleši• 1997: 21).

on independent and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be just, because many who were killed during WWII cannot cast their vote while those converted vote contrary to the will of the Serbs (Glas, March 15 1992, Referendum i genocid/Referendum and genocide; 02029694; Glas, March 16 1992, Krajiški kamen me•ac/Krajina's boundary stone, 02029698).

Glas writes: "By celebrating Vidovdan the Serbian nation returns to its history and traditions. It reminds us of the bright moments in Serbian history, ranging from Kosovo, where the Serbian knights wrote in their own blood the oath of the Serbian nation to always defend Serbian sacraments (the battle at Kosovo polje was the biggest military defeat in Serbian history, MM), through Karadjordje's Topola and Gavrilo Princip, the hero (Gavrilo Princip assassinated Franz Ferdinand, which was the event that marked the outbreak of WWI, MM), to the present day. The star of Fascism and obscurantism again forced it (Serbian nation, MM) to close military ranks and defend its freedom and human dignity with arms" (Glas, June 29 1992, Prva generacija/The first generation, 02112 613).

The messages with religious content have also found their place in propaganda activities of Glas. It carried parts of the interview given by Radovan Karadži• to Novi Sad's Dnevnik. "The Serbs are the European ramparts of Christianity". Among other things, Karadži• supports the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina saying that all three constitutive nations should exercise power within their respective territories (Glas, March 16, Srbi na braniku hriš•anstva/Serbs are the ramparts of Christianity; 02029697).

Glas accuses Croatian religious authorities of converting Muslims in Croatia, which prompted protests by the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Catholic Church continued with these activities nevertheless (Glas, July 18 1992, Podsticanje ratne opcije/Encouragement for the war option; 02112693). On the contrary, what is most detrimental for Serbs is their religious relaxedness and their decades long alienation from Orthodoxy which is the only unifying spiritual thought (Glas, July 29, Analfabeti te•aj demokratije/An alphabet's course in democracy; 02112743).

On several occasions Glas carried reports on military activities of the Banjaluka corps within the Croatian territory – the protagonists in these reports refer to the occupied Croatian regions as "liberated territory", while at the same time Croatia is discredited and accused of attempting to influence the developments in Bosnia-

Herzegovina (Glas, March 5 1992, Armija ostaje u Krajini/The army stays in Krajina; 02029661). Glas also accuses the Sarajevo Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) that throughout its term in office it did nothing but arm Muslims and set up the Muslim army (Glas, March 21 1992, Nikada više zajedno/Never again together; 02029706). Alija Izetbegović calls on the Muslims to fight the "holy war" against the Serbs. In his Islamic declaration it is said that the desired order can be realized only in countries where the Muslims make the majority of the population. Bosnia-Herzegovina as a part of Yugoslavia is not such a country, but an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina would be (Glas, May 15 1992, Bosna – zemlja Muslimana/Bosnia – the country of Muslims; 02029951). The basic idea of Muslim leaders is that the Muslims must have the supreme power in Bosnia-Herzegovina in every respect, that only Sharia laws should be observed, and that all Muslims, especially fighters, will have all privileges as in the period of the Ottoman empire (Glas, July 8, Ratno huskaštvo Sefera Halilovića/Sefer Halilović's warmongering; 02112643). Izetbegović is described as a religious fanatic who doesn't care how many of his fighters will die as long as he can realize his crazy ideas (Glas, September 15 1992, Goražde kao pouka/Goražde as a lesson). Tudjman will fight the war in BH "until the last Muslim dies" (Glas, September 15 1992, Goražde kao pouka/ Goražde as a lesson).

The Serbs are the victims of terror. They fight against Ustashas and Fascists and not against people. Even Dante would change the content of "Hell" after this war. The place of the Serbs is in a battle against Fascism, Ustashas, Green Berets and war profiteers (Glas, July 10 1992, Stop ratnim profiterima/"Stop" for war profiteers; 02112658).

Muslim, Croatian and Albanian leaders have long since arranged for themselves spare homelands abroad. The compromise in the resolution of this conflict cannot be reached with the transformed ex-member of the Yugoslav People's Army, Franjo Tudjman, and completely non-transformed ex-prisoner Izetbegović. Tudjman transforms Croats from Slav into Germanic people (Glas, June 1 1992, Diktati iz rezervne domovine/Dictates from spare homelands; 02112471).

In the spirit of the conspiracy theory, Glas declares that Serbs are exposed to unprecedented terror, while the US and other western countries, and the block of German countries in particular, openly support this. The Serbs should finally come to

their senses and be mobilized in a struggle against genocide. The west is dominated by blindness and it invents Serbian syndrome. "Two million Serbs in (former) Bosnia-Herzegovina found themselves face to face with the whole world" ... while the campaign against Serbs has been lasting for half a century (Glas, July 17 1992, Hajka• i poslušnik/The beater and the yes-man; 02112688).

The scenario invented by America and German lobby, or rather by Catholic-Vatican connection, is decades old (Glas, July 18 1992, Podsticanje ratne opcije/Encouragement for the war option; 021122693; Glas, September 24 1992, Inat kao zanat/Spite as a trade). The most responsible for failing to detect their goals are communists who today walk freely the streets of Belgrade. All that happens to Serbs is a product of German politics implemented through official institutions and governments of Germany and Austria. For the fourth time in this century, Germans are penetrating the Balkans and occupying Serbian territories (Glas, June 19 1992, Alija nije naš predstavnik/Alija is not our representative; 02112 572).

Glas is active also in the field of counter-propaganda. Only the Muslim picture of the war is presented to the world, so it is not surprising that Serbs and Serbia are blamed for the war. According to the Muslims, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) is a terrorist organization led by an inhumane doctor who orders the shooting of innocent civilians. The end goal of this propaganda is to persuade the public that terrorism of the SDS is a true fact (Glas, April 22 1992, Potjernica za Karadži•em/Karadži• on the wanted-persons list; 02029812). Also the Slovenian "propaganda machinery" is accused of being in the service of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), but the thesis is neither elaborated nor corroborated by evidence in the article (Glas, April 25 1992, Ekstremisti ne miruju/Extremists do not rest; 02029834). In line with counter-propaganda and the conspiracy theory, Glas states: "The Catholic Church wages the campaign against the Serbs as it did countless times before. Through its media the Catholic Church attempts to provoke conflicts between nationalities in Banjaluka where some external forces are likely to be activated, ostensibly to protect the Catholic population" (Glas, July 18 1992, Podsticanje ratne opcije/Encouragement for the war option, 02112693). Glas proclaimed CNN's report on the camp in Omarska a "skilful engineering" by the American propaganda machinery, which was joined by the leading American print media (Glas, August 8 1992, Ameri•ka 'vješta' režija/American "skilful" engineering; Glas August 10 1992, Kampanja protiv Srbije/Campaign against Serbia). When Serbian civil and military authorities invited foreign journalists to show them the truth about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they turned down their invitation because they

“are obviously not interested in the suffering of Serbian people” (Glas, August 13 1992, Ne interesuje ih agresija Hrvatske/Not interested in Croatian aggression).

Serbian fighters are not intimidated by the Croatian media war. Some day in the future the victory will belong to the truth. Serbian fighters are exposed to propaganda by Croatian-Muslim defence alliance, which skilfully exploits Serbian weaknesses (Glas, May 11 1992, Borci •ista obraza/Fighters with clean hands; 02029925).

Serbian radio and Banjaluka Serbian television must be more resolute in their propaganda. The radio should repeat non-stop the news coming from the borders of Krajina, from SR Yugoslavia and the world, so that all listeners can hear them despite frequent power blackouts (Glas, June 13 1992, Pravoslavlje za šaku dolara/Orthodoxy for a handful of dollars, 02112533). Glas is used by the soldiers fighting for the “Serbian corridor” to issue a warning to the Serbian opposition democrats that they “mixed up the persecutors with the victims”, but once the “bloody corridor” is opened they will have to answer some unpleasant questions (Glas, July 2 1992, “Demokrati” nisu Srbi/“Democrats” are not Serbs; 02112629). Glas featured a general attack on Serbian intellectuals who are accused of “forgetting all about people to whom they belong”. “They are needed only by themselves and their vanities, they are easy to buy and their patriotism extends only as far as directors’ chairs” (Glas, July 10 1992, Taština nad taštinama/Vanity above all vanities; 02112656).

In the spirit of classic propaganda Glas cites the words of the Minister of Defence of Srpska Republika Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Serbs in Sarajevo are held captive at the football stadium Koševo, that they are taken blood, Serbian women are raped, people are tortured (Glas, July 7 1992, Ukinuti krizni štabovi/Crisis staffs abolished; 00951906). Glas also published stories from the concentrations camps – Serbs were forced to eat grass and to work (Glas, August 31 1992, Zarobljenici jeli travu/Captives ate grass). Civilians were exposed to torture – they were victims of jihad (Glas, September 30 1992, Civili – žrtve •ihada/Civilians the victims of jihad). On September 30 1992 (Zvjerstva mu•ahedina/Atrocities of mujahedin), Glas published a story on “bestiality of mujahedin from Saudi Arabia”, who according to the report and confiscated photos killed three Serbian soldiers and cut their heads off

(one photo is the same as published by Javnost on October 3 and December 26 1992, and shows a mujahedin with a severed head in his hands; the other photo shows three severed heads on the floor and a foot on one of them – the photo is subtitled by the names of killed Serbian soldiers). According to Glas, this is the confirmation of the destiny that was arranged for Serbian people by Izetbegović and his fundamentalists. A fortnight before, 'Ustashas' from Kotor-Varoš reportedly massacred and killed 18 soldiers, women and children. The report was illustrated with the photo of dead bodies on the truck (Glas, September 19 1992, Zločin za zločinom/Crime after crime).

Glas describes Radoslav Branić as having been one of the "most fervent advocates of the republic of Krajina" in a dispute between the "Krajina and Sarajevo options" at the end of February 1992 (Glas, March 2 1992, Dioba suvereniteta/Division of sovereignties; 00951915). In March 1992, at the meeting in Banjaluka, Branić supported the formation of the Banjaluka-Belgrade-Titograd axis, while in negotiations with the SDA and the HDZ, according to Branić, the Serbs of Krajina cannot possibly accept any alternative "because the Latins resort to alternatives as a means of deception" (Glas, March 16 1992, Krajiški kamen meć/Krajina's boundary stone; 02029698). "The occurrence of people"¹²(demonstrations for peace, MM) in Sarajevo are, according to Branić, the work of anti-Yugoslav and anti-army forces (Glas, April 9, "Događanje naroda" u Sarajevu – izrežirano/The "occurrence of people" in Sarajevo – it was stage-managed; 02029748).

Within the Crisis Staff of ARK Branić performed the role of the president of the Personnel Board and as such he carried out purges in the region, mainly based on the ethnic principle (this has been concluded on the basis of the names and surnames of replaced employees, MM), but among the victims of such personnel policy were also non-obedient Serbs. The replacements were carried out in the name of Serbian unity and resolution of the Serbian national question in Krajina. As the president of the Personnel Board of the Crisis Staff, Branić was responsible for

¹² The "occurrence of people" is a term to describe the will of the people expressed publicly, usually through demonstrations. In late eighties these demonstrations were called anti-bureaucratic revolution and were instrumentalised by the political elites in Serbia to make

“ethnic levelling” of the personnel in various companies and institutions (Glas April 21 1992, Smjene po volji naroda/Replacements in accordance with the will of people; 02029808; Glas April 30, May 1, 2 1992, Samo kadrovi lojalni srpskoj BiH/Only cadres loyal to Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina; 00951928). The armed forces were not exempted, as all non-obedient officers and soldiers had to leave Krajina immediately (Glas, April 29 1992, Ni ‘vojna igla’ bez saglasnosti Krajine/Even a “soldier’s needle” needs an approval from Krajina; 00951921). The university was not spared either: “the President of the University in Banjaluka must bring the teaching staff in line with the national structure and election results in Krajina [...] Since this is an academic institutions we have no doubts that this will be carried out in a civilized manner and in the shortest time possible - and the deadline is already passed”, Br•anin said (Glas, April 24 1992, Srpski univerzitet u srpskoj republici/Serbian university in the Serbian republic; 02029827).

What went on was a peculiar ethnic cleansing of cadres, while Br•anin excuses his deeds by a dramatic situation: “everything must be focused on the defence of the biological existence of the Serbian nation in this region” (Glas, April 28 1992, Nema popuštanja/No yielding; 02029854). On 22 June 1992 Br•anin signed a directive, in which it is stated that positions possibly exposed to the inflow of information, then positions at which social property is being protected, and all other positions [...] may be occupied by Serbs exclusively. The personnel had to confirm their Serbian nationality through plebiscite and ideologically leave no doubts that the only representative of Serbian nation is the SDS! (facsimile of the directive was published by Glas on 25 June 1992; 02112600).

According to Br•anin, certain individuals did not want to see that what was going on was a general war against the Serbs and Orthodoxy - but chameleons cannot occupy the leading positions (Glas, May 5 1992, Hitno mijenjati rukovode•e ljude/Managers to be replaced urgently; 02029881). In accordance with his human resource policies, Br•anin advocated that general Ratko Mladi• should become the leader of the Serbian Territorial Defence (Glas, May 7 1992, Masovan odziv na mobilizaciju/Massive response to mobilization; 00951924).

pressure on political leaders primarily in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro that resisted the

Despite these facts, Br•anin responded to certain objections to his conduct by asking in what way the Crisis Staff of ARK meddles with the executive power of Banjaluka authorities (Glas, June 10 1992, Ne postoji dualizam vlasti/Dualism of the authorities does not exist; 02112526). In an interview published on 13 June 1992 Br•anin states that ARK is a part of the Serbian state of Bosnia-Herzegovina but at the same time it figures as a “separate state creation”. Serbs must “liberate” the corridor leading to Knin and Belgrade, and if the rivals do not hand over the corridor, the price will be paid by the Muslim and Croatian population because it is they who are situated along this imagined route. According to Br•anin, the people of Krajina must unite with the Knin krajina in order to accomplish the “holy task” – the penetration of corridor into Serbia (Glas, June 13 1992, Prolaz ka Srbiji kao put svile/A corridor to Serbia as a silk route; 02112536).

Br•anin accuses the media from Sarajevo that they demonise Serbian nation and attack the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Sarajevo Television presents them as Chetniks and terrorists, while JNA is called the occupying army. On 8 May the Crisis Staff ordered that the media in Krajina must switch to the wartime schema. On 10 July 1992 (Kako ukloniti tragove/How to remove traces; 00951912) Vojo Kuprešanin and Br•anin attacked vehemently the editorial policy of Glas, with the replacement of its editor in chief following in the wake of this attack, even though the replaced editor was described by some as “the fighter in the struggle of Serbian people for national identity from the very beginning” (Glas, July 12 1992, Smjena pod velom tajne/Replacement veiled in secrecy; 02112687). Br•anin stated that the editorial policy must work towards unification and not breaking up of Serbs – it must work towards the affirmation of the Serbian movement for liberation and the destruction of Ustashas. One week later Glas attacked the editor in chief of Television Banjaluka. Despite pressures, Glas did not change essentially its editorial policy and it maintained a certain degree of critical distance towards the organs of the ruling power in the region. After this conflict Br•anin almost disappeared from Glas, one among the reasons being the abolition of crisis staffs (he primarily appeared in the role of a member, and later the president, of the Crisis Staff of ARK). The ministers of the government of Srpska Republika Bosnia-Herzegovina later (in August 1992) showed more tolerance with regard to the employment policy (the same rights for all

policy of Slobodan Milošević.

loyal citizens disregarding their nationality) and information (declaratively they supported freedom of press, which is, however, understood in their own way – “information provision as an integral concept” and “propaganda must have the elements of information”) (Glas, August 8 1992, Sloboda štampe kao temelj/Freedom of the press as a foundation).

General Momir Talić assumed his duty as a Commander of Banjaluka Corps on March 21, 1992. He stayed in Krajina because he could not betray nine Talićs (his ancestors, MM) “built in this land” (Glas, April 30, Maj 1, 2 1992, Vojska ostaje ovdje/The army stays here; 02029865). On April 23, he opened the exhibition “Western Slavonia in the Whirlwind of War” which began with one minute of silence in memory of those who fell in the struggle against Fascism. In his speech Talić drew a parallel between July 1941 and June 1991 when people from Krajina had to fight against Fascism and help their brothers in Western Slavonia in their struggle against Ustasha terrorism (Glas, April 24 1992, Svjedočanstvo protiv fašizma/Testimony against Fascism; 02029825). According to Talić, Serbs again struggle against Ustasha’s Fascism, and the Serbian people cannot afford to forget any more – all crimes must be well remembered (Glas, April 24 1992, Svjet ima ‘ušnu manu’/The world has “defective ears”; 02029829). Talić opposed military units outside the JNA, and he even opposed the Serbian Defence Forces (Srpske obrambene snage – SOS) (Glas, May 19 1992, ‘Strah’ od izmišljenog datuma/“Fear” of a fictitious date ; 00951930). According to Talić, Stipe Mesić announced aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croats want to occupy certain territories, particularly those situated along the main communication lines in the direction of Split (Glas, April 30, May 1, 2 1992, Vojska ostaje ovdje/The army stays here; 02029865).

In an interview published by Glas on June 15 (Istrajati u pravednoj borbi/Persevering in a just struggle; 02112548), Talić stated that the Serbian army fights for “our Republic, that is to say, Srpska Republika Bosnia-Herzegovina. It must be united as all Serbs must be. Only by being united can we win [...] The people delivered a message to themselves to persevere with the struggle and to stay united until the end”. “Serbs will endure their just struggle, they will persevere in defending the Serbian essence and Serbian nation, and in what the previous generation failed”. In an interview dated July 4 (Koridor zajedničkog života/The corridor of a shared life; 02112639), Talić stated that without unity Serbs would fall prey to those who want

to break up not only the Serbian people but Eastern Orthodoxy as well. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is war for the freedom of Serbs and by no means a religious war. His statements show that one of the military goals of the Serbian army was "to define the borders of our future country" (ibidem).

On August 19, 1992 Glas published another interview with Tali• (Humanost kao krinka/Humanitarianism as a pretence) in which he concluded that a military intervention against Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is being prepared under the "pretence of humanitarianism". The hasty and deliberate recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the thrusting of Serbs into an inferior position – they were turned from a constitutive nation into a national minority – brought about the war. Neither Serbs in Croatia nor Serbs in Bosnia wanted this war. "The question of war will eventually be resolved politically, no matter whether Alija wants it or not [...] He set a goal for himself to create a fundamentalist state with the issue of its cost or size being irrelevant." "We (Serbs, MM) must, despite everything, ensure long-term solutions and peace, because otherwise all deaths, victims and wars are in vain", says Tali•.

Conclusion

Until september 1992, Glas contained radically less propaganda than Javnost, and it was less strong as well. The language used was rather moderate with no radical exaggerations or black-and-white presentation of the wartime reality in the region of Krajina. Glas was quite critical of negative phenomena in its environment – it criticized politicians, their attempts to usurp power in wartime circumstances, defectors and those who escaped mobilization, as well as assassins and thieves among their own (Serbian) ranks.

However, this does not mean that Glas is free of propaganda. The newspaper propagated nationalistic idea of confederate Bosnia-Herzegovina in which Serbian nation would be sovereign within its ethnic territories and would have a possibility of connecting the Serbian part of confederation with Yugoslavia, at the cost of war if necessary. The thesis that Serbs are threatened is launched in the spirit of general Serbian propaganda. Specific Krajina 'nationalism' is also present. The historical dimension of propaganda came to light prevailing through Glas's attempts to draw a parallel between the events that took place in Krajina during WWII and those taking place in 1992 – according to Glas in both cases what was going on was a struggle against Usthas and Fascism. Occasionally religious differences between three nations in conflict were also used to spread propaganda.

Glas accused the opponents – Muslim leaders, Croatia, Germany, the Vatican and the US above all – of the conspiracy and it discredited them. Glas also carried counter-propaganda, which was particularly obvious in relation to Omarska camp, which was allegedly completely invented by the American media. This was related to the conspiracy theory and counter-propaganda occasionally employed by Glas. The amount of so called classic propaganda in Glas reporting was proportional to the growing impact of the political elite on the editorial policy. The iconography of the Serbian para-state, Orthodox and military iconography were almost absent from Glas. When writing about the Muslims in Bosnia, Glas capitalized the term Muslim meaning that it indirectly recognized them as a nation and did not reduce them to a religious community¹³.

A part of ARK ruling powers attacked Glas in an attempt to influence its editorial policy by exerting pressure on the newspaper to change the structure of personnel within the newspaper. Among them was also Radoslav Br•anin who is described by Glas as a personnel manager who replaced the employees in companies and institutions according to ethnic criteria in the name of Serbian unity and resolution of Serbian national question in Krajina. In addition to Glas, Br•anin attacked other media as well, because he held that the editorial policy must work towards the unification of Serbian nation. We should stress here that the editorial policy of Glas did not change essentially after the replacement of the editor in chief in July 1992, so the newspaper continued to maintain a certain critical distance towards the organs of the ruling power and did not start to spread more forceful propaganda. The real change in editorial policy and in performing propaganda occurred in September 1992 when Glas was renamed Glas Srpski and became a daily of entire Republika Srpska (the decision was adopted by the Assembly of RS and approved by the Assembly of Banjaluka Municipality, the founder of Glas). The leading employees of Glas sent a message to the public that they will fight for “truth, freedom and fatherland” (Glas, September 18 1992, •elni ljudi Glasa o odluci skupštine Republike Srpske/Leading people in Glas on the decision brought by the Assembly of Republika Srpska).

¹³ In Serbian, the names of religious communities are not capitalized.

General Momir Tali• gave three interviews to Glas during the period analysed here. He is also mentioned in reports, which occasionally included his statements. In these public appearances Tali• supported the creation of the Serbian republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the unity of Serbian nation. He evaluated Croats on the basis of historical experience (Ustasha), and Muslims on the basis of religion (Islamic fundamentalism). His Command published the names of defectors from Serbian military ranks in Glas. Verbally Tali• advocated peace, while the goals of the Serbian policy he endorsed could not have been achieved without using violent means.

Kozarski vjesnik

Our analysis covers issues of Kozarski vjesnik¹⁴ (December 1991 to January 1993) that the ICTY made available to us and from this material we made a selection. From 1991 Kozarski vjesnik was an independent weekly newspaper published by a private company. The weekly had its editor in chief and editorial office, which operated Radio Prijedor as well. Until May 1992 Kozarski vjesnik was a typical local weekly. It featured editorials on the front page and had other sections clearly defined (politics, economy, culture, sport, readers' response), meaning that it carried the most important local information. The prevailing journalistic genres were local news, reports and commentaries. The newspaper also published readers' letters and their responses to current political events. Before May 1992 Kozarski vjesnik featured critical articles on the situation in the community (such were especially editorials signed by Miloš Aprilski, the editor in chief). For example, on 24 January 1992 the newspaper published a protest in the name of the readers against the obstruction of the session of the municipal assembly. »Even though this newspaper has no extra space to waste, because it competes on the market, we leave this portion blank. It is a protest by Kozarski vjesnik in the name of all people who are fed up with national and political parties' wrangles«. This introduction is followed by a blank space in place of a commentary. The issue dated 13 March 1992 featured, on the front page, a commentary by the editor in chief Miloš Aprilski entitled »A lie – another name for the truth«: »If HTV (Croatian TV), »Vjesnik« (a Croatian daily) or some other Croatian 'means of communication' announces that 'Serbian Chetnik army' violated the Sarajevo truce, we all know that it is not true; if according to the news by TVS

(Serbian TV), »Politika« (a Serbian daily) or some other Serbian »means of communication«¹⁵, the truce was violated by »Ustashe para-units', we again know that it is not true; But if Jutel (a Yugoslav television station founded by the last federal prime minister Ante Marković) (and Sarajevo TV is not far from it) announces that the truce was first violated by Serbs and Croats, we know very well that this, just this, is the truth. Because, for God's sake, the culprit cannot be one side only«. The article is accompanied by a cartoon which critically presents »national providing of information on the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina«.

Our analysis showed that until 29 May 1992 Kozarski vjesnik was an independent weekly which critically analysed political situation in the community. The newspaper was open to the expression of opinion, meaning that it ensured the plurality of political views and opinions.

The text 'independent weekly' in the title line was first replaced with 'wartime edition' on 29 May 1992 (the same text appears in all subsequent issues analysed here). The organizational structure of the newspaper changed too. The position of editor in chief was discontinued (the previous editor in chief was henceforth cited only as a member of the editorial board, while Muharem Nezirević, the previous editor in chief of Radio Prijedor, initially appeared as a member of the editorial board, but from June 1992 his name was no longer mentioned). Obviously, the editorial board was nationally homogenized, or in other words, ethnically cleansed. Not one of the articles in the first wartime issue (in contrast to the articles in "pre war" issues of Kozarski vjesnik which are analysed here) was signed by a journalist or the editor in chief (in case of editorial) – all were signed by the Crisis Staff and the Municipal Secretariat for Information. Most of other content is similarly unsigned.

Throughout the period from 29 May to the end of December 1992, the editorial policy was steered by the Crisis Staff and Secretariat for Information, meaning that Kozarski vjesnik was taken under political control.¹⁶ Officially the ruling power

¹⁴ In the issues of Kozarski vjesnik analyzed here Momir Talić and Radoslav Branić were not mentioned.

¹⁵ The author uses two slightly different terms, namely 'sredstva priopćavanja' for Croatian means of communication and 'sredstvo informisanja' for Serbian ones, to stress the difference between the two languages.

¹⁶ U prvom ratnom izdanju Kozarskog vjesnika (29. maj 1992) su svi članci signed by the Crisis Staff and the Municipal Secretariat for Information. Preuzimanjem kontrole nad uredničkom politikom

maintained that the media were not subject to censorship. On 14 August 1992 Minister Velibor Ostojić organized a meeting with a group of foreign journalists in Prijedor where he said that "in the area of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina there is no, and there will be no, censorship of newspapers and radio, but the full freedom of expression is observed. However, said Ostojić, please send a copy of a newspaper with your article about Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Ministry of Information" ("Bez ratne cenzure"/"No wartime censorship", 14 August 1992, no author).

Our analysis of propaganda covers the entire first copy of the wartime edition and selected subsequent articles (approximately 80 of them until the end of 1992) that contain the elements of propaganda expressed in any form (through texts or graphics). In our analysis of Kozarski vjesnik we found the following elements of propaganda: the presence of nationalistic ideology, relationship between propaganda and religion, (re)interpretation of history, (ab)use of language and symbols, accusations of the opposite side i.e. ascribing responsibility for war to the opposite side, discrediting of the opposite side, labelling of the opposite side, routine lies and hard propaganda.

1. Nationalist ideology rests on attempts to prove that Serbian national character, Serbian nation ("in this war against the Serbian nation it is the biological existence that is defended for the third time"), their living space, physical existence, religion, values and language are under threat. In our example, all of this is linked to the conspiracy theory according to which Serbs/Serbian national character is threatened by "tito-historical ruling circles", "Catholic mafia" and "clerical Fascist forces" which are getting ready for a new crusade against the heavenly Serbian nation. Or, to put it differently, Serbs are threatened by the interests of the Catholic International that may be easily identified as another attempt by the Vatican, similar to those in the past, to penetrate the very heart of Eastern Orthodoxy. ("Istina i propaganda"/Truth and propaganda, unsigned, 25 September 1992).

"Serbian people raised Ustasha orphans together with their own. Only now it is clear why godfather-Tito was a godfather to all Shiptars (Albanians in Kosovo, SB) and Muslims who had ten or more children. (...) the new country, recognized even by the

časopisa postavljen je jedan od temeljnih uvjeta za uspješno sprovođenje propagande. Tako je Kozarski

United Nations, was created in bed, in the gloom of backwardness, primitivism, laziness, but with a distinct dream about medieval state in which our sisters and brides would have to go through harem bedrooms (...) After several genocides and several deceptions by the Slav brothers (...) Serbian nation, like a wondrous bird phoenix, freed the folded wings of its consciousness to rise anew" ("Kuma-Titini "mir" i blagostanje"/Godfather-Tito's "peace" and prosperity, unsigned, 19 June 1991).

Muslims hence threaten the very essence of the Serbian nation. To live with them in a common state would mean to consent to a "jihad state or theocratic jamahiriyah¹⁷" ("Ko su Muslimani po Izetbegovi•u"/Who are the Muslims according to Izetbegovi•, unsigned, 19 June, 1992, italics our). Therefore the struggle against such a state is a "life-and-death struggle", an eternal struggle, a struggle for mere survival in which all means are justified. Such an enemy cannot be conquered simply by being destroyed militarily. Such an enemy is a pure evil and it must be exterminated. "The same as in 1875, 1808, 1912, 1914 ... The same had to happen in 1991, and in this year – 1992. Whenever Serbs confronted their enemies they behaved like El Greco's Christ who embraces the cross on which he is going to be crucified" ("Naši paradoksi i apsurdni"/"Our paradoxes and absurdities", unsigned, 19 June 1992).

"And it started five or six centuries ago, when Asiatic, Osmanli-Seljuk ghost penetrated the Balkans contaminating these regions for ever and thrusting them backwards (...) The beginnings of the decomposition and disrooting of the Serbian national character coincided with the decomposition of Dušan's Empire, the most powerful state of Serbs, Greeks and Albanians (...). After subjugating many, Turkey sowed only graves (nowhere else in the world is death so complete and miserable as in Muslim graves), epidemics and devastation of all kinds (...) Two opposed worlds, cultures, mentalities and characters are being established and shaped out of the people divided in half" ("Islamizacija – najbolnije raskorjenjivanje

vjesnik postao "službeno glasilo" za širenje propagandnih poruka lokalnih vlasti.

¹⁷ Jamahiriyah or jumhuriyet is a word of Arabic origin meaning 'republic'. The language spoken in Bosnia contains a number of words of Turkish and Arabic origin used in everyday speech. However, such colloquialisms in an article like this, where words of Turkish or Arabic origin are rare, have a derogatory meaning.

srpstva"/"Islamization – the most painful disrooting of Serbian national character, unsigned, 10 June, 1992).

2. A strong propaganda effect is achieved by (re)interpreting history and drawing historical parallels between wars in these regions. Everything that happened in the past is used as an interpretative network within which the present events should be understood. For example, Kozarski vjesnik featured a series, once again unsigned, in which testimonies of the prisoners of Kerestinac camp were presented. Kerestinac was a notorious Ustasha's concentration camp in Independent Croatian State (NDH) during WWII in which Jews, Roma, Serbs, and Croats were killed. The series describes events of 1992 ("No•ni ples uz ustaške pjesme"/"Night dancing accompanied by Ustasha songs", 29 May 1992): the same concentration camp (only fifty years later), the same prisoners, the same torture methods...

3. When labelling, propaganda is primarily focused on moral discrediting of the leading figures of the opposite side (we have observed both the elements of national ideology and of religious propaganda). Haris Silajdzi• is named effendi¹⁸, hoja, and Muslim Kennedy, Alija Izetbegovi• is a fanatic leader, a political puppet whose strings are pulled by Ejup Gani•i's¹⁹ foreign mercenaries, Bosnian sultan, Aljo, Julia ("Romeo Tu•man and Julia Izetbegovi•"), Irfan Ajanovi• is a travelling salesman, and Juka Jusuf Prazina is Alija's prison mate and his newly produced 'asker²⁰ and a butcher from Sarajevo (29 May 1992).

During the power seizure and immediately after that the major part of propaganda concentrated on discrediting Muslim high officials in the town of Prijedor, above all Mirza Mujadžić and Muharem •ehajić. The majority of these elements of psychological warfare are found in the communiqués by the Secretariat for Information, which were published as unsigned articles. These articles include claims (uncorroborated by evidence) that Mujadžić and •ehajić were stealing and smuggling hard currency and weapons. The lack of evidence is explained by a conspiracy (a

¹⁸ This word of Turkish origin, which is primarily used as a title of respect (in the sense 'master'), is in Bosnia used to denote a Muslim priest or a Muslim with religious education.

¹⁹ An 'i' added to 'i•', a typical ending of Serbian surnames, alludes to the typical Albanian surname ending in 'iqi' (pronounced the same as 'i•i'), that is to say, it alludes to the Albanian origin of Ejup Gani•.

conspiracy of Muslims aimed at destroying everything that is of Serbian origin). "Among his other virtues, Mirza Mujadžić had a pronounced feeling for transactions in hard currencies. Numerous stories about the machinations of his clique have not yet been confirmed, but it is already known that mister Mujadžić was the only member of the SDA (...) leadership who had keys to the safes in which were kept contributions by Muslims from western countries (...) Elvedin Rizvan, the owner of "Bosna" bar, was one of the organizers of armament, and many others performed the same task, among them hoje (italics ours) (...) A special story and delicacy of SDA were kidnappings and planned killing of Serbs. It is known that the preparations for the attack on Prijedor included plans for many kidnappings. The targets were the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party, SB) politicians and even their children, as well as some directors from Prijedor" ("Devizne transakcije Mirze Mujadžića"/"Mirza Mujadžić's transactions in hard currency", unsigned, 19 June 1992).

"Documentation, admittedly incomplete, that sheds some more light on the provision of finances for the SDA and purchase of arms, has been discovered. As a matter of fact, more than 100 houses owned by Serbs, mostly those of some value, were sold for 100,000 Deutchmarks with the provision that the new owner gets the house only after the SDA comes into power. It is not hard to imagine what destiny awaited the real owners of these houses" ("Pakleni plan Muslimanskih napada"/"The diabolic plan of Muslim attackers", unsigned, 12 June 1992).

4. The primary aim of the first wartime edition of Kozarski vjesnik (29 May 1992) was to justify the seizure of power by attributing blame for future events to the opposite side. According to such redefinition of events, the responsibility for war lies with 'them' (Muslims, Croats) who were getting prepared for war for quite some time, while 'we' (Serbs) only defended ourselves. In this imposed war Serbs (we) had no other alternative but to defend themselves by all available means. Accusation of the opposite side ("they started it, not we") is an effective mechanism of propaganda employed to mobilize one's own public.

"In the village of Belašići, in one of the numerous dugouts above Kozarac, the members of the army of Srpska Republika Bosnia-Herzegovina yesterday captured Bećir Medunjani, another member of the War Staff of Sanska-Unska region of Alija Izetbegović's army. His older son Anes and wife Sadeta, and Suad and Fehim Trnjanin, members of the Crisis Staff of Kozarac, were also captured (...) During the

²⁰ A local word for a soldier derived from Turkish.

arrest a number of documents and weapons were seized, then one Winchester belonging to Be•ir Medunjani who has been declaring himself a big peacemaker during the past years" ("Uhapšen Be•ir Medunjani"/"Be•ir Medunjani arrested", unsigned, 10 June, 1992). This short news is accompanied by a photo, in which five people on their knees are surrounded by five armed soldiers (some not in uniforms).

"Some attackers remained hidden in mosques after the prayer waiting for the attack to start, while others hid in the ovens of private bakeries (...) The goal of this group of extremists was to take over the radio station in order to create panic among soldiers and especially among citizens by broadcasting disinformation (...) On the night before the attack, the police patrol noticed a woman digging something at the spot where gardens meet the park. The policemen on patrol did not pay attention since the digger was a woman, and in addition, they were keeping in mind the fact that additional tensions between people should be avoided. However, they were soon bitterly disappointed. What was dug out in the park was a trench for the battle and it was used by a Green Beret sniper who was silenced only several hours later" ("Kako je bio organizovan napad na Prijedor"/"How the attack on Prijedor was organized", unsigned, 19 June, 1992).

5. The technique of frightening was used to demoralize the opposite side. Muslims must be convinced that everybody abandoned them (including their leadership, army, Europe, and the world). When coupled with threats with (and rumours about) physical torture, the terrain for psychological and subsequently ethnic cleansing was ready.

"Muslim people, do not be deceived. No European Community and no Sixth Fleet can stop the developments around here. All trump cards are in your hands. Surrender your weapons. Cooperate with the official bodies of the ruling power. Do not play with the army. Free yourself of extremists among your ranks". ("Okanite se ekstremista"/"Get rid of extremists", The Municipal secretariat for Information, 29 May, 1992).

6. The media and propaganda war is being waged against Serbs. ("Why so many people turned their back on Serbs? Because of the poorly handled media war.") (...) What should Serbs do in such a situation? They should recognize finally

that the global information war is being waged against them. This is the war that has not been declared, as the only thing that all of these newspapers that published the saddest and the ugliest details of our tragedy did not do, was declare the war that is waged against us. Serbs must stop lamenting that they are not understood and that their truth cannot find expression. They must finally swallow the bitter pill of recognition that the truth in the media is just one among the news, as is a lie. ("Tre•i svjetski medijski rat – protiv Srba"/"The third media world war – against the Serbs", unsigned, 4 September 1992).

7. The examples of routine lies and hard propaganda. In August 1992 the "Readers' response" section featured the text entitled "The two faces of the civil war – from the perspective of a Serb woman" (signed N.M.) "What a number of children's lives have been taken in the most cruel way (the most recent and painful example is one from Sarajevo zoo where children were even fed to tigers in cages)". ("Muslimani su nas opet iznevjerili"/"Muslims betrayed us again", N.M, 28 August 1992). The letter is signed by initials so in a way it ensures the 'authenticity' of the author's opinion. At the same time it serves as the voice of the public. The story itself is probably the most widely known case of hard propaganda during the war in ex-Yugoslavia. The story was first published by TV Pale as a commentary by the journalist Risto •ogo and later interpreted and reinterpreted many times. In addition, this was the story that, whenever it appeared in the media, served to dehumanise the Muslim side.

Another example is a story published towards the end of October 1992 at the time when the world was confronted with information and pictures of Serb-controlled camps. The author of this article uses the name of well known public figures, among them politicians (Zlatko Lagumdžija), sportsmen (Mirza Delibaši•), and musicians (Safet Isovi•), claiming that they are the managers of the Muslim-controlled camps in which Serbs are held and tortured. All three public figures mentioned above were known for their pro-Yugoslav views and their support of the civil state. "There are 170 Serbs held in the safe of the Privredna banka Sarajevo (Business Bank Sarajevo). The members of the HVO unit called Kvadrant, who guard this camp, call this camp a torture house for Serbs. The commander of the unit is Zlatko Lagumdžija, a member of the government of the so called BiH... The manager of the concentration camp in Zetra, where around 1500 Serbs are held (300 killed up to

now), is Safet Isović, a singer and a deputy... Another impressive fact is a number of brothels across the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which Serb women and girls satisfy tired and 'courageous' Green Berets and [Croatian] warriors. Mirza Delibašić, the internationally renowned basketball player, runs a brothel located within the premises of the Faculty of Civil Engineering, with around 100 women of Serbian nationality working there..." ("Zatono oko 50, a ubijeno preko 10 hiljada Srba"/"50 thousand Serbs held captive, and more than 10 thousand killed", Živko Eim, 30 October 1992). In August 1992 Kozarski vjesnik featured an article (signed by initials only, it was a reader's letter), in which the author claims that the camps were a manipulation concocted by the western media. "Such an example was Trnopolje in the case of which they could not believe that people were going home, for a swim, and to do some work in their gardens... This picture was circulated around the globe thus directly disproving the true facts, even though the man was not any thinner when he came to the shelter (a picture of an extremely thin man squatting and eating) ("Kome je još do istine stalo?"/"Does anybody still care about the truth?", N.R., 28 August 1992).

Another example of hard propaganda is the news about the arrest of a doctor "who when interrogated admitted his crime without a pang of consciousness or shame, saying that he was only sorry that he started too late. What he actually has done is more than a crime. He castrated baby boys just born to Serbian parents, induced abortions and sterilized women of Serbian nationality ("Doktor monstrum"/"A monster doctor", unsigned, 26 June 1992).

The next example is a case of hard propaganda that exploits the photo commentary ("Simboli ustaške demokracije"/"The symbols of Ustasha democracy", 10 June, 1994). The framed caption reads "Instead of a commentary" while the photo shows the crucifixion with a knife, gun and hand grenade under it.

Conclusion

Our analysis showed that until 29 May 1992 Kozarski vjesnik was an independent weekly which critically analysed political situation in the community. The newspaper was open to the expression of opinion, meaning that it ensured the plurality of political views and opinions.

The text 'independent weekly' in the title line was first replaced with 'wartime edition' on 29 May 1992 (the same text appears in all subsequent issues analysed here). The organizational structure of the newspaper changed too. The position of editor in chief was discontinued (the previous editor in chief was henceforth cited only as a member of the editorial board, while Muharem Nezirević, the previous editor in chief of Radio Prijedor, initially appeared as a member of the editorial board, but from June 1992 his name was no longer mentioned). Obviously, the editorial board was nationally homogenized, or in other words, ethnically cleansed. Not one of the articles in the first wartime issue (in contrast to the articles in "pre war" issues of Kozarski vjesnik which are analysed here) was signed by a journalist or the editor in chief (in case of editorial) – all were signed by the Crisis Staff and the Municipal Secretariat for Information. Most of other content is similarly unsigned. Kozarski vjesnik became a "mouth piece" of official Serbian politics.

In our analysis of Kozarski vjesnik we found the following elements of propaganda: the presence of nationalistic ideology, relationship between propaganda and religion, (re)interpretation of history, (ab)use of language and symbols, accusations of the opposite side i.e. ascribing responsibility for war to the opposite side, discrediting of the opposite side, labelling of the opposite side, routine lies and hard propaganda.

Nationalist ideology was basic element of propaganda in Kozarski vjesnik. It rests on attempts to prove that Serbian national character, Serbian nation, their living space, physical existence, religion, values and language are under threat. In our example, all of this is linked to the conspiracy theory according to which Serbs are threatened by the interests of the Catholic International ("Catholic mafia", "clerical Fascist forces") that may be easily identified as another attempt by the Vatican, similar to those in the past, to penetrate the very heart of Eastern Orthodoxy. Muslims hence threaten the very essence of the Serbian nation. According to the arguments used in Kozarski vjesnik, Serbs can not live with Muslims in a common state. Therefore the struggle against such a state is a "life-and-death struggle", an eternal struggle, a struggle for mere survival in which all means are justified. Such an enemy cannot be conquered simply by being destroyed militarily. Such an enemy is a pure evil and it must be exterminated.

A strong propaganda effect in Kozarski vjesnik is achieved by (re)interpreting history and drawing historical parallels between wars in these regions. Everything that happened in the past is used as an interpretative network within which the present events should be understood. For example, Kozarski vjesnik featured a series, once again unsigned, in which testimonies of the prisoners of Kerestinac camp were presented. Kerestinac was a notorious Ustasha's concentration camp in Independent Croatian State (NDH) during WWII in which Jews, Roma, Serbs, and Croats were

killed. The series compares events from 1941 and 1992: the same concentration camp (only fifty years later), the same prisoners, the same torture methods...

When labelling, propaganda in *Kozarski vjesnik* is primarily focused on moral discrediting of the leading figures of the opposite side (we have observed both the elements of national ideology and of religious propaganda). During the power seizure and immediately after that the major part of propaganda concentrated on discrediting Muslim high officials in the town of Prijedor. Most of the accusation (stealing, smuggling hard currency and weapons...) uncorroborated by evidence are found in the communiqués by the Secretariat for Information. The lack of evidence is explained by a conspiracy (a conspiracy of Muslims aimed at destroying everything that is of Serbian origin). Jedan od efikasnih elemenata propagande je prebaciti krivicu za događaje na drugu stranu. The primary aim of the first wartime edition of *Kozarski vjesnik* (29 May 1992) was to justify the seizure of power by attributing blame for future events to the opposite side. According to such redefinition of events, the responsibility for war lies with 'them' (Muslims, Croats) who were getting prepared for war for quite some time, while 'we' (Serbs) only defended ourselves. In this imposed war Serbs (we) had no other alternative but to defend themselves by all available means. Accusation of the opposite side ("they started it, not we") is an effective mechanism of propaganda employed to mobilize one's own public.

At the same time *Kozarski vjesnik* used the technique of frightening to demoralize the opposite side. Muslims must be convinced that everybody abandoned them (including their leadership, army, Europe, and the world). When coupled with threats with (and rumours about) physical torture, the terrain for psychological and subsequently ethnic cleansing was ready.

We also found examples of classic (hard) propaganda and routine lies including the "story" from Srajevo zoo where children were fed to tigers in cages. The story itself is probably the most widely known case of hard propaganda during the war in ex-Yugoslavia. The story was first published by TV Pale as a commentary by the journalist Risto • ogo and later interpreted and reinterpreted many times. In addition, this was the story that, whenever it appeared in the media, served to dehumanise the Muslim side.

Television and radio

The analysis of video and audio tapes was carried out in two stages. We first reviewed video and audio tapes made available to us by ICTY (18 video tapes and 12 audio tapes)²¹ which cover the period from January 1992 to December 1992. We then excluded from the analysis the materials broadcast by radio and television stations outside Bosnia-Herzegovina (e.g. HRT and RTV Serbia), as this propaganda was primarily targeted at the public in Croatia and Serbia, that is to say, it was spread by other propaganda organizations. During the second stage we analysed broadcasts by radio and television stations situated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As our analysis showed, these were the media over which political and military ruling powers established complete control (replacements of editors and editorial boards, control over the finances and content etc.). The analysed media were directly included in preparing the public for war. In analysing the selected material we focused on the elements of propaganda defined in the study model. In addition to analyzing nationalist ideology, reinterpretations of history, historical parallels, the conspiracy theory, the use of language for propaganda purposes, political propaganda, accusations and dehumanisation of the opposite side, we also focused on the following four fields: psychological cleansing (psychological threatening of the population that preceded ethnic cleansing), forced testimonies of captured civilians and soldiers, hard propaganda, accusations of the opposite side and mobilization of the own public.

1. Psychological cleansing as an element of psychological warfare

For the purpose of our analysis we broadly defined psychological warfare as an employment of any non-lethal means designed to affect the morale and behaviour of any group for a specific military purpose. The goal of psychological war is to waken (or to destroy) the enemy through a wide set of actions ranging from diplomatic manoeuvring, economic pressure, a combination of information and disinformation, to provocation, intimidation, acts of sabotage and terrorism, cleansing of targeted territory by isolating the enemy from its friends and supporters and destroying the enemy's will to fight. The techniques used in propaganda can be many and varied,

²¹ Reviewed material includes following video tapes V0001152, V0000965, V0001853, V0001979, V0001980, V0001981, V0001983, V0001988, V0002297, V0002733, V0002735, V0001916, V0002840, V0003125, V0000103, V0001366, V0001714, V0002578 and audio tapes T0000222, T0000228, T0000506, T0000503, T0000561, T0000588, T0000589, T0000464, T0000504, T0000505.

from seeking a “scapegoat” to presenting either individuals or groups as physically and spiritually superior – from undertaking violent actions and bribery to issuing emotionally arousing rallying cries. As a form of mass communication, propaganda is based on “emotional shock” designed to motivate people and to lead them in a desired direction. People living in an atmosphere of tension, threat and constant fear are very “vulnerable” to any kind of psychological warfare. It is important to underline that the psychological war is not the result of chance events, but, it is a war that is meticulously planned.

In our case the term 'psychological cleansing' denotes propaganda techniques that are intended to create panic, fear, uncertainty and the feeling of threat among local population. Propaganda begins with the spreading of rumours aimed at various target groups living in a certain territory. We found two (in terms of psychological warfare actions) related types of spreading rumours. The rumours aimed at the population of Serbian nationality about the preparations taken by the Muslims for military actions (arming, smuggling of arms, medicines and food, preparing bomb shelters) and crimes that were planned (or already carried out) by the opposite side (massacres, eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off etc.) (V0002578). At the same time, rumours directed at Muslim population were spread, coupled with calls to surrender arms, publishing of the lists of extremists and forced gatherings. These rumours were then taken up by the media and spread as confirmed information (T0000561). Radio stations daily broadcast the messages by the Crisis Staff or the Serbian army ordering the gathering of citizens of other nationalities at specific locations. In order to arouse the feeling of threat and helplessness, the media employed the following technique: first the rumours were spread, then an official explained that these were rumours aimed at creating unnecessary panic. This was followed by messages that people should only listen to information broadcast over the radio and should behave in accordance with the instructions. In the next step mandatory gatherings of Muslims were staged and statements extorted from leading figures belonging to the opposite side were published, in which they blamed themselves for the situation and called their people to surrender (T0000561). Finally, the warnings were issued that the army would intervene to protect the lives and property of people should the opposite side reject to surrender arms and hand over extremists from among its ranks. This is a typical example of planned psychological warfare activities aimed at affecting the morale and behaviour of Muslim population for a specific military purpose, (Serbian) activities.

Reporter: ... various rumours, misinformation which sometimes raises the temperature and which has been calculated to upset the population. What do you recommend that citizens should do? Probably, perhaps, to listen to our radio because you will /unintelligible/ information?

Vlado Vrkeš: Radio Sanski Most will broadcast daily and it is the only institution charged with conveying views and information about events in the territory of the

Sanski Most municipality. I ask you to listen to Radio Sanski Most non-stop and act in accordance with the decisions broadcast on Radio Sanski Most. (...) this is a very difficult type of war with religious characteristic, with an ethnic war, a civil war and so on, it has always been difficult and such wars tend to last longer and leave deeper consequences. That is why mental preparation is necessary for everything that will happen these days. (T0000589)

- Male announcer: ... calls on a representatives of Vrhpolje, Hrustovi, Kami•ak, Kljevci and Sanica to come at 20.00 hours for an interview at the school in Tomina. They are to bring with them a list of Muslim units, a list of weapons and military equipment, the full names of the leaders of extremist groups and their whereabouts. We repeat that your villages have been surrounded and that you stand no chance in open armed conflict. Therefore, we warn you that you are to attend the meeting without delay because by doing so you will prevent the destruction of property and human life for which you will answer before a tribunal of the people. Should you fail to attend the meeting we will consider that as a sign that you have accepted armed conflict, which is what you will get. The Serbian Armed Forces Command. (T0000561)

- Muslims in temporary accommodation in Stari Majdan are to gather at the outskirts of Stari Majdan near Sanski Most at exactly 10.00 hours in accordance with the appeal sent out yesterday. Muslims accommodated in Podbrežje and Zdenj are to gather in front of the sports hall, also at 10.00 hours. The Crisis Staff. (T0000561)
- The Crisis Staff issued an ultimatum that those responsible for last night's incident were to be handed over to them by 1200 hours today. If this is not done, individual safety will not be guaranteed. For the third day, the Kozarac area is blocked. There is no traffic between the Prijedor and Banja Luka except for priority or urgent cases and the Serbian authorities are controlling everything in order to disarm the Muslims completely. The Decision on General Mobilisation is on force here. (T0000561)
- we call on the inhabitants of Pobrežje to take all their weapons and military equipment to the crossroads near the checkpoint by 1800 hours. Otherwise, we will begin bombing the settlement at exactly 1810 hours. In the event of failure to carry out the order, we bear no moral or material responsibility for the consequences of the bombing. (T0000561)
- Your opposition will force us to destroy and ravage your villages and that will mean that you will no longer be able to live along us in these areas.... (T0000561)

- The Left Bank Regional Staff hereby informs all the refugees housed in the following streets and areas: the Narodni Front area, Omladinska street, the Alagi•a Polje estate, Marije Bursa• street, Cvije Kukulja street, Prvomajska street down to zero, Rudarska street as far as Otoka, the Mladena Stojanovi•a estate and Veljka Miljevi•a area from the department store to Pobriježje that they are to assemble in front of the Narodni Front elementary school at 14.30 hours. They are to bring their things with them. Accommodation will be secured for them at Pobriježje and Stari Majdan. After 14.30 hours, apartments will be searched, we therefore warn the refugees and their hosts that no one should be hidden in the apartments. The Crisis Staff. (T000589)

An example of propaganda that represents a typical psychological preparation for ethnic cleansing is the following message broadcast by Krajina Television.

- Banja Luka Television announcer: ... it is high time for you finally to part company with the extremists who endanger your lives by sowing terror and we call on you to immediately drive out any extreme individuals who have come to your villages, as your villages could go up in flames because of them. (...) Citizens, go back to your homes, hand over your weapons and once and for all leave the extremists who wish neither you nor your children well. To all those who return their weapons, we guarantee absolute safety of their property and person«, says the appeal of the Kotor Varoš Crisis Staff. (V0001152/00917437)

2. Classic (Hard) propaganda

Hard propaganda includes stories about massacres (crushing of skulls, gouging out of eyes, cutting off of noses and ears, impaling, burning of bodies, slaughters with a knife, killing of women with the children in their arms), which evoke the events (and identical pictures) that happened during WWII. The soldiers of the opposite side are cowards (they attack from the ambush, mutilate dead bodies, kill helpless civilians, women, children and old people), they are religious fanatics without moral values (mercenaries who kill for money). Hard propaganda is based on lies, rumours and manipulated interpretations of the events. It is extremely emotionally charged – it resorts to frightening to mobilize one's own public for merciless war against the

enemy and it functions as a catharsis – the crimes they commit exonerate our crimes.

This group is mostly composed of television features by the journalist Radoslav Brankov. The first feature presents a taped conversation with wounded soldiers who explain that the Muslim side uses dum dum bullets and that Muslim soldiers are religious fanatics prepared by hojas (Muslim priests, SB) for a fight to the death. (»We found the amulet they usually wear on him, which the hoja, I mean, gives them before battle, that is, I guess it's something like an extract out of their so called Qur'an. All the soldiers wear them around their necks«. (V0001152/00917437)

The second feature was broadcast for the second time, as the presenter explained, on request of many viewers. It is about the taking over of the bodies and burying of dead soldiers (special police detachment of the Banja Luka Security Services Centre). Brankov explains that Serbian soldiers found it easier to fight than to witness the arrival of the bodies of their dead fellow fighters. The Muslim side reportedly cheated the Serbs when exchanging bodies, meaning that the Serbs got mutilated bodies of dead soldiers in exchange for live Muslims (»among them hoja's son who was not in prison at all«). »The enemy first mutilates the dead body, cuts the face, gouges out the eyes, cuts off the head and invariably asks for several live extremists /in exchange/ for the body of a dead and mutilated Serb«. The camera slowly, in close up, moves across the burnt and already decomposed bodies. One can see a mutilated head without eyes, decomposing flesh, open skull with the brain leaking out of it.

Policeman: We got our comrades back after three days. We complied with all the requests they put to us. They asked us to bring a hoja's son who had not even been arrested... And look what they returned to us – our men mutilated and burnt. And we shall pay them back. We shall remember and pay them back.

Brankov: Could you identify the dead and mutilated combatants?

Second policeman: By their uniform.

Soldier/Policeman: The lads were mutilated, their eyes gouged out, their heads set on fire, and the rest.

Reporter: They did that- gouged out eyes and burnt the heads of Serbs fighters. And so, after several days, the bodies of the dead soldiers are here today.

My best friends. (00917439/V0003125) says a deeply shaken soldier with tears in his eyes.

Another feature by Radoslav Brankov talks about the massacre that took place near Bosanski Brod. We can first hear the statements of a witness who gave his statement to radio Belgrade.

Brankov: The Ustashas killed innocent people with hammers and stones. What other objects did you find on the spot?

Voice of 2nd witness: ... a pick which was bloody. I don't know what they did with it, they probably struck them....

Brankov: In the village of Sijakovac near Bosanski Brod, the Ustashas and Croatian-Muslim paramilitary armies killed and mutilated a large number of Serbian families in recent days. The Ze•evi• family was killed at the threshold of their homes. The Ustashas slit the throats of and killed the father and the sons Milan, Petar and Vaso. The sisters, wives and Serbian mothers watched the massacre helplessly. It happened, they stayed alive. Alive, to testify about the horror today« (V0003125) This is followed by accounts given by the wife and the mother who stand in the courtyard of the house in which the crime took place. The wife of a man who was killed describes what has happened, cries and says that she could not tell to her children that their father was gone. This is followed by the interview with the mother who lost her husband and three sons.

3. "Media interrogation" of the captives

Forced confessions of the prisoners of war and captives in media are often used for propaganda purposes during the military activities. Prisoners of war symbolise other (enemy) side, they can be use as a "emotional target" for our side (as a symbolic object of our fears and anger) or as a representation of non-human behaviour of other side (prisoners of war and captives who publicly blame themselves for military actions of their own side).

In order to demoralize the opposite side and excuse their own military actions, forced statements by the captured leaders are exploited. By assuming responsibility for what their own side has done, the victims are turned into culprits. Self-accusations create the feeling of helplessness and threat.

Serbian armed forces have captured the greatest Muslim and Croatian extremist in Sanski Most, Faik Biš•evi•, who was attempting an escape from the town. This extremist will address the Croatian and Muslim people over the radio and explain the reasons why he led them to war:

Faik Biš•evi•: ... It is necessary to do this immediately, to hand in the weapons in order to prevent a continuation of the destruction of the town for which I bear most of the blame.... I recommend Alija's and Tu•man's extremists, whose greatest follower in Sanski Most is myself (he then gives the names and surnames of the like-minded persons²²).... I assure you that the Serbian Armed Forces Command, which is carrying out combat operations in Sanski Most, was forced to take such action because of our lies and cowardice. (T0000561)

Chairman of the SDA Municipal Board Redžo Kurbegovi• will address the Muslim people of the municipality: (it is obvious that Kurbegovi• reads a written statement): Although the Serbian Armed Forces have tremendous combat power, to date their operation have not been directed at the destruction of human life, as they proved... (T0000561)

Faik Biš•evi• (voice in the background: Louder! Louder!): I ask you to listen to the appeal and hand in your weapons to the Serbian Army Command where I have been for the last two days now. I have personally seen that this is the most humane army I have come across so far. .. These words of mine are my own and my eyes have been opened to the truth by the soldiers and officers of the Serbian Armed Forces with whom I have spent two whole days. Announcement written by Faik Biš•evi•. (T0000561)

The analysis also includes two features, namely an interview with a prisoner who blames Mirza Mujadži• for organizing combat activities in the region (V0001714), and

²² “Nedo Kurbegović, Mirzet Karabeg, Suad Šabić, Hamdija Hasić, Elvis Burnić, Enver Burnić, Nihad Ključanin, Ekrem Medić, Nedžad Muhić, Enis Šabanović, Ahmed Paunović, Hase Osmančević, Fahrudin Krstić, Arif Družić, Hidajet Družić, Arif Hukanović, Fikret Alagić, Muhamed Nailović, Muhamed Arapović, Mehmed Alagić, Ibro Safić, Omer Krupić, Enisa Kurbegović, Ibro Kričković, Vahid Badnjević (also known as Fajdo), Safet Avdić, Vahid Hamdanagić, Suad Čehić, Ismet Avdić (also known as Ičo) and his two brothers, ... Zahirović, Muharem Hamdanagić, Zahid Crnkić, Hamza Rekić, Fuad Kurbegović, Osman Talić, Derviš Hamzić, Elhad Talić, Bačić whose first name I don't know and who works at Luška Palanka as a leagal officer“ (T0000561)

an interrogation of the war prisoner Marko Kiki• from Odžak (V0002297). Both features exploit the statements by war prisoners for propaganda purposes. The journalist assumes the role of an interrogator and asks questions on behalf of the TV audience and his nation. The purpose of a “media trial” is the dehumanisation of the opposite side and mobilization of the own public. »We are interviewing you for our listeners and television viewers. This conversation... you have been registered through this conversation, nothing can happen to you. I ask you and appeal to you as a human being, if there is anything human in you...« (V0002297)

The prisoner mostly answers that he does not know anything about the thing asked. The story focuses on pubic hairs found among his things. He says that he collected them for months from the toilet paper used by a woman (of Serbian nationality) (03003517). Then follows the questioning about rapes. Kiki• mentions the raping of a nine-year old girl. He says that he heard about it but has nothing to do with it. The culprits, in his opinion, are the members of HOS (Vatreni konji) The journalist is not satisfied with his answer so he tries to bring him to admit the crime. Even though the prisoner does not admit anything, the journalist suggests to the audience that the prisoner lies and that there is nothing human in him, so accordingly he is not capable of taking on the responsibility for the crimes he committed.

Reporter: How many people did you rape?

Marko Kiki•: None. You /unintelligible/ can check – I didn't rape anyone.

Reporter: You were one of the people who watched these rapes.

Marko Kiki•: I wasn't there and I didn't watch.....

Reporter: OK. OK. lets skip over this. (...)

Reporter: Let's say goodbye to the listeners and viewers. /reporter and prisoner raise three fingers as a sign of farewell (V0002297 – 03003511-27)

Such media trials are the trials of a nation as a whole. Prisoners symbolize the opposing side. They are guilty because they belong to another nation, and their crimes are the crimes committed by the whole other nation. In this example the dehumanisation of the opposing side serves to mobilize the own public. One should not feel mercy for an enemy who has no human traits.

Radoslav Brđanin and Momir Talić in propaganda activity

The subject of the analysis are television appearances by Momir Tali•, Commander of Banjaluka Corps, and Radoslav Br•anin who served as the vice-president of the ARK Assembly, a member of the Crisis Staff and Minister of urban development,

accommodation and housing and civil engineering in the Government of Republika Srpska.

In his statements Momir Tali• defines the context (using propaganda techniques as nationalism and historical parallels) within which the public should interpret the operation of the Serbian Army. Tali• used the media as a part of the military/wartime propaganda machinery, as stated by a journalist in one of the features: »The general (Momir Tali•, SB) has ordered us to film you here in Odžak from every angle, because he says he is delighted with the job done by units you /colonel Novica Simi•, SB/ commanded.« (V0002297/03003509)

In his television appearances Tali• often exploited history (especially the events during WWII) and historical parallels to explain current military and political issues. The interview that was broadcast by SRT (V0001916) clearly shows that the media and politics use identical propaganda elements. The media (re)produce politicians' statements, while politicians (re)produce media reports. In the interview with Tali• analysed here, the journalist first defines the ideological context through questions (nationalism, historical parallels, accusations of the opposite side), that is to say, a context within which current events should be interpreted (Journalist: "There was no genocide in the zone of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps during the last four years like the one that happened at Kozara and Potkozarje in WWII. Is this thanks to the genetic memory of the generation which survived all this or to the readiness of the Corps?"/ V0001916- 03016723) , while Tali•, through his answers, simply reproduces the same mythological elements that serve propaganda purposes ("This generation was thought, not only by history, but by its parents and grandparents, what the Ustasha knife means, what the knife of the Turk converts means... I must confess that in 1991 I was the most afraid of 1941 with images of us being led away to the slaughter again. That is why we did not obey directives or orders, but only kept in mind, the directive of the people, the directive of our own – that we must not permit genocide" /V0001916- 03016723).

Reporter Rade Muti•: In Jasenovac, the worst place of torture and execution for Serbs and one of the largest Fascist camps where over 700.000 Serbs, Jews and Gypsies were killed, beaten to death, hanged and slaughtered in a bestial way in World War II, a commemoration and parastos (prayer for the dead, SB) for the

victims of the Ustasha genocide was held. Before tens of thousands of Serbs from all parts of the former Yugoslavia, who had come to light candles and bow to the memories of the innocent dead... present who, even if they had wanted to, could not hide their pride in being Serbs and their resolve to preserve their land and realise the centuries old Serbian dream even at the cost of another million Serbian victims, was perhaps best expressed by General Momir Tali•, Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, whose soldiers in the summer of 1991 for the second time expelled the Ustashes from this sacred Serbian spot. (V0001916)

Momir Tali•: The proud, brave and – above all – honest men from Krajina knew that they were going into a fierce battle. They knew they would be fighting the descendants of those who had slaughtered their grandfathers, fathers, mothers and infants in Jasenovac and Gradina, of those who had competed to see who would kill more Serbs, Jews and even members of other nations and in a more ghastly way. They knew this and they decided they would not allow themselves to be quietly taken away for slaughter. They knew that they dared not, could not wait, and that they had to protect the children and those unable to bear arms from the knife, which was much sharper in 1991 than in 1941. (V0001916/03016715)

Tali• often resorts to historical parallels using them to simply transpose the events from WWII to the year 1991/92. He mentions Jasenovac, and describes massacres that the population of that region went through during WWII. For Tali•, Muslims are a threat to Eastern Orthodoxy and Serbian national character. According to him, in a country with a Muslim majority Serbs would be converted to Islam, but by losing religion they would lose their history. On the other hand, Croats threaten to physically exterminate Serbs. The symbol of the Croats is Ustasha knife (kama/dagger) used to slaughter. Accordingly, the struggle against Muslims is a struggle for historical survival, and the struggle against Croats is a struggle for sheer life.

»The soldiers' strength also lies in the information that we have now acquired that we were threatened with total genocide by the Turkish converts and the Ustasha knife. There were plans, for example, only the documents found in Kozarac show that for every house someone would have the task of liquidating everybody, from children to old people«. (V0001916/03016726).

In the second interview Tali• answered questions about refugees, then about »incidents« for which Serbs were allegedly responsible, about para-military units

from Yugoslavia which fight for the Serbian side, and the mujahedin who fight for the Muslims. As regards refugees, Tali• says that they fled without reason, or in other words, that their flights were induced by propaganda («The majority of refugees have fled .. left their ... their homes for no great reason and without any threats that they could come to harm. It's the result of propaganda, and you know that civil wars are the hardest» /V0002840)²³

Reporter: There are, there are, at least, two incidents²⁴ – there are accusations concerning at least two incidents that occurred, involving refugees in this territory. One concerns the Keraterm prison, where about 150 people were killed according to some accusations. The other concerns a convoy of Muslim people travelling from Trnopolje to Travnik, via Mt. Vlaši•, where there are also accusations that people were killed for no reasons. Did your men take part in these operations and – another question concerning this issue – has the army conducted any investigation of these incidents?

Tali•: The army carried out investigation into whether any of our members had by any chance participated in any crimes violating moral principles. We established that the soldiers had not participated, and we criticised the civilian authorities for failing to inform us that the convoy was leaving, as we would have secured it and prevented any, er, disputes about the departure of the convoy....

Commenting on para-military groups arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, which are beyond control of the Army of Republika Srpska, Tali• is categorical that such groups do not exist, so there is no need to disarm them. The following is Tali•'s response to the journalist's assertion (not question) about the danger posed by the

²³ In June 1992 there was a meeting of the representatives of the Forum of Intellectuals of Islamic Community and representatives of the SDA from Banjaluka with the leading people of the town, among them Momir Tali•, when the difficulties faced daily by Muslim and Croatian population have been presented. »Even though they are continually exposed to provocations, Muslims have been avoiding conflicts. Around ten Muslims were killed for no reason, several were wounded, more than 120 were taken to unknown places, 170 business facilities owned by Muslims were destroyed, 2000 were dismissed from their jobs....« (Oslobo•enje, 26.6.1992/02053221). The refugees did not leave their homes for no great reason or as a result of propaganda activities as general Tali• said in his TV interview but because of physical threats, intimidation, fear, economic pressures and killings as he was informed during Banja Luka meeting in June 1992.

²⁴ The crimes of the Serbian side are referred to as »incidents«, which in Serbian connotes an event that happened unintentionally, by chance. In other words, it is an event for which nobody can be held responsible.

mujahedin in Bosnia-Herzegovina: »we only know what kind of soldiers they are, because by our estimate, there are up to 10.000 of them in the territory of the former BH, and they have declared this a holy war. You know very well what the jihad is, it is dangerous not only for the territory we are fighting in, it is dangerous for the world, and unless the world realises that, and the United States, Great Britain and all of Europe, they will have the jihad very soon in their own backyard. Let me conclude, we are fighting against the jihad, you have to understand that« (V0002840).

When analysing Radoslav Br•anin's television appearances we singled out those containing the elements of propaganda as defined in the theoretical model, as well as statements in which he described his idea of forced migrations, or »humane movement of people« in ARK region, to use Br•anin's own term.

Br•anin uses the elements of nationalist ideology, hard propaganda, frightening (of people belonging to both his own and the opposite side), dehumanisation and criminalisation of Muslims and Croats.

1. In Br•anin's statements nationalist ideology is linked to biological determinism which explains differences (superiority or inferiority of a nation) by genetic (innate) differences:

- I know that when we live as Serbs in the majority, we will have peace there, and those others will be able to live too. And it has been proved that where Muslims and Croats lived, there was real chaos. (V0001980, 01108384)
- I must really say that it is misleading to believe that the Croatian people have bad leadership or that the Muslim people have bad leadership. When it comes to us, their feelings of antagonism and hate come from their genes (V0001980)
- ... the Croats who where never fighters, the Muslims who knew only how to bake deserts in their own fashion, which the Serbs did not want to eat in Sarajevo (T0000506)

2. Conspiracy theory:

- There are suppositions about it, there are proofs, that Germany wants to get rid of one million Turks and they will move them to Alija's State in these provinces that they have invented. In order to get rid of the Turks, they will

give some bank loans and dirty industries. Therefore we will soon be occupied and we will disappear from this region. (V0001980/01108390)

- The leftists who are offering us again to live together must know that the obligation of the Serbs for the next one hundred years is to wipe the shoes of this non-Christian scum /unintelligible/ this country of ours.(V0001980)

3. Hard propaganda

It was through UNPROFOR and their associates that the news was broadcast to the world that people were being killed and hanged in Banjaluka. Everyone is living well and peacefully in Banjaluka. And it doesn't occur to them to ask whether we have disbanded all the camps. I was against the disbandment of the camps, but all right, I respect the decision. (V0001980/01108394)

- The shocking conditions exposed by ITN five weeks ago at this camp in Trnopolje have gone. There's no starvation, the red Cross do supply regular food, the barbed wire's gone. In fact, all these men are free to leave the camp, but they choose to stay because it's safer. (V002735/03002799-80)
- The greatest massacre was committed by the Muslim population against Serbian population, and now that same UNPROFOR is protecting the war criminals. Mr. Mladić again explained that there was a young man who had slit the throats of about 20 Serbian children. (V0001980)
- I know that the Argentines will come and that they are the descendants of the most notorious Ustashas. They will create buffer zones for a few days and allow the Ustashas to pass through every five or six days and perpetrate massacres. (...) There will be an exodus of people. (T0000506)

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4. Propaganda based on religion:

- ... "a Serbian army.... True Orthodox Serbian Army (T0000506); orthodoxy must have its counterpart to the Vatican (V0001980) and Republika Srpska from Obrovac to Moscow" (T0000506)

5. Accusations of the opposite side:

Which man from Kozara will accept a Muslim ruler? Those who put them to the knife, those who slaughtered the children and killed? (V0001980)

6. Frightening own nation (the scorched land theory, no individual guilt, we are all guilty if defeated)

- even American occupation would be better than the Islamic state; we'd better become outlaws, than allow Kozara and Grmeč to fall in the hands of Muslims; if our people say: We do not want Alija's state, well done people, I would rather kill myself in such a state than live in it; our soldiers would certainly be persecuted in Alija's state (V0001980).

»Humane forced migrations«

At the beginning of June 1992, Oslobo•enje (6.5.1992 – 02053221) featured an article in which it is said that the vice-president of ARK Assembly and a member of the Crisis Staff Radoslav Br•anin made public the list of directors »who cannot remain in their positions because of their political (in)activity«. One month later, in the article entitled »Only loyal Serbs« (Oslobo•enje, 27.6.1992 – 02053243) one could read: »from today in Banjaluka, and across the entire region of the so-called AR Krajina, the managerial positions, then positions related to the protection of social property, positions that are of importance in the functioning of the social system, and positions that are important because of the inflow of information, may be occupied by Serbs exclusively, but not any Serb – just those who, in addition to declaring themselves Serbs, participated in the Serbian plebiscite and accepted ideology which states that the only representative of the Serbian nation is the SDS. The implementation of this directive, signed by Radoslav Br•anin, cannot be disputed. The replacements are therefore automatic«. In one of his television appearances Br•anin explained the official policy of replacing all those who are not Serbs, or in other words, who are not loyal to Serbian (SDS's, SB) politics.

»In any country in the world, your first duty is to defend your fatherland. During this war, there's no place in leading jobs for people who are not loyal to Serb politics. But it's not just people in sensitive jobs who have been sacked. Practically all Muslims have lost their jobs.« (V0002735)

Reporter: For how long will Muslims from certain firms keep their home ownership, while soldiers are unable to solve their housing problems, asks Mirjana from Banja Luka.

RB: That is more of a political question and less of an expert's question. While there is still a citizen's option and those who think that they can still /indistinct/, that is how things will probably stand. We are not going to throw anyone into the street, but the Muslims who have liable for military service men /indistinct/ we give them too much even when we house them in a much smaller flat. Not even individuals will do that. I have to say again, that lawyer who is defending such people, he must be a Serb, I can see it by his name and surname. We have to say that this is a civic state and everyone has the same rights, but we must apply reciprocity. Our people are not

allowed to take more than three kilograms out of Travnik, Zenica, Tuzla and we think that a married couple of, say, Muslims should live in 70 or 80 square meters.

Reporter: What does Mr. Brdjanin think of a lady who has kept a four room apartment and she is Muslim and has three sons in the Ustasha army, it says so here. She has arrived from /indistinct/...

RB: /indistinct/ what I think, he knows what I think. There is no chance that she will stay in a four-room apartment, even if she is protected by some etc. (V0001980/01108423-4)

The idea of "humane forced migrations" (as a part of broader psychological warfare activities) was publicly justified in Radoslav Br•anin's media appearances. Giving the idea political endorsement (as a vice president of ARK Assembly and a member of the Crisis Staff) Br•anin actually created an acceptable context for fulfilling this idea in practice.

Conclusion

Our analysis of broadcasts by radio and television stations situated in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed, that these were the media over which political and military ruling powers established complete control (replacements of editors and editorial boards, control over the finances and content etc.). The analysed media were directly included in preparing the public for war. In analysing the selected material we focused on the elements of propaganda defined in the study model. In addition to analyzing nationalist ideology, reinterpretations of history, historical parallels, the conspiracy theory, the use of language for propaganda purposes, political propaganda, accusations and dehumanisation of the opposite side, we also focused on the following four fields: psychological cleansing (psychological threatening of the population that preceded ethnic cleansing), forced testimonies of captured civilians and soldiers, hard propaganda, accusations of the opposite side and mobilization of the own public.

The goal of psychological war is to waken (or to destroy) the enemy through a wide set of actions ranging from diplomatic manoeuvring, economic pressure, a

combination of information and disinformation, to provocation, intimidation, acts of sabotage and terrorism, cleansing of targeted territory by isolating the enemy from its friends and supporters and destroying the enemy's will to fight. It is important to underline that the psychological war is not the result of chance events, but, it is a war that is meticulously planned.

In our case the term 'psychological cleansing' denotes propaganda techniques that are intended to create panic, fear, uncertainty and the feeling of threat among local population. Propaganda begins with the spreading of rumours aimed at various target groups living in a certain territory. We found two (in terms of psychological warfare actions) related types of spreading rumours. The rumours aimed at the population of Serbian nationality about the preparations taken by the Muslims for military actions (arming, smuggling of arms, medicines and food, preparing bomb shelters) and crimes that were planned (or already carried out) by the opposite side (massacres, eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off etc.) (V0002578). At the same time, rumours directed at Muslim population were spread, coupled with calls to surrender arms, publishing of the lists of extremists and forced gatherings. These rumours were then taken up by the media and spread as confirmed information (T0000561). Radio stations daily broadcast the messages by the Crisis Staff or the Serbian army ordering the gathering of citizens of other nationalities at specific locations. In order to arouse the feeling of threat and helplessness, the media employed the following technique: first the rumours were spread, then an official explained that these were rumours aimed at creating unnecessary panic. This was followed by messages that people should only listen to information broadcast over the radio and should behave in accordance with the instructions. In the next step mandatory gatherings of Muslims were staged and statements extorted from leading figures belonging to the opposite side were published, in which they blamed themselves for the situation and called their people to surrender (T0000561). Finally, the warnings were issued that the army would intervene to protect the lives and property of people should the opposite side reject to surrender arms and hand over extremists from among its ranks. This is a typical example of planned psychological warfare activities aimed at affecting the morale and behaviour of Muslim population for a specific military purpose, (Serbian) activities.

Radio and television stations used also hard (classic) propaganda: stories about massacres (crushing of skulls, gouging out of eyes, cutting off of noses and ears, impaling, burning of bodies, slaughters with a knife, killing of women with the children in their arms), which evoke the events (and identical pictures) that happened during WWII. The soldiers of the opposite side are cowards (they attack from the ambush, mutilate dead bodies, kill helpless civilians, women, children and old people), they are religious fanatics without moral values (mercenaries who kill for money). Hard propaganda is based on lies, rumours and manipulated interpretations of the events. It is extremely emotionally charged – it resorts to frightening to mobilize one's own public for merciless war against the enemy and it functions as a catharsis – the crimes they commit exonerate our crimes.

In order to demoralize the opposite side and excuse their own military actions, Serbian media broadcast forced statements by the captured leaders. Forced confessions of the prisoners of war and captives in media are often used for propaganda purposes during the military activities. Prisoners of war symbolise other (enemy) side, they can be use as a "emotional target" for our side (as a symbolic object of our fears and anger) or as a representation of non-human behaviour of other side (prisoners of war and captives who publicly blame themselves for military actions of their own side).

In his television appearances Radoslav Br•anin mostly uses following propaganda elements: nationalist ideology, hard propaganda, frightening (of people belonging to both his own and the opposite side), dehumanisation and criminalisation of Muslims and Croats. According to Br•anin's statements nationalist ideology is linked to biological determinism which explains differences (superiority or inferiority of a nation) by genetic (innate) differences.

Conspiracy theory is based on the assumption that western countries (primarily Germany and Vatican), openly exploit Muslims in order to realize their objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are contrary to the interests of the Serbs. According to this theory, Germany would like to "get rid of millions of Turks and send them to Alija's country" in exchange for bank loans and dirty industry. Br•anin's statements also include the elements of classic propaganda and routine lies. When explaining the existence of the camp in Trnopolje, Br•anin (who, according to his own words, "was against the disbandment of the camps, but he respected the decision" V0001980/01108394) stated that "the shocking conditions exposed by ITN five weeks ago at this camp in Trnopolje have gone. There's no starvation, the red Cross do supply regular food, the barbed wire's gone. In fact, all these men are free to leave the camp, but they choose to stay because it's safer". (V002735/03002799-80).

The idea of "humane forced migrations" (as a part of broader psychological warfare activities) was publicly justified in Radoslav Br•anin's media appearances. Giving the idea political endorsement (as a vice president of ARK Assembly and a member of the Crisis Staff) Br•anin actually created an acceptable context for fulfilling this idea in practice.

ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Content analysis of official documents of the republic and local documents is important for two main reasons. Firstly, it reveals the 'state of mind' of the official political and administrative organs and bodies and their members. Propaganda that is spread at the meetings of these organs and bodies directly reaches only the participants and those who are in a position to read minutes of the meetings. However, these people are most often 'opinion-makers', who have a great impact on the attitudes, standpoints and opinions of 'ordinary people' they communicate with. Secondly, the substance of documents shows how individuals and institutions influenced the status of mass media through adopting decisions on financing the media, influencing their personnel and editorial policies, and through ordering the forms of their organisation and the way of reporting.

We checked the documentation that was made available to us by the ICTY and we made a sample consisted of 75 documents, pertaining to the period of time from July 27, 1991 to February 16, 1993. We thoroughly analysed all 75 documents and picked up most typical examples of propaganda and of control of mass media in Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially in the area of Autonomous Republic of Krajina, and the municipalities it consisted of. We were also interested in the activities and roles of Radoslav Br•anin and Momir Tali•. To this effect we quoted 16 analysed documents. The intention of the researchers was to establish whether there was a connection between the political activities of republican bodies, regional and local authorities, and mass media activities, or not. Content analysis of the documents reveals as follows:

1 The Council of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) released the minutes of the meeting held on October 15, 1991. Some crucial items that correspond to our model of propaganda research in general: this evening we must shed the illusion that a form of coexistence with the Muslims and the Croats can be found; nothing can be done legally with the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ); we should start a media war: an urgent proclamation, daily announcements, letters to all the media; since they (SDA and HDZ) will not revoke their decisions, I suggest that a parliamentary crisis be provoked; go for a change of policy with the aim of creating a Greater Serbia; overwhelm the public with a wave of information; we should organize militarily, especially in towns; we must call on the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to secure the bridges on the river Drina; the reactions of JNA are too slow, communications have

not been secured yet - we should draw the attention of the JNA to this; we are not well organized in the media war. (00926968)

2 Sarajevo SDS issued an order on October 29, 1991, adopted at the meeting of all presidents of municipalities and by the Presidency of the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK) and the government of the ARK. The order comprising, among other issues, a request that radio stations introduce wartime scheme and a demand that Radio Banjaluka broadcast an hour-long programme every day on the war in Croatia. (00473781)

3 In the beginning of November 1991, Radovan Karadžić made a speech on Plebiscite of the Serbian People which was held on November 9-10. The speech is full of propaganda, starting with nationalism (stressing the rights of Serbian people, but neglecting the rights of other peoples at the same time; 'let us become monks of the church, the church which is called the Serbian people', 'you belong to the same people and you want to create the same state'), reinterpretation of history ('I do not know when Serbian people have lived through moment like the one we are living today'), accusations of the opponents ('they have seized power wherever they could, and are now shamelessly doing whatever they please'; they are stealing and cheating; only distrust has saved the Serbs so far), psychological preparation for war ('there is a chance that we will fight', 'we could lose everything we have conquered in the 20th century, everything that Brčić wrote to the presidents of municipalities should be done – apply everything, we are at war!'); conspiracy theory (municipalities are not God-given – they were established to the disadvantage of the Serbian people, Muslims have a plan to conquer Bosnia).

It is also evident from Karadžić's speech that he ordered to SDS members to seize the power –'you should seize power completely and energetically. It cannot happen that a company manager is not loyal to the party where the party is in power. We cannot have a radio chairman or a newspaper editor who is not implementing the policy of the party in power. Those are state functions ... in all municipalities where we have the radio, we have power. Appoint acting editors-in-chief, and then you can carry it out. Then whoever wants to complain can do so...²⁵ The world will understand when we tell them that we will not allow the demographic picture to

²⁵ The analysis of Glas, TV and radio revealed that Radoslav Brčić strictly followed these ideas, i.e. nobody who is not loyal to the SDS policy should retain or assume important post in companies, institutions and mass media.

change, either naturally or artificially. No way, our territories are ours, we may be hungry but we will be there ... you must not sell land to Muslims. You must not! Because this is the fight to the finish, a battle for living space'. There is also political propaganda presented in his speech: 'What is important for us is that the plebiscite goes off with dignity and in good spirit, the way Serbs can do it, like gentlemen, so that we have a maximum turnout in this plebiscite. You should apply all tactics, all propaganda, take all prominent people, hold rallies before this, before the plebiscite'. The JNA is on the Serbs' side, as well: 'There will probably be more discussions and questions concerning the army. The army is here. By chance, their aims and our aims coincide one hundred per cent'. (01906884)

4 On December 19, 1991 SDS released the 'Instructions for the organization and activity of the organs of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances'. The instructions should enable Serbian national community in BH to implement the plebiscitary decision of the Serbian people in BH to live in one state, and enhance the preparedness of the Serbian people and their readiness to defend their interests. Among other things, the municipalities should form the crisis staffs and it is evident that SDS wanted to seize the police and military related powers in municipalities where the Serbs were the majority of population. In other municipalities Serbs were requested to form parallel power bodies. In both cases, municipalities are instructed to 'intensify information and propaganda activities in order to provide the Serbian people with timely and complete information about the political and security situation in the municipality and beyond'. (00184274, original document)

5 The Official Gazette of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, released on January 15, 1992, shows implicitly that the newspaper "Javnost" was regarded as 'the Serbian people gazette'. The para-state had its Minister of Information. The Official Gazette requested the Club of Serbian Deputies to the Assembly of the SR of BH to institute proceedings in the Assembly for division of property in the common mass media and for the establishment of separate radio and TV channels. 'The Serbian share in the common mass media provides a basis for creating a Serbian Radio and Television in BH which would broadcast objective, truthful and fair information about its own people'. This was an attempt to provide propaganda with all necessary media infrastructure. (00921243)

6 On January 27, 1992, the Official Gazette of the Serbian People in BH released the Declaration on the proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the introduction to the Declaration there is a lot of propaganda using historical context ('despite the cruelties of fascist occupiers and the ghastly genocide carried out against them in WWII by the puppet regime of the NDH /Independent State of Croatia/, the Serbian people opted for ... federal state'; in

some areas of BH, 'Serbian people are now a minority due to the genocide carried out against them in WWII'), accusations and conspiracy theory ('irresponsible and selfish secessionists, motivated and supported by foreign powers hostile to Yugoslavia, are trying to destroy the joint state ... and remove it from the historical scene'; 'Muslim and Croat ethnic communities have joined the secessionist attempts to dismantle Yugoslavia'), and nationalism (all Serbs should live in one state). (00183433, original document)

7 We could see from the Minutes of the 16th session of the assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina held on May 12, 1992 in Banjaluka that a decision was adopted by the Assembly on establishing the SRNA news agency. There are several speeches of prominent Bosnian Serbs available in the Minutes that are comprised of many propaganda messages. Radovan Karadžić uses historical parallels (we found ourselves in a situation created by the historical fate of the Serbian people), accuses the opponents (HDZ with its 'militant and dangerous gatherings, with the insignia of the Ustasha regime which has committed genocide against us', and SDA 'with their militant Islamic fundamentalism'; they want independent BH; they are our partners but at the same time 'our secret adversaries and enemies'; Izetbegović resorted to a mobilisation call on Ramadan Bairam, for which he was hundred per cent sure it would be unacceptable to the Serbs; the government in the Muslim Bosnia is exercised in a most shameless criminal way), describes Serbian national character (Serbs 'with their natural readiness for law, order and peace'); uses conspiracy theory (Serbs 'have to fight against genocidal attempts against them'; 'we see what is happening in the OSCE, we see the pressure on Yugoslavia by the Fascist coalition from the WWII, unfortunately strengthened by American support; there is 'unscrupulous terror, diplomatic terrorism and pressure on Yugoslavia within OSCE'; the Serbs are alone in this fight, while in years 1914 and 1941 they had a support of their allies; the Islamic countries, especially Turkey, want to create a Green Transversal across Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandžak, Kosovo and the Albanian part of Macedonia), spread nationalism (the strategic goal of Serbian people is 'separation from the other two national communities – separation of states'; he is also in favour of using political means in achieving national /Serbian/ strategic goals that pertain to territorial conquests, although it is clear they can not be achieved without using military and police violence). (00913505)

Other speakers accused the opponents ('we organised ourselves in such a way that an besieged population of 11,000 of us was the defence against 70,000 of our bitter, unyielding enemies, proven Ustashas, the worst enemies of ours, of the Serbian people'), called for military conquests ('only what has been conquered militarily may become really and truly ours') and displayed a lot of militant hatred ('to the Serb who refuses to come under Serbian flag and under "šajka•a" /a traditional Serbian cap/, we will show the way to Istanbul, Teheran, just as we did to the mujahedin'). (00913505)

Radoslav Br•anin speaks in a rather confused manner, often mixing different topics and not finishing his thoughts. He rejects negotiation on the situation in BH because 'we do not have anyone to negotiate with ... and there is no one who could be the mediator'. He accuses the Croats for hating the JNA, 'not hundred per cent, but hundred and one per cent'. He does not trust Muslims, and displays this by saying 'how can anyone still believe it is right that we have a Muslim teaching political classes in the Banjaluka Corps ... I am less of a chauvinist than many believe. I merely have a high degree of national awareness'. He uses value-weighted appellations of his opponents – mujahedin and Ustashas. He uses nationalism to serve propaganda purposes by claiming that all Serbs should live in one state, and Serbs in war must be unified. For the purpose of furthering the general Serbian cause, a reconciliation of all political options in the Serbian Republic of BH is needed. Br•anin also uses a chauvinist speech, by saying that a group of mujahedin (a construction service) should come to Banjaluka to work on a project, that 80 per cent of Banjaluka Corps staff is 'patriotic, of pro-Serbian orientation', ... while 'the minority has to be eliminated'. 'Serbia has too many weapons, Serbia is our motherland, we shall receive food from Serbia, but today, with the establishment of the Serbian armed forces' ... one should allow 'as few weapons as possible to be taken to Serbia from Serbian Krajina'. It stems from the analysis of Br•anin's speech that he endorsed key propaganda anchor that Serbian mass media in general used in the wars waged on the territory of former Yugoslavia – all Serbs should live in one state. (00913505)

General Ratko Mladi• also contributed a long speech in which he openly agitates for war: Serbs have only two paths to follow, one is 'the path of honour and survival', and there will be many victims because the war has not really even started,

the other is 'the path of chaos, passivity, disorganization, quibbling and empty talk, not a path of fighting ... that is a path to our extinction'. 'If we consider and assess that war is the only way out, then we have to gather our wits, consult history on how to win the war and how to wage this war'. The war is necessary because it was imposed on Serbs. He also uses nationalist ideology, by saying that 'the Serbian people and Serbian brains are posing the Serbian question for the third time in this century'. Serbs are 'winners in war, losers in peace'. (00913505)

8 A lot of propaganda was disseminated on the local level, as well. The most extreme example is the one from the "Informator" of the SDS, Sanski most, published on St. Peter's day 1992. Here is a quote, which contains the intimidation of their own (Serbian) people by the alleged crimes of the opponents, the mobilisation (agitation) of people for war on that basis, and examples of classic (hard) propaganda and nationalism: 'Dear brothers Serbs, Do you know what our blood-thirsty enemies have been scheming for us? What they had in mind was to gouge out our eyes and carve us up, hack our bodies to pieces, rape women and girls in front of their dearest, to circumcise, to destroy our religion, to crush us – just because we happen to be Serbs. Don't ever think that anybody's family would have been spared. They had monsters ready and committed to raping Serbian women, and they had developed a system of killing each and every Serb. Soon we will show everyone their horrible weapons – the "Srbosjeks" (Serb-cutters), swords from the Middle ages, sledge-hammers, special knives, instruments to gouge out eyes with and instruments to carve us up. A decent man shudders in horror! In Vrhpolje, an Ustasha killed his own two young children, then turned around to shoot at the army. When one of our soldiers fell into their hands, he was butchered in the most beastly manner. They had been preparing for genocide against Serbs, but did not get away with it because we saw what was coming. We warned and prepared our people in time. The leaders of the SDS are resolute in their undertaking to accomplish all that the Serbian people have entrusted them with. Dear brothers the war is not over yet! Irresponsible individuals among the Serbs, those who are getting rich while other people are dying, war profiteers and thieves – all of them will answer for their crimes. This is what the noble Serbian people have asked us to do. United until the final victory is ours!' (00922335)

9 SDS from Bosanska Krupa released a leaflet to discourage Serbian people to attend the 'Alija's (Izetbegović's, MM) referendum on an independent BH on February 29 and March 1, 1992'. They also use historical context (we do not need to go back to the blood-soaked past of the Serbian people; there must be no more Brankovićs /traitors, MM/ among Serbs), accusations of the opponents (many known and unknown crimes committed by representatives of the savage, genocidal and ustashoid Croatian people under the veil of independence and democracy), nationalism (to the great, wise and respected Serbian people), and conspiracy theory (Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman are both the refuse of the politics of Genscher and Kohl, who like only dead Serbs; Alija wants to have his "jamahiriyah", his own Islamic state on Serbian territory. And finally, a cry for national unity of Serbs: 'He who is a Serb, a Serb by birth, and who casts his vote at "Alija's referendum", may no offspring, male or female, fill his heart with joy, may his hands' toil leave his land barren, may he have no dark-red wine or white wheat, may misfortune plague all his kin forever'. (01107481)

10 The Bulletin of Kotor-Varoš Municipality on June 26, 1992, counts the victims of the war in the manner of classic (hard) propaganda and then establishes the following: 'These figures show and remind us that we are in war that was started to bring about the extermination of the Serbian people from these parts, that we are in a war with an enemy that took the oath of "besa" (a solemn oath) for their "baba" (father, i.e. Izetbegović) in a holy war, a "jihad"'. (40023402)

11 A leaflet of SDS Bosanski Petrovac, released prior to referendum on independent BH and well prior to the eruption of war, also fits into classic (hard) propaganda. A leaflet calls upon Serbian people to 'stem the tide of fascism! Our houses, towns and villages are again being torched and destroyed! Our loved ones and our children are again being slaughtered and driven out. We are fighting against Ustasha and Islamic fascists, against scandalous lies and international conspiracy. We are fighting for our own fate. Let us stand up and defend our freedom, our faith, our homes and our native soil. We cannot be defeated'. (L0022693)

12 The minutes of the Bosanski Petrovac Municipality assembly held on June 9, 1992, prove that the control of media was a practice on the local level, too. Among the conclusions we can find one that approves four staff positions for the radio station, implement censorship of radio broadcast and request delivery of the

allocated antenna currently located at the Batajnica airport in order to improve the work of the radio station. The analysis of the Minutes also showed that a so called civil society was manipulated by the authorities, who ordered where should a peace rally take place. (L0022615)

13 On May 8, 1992, the War Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina reached some conclusions, among them the one saying that 'Krajina media organisations shall in future work according to the war plan of work, in other words they have to inform citizens fully and on time about all the orders and decisions of the War Staff of the ARK. Radio Banjaluka shall inform citizens once every hour that they must return weapons so that peace can be preserved in the area'. The document that envisaged a war scheme and control over mass media, was signed by Radoslav Br•anin, the president of ARK War Staff. (00473784)

14 The analysis of Official Gazette of Banjaluka Municipality on April 15 (00929127), June 5 (00882889), July 20 (00922167), December 31 (00921379), 1992, reveals that the mass media in the area (Radio Banjaluka, Television Banjaluka and newspaper Glas) were financed by the municipality authorities who also had the right to influence the personnel structure of mass media. Namely, they adopted decree on the appointment of Pro Tempore Director of Public Company Radio Banjaluka, the decision on the establishment of Radio-Television Krajina and the decision on the appointment of the director of Radio-Television Krajina (both decisions signed by Radoslav Br•anin, president of the Crisis Staff), the decision on the dismissal of the editor of the Glas newspaper from Banjaluka, and the decision on the appointment of the Editor-in-Chief of Glas Srpski, Banjaluka. This proves the impact that the authorities had on the media through personnel and financing policies.

15 There is also a call for tolerance as a rare case in our content analysis of official documents. Namely, the Klju• Municipality Crisis Staff released few announcements (June 9 1992 – L0022987 and on two more occasions in the same year – L0022439, L0022408), in which the Crisis Staff appeal to all Serbian citizens to treat people of other ethnicities decently. 'In your relations with your neighbours of other ethnicities, you uphold not only your own dignity but also the traditional tolerance of your people'. The Crisis Staff also appealed to citizens to refrain from spreading rumours and to rely exclusively on official information from competent authorities. It is written in the announcement that irresponsible individuals, on the basis of disinformation, committed 'rush things' and attacked the integrity of their fellow citizens of other ethnicities.

16 The strictly confidential report of Ključ Public Security Station on July 1992, starts with an estimation in a spirit of conspiracy theory: Serbs were moving out of municipality area in last 50 years. Other factors like 'locality of life', infrastructure and industrial facilities also show that there is a long-term and well-thought activity behind it, to dominate the entire area of municipality. The 'eternal dream' of this policy was to break in pieces and to gradually destroy Serbs in this area. The report also accused Muslims that they started armed rebellion and that SDA left its pre-election programme and started to break up Yugoslavia, and to create unitary and independent BH as the very first state in Europe to be organised on the principle of Islamic fundamentalism. In the continuation of the report, the thesis on the armed rebellion of Muslim extremists and fundamentalists is repeated.

The report continues: Along with regular forces of Serbian Republic of BH, there exists a parallel system of Muslim Territorial Defence. The system of command and control of the latter, functions in an excellent way. The orders are fully obeyed without objections. The active role in the process had also the religious officials who built up total loyalty, and exercised religious self-deception, hatred and danger of everything that is not Islamic, in mosques. The report also uses anti-propaganda by saying that SDA and Muslim Bosniac Organization (MBO) disseminated propaganda against Muslims, that they will be physically destroyed by the Serbs. Both organizations are also accused to exercise indoctrination of young Muslim generation. The report is also critical and at least indirectly accuses Serbs of committing crimes: mass destroying and burglaries of Muslim and Croat property occurred in the territory of municipality. Many house-searches, and stealing of cars, tractors and trucks occurred. (00489819, original document)

Conclusion

The analysis of the selected republican and local documents revealed that the preparations for war in Serbian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina started at least half a year before the war actually started. All documents indicating operational preparations for war were top secret. Mass media activities were part of those preparations.

We could see from the analysis that propaganda messages disseminated during the meetings of different para-state bodies and through released documents prior to the war, contained aggressive nationalism, conspiracy theory, accusations of the opponents on the basis of allegations and anticipated deeds rather than facts, reinterpretation of history and producing historical parallels between reputable Serbian history and the contemporary events, and classic (hard) propaganda. The main objective of propaganda was to agitate for war and to mobilise people to participate in it. The main propagandists were members of SDS on republican and local levels.

SDS created a critical mass of war in ideological and political fields. They spread the ideology of Serbian nationalism, misinterpreted history, and they presented an idea of coexistence between three ethnic communities in BH as being impossible.

The analysis of documents showed that SDS officials and the bodies they controlled, overwhelmingly dominated the media landscape on the Serb controlled territories. SDS was in a position to finance mass media, to influence their personnel and editorial policies, to order forms of organisation and the way of reporting for mass media prior to and during the war.

General conclusions

The content analysis of official documents of Republika Srpska, Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK), some municipalities and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) revealed that mass media in Serbian-controlled territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) were not independent and free. Instead, they were influenced, instrumentalised and controlled by the Serbian political and military elite. However, this control was not very effective all the time, like in the case of Glas and Kozarski vjesnik, while television, radio and Javnost were very much controlled and influenced throughout the period under our investigation. Kozarski vjesnik was a special case, where we can clearly see the dramatic change of editorial policy in late May 1992, when the local Serbian political elite interfered in the personnel structure of the newspaper. On the other hand, Glas, despite the replacement of the editor in chief orchestrated by Vojo Kuprešanin and Radoslav Br•anin in July 1992, continued with more or less the same editorial policy. However, a significant change in disseminating propaganda messages occurred in September 1992, when Glas was renamed Glas srpski and

became an official daily of Republika Srpska. SDS organs and its members were the main protagonists of the pressure imposed on mass media in the territories of BH controlled by Serbs.

The general media climate produced by Serbian mass media in BH was pervaded mainly with propaganda messages of nationalism, reinterpretation of history and actual events, religious intolerance, psychological cleansing, conspiracy theory, classic (hard) propaganda, accusations of the opponent, and routine lies. However, not all mass media were involved in the dissemination of propaganda to the same extent in the analysed period. While Javnost, television and radio were full of propaganda messages, Glas and Kozarski vjesnik were more moderate. The latter started to perform propaganda more frequently and intensively after the above-mentioned interference of local politicians in the editorial policy, while the former experienced the same destiny when it became a 'republic's' daily Glas Srpski. Nevertheless, generally speaking, Serbian mass media in BH produced the 'critical mass' of war in ideological, religious and political fields. No doubt, some propaganda messages conveyed through media to the public were designed to justify atrocities that occurred in BH in 1992. The stigmatisation of mujahedin and Ustashas applied to the entire ethnic communities of Muslims and Croats living in BH. The Croats and Muslims were satanized, they were presented as religious fanatics, ruthless killers, torturers and rapists, who deserved no mercy: killing of such people was not morally disputable. The opponents of Serbian policy were totally dehumanised and criminalized in mass media. Therefore, the main objective of propagandist to agitate for war and to mobilise Serbian people to participate in it actively, was successfully accomplished.

Radoslav Br•anin played an important role in propaganda activity, not only through his public appearances but also through his deeds, i.e. the 'personnel cleansing' in companies, institutions and media based on the ethnic background of employees and their loyalty to the SDS ideology and policy. His policy was guided by the necessity of the 'Serbian national question to be resolved' once and for all, and by the imperative 'to defend the biological existence of the Serbian nation in that region'. According to Br•anin, the editorial policy of mass media must work towards the affirmation of the Serbian movement for liberation and the destruction of Ustashas. He used 'biological determinism' to explain the differences between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims. The

latter have feelings of antagonism and hate against Serbs in their genes. On that basis, Br•anin also claimed he was against the disbandment of the concentration camps designed for Muslims and Croats.

In his public appearances Momir Tali• supported the creation of the Serbian republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the unity of Serbian nation. He evaluated actual events and the opponents on the basis of historical experience (Ustasha regime in Croatia during WWII), and on the basis of religion (Islamic fundamentalism). He often drew parallels between WWII battles and contemporary battles and in his words, he wanted 'to prevent the genocide against Serbian people' in 1992. Verbally Tali• advocated peace, but in practice he fought 'to define the borders of our future country' and 'against Ustasha knife and jihad'.

Appendix: Chronology of selected events

Below is the chronology of key events based on the official documents of the republic and local documents, and on the content of electronic and printed mass media we analysed for the purpose of this report:

15 October 1991 – the initial preparations for the Serbian state within Bosnia-Herzegovina as a consequence of Declaration adopted by the HDZ and the SDA in BH Assembly have started; Serbian mass media activities in BH have a prominent role in that process;

29 October 1991 – the beginning of operational preparations for war; among other things, radio stations were ordered by the Coordinator for implementation of decisions in the SDS, Radoslav Br•anin, Vice President of the Assembly of the Autonomous Region, to introduce a wartime scheme, while Radio Banjaluka was demanded to broadcast daily an hour-long programme on the war in Croatia;

November 1991 – an announcement of the plebiscite of Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

19 December 1991 – the establishment of crisis staffs of the Serbian people in municipalities,

9 January 1992 (an Orthodox Church Christmas) – the establishment of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

15 January 1992 – the decision on the establishment of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina was published in the Official Gazette of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the preparations for war, led by the SDS, started well before the Assembly was established and its representatives were elected;

11 February 1992 – Radoslav Br•anin is reported to be the president of executive committee of the •elinac municipal assembly;

25 February 1992 - Radoslav Br•anin is reported to be the vice president of ARK;

29 February and 1 March 1992 – referendum on the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina was held, but was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs;

16 March 1992 – Radoslav Br•anin is reported to be a people's delegate in the assembly of ARK;

21 March, 1992 - General Momir Tali• assumed his duty as a Commandant of Banjaluka Corps;

3 April, 1992 – Crisis Staff of ARK was established, Radoslav Br•anin is a member as a representative of the Assembly of Autonomous Region;

7 April, 1992 – Srpska Republika BH was declared;

12 April 1992 – Radoslav Br•anin is a member of the Crisis Staff of Autonomous Region of Krajina (at the same time he was a Vice President of Autonomous Region of Krajina – it's seat was in Banjaluka) as a part of Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina;

15 April 1992 – the Official Gazette of Banjaluka Municipality released the decision that Miodrag Hrni• from Banjaluka becomes an acting director of Radio Banjaluka; the decision on financing mass media was released, as well.

8 May 1992 – Radoslav Br•anin is a President of War Staff of Autonomous Region of Krajina in Banjaluka;

12 May 1992 – SRNA Press Agency was established;

13 May The Army of Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was established;

22 May 1992 – Radoslav Br•anin is signed under one document as a President of Crisis Staff;

3 June 1992 – Crisis Staff of Autonomous Region of Krajina, led by Radoslav Br•anin, appointed a rector of Banjaluka University;

4 June 1992 - Crisis Staff of Autonomous Region of Krajina, led by Radoslav Br•anin, established Radio Television Banjaluka and appointed its director;

6 July 1992 – crisis staffs were abolished by the decision of the Government of SR BH;

10 July 1992 – Vojo Kuprešanin and Radoslav Br•anin attacked Glas and its editor in chief; the latter was dismissed few days later;

20 July 1992 – the Official Gazette of Banjaluka Municipality released a dismissal of the editor of newspaper 'Glas' from Banjaluka;

12 August 1992 - Srpska republika BH was replaced by Srpska republika;

16 August 1992 - Radoslav Br•anin was appointed as a Minister of 'spatial planning and protection of environment';

17 September 1992 - the Assembly of Republika Srpska adopted a decision that Glas becomes a daily of entire Serbian republic and is renamed Glas srpski;

25. September 1992 – the Assembly of Banjaluka Municipality adopted a decision that all municipality mass media (Glas, Televizija Banjaluka and Radio Banjaluka) are put under the authority of Republika Srpska.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia commissioned a content analysis of official documents of Republika Srpska, Autonomous Region of Krajina, certain municipalities and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and a content analysis of selected electronic and printed mass media, i.e. Krajina Television Banjaluka, Serbian Television Pale, Radio Prijedor, Radio Sanski most, Javnost, Glas (Glas srpski), and Kozarski vjesnik. The task of the researchers at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, was to analyse the content of official documents and mass media and to establish the connection between the propaganda activity and the events that took place on the ground. A special attention was given to the role played by the indicted persons Radoslav Br•anin and Momir Tali• in this process.

The basis for sampling were documents, newspaper items, TV and radio items provided by the ICTY. The researchers checked this material and selected all articles/TV and radio shows in which the indicted persons Radoslav Br•anin and General Momir Tali• played an important role, either by giving a statement or an interview or by being a subject of news report referring to their (or the bodies' they chaired) activities. In addition, in order to gain the understanding of the general media climate in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, our analysis also included other newspaper, TV and radio items, mainly interviews with important political, spiritual and military leaders, war reports and commentaries. Those items were selected randomly. The research of mass media covered a period from January 1992 to December 1992, with an emphasis on the period from April 1992 to September 1992, while the research of official documents covered a period from July 1991 to February 1993.

THEORETICAL MODEL

In the initial stage of research, we developed a theoretical model of propaganda, which was later on in the research process, confronted with propaganda reality in selected mass media and documents published and released on the territory of Republika Srpska.

In the study of how propaganda in the Bosnian Serbs media has affected the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following elements are of particular interest: (1) propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, propaganda and religion,

propaganda and history), (2) the use of language for propaganda purposes, (3) the level of source criticism; (4) iconography, (5) compatibility of visual and textual information, (6) (de)construction of national memory, (7) designation of "the Other", (8) routine lies, (9) collective (and selective) memory loss, (10) classic (hard) propaganda, (11) anti-propaganda, (12) accusations of the opponent, (13) conspiracy theory, (14) the context of propaganda, (15) propaganda organisation and propagandists, and (16) the public. As a general rule, the foregoing elements should not be divorced one from another, although to a certain degree such a separation is essential for the sake of analysis. Instead, they should all be viewed in the context of their interlinked and mutually complementary character.

The existence of a theoretical model of propaganda makes it feasible to study 'propaganda reality' in Republika Srpska. Some elements of the model directly relate to propaganda messages, others relate indirectly, and still others concern the propaganda environment. All elements of propaganda model are interrelated and compatible. In our analysis, we will focus on some most relevant elements, especially those that are directly and indirectly related to the propaganda message (points 1 to 13 in the model), while the propaganda environment itself (points 13-15 of the model) surpasses the purpose of this analysis.

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SERBIAN MASS MEDIA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Javnost

Analysis showed that Javnost disseminated extensive and intense propaganda in which the messages with nationalistic, historical and religious content were in the forefront. An exceptionally important place in the spreading of propaganda was accorded to the conspiracy theory and classic propaganda techniques. The elements of propaganda presented above, are interrelated and intertwined in Javnost's propaganda approach – the most typical are links between nationalism, history and religion, and between conspiracy, accusation and counter-propaganda. An important role is played by classic propaganda and dissemination of 'routine lies'. The propaganda messages rely on a typical pattern, which glorifies Serbs, their interests and national character, and launches the thesis that all Serbs are threatened, that they have to defend themselves and unite in a common country. In this war Serbs were presumably building a new country. Nationalism is presented as a prerequisite for democratic society. Javnost presents the Serbian nation as a holy nation. The Serbs are the victims of genocide for the third time in the twentieth century. The only solution for the Serbs lies in the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Eastern Orthodoxy is a tolerant religion, while 'Catholic clericalism' and Islam are intolerant, militant and aggressive.

The whole world plots against the Serbs, they are the victims of the emerging 'new world order', and particularly the victims of the Vatican's and Germany's interests related to the Balkans. Javnost accuses Serbia's opponents, presents them as evildoers and criminals, and in so doing it occasionally resorts to completely irrational arguments.

Serbs can no longer live together with 'others' – Muslims and Croats. The international media manipulate the public opinion, they do not care about the truth but try to 'satanize' the Serbs. Javnost attacks even the media in Serbia blaming them for not being sufficiently supportive of the 'Serbian issue', even though our previous analyses showed that at that time the Serbian media were brimming with pro-Serbian and anti-Croatian and anti-Muslim propaganda.²⁶ Classic propaganda is mainly verbal but it is often accompanied by the photos of war horrors – for example, a mujahedin fighter with a severed head in his hand, a mutilated soldier, mutilated civilians, skulls and bones, burnt bodies and numerous coffins with the remains of the dead.

Propaganda messages are often accompanied by specific iconography and cartoons. The icons used for affirmative purposes are the symbols of the Serbian para-state, Orthodox religion and military symbols, with the messages reading 'Only unity can save the Serbs', 'God protects the Serbs' and stressing of Serbian military superiority. Icons with a negative prefix, which appear in corresponding contexts, are the Catholic and Islamic religious symbols and rituals, which obviously stir negative emotions in Serbs. The cartoons often include Muslim crescent and Croatian 'chessboard', occasionally coupled with European stars. Once Serbs conquered the territories they wished, Javnost started to advocate negotiations and peace hoping to formalize their military achievements in this way. In relation to this, it strictly referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 'former' or 'past' state. The term Muslims is strictly not capitalized, which conveys a message that Muslims are a religious community and not a nation²⁷, or in other words, that Muslims are Serbs or Croats that were Islamicised by the Turks in the course of the several centuries of their rule in those regions.

²⁶ See Marjan Malešić ed. 1997. Propaganda in War. Stockholm: SPF.

²⁷ In Serbian, the names of religions and religious communities are not capitalized.

The language used by Javnost was hyperbolic, full of exaggeration, emotional, dramatic and Manichean (black and white presentation of reality). The sources of information used were mainly Serbian and sometimes unknown. The opposite side and foreign sources were used exclusively as a basis of counter-propaganda, and served as a means to reinforce propaganda messages of Javnost.

It is practically impossible to expose the structure of the propaganda organization solely on the basis of media analysis, but it is obvious that Javnost apportioned most space to politicians, historians, artists, particularly writers and painters, and soldiers. Some of them (Radovan Karadžić, Milorad Ekmečić, Brana Crnčević, Momo Kapor, and Aleksa Buha) gave several interviews to Javnost during the period analysed here and/or contributed several articles. Soldiers are mostly portrayed as Serbian heroes (Željko Ražnjatović Arkan, Savo Dotlić Sanković, Ratko Mladić, Slavko Lisica, Miroslav Vještica), even though some of them were later indicted for war crimes.

Glas

Until September 1992, Glas contained radically less propaganda than Javnost, and it was less strong as well. The language used was rather moderate with no radical exaggerations or black-and-white presentation of the wartime reality in the region of Krajina. Glas was quite critical of negative phenomena in its environment – it criticized politicians, their attempts to usurp power in wartime circumstances, defectors and those who escaped mobilization, as well as assassins and thieves among their own (Serbian) ranks.

However, this does not mean that Glas is free of propaganda. The newspaper propagated nationalistic idea of confederate Bosnia-Herzegovina in which Serbian nation would be sovereign within its ethnic territories and would have a possibility of connecting the Serbian part of confederation with Yugoslavia, at the cost of war if necessary. The thesis that Serbs are threatened is launched in the spirit of general Serbian propaganda. Specific Krajina 'nationalism' is also present. The historical dimension of propaganda came to light prevalingly through Glas's attempts to draw a parallel between the events that took place in Krajina during WWII and those taking place in 1992 – according to Glas in both cases what was going on was a

struggle against Ustashas and Fascism. Occasionally religious differences between three nations in conflict were also used to spread propaganda.

Glas accused the opponents – Muslim leaders, Croatia, Germany, the Vatican and the US above all – of the conspiracy and it discredited them. Glas also carried counter-propaganda, which was particularly obvious in relation to Omarska camp, which was allegedly completely invented by the American media. This was related to the conspiracy theory and counter-propaganda occasionally employed by Glas. The amount of so called classic propaganda in Glas reporting was proportional to the growing impact of the political elite on the editorial policy. The iconography of the Serbian para-state, Orthodox and military iconography were almost absent from Glas. When writing about the Muslims in Bosnia, Glas capitalized the term Muslim meaning that it indirectly recognized them as a nation and did not reduce them to a religious community.

A part of ARK ruling powers attacked Glas in an attempt to influence its editorial policy by exerting pressure on the newspaper to change the structure of personnel within the newspaper. Among them was also Radoslav Br•anin who is described by Glas as a personnel manager who replaced the employees in companies and institutions according to ethnic criteria in the name of Serbian unity and resolution of Serbian national question in Krajina. In addition to Glas, Br•anin attacked other media as well, because he held that the editorial policy must work towards the unification of Serbian nation. We should stress here that the editorial policy of Glas did not change essentially after the replacement of the editor in chief in July 1992, so the newspaper continued to maintain a certain critical distance towards the organs of the ruling power and did not start to spread more forceful propaganda. The real change in editorial policy and in performing propaganda occurred in September 1992 when Glas was renamed Glas Srpski and became a daily of entire Republika Srpska (the decision was adopted by the Assembly of RS and approved by the Assembly of Banjaluka Municipality, the founder of Glas). The leading employees of Glas sent a message to the public that they will fight for “truth, freedom and fatherland” (Glas, September 18 1992, •elni ljudi Glasa o odluci skupštine Republike Srpske/Leading people in Glas on the decision brought by the Assembly of Republika Srpska).

Our analysis showed that until 29 May 1992 Kozarski vjesnik was an independent weekly which critically analysed political situation in the community. The newspaper was open to the expression of opinion, meaning that it ensured the plurality of political views and opinions.

The text 'independent weekly' in the title line was first replaced with 'wartime edition' on 29 May 1992 (the same text appears in all subsequent issues analysed here). The organizational structure of the newspaper changed too. The position of editor in chief was discontinued (the previous editor in chief was henceforth cited only as a member of the editorial board, while Muharem Nezirević, the previous editor in chief of Radio Prijedor, initially appeared as a member of the editorial board, but from June 1992 his name was no longer mentioned). Obviously, the editorial board was nationally homogenized, or in other words, ethnically cleansed. Not one of the articles in the first wartime issue (in contrast to the articles in "pre war" issues of Kozarski vjesnik which are analysed here) was signed by a journalist or the editor in chief (in case of editorial) – all were signed by the Crisis Staff and the Municipal Secretariat for Information. Most of other content is similarly unsigned. Kozarski vjesnik became a "mouth piece" of official Serbian politics.

In our analysis of Kozarski vjesnik we found the following elements of propaganda: the presence of nationalistic ideology, relationship between propaganda and religion, (re)interpretation of history, (ab)use of language and symbols, accusations of the opposite side i.e. ascribing responsibility for war to the opposite side, discrediting of the opposite side, labelling of the opposite side, routine lies and hard propaganda.

Nationalist ideology was basic element of propaganda in Kozarski vjesnik. It rests on attempts to prove that Serbian national character, Serbian nation, their living space, physical existence, religion, values and language are under threat. In our example, all of this is linked to the conspiracy theory according to which Serbs are threatened by the interests of the Catholic International ("Catholic mafia", "clerical Fascist forces") that may be easily identified as another attempt by the Vatican, similar to those in the past, to penetrate the very heart of Eastern Orthodoxy. Muslims hence threaten the very essence of the Serbian nation. According to the arguments used in Kozarski vjesnik, Serbs can not live with Muslims in a common state. Therefore the struggle against such a state is a "life-and-death struggle", an eternal struggle, a struggle for mere survival in which all means are justified. Such an enemy cannot be conquered simply by being destroyed militarily. Such an enemy is a pure evil and it must be exterminated.

A strong propaganda effect in Kozarski vjesnik is achieved by (re)interpreting history and drawing historical parallels between wars in these regions. Everything that happened in the past is used as an interpretative network within which the present events should be understood. For example, Kozarski vjesnik featured a series, once again unsigned, in which testimonies of the prisoners of Kerestinac camp were presented. Kerestinac was a notorious Ustasha's concentration camp in Independent Croatian State (NDH) during WWII in which Jews, Roma, Serbs, and Croats were killed. The series compares events from 1941 and 1992: the same concentration camp (only fifty years later), the same prisoners, the same torture methods...

When labelling, propaganda in Kozarski vjesnik is primarily focused on moral discrediting of the leading figures of the opposite side (we have observed both the elements of national ideology and of religious propaganda). During the power seizure and immediately after that the major part of propaganda concentrated on discrediting Muslim high officials in the town of Prijedor. Most of the accusation (stealing, smuggling hard currency and weapons...) uncorroborated by evidence are found in the communiqués by the Secretariat for Information. The lack of evidence is explained by a conspiracy (a conspiracy of Muslims aimed at destroying everything that is of Serbian origin). Jedan od efikasnih elemenata propagande je prebaciti krivicu za događaje na drugu stranu. The primary aim of the first wartime edition of Kozarski vjesnik (29 May 1992) was to justify the seizure of power by attributing blame for future events to the opposite side. According to such redefinition of events, the responsibility for war lies with 'them' (Muslims, Croats) who were getting prepared for war for quite some time, while 'we' (Serbs) only defended ourselves. In this imposed war Serbs (we) had no other alternative but to defend themselves by all available means. Accusation of the opposite side ("they started it, not we") is an effective mechanism of propaganda employed to mobilize one's own public.

At the same time Kozarski vjesnik used the technique of frightening to demoralize the opposite side. Muslims must be convinced that everybody abandoned them (including their leadership, army, Europe, and the world). When coupled with threats with (and rumours about) physical torture, the terrain for psychological and subsequently ethnic cleansing was ready.

We also found examples of classic (hard) propaganda and routine lies including the "story" from Srajevo zoo where children were fed to tigers in cages. The story itself is probably the most widely known case of hard propaganda during the war in ex-Yugoslavia. The story was first published by TV Pale as a commentary by the

journalist Risto • ogo and later interpreted and reinterpreted many times. In addition, this was the story that, whenever it appeared in the media, served to dehumanise the Muslim side.

Radio and Television

Our analysis of broadcasts by radio and television stations situated in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed, that these were the media over which political and military ruling powers established complete control (replacements of editors and editorial boards, control over the finances and content etc.). The analysed media were directly included in preparing the public for war. In analysing the selected material we focused on the elements of propaganda defined in the study model. In addition to analyzing nationalist ideology, reinterpretations of history, historical parallels, the conspiracy theory, the use of language for propaganda purposes, political propaganda, accusations and dehumanisation of the opposite side, we also focused on the following four fields: psychological cleansing (psychological threatening of the population that preceded ethnic cleansing), forced testimonies of captured civilians and soldiers, hard propaganda, accusations of the opposite side and mobilization of the own public.

The goal of psychological war is to waken (or to destroy) the enemy through a wide set of actions ranging from diplomatic manoeuvring, economic pressure, a combination of information and disinformation, to provocation, intimidation, acts of sabotage and terrorism, cleansing of targeted territory by isolating the enemy from its friends and supporters and destroying the enemy's will to fight. It is important to underline that the psychological war is not the result of chance events, but, it is a war that is meticulously planned.

In our case the term 'psychological cleansing' denotes propaganda techniques that are intended to create panic, fear, uncertainty and the feeling of threat among local population. Propaganda begins with the spreading of rumours aimed at various target groups living in a certain territory. We found two (in terms of psychological warfare actions) related types of spreading rumours. The rumours aimed at the population of Serbian nationality about the preparations taken by the Muslims for military actions (arming, smuggling of arms, medicines and food, preparing bomb shelters) and crimes that were planned (or already carried out) by the opposite side (massacres, eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off etc.) (V0002578). At the same time, rumours directed at Muslim population were spread, coupled with calls to

surrender arms, publishing of the lists of extremists and forced gatherings. These rumours were then taken up by the media and spread as confirmed information (T0000561). Radio stations daily broadcast the messages by the Crisis Staff or the Serbian army ordering the gathering of citizens of other nationalities at specific locations. In order to arouse the feeling of threat and helplessness, the media employed the following technique: first the rumours were spread, then an official explained that these were rumours aimed at creating unnecessary panic. This was followed by messages that people should only listen to information broadcast over the radio and should behave in accordance with the instructions. In the next step mandatory gatherings of Muslims were staged and statements extorted from leading figures belonging to the opposite side were published, in which they blamed themselves for the situation and called their people to surrender (T0000561). Finally, the warnings were issued that the army would intervene to protect the lives and property of people should the opposite side reject to surrender arms and hand over extremists from among its ranks. This is a typical example of planned psychological warfare activities aimed at affecting the morale and behaviour of Muslim population for a specific military purpose, (Serbian) activities.

Radio and television stations used also hard (classic) propaganda: stories about massacres (crushing of skulls, gouging out of eyes, cutting off of noses and ears, impaling, burning of bodies, slaughters with a knife, killing of women with the children in their arms), which evoke the events (and identical pictures) that happened during WWII. The soldiers of the opposite side are cowards (they attack from the ambush, mutilate dead bodies, kill helpless civilians, women, children and old people), they are religious fanatics without moral values (mercenaries who kill for money). Hard propaganda is based on lies, rumours and manipulated interpretations of the events. It is extremely emotionally charged – it resorts to frightening to mobilize one's own public for merciless war against the enemy and it functions as a catharsis – the crimes they commit exonerate our crimes.

In order to demoralize the opposite side and excuse their own military actions, Serbian media broadcast forced statements by the captured leaders. Forced confessions of the prisoners of war and captives in media are often used for propaganda purposes during the military activities. Prisoners of war symbolise other (enemy) side, they can be used as an "emotional target" for our side (as a symbolic object of our fears and anger) or as a representation of non-human behaviour of other side (prisoners of war and captives who publicly blame themselves for military actions of their own side).

ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

The analysis of the selected republican and local documents revealed that the preparations for war in Serbian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina started at least half a year before the war actually started. All documents indicating operational preparations for war were top secret. Mass media activities were part of those preparations.

We could see from the analysis that propaganda messages disseminated during the meetings of different para-state bodies and through released documents prior to the war, contained aggressive nationalism, conspiracy theory, accusations of the opponents on the basis of allegations and anticipated deeds rather than facts, reinterpretation of history and producing historical parallels between reputable Serbian history and the contemporary events, and classic (hard) propaganda. The main objective of propaganda was to agitate for war and to mobilise people to participate in it.

The main propagandists were members of SDS on republican and local levels. SDS created a critical mass of war in ideological and political fields. They spread the ideology of Serbian nationalism, misinterpreted history, and they presented an idea of coexistence between three ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being impossible.

The analysis of documents showed that SDS officials and the bodies they controlled, overwhelmingly dominated the media landscape on the Serb controlled territories. SDS was in a position to finance mass media, to influence their personnel and editorial policies, to order forms of organisation and the way of reporting for mass media prior to and during the war.

THE ROLE OF RADOSLAV BR•ANIN IN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

In the analyzed articles published by Javnost and Kozarski vjesnik, Radoslav Br•anin did not appear.

Glas describes Radoslav Br•anin as having been one of the "most fervent advocates of the republic of Krajina" in a dispute between the "Krajina and Sarajevo options" at the end of February 1992 (Glas, March 2 1992, Dioba

suvereniteta/Division of sovereignties; 00951915). In March 1992, at the meeting in Banjaluka, Br•anin supported the formation of the Banjaluka-Belgrade-Titograd axis, while in negotiations with the SDA and the HDZ, according to Br•anin, the Serbs of Krajina cannot possibly accept any alternative “because the Latins resort to alternatives as a means of deception” (Glas, March 16 1992, Krajiški kamen me•ac/Krajina’s boundary stone; 02029698). “The occurrence of people”²⁸ (demonstrations for peace; remark by the authors) in Sarajevo are, according to Br•anin, the work of anti-Yugoslav and anti-army forces (Glas, April 9, “Doga•anje naroda” u Sarajevu – izrežirano/The “occurrence of people” in Sarajevo – it was stage-managed; 02029748).

Within the Crisis Staff of ARK Br•anin performed the role of the president of the Personnel Board and as such he carried out purges in the region, mainly based on the ethnic principle (this has been concluded on the basis of the names and surnames of replaced employees; remark by the authors), but among the victims of such personnel policy were also non-obedient Serbs. The replacements were carried out in the name of Serbian unity and resolution of the Serbian national question in Krajina. As the president of the Personnel Board of the Crisis Staff, Br•anin was responsible for “ethnic levelling” of the personnel in various companies and institutions (Glas April 21 1992, Smjene po volji naroda/Replacements in accordance with the will of people; 02029808; Glas April 30, May 1, 2 1992, Samo kadrovi lojalni srpskoj BiH/Only cadres loyal to Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina; 00951928). The armed forces were not exempted, as all non-obedient officers and soldiers had to leave Krajina immediately (Glas, April 29 1992, Ni ‘vojna igla’ bez saglasnosti Krajine/Even a “soldier’s needle” needs an approval from Krajina; 00951921). The university was not spared either: “the President of the University in Banjaluka must bring the teaching staff in line with the national structure and election results in Krajina [...] Since this is an academic institutions we have no doubts that this will be carried out in a civilized manner and in the shortest time possible - and the deadline is already passed”, Br•anin said (Glas, April 24 1992, Srpski univerzitet u srpskoj republici/Serbian university in the Serbian republic; 02029827).

²⁸ The “occurrence of people” is a term to describe the will of the people expressed publicly, usually through demonstrations. In late eighties these demonstrations were called anti-bureaucratic revolution and were instrumentalised by the political elites in Serbia to make

What went on was a peculiar ethnic cleansing of cadres, while Br•anin excuses his deeds by a dramatic situation: "everything must be focused on the defence of the biological existence of the Serbian nation in this region" (Glas, April 28 1992, Nema popuštanja/No yielding; 02029854). On 22 June 1992 Br•anin signed a directive, in which it is stated that positions possibly exposed to the inflow of information, then positions at which social property is being protected, and all other positions [...] may be occupied by Serbs exclusively. The personnel had to confirm their Serbian nationality through plebiscite and ideologically leave no doubts that the only representative of Serbian nation is the SDS! (facsimile of the directive was published by Glas on 25 June 1992; 02112600). According to Br•anin, certain individuals did not want to see that what was going on was a general war against the Serbs and Orthodoxy - but chameleons cannot occupy the leading positions (Glas, May 5 1992, Hitno mijenjati rukovode•e ljude/Managers to be replaced urgently; 02029881). In accordance with his human resource policies, Br•anin advocated that general Ratko Mladi• should become the leader of the Serbian Territorial Defence (Glas, May 7 1992, Masovan odziv na mobilizaciju/Massive response to mobilization; 00951924).

Despite these facts, Br•anin responded to certain objections to his conduct by asking in what way the Crisis Staff of ARK meddles with the executive power of Banjaluka authorities (Glas, June 10 1992, Ne postoji dualizam vlasti/Dualism of the authorities does not exist; 02112526). In an interview published on 13 June 1992 Br•anin states that ARK is a part of the Serbian state of Bosnia-Herzegovina but at the same time it figures as a "separate state creation". Serbs must "liberate" the corridor leading to Knin and Belgrade, and if the rivals do not hand over the corridor, the price will be paid by the Muslim and Croatian population because it is they who are situated along this imagined route. According to Br•anin, the people of Krajina must unite with the Knin krajina in order to accomplish the "holy task" – the penetration of corridor into Serbia (Glas, June 13 1992, Prolaz ka Srbiji kao put svile/A corridor to Serbia as a silk route; 02112536).

Br•anin accuses the media from Sarajevo that they demonise Serbian nation and attack the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Sarajevo Television presents them as

pressure on political leaders primarily in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro that resisted the

Chetniks and terrorists, while JNA is called the occupying army. On 8 May the Crisis Staff ordered that the media in Krajina must switch to the wartime schema. On 10 July 1992 (Kako ukloniti tragove/How to remove traces; 00951912) Vojo Kuprešanić and Br•anić attacked vehemently the editorial policy of Glas, with the replacement of its editor in chief following in the wake of this attack, even though the replaced editor was described by some as “the fighter in the struggle of Serbian people for national identity from the very beginning” (Glas, July 12 1992, Smjena pod velom tajne/Replacement veiled in secrecy; 02112687). Br•anić stated that the editorial policy must work towards unification and not breaking up of Serbs – it must work towards the affirmation of the Serbian movement for liberation and the destruction of Ustashas. One week later Glas attacked the editor in chief of Television Banjaluka. Despite pressures, Glas did not change essentially its editorial policy and it maintained a certain degree of critical distance towards the organs of the ruling power in the region. After this conflict Br•anić almost disappeared from Glas, one among the reasons being the abolition of crisis staffs (he primarily appeared in the role of a member, and later the president, of the Crisis Staff of ARK).

In his television appearances Radoslav Br•anić mostly uses following propaganda elements: nationalist ideology, hard propaganda, frightening (of people belonging to both his own and the opposite side), dehumanisation and criminalisation of Muslims and Croats. According to Br•anić's statements nationalist ideology is linked to biological determinism which explains differences (superiority or inferiority of a nation) by genetic (innate) differences.

Conspiracy theory is based on the assumption that western countries (primarily Germany and Vatican), openly exploit Muslims in order to realize their objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are contrary to the interests of the Serbs. According to this theory, Germany would like to “get rid of millions of Turks and send them to Alija's country” in exchange for bank loans and dirty industry. Br•anić's statements also include the elements of classic propaganda and routine lies. When explaining the existence of the camp in Trnopolje, Br•anić (who, according to his own words, “was against the disbandment of the camps, but he respected the decision” V0001980/01108394) stated that “the shocking conditions exposed by ITN five weeks ago at this camp in Trnopolje have gone. There's no starvation, the red Cross do supply regular food, the barbed wire's gone. In fact, all these men are free to leave the camp, but they choose to stay because it's safer”. (V002735/03002799-80).

policy of Slobodan Milošević.

The idea of “humane forced migrations” (as a part of broader psychological warfare activities) was publicly justified in Radoslav Br•anin’s media appearances. Giving the idea political endorsement (as a vice president of ARK Assembly and a member of the Crisis Staff) Br•anin actually created an acceptable context for fulfilling this idea in practice.

As far as the official republic and local documents are concerned, we could see from the Minutes of the 16th session of the assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina held on May 12, 1992 in Banjaluka, that Radoslav Br•anin was one of the speakers. Br•anin speaks in a rather confused manner, often mixing different topics and not finishing his thoughts. He rejects negotiation on the situation in BH because ‘we do not have anyone to negotiate with ... and there is no one who could be the mediator’. He accuses the Croats for hating the JNA, ‘not hundred per cent, but hundred and one per cent’. He does not trust Muslims, and displays this by saying ‘how can anyone still believe it is right that we have a Muslim teaching political classes in the Banjaluka Corps ... I am less of a chauvinist than many believe. I merely have a high degree of national awareness’. He uses value-weighted appellations of his opponents – mujahedin and Ustashas. He uses nationalism to serve propaganda purposes by claiming that all Serbs should live in one state, and Serbs in war must be unified. For the purpose of furthering the general Serbian cause, a reconciliation of all political options in the Serbian Republic of BH is needed. Br•anin also uses a chauvinist speech, by saying that a group of mujahedin (a construction service) should come to Banjaluka to work on a project, that 80 per cent of Banjaluka Corps staff is ‘patriotic, of pro-Serbian orientation’, ... while ‘the minority has to be eliminated’. ‘Serbia has too many weapons, Serbia is our motherland, we shall receive food from Serbia, but today, with the establishment of the Serbian armed forces’ ... one should allow ‘as few weapons as possible to be taken to Serbia from Serbian Krajina’. It stems from the analysis of Br•anin’s speech that he endorsed key propaganda anchor that Serbian mass media in general used in the wars waged on the territory of former Yugoslavia – all Serbs should live in one state. (00913505)

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The main task of the researchers was to establish the connection between the propaganda activity and the events that took place on the ground. **The questions we attempted to answer on the basis of our analysis are as follows:**

1. Does propaganda influence people's action?
2. What are the necessary components?
3. Did the material assessed contain the "necessary components"?

Propaganda can influence people's actions, no doubt, although sometimes propaganda advocates inaction, too. Propaganda can be agitational in character, intended to rouse people's emotions; alternatively, it can be integrative, i.e., designed to pacify the general public and to instill a 'feel good' factor. Propaganda of Bosnian Serbs mass media was the agitational one. The necessary components/characteristics that enable propaganda to have this casual influence could be classified as general and specific ones. General components are the control of mass media and the flow of information, and centralized, coordinated and organized action of propagandist. Specific components are rousing emotions, manipulation of symbols, suggestibility and an emphasis on value-charged messages. The mass media presentation of the (ostensibly) basic and common interests between the propagandist and the public is also an important component of that kind.

Although one of the most notorious propagandists Joseph Goebbels did not explicitly describe the techniques and modes of propaganda spreading, his diaries and public speeches²⁹ enable us to identify 19 basic principles of successful propaganda. In order for propaganda to be successful, it must be planned and managed centrally; propaganda must encourage aggression and the message must be incessantly repeated (a lie repeated thousand times eventually becomes the truth). Centrally directed propaganda presupposes that information comes from one (in most cases official) source. Centralization also ensures that information appearing in the media is not contradictory, since contradictory information could arouse "suspicion" about the credibility of the source. Centralized propaganda is also linked to the establishing of control over the media and information offered to the public. In situations in which

²⁹ Doob L.W. "Goebbels' principles of propaganda" in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14, 1950.

information of just one provenance is available (one perspective on the events), in which no alternative media are available that could offer a chance to check the truthfulness of information, in which information about the "other side's" inhumane treatment of "our civilians and soldiers" is based on rumor (a characteristic of rumor is that it is impossible to establish its source/author and consequently its truthfulness), people resort to the most simple explanations of the situation led by fear and the need to harmonize their system of reasoning with the dominating system. The most successful propaganda is one which manages to present a lie as a truth. If a lie is incessantly repeated, it will be eventually accepted as the truth. In addition, repetition is one of the techniques used to convince people into accepting certain "unacceptable" interpretations of events. By repeating that the war was caused by the other side which first attacked, which planned everything in advance, which wants to destroy us and has no respect for fundamental moral and ethical principle, one creates such an "opinion climate" in which people begin to accept lies as truths (usually, this is a point at which the majority of propaganda analysts ask the question: how can one possibly believe this?). The events in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a textbook example of the dissemination of lies for propaganda purposes. A lie (first published by TV Pale) that Serbian children are fed to the animals in Sarajevo zoo, became the truth with the help of media's incessant repetition of the lie. The story can be found in Kozarski vjesnik (August 28, 1992) in which a letter entitled "Two sides of the civil war – from the perspective of a Serbian woman," published in the Reactions column, includes the following sentence: What a number of children's lives have been taken in the most cruel way (the most recent and painful example is one from Sarajevo zoo where children were even fed to tigers in cages)."

The content analysis of official documents of Republika Srpska, Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK), some municipalities and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) revealed that mass media in Serbian-controlled territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) were not independent and free. Instead, they were influenced, instrumentalised and controlled by the Serbian political and military elite. However, this control was not very effective all the time, like in the case of Glas and Kozarski vjesnik, while television, radio and Javnost were very much controlled and influenced throughout the period under our investigation. Kozarski vjesnik was a special case, where we can clearly see the dramatic change of editorial policy in late May 1992, when the

local Serbian political elite interfered in the personnel structure of the newspaper. On the other hand, Glas, despite the replacement of the editor in chief orchestrated by Vojo Kuprešanin and Radoslav Br•anin in July 1992, continued with more or less the same editorial policy. However, a significant change in disseminating propaganda messages occurred in September 1992, when Glas was renamed Glas srpski and became an official daily of Republika Srpska. SDS organs and its members were the main protagonists of the pressure imposed on mass media in the territories of BH controlled by Serbs.

The general media climate produced by Serbian mass media in BH was pervaded mainly with propaganda messages of nationalism, reinterpretation of history and actual events, religious intolerance, psychological cleansing, conspiracy theory, classic (hard) propaganda, accusations of the opponent, and routine lies. However, not all mass media were involved in the dissemination of propaganda to the same extent in the analysed period. While Javnost, television and radio were full of propaganda messages, Glas and Kozarski vjesnik were more moderate. The latter started to perform propaganda more frequently and intensively after the above-mentioned interference of local politicians in the editorial policy, while the former experienced the same destiny when it became a 'republic's' daily Glas Srpski. Nevertheless, generally speaking, Serbian mass media in BH produced the 'critical mass' of war in ideological, religious and political fields. No doubt, some propaganda messages conveyed through media to the public were designed to justify atrocities that occurred in BH in 1992. The stigmatisation of mujahedin and Ustashas applied to the entire ethnic communities of Muslims and Croats living in BH. The Croats and Muslims were satanized, they were presented as religious fanatics, ruthless killers, torturers and rapists, who deserved no mercy: killing of such people was not morally disputable. The opponents of Serbian policy were totally dehumanised and criminalized in mass media. Therefore, the main objective of propagandist to agitate for war and to mobilise Serbian people to participate in it actively, was successfully accomplished.

Radoslav Br•anin played an important role in propaganda activity, not only through his public appearances but also through his deeds, i.e. the 'personnel cleansing' in companies, institutions and media based on the ethnic background of employees and their loyalty to the SDS ideology and policy. His policy was guided by the necessity of

the 'Serbian national question to be resolved' once and for all, and by the imperative 'to defend the biological existence of the Serbian nation in that region'. According to Br•anin, the editorial policy of mass media must work towards the affirmation of the Serbian movement for liberation and the destruction of Ustashas. He used 'biological determinism' to explain the differences between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims. The latter have feelings of antagonism and hate against Serbs in their genes. On that basis, Br•anin also claimed he was against the disbandment of the concentration camps designed for Muslims and Croats.

War propaganda is a somewhat forgotten crime. Nevertheless, already for some time it is recognized in international law and widely penalized in national legislations. The former Yugoslav constitution also contained provisions to prohibit such practices. The important lesson from the Nuremberg trial of major war criminals in August 1945 is that crimes against peace include "preparation" of aggressive war as well as "planning, initiating, or waging" war crimes. Furthermore, "instigators" of these and other war crimes were found criminally responsible no less than "leaders, organizers and accomplices". The Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced German anti-semitic propagandist Julius Streicher to death for crimes against humanity although he took no administrative or military part in such crimes. His acts of anti-Semitic propaganda were judged to be "incitements to murder and extermination" and were considered to fall within the crimes against humanity, including persecution of minorities.³⁰

Prohibition of war propaganda is embodied in Article 20 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as follows:

- 1. Any propaganda of war shall be prohibited by law.**
- 2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility of violence shall be prohibited by law.**

³⁰ Q. Wright: "The Crime of War-Mongering", American journal of International Law, January 1948, 42, No.1, p. 133.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-99-36-T

IN TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before: Judge Carmel A. Agius, Presiding
Judge Ivana Janu
Judge Chikako Taya

Registrar: Mr Hans Holthuis

Date Filed: 18 June 2003

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

RADOSLAV BRĐANIN

APPENDIX B
TO
PROSECUTION'S SUBMISSION OF STATEMENT OF EXPERT
WITNESS PURSUANT TO RULE 94 *BIS*

The Office of the Prosecutor:
Miss Joanna Korner

Counsel for the Accused Brđanin:
Mr John Ackerman
Mr David Cunningham

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

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WITNESS PURSUANT TO RULE 94 *BIS*

Curriculum Vitae

Dr. Sandra Bašić Hrvatin

Dr. Sandra Bašić Hrvatin was born on February 5, 1962 in Rijeka (Croatia).

SCHOOLING, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

In 1979 she concluded her education at the Center of Education and Culture (with focus on philosophy, sociology, arts) with excellence.

In the academic year 1979/1980 she matriculated at the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism in Ljubljana – the Department of International Studies.

After concluding her fourth year, she worked for one year as journalist with the Slovenian department of the Tanjug press agency.

She finished her undergraduate studies in 1987. Her thesis was awarded with the highest academic Prize.

In 1990 she defended her master's thesis with the title *The Construction of Reality in the Media* receiving her MA in Communicology.

In 1996 she defended her doctor's thesis *The Public and Mass Media: From Deconstruction to Reconstruction* and was bestowed a PhD in Communicology.

In July 1997, she was first elected to the post of assistant professor of international communication. Since November 1, 1997 she is employed with the Faculty of Social Science full time.

PAEDAGOGICAL CAREER

Within the Faculty of Social Science, she is the holder of the subjects Introduction to Communication Studies, Communication Systems, Communication Law and Practice and Political Communication. Within the programme of post graduate studies of communication studies, she is the holder of the subject International Communication and Public Diplomacy.

In the academic years 1999/2000 and 2000/2001, she lectured within the post-graduate programme Sociology of Everyday Life at the ISH in Ljubljana. She was Chair of Journalism from 1999 to 2001.

SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH WORK

Her scientific and research work focuses on the issues of media policy, propaganda, communication rights and international communication. She regularly published the results of her research work in national and international scientific magazines. She is regularly participating in international scientific and professional conventions with papers, lectures and presentations.

MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

She is a founding member of the Slovenian Communicological Society and its first secretary. She is member of the International Press Institute and one of the founders of IPI Slovenia and member of the Organising Committee of the IPI Global Convention held in May 2002 in Ljubljana.

PROFESSIONAL WORK

She is a regular speaker on the issue of media regulation. She cooperates with the Association of Journalists on the project of founding a Press Council and settling the situation of independent free-lance journalists. Since 1999 she has been chairing the Council for Broadcasting and is member of the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities. As expert in the field of media regulation, she co-operates with the European Media Institute from Düsseldorf. Since 2000, she works as independent expert for the Council of Europe in the field of the broadcasting media. For the Council of Europe she has set up reports on monitoring the media legislation in numerous Central and Eastern European Countries. She worked in Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Georgia, Moldavia, Romania and the FR of Yugoslavia.

She is member of the editorial board of *Medijske preže* (MediaWatch) critically monitoring the media in South-Eastern Europe, where she regularly publishes her contributions.

