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International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991	Case No. IT-06-90-T
	Date: 18 December 2009
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**IN TRIAL CHAMBER I**

**Before:** Judge Alphons Orie  
Judge Uldis Ķinis  
Judge Elisabeth Gwaunza

**Registrar:** Mr. John Hocking

**Submission:** 18 December 2009

**PROSECUTOR**  
v.  
**ANTE GOTOVINA, IVAN ČERMAK AND MLADEN MARKAČ**

***PUBLIC***

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**DEFENDANT MLADEN MARKAČ'S SUBMISSION OF  
PROFESSOR DRAGUTIN REPINC'S EXPERT REPORT  
PURSUANT TO RULE 94 *bis***

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**For Mladen Markač:** Mr. Goran Mikuličić and Mr. Tomislav Kuzmanović


DEFENDANT MLADEN MARKAČ'S SUBMISSION OF PROFESSOR DRAGUTIN REPINC'S  
EXPERT REPORT PURSUANT TO RULE 94 *bis*

1. Pursuant to Rule 94 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Defence for Mladen Markač hereby submits the report of Witness MM-21, Dragutin Repinc.
2. Mr. Repinc drafted the original report in Croatian, and translated it into English. The original and translated reports are attached as Appendices 'A,' and 'B,' respectively.

Word Count: 54

Dated: 18 December 2009

Respectfully submitted,



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Mr. Goran Mikuličić  
Counsel for Mladen Markač



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Mr. Tomislav Kuzmanović  
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## **APPENDIX A**

**EKSPERTNO IZVJEŠĆE**  
**general bojnik Dragutin Repinc**  
**ZA PREDMET IT-60-09-T**

**SPECIJALNA POLICIJA U OPERACIJI „OLUJA“**

**Zagreb, prosinac 2009.**

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## 1. Životopis

1. Rođen sam 19. studenoga 1959. u Zagrebu. Osnovnu školu sam završio u Sesvetama 1974. godine, a Vojnu gimnaziju 1978. godine.
2. Svoju sam vojničku karijeru započeo 1982. godine nakon završetka Vojne akademije kopnene vojske – smjer inženjerija, kao potporučnik na dužnosti zapovjednika voda u Školi pričuvnih časnika inženjerije.
3. Od 1984. do 1991. godine radio sam kao nastavnik opće taktike i taktike inženjerije te sam završio tečajeve za zapovjednika voda, zapovjednika satnije i zapovjednika bojne u inženjeriji. Kao nastavnik opće taktike držao sam nastavu iz taktike rodova s kojima inženjerija najčešće djeluje u borbi (pješaštvo, oklopno-mehanizirane postrojbe).
4. U rujnu 1991. postao sam pripadnik Hrvatske vojske u kojoj obnašam niz dužnosti, uglavnom u području operativnih poslova i obuke.
5. Od 1992. – 1993. godine obnašam dužnost savjetnika za operativno ratno planiranje u zapovjedništvu Operativne zone Zagreb. Na toj dužnosti sudjelujem u izradi operativnih planova, zapovijedi i odluka za vođenje borbenih djelovanja postrojbi koje pripadaju OZ Zagreb, vodim radne zemljovide te ostale grafičke prikaze, kao i sve ostale borbene dokumente koji se vode u operativnom odjelu, surađujem sa svim ostalim stožernim dijelovima za uključivanje njihovih planskih elemenata u operativne i ratne planove, te pratim njihovu provedbu.
6. Nakon završetka Zapovjedno-stožerne škole od kolovoza do prosinca 1994. ostajem u školi kao nastavnik taktike, gdje učim polaznike taktici borbene uporabe postrojbi do razine brigade (proces donošenja odluka i izrada borbenih dokumenata).
7. Od siječnja 1995. do lipnja 1996. radim s američkom kompanijom MPRI, a temeljno područje stručnosti je upravljanje obukom, a pored toga držim nastavu i iz područja upravljanja organizacijom i vođenja. Bio sam nositelj uvođenja američkog sustava obuke u Hrvatsku vojsku, te sam se upoznao i s organizacijom američke

vojske, kao i sustavom organizacije namjenski organiziranih snaga za borbenu zadaću.

8. Od lipnja 1996. do lipnja 1997. završio sam američku Zapovjedno-stožernu školu (Command and General Staff Course) na kojoj sam, pored ostalog, izučavao taktiku (planiranje, organiziranje, odlučivanje, uporaba, izrada borbenih dokumenata) postrojbi razine brigade, divizije i korpusa, a pored toga kao izborni predmet sam odabrao primijenjenu taktiku (Applied Tactics).

9. Od 1999. do 2003. godine radim kao načelnik Odjela za operativno planiranje gdje sam odgovoran za sva gledišta planiranja, usklađivanja i pripreme za buduće planirane i izvanredne operacije, uključujući i izradu ratnih planova te usklađivanja i planiranja pripreme i modifikacije zemljišta i infrastrukture za rat.

10. U to vrijeme pa sve do 2005. godine pored svoje redovne dužnosti voditelj sam kolegija i predavač na Ratnoj školi za predmete Pojmovi ratnog umijeća, Operativno umijeće i Neratne operacije.

11. Od 2003. do kraja 2005. godine obnašam dužnost načelnika stožera (Chief of Staff) u Zapovjedništvu Hrvatske kopnene vojske gdje su mi temeljne zadaće organizacija i upravljanje svih aktivnosti i usklađivanje rada stožernih odjela, nadzor svih zadaća dodijeljenih stožeru, upravljanje zahtjevima za kritičnim zapovjedničkim informacijama, organizacija, planiranje i provedba obuke u stožeru te osiguranje da je sav stožerni rad sukladan zadaćama i naputcima zapovjednika.

12. Od prosinca 2005. do prosinca 2007. postavljen sam za zapovjednika UN misije UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) sa mandatom praćenja, nadzora i izvješćivanja o narušavanju prekida vatre uzduž crte nadzora između Indije i Pakistana u Kašmiru.

13. Po povratku iz misije do danas obnašam dužnost načelnika Uprave za planiranje u Glavnom stožeru OS RH gdje sam odgovoran za obrambeno planiranje, planiranje snaga, planiranje, programiranje i izradu proračuna te za bilateralnu i multilateralnu međunarodnu vojnu suradnju.

14. Pored redovitog vojnog školovanja završio sam veći broj američkih i NATO/PfP tečajeva i seminara (operativni engleski jezik, upravljanje resursima i dr.).

15. Preveo sam nekoliko američkih pravila na hrvatski jezik (Obuka snaga (Train the Force), Borbeno usredotočena obuka (Battle Focused Training), Operacije (Operations), Taktika (Tactics)), a napisao sam Uputu o vojnim vježbama u Oružanim snagama Republike Hrvatske.

16. Tijekom operacije Oluja kao djelatnik MPRI-DTAP programa na temelju zapovijedi načelnika GS HV upućen sam na IZM GS HV u Đakovo kao časnik za operativne poslove te sam cijelo vrijeme Oluje ostao u istočnoj Slavoniji. Nakon gašenja IZM Đakovo vraćen sam nazad na svoje radno mjesto u Zagreb. Kao časnik za operativne poslove bio sam zadužen za izradu operativnih dokumenata (planova, zapovijedi, operativnih zemljovida), nadzor operativne spremnosti zapovjedništava I postrojbi, vođenje ratnog dnevnika i izradu dnevnih operativnih izvješća.

## 2. Metodologija

17. Odlukom ministra obrane određen sam u radnu skupinu za izradu raščlambe operacije "Oluja". Međutim, prije nego što je počeo rad na dokumentu otišao sam na dužnost zapovjednika UN Misije UNMOGIP tako da uopće nisam sudjelovao u izradi raščlambe jer je ona završena u srpnju 2007., nekoliko mjeseci prije mog povratka.

18. Nekoliko mjeseci nakon povratka iz misije zamoljen sam od strane odvjetničkog tima general pukovnika Mladena Markača da izradim vojnu ekspertizu djelovanja Skupnih snaga specijalne policije u operaciji „Oluja“. U tu sam svrhu dobio dokumente tužilaštva, uključujući i ekspertizu gosp. Theunensa, te veliki broj dokumenata koji su uglavnom bili snimljeni na CD-ovima, a dobio sam i pisanu verziju dokumenta „Raščlamba operacije Oluja“.

19. Tijekom pripreme ekspertize obišao sam područje djelovanja Skupnih snaga specijalne policije u sektoru Jug i upoznao se s taktičkim i zemljopisnim uvjetima toga prostora.

20. Tijekom suđenja dva sam dana prisustvovao svjedočenju vojnog eksperta tužiteljstva gosp. Theunensa.

21. Težište u izradi raščlambe bilo je utvrditi odnos general pukovnika Mladena Markača i načelnika GS HV, kao nadređenog u lancu zapovijedanja tijekom operacije i nakon nje tijekom pretresa terena, odnosno zaključiti je li general pukovnik Mladen Markač provodio isključivo zapovijedi načelnika GS HV ili je samostalno donosio pojedine odluke za djelovanje. Pored toga, željelo se utvrditi koje su to specifičnosti organizacije i djelovanja specijalnih jedinica policije u odnosu na klasične vojne postrojbe i kako te specifičnosti utječu na način organiziranja i funkcioniranja sustava planiranja, organiziranja i zapovijedanja Skupnim snagama specijalne policije tijekom borbenih djelovanja. Drugi je cilj bio utvrditi ima li u dokumentima koje je general pukovnik Mladen Markač dobivao od načelnika GS HV, te u dokumentima koje je Stožer skupnih snaga specijalne policije izrađivao i dostavljao svome nadređenome i podređenima bilo što, što bi moglo ukazati na nepoštivanje odredbi međunarodnog ratnog prava.

22. Kronologija djelovanja Skupnih snaga specijalne policije izrađena je na temelju dostupnih dokumenata kako bi se pokazao obujam, intenzitet i rezultati djelovanja, dok je analiza djelovanja ZP Gospić i ZP Split rađena samo u onome dijelu gdje su djelovanja ta dva ZP imala izravan utjecaj na djelovanje Skupnih snaga. Grafički prikaz djelovanja po danima izrađen je isključivo na temelju Raščlambe tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije od 28. rujna 1995.

### 3. Uvod

23. Oslobođanje svih okupiranih područja Republike Hrvatske imperativ je koji pred civilnim i vojnim vlastima RH stoji još od 1991. godine. Planiranje napadnih operacija za ostvarenje toga cilja provode svi načelnici Glavnoga stožera, a planovi su ovisili prvenstveno o političkim i vojnim uvjetima koji su prevladavali u trenutku izrade planova.

24. Tako načelnik Glavnog stožera Hrvatske vojske (GS HV) general pukovnik Anton Tus 10. listopada 1991. izdaje zapovjedništvima Operativnih zona Osijek, Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Rijeka i Split zapovijed „ u cilju dugoročnijeg pripremanja i borbenog djelovanja za razbijanje neprijatelja i oslobađanja cijelog teritorija Republike Hrvatske.“<sup>1</sup>

25. U toj zapovijedi Operativna zona Split (OZ Split) dobiva zadaću da odlučnije počne s borbenim djelovanjem s ciljem razbijanja neprijatelja i oslobađanja teritorija u širem dalmatinskom zaleđu, dok OZ Karlovac i OZ Rijeka trebaju osloboditi širi teritorij Like i Korduna, a kasnije zajedno sa snagama OZ Split i Kninsku krajinu.

26. Posebno je važno istaknuti sljedeću točku zapovijedi:

*„Na dijelovima teritorija gdje se nalaze četničko-teritorijalne snage potpomognute tehnikom i snagama JA što prije prijeći u odlučnije napadno djelovanje s ciljem rasjecanja i razbijanja snaga neprijatelja, brzog ovladavanja značajnim točkama, kotama i naseljima, stvarajući uvjete za brz prodor jačih snaga i širenje uspjeha. U tome primjenjivati udare po pravcima, bez širenja snaga i čišćenja cijelog teritorija, izbjеći frontalne sukobe jačim snagama i usporavanja tempa.“<sup>2</sup>*

27. Taktički zahtjevi da se brzo ovlada značajnim točkama, kotama i naseljima, da se napada po smjerovima, bez širenja (rasipanja) snaga i čišćenja cijelog teritorija (tj. da se čišćenje zemljišta provede nakon što se ostvare glavni ciljevi napada), uz izbjegavanje većih frontalnih napada i bez usporavanja tempa, bili su prevladavajući planski čimbenici u operaciji „Oluja“.

28. U posljednjoj točki zapovijedi načelnik GS HV zapovjednike operativnih zona čini odgovornim „u pripremi i izvršavanju aktivnosti i borbenom djelovanju... za

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<sup>1</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: str.pov. 8/91-01/118, Ur.broj: 5120-01-91-1, od 15. listopada 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Isto, točka 3.

*suradnju, sadejstvo i koordinaciju sa svim snagama u zonama odgovornosti, općinama i kriznim štabovima, zapovjedništvima i jedinicama MUP-a...*<sup>3</sup>,

a takva suradnja i koordinacija regulirana je u gotovo svim direktivama ili zapovijedima za borbena djelovanja (napad, obranu) koje se s razine Glavnog stožera šalju podređenim zapovjednicima.

29. Temeljna ideja oslobađanja cjelokupnog teritorija RH vidljiva je i u Direktivi načelnika GS HV iz 1992. godine:

*„Odmah intenzivirati sve pripreme za podizanje borbene spremnosti zapovjedništava i jedinica Hrvatske vojske na najviši stupanj kojim osigurati iznenadno, jednovremeno i energično izvođenje napadnih operacija protiv snaga neprijatelja na svim područjima koje je privremeno zaposjeo s ciljem: razbiti, uništiti i izbaciti sa državnog teritorija sve neprijateljske snage, JA, četničke, teritorijalne i druge paravojne jedinice i osloboditi cjelokupan teritorij Republike Hrvatske.“*<sup>4</sup>

30. I u toj se direktivi, koja je početkom 1992. godine prihvaćena i usvojena na sjednici Vijeća obrane i nacionalne sigurnosti (VONS), ističu izbor najpovoljnijih rejlona – zona i pravaca uz izbjegavanje jačih snaga, bolje utvrđenih i zapriječenih objekata i većih naselja; brzi prodori u dubinu s ciljem odsijecanja i dubljeg okruženja snaga u dodiru, uz punu koordinaciju vatrenih udara, čišćenja minskih zapreka i osiguranja pokreta; preciznom planiranju i izvršavanju udara po ciljevima čijim se uništenjem - neutraliziranjem najviše može narušiti moral neprijatelja, spriječiti njegovo vatreno djelovanje i osigurati brz prodor jedinica u napadu.<sup>5</sup>

31. Tijekom 1993. i 1994. godine nastavljeno je s izvođenjem stožernih trenaža, taktičkih vježbi i intenzivnog obučavanja časnika i dočasnika u Hrvatskom vojnom učilištu. Godišnje zapovijedi za obuku postaju sve određenije i daju precizno usmjerenje kakva se vrsta obuke i praktičnih uvježbavanja treba provesti na određenoj razini.

32. Tako načelnik Glavnog stožera HV u svojoj Godišnjoj zapovijedi za vojnu obuku i odgoj zapovjedništava i postrojaba HV u 1994. godini<sup>6</sup> kao svoju godišnju temu za obuku zapovjedništava i postrojaba određuje „Obrambenu operaciju HV s prelaskom u protuudar“. Svako je zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja dobilo zadaću

<sup>3</sup> Isto, točka 12.

<sup>4</sup> Direktiva za izvođenje strategijske ofenzive Hrvatske vojske, Glavni štožer Hrvatske vojske, 1992. godine.

<sup>5</sup> Isto, točka 2.

<sup>6</sup> Godišnja zapovijed za obuku, Klasa: Str.pov. 813-01/94-01/03, Ur.broj: 512-06-18-94-1, od 15. siječnja 1994.

provedbe dva stožerna trenaža, po jednog u svakom polugodištu u svom području odgovornosti.

33. Krajem 1994. godine načelnik Glavnog stožera HV u svojoj Godišnjoj zapovijedi za vojnu obuku i odgoj zapovjedništava i postrojaba HV u 1995. godini<sup>7</sup> kao svoju godišnju temu za obuku zapovjedništava određuje „Napadnu operaciju HV“ s težištem na osposobljenosti zapovjedništava u planiranju, pripremi i izvedbi bojnih djelovanja i provedbi mobilizacije uz izlazak zapovjedništava na zapovjedna mjesta, razvoj sustava veze i osiguranja.

34. Promjena usredotočenja obuke s obrane na napad pokazuje da se na strateškoj razini odlučivanja u HV došlo do zaključka da će se pitanje okupiranih područja RH morati rješavati vojnim sredstvima.

35. Završne planske pripreme na izradi dokumenata za potpuno oslobađanje okupiranih područja RH provele su se početkom 1995. godine kada se pristupilo izradi plana operacije i donošenju integralne Direktive pod nazivom „Bljesak“ (gdje su zadaće pojedinih zbornih područja bile numerirane od 1 do 5). Nakon što je prema Direktivi „Bljesak-1“ oslobođena zapadna Slavonija, direktive za ZP Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić i Split mijenjaju svoj naziv u „Oluja“ te se izdaju pod imenima „Oluja-1“ do „Oluja-4“ u drugoj polovini lipnja 1995., a po kojima se operacija i izvodi početkom kolovoza 1995.

36. Konačnu odluku o provedbi operacije „Oluja“ donio je vrhovni zapovjednik dr. Franjo Tuđman na Brijunima 31. srpnja 1995.

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<sup>7</sup> Godišnja zapovijed za obuku, Klasa: Str.pov. 813-01/94-02/57, Ur.broj: 512-06-18-94-1, od 31. prosinca 1994.

#### 4. Temelji zajedničkog djelovanja Hrvatske vojske i Specijalne policije u borbenim djelovanjima

37. Zajedničko djelovanje postrojbi Hrvatske vojske i policijskih postrojbi Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova uobičajeno je od 1991. godine. Težilo se da u svim operacijama/akcijama Hrvatske vojske sudjeluju svi oni koji na bilo koji način sudjeluju u oružanom ili neoružanom pružanju otpora na određenom području obuhvaćenom borbenim aktivnostima. Tako npr. načelnik GS HV 27. listopada 1991. izdaje zapovijed zapovjedništvima Operativne zone Zagreb i Bjelovar i Operativnoj grupi „Posavina“:

*„Snagama OG „Posavina“, (1. brigada ZNG, 125. brigada, 121. brigada i jedinice podrške), 105. brigada/OZ Bjelovar i svim snagama MUP-a, narodne zaštite i ostalim snagama na tom području izvršiti energičan jednovremeni napad...“<sup>8</sup>*

38. Zapovjedni odnosi između Hrvatske vojske i policijskih postrojbi Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova utemeljeni su i razvijani i provođeni u praksi još 1991. godine, a oblikovao ih je u svom dopisu prema ministru obrane, ministru unutarnjih poslova, zamjeniku ministra i načelniku Glavnog stožera pomoćnik ministra UP gosp. Joško Morić:

*„Međusobni odnos zapovjednika Hrvatske vojske i zapovjednika policije na svim razinama odgovornosti mora biti koordinirajući i suradnički. Isključena je mogućnost da zapovijedaju jedni drugima. Međutim, kad se policija, po zahtjevu zapovjedništva Hrvatske vojske, stavlja u funkciju obrambenih ratnih djelovanja, policijske jedinice stavljaju se pod zapovjedništvo Hrvatske vojske. Zapovjedništvo Hrvatske vojske ima obvezu materijalno – tehnički popuniti i doopremiti policijsku jedinicu sukladno zadatku na kojem se angažira.*

*Držimo potrebitim da zahtjevi za sudjelovanje policije u borbenim djelovanjima idu preko Glavnog stožera i MUP-a koji će prosuditi svrhovitost, odobravati sudjelovanje i za njega snositi odgovornost.“<sup>9</sup>*

39. Dakle odnosi su prije svega trebali biti suradnički, ali utemeljeni na jasnom zapovjednom odnosu koji je načelno uvijek bio jednosmjern tako da su zapovjednici vojnih postrojba mogli zapovijedati pridodanim – podređenim postrojbama specijalne

<sup>8</sup> Zapovijed Zapovjedništva ZNG, Klasa: str.pov. 8/91-01/169, Ur.broj: 5120-21-91, od 27. listopada 1991.

<sup>9</sup> Dopis pomoćnika ministra UP-a, Broj: 511-01-22-30232/91, Zagreb, 12. prosinca 1991.

policije, ali je situacija u kojoj se vojne snage pridodaju – podređuju zapovjedniku specijalne policije bila nepoznata.

40. Zajedničko djelovanje specijalne policije s hrvatskom vojskom regulira se i u privremenom Pravilniku o unutarnjem redu specijalne policije:

” *Članak 23.*  
*Moguće je zajedničko obnašanje zadaća iz djelokruga djelovanja specijalne policije s pripadnicima Ministarstva obrane Republike Hrvatske, Glavnog stožera Hrvatske vojske, koje isključivo odobrava ministar odnosno njegov zamjenik (zamjenik prekríženo i rukom dopisano njegov pomoćnik za specijalnu policiju).<sup>10</sup>*

41. Proces sudjelovanja Specijalne policije u vojnim operacijama započinjao bi zahtjevom načelnika GS HV prema vrhovnom zapovjedniku, a nakon odobrenja zahtjeva, ministar unutarnjih poslova davao je svoju suglasnost na temelju koje je Sektor specijalne policije počinjao s pripremama za sudjelovanje u operaciji. Nakon toga bi se sve ostale aktivnosti realizirale prema zapovijedima načelnika GS HV, ali samo za zadaće iz djelokruga rada specijalne policije.

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<sup>10</sup> Privremeni Pravilnik o unutarnjem redu Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-46-1384/93 od 13. prosinca 1993.

## 5. Osposobljenost Specijalne policije za sudjelovanje u borbenim djelovanjima

42. Kako je to regulirano člankom 24. Zakona o unutarnjim poslovima, specijalna policija je namijenjena:

*„Za borbu protiv svih oblika diverzantsko-terorističkih djelovanja, sprečavanja otmica osoba i prijevoznih sredstava, oslobađanje talaca te obavljanja drugih poslova iz djelokruga Ministarstva pod posebnim uvjetima, osniva se specijalna policija.“<sup>11</sup>*

43. Iz ove je definicije vidljivo da vođenje dugotrajnih borbenih operacija, provedbom napadnih i obrambenih operacija na bojištu, nije zadaća koja je posebno specificirana u Zakonu o unutarnjim poslovima.

44. Međutim, kao što je napomenuto u prethodnom naslovu, postrojbe Specijalne policije tradicionalno sudjeluju u borbenim djelovanjima od 1991. godine i kontinuirano poboljšavaju svoju osposobljenost kroz iskustva i znanja stečena praksom u nizu operacija i manjih akcija do kolovoza 1995. godine, stručnim usavršavanjem bilo samostalno u svom središtu za obuku, bilo slanjem svojih predstavnika na Vojno učilište, kao i provedbom zajedničkih stožernih trenaža i uvježbavanja s Glavnim stožerom HV.

45. Na praktičnoj razini najviše se znanja i iskustava steklo kroz sudjelovanje u operativnim akcijama i operacijama. Prva akcija, kojom je počelo intenzivnije dovođenje postrojbi Specijalne policije na Velebit u područje s kojeg se 1995. godine provela operacija „Oluja“ bila je „Poskok-1“ koja je započela krajem travnja, a završila krajem rujna 1992. U kolovozu 1992. pokreće se utemeljenje akcije „Poskok-2“ s prvenstvenim ciljem izviđanja i sprječavanja neprijateljskih diverzantsko-terorističkih grupa u izbijanju na prometnice koje s Velebita vode na Jadransku magistralu, kao i njihov pronalazak, razbijanje, uhićenje, razoružanje, privođenje ili uništenje.<sup>12</sup> U naredne tri godine postrojbe Specijalne policije dovode se na Velebit u područje koje je podijeljeno u tri sektora. Iako su u sklopu ove akcije tijekom naredne tri godine snage Specijalne policije napravile određene pomake i osvojile određena manja područja, zbog neprekidne dvotjedne rotacije snaga i borbenih djelovanja ograničenih na razinu manjih skupina nisu stečena iskustva i znanja potrebna za

<sup>11</sup> Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o unutarnjim poslovima, Broj: PA4-92/1-94, od 12. listopada 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Prijedlog utemeljenja akcije „Poskok“, Broj: 511-01-34-19/92, od 18. kolovoza 1992.

provedbu operacije kao što je bila „Oluja“. Ono što jest stečeno je potpuno poznavanje Velebita, uvjeta života i rada na njemu, načinu kretanja i psihofizičke sposobnosti kroz „izvidničko-diverzantske akcije i prepade u neprijateljskoj dubini“.<sup>13</sup>

46. Tijekom 1993. godine izvedene su dvije operacije (u dokumentima Specijalne policije ne govori se o operacijama već o akcijama) na planini Velebit i to „Maslenica“ (od 21. do 27. siječnja uz sudjelovanje oko 1000 pripadnika specijalne policije) i „Medački džep“ (9. – 14. rujna 1995. s oko 750 pripadnika specijalne policije). Premda su obje akcije Specijalne policije provedene na puno manjem prostoru i uz sudjelovanje manje ljudi nego u operaciji „Oluja“, u obje su operacije stečena određena iskustva o međusobnom djelovanju i koordinaciji s postrojbama Hrvatske vojske.

47. U svibnju 1995. godine Skupne snage SJP MUP-a sudjeluju u operaciji „Bljesak“ (1. - 4. svibnja 1995. sa snagama jačine jedne brigade). U toj su operaciji specijalne snage MUP-a bile izravno podređene načelniku GS HV, a organizacijski su podijeljene u jedno glavno i dva niža zapovjedništva.

48. Pored iskustava iz praktičnog rada na zemljištu, pripadnici Specijalnih jedinica policije su se osposobljavali i kroz civilni i policijski sustav školovanja i obuke. Tijekom 1994. godine ustrojen je Obučni centar specijalne policije. U svom godišnjem izvješću za 1995. godinu general pukovnik Mladen Markač navodi:

*„U protekloj godini Sektor specijalne policije u suradnji sa drugim ustrojstvenim jedinicama MUP-a te GSHV-e, ustrojio je ukupno 20 raznih specijalističkih tečajeva koje je pohađalo 1134 djelatnika Specijalne policije te 16 stručnih seminara koje je pohađalo 533 djelatnika.“<sup>14</sup>*

49. Prema tom izvješću je tijekom 1995. godine do početka operacije „Oluja“ održan Tečaj za rukovoditelje u SJP sa 60 polaznika te Tečaj za vođe specijalističkih grupa sa 75 polaznika.

50. Tečaj za rukovoditelje je pokrивao gotovo sva područja policijske, ali i vojne taktike.<sup>15</sup> Tako se na tečaju između ostaloga izučavala opća vojna taktika od razine pojedinca, specijalističke grupe do specijalne jedinice (obrana, napad, izviđanje, zasjeda, pretraga terena i borba protiv diverzantsko-terorističkih grupa (DTG), taktika

<sup>13</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Godišnje izvješće o radu Specijalne policije MUP-a RH u 1995. godini, Broj: 511-01-30- /96, Zagreb, 22. veljače 1996.

<sup>15</sup> Dopis načelnika Sektora specijalne policije pomoćniku ministra gospodinu Mladenu Markaču pod nazivom „Zapovjedništvo, nositelji nastave na Tečaju za rukovoditelje u Specijalnim jedinicama policije, dostavlja se, molimo suglasnost“, Broj: 511-01-31-127/95, od 31. siječnja 1995.

čišćenja naseljenog mjesta), policijska taktika, rad na minobacačima, a u sklopu teorijskih stručnih tema izučavalo se ratno pravo u trajanju od dva sata.

51. U odnosu na međunarodno ratno pravo Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova je 1992. godine izdalo priručnik „Ponašanje u borbena-stresnim situacijama“<sup>16</sup> za potrebe osposobljavanje svojih djelatnika. U priručniku se ukazuje na nefunkcionalno ponašanje u borbena-stresnim situacijama, uzrokovanih poglavito borbenim umorom i neposluhom. Posebno se ukazuje na ponašanja koja se zbog nepoštovanja stege, i u ekstremnim situacijama kršenja ratnog prava, moraju prijaviti, počinitelje izvesti pred sud i kazniti. Ta se ponašanja prvenstveno odnose na odbijanje uhićenja neprijatelja (neprihvatanje predaje), ubijanje neprijateljskih zarobljenika, unakaživanje mrtvog neprijatelja, mučenje zatvorenika, pljačkanje i silovanje te ubijanje civila (neboraca).

52. Organizacijom ovakvih tečajeva je postignuto puno, ali oni nisu mogli u kratko vrijeme obuhvatiti sve osobe koje su imale funkciju vođa pa je postojala razlika po pitanju obučenosti zapovjednog osoblja. Na primjer, unutarnji ustroj pojedinih specijalnih jedinica policije uvjetovan je brojem pripadnika u postrojbi, a svaka postrojba je imala nekoliko razina zapovijedanja: zapovjednik, pomoćnik, instruktor, vođa specijalističke grupe i zamjenik vođe specijalističke grupe. Broj djelatnika koji su obavljali zapovjedne dužnosti na svim razinama ovisio je o broju pripadnika u pojedinim postrojbama.

53. Jačina jedinice kreće se od 100 do 250 pripadnika (jedinice mogu imati 100, 120, 150, 180, 200 ili 250 pripadnika), a unutarnja organizacija je prilagođena jačini. Tako npr. jedinica jačine 100 pripadnika ima jednog zapovjednika, 2 pomoćnika zapovjednika, 6 instruktora specijalističke obuke, 11 vođa specijalističke grupe i 78 specijalaca, dok jedinica jačine 200 pripadnika ima jednog zapovjednika, 3 pomoćnika zapovjednika, 10 instruktora specijalističke obuke, 23 vođe specijalističke grupe i 160 specijalaca.<sup>17</sup> Prema tom dokumentu u 20 jedinica specijalne policije nalazilo se preko 280 vođa grupa, ne računajući više razine zapovijedanja, a za tu je strukturu trebalo puno vremena za obuku.

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<sup>16</sup> COMBAT STRESS BEHAVIORS, Risk Factors and Leader Actions, Department of the Army, USA, 1991., izdanje MUP, Sektor za odnose s javnošću i izdavačku djelatnost, Odjel za izdavačku djelatnost i dokumentaciju, prevela Irena Šarović.

<sup>17</sup> Prijedlog ustroja Specijalnih jedinica policije pri Policijskim upravama shodno županijskom ustroju Republike Hrvatske, Broj: 511-01-34-576/93, od 9. srpnja 1993.

## 6. Zapovjedni odnosi unutar specijalne policije MUP-a RH

54. Unutar Sektora specijalne policije vladali su hijerarhijski odnosi, kao i unutar jedinica specijalne policije. Prema Uredbi o unutarnjem ustrojstvu i načinu rada MUP-a RH, radom Sektora specijalne policije upravlja pomoćnik ministra, a rukovodi načelnik sektora.<sup>18</sup>

55. General pukovnik Mladen Markač, kao pomoćnik ministra, prilikom izdavanja zadaća, nije izravno izdavao zapovijedi zapovjednicima SJP dok su se oni nalazili u svojim matičnim Policijskim upravama. Svaka zapovijed za uporabu SJP morala se uputiti na ruke načelnika Policijske uprave (PU) s naznakom „uručiti zapovjedniku SJP“, kako bi načelnik PU bio upoznat s angažiranjem specijalnih jedinica iz svog sastava. Kao primjer mogu se navesti sve zapovijedi koje je Sektor specijalne policije uputio za dovođenje specijalnih jedinica policije za operaciju „Oluja“, a zbog njihove brojnosti ovdje se navode samo neke.<sup>19</sup>

56. General pukovnik Mladen Markač izravno je zapovijedao specijalnim jedinicama kada su one postale sastavnim dijelom Skupnih snaga specijalne policije u području operacije. Prije toga i nakon povratka u matičnu PU, specijalnom jedinicom policije zapovijedao je načelnik PU u čijem se sastavu jedinica nalazila, uz obvezu da se o izdanim zadaćama upozna Sektor specijalne policije.

### „ Članak 15.

*Zapovjednik specijalne jedinice odgovoran je za rad specijalne jedinice policije policijske uprave na području matične policijske uprave načelniku policijske uprave. Načelnik policijske uprave ili iznimno njegov zamjenik osobno izdaju napatke za izvršenje neposrednih zadaća iz djelokruga rada specijalne policije.*

*Načelnik policijske uprave ili njegov zamjenik nalaže uporabu specijalne jedinice glede izvršenja zadataka iz djelokruga rada specijalne jedinice (policije) na području policijske uprave, a u skladu s njegovom prosudbom o sigurnosnom stanju.*

*Zapovjednik izvršava zadaću dobivenu neposredno od načelnika policijske uprave ili njegovog zamjenika u skladu s pravilima struke glede najsvrsishodnijeg*

<sup>18</sup> Uredba o unutarnjem ustrojstvu i načinu rada Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske od 23. veljače 1995., članak 27.

<sup>19</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP svim načelnicima PU (osim PU Virovitičko-podravske i PU Međimurske) i ATJ Lučko, Broj: 511-01-31-1015/95, od 29. srpnja 1995.; Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP SJP PU Dubrovačko-neretvanske, Broj: 511-01-31-1038/95, od 30. srpnja 1995.; Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP SJP PU Šibenske, Sisačko-moslavačke, Splitsko-dalmatinske, Zagrebačke i Zadarsko-kninske, Broj: 511-01-31-1129/95, od 18. kolovoza 1995.;

*načina postupanja i djelovanja. Po obavljenoj zadaći, podnosi izvješće načelniku policijske uprave i načelniku Sektora specijalne policije MUP-a.*

#### *Članak 16.*

*Specijalne jedinice policije upotrebljavaju se prema odlukama načelnika policijske uprave i zamjenika (pomoćnika) ministra ili osobe koju zamjenik (pomoćnik) ministra odredi.*

*Ukoliko načelnik policijske uprave procijeni da postoji potreba za uporabom više od 50% djelatnika specijalne jedinice policijske uprave u vremenskom razdoblju duljem od 7 dana, suglasnost za uporabu zatražit će od načelnika Sektora specijalne policije (pomoćnika ministra za specijalnu policiju).<sup>20</sup>*

57. Pored toga, general Markač nije zapovijedao onim specijalnim snagama koje je načelnik GS HV svojom zapovijedi odredio kao dio svojih snaga kojima izravno zapovijeda:

*„U širem području Zadra (Šepurine) GS HV i dalje zadržava u svojoj pričuvu postrojbu specijalnih snaga MUP-a.<sup>21</sup>*

58. ili snagama koje je dodijelio svojim podređenima, kao u slučaju SJP PU Karlovačke koja je podređena zapovjedniku IZM GS HV general bojniku Marijanu Marekoviću:

*„1. Specijalne snage MUP-a PU Karlovačke (160 policajaca) u pričuvu IZM GSHV Ogulin.*

*2. IZM GSHV Ogulin regulirat će njihovu uporabu temeljem zapovijedi NGSHV.*

*3. Rok za izvršenje ove zapovijedi 20,00 sati 03.08.1995. O izvršenju zapovijedi izvjestiti me preko SOC GSHV.<sup>22</sup>*

59. Kad se jednom uspostavio Stožer (zapovjedništvo) Skupnih snaga tada se crta zapovijedanja jasno protezala od zapovjednika operacije, što je uglavnom bio general pukovnik Mladen Markač, preko načelnika Stožera skupnih snaga (brigadir Željko Sačić) na zapovjednike pravaca napada, do zapovjednika postrojbi specijalne policije koji su bili u sastavu određenog pravca.

<sup>20</sup> Privremeni pravilnik o unutarnjem redu Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-46-1384/93, od 13. prosinca 1993.

<sup>21</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV zapovjedniku ZP Split, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-334, od 30. srpnja 1995.

<sup>22</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV general pukovniku Mladenu Markaču, Klasa 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-360 od 3. kolovoza 1995. u 16,00 sati.

## 7. Neka razmatranja od utjecaja na način funkcioniranja Skupnih snaga specijalne policije

### 7.1. Skupne snage SJP MUP-a

#### 7.1.1. Uvod

60. Premda su postrojbe specijalne policije bile temelj na kojem je nastala i razvila se Hrvatska vojska 1991. godine, i premda su svih godina rata aktivno sudjelovale u borbenim djelovanjima, one su bile policijska, a ne vojna organizacija, kao što niti Stožer skupnih snaga SJP MUP-a nije bio vojno nego policijsko zapovjedništvo. Ovo treba naglasiti da bi se jasno ukazalo na to da se ne smije jednako promatrati i uspoređivati npr. Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja sa Stožerom skupnih snaga, bez obzira što su i jedni i drugi bili izravno podređeni načelniku GS HV i postali dio jedinstvenog sustava zapovijedanja i nadzora u operaciji „Oluja“ bez kojeg se ta operacija ne bi mogla uspješno provesti. Tako kada general pukovnik Mladen Markač, tada kao specijalni savjetnik ministra za specijalnu policiju, u svom godišnjem izvješću ministru unutarnjih poslova gosp. Ivanu Jarnjaku kaže:

*„U vojno-redarstvenoj operaciji „Oluja“, Specijalna policija je sudjelovala sa snagama jačine dvije pješачke brigade...“<sup>23</sup>*

on govori o veličinskom ekvivalentu vojne postrojbe u odnosu na ukupan broj pripadnika specijalne policije koji su sudjelovali u operaciji, a ne nikako o organizaciji. To nije niti moguće jer specijalne postrojbe koje su organizirane na razini Policijskih uprava jednostavno se zovu specijalne jedinice policije bez naziva koji bi mogao ukazati na odgovarajuću vojnu postrojbu (vod, satnija, bojna i sl.).

61. Takve se jedinice mogu slagati i preslagivati unutar i između sebe jer su relativno fleksibilne, ali samo do određene razine. Kada se jednom u sklopu Skupnih snaga SP MUP-a od njih pokuša stvoriti namjenska organizacija koja u sebi ima više jedinica pa zajednički naraste na organizaciju koja je ekvivalenta bojne ili veće, tada nastaje problem nepostojanja zapovjedništva (zapovjedne strukture) takve bojne koje se mora složiti od zapovjednog kadra unutar jedinice, čime se slabi sustav zapovijedanja jedinica čiji djelatnici tvore privremeno zapovjedništvo. Stvaranje

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<sup>23</sup> Godišnje izvješće o radu Specijalne policije MUP-a RH u 1995. godini, Broj:511-01-30- 96, od 22. veljače 1996.

privremenih zapovjedništava i imenovanje privremenih zapovjednika može uspješno funkcionirati samo ako među njima vlada apsolutno povjerenje u sposobnosti zapovjednika za uspješno vođenje.

### 7.1.2. Organizacija

62. Skupne snage SJP je opći pojam za snage koje su se nalazile u provedbi iste zadaće, a njihova veličina, sastav, broj postrojaba, kao i način vođenja ovisio je konkretnoj situaciji tj. dobivenoj zadaći, neprijatelju, zemljištu, raspoloživim snagama i sredstvima i drugim čimbenicima. Načelno to su mogle biti snage jedinica specijalne policije iz najmanje dvije policijske uprave, pa do SJP iz gotovo svih PU, kao što je bio slučaj u operaciji „Oluja“ (izuzev dvije). U tom smislu skupne snage nemaju svoj stalan organizacijski ili ustrojbeni oblik ili strukturu već se radi o privremenom sastavu koji se namjenski organizira za zadaću. Da bi Skupne snage stvarno postale skupne, potreban je još jedan uvjet, a to je da postoji potreba da s njima izravno zapovijeda Sektor specijalne policije, uglavnom ustrojavanjem Stožera skupnih snaga.

63. Na taj su se način ustrojavale Skupne snage za sudjelovanje u ratnim operacijama koje su provodile pod zapovijedanjem načelnika GS HV („Maslenica“, „Medački džep“, Bljesak“ i „Oluja“) ili po zapovijedi ministra unutarnjih poslova („Poskok-1“ i „Poskok-2“).

64. Premda je rečeno da se skupne snage namjenski organiziraju za konkretnu zadaću, one nemaju sve značajke klasičnih namjenski organiziranih snaga koje se organiziraju na razini brigade, bojne i satnije. Pod namjenski organiziranim snagama podrazumijevamo snage koje se na temelju zadaće privremeno grupiraju od različitih postrojbi pod jednim zapovjednikom za provedbu određene operacije ili zadaće. To može biti i polutrajna organizacija postrojbi pod jednim zapovjednikom za ostvarivanje neprekidne specifične zadaće. Nakon provedbe dodijeljene zadaće namjenski organizirane snage se ukidaju, a postrojbe se vraćaju u svoje matične organizacije. Tako npr. namjenski organizirane snage brigade su postrojba veličine brigade borbenih rodova koja se sastoji od zapovjedništva brigade s najmanje jednom glavnom podređenom postrojbom (bojnom), te s najmanje jednom pridodanom postrojbom veličine bojne drugog borbenog roda ili roda za borbenu potporu. Naravno da Skupne snage specijalne policije, bilo na svojoj razini, bilo na nižoj razini (npr. na razini snaga koje su se u operaciji „Oluja“ organizirale pod jednim

zapovjednikom na smjerovima napredovanja) ne mogu ispuniti ove kriterije jer nemaju sve potrebne rodove i službe.

65. Problem koji se javlja u takvoj strukturi je nedostatak čvrstih veza i odnosa između zapovjednika i njemu podređenih snaga jer nije bilo rutinskog obučavanja i vježbanja međusobnih odnosa i međusobnog pridavanja postrojbi. Sektor Specijalne policije MUP-a, zbog stalnog angažiranja specijalnih snaga na drugim zadaćama i u akciji „Poskok 2“ koja se provodi bez prekida od 1992. godine, pa i nakon operacije „Oluja“, nije bio u mogućnosti uvježbavati te odnose. I prethodne tri borbene operacije prije operacije „Oluja“, premda su sigurno ukazale na dobre i loše strane organizacije i identificirale nedostatke nisu mogle imati većeg utjecaja na uspostavu rutinskih odnosa jer su dvije bile još 1993. godine, a jedna 1995. godine. Za svaki dan operacije „Oluja“ snage su se namjenski organizirale po smjerovima od različitih jedinica specijalne policije iz različitih Policijskih uprava, pod različitim zapovjednicima, kako je to vidljivo iz kronologije provedbe operacije „Oluja“ od 4. do 9. kolovoza 1995. godine.

### 7.1.3. Stožer skupnih snaga

66. Nakon što načelnik GS HV 21. srpnja 1995. izdaje zapovijed:

*„1. Iz sastava Specijalne policije MUP-a RH, u rajon Zadar – Vir – Nin do 20.00 sati 23. srpnja 1995. godine izmjestiti snage specijalne policije u jačini od 300 specijalaca.“<sup>24</sup>,*

general pukovnik Mladen Markač, uz supotpis ministra unutarnjih poslova gosp. Ivana Jarnjaka, izdaje zapovijed za ustrojavanje i početak rada Stožera skupnih snaga specijalne policije.<sup>25</sup> U Stožer skupnih snaga imenovano je 15 članova, na čelu sa zapovjednikom akcije general pukovnikom Mladenom Markačem i načelnikom Stožera skupnih snaga brigadirom Željkom Sačićem. Od 15 članova Stožera njih deset je iz Sektora specijalne policije, dok pet dolazi izravno iz Specijalnih jedinica policije (od toga tri zapovjednika SJP i dva zamjenika zapovjednika). Prema navedenim dužnostima, djelatnici stožera pokrivaju temeljne rodove unutar strukture Skupnih snaga SP (pješaštvo, topništvo, veza) te određene borbene operativne sustave (obavještajni poslovi, logistika). Ovakav je stožer trebao

<sup>24</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV za izmještanje snaga SP, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/1-95-303 od 21. srpnja 1995.

<sup>25</sup> Zapovijed za početak rada Stožera skupnih snaga specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-602/95, od 22. srpnja 1995.

uspostaviti djelotvoran i neprekidan (24-satni) sustav zapovijedanja i nadzora nad Skupnim snagama za cijelo vrijeme trajanja operacije, te sve ostale stožerne funkcije, prije svega planiranja, donošenja i nadzora provedbe zapovijedi i odluka, te vođenja borbene dokumentacije (u zapovijedi za početak rada Stožera traži se da se vode samo ratni dnevnik i zemljovid).<sup>26</sup> Stožer skupnih snaga je bio dodatno podijeljen između Temelnog zapovjednog mjesta (TZM) u Starigradu (Seline) u podnožju Velebita na kojem ostaje general pukovnik Mladen Markač s dijelom Odjela za unutarnju kontrolu i dijelom operativnog dežurstva i Istaknutog (izdvojenog) zapovjednog mjesta (IZM) na Malom Goliću na kojem se nalazi načelnik Stožera skupnih snaga brigadir Željko Sačić s većinom stožera čime se sustav mora maksimalno napregnuti kako bi se pratilo i upravljalo ukupnom situacijom.

67. Tu se pojavljuju još jedan problem, a to je odlazak dijela djelatnika stožera početkom operacije – Zdravko Janić, načelnik Odjela za borbu protiv terorizma imenovan je za zapovjednika glavnog smjera napada, dok se zapovjednik SJP PU Zadarsko-kninske Svemir Vrsaljko vraća u svoju postrojbu i postaje zamjenik zapovjednika glavnog smjera napada, a u svoju se postrojbu vraća i Zoran Maras, pomoćnik zapovjednika SJP PU Bjelovarsko-bilogorske. Time se s jedne strane oslabljuje rad stožera, a s druge strane se dobiva kvaliteta na terenu, gdje je potrebno ostvariti početne uspjehe. To isto tako pokazuje i da je postojao nedostatak stručnih ljudi pa se oni moraju prvo uzimati iz jedinica specijalne policije u Stožer skupnih snaga, pa potom ponovno uzimati i vraćati iz Stožera skupnih snaga u svoje matične jedinice.

68. Ako bi se vratili na raniju elaboraciju da je ovakav Stožer uspješno zapovijedao s „dvije brigade“ onda je vidljivo o kojim se naporima radi jer je npr. domobranska pukovnija koja je po ustroju imala približno jednak broj ljudi (2180 u odnosu na 2200 pripadnika SP u operaciji) u svom zapovjedništvu imala 43 osobe,<sup>27</sup> a npr. gardijska brigada sa svojih 2994 pripadnika čak 56.<sup>28</sup>

69. Pitanje je zbog čega je došlo do ovakve organizacije i zbog čega se ne upravlja s jednog mjesta? Prvo treba napomenuti da bi u normalnoj organizaciji i podjeli dužnosti unutar zapovjedništva, zapovjednik (general Markač) trebao biti na IZM-u:

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<sup>26</sup> Isto.

<sup>27</sup> Ustroj broj 1106199, Domobranska pukovnija, 1994. godina

<sup>28</sup> Ustroj broj 1105190, Gardijska brigada, 1994. godina

*„IZM se organizira radi boljeg praćenja borbenih djelovanja, neposrednijeg utjecaja zapovjednika na njihov tijek, uspostavljanja narušenog sustava rukovođenja i zapovijedanja, a posebno kada je rukovođenje i zapovijedanje otežano sa zapovjednog mjesta“.*<sup>29</sup>

70. Ostanak generala Markača na TZM bio je uzrokovan organizacijom veze zapovijedanja i izvješćivanja između načelnika GS HV i Stožera skupnih snaga, jer se te veze zbog specifičnosti terena i drugih razloga nisu mogle uspostaviti s IZM-a. Pored žične i telefax veze na TZM u Selinama uspostavlja se i još jedna veza koja s IZM-a nikako ne bi mogla funkcionirati, a to je veza pomoću sustava „Rebus“ koji je kriptirani sustav za prijenos informacija telefonskom - žičanom vezom. Sustav sa sobom donosi i na njemu radi bojnik Petar Ričko iz Obavještajne uprave GS HV<sup>30</sup> kao obavještajni analitičar koji šalje dnevna izvješća Obavještajnoj upravi GS HV. Na TZM u Selinama dolaze sve zapovijedi i ostali dokumenti iz GS HV, a dio zadaća se dobiva preko žične veze, pa je važno da general Markač cijelo vrijeme, ili nakon probijanja fronte i osvajanja Gračaca 5. kolovoza 1995. te dnevnog premještanja IZM-a na nove lokacije barem neko vrijeme i dalje provodi na TZM-u.

71. Iako to nije nigdje napisano i propisano, na temelju dostupnih dokumenata može se zaključiti da je proces zapovijedanja i nadzora na početku operacije, a dijelom i kasnije, takav da general Markač dobiva zapovijedi od načelnika GS HV, prenosi ih na IZM gdje ih stožer na čelu s brigadirom Sačićem raščlanjuje, donosi odluke i prenosi zapovijedi zapovjednicima na smjerovima napada. Stoga nije čudno da se u izvješćima o borbenim putovima SJP PU MUP-a koje se rade nakon operacije „Oluja“ gotovo izričito navodi da su zapovijedi primali od brigadira Sačića.<sup>31</sup> Međutim, general pukovnik Mladen Markač ostaje i dalje odgovoran za ukupno djelovanje Skupnih snaga specijalne policije, ako postoji funkcionalan sustav zapovijedanja i izvješćivanja.

72. Sustav veza bio je uspostavljen pomoću radio i žičnih veza. Radio veze funkcioniraju tako da postoji UHF semidupleksna veza između Stožera skupnih snaga i zapovjednika napadnih pravaca. Zapovjednici napadnih pravaca održavaju

<sup>29</sup> Pravilo brigada (pešadijska, motorizovana, brdska, planinska, mornaričke pešadije i laka), Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, Generalštab JNA, Beograd, 1984. godine, str. 80.

<sup>30</sup> Ocjena izvršenih zadaća obavještajnog osiguranja u operaciji „Oluja“, Klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur.broj: 512-06-06/1-95-2290, od 15. rujna 1995.

<sup>31</sup> Borbeni put specijalne policije PU Bjelovarsko-bilogorske 1991. – 1995., str 68.; Borbeni put specijalne jedinice policije Policijske uprave Karlovačke 01.03.1991. – 24.05.1996., str.30.; Borbeni put SJP PU Vukovarsko-srijemske, Broj: 511-15-08-VT-01/4-98, od 8. kolovoza 1998., str. 11.; Borbeni put specijalne jedinice policije PU Istarske, Broj: 511-08-08-01-VT-9/2-98, od 7. svibnja 1998., str. 77.; Borbeni put specijalne jedinice policije PU Ličko-senjske, Broj: 511-04-08-VT-51/2-98, od 5. svibnja 1998., str. 17.

simpleksnu vezu sa svojim podređenim zapovjednicima (zapovjednicima podskupina i zapovjednicima grupa).<sup>32</sup> Budući da ove dvije veze rade na različitim frekvencijama, Stožer skupnih snaga ne čuje komunikaciju između zapovjednika pravaca i njihovih podređenih.

## 7.2. Prosudba situacije

73. Kako je već rečeno, načelnik GS HV izdao je general pukovniku Mladenu Markaču zapovijed kojom su mu konkretno, jasno i nedvosmisleno određene zadaće za operaciju „Oluja“ temeljem koje je trebao odlučiti o načinu na koji će je provesti. Za donošenje takve odluke bilo je potrebno prosuditi situaciju u odnosu na neprijatelja, vlastite snage, zemljište i vrijeme. Ova će se ekspertiza usredotočiti na prosudbu neprijatelja, dok će ostala tri čimbenika biti elaborirana samo u mjeri potrebnj da se utvrdi zbog čega je izabran određeni način djelovanja.

### 7.2.1. Doktrina neprijatelja

74. Kod obavještajne pripreme bojišta i razmatranja na koji će način neprijatelj boriti polazi se od doktrine, tj. od doktrinarnog modela koji se temelji na pretpostavljenoj (koja se smatra istinitom) neprijateljskoj taktičkoj doktrini. Doktrinarni modeli prikazuju raspored i aktivnosti neprijateljskih snaga i sredstava (prvenstveno visokovrijedne ciljeve) koje provode određenu operaciju bez ograničenja nametnutih učincima borbenog okružja. Obično pokazuju normalnu organizaciju neprijatelja za borbu, širine, dubine, razmake između postroja, granice i druge mjere, sredstva dostupna iz drugih postrojbi, dubinu ciljeva, područja djelovanja, sastav snaga, te raspored borbenih postrojbi, postrojbi borbene i logističke potpore za određenu operaciju.<sup>33</sup> Doktrina po kojoj neprijatelj vodi obrambene operacije opisana je u priručnicima bivše JNA jer je ona bila istovjetna onoj po kojoj su se borile postrojbe VSK.


75. Operativni raspored korpusa u obrani prikazan je na sljedećoj shemi<sup>34</sup> i najčešće se sastoji od snaga za djelovanje na fronti, snaga za djelovanje iz pozadine

<sup>32</sup> Raščlamba tijeka operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 29.

<sup>33</sup> FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, HQ Department of the Army, July 1994, Washington, DC

<sup>34</sup> Osnove operacija oružanih snaga u ONOR-u (općenarodnom obrambenom ratu), Centar vojnotehničkih škola KoV „General armije Ivan Gošnjak“, Zagreb, 1991. godine

neprijatelja, snage za djelovanje unutar taktičkog borbenog rasporeda neprijatelja, snage za potporu, snage za protuoklopnu borbu, snage za protuzračnu obranu, snage za protudesantnu borbu, snage za obranu gradova, snage za zaprječavanje, snage za osiguranje i pričuva različite jačine i sastava.



76. Elementi ovakvog rasporeda potvrđuju se u „Direktivi za upotrebu vojske Srpske krajine“<sup>35</sup> koja je izrađena za slučaj „agresije na RSK“:

„Operativnim rasporedom grupirati snage po sljedećem:

- Snage za obranu,

<sup>35</sup> Direktiva za upotrebu Srpske vojske krajine, veljača 1995.

- Snage za aktivna djelovanja i ubacivanje,
- Snage za protudesantnu borbu,
- Snage za izvođenje udara po izabranim ciljevima,
- Snage za potporu i protuzračnu obranu,
- Snage za kontrolu teritorija, zaštitu objekata i borbu s DTG i snage za obranu naseljenih mjesta,
- Snage za brze intervencije i sprječavanje dezerterstva.<sup>36</sup>

77. Nakon definiranja zadaća podređenih korpusa i drugih snaga, posebno se regulira obrana gradova i većih naseljenih mjesta:

*„U zonama obrane korpusa i brigada, odmah otpočeti s pripremama većih naseljenih mjesta i gradova za dugotrajnu i kružnu obranu, s težištem na zaprečavanju i pripremi tvrdih objekata za vatreno djelovanje i zaštitu žive sile i MS.*

*U pripremi angažirati svo sposobno stanovništvo, jedinice CZ, zapovjedništva i jedinice SVK.*

*Težište imati na pripremi gradova i naseljenih mjesta na prvim položajima i pripremi grada Knina za koji posebno formirati zapovjedništvo i jedinice za obranu.<sup>37</sup>*

78. Organizacija obrane osloncem na naseljena mjesta na teorijskoj, doktrinarnoj razini potvrđuje se i na razini brigade:

*„Naseljeno mjesto se obavezno uključuje u sistem obrane. Brigada može braniti jedno veće ili više manjih naseljenih mjesta, a ponekad i dio velikog naseljenog mjesta – grada. U svim uvjetima u obranu naseljenog mjesta uključuju se snage teritorijalne obrane... i cjelokupno stanovništvo.<sup>38</sup>,*

ali i u praksi u zapovijedi zapovjednika 9.mtbr iz Gračaca za obranu:

*„2.- 9.mtbr pod zaštitom gotovih snaga što prije izvršiti potpunu mobilizaciju i organizirati obranu u zoni: Jajića vrh (tt 727) isključno, Visočica (tt 1617) Mali Alan, Vijoja (tt 997) sa zadatkom: osloncem na naseljena mjesta i sjeverne padine Velebita upornom obranom nanositi agresoru što veće gubitke u živoj sili i MTS.*

*Stvoriti uvjete za sklanjanje ugroženog stanovništva i materijalnih dobara, a zatim bočnim djelovanjima lomiti mu napadnu moć i spriječiti mu izbijanje na liniju: s. Pavlovac – s. Medak.<sup>39</sup>*

<sup>36</sup> Isto, točka 4.

<sup>37</sup> Isto, točka 5.11.

<sup>38</sup> Pravilo brigada (pešadijska, motorizovana, brdska, planinska, mornaričke pešadije i laka), Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, Generalštab JNA, Beograd, 1984. godine, str. 217-218.

<sup>39</sup> Zapovijed za obranu, Zapovjedništvo 9.mtbr (Zapovest za odbranu, Komanda 9. mtbr), str. pov. br.: 100-2014 od 12. listopada 1993. godine.

79. Iz navedene zapovijedi indikativno je i reguliranje rasporeda logističke satnije (pozadinska četa):

*„Pozadinsku četvu razmjestiti u rejonu Kruškovac (PKM) i Gračac (MIG). Skladište municije i naoružanja u krugu RO „MIG“ i OŠ Kruškovac. Skladište InMS u krugu RO „MIG“ i OŠ Kruškovac.“<sup>40</sup>*

80. Iz ovoga je borbenog rasporeda očito da se skladišta streljiva i naoružanja razmještaju u objekte unutar naseljenih mjesta.

81. Na temelju obavještajne prosudbe koju je izradio Odjel unutarnje kontrole, a s kojom je načelnik Odjela unutarnje kontrole Ante Šoljić upoznao sve zapovjednike na stožernom sastanku na IZM-u Stožera skupnih snaga na Malom Goliću 2. kolovoza 1995.<sup>41</sup>, ispred Skupnih snaga SP MUP-a branila se 9.mtbr iz Gračaca (dvije bojne) kao najjača postrojba 15. ličkog korpusa i dijelovi 4.lbr (3/4.lbr) iz sastava 7. kninskog korpusa.<sup>42</sup> Zapovjedno mjesto 9.mtbr je bilo u Gračacu, a IZM brigade u s.Radoševići, a zapovjedna mjesta bojni su: 1/9.mtbr u području s.Ruka, 2/9.mtbr u području Medak i 3/9.mtbr u području s.Vrebac. Brigada je raspolagala s mješovitim topničkim divizijunom (H-105, H-155 i VBR 128) i tenkovskom satnijom (po 6 tenkova u 1. i 2/9.mtbr i tri u pričuvi brigade, ukupno 15 tenkova), uz minobacače 120 mm na razini bojni i 82 mm na razini satnija. Postojala je mogućnost uporabe oklopnog vlaka (H-105) na pruzi od Gračaca do Medka, kao i potpora VBR-ovima (1-2) iz Korpusne artiljerijske grupe. Očekivala se i uporaba pričuve jačine jedne bojne s vodom tenkova iz smjera Bruvna. 3/4.lbr nalazila se na spoju s 1/9.mtbr sa zapovjednim mjestom brigade u Obrovcu i zapovjednim mjestom bojne u području Križa. U svojoj prosudbi načelnik Odjela unutarnje kontrole Ante Šoljić zaključuje:

*„Ukoliko bi napadnom operacijom bilo predviđeno vezivanje svih neprijateljskih snaga za crtu bojišnice, (što se u stvarnosti i dogodilo) onda je realno za očekivati angažiranje cijele 1/9.mtbr, dvije satnije 2/9.mtbr i jedne satnije 3/4.lbr, uz pričuvu u jačini jedne ojačane satnije s vodom tenkova.“<sup>43</sup>*

82. Prema toj prosudbi neprijatelj bi mogao angažirati 880 vojnika, 12 tenkova, 6 oklopnih transportera i 15 raketno-topničkih oružja većeg kalibra, ne računajući minobacače 120 mm i 82 mm, s očitom nadmoći u odnosu na Skupne snage

<sup>40</sup> Isto, točka 17.

<sup>41</sup> Preslika Knjige dežurstva SP MUP-a RH vođena u Gračacu 1995. godine, str. 2.

<sup>42</sup> Obavještajna prosudba neprijateljskih snaga u zoni odgovornosti Skupnih snaga Specijalne policije u području Velebita, Broj: 511-01-30- 95, od 28. lipnja 1995. (0349-3505 0349-3507)

<sup>43</sup> Isto, str. 3.

specijalne policije u oklopnim sredstvima i teškom topništvu, dok je odnos u pješaštvu bio oko 3:1 na strani specijalne policije.

83. Pored 9.mtbr i dijelova 4.lbr bilo je poznato da se u dubini obrane u širem području Donjeg Lapca nalazi 103.lbr.<sup>44</sup>

84. Zemljište ispred prednjeg kraja u području napada Skupnih snaga SP bilo je relativno slabo naseljeno i izuzetno teško prohodno, što je i bio jedan od glavnih razloga da se izuzetno teška zadaća osvajanja dijela Velebita i velebitskih padina prema Gračacu i Medku da specijalnim jedinicama MUP-a koje su u više od tri godine boravka na tom prostoru stekle dovoljno iskustva, znanja i psihofizičke snage za provedbu te zadaće.

#### 7.2.2. Gravitacijsko središte

85. Kao što je za ZP Split gravitacijsko središte bio grad Knin, tako je to za Skupne snage SJP MUP-a bio grad Gračac. Smješten u podnožju Velebita nalazio se na raskrižju putova prema Gospiću, Obrovcu, Udbini i Otriću, a odatle prema Kninu i Srbu. Njegovim zauzimanjem dolazi do potpunog prekida cestovnog i željezničkog prometa te nemogućnosti dovođenja snaga prometnicama koje su paralelne s crtom fronte, pa time i nemogućnosti intervencije prema ugroženim područjima, ali i iz dubine prema crti fronte. Da je ovakva intervencija bila izgledna navodi se i u Direktivi načelnika GS HV zapovjedništvu ZP Split:

*„Za očekivati je intervenciju snaga jedne brigade iz smjera B. Grahova i jedne brigade iz smjera Gračaca.“<sup>45</sup>*

86. Osim komunikacijskog središta, Gračac je i važno vojno središte u kojem se nalazi zapovjedništvo 9. motorizirane brigade (9.mtbr), najjače postrojbe 15. ličkog korpusa, sa svojom zapovjednom satnijom i logistikom. Uništenjem ili neutralizacijom zapovjednog mjesta 9.mtbr potpuno bi se raspao sustav vođenja i zapovijedanja unutar brigade, ali i izbacivanjem zapovjedništva brigade iz Gračaca narušio bi se stacionarni sustav veza te time smanjile mogućnosti neprekidne i djelotvorne komunikacije između zapovjednika brigade i podređenih zapovjednika bojni.

<sup>44</sup> Direktiva za napad Op.br. 12-3/95, RP/12-3/95, Operacija „OLUJA-3“ (ZP Gospić) od 26. lipnja 1995., str. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Direktiva za napad Op.br. 12-4/95, RP/12-4/95, Operacija „OLUJA-4“ (ZP Split) od 26. lipnja 1995., str. 2.

### 7.2.3. Zemljište i vrijeme kao astronomski čimbenik

87. Na temelju obavještajnih izvješća bilo je poznato da se neprijatelj priprema za obranu i da zna da će početi napadna operacija, pa se nije moglo računati na bilo kakvo strateško iznenađenje<sup>46 47</sup> te je i donijeta odluka da Skupne snage SP MUP-a krenu u napad uz snažnu vatrenu pripremu uz pokušaj probijanja neprijateljskih položaja na širokoj fronti kako bi se spriječilo njegovo pregrupiranje i koncentracija na užoj fronti. Napad na više smjerova, uz moguće taktičko iznenađenje, vezao bi gotovo sve neprijateljske snage na prednjem kraju i proboj na samo jednom mjestu doveo bi do ugrožavanja bokova susjednih postrojbi, čime bi se one bile prisiljene povući kako ne bi došle u poluokruženje ili okruženje. Time bi se srušila cjelokupna crta obrane, a nastavak brzog napredovanja Skupnih snaga onemogućio bi zaposjedanje druge crte obrane i konsolidaciju snaga već bi ih prisilio na uzastopno povlačenje. Istodobno bi se s vrlo malim brojem topničko-raketnih oružja većeg dometa gađali ciljevi po dubini kako bi se neutralizirao neprijateljski sustav zapovijedanja i logistička potpora te spriječilo ili otežalo dovođenje pričuva. Imperativ vremena, tj. zahtjev da se cijela operacija završi za 3-4, a najviše za 8 dana do potpunog slamanja otpora i izbijanja na državnu granicu iziskivao je maksimalne napore pripadnika Skupnih snaga, jer se cjelokupni prostor morao prijeći pješke, ali i napore Stožera skupnih snaga jer je trebalo jako dobro svakodnevno organizirati snage po smjerovima napada, da bi se zadržao zamah i tempo napada.

### 7.3. Zona djelovanja i granice

88. Premda u svojoj raščlambi tijekom operacije „Oluja“<sup>48</sup> general pukovnik Mladen Markač navodi da je načelnik GS HV general Červenko Skupnim snagama specijalne policije dodijelio zonu odgovornosti, pisana zapovijed koju je primio i od prijašnjeg načelnika GS HV generala Bobetka 26. lipnja 1995.<sup>49</sup> i zapovijed koju mu je dao

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<sup>46</sup> Izjava general pukovnika Petra Stipetića na sastanku na Brijunima 17. srpnja 1995. godine, transkript, str. 20. („Dakle, ovako, što se tiče dolaska generala Mrkšića i odlaska Čeleketića, mislim da više iznenađenja koje smo postigli u operaciji „Bljesak“ nema.

<sup>47</sup> Da je početak napada poznat potvrđeno je u Izvješću o izvođenju borbenih djelovanja zapovjednika 15. korpusa, Str.pov.br: 153-16/8 od 9. kolovoza 1995. (1D70-8370) („Dana 03.08.1995. godine oko 20,30 s primljeno je obavještenje da se očekuje napad ustaških snaga 04.08.1995. godine oko 04,00 s do 05,00 s.“)

<sup>48</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 3.

<sup>49</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV za operaciju „Oluja“, Klasa: 8/95-172/02, Ur.broj: 512-06-06/1-95-32, od 26. lipnja 1995.

general Červenko 29. srpnja 1995.<sup>50</sup>, a niti praktična događanja na terenu to ne potvrđuju.

89. Jedina nadzorna grafička mjera vidljiva u obje zapovijedi (kako je već naglašeno radi se zapravo o gotovo istoj zapovijedi samo s dva različita datuma) je operativna osnovica Bukva, tt.929 – Visočica, tt.1616.

90. Za uspješnu provedbu zadaće, nadređeni zapovjednik podređenom zapovjedniku dodjeljuje zonu djelovanja ili područje operacija, a načelnik GS HV to ne čini niti jednom svojom zapovijedi.

*„Zona djelovanja predstavlja zemljišnu prostoriju ograničenu po širini i dubini u kojoj brigada organizira i izvodi borbena djelovanja.“<sup>51</sup>*

*„Zona djelovanja je zemljišna prostorija, ograničena po širini i dubini, u kojoj divizija izvodi djelovanja.“<sup>52</sup>*

*„Zone obrane određuju se s četiri točke (dvije na prednjem kraju i dvije u dubini) počevši zdesna na prednjem kraju... U napadu (gonjenju) postrojbama se određuje fronta i smjer napada,... a zona se precizira granicama.“<sup>53</sup>*

91. Zona djelovanja, odnosno granice kojima je omeđena, važna je stoga jer u njoj zapovjednik koji ju je dobio ima punu odgovornost za organizaciju jedinstvenog sustava borbe po cilju, mjestu i vremenu, a dodijeljenu zonu borbenih djelovanja postrojba ne smije napustiti bez odobrenja nadređenog zapovjednika.<sup>54</sup>

92. Gotovo istovjetan zoni djelovanja su NATO i američki koncept (taktičke nadzorne mjere) područja operacije i granica.

*„Područje operacija operativno je područje koje definira zapovjednik združene snage za kopnene i pomorske snage... Više zapovjedništvo određuje područje operacija pomoću granica... Dodijeljeno područje operacija jednako ograničava i olakšava kretanje postrojba i uporabu vatara. Ono ograničava postrojbe kojima nije dodijeljena odgovornost za područje operacija u kretanju kroz to područje. Ono ograničava i postrojbe izvan područja operacija u otvaranju vatara u njega ili da učinci njihovih vatara utječu na ono što se događa u području operacija. Oba ova ograničenja mogu biti umanjena koordinacijom s postrojbom odgovornom za područje operacija.“*

<sup>50</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV za operaciju „Oluja“, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-328, od 29. srpnja 1995. u 12,00 sati.

<sup>51</sup> Pravilo brigada (pešadijska, motorizovana, brdska, planinska, mornaričke pešadije i laka), Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, Generalštab JNA, Beograd, 1984. godine

<sup>52</sup> Pravilo divizija kopnene vojske, Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, Generalštab JNA, Beograd, 20. srpnja 1984.

<sup>53</sup> Uputstvo za rad komandi – štabova, nacrt, Centar Visokih vojnih škola JNA „Maršal Tito, Beograd, 1983. godine

<sup>54</sup> Pravilo brigada (pešadijska, motorizovana, brdska, planinska, mornaričke pešadije i laka), Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, Generalštab JNA, Beograd, 1984. godine, str. 16 i 17.

*Područje operacija olakšava kretanje i vatre postrojbe koja je odgovorna za to područje ili ga posjeduje.*<sup>55</sup>

*„Granica je crta koja označava površinska područja radi olakšavanja usklađivanja i rješavanja spornih pitanja u planiranju i provedbi operacija između susjednih postrojba, postroja ili područja. Zapovjednik rabi grafičke nadzorne mjere za definiranje granica područja operacija i time uspostavlja odgovornosti kopnenih snaga.*<sup>56</sup>

93. Ako bi pretpostavili da je krajnja crta napredovanja državna granica Republike Hrvatske, uz operativnu osnovicu, dobili smo dvije granice, ali još uvijek nedostaju dvije bočne.

94. Pitanje nepostojanja granica otvorilo je niz problema koje je general Markač i sam osjetio tijekom provedbe operacije. U praksi je pitanje desne granice sa ZP Split relativno lako i dobro riješeno jer je suradnja s 2/9. gbr bila imperativ za obje strane da bi se ostvarile zajedničke zadaće, a prije svega ona o stavljanju pod nadzor prometnice Jasenica – Zaton – Muškovci – Prezid. S druge strane, lijeva granica sa ZP Gospić nije nikada jasno definirana i snage se kroz prostor kreću i susreću, ali ne postoje planovi o vremenu i mjestu susreta. Zahtjev da susjedne postrojbe ne smiju otvarati topničku i druge vatre u područje operacija (zonu djelovanja) postrojbe koja ima odgovornost za to područje nije ispunjen jer granica nije bilo, odnosno one koje su određene nisu ispunjavale svoju svrhu. Tako se i moglo dogoditi da su postrojbe ZP Gospić dana 7. kolovoza 1995. otvorile jaku topničku vatru na specijalne snage MUP-a koje su se nalazile u Donjem Lapcu.<sup>57</sup>

95. Glavni stožer HV je najvjerojatnije smatrao da određivanje granica između Skupnih snaga SJP MUP-a i ZP Gospić i Split nije toliko važno i da neće predstavljati nikakav operativni problem, pa je jednostavno zadržao granicu između dva ZP prema Odluci o vojnopodručnoj podjeli Republike Hrvatske iz veljače 1993.<sup>58</sup> Tom se odlukom umjesto Operativnih zona ustrojavaju Zborna područja, a granice između njih određene su županijskim, odnosno općinskim granicama.

96. Međutim, sukladno operativnom razvoju situacije, a poradi usklađenog djelovanja Zbornih područja, načelnik GS HV 6. kolovoza 1995. izdaje zapovijed kojom mijenja granice zona odgovornosti tako da nove granice više ne slijede

<sup>55</sup> Tactics, Field Manual No. 3-90, HQ Department of the Army, July 2001, Washington, DC, str. 2-12.

<sup>56</sup> Isto, str. 2-15.

<sup>57</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“, Sektor specijalne policije MUP-a, Broj 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 15.

<sup>58</sup> Odluka o vojnopodručnoj podjeli Republike Hrvatske, Broj: PA7-3/1-93 od 1. veljače 1993.

administrativne granice županija već operativne potrebe nastavka napadnih djelovanja temeljem do tada ostvarenih uspjeha. Zapovijed je dostavljena zapovjednicima Zbornih područja, ali ne i generalu Markaču. Tom zapovijedi nova granica ide:

*„Između ZP Slit i ZP Gospić crtom: Mali Alan – Gračac – V.Sedlo tt. 1209 – Međedak tt. 639 – željeznička stanica Una (sve uključno Split).“<sup>59</sup>*

97. Tako su Skupne snage MUP-a koje se 6. kolovoza 1995. nalaze od Medka do Gračaca, te dijelom snaga u Bruvnu i Otriću, ponovno, kao i na početku operacije, teritorijalno podijeljene između ZP Split i ZP Gospić. Time se potvrđuje da general pukovnik Markač nema teritorijalnu odgovornost, te nema niti zadaću, niti snaga, a niti mehanizama kojima bi nadzirao, zabranjivao ili dopuštao ulazak ili izlazak bilo kojih snaga, osim vlastitih, na smjerovima napada ili područjima razmještaja Skupnih snaga SJP MUP-a, kako tijekom operacije „Oluja“, tako i tijekom pretresa terena u operaciji „Oluja – Obruč“. Pored toga, s obzirom na brzinu i tempo napada i potrebe brzih prodora prije nego što se protivnik sredi i uspostavi moguću obranu po dubini, te broj raspoloživih ljudi, general Markač, čak i kad bi htio, nije imao nikakvih mogućnosti uspostaviti nadzorne ili blokadne punktove iza dostignutih crta kako bi nadzirao teritorij (ostavljanje većeg broja snaga na blokadno-borbenim punktovima i nadzornim točkama ugrozio bi nastavak iskorištavanja uspjeha napada i realizaciju dnevnih zadaća koje je načelnik GS HV izdavao svakodnevno za sljedeći dan). Uspostava takvih kontrolnih točaka i nadzor oslobođenih područja bili su u nadležnosti Vojne policije i temeljne policije MUP-a, kao i ostale zadaće sprječavanja izvršenja krivičnih djela, otkrivanja njihovih počinitelja, sprječavanja narušavanja javnog reda i mira, zaštite života i osobne sigurnosti ljudi, kontrole i regulacije prometa i drugo.

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<sup>59</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/1-95-408, od 6. kolovoza 1995.

## 8. Kronologija sudjelovanja Skupnih snaga SJP MUP-a u operaciji „Oluja“

98. Ova se kronologija prvenstveno bavi sudjelovanjem Skupnih snaga SJP MUP-a, a sudjelovanje susjednih ZP Split i ZP Gospić analizira se u onoj mjeri koja je potrebna da bi se razumjela dinamika djelovanja i međusobni odnosi sa susjedima.

99. Dana 26. lipnja 1995. godine načelnik GS HV, general zbora Janko Bobetko, upućuje izvode iz Direktive<sup>60</sup> svim zapovjedništvima ZP te Zapovijed<sup>61</sup> zapovjedništvu specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a, radi obavljanja neposrednih priprema i izrade vlastitih dokumenata za provedbu napadne operacije. Ovdje je potrebno radi boljeg razumijevanja procesa planiranja i odlučivanja na razini Zbornih područja i zapovjedništva SP MUP-a objasniti razliku između direktive i zapovijedi pomoću definicija iz Uputstva za rad komandi – štabova.<sup>62</sup>

*„Direktivom se služe: Vrhovno zapovjedništvo, zapovjedništva armija, njima ravna zapovjedništva i odgovarajući stožeri Teritorijalne obrane... Direktivama se postavljaju zadaće s manje detalja, više se naglašava cilj djelovanja, opća zadaća postrojbe i zamisao zapovjednika, i one trebaju dati potrebne elemente za samostalnije djelovanje podređenih u duhu zapovjednikove zamisli.“<sup>63</sup>*

100. Kao što je navedeno, direktivama koje je Glavni stožer HV dostavio zapovjednicima Zbornih područja, njima se ostavila veća sloboda samostalnog planiranja tj. odlučivanja kako će provesti dobivenu zadaću.

*„Zapovijedima se kategorički i naredbodavno izražava odluka zapovjednika i konkretno, jasno i nedvosmisleno postavljaju zadaće podređenima. Njima se služe sva zapovjedništva.*

*Zapovijed za borbu, načelno, sadrži:*

- *podatke o neprijatelju;*
- *zadaću postrojbe, njena pojačanja i potpora od strane nadređenog;*
- *podatke o susjedima i granice s njima, i*

<sup>60</sup> Direktiva za napad Op.br. 12-1/95, RP/12-1/95, „OLUJA-1“ (ZP Zagreb) od 26. lipnja 1995.; Direktiva za napad Op.br. 12-2/95, RP/12-2/95, Operacija „OLUJA-2“ (ZP Karlovac) od 26. lipnja 1995.; Direktiva za napad Op.br. 12-3/95, RP/12-3/95, Operacija „OLUJA-3“ (ZP Gospić) od 26. lipnja 1995.; Direktiva za napad Op.br. 12-4/95, RP/12-4/95, Operacija „OLUJA-4“ (ZP Split) od 26. lipnja 1995.

<sup>61</sup> Zapovijed NGS HV, SP Klasa: 8/95-172/02, Urbroj: 512-06-06/01-95-32, od 26. lipnja 1995. godine.

<sup>62</sup> Uputstvo za rad komandi – štabova, nacrt, Centar Visokih vojnih škola JNA „Maršal Tito, Beograd, 1983. godine

<sup>63</sup> Isto, stranica 69., na hrvatski preveo autor ekspertize.

– odluku zapovjednika.<sup>64</sup>

101. Iz navedene je definicije jasno da general pukovnik Mladen Markač nema toliku slobodu planiranja kao što je imaju zapovjednici zbornih područja, već jedino treba odlučiti kako će provesti dobivenu zadaću.

102. Zapovijed<sup>65</sup> načelnika GS HV regulira spremnost SP MUP za napadna djelovanja na dan 29. lipnja 1995. godine s ciljem ovladavanja područjem: Mali Golić – Sveti Rok – Gračac – Prezid. Premda su izvršene određene pripreme i počelo se s dovođenjem dijelova snaga, temeljem novonastale situacije, 29. lipnja 1995. načelnik GS HV zapovijed stavlja izvan snage,<sup>66</sup> te SP MUP nastavljaju dotadašnje zadaće na Velebitu u sklopu akcije „Poskok 2“.

103. Novi načelnik GS HV, general zbora Zvonimir Červenko, 29. srpnja 1995. izdaje novu zapovijed:

*„1. Specijalnim snagama MUP-a, s operativne osnovice u području Velebita (Bukva, tt 929 – Visočica, tt 1616) izvesti napadna djelovanja s ciljem ovladavanja područjem Mali Golić – Sveti Rok – Gračac – Prezid te:*

*(1) presjeći prometnicu Gospić – Gračac u dijelu Sveti Rok – Štikada,*

*(2) zauzeti radio relejni objekt Čelavac,*

*(3) staviti pod nadzor prijevoj i tunel na Prezidu,*

*(4) spojiti se sa snagama ZP Split (2/9. gbr) i staviti pod nadzor prometnicu Jasenica – Zaton – Muškovci – Prezid.*

*2. Operaciju izvesti u 2 etape, u ukupnom trajanju od 3 dana.*

*U prvoj etapi, ostvarivanjem taktičkog iznenađenja pri uvođenju dovoljno jakih snaga i uz snažnu topničku potporu vlastitog topništva izbiti na crtu Sveti Rok – Baleni – Bukova kosa (tt 695) – Crni vrh (tt 934) – Rastovača (tt 844) i Oščenica (tt 1182) – Kurcelji (tt 872) – Balenova Plana (tt 675).*

*U 2. etapi, uvođenjem glavnine snaga nastaviti napad i izbiti na crtu Malinjak (tt 1631) – Veliki Crnopac (tt 1403) – Toplo Brdo (tt 897) i*

*(1) ovladati radio relejnim objektom Čelavac,*

*(2) staviti pod nadzor prijevoj i tunel na Prezidu,*

*(3) spojiti se sa snagama 2./9. gbr.*

<sup>64</sup> Isto.

<sup>65</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, SP Klasa: 8/95-172/02, Ur. broj: 512-06-06/01-95-32, od 26. lipnja 1995.

<sup>66</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, SP Klasa: 8/95-172/02, Ur. broj: 512-06-06/01-95-32/2, od 29. lipnja 1995. u 18,30 sati.

*Nakon ostvarenja ciljeva 2. etape imati snage spremne za nastavak bojnih djelovanja.*

*3. Ostalim snagama s područja Velebita izvoditi aktivnu obranu, a u slučaju postizanja povoljne taktičke situacije izvoditi napadna djelovanja radi ugrožavanja prometnice Medak – Sveti Rok.*

*4. U pripremi i izvođenju bojnih djelovanja stalno koordinirati rad sa Zapovjedništvom ZP Split – IZM Zadar i Zapovjedništvom ZP Gospić.*

*5. Snage za izvršenje zadaće imati spremne 01. kolovoza u 04,00 sati.*

*6. Za izvršenje ove zadaće činim odgovornim osobno general-pukovnika Mladena Markača, koji će me o realizaciji iste izvijestiti 31. srpnja 1995. godine do 24.00 sati preko COR GSHV.<sup>67</sup>*

104. Sadržaj ove zapovijedi potpuno je istovjetan zapovijedi koju je general pukovnik Mladen Markač dobio 26. lipnja, osim u točki 2. te zapovijedi gdje se uz topničku potporu vlastitog topništva spominjala i potpora topničke skupine 7. gbr, dok u novoj zapovijedi nema nikakve topničke potpore izvan Skupnih snaga SP MUP-a.

105. Zapovijed ne regulira granice djelovanja, kao niti susjede što bi bilo nužno za normalan proces planiranja i donošenja odluke.

106. Par dana prije ove zapovijedi, načelnik GS HV 21. srpnja 1995. izdaje zapovijed:

*„1. Iz sastava Specijalne policije MUP-a RH, u rajon Zadar – Vir – Nin do 20.00 sati 23. srpnja 1995. godine izmjestiti snage specijalne policije u jačini od 300 specijalaca.<sup>68</sup>“*,

čime se pokreće lanac događaja koji započinje s dvije zapovijedi general pukovnika Mladena Markača. Prva se zapovijed odnosi na upućivanje izvidničko-operativnih skupina u područje Velebita čime se u pripremi operacije „Oluja“ intenzivira obavještajni rad:

*„Dana 23. 07. 1995. g. najkasnije do 09,00 sati dužni ste iz sastava SJP PU Zadarsko-kninske, SJP PU Splitsko-dalmatinske, SJP PU Šibenske i SJP Brodsko-posavske uputiti izvidničko-operativne skupine jačine cca 16 djelatnika u logističku bazu Specijalne policije Lukovo Šugarje.*

<sup>67</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-328, od 29. srpnja 1995. u 12,00 sati

<sup>68</sup> Zapovijed NGS HV za izmještanje snaga SP, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/1-95-303 od 21. srpnja 1995.

*Narečene izviđačko-operativne skupine dužne su obnašati izvidničke aktivnosti na području Velebita a njihov angažman će trajati cca 15 dana.*<sup>69</sup>

107. S konkretnim zadaćama, težišnim pravcima te zonama odgovornosti pojedinih skupina, zapovjednike upoznaje načelnik Odjela unutarnje kontrole Ante Šoljić, koji je dužan uvezati se s izvidničkim organima susjednih postrojbi HV i obavještajnim odjelima ZP Gospić i ZP Split, kao i za koordinaciju rada izvidničko-operativnih skupina.

108. Dana 29. srpnja 1995. načelnik Odjela unutarnje kontrole Ante Šoljić dostavlja general pukovniku Mladenu Markaču zbirno izvješće o radu izvidničko-operativnih skupina,<sup>70</sup> u kojem se govori o uređenim položajima za obranu, putovima, minskim poljima, ali i o pogodnim prostorima za uvođenje specijalnih snaga kroz neprijateljsku obranu. Rad izvidničko-operativnih skupina navodi se i u dnevnim izvješćima Odjela unutarnje kontrole. Zadnje pisano izvješće Odjela unutarnje kontrole koje sam dobio na uvid datirano je 3. kolovoza 1995. što pokazuje da nakon što je počeo napad, Stožer skupnih snaga više nema potpunu sliku o stanju i rasporedu neprijatelja.

109. Druga zapovijed koju izdaje general Markač, uz supotpis ministra unutarnjih poslova gosp. Ivana Jarnjaka, odnosi se na ustrojavanje i početak rada Stožera skupnih snaga specijalne policije.<sup>71</sup>

110. Po dobivanju zapovijedi od načelnika GS HV, načelnik Sektora specijalne policije upućuje pripremnu zapovijed na ruke svih načelnika PU (osim PU Virovitičko-podravske i PU Međimurske) i zapovjednika ATJ Lučko kojom se od zapovjednika SJP traži:

*„Od dana 29. 07. 1995. godine, od 19,00 sati dužni ste staviti cjelokupni sastav (djelatni i pričuvni) jedinice kojom zapovijedate u stanje pripravnosti na način da se narečene snage mogu okupiti najkasnije u roku 2 sata od dobivanja zapovijedi za okupljanje.”*<sup>72</sup>

111. Od 29. srpnja 1995. počinje dovođenje snaga za operaciju i time stvaranje Skupnih snaga SP. Ove su administrativne zapovijedi gotovo istovjetne, kao i za

<sup>69</sup> Zapovijed general pukovnika Mladena Markača za upućivanje izvidničko-operativnih skupina, Broj: 511-01-30-597/95, Zagreb, 21. srpnja 1995.

<sup>70</sup> Zbirno izvješće o radu izvidničko-operativnih skupina na području Velebita, Broj: 511-01-30- 95, od 29. srpnja 1995.

<sup>71</sup> Zapovijed za početak rada Stožera skupnih snaga specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-602/95, od 22. srpnja 1995.

<sup>72</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP svim načelnicima PU (osim PU Virovitičko-podravske i PU Međimurske) i ATJ Lučko, Broj: 511-01-31-1015/95, od 29. srpnja 1995.

dovođenje za sudjelovanje u operaciji „Oluja – Obruč“ pa će se ovdje kao primjer navesti jedna:

*„Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova*

*Sektor specijalne policije*

*Broj: 511-01-31-1024/95*

*Zagreb, 29. srpnja 1995. g.*

*n/r načelniku PU Krapinsko-zagorske*

*uručiti zapovjedniku SJP*

*Glede izvršenja najsloženijih zadaća iz djelokruga rada specijalne policije, donosim*

*z a p o v i j e d*

*Dana 30. 07. 1995. godine do 17,00 sati dužni ste biti na dogovorenoj poziciji, s dogovorenim brojem djelatnika, opremljenim naoružanjem, streljivom i potrebitom opremom shodno dogovoru, kao i s dovoljnim brojem šatora za privremeni smještaj djelatnika.*

*Prihvat narečenih snaga izvršit će v.d. načelnik odjela logistike, gospodin Branislav Bole.*

*Prijevoz djelatnika osigurajte vozilima iz voznog parka SJ ili autobusima.*

*Prilikom uporabe vozila dužni ste se kretati u propisanoj koloni, pridržavajući se prometnih propisa i krećući se maksimalnom brzinom od 80 km/h.*

*Glede izvršenja ove zadaće visina dnevnice je 100 posto.*

*Načelnik Sektora*

*Željko Sačić“*

112. Istovjetnost zapovijedi od 29. srpnja 1995. s onom od 26. lipnja 1995. vrlo je vjerojatno olakšala proces planiranja Stožera skupnih snaga jer je dio posla odrađen prije i nakon prijema prve zapovijedi. Ta istovjetnost isto tako pokazuje da nije došlo do promjene njezina sadržaja u odnosu na postavljene zadaće i način njihove

realizacije nakon sastanka na Brijunima 17. srpnja 1995. ali niti nakon drugog sastanka na Brijunima 31. srpnja 1995.

113. U svojoj Raščlambi tijekom operacije general pukovnik Mladen Markač navodi nekoliko datuma i događaja koji su važni u procesu planiranja a to su:

- 21. lipnja 1995. na V. Goliću izvršeno je stožerno izviđanje planiranog područja napadnog djelovanja prema Ličkom polju i Gračacu uz sudjelovanje užeg kolegija Sektora specijalne policije i pripadnika ZP Split pod vodstvom načelnika Obavještajne uprave GS HV kontraadmirala Davora Domazeta – Loše,
- 27. lipnja 1995. čelništvo specijalne policije održalo je stožerni trenaž sa svrhom razrade borbene zadaće u Zagrebu, a zapovjednici glavnih i pomoćnih pravaca upoznati su s konkretnim zadaćama svojih postrojbi te im je podijeljena potrebna dokumentacija,
- 29. srpnja čelništvo Sektora specijalne policije dobiva pisanu zapovijed za napad u Glavnom stožeru HV s ucrtanim napadnim pravcima na zemljovidu,
- 31. srpnja 1995. stavljen je u funkciju sustav bežičnih i žičnih veza, u funkciju je stavljeno izmješteno zapovjedno mjesto na južnim padinama V. Golića, konkretizirane su zadaće pridodanih topničko-raketnih postrojbi HV za potporu, a u sjedištu Stožera skupnih snaga u Starigradu je zapovjednicima napadnih pravaca i postrojbi podijeljena cjelovita dokumentacija, a zadaća je u potpunosti shvaćena i razrađena do operativne razine.<sup>73</sup>

114. Konkretiziranje zadaća pridodanih topničko-raketnih postrojbi HV za potporu moglo se provesti tek nakon što je 30. srpnja 1995. načelnik GS HV izdao zapovijed kojom je regulirao zapovijedanje u sektoru Zadar (zapovijed je upućena zapovjedniku ZP Split, a generalu Markaču na pažnju):

*„2. Snage na padinama Velebita pripremiti za ofanzivna djelovanja u sudjelovanju sa specijalnim snagama MUP-a na smjeru Jasenice – Muškovci. Dijelom snaga na lijevom boku osigurati neposredno djelovanje sa specijalnim snagama MUP-a na smjeru Tulove grede - Prezid, a dijelom snaga na desnom boku ostaviti*

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<sup>73</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“, MUP – Sektor specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 3-4.

(pretpostavljam da je trebalo pisati ostvariti umjesto ostaviti) *nadzor na kanjonu r. Zrmanja.*

...

*4. Snagama koje djeluju na padinama Velebita osigurati posebnu topničku skupinu koja će pružiti topničku potporu tim snagama i snagama MUP-a.*

...

*6. U širem rejonu Zadra (Šepurine), GSHV i dalje zadržava u svojoj pričuvi postrojbu specijalnih snaga MUP-a.<sup>74</sup>*

115. Za prilagodbu sustava vođenja i zapovijedanja u uvjetima ratnih djelovanja, načelnik GS HV izdaje zapovijed o ustrojavanju Stožernog Operativnog Centra GS HV (SOC) sa stožernim operativnim timom i potrebnom opremom za sustav zapovijedanja, nadzora, veza i kompjutorske obrade podataka.<sup>75</sup> U zapovijedi NGS regulira:

*„Zadaće Stožernog operativnog centra su prikupljanje, obrada i analiza podataka, te vođenje postrojbi i zapovjedništava na operativno strateškoj razini. Operativni tim podносит će prijedloge uporabe snaga Načelniku GSHV i neposredno će odgovarati za praćenje i nadzor stanja u zbornim područjima.“<sup>76</sup>*

116. Iz navedene je odredbe vidljivo da se ona ne odnosi na specijalne jedinice policije (Skupne snage) već isključivo na zborna područja (SJP MUP-a se ne spominju niti u jednoj točki zapovijedi). Budući da je general pukovnik Markač bio izravno podređen Glavnom stožeru, nepoznato je zbog čega je izostavljen, jer je zapovijed izdana pred samu operaciju kad je bilo sasvim jasno tko u njoj sudjeluje. Međutim, to nije jedina zapovijed koja je dostavljena svim zapovjednicima Zbornih područja, ali ne i generalu Markaču.<sup>77 78</sup>

117. Dana 3. kolovoza 1995. načelnik GS HV izdaje zapovijed za spremnost snaga za napad:

<sup>74</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV za reguliranje zapovijedanja u sektoru Zadar, Klasa: 080-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-334, od 30. srpnja 1995., 13.00 sati.

<sup>75</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-340, od 2. kolovoza 1995. godine 09.00 sati.

<sup>76</sup> Isto, točka 2.

<sup>77</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-408; 06. kolovoza 1995. koja regulira novu granicu između ZP Split i ZP Gospić, koja napola siječe područje djelovanja Skupnih snaga SP.


<sup>78</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-410, od 6. kolovoza 1995. koja regulira sprječavanje otuđivanja imovine i nestegovnog ponašanja pripadnika HV pri ulasku u oslobođeni teritorij.

„1. Spremnost snaga ZP Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić, Split i snaga specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a RH za napad a ZP Osijek, Južnog bojišta i snaga HRM za obranu dana 04. kolovoza 1995. godine u 03,00 sata.

...

4. Napadna djelovanja otpočeti u 05.00 sati 04. kolovoza 1995. godine na svim pravcima osim težišnom smjeru napada ZP Gospić, gdje napad otpočeti u 06,00 sati 04. kolovoza 1995. godine.<sup>79</sup>

118. Istoga dana u 16,50 sati odvija se sastanak Stožera skupnih snaga sa zapovjednicima SJP, na kojem se raspravlja o obavještajnim poslovima, topništvu, logistici i operativnim pitanjima. Nakon sastanka zapovjednici se vraćaju u svoje postrojbe i čekaju početak napada.



**Razmjještaj Skupnih snaga specijalne policije MUP-a uoči napada**

<sup>79</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/1-95-364, od 3. kolovoza 1995. u 21,15 sati.

## 8.1. Aktivnosti na dan 4. kolovoza 1995.

119. Napad počinje prema planu u 05,15 sati na jednom glavnom i četiri pomoćna pravca uz snažnu topničku pripremu po unaprijed određenim ciljevima, djelovanjem ustrojbenih 6 bitnica MB 120 mm, jednim divizijunom RAK 128 mm i 10 LRL 107 mm, uz potporu TS-5 OG Zadar.<sup>80</sup>

120. Prema zapovijedi<sup>81</sup> za napad Skupnih snaga specijalne policije, snage napadaju na sljedeći način:

„ **GLAVNI PRAVAC NAPADA**

*Uvođenjem snaga Specijalne policije na crtu razvoja od Malog Golića do Prosine, snage na glavnom pravcu napada jačine jedne bojne, sastavljene od 140 pripadnika SJP PU Varaždinske, 180 pripadnika SJP PU Splitsko-dalmatinske, 180 pripadnika SJP PU Zadarsko-kninske, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika na glavnom pravcu, gospodina Zdravka Janić, načelnika Odjela za borbu protiv terorizma, pozivnog znaka „LED“ i njegovog zamjenika, gospodina Svemira Vrsaljko, zapovjednika SJP PU Zadarsko-kninske, pozivnog znaka „LED 50“, izvršiti brz i iznenadan prodor po smjeru: Mali Alan, Crveni potoci, Male i Velike Žuljine, relejni centar Čelavac i prijevoj Prezid...*

*c) Pripadnici SJP PU Zadarsko-kninska, raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 60 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Anton Dražina...*

*d) Pripadnici SJP PU Osječko-baranjske raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 50 djelatnika... i pripadnici SJP PU Šibenske raspoređeni u dvije skupine jačine cca 50 djelatnika... u prvoj i drugoj fazi operacije bit će u funkciji interventne skupine zapovjedniku Glavnog pravca napada...*

### I POMOĆNI PRAVAC

*Uvođenjem snaga Specijalne policije na crtu razvoja od Božića Vršina, na prvom pomoćnom pravcu napada, jačine dvije satnije, sastavljene od 150 pripadnika SJP PU Karlovačke i 170 pripadnika SJP PU Bjelovarsko-bilogorske, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika na prvom pomoćnom pravcu, gospodina Dražena*

<sup>80</sup> Operativni dnevnik 1. Sektora (OG Zadar) – od 09,55 sati do 19,00 sati s četiri topnička udara djelovalo se prema Gračacu s oko 30 projektila 130 mm.

<sup>81</sup> Zapovijed za napad Skupnih snaga specijalne policije, nedatirana i nepotpisana.

*Perković, zapovjednika SJP PU Karlovačke pozivnog znaka „LED 1“ i njegovog zamjenika, gospodina Hamdije Mašinović, zapovjednika SJP PU Bjelovarsko-bilogorske, pozivnog znaka „LED 10“, izvršiti brz i iznenadan prodor po smjeru Božića Vršine, Plantaže, Markovac, s.Smolčići, s.Japundžići, komunikacija Gračac-Obrovac...*

*a) pripadnici SJP PU Karlovačke raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 50 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Dražena Perković... u prvoj etapi ovladat će... U drugoj etapi izvršit će presijecanje i ovladavanje komunikacijom Gračac – Sv. Rok... te na ovom pravcu uspostaviti aktivnu obranu glede sprečavanja neprijateljskog udara pješastvom iz pravca Gračaca u bok naših glavnina snaga.*

*b) pripadnici SJP PU Bjelovarsko-bilogorske raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 60 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Hamdije Mašinović... u prvoj etapi ovladat će... U drugoj etapi ovladat će dominantnim visovima iznad Gračaca i to Bukova Kosa (tt 695), tt 651 i Mala Gudura i uspostaviti aktivnu obranu glede sprečavanja neprijateljskog napada iz smjera Gračaca.*

*c) Pripadnici SJP PU Dubrovačko-neretvanske, raspoređeni u jednu skupinu, jačine cca 40 djelatnika... i pripadnici SJP PU Vukovarsko-srijemske (skupina Županja) raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 40 djelatnika... u prvoj i drugoj fazi operacije bit će u funkciji interventne skupine zapovjedniku prvog pomoćnog pravca napada napada...*

## II POMOĆNI PRAVAC

*Uvođenjem snaga Specijalne policije na crtu razvoja od Velikog Golića, na drugom pomoćnom pravcu napada, jačine dvije satnije, sastavljene od 130 pripadnika SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačke (skupina Kutina) i 190 pripadnika SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačke (skupina Sisak), pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika na drugom pomoćnom pravcu, gospodina Borisa Jambrešić, zapovjednika SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačke pozivnog znaka „LED 2“ i njegovog zamjenika, gospodina Marija Božić, pomoćnika zapovjednika SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačke, pozivnog znaka „LED 20“, izvršiti brz i iznenadan prodor po smjeru Veliki Golić, Liščana Draga, Šilovići, Pilar do istočnih brda iznad komunikacije...*

*a) pripadnici SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačke (skupina Kutina) raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 40 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Dragutina*

*Vurnek... u prvoj etapi ovladat će... U drugoj etapi ovladat će komunikacijom Gračac – Sv. Rok... te na ovom pravcu uspostaviti aktivnu obranu glede sprečavanja neprijateljskog udara pješastvom iz pravca Gračaca.*

*b) pripadnici SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačke (skupina Sisak) raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 50 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Marija Božić... u prvoj etapi ovladat će... U drugoj etapi ovladat će komunikacijom Gračac – Sv. Rok i uspostaviti aktivnu obranu glede sprečavanja neprijateljskog napada pješastvom iz smjera Gračaca.*

*c) Pripadnici SJP PU Vukovarsko-srijemske (skupina Vinkovci), raspoređeni u tri skupine, jačine cca 40 djelatnika... u prvoj i drugoj fazi operacije bit će u funkciji interventne skupine zapovjedniku drugog pomoćnog pravca napada...*

### III POMOĆNI PRAVAC

*Uvođenjem snaga Specijalne policije na crtu razvoja od Dušica, na trećem pomoćnom pravcu napada, jačine jedne satnije, sastavljene od 120 pripadnika SJP PU Ličko-senjske i 40 pripadnika SJP PU Zagrebačke, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika na trećem pomoćnom pravcu, gospodina Miroslava Cindrić, (zapovjednika SJP PU Ličko-senjske) pozivnog znaka „LED 3“ i njegovog zamjenika, gospodina Darka Gešpaher (instruktora specijalističke obuke u SJP PU Zagrebačke, pozivnog znaka „LED 30“, izvršiti brz i iznenadan prodor po smjeru Biljevina, Staro Selo, Sv. Rok, brdo Zmelovača (tt 609.7)...*

*a) pripadnici SJP PU Ličko-senjske raspoređeni u dvije skupine jačine cca 60 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Miroslava Cindrić... u prvoj etapi ovladat će... U drugoj etapi ovladat će komunikacijom Gračac – Sv. Rok na dijelu od s.Ruka (uključno) do Zmelovače, te na ovom pravcu uspostaviti aktivnu obranu glede sprečavanja neprijateljskog udara pješastvom iz pravca Lovinca.*

*b) pripadnici SJP PU Zagrebačke raspoređeni u jednu skupinu jačine cca 40 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom, gospodina Darka Gešpaher... u prvoj etapi ovladat će... U drugoj etapi izvršit će presjecanje komunikacijom Madak – Gračac kod zaseoka Čovići i uspostaviti aktivnu obranu glede sprečavanja neprijateljskog napada iz smjera Medka i Lovinca.*

*c) Pripadnici PP Lovinac, raspoređeni u jednu skupinu, jačine cca 50 djelatnika... u prvoj i drugoj fazi operacije bit će u funkciji interventne skupine zapovjedniku trećeg pomoćnog pravca napada napada...*

#### IV POMOĆNI PRAVAC

*Uvođenjem snaga Specijalne policije na crtu razvoja od istočnih padina Svetog Brda, na četvrtom pomoćnom pravcu napada, jačine dvije satnije, sastavljene od 130 pripadnika SJP PU Primorsko-goranske, 140 pripadnika SJP PU Zagrebačke i 50 djelatnika ATJ Lučko, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika na četvrtom pomoćnom pravcu, gospodina Zorana Cvrk, (zapovjednika SJP PU Zagrebačke) pozivnog znaka „LED 4“ i njegovog zamjenika, gospodina Tomislava Dizdar (zapovjednika SJP PU Primorsko-goranske), pozivnog znaka „LED 40“, izvršiti brz i iznenadan prodor po smjeru Bile Kuci, Tropolje, Palež, s. Jurjevići...*

*a) pripadnici SJP PU Primorsko-goranske raspoređeni u dvije skupine jačine cca 60 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Tomislava Dizdar... u prvoj etapi ovladat će...*

*b) pripadnici SJP PU Zagrebačke raspoređeni u tri skupine jačine cca 40 djelatnika, pod zapovjedništvom zapovjednika, gospodina Zorana Cvrk... u prvoj etapi ovladat će... U drugoj etapi ovladat će s. Jurjevići i uspostaviti aktivnu obranu glede sprečavanja neprijateljskog napada na smjeru Medak – Gračac.*

*c) Pripadnici SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorske), raspoređeni u tri skupine, jačine cca 40 djelatnika... i SJP PU Istarske, raspoređeni u dvije skupine, jačine cca 40 djelatnika...u prvoj i drugoj fazi operacije bit će u funkciji interventne skupine zapovjedniku prvog (pogrešno napisano umjesto četvrtog) pomoćnog pravca napada...*

...<sup>82</sup>

121. Premda je zapovijed nepotpisana i nedatirana autentičnost njena sadržaja potvrđuje raščlamba Sektora specijalne policije<sup>83</sup> i ratni putovi koje zapovjednici SJP svih policijskih uprava dostavljaju u Sektor specijalne policije 1996. i 1997. godine.


<sup>82</sup> Isto.

<sup>83</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 5 i 6.

122. Raščlanjujući ovu zapovijed vidljivo je da je, iako se na prvi pogled čini jednostavnim, vrlo složen sustav zapovijedanja skupnim snagama na pojedinim smjerovima. Tako na glavnom pravcu napada zapovijeda Zdravko Janić, koji jedini od svih ostalih zapovjednika dolazi izravno iz Sektora specijalne policije i nije zapovjednik neke od SJP PU koje se nalaze raspoređene na smjeru te zapravo zapovijeda sa snagama s kojima nije nikada prije zapovijedao. Njegov je zamjenik zapovjednik SJP PU Zadarsko-kninske Svemir Vrsaljko i njih dvojica zapovijedaju snagama jačine bojne (500 pripadnika u napadu i 250 u sastavu interventnih snaga), primajući neprekidno izvješća od podređenih i izvješćujući o događanjima Stožer skupnih snaga.

123. Situacija je još složenija na ostalim pravcima. Tako na prvom pomoćnom pravcu (320 pripadnika u napadu i 160 u sastavu interventnih snaga) zapovjednik pravca Dražen Perković ujedno je i zapovjednik SJP PU Karlovačke sa 150 pripadnika, dok je njegov zamjenik Hamdija Mašinović ujedno i zapovjednik SJP PU Bjelovarsko-bilogorske sa 180 pripadnika. U sustavu u kojem je zapovjednik u dvostrukoj ulozi, njegov bi prvi prioritet trebao biti zapovijedanje ukupnim dodijeljenim snagama, a ne zapovijedanje svojom postrojbom u čijem se sastavu nalazi i kreće. Međutim, u realnim uvjetima svaki zapovjednik prvo zapovijeda s onim što vidi i izravno vodi, a to je njegova matična postrojba s čijim pripadnicima ima poseban personalni odnos i za koje osjeća najveću odgovornost. Tako je njegova mogućnost nadzora smanjena uglavnom na prostor u kojem djeluje njegova postrojba, dok o događanjima na ostatku smjera može znati samo onoliko koliko ga sredstvima veze informira njegov zamjenik (i obrnuto), koji je opet prioritetno vezan uz zapovijedanje svojom postrojbom, a njihova fizička razdvojenost dodatno usložnjava sustav zapovijedanja i nadzora.

124. Istu situaciju dvostruke uloge imamo na drugom pomoćnom pravcu sa zamjenikom zapovjednika pravca, ujedno zapovjednikom SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačka (skupina Sisak), te na trećem i četvrtom pomoćnom pravcu i sa zapovjednikom i sa zamjenikom zapovjednika pravca.



Shema zapovijedanja u Skupnim snagama specijalne policije na dan 4. kolovoza 1995. godine (podebljanim slovima obilježeni su zapovjednici koji se nalaze u dvostruhoj ulozi)

125. Navedeni zapovjednici pravaca i njihovi zamjenici uglavnom zapovijedaju skupnim snagama koje djeluju na različitim pravcima do kraja operacije tj. do izvlačenja snaga 9. kolovoza 1995., ali se gotovo dnevno mijenjaju podređene SJP koje djeluju u sastavu snaga na određenom pravcu.

126. Prema izvješću načelnika GS HV Predsjedniku RH u 18,00 sati 4. kolovoza 1995.:


„6. **Specijalne snage MUP-a** u suradnji sa snagama 2/9. gbr uspješno ovladale kotama na Velebitu na smjeru napada Tulove grede – Mali Alan – prema Svetom Roku, te ovladale crtom: Babin Gaj – Krpani – Brkina glavica – Sveti Rok – Grabar-V. Malovan – Vršak tt 675 – Kurcelji. U dosadašnjim b/d 2 poginula i 8 ranjenih.“<sup>84</sup> Međutim, borbe su trajale neprestano do 21.00 sati kad je zapovjeđena obustava borbenih djelovanja<sup>85</sup>, a dostignuta crta je zapadno s.Međuvode – s. Lipač Radučki –

<sup>84</sup> Izvješće načelnika GS HV Predsjedniku RH, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08. Ur.br. 512-06-05/01-95-381, 4. kolovoz 1995. u 18,00 sati.

<sup>85</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 9.

s.Žmelovača – rijeka Opsenica – s.Pilar – s.Poljana – s.Čuljeti – Milska Glavica čime je na cijeloj fronti probijena prva crta obrane neprijatelja. Najveći je otpor pružen u području Malog Alana i dalje prema Čelavcu. Posebno je važno prekidanje komunikacije Gospić – Gračac jer je time onemogućen uzdužni manevar neprijatelja tim smjerom i snage 9. mtbr bile su razdvojene u dva dijela, jedan dio koji se branio prema Gospiću i drugi koji je gravitirao Gračacu. Time je umanjena manevarska sposobnost cijelog 15. korpusa, a nadzorom komunikacije stvoreni su preduvjeti za nastavak napada idućega dana silaskom s obronaka Velebita na prohodnije zemljište. Na kraju prvoga dana napadne operacije Skupne snage SJP MUP-a imale su 5 poginulih i 30 ranjenih pripadnika.

127. Tijekom dana, pored dodira i zajedničkog djelovanja s 2/9. gbr na desnom boku, nisu uspostavljeni dodiri s drugim snagama ZP Split i ZP Gospić.



Djelovanje SP MUP-a 4. kolovoza 1995.

## 8.2. Aktivnosti na dan 5. kolovoza 1995.

128. Na kraju prvoga dana načelnik izdaje zapovijed za 5. kolovoza (D+1) u kojoj je regulirano:

*„1. Bojeva djelovanja na dan 05. kolovoza 1995. godine otpočeti i izvršavati sukladno zapovijedima i odlukama zapovjednika ZP, HRM, HRZ, JB i specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a.*

*2. Bojeva djelovanja nastaviti pojačanim intenzitetom uz uporabu paljbe, pokreta, korišćenje zrakoplovne potpore i pješćkih napadaja.*

...

*3.5. Specijalne postrojbe MUP-a RH*

*- energičnim napadom i manevrom snaga zauzeti naselje Gračac.<sup>86</sup>*

129. Skupne snage specijalne policije, ne dopuštajući neprijatelju da se konsolidira i uspostavi novu crtu obrane po dubini, pritišću na cijeloj fronti i ubrzo zauzimaju cijelu prometnicu Gospić – Gračac te sam grad Gračac kako je izričito zapovijeđeno od strane načelnika GS HV. Napad se nastavlja na istim pravcima kao i prethodnoga dana (druga etapa napada) s istim zapovjednicima i s gotovo istim snagama. General Markač u svom izvješću načelniku GS HV piše:

*„Uz topničku potporu skupne snage Specijalne policije nadnevka 05. 08. 1995. godine do 11.30 sati ovladale su u potpunosti Gračacom, a do 12.00 sati objektima Čelavac i Prezid... Ovim je u potpunosti izvršena Planom predviđena zadaća Skupnih snaga Specijalne policije... U tijeku je pregrupiranje snaga s kojima će se, prema Vašoj zapovijedi, nastaviti napadna djelovanja na glavnom pravcu Gračac – Bruvno i na pomoćnom pravcu Gračac – Malovan...<sup>87</sup>*

jer su se tim smjerovima povukle i snage 9.mtbr, koje u povlačenju borbeno djeluju protiv Skupnih snaga specijalne policije u nastupanju.

130. Slično izvješće dostavlja i zapovjednik IZM Zadar zapovjedniku ZP Split:

*„SNAGE SJP MUP-a:*

*U cijelosti se kontrolira komunikacija Medak – Gračac, zauzimanjem svih visova sjeverno od navedene komunikacije.*

<sup>86</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/1-95-384, od 5. kolovoza 1995, u 00.00 sati.

<sup>87</sup> Izvješće o borbenom razmještanju Skupnih snaga Specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-VT-104/95, Stožer Seline, 5 kolovoza 1995.

Po zadnjim spoznajama ovladana crta je: MEDVIDOVAČA tt.832 – VRH MATINOVIĆA tt.988 – VRH BRSTANUŠA tt.911 – TRPOLOVAČKA GLAVA tt.817 – ŽUTIĆA VRH tt.909 – PLASE tt.920 – LJUBOVIĆ – GRAČAC (komunikacija GRAČAC – ČELAVAC – PREZID tt.766), te su snage usmjerene prema MALOVANU i lijevom stranom prema BRUVNU.<sup>88</sup>

131. U svom izvješću predsjedniku RH, načelnik GS HV potvrđuje izvješće generala Markača:

*„Snage HV ojačane specijalnim snagama MUP-a nastavile su napadna djelovanja iskazivanjem težišta na području Sjeverne i Srednje Dalmacije, te Like...*

*Na području Like specijalne snage MUP-a i dio snaga ZP Gospić u cijelosti su ovladale prometnicom Gospić-Gračac i komunikacijskim čvorištem Gračac.*<sup>89</sup>

132. Pored Gračaca od većih mjesta oslobođeni su Lovinac i Medak, a snage specijalne policije su se na četvrtom pomoćnom pravcu spojile sa snagama ZP Gospić u s. Lički Ribnik.

133. Prema obavještajnim podacima očekivala se uporaba pričuve jačine jedne bojne s vodom tenkova iz smjera Bruvna pa je bilo važno da se takva akcija što prije spriječi aktivnim nastupanjem prema Bruvnu i Malovanu.

134. Zapovjednik ZP Split 5. kolovoza izdaje zapovijed u kojoj daje zadaću 4. gbr:

*„1. Zapovjednik 4.gbr HV pregrupirat će postrojbe za nastavka napadnih bojnih djelovanja općim smjerom KNIN-VELEBIT, a ciljem ovladavanja širim prostorom KOM k.1003 – GORNJI ERVENIK i spajanja sa postrojbama OG Zadar (1.HGZdrug, 2/9.gbr i ATG satnija VP) u području KAŠTEL ŽEGARSKI.*

*Po izvršenju spajanja sa snagama OG Zadar preusmjeriti postrojbe za izvođenje napadnih djelovanja prema sjeveru, s ciljem izbijanja na crtu TOMAŠEV VRH tt. 1155 – SRBSKI KLANAC k.793, spajanjem sa snagama SP MUP RH u području Tomašev Vrh i osiguranja cestovne i željezničke komunikacije Knin – Gračac. Po*

<sup>88</sup> Dnevno izvješće IZM Zadar zapovjedniku ZP Split, Klasa: 81/95-01/12, Ur.broj: 1080-01-95-269, od 5. kolovoza 1995.


<sup>89</sup> Izvješće načelnika GS HV Predsjedniku RH, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.br. 512-06-05/01-95-400, od 5. kolovoza 1995. u 20,00 sati.

dostizanju crte TOMAŠEV VRH k.1155 – SRBSKI KLANAC k.793, prijeći u upornu i aktivnu obranu.<sup>90</sup>

135. Međutim do toga spoja ne dolazi.

136. Stožer Skupnih snaga se iz Selina i s IZM V. Golić odmah nakon oslobađanja seli u Gračac te počinje s radom u 16,00 sati u zgradi Općinskog suda Gračac,<sup>91</sup> međutim Temeljno zapovjedno mjesto u Selinama se ne gasi već i dalje radi, ali u smanjenom obujmu, a na njemu ostaje i bojnič Petar Ričko iz Obavještajne uprave GS HV. Oko 18,00 sati u radni posjet Stožeru stižu ministar unutarnjih poslova gosp. Ivan Jarnjak i predstojnik Ureda za nacionalnu sigurnost dr. Miroslav Tuđman.

137. Tijekom drugog dana b/d snage SP MUP na ličko-dalmatinskoj bojišnici imale su ukupno 1 poginulog, 12 ranjenih i 5 ozlijeđenih pripadnika.



Djelovanje SP MUP-a 5. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>90</sup> Zapovijed ZP Split, Klasa: SP 8/95-01/17, Ur.broj: 1080-01-95-342, od 5. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>91</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 11.

### 8.3. Aktivnosti na dan 6. kolovoza 1995.

138. Kao i prethodnoga dana, načelnik GS HV izdaje zapovijed za nastavak izvođenja bojnih djelovanja na "D+2", te još nekoliko dodatnih zapovijedi:

*„1. ZP Split*

*- ovladati širim prostorima Otrića i Srba, a zatim izbiti na državnu granicu u prostoru Međedak – željeznička postaja na rijeci Uni...*

*2. ZP Gospić*

*- dijelom snaga sa prostora Ljubovo ovladati Udbinom i produžiti napad uz sudjelovanje sa Specijalnim postrojbama MUP-a, s ciljem ovladavanja D.Lapca i izbiti na državnu granicu isključivo do prostora Međedak – željeznička postaja na r. Uni.*

*3. Specijalne postrojbe MUP-a*

*- po ovladavanju prijevoja Bruvno i Malovan, produžiti napad u smjeru D.Lapca i izvršiti ovladavanje tim prostorom uz sudjelovanje sa snagama ZP Gospić na lijevom i snagama ZP Split na desnom krilu.“<sup>92</sup>*

139. Načelnik GS HV izdaje zapovijed kojom određuje granice zona odgovornosti između ZP Split i ZP Gospić te ostalih ZP (kako se navodi u uvodu u zapovijed, na temelju operativnog razvoja situacije, a u cilju usklađenog djelovanja zbornih područja):

*„1. Operativne granice zona odgovornosti između ZP uspostaviti prema slijedećem:*

*A/ Između ZP Split i ZP Gospić crtom: Mali Alan – Gračac – V.Sedlo tt. 1209 – Međedak tt.639 – željeznička stanica Una /sve uključno Split/.“<sup>93</sup>*

140. Zapovijed nije adresirana na generala Markača (učinak ove zapovijedi je već ranije elaboriran).

141. U cilju sprječavanja otuđivanja imovine i nestegovnog ponašanja, načelnik GS HV izdaje novu zapovijed:

*„1. Po ulasku pripadnika HV u oslobođena područja spriječiti svako nestegovno ponašanje.*

<sup>92</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV za nastavak bojnih djelovanja na "D+2", Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-409, od 6. kolovoza 1995. u 10,00 sati.

<sup>93</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-408; 6. kolovoza 1995. godine u 05,55 sati.

2. *Energično spriječiti otuđivanje imovine i ratnog plijena.*
  3. *Protiv počinitelja nestegovnog ponašanja poduzimati energične mjere.*
  4. *Za provođenje ove zapovijedi osobno činim odgovorne zapovjednike ZP.*<sup>94</sup>
- Zapovijed nije adresirana na generala Markača.

142. Načelnik GS HV mijenja i način izvješćivanja pa donosi zapovijed za dostavu operativnih izvješća:

„1. *Svakog dana dostavljati jasna operativna izvješća i to:*

- *do 12.00 sati sa stanjem u 11.00 sati,*
- *do 19.00 sati sa stanjem u 18.00 sati,*

...

3. *Sadržaj izvješća:*

1. *Kratki opis razvoja situacije, iskazanih problema, oslobođeni objekti, ciljevi po postrojbama...*

2. *Gubici u ljudstvu: mrtvi, teže ranjeni, lakše ranjeni i b/k (u 19,00 sati).*
3. *Gubici i oštećenja MTS-a.*
4. *Utrošak MTS po vrstama, u komadima i b/k (u 19,00 sati).*
5. *Zarobljena MTS i ljudstvo neprijatelja.*
6. *Dostignuta crta.*
7. *Jasna zamisao daljnjeg angažiranja snaga.*
8. *Zahtjevi.*

4. *Izvanredna izvješća dostavljati odmah zaštićenim sustavima veza.*<sup>95</sup>

143. Ovaj sadržaj, kao i vremena dostave izvješća postaju obvezujući za sve zapovjednike izravno podređene načelniku GS HV, uključujući i generala Markača. Da bi mogao dostavljati tražena izvješća isti se sustav izvješćivanja mora uspostaviti i unutar Skupnih snaga s vremenskim pomakom (npr. kako bi se izvješće moglo poslati do 12,00 sa stanjem u 11,00, izvješća podređenih u Stožer skupnih snaga moraju stići najkasnije do 11,30 sa satnjem u 11,00 kako bi djelatnici stožera imali dovoljno vremena za pripremu i slanje svoga izvješća).

<sup>94</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-410 od 6. kolovoza 1995. godine 11.00 sati.

<sup>95</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV za dostavu operativnih izvješća, Klasa: 80-01/95- 02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-407, od 6. kolovoza 1995.u 07.30 sati.

144. Specijalne postrojbe MUP-a nastavljaju s napredovanjem i gonjenjem neprijatelja na dva temeljna smjera: Gračac – Bruvno i Gračac – Malovan – Otrić gdje su obje komunikacije stavljene pod nadzor.

145. Većina je snaga raspoređena uzduž komunikacije Medak – Lovinac – Gračac gdje provode čišćenje prostora, te u pričuvi na širem području Gračaca gdje se spremaju za nastavak gonjenja.

146. U redovnom dnevnom zapovjedništvu ZP Gospić načelniku GS HV, navodi se:  
*„Potpuno je oslobođena prometnica Bunić – L. Osik i ostvaren je spoj sa specijalnim snagama MUP-a ispred Medka. Prometnica Gospić – Gračac se koristi od strane HV i specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a RH. Ostalim snagama vrši se slamanje otpora neprijateljskih snaga u okruženju i čišćenje terena.*

*Planirano je daljnje napadajno djelovanje u smjeru D. Lapac i oslobođenja teritorije RH u pojasu odgovornosti.“<sup>96</sup>*

147. Namjera djelovanja ZP Gospić prema D. Lapcu potvrđena je i u obavještajnom izvješću:

*„1. Značajke aktivnosti neprijatelja*

*Neprijatelj se izvlači ka D. Lapcu i Srbu, a zatim na prostor BiH.*

...

*4. Prijedlog daljnjih djelovanja*

*- Brzim prodorom smjerom s. Debelo Brdo – Udbina – D. Lapac, ovladati Udbinom i z/ „Krbava“ te se spojiti sa specijalnim snagama MUP-a u rajonu D. Lapac.“<sup>97</sup>*

148. 6. kolovoza počinje se i s ustrojavanjem vojne policije u Gračacu, a zastupnik zapovjednika 71. bojne VP ZP Gospić natporučnik Luka Matanić u svom izvješću pukovniku Damiru Koziću, djelatniku Uprave VP na IZM GS HV u Ogulinu, navodi:


*„Okolo 10,00 sati upućena je jedna desetina OVP u Gračac, a u tijeku su pripreme za formiranje voda VP u Gračacu. Također vrše se pripreme za formiranje vodova u Plitvičkim Jezerima i D. Lapcu, koji će biti upućeni po oslobađanju navedenih.“<sup>98</sup>*

<sup>96</sup> Redovno dnevno izvješće br. 5 zapovjedništva ZP Gospić, Klasa: 80-02/95-01/06, Ur.broj: 1043-04-95-17, od 6. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>97</sup> Obavještajno izvješće Obavještajnog odsjeka ZPP Gospić, Klasa: 804-08/95-02/01, Ur.broj: 1043-14-95-260 od 6. kolovoza 1995. u 17,20 sati

<sup>98</sup> Izvješće u svezi provedbe zadaća 71. bojne VP u zoni ratnih djelovanja i novooslobođenih područja, Klasa: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ur.broj: 2232-01/02-95-20, od 6. kolovoza 1995.

### 3. DAN (06. kolovoza 1995.) – NAPREDOVANJE I DOSTIGNUTA CRTA U NAPADU



Djelovanje SP MUP-a 6. kolovoza 1995.

#### 8.4. Aktivnosti na dan 7. kolovoza 1995.

149. U cilju nastavka i uspješnog završetka napadne operacije HV na dan "D+3" i djelomice neprovedene ranije zapovijedi NGS HV za dan D+2 izdana je nova zapovijed za nastavak bojnih djelovanja, ovladavanje cjelokupnim područjem, te izbijanje na državnu granicu do 18,00 sati dana 7. kolovoza 1995. godine:

„1. U svim zbornim područjima sukladno gore navedenoj zapovijedi NGSHV, na zadanim pravcima uložiti maksimalne napore i energično nastaviti sa napadnim borbenim djelovanjima i tijekom dana u potpunosti provesti citiranu Zapovijed, a najkasnije do 18,00 sati ovladati cjelokupnim teritorijem i izbiti na državnu granicu kako je zapovjedbano.

2. Zapovjednici ZP Split, Gospić i Zapovjednik Specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a dužni su iskoordinirati i međusobno usuglasiti vrijeme napada na zapovjedbanim smjerovima, o čemu me pravovremeno izvijestiti.

3. *Ponovno upozoravam sve podređene zapovjednike i zapovjedam korektan odnos spram pripadnika UNCRO i drugih djelatnika UN-a, čije živote i materijalna dobra ne izlagati pogibelji.*<sup>99</sup>

150. U 04,30 sati počeo je s radom IZM Stožera skupnih snaga u Bruvnu, a Skupne snage SP MUP-a raspoređene u pet pješачkih bojni su u 06,00 sati započele s napadnim djelovanjima sa sljedećim zadaćama:

*„a) ovladavanje jugoistočnim i istočnim zaleđem grada Udbine, uz uporabu jedne bojne jačine 390 pripadnika specijalne policije PU Zagrebačke, Karlovačke i Krapinsko-zagorske s osnovnom zadaćom zaštite lijevog boka uposlenim snagama na oslobađanju Donjeg Lapca;*

*b) oslobađanje Donjeg Lapca, uz uporabu jedne bojne jačine 400 pripadnika specijalne policije PU Osječko-baranjske, Dubrovačko-neretvanske, Sisačko-moslavačke (skupina Sisak), Splitsko-dalmatinske;*

*c) oslobađanje Gornjeg Lapca i Dobrog Sela uz uporabu jedne bojne jačine 330 pripadnika Specijalne policije PU Ličko-senjske, Primorsko-goranske, Varaždinske i ATJ Lučko;*

*d) izbijanje na šire područje državne granice sa BiH kod Kulen Vakufa uz uporabu jedne bojne jačine 310 pripadnika specijalne policije PU Sisačko-moslavačke (skupina Kutina), Bjelovarsko-bilogorske, Požeško-slavonske i Primorsko-goranske.*<sup>100</sup>

151. Prije početka napada u 07,00 sati zapovjednik jordanske bojne UNCRO-a dobiva informaciju o planu raketno-topničkog djelovanja snaga SP MUP-a na pravcima napada prema Donjem i Gornjem Lapcu. Brzim djelovanjem oslobođeni su s. Mazin u 09,30 sati, Gornji Lapac u 13,00 sati, Donji Lapac u 14,00 sati i na kraju Dobroselo u 14,30 sati.<sup>101</sup>

152. U svojoj raščlambi general Markač navodi i da su Skupne snage SP MUP-a nakon oslobađanja Donjeg Lapca od 14,00 do 14,40 sati bile izložene jakom topničkom udaru *"prijateljske vatre"* koji je prestao tek nakon intervencije generala

<sup>99</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-417, od 6. kolovoza 1995. godine u 21.00 sati.

<sup>100</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 14.

<sup>101</sup> Isto, str. 15.

Markača. U Ratnom dnevniku trd 9.gbr stoji nešto drugačiji navod koji potvrđuje djelovanje po području Lapca, ali se radi o Gornjem Lapcu:

*„07. kolovoza 1995. 13.30 sati 1 „Grad“ djeluje sa 175 raketa po ciljevima po Gornjem Lapcu“<sup>102</sup>*

153. Tijekom popodneva u grad ulaze i postrojbe ZP Gospić:

*„1. Oko 18,00 sati postrojbe ZP Gospić uz suradnju sa specijalnim postrojbama MUP-a RH oslobodile su grad Donji Lapac i izbile na državnu granicu.*

*Ovim je u potpunosti izvršena zadaća ZP Gospić u napadajnoj operaciji „Oluja - 3“ i oslobođen cijeli prostor u pojasu ZP Gospić. Pored toga postrojbe su angažirane na čišćenju terena, asanaciji bojišta i prikupljanju ratnog plijena.“<sup>103</sup>*

154. U Raščlambi tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije navodi se da su u 19,30 sati *„makadam cestom iz pravca Udbine u Donji Lapac ušli pripadnici 118. domobranske pukovnije HV.“<sup>104</sup>* Postrojbe 1/118. dp kao pridodane postrojbe 9. gbr ušle su u Donji Lapac zajedno s njom:

*„Trećeg dana operacije 9.gbr oslobodila je Udbinu, a četvrtog dana ušla je u Donji Lapac spajajući se sa snagama MUP-a RH koje su napredovale iz smjera Gračaca.“<sup>105</sup>*

155. Nakon oslobađanja Donjeg Lapca većina snaga specijalne policije napušta grad i nastavlja borbena djelovanja u smjeru Kulen Vakufa u širem zahvatu komunikacije G. Lapac – s. Boričevac – Kulen Vakuf, te do 19,05 sati ovladavaju područjem s. Boričevac, s. Ostrovica i zapadnim dijelom Kulen Vakufa (zapadna obala rijeke Une).

156. Tijekom dana Skupne snage MUP-a spajaju se sa snagama ZP Gospić na prilazima Udbine u 15,00 sati te sa snagama 4.gbr u Otriću u 15,05 sati.<sup>106</sup>

157. U izvješću načelnika GS HV predsjedniku RH navodi se:

**„Snage ZP Split su ovladale crtom:**

**– STRMICA – PLAVNO – OTRIĆ – GRAČAC i u tijeku su pripreme za produženje djelovanja uz Državnu granicu i na smjeru: OTRIĆ – SRB.**

<sup>102</sup> Ratni dnevnik trd 9.gtmbr, str.189.

<sup>103</sup> Redovno dnevno izvješće broj 8. ZP Gospić, Klasa: 80-02/95-01/06, Ur.broj: 1043-04-95-31 od 7. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>104</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 16.

<sup>105</sup> Raščlamba operacije "Oluja 95" Zapovjedništva ZP Gospić, Klasa: 80-02/95-01/06, Ur.broj: 1043-04-95-43, od 30. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>106</sup> Operativni dnevnik 4. gbr (srpnja 1995.), str. 25.

*Postrojbe pod zapovijedanjem ZP Split na Kninskoj bojišnici nisu tijekom 06. i 07. kolovoza 1995. godine bojevo djelovale, odnosno nisu izvršavale zapovijed Načelnika GSHV.*

**SP MUP-a RH** su po ovladivanju s MALOVANOM i BRUVNOM, produžile bojeva djelovanja, dijelom snaga izvršile su spajanje s postrojbama ZP Gospić u prostoru Udbine.

- Drugim dijelom snaga uz topničku potporu ZP Gospić postrojbe MUP-a ovladale su Gornjim i Donjim Lapcom.
- Držeći jednovremeno trećim dijelom snaga prijevoje MALOVAN – OTRIĆ.

**Snage ZP Gospić** su nastavile bojna djelovanja i oslobodile Udbinu i ovladale crtom:

- D. LAPAC – UDBINA – PEĆANI – FRKAŠIĆ – DRŽAVNA GRANICA uključno SAVSKA GLAVA tt 383), i u tijeku je nastavak djelovanja uz sudjelovanje sa SP MUP-a na smjeru FRKAŠIĆ – ŽELJEZNO POLJE.<sup>107</sup>

158. Navečer 7. kolovoza 1995. godine general pukovnik Mladen Markač sudjeluje na sastanku u ZP Split – IZM Zadar:

*„\*07. 08. – u večernjim satima održan sastanak i razrada plana za daljnja djelovanja između zapovjednika SP MUP-a, 2/9.gbr, HGZdrug i koordinatora (mog zastupnika na koordinaciji IZM-u Zadar). Isti su razradili zadaću koju sam uputio i pripremio, a koja mi je zapovjeđena od Načelnika GSHV.*

*Zapovijed se odnosila na razbijanje i potiskivanje neprijatelja iz prostora Gračac, Malovan, Srb, te zajedno sa snagama 4.gbr zauzeti s.Begluci – Krčko brdo – željeznička stanica Una...“<sup>108</sup>*

159. Sudjelovanje na ovom sastanku potvrđeno je i u obavještajnom izvješću Obavještajnog odsjeka ZP Split – IZM Zadar, u kojem se navodi i dostignuta crta Skupnih snaga specijalne policije:

*„U napredovanju postrojbe, međusobno uvezane, ovladale su prostorom Krupe te vrše daljnje čišćenje prostora Velebita.*

<sup>107</sup> Izvješće načelnika GS HV predsjedniku RH, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-427, 7. kolovoza 1995. u 17.10 sati.

<sup>108</sup> Raščlamba „Kozjak-95“ Zapovjedništva ZP Split – Izvod iz raščlambe u prostoru: Jasenice – Obrovac – Velebit – Kaštel Žegarski – Otrić – Srb, Klasa: SP 81/95-01/20, Ur.broj: 1080-01-95-3, od 20. kolovoza 1995.

*Postrojbe SJP MUP-a dostignule su pozicije: Dropolje-Ograđenik, tt. 1122-Sekanski vršak, tt 690 (Lapačko polje-Dobroselo te uz komunikaciju Dobroselo-Gračac uz visove poviše komunikacije Gračac-Malovan do s.Otrić.*

*U prostoru Lapca očekuje se spajanje s postrojbama 9 gbr iz smjera Udbine i Korenice.*

*U tijeku je operativni sastanak na kom su nazočni gen Mareković (pogrešno umjesto gen Markač) i zapovjednik 2/9 glede koordinacije sutrašnjih aktivnosti.<sup>109</sup>*

160. Zapovijed koja se usklađivala na ovom sastanku je zapovijed načelnika GS HV za D+3 koja se provela s danom zakašnjenja. Za njenu realizaciju zapovjednik ZP Split general Gotovina izdaje zapovijed koja je važna jer zahvaća područja u kojima se nalaze raspoređene skupne snage SJP MUP-a:

**„ 1. 4.gbr**

*Pregrupirati i pripremiti snage za napad u zoni odgovornosti prema zemljovidu (prilog uz ovu Zapovijed) sa zadaćom*

*Iz dosadašnjeg rajona razmještaja izvršiti dovođenje i grupiranje snaga na crtu: RASTIĆEVO – MALOVAN sa koje usmjeriti napad putnim pravcem OTRIĆ – SRB – RAĐENOVIĆI. Zauzeti mjesto SRB i na crti BOSANSKI OSREDCI – KRČKO BRDO, zaustaviti napad i prijeći u aktivnu obranu...*

*U izvršenju zadaće sudjelovati sa SP MUP-a u rajonu s.Otrić i sa 7.gbr i 2/9.gbr s HGZ.*

...

**3. OG ZADAR (za 2/9.gbr):**

*2/9.gbr sa HGZ pripremiti i pregrupirati za napad u zoni odgovornosti: prema zemljovidu (prilog uz ovu Zapovijed), sa zadaćom uz sudjelovanje sa 4.gbr i postrojbama ZP Gospić, a sa crte MALOVAN –GRAČAC, napad usmjeriti pravcem s.VUČIPOLJE – OROŽOVAC – s.BEGLUCI, sa zadaćom: razbiti i potisnuti snage neprijatelja, zauzeti s.BEGLUCI i na crti KRIČKO BRDO – želj.st. UNA, zaustaviti napad i prijeći u aktivnu obranu.<sup>110</sup>*

<sup>109</sup> Obavještajno izvješće IZM Zadar - Obavještajni odsjek; Klasa: SP/95-01/11; Ur.broj: 1060-02-10-95-214 od 07. kolovoza 1995. godine u 18,45 sati

<sup>110</sup> Zapovijed ZP Split – IZM Sajkovići, Klasa: SP 8/95-01/17, Ur.broj: 1080-01-95-348, Zadar, 7. kolovoza 1995.

161. Ukupne rezultate djelovanja 7. kolovoza 1995. general pukovnik Mladen Markač dostavlja načelniku GS HV u ranim jutarnjim satima 8. kolovoza 1995.

*„Nadnevka 07.08.1995. godine Skupne snage Specijalne policije uz raketno topničku potporu i uporabu oklopa ovladale su selom Mazin, Dobroselo, Gornji Lapac, Donji Lapac, te nakon dostignute crte izvršile pregrupiranje i krenule brzim prodorom prema državnoj granici i Uni, s ciljem oslobađanja Kulen Vakufa.*

*Uz to, dio snaga Specijalne policije (ekvivalenta 2 satnije) obavljale su tijekom dana čišćenje podvelebitskog terena na području od Medka do Svetog Roka, a ciljem uništenja zaostalih neprijateljevih skupina.*

*U 19,00 sati Skupne snage Specijalne policije ovladale su Kulen Vakufom i rasporedile se na dominantnim točkama u njegovom širem području, radi sprečavanja eventualnog protuudara srpskih snaga.“<sup>111</sup>*

162. Tijekom četvrtog dana b/d specijalne postrojbe MUP na ličko-dalmatinskoj bojišnici imale su ukupno 7 ranjenih i 2 nestala pripadnika s vozilom na širem području s.Mazin. Nestanak dva pripadnika, koji su zarobljeni i kasnije razmijenjeni, pokazuje da se na tom prostoru još uvijek nalaze dijelovi razbijenih neprijateljskih snaga u povlačenju.


163. 7. kolovoza formiran je i počeo s radom vod VP u Gračacu s 30 djelatnika svih specijalnosti, a jedna desetina je s postrojbama HV krenula prema Udbini i dalje prema D.Lapcu radi pretresa i započinjanja formiranja voda VP u D.Lapcu.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Izvješće o dostignutoj crti Skupnih snaga Specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-VT-106/95, Stožer Seline, od 8. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>112</sup> Izvješće u svezi provedbe zadaća 71. bojne VP u zoni ratnih djelovanja i novooslobođenih područja, Klasa: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ur.broj: 2232-01/02-95-22, od 7. kolovoza 1995.

#### 4. DAN (07. kolovoza 1995.) – NAPREDOVANJE I DOSTIGNUTA CRTA U NAPADU



Djelovanje SP MUP-a 7. kolovoza 1995.

#### 8.5. Aktivnosti na dan 8. kolovoza 1995.

164. Budući da snage ZP Split i ZP Gospić nisu još uvijek izašle na državnu granicu, u nastavku svog izvješća od 8. kolovoza 1995. general Markač od načelnika GS HV posebno traži:

„1. Da se Specijalnoj policiji dostavi crta razgraničenja zbornih područja koja su od Skupnih snaga Specijalne policije dužna preuzeti borbeno osiguranje dostignute crte bojišnice na granici RH.

2. Da se 4. gardijska brigada tijekom današnjeg dana spoji sa snagama Specijalne policije na državnoj granici na Uni (šire područje Kulen Vakufa).

3. Da se snage Zbornog područja Gospić izmjesti prema svojoj krajnjoj zadaći na granicu RH i ostvare koordinaciju sa stožerom Skupnih snaga Specijalne policije smještenim u Donjem Lapcu.

4. ...<sup>113</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Izvješće o dostignutoj crti Skupnih snaga Specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-VT-106/95, Stožer Seline, od 8. kolovoza 1995.

165. Tijekom dana Skupne snage SP učvršćuju svoju obranu na dostignutim crtama, a jedna bojna SP MUP-a (410 osoba pripadnika PU Krapinsko-zagorske, Vukovarsko srijemske, Koprivničko-križevačke i Šibenske) ojača prostor i proširuje crtu prema Kulen Vakufu zauzimanjem s.Kalati i s.Žegari, gdje se priprema za predaju položaja na državnoj granici postrojbama ZP Gospić i ZP Split kako je to zapovijedio načelnik GS HV prethodnoga dana. Tri satnije Temeljne policije započele su s ustrojavanjem policijskih postaja u gradovima Udbini, Donjem Lapcu i Gornjem Lapcu.<sup>114</sup> Nakon sastanka načelnika Stožera skupnih snaga sa svim zapovjednicima u s. Boričevac, određene su pričuvne snage za intervenciju na Kulen Vakuf, a ostale postrojbe upućene su na odmor u sjedišta svojih PU.<sup>115</sup> Tijekom petog dana b/d specijalne snage MUP na ličko-dalmatinskoj bojišnici imale su ukupno 2 ranjena i 4 ozlijeđena pripadnika.

166. Snage ZP Split napreduju na smjerovima Otrić – Srb i Knin – Srb i izbijaju na državnu granicu RH, dok 2/9. gbr u ranim jutarnjim satima 8. kolovoza s polazne crte Malovan – Gračac napada zajedno s 1. HGZ koji u svojoj raščlambi operacije navodi: *„U noći 07./08.08. postrojbu smo prebacili u Gračac, gdje smo dobili zadaću da uz sudjelovanje sa 4.gbr i postrojbama ZP Gospić sa crte Malovan-Gračac, napad usmjeriti prema s. Vučipolje – Orožac – s.Begluci, gdje razbiti i potisnuti snage neprijatelja i zauzeti s. Begluci i na crti Krčko brdo – ž.st. Una zaustaviti napad i prijeći u obranu.*

*Napad je započet u 05,00 sati, a vršen je napad iz pokreta.*

*Tijekom prvog dana napada ovladano je sa prostorom između polazne crte i crte s.D.Suvaja – s.Neteka i izbili smo na cestu Srb – D. Lapac. U drugom danu napada izbili smo na lijevu obalu r.Krke.*<sup>116</sup>

167. I iz ove je raščlambe vidljivo da u prostor Gračaca i oko njega ulaze i druge snage koje nisu u nadležnosti generala Mladena Markača.

168. ZP Gospić u svom dnevnom izvješću GS HV navodi:

*„U tijeku je organizacija obrane na državnoj granici RH u pojasu odgovornosti ZP. Težište obrane je na smjeru Udbina – D.Lapac- Kulen Vakuf. Pojas odgovornosti*

<sup>114</sup> Raščlamba tijekom operacije „Oluja“ Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-30-771/95 od 28. rujna 1995., str. 17.

<sup>115</sup> Isto, str. 18.

<sup>116</sup> Raščlamba operacije „Oluja“ 1. HGZ, Klasa: SP 8/95-01/01, Ur.broj: 3311-10-01-95-2 od 23. kolovoza 1995.

*ZP... podijeljen je u 5 pojaseva u kojima se angažirane pričuvne brigade – pukovnije s po jednom pješačkom bojnom....*

*Glavnina topništva i tenkova angažirana je na težištu obrane u području D.Lapca i Udbine...*

*Ostale snage angažirane su na čišćenju terena, asanaciji bojišta, prikupljanju stoke i ratnog plijena i izvlačenju oštećenih MTS-a...<sup>117</sup>*

169. Premda više nema izravne opasnosti od mogućeg pješačkog napada, neprijatelj i dalje povremeno djeluje svojim topništvom s područja BiH, što je vidljivo i iz obavještajnog izvješća ZP Gospić:

*„Tijekom današnjeg dana neprijatelj je s područja BiH, s nekoliko topničkih projektila, djelovao po širem području D.Lapac.“<sup>118</sup>*

170. Vod VP u Donjem Lapcu formiran je 8. kolovoza 1995. i počeo s provedbom svojih zadaća. U svom dnevnom izvješću zastupnik zapovjednika 71. bojne VP, između ostalog, navodi:

*„Izvršena je pretraga zemljišta u Udbini i D.Lapcu, a po ulasku postrojbi HV, kojom prilikom nisu zabilježeni događaji, tj. nitko nije priveden.“<sup>119</sup>*

171. Istodobno vod VP u Gračacu uspostavlja 3 kontrolno-nadzorna punkta na nadvožnjaku, u Štikadi i Kontićima.<sup>120</sup> Izvješće od 9. kolovoza potvrđuje da je time uspostavljen sustav djelovanja VP koji stabilno nastavlja djelovati u idućem razdoblju.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Izvješće ZP Gospić; Klasa: 80-02/95-01/01; Ur.broj: 1043-04-95-104 od 8. kolovoza 1995.


<sup>118</sup> Obavještajno izvješće Obavještajnog odsjeka zapovjedništva ZP Gospić, Klasa: 804-08/95-02/01, Ur.broj: 1043-14-95-263, od 8. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>119</sup> Izvješće u svezi provedbe zadaća 71. bojne VP u zoni ratnih djelovanja i novooslobođenih područja, Klasa: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ur.broj: 2232-01/02-95-26, od 8. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>120</sup> Isto.

<sup>121</sup> Izvješće u svezi provedbe zadaća 71. bojne VP u zoni ratnih djelovanja i novooslobođenih područja, Klasa: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ur.broj: 2232-01/02-95-32, od 9. kolovoza 1995.

### 5. DAN (08. kolovoza 1995.) – NAPREDOVANJE I DOSTIGNUTA CRTA U NAPADU



Djelovanje SP MUP-a 8. kolovoza 1995.

#### 8.6. Aktivnosti na dan 9. kolovoza 1995.

172. Prema izvješću koje bojnici Petar Ričko dostavlja Obavještajnoj upravi GS HV 10. kolovoza 1995. Skupne snage provode sljedeće zadaće:

*„Tijekom 9. kolovoza skupne snage Specijalne policije obnašale su zadaću čišćenja šireg prostora sjevernog dijela Velebita (širi prostor Bunovca, tt. 1199)...*


*U prijepodnevnim satima na širem području granice RH uz Unu (područje Kulen Vakufa) snage Specijalne policije trpile su veće raketno-topničke udare, te svojim topništvom uzvraćale po desnoj obali Une...*

*Prema zapovijedi GSHV dostignute položaje na Uni (granica RH) preuzele su tijekom popodneva postrojbe ZP Gospić, te na paljbene položaje izmjestile svoje topništvo.*

*Uz to, tijekom podneva obavljeno je pregrupiranje snaga Specijalne policije jačine jedne bojne (ostale su snage zbog iscrpljenosti upućene na dvodnevni odmor), a*

zbog bolje koordinacije sustava zapovijedanja, te osiguranja logističke potpore postrojbama na terenu u Gračacu je stavljen u funkciju novoustrojeni IZM.<sup>122</sup>

173. Skupne snage SJP MUP-a provode primopredaju granice na području Gornjeg i Donjeg Lapca postrojbama 118. dp i 8. dp ZP Gospić, a Stožer skupnih snaga dobiva zapovijed<sup>123</sup> načelnika GS HV za novu zadaću koja označava novu fazu u djelovanju Skupnih snaga specijalne policije, tj. prijelaz s napadnih borbenih djelovanja na čišćenje i pretres terena, prvo okruživanjem neprijateljskih snaga na Petrovoj Gori te izbijanju na državnu granicu.



Djelovanje SP MUP-a 9. kolovoza 1995.

## 8.7. Zaključak

174. Skupne snage MUP-a uspješno su provele sve zapovijedi koje je izdao načelnik GS HV od 4. do 8. kolovoza 1995. godine. General pukovnik Mladen Markač uspostavio je sustav zapovijedanja koji mu je omogućavao da u vrlo

<sup>122</sup> Izvješće bojnika Petra Rička Obavještajnoj upravi GS HV, Seline, 10. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>123</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-444, od 9. kolovoza 1995. godine 12.20 sati.

složenim zemljišnim uvjetima, posebno prva dva dana operacije, preko Stožera skupnih snaga zapovijeda snagama, bilo izravno, bilo preko načelnika Stožera skupnih snaga MUP-a. Gotovo dnevnim prebacivanjem IZM-a na lokacije što bliže prednjem kraju omogućio je neprekidnost veza i relativno brze intervencije u slučaju da se podređeni zapovjednici suoče s problemom koga ne mogu riješiti. Naravno, general pukovnik Mladen Markač može intervenirati samo ako zna što se događa.

175. Nakon žestokih borbi prva dva dana u kojima je probijena neprijateljska fronta i osvojen Gračac kao važno komunikacijsko središte, već u večernjim satima 5. kolovoza 1995. general Markač prelazi u gonjenje neprijatelja kako bi spriječio njegovu konsolidaciju po dubini te osvaja Bruvno u kojem su prema ranijoj obavještajnoj prosudbi bile razmještene interventne oklopno-pješačke snage ekvivalenta bojne, što se nije pokazalo točnim. Od toga trenutka pa do 8. kolovoza Skupne snage se na području Medka (35 km od Gračaca), Udbine (34 km od Gračaca) i D.Lapca (43 km od Gračaca) spajaju s postrojbama ZP Gospić i u Otriću (21 km od Gračaca) s postrojbama ZP Split, ostvarujući povremene dodire s neprijateljskim snagama u povlačenju.

## 9. Aktivnosti Specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a na čišćenju i pretresu terena

176. Po završetku operacije "Oluja" snage SPJ MUP-a zaključno s 9. kolovoza 1995. izvlače se iz graničnog područja RH uz r. Unu (dostignute položaje preuzele su snage ZP Gospić) te provode pregrupiranje vlastitih snaga, radi pripreme za predstojeće zadaće, te radi odmora ljudstva.<sup>124</sup> Time aktivnosti specijalne policije ne prestaju, ali se njihovo težište mijenja s klasičnih borbenih zadaća na zadaće čišćenja i pretresa terena. I te zadaće, koje Skupne snage SP MUP-a provode u razdoblju od 13. kolovoza do 9. listopada 1995., ne provode se samoinicijativno već isključivo prema zapovijedima načelnika GS HV kojemu su Skupne snage SP MUP-a još uvijek podređene. To je jasno vidljivo iz dokumenata koje iz GS HV dolaze generalu Markaču, ali i iz izvješća koje general Markač svakodnevno dostavlja načelniku GS HV nakon provedbe zadaće pretresa određenog područja.

### 9.1. Pojmovno određenje čišćenja i pretresa terena

#### 9.1.1. Čišćenje terena

177. Prije nego što se prijeđe na opisivanje kronologije događanja potrebno je razjasniti određene pojmove. U službenoj dokumentaciji koja je rađena tijekom i nakon operacije „Oluja“, često se spominju pojmovi čišćenje terena i pretres (ili pretraga) terena, negdje odvojeno:

*„Dio snaga angažiran je na čišćenju terena, asanaciji bojišta, prikupljanju stoke i ratnog plijena i izvlačenju oštećenih MTS-a.“<sup>125</sup>*

*„1. Snagama specijalne policije MUP-a pod zapovijedanjem general-pukovnika Mladena Markača izvršiti čišćenje i potpuno zauzimanje rajona Petrove gore.“<sup>126</sup>*

*„SP MUP-a RH u suradnji sa snagama ZP Gospić intenzivno rade na čišćenju terena i uništavanju zaostalih manjih grupa neprijatelja.“<sup>127</sup>*

<sup>124</sup> Izvješće Zapovjedništva SP MUP ObU GS HV, Seline, od 10. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>125</sup> Dnevno izvješće ZP Gospić Operativnoj središnjici GS HV, Klasa: 80-02/95-01/06, Ur.broj: 1043-04-95-445, od 9. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>126</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-459, od 10. kolovoza 1995. u 16,40 sati.

<sup>127</sup> Izvješće načelnika GS HV predsjedniku RH, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-438 u 18,00 sati, od 8. kolovoza 1995.

„1. Zapovjedništva zbornih područja Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić i Split dužna su u svojim pojasima odgovornosti pripremiti i izvršiti slijedeće težišne zadaće:

...

b) Razbijanje zaostalih neprijateljevih skupina i čišćenje terena

...

f) Obuka ratnih sastava postrojbi kroz ciklus priprema i zamjena na čuvanju državne granice te na pretresu terena.<sup>128</sup>

„3. Dana 16. 08. 1995. od 07,00 sati biti u spremnosti za pretres oslobođenog područja u zoni lijevo: Cerovačke pećine (isključno) – tt. 683 Rujevac – tt.1208 V.Sedlo – s.Dobašnica (uključno) i desno: tt. 821 Vodice – tt. 1207 Maglaj sa zadaćom pretresa do crte s.Dobašnica – Reljić – tt. 855 po posebnom planu.“<sup>129</sup>

a negdje zajedno u istoj rečenici:

„S ciljem organiziranog planiranja i pristupanja pretresu i čišćenju terena i objekata od strane za to namijenjenih specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a i VP te korištenja postrojbi HV za temeljne zadaće uređenja i čuvanja državne granice...“<sup>130</sup>

pa nije do kraja jasno radi li se o sinonimima ili o različitim kategorijama djelovanja, odnosno borbenim zadaćama.

178. U pokušaju razjašnjavanja te dvojbe treba krenuti od definicije taktičke zadaće *čišćenje, čistiti*.

„Čišćenje (čistiti) je taktička zadaća koja traži od zapovjednika da ukloni sve neprijateljske snage i svaki organizirani otpor u dodijeljenom području. Postrojba to čini uništavajući, zarobljavajući ili prisiljavajući neprijateljske snage na povlačenje tako da ne mogu ometati misiju naše postrojbe. U svim slučajevima ta zadaća traži detaljno izviđanje za otkrivanje neprijateljskih položaja. Nakon njihova otkrivanja snaga za čišćenje manevrira protiv neprijateljske snage. Ova zadaća zahtijeva značajno vrijeme i druge resurse. U svojem navodu misije zapovjednik može prilagoditi cilj povezan s ovom zadaćom za uništenje, zarobljavanje ili prisiljavanje na povlačenje samo neprijateljskih snaga većih od navedene veličine. U tom slučaju, snaga za

<sup>128</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-485 od 14. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>129</sup> Zapovijed 134. dp za pretres terena, Klasa: 8/95-01/01, Ur.broj: 8286-01-95-502, od 14. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>130</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-503 od 21. kolovoza 1995.

*čišćenje drži manje neprijateljske snage pod motrenjem dok ih ostatak naše snage obilazi.*<sup>131</sup>

179. Iz definicije je vidljivo da je zadaća čišćenja klasična borbena zadaća u kojoj određena postrojba ili namjenski organizirana snaga prvo pronalazi neprijatelja, te na temelju njegove snage, sastava i rasporeda poduzima određeni manevar (frontalni napad, probijanje, obuhvat...) s ciljem trajnog čišćenja određenoga prostora od svih neprijateljskih snaga, ili tako da su preostale snage manje od snaga koje na bilo koji način mogu ugroziti djelovanje naših snaga.

180. Aktivnosti koje su se provodile tijekom same operacije u razdoblju od 4. do 10. kolovoza 1995., a koje su se u dokumentima navodile/opisivale kao čišćenje, se u odnosu na danu definiciju teško mogu svrstati u tu kategoriju iz jednostavnog razloga što se čišćenje mora definirati kao temeljna misija postrojbe koja ga provodi, a ne kao nusprodukt napada, iskorištavanja uspjeha ili gonjenja neprijatelja. Iz izvješća koje su stizala u GS HV vidljivo je da je takvo čišćenje bila dosta raširena pojava i da se njime nisu bavile samo snage specijalne policije, već i druge postrojbe HV i vojne policije. Brojni su primjeri, a radi ilustracije ovdje se navodi samo nekoliko:

*„Tijekom današnjeg dana nastavljeno je s aktivnostima čišćenja terena u prostoru Golubić – Kaštel Žegarski – Ervenik u smjeru Velebita.*<sup>132</sup>

*„Potom slijedi dan odmora, tj. priprema za izvršenje novih zadaća, te 07.08.1995.g. u 21,30 sati dobijamo zapovijed o izmještanju u Gračac. U Gračac stižemo u 12,30 sati te nakon par sati odmora u zoru krećemo u čišćenje terena od sela Brkljači - tt1186 Mila - selo Labusi (prva borbena grupa), a druga borbena grupa kreće u čišćenje terena na pravcu Novakovići – Škundrići – Podmila - Velika Popina – Vrpolje - selo Labusi u kojem se grupe ponovno uvezuju.*<sup>133</sup>

*„Također, snage Specijalne policije (ekvivalenta 2 satnije) obavljale su tijekom dana čišćenje podvelebitskog terena na području Medka do Svetog Roka, s ciljem uništenja zaostalih neprijateljevih skupina.*<sup>134</sup>

*„SP MUP-a RH u suradnji sa snagama ZP Gospić intenzivno rade na čišćenju terena i uništavanju zaostalih manjih grupa neprijatelja.*

<sup>131</sup> Field Manual No. 3-90 Tactics, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 4. srpnja 2001., Dodatak B, str. B-6.

<sup>132</sup> Obavještajno izvješće IZM Zadar- Obavještajni odsjek; Klasa: SP/95-01/11; Ur.broj: 1060-02-10-95-214 od 07. kolovoza 1995. godine u 18,45 sati

<sup>133</sup> Izvješće o uporabi AT voda/72.boVP u operaciji „Oluja“, Klasa: 8/95-01/08, Ur.broj: 2233-01/1-95-17 od 14. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>134</sup> Izvješće načelniku GS HV o dostignutoj crti Skupnih snaga SP MUP-a, Broj: 511-01-VT-106/95 od 8. kolovoza 1995.

*Snage ZP Gospić vrše razmještaj postrojbi u novo određenim pojasevima odgovornosti, čišćenje terena, asanaciju bojišta, prikupljanje stoke i ratnog plijena i izvlačenje oštećenih MTS.*<sup>135</sup>

*„1. Sve postrojbe Vojne policije angažirane u borbenim djelovanjima u 07,00 sati 10. kolovoza 1995. godine izvući iz zone ratnih djelovanja.*

*2. AT vodove i ostale pripadnike Vojne policije koji sudjeluju u borbenim djelovanjima, tijekom 10. i 11. kolovoza 1995. godine odmoriti i od 07,00 sati 12. kolovoza 1995. godine iste u zoni odgovornosti postrojbi VP po planu zapovjednika angažirati na pretresu (čišćenju) oslobođenog područja Republike Hrvatske uz poduzimanje svih mjera sigurnosti.*<sup>136</sup>

181. Većina ovih akcija „čišćenja“ provodila se s relativno malim snagama, na ograničenom području i protiv još manjih neprijateljskih snaga za koje se uglavnom nije točno znalo da se nalaze na nekom prostoru, već se više na njih „naišlo“ tijekom akcije.

182. Jedina operacija koja ima sve elemente čišćenja jest operacija čišćenja Petrove gore.

### 9.1.2. Pretres terena

183. Za razliku od čišćenja, pretres terena je u priručniku „Komandiranje i borbena taktika u policiji“,<sup>137</sup> koji se koristio za obuku pripadnika specijalne policije, opisan kao:

*„organizirano i sustavno pretraživanje određene zemljišne prostorije i objekata na njoj radi otkrivanja prisutnosti i položaja protivnika ili tragova koji bi na njega ukazivali te uspostavljanje borbenog kontakta.*<sup>138</sup>

184. Dakle cilj je pretresa u borbenim djelovanjima ili izvan njih prvenstveno otkriti nazočnost neprijatelja i uspostaviti borbeni kontakt s njim, dok bi njegovo uništenje ili zarobljavanje prije svega ovisilo o odnosu snaga i nije postavljeno kao cilj kao kod čišćenja. Pored ove zadaće, specijalne snage MUP-a su teren pretresale i radi pronalaženja skladišta i odbačenih dijelova naoružanja i vojne opreme te minskih

<sup>135</sup> Izvješće načelnika GS HV predsjedniku RH Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-438 od 8. kolovoza 1995. u 18.00 sati.

<sup>136</sup> Zapovijed načelnika UVP za izvlačenje postrojbi VP iz borbenih djelovanja, Klasa: SP 80-01/95-158, Ur.br. 512-19-01-95-504, od 9. kolovoza 1995. godine

<sup>137</sup> Priručnik „Komandiranje i borbena taktika u policiji“, Tomo Radičević, Izdavač MUP RH, 1991. godine.

<sup>138</sup> Isto, str. 129.

polja, kao i pronalaženja, evidentiranja, pomoći ili evakuacije civilnih osoba kako bi se uspostavili normalni uvjeti za život na oslobođenom teritoriju.

185. Budući da je prema Zakonu o unutarnjim poslovima<sup>139</sup> i Uredbe Vlade RH<sup>140</sup> borba protiv terorizma (diverzantsko-terorističkih grupa) određena kao temeljna zadaća specijalne policije, pretres terena je rutinska zadaća za koju se rukovoditelji i pripadnici postrojbi specijalne policije obučavaju u sklopu policijske taktike. Ta se obuka uglavnom provodila sukladno poglavlju „4. Borbena taktika organa policije“, gdje se pod točkom 4.4.4. opisuje rad grupe – odjeljenja policije u pretresu zemljišta, naselja i objekata.<sup>141</sup> U priručniku se navodi da *„pretresanje zemljišta može se, zavisno od raspoloživih snaga i zemljišnih uvjeta, izvršiti streljačkim strojem, po patrolama, odjeljenskim kolonama i kombinirano. Pretresanje u streljačkom stroju bilo bi najtemeljnije jer se razmak između pojedinih izvršitelja može podesiti tako da, zavisno od zemljišnih uvjeta, mogu međusobno komunicirati i surađivati.“*<sup>142</sup> U praksi se uglavnom koristila ta metoda za pronalaženje manjih zaostalih ili ubačenih protivničkih snaga, oružja, minskih polja i drugih zapreka i sl. Ona se izvodila na dva načina:

- (1) postrojba za pretres s polazne crte polazi u streljačkom stroju pojedinačno ili u manjim skupinama od 3-5 osoba na određenoj međusobnoj udaljenosti i pretresa određeno područje do izlazne crte određene na zemljovidu, i
- (2) pored postrojbe za pretres na izlaznoj crti druga postrojba postavlja blokadno-borbene punktove za intervenciju u slučaju nailaska osoba koje su se povukle pred postrojbom u pretresu. Ova se metoda uglavnom primjenjivala na teže prohodnom zemljištu.

186. Kao primjer obuke za zadaće pretresa može se navesti dopis vršitelja dužnosti načelnika Sektora specijalne policije gosp. Željka Sačića<sup>143</sup> upućen ministru unutarnjih poslova gosp. Ivanu Jarnjaku u kojem traži suglasnost za stručno usavršavanje rukovoditelja Specijalnih jedinica MUP-a RH. Na temelju suglasnosti pomoćnika ministra general pukovnika Mladena Markača i odobrenja ministra unutarnjih poslova gosp. Ivana Jarnjaka u obučnom središtu na Kovčanju se od 9.

<sup>139</sup> Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o unutarnjim poslovima, Broj: PA4-92/1-94, od 12. listopada 1994., članak 11.

<sup>140</sup> Uredba o unutarnjem ustrojstvu i načinu rada Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske od 23. veljače 1995., članak 27.

<sup>141</sup> Priručnik „Komandiranje i borbena taktika u policiji“, Tomo Radičević, Izdavač MUP RH, 1991. godine, str. 128 – 138.

<sup>142</sup> Isto, str. 130.

<sup>143</sup> Dopis v.d. načelnika Sektora SP ministru unutarnjih poslova, Broj: 511-01-30-67/95, od 31. siječnja 1995.

veljače do 9. travnja 1995. održao tečaj sa 60 polaznika na kojem se u sklopu opće vojne taktike u trajanju od 10 sati izučavala tema „Jedinica specijalne policije u pretrazi terena i borbi protiv DTG-a“.<sup>144</sup> Sličan se tečaj za 75 vođa specijalističkih grupa održao na Kovčanju od 15. travnja do 2. srpnja 1995.<sup>145</sup>

187. U sklopu teme se polaznicima obuke davao obrazac/matrica zapovijedi za pretres (pretragu)<sup>146</sup> koju su polaznici ispunjavali.

188. Na temelju svega navedenog može se zaključiti da je pretres terena „prirodna“ zadaća za specijalne jedinice MUP-a, a to se može potvrditi i izrađenom dokumentacijom koja je po pitanju pretresa vrlo detaljna, za razliku od borbene dokumentacije koju je stožer specijalnih snaga proizveo tijekom operacije „Oluja“.

## 9.2. Operacija čišćenja područja Petrove gore „Oluja-Obruč“

189. U skladu s novonastalim operativnim stanjem nakon predaje 21. kordunskog korpusa, a u cilju potpunoga ovladavanja područjem Petrove gore, NGS HV 10. kolovoza 1995. izdaje zapovijed kojom general pukovnik Mladen Markač u točki 1. zapovijedi dobiva zadaću:

*„1. Snagama specijalne policije MUP-a pod zapovijedanjem general-pukovnika Mladena Markača izvršiti čišćenje i potpuno zauzimanje rajona Petrove gore.*

*Plan čišćenja sačinit će general-pukovnik Mladen Markač u suradnji sa general-bojnikom Marjanom Marekovićem.“<sup>147</sup>*

190. Ostalim točkama zapovijedi regulira se ojačanje specijalnih snaga MUP-a 153. brigadom HV, 102. brigadom HV i tenkovskom satnijom iz 110. brigade HV, topnička potpora snaga MUP-a dvjema topničkim skupinama iz 110. i 137. brigade HV, a točkom 4. regulira se vrijeme početka operacije „Oluja-Obruč“<sup>148</sup> 13. kolovoza 1995. u 04,00 sati.

191. General pukovnik Mladen Markač određen je za zapovjednika snaga, a pomoćnik načelnika GS HV za KoV general bojnik Marijan Mareković za zapovjednika operacije „Oluja-Obruč“ sa zapovjednim mjestom u Vojniću.

<sup>144</sup> Dopis v.d. načelnika Sektora SP pomoćniku ministra unutarnjih poslova, Broj: 511-01-30-127/95, od 31. siječnja 1995.

<sup>145</sup> Godišnje izvješće o radu Specijalne policije MUP-a RH u 1995. godini, Broj:511-01-30- /96, od 22. veljače 1996.

<sup>146</sup> Primjer matrice zapovijedi za pretragu terena Sektora specijalne policije, broj: 511-01-30- /95, Zagreb, 5. srpnja 1995. godine s pisanom zapovijedi kao primjerom rada na tečaju.

<sup>147</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Urbroj: 512-06-05/01-95-459, od 10. kolovoza 1995. godine u 16.40 sati.

<sup>148</sup> Sukladno tomu u pisanoj korespondenciji koja se odnosi na aktivnosti na čišćenju i pretresu terena uglavnom se govori o operaciji „Oluja-Obruč“ kako bi je se i operativno i vremenski razlikovalo od operacije „Oluja“.

192. U skladu s takvom zadaćom specijalne postrojbe MUP-a se iz područja Sjeverne Dalmacije i Like, a one na odmoru iz matičnih policijskih uprava, prebacuju u područje Petrove gore, koje se zemljopisno nalazi izvan područja Sektora Jug u kojem su do tada djelovale Skupne snage SPJ MUP-a, i tu ostaju do 21. kolovoza 1995. godine. Zapovijed je upućena svim policijskim upravama osim Dubrovačko-neretvanske, Virovitičko-podravske, Ličko-senjske i Zadarsko-kninske da:

*„dana 12. 08. 1995., do 19.00 sati, dužni ste biti na dogovorenoj poziciji, s dogovorenim brojem djelatnika, opremljenim dogovorenim naoružanjem, streljivom i opremom i MTS, shodno već stečenim iskustvima (operacija „Oluja“) za boravak na terenu i obnašanje zadaća čišćenja terena od zaostalih neprijateljskih skupina.“<sup>149</sup>*

193. Kao što je već prethodno napomenuto, general pukovnik Mladen Markač zapovijeda isključivo specijalnim policijskim jedinicama koje se nalaze u sastavu Skupnih snaga, a to su jedino snage koje su angažirane u operaciji „Oluja-Obruč“ u čišćenju područja Petrove Gore. Sve ostale snage koje nisu dio Skupnih snaga pod zapovijedanjem su načelnika Policijskih uprava iz čijeg su sastava.

194. Premda je ranijom zapovijedi general bojnik Marijan Mareković bio određen za zapovjednika operacije „Oluja-Obruč“, načelnik GS HV dostavlja novu zapovijed adresiranu na general pukovnika Mladena Markača kao zapovjednika operacije „Oluja-Obruč“. U toj je zapovijedi između ostaloga regulirano:

*„1. Uspostaviti blokadu prostora Petrove Gore, s postrojbama koje ojačavaju Specijalne snage MUP-a, prema slijedećem:*

*– na crti između Vrginmosta i r. Glina (odnosno između snaga 110. dp i 99. br s istočne strane Petrove Gore) snagama 102. br i 153. br ZP Zagreb,*

*– na crti sjevero-zapadno i južno od Petrove Gore snagama 110. dp, 143. dp i 99. br ZP Karlovac.*

*2. Navedene snage ojačanja koristiti isključivo za blokadu, a eventualno uvođenje istih u prostor čišćenja odobravam isključivo po zapovijedi generala Mladena Markača.*

...

*4. Uspostaviti zapovjedno mjesto Specijalnih snagama MUP-a (operacije „Obruč“) u Vojniću.“<sup>150</sup>*

<sup>149</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP, Broj: 511-01-31-1099/95, od 11. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>150</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-470 od 11. kolovoza 1995.

195. U sklopu pripreme operacije general pukovnik Mladen Markač održao je završni koordinacijski sastanak sa zapovjednicima specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a i zapovjednicima brigada i domobranskih pukovnija na kojem su donijeti sljedeći zaključci:

*„(1) Ostvarena je puna početna koordinacija (nečitljivo) operacije po svim elementima od razmještaja ljudstva do (nečitljivo) postrojbi (veza, topništvo, logistika, sanitet).*

*(2) Sve se postrojbe nalaze u očekujućim rejonima (nečitljivo) djelovanja spremne za izvršenje predstojeće zadaće (nečitljivo) spremnosti je 13. kolovoza u 4.30 sati, nakon čega će (nečitljivo) otpočeti planirana operacija.“<sup>151</sup>*

196. Operacija čišćenja Petrove Gore započinje 13. kolovoza 1995. u 5.32 sati<sup>152</sup>, a prema izvješćima koja se šalju načelniku GS HV toga dana<sup>153 154</sup> provodi se uz minimalan otpor neprijateljskih skupina (zarobljen jedan neprijateljski vojnik na području Magarčevca), a cjelokupan je prostor stavljen pod nadzor te je operacija završena 14. kolovoza 1995.

197. Tijekom operacije „Oluja-Obruč“ provedena je temeljita koordinacija između svih sudionika koja je omogućila da se operacija provede bez izvanrednih događaja, prema svim načelima planiranja, organiziranja i provedbe operacije čišćenja, te zapovijedanja i nadzora takve operacije.

### **9.3. Akcije pretresa terena od 21. kolovoza do 9. listopada 1995. na području Like, sjeverne Dalmacije i izvan područja Sektora Jug**

198. Uvod u sveobuhvatan pretres terena bila je zapovijed načelnika GS OS RH generala zbora Zvonimira Červenka upućena svim zapovjednicima Zbornih područja, zapovjedniku Južnog bojišta i Hrvatskih zračnih snaga 14. kolovoza 1995. godine u kojoj se definiraju njihove težišne zadaće u svojim pojasevima odgovornosti.<sup>155</sup>

199. U zapovijedi su definirane sljedeće težišne zadaće:

**„A) ZAŠTITA DRŽAVNE GRANICE**

<sup>151</sup> Zaključci sa sastanka zapovjednika operacije „Oluja-Obruč“ sa zapovjednicima sudjelujućih postrojbi, Vojnić, 12. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>152</sup> Izvješće Glavnog stožera operacije o početku operacije, Vojnić, 13. kolovoz 1995.

<sup>153</sup> Izvješće Stožera operacije sa stanjem 13. kolovoza 1995. u 10,00 sati.

<sup>154</sup> Izvješće Stožera operacije sa stanjem 13. kolovoza 1995. u 17,00 sati.

<sup>155</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-485 od 14. kolovoza 1995.

...

*B) RAZBIJANJE ZAOSTALIH NEPRIJATELJEVIH SKUPINA I ČIŠĆENJE TERENA Pričuvnim snagama (domobranskim i domicilnim postrojbama, kao i interventnim gardijskim postrojbama) organizirano, planski i uzastopce, vršiti pretrese terena i čišćenje prostora od zaostalih i eventualno ubačenih neprijateljevih bandi.*

*C) OSIGURANJE PROMETNICA I KOMUNIKACIJA*

...

*D) ŽURNA USPOSTAVA PROSTORNE ZAPOVJEDNE STRUKTURE*

...

*E) POPUNA I PRIPREMA RATNIH POSTROJBI I POSTROJBI DOMOBRANSTVA SA LJUDSTVOM I TVARNIM SREDSTVIMA PO USTROJU*

*F) OBUKA RATNIH SASTAVA POSTROJBI KROZ CIKLUS PRIPREMA I ZAMJENA NA ČUVANJU DRŽAVNE GRANICE TE PRETRESU TERENA.<sup>156</sup>*

200. Kao što je vidljivo iz predmetne zapovijedi za čišćenje (točka B), odnosno pretresu (točka F) terena rabile su se i postrojbe Hrvatske vojske. Zapovijed nije dostavljena general pukovniku Mladenu Markaču.

201. Premda su snage Hrvatske vojske izbile na granicu RH, na oslobođenim područjima situacija je i dalje nesigurna zbog postojanja zaostalih, ali i ubačenih neprijateljskih pojedinaca i skupina. Primjeri ugrožavanja normalnog života vidljivi su iz sljedećih primjera:

*„Na području Medak (Raduč) od strane zaostale neprijateljske skupine automatskim automatskim pješačkim naoružanjem napadnuti su pripadnici MUP-a RH kojom prilikom su prema našim saznanjima ranjena četiri policajca (broj nije potvrđen).<sup>157</sup>*

*„Nadnevka 12. na 13. 08. 1995. g. oko 2,30 sati poginula su 2 (dva) pripadnika 8.dp bitnica MMB 120 mm 3.pješačka bojna – Opatija... Vjerojatno manja grupa četnika (3-4) ušla je u navedeno selo... naši vojnici su pogođeni iz pješačkog naoružanja... odmetnici su ponovno pobjegli u šumu...<sup>158</sup>*

<sup>156</sup> Isto.

<sup>157</sup> Obavještajno izvješće Obavještajnog odsjeka ZPP Gospić, Klasa: 804-08/95-02/01, Ur.broj: 1043-14-95-266 od 11. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>158</sup> Izvanredno izvješće ZPP Gospić Političkoj upravi MORH-a, Klasa: 818-01/95-01/05-2, Ur.broj: 1043-17-95-24, od 13. kolovoza 1995.

202. Budući da je sigurnosna situacija i dalje bila složena načelnik GS HV 21. kolovoza 1995. godine izdaje zapovijed kojom regulira dostavu potrebnih podataka za organizirano planiranje pretresa i čišćenja objekata i terena od strane specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a i VP:

*„Sa ciljem organiziranog planiranja i pristupanja pretresu i čišćenju terena i objekata od strane za to namijenjenih specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a i VP te korištenja postrojbi HV za temeljne zadaće uređenja i čuvanja državne granice,*

### Z A P O V I J E D A M

1. Zapovjedništva ZP i ZM Knin izraditi će i dostaviti u Operativnu upravu GSHV, opisno i na zemljovidu 1:50 000, slijedeće podatke:

- *prostore na kojima je došlo do kontakata sa zaostalim ili ubačenim skupinama neprijatelja, točno mjesto i broj uočenih odmetnika*
- *prostore na kojima se pretpostavlja da se u njima nalaze zaostale skupine neprijatelja*
- *prostore koji nisu ili nisu dovoljno pregledani, a treba ih pregledati*

...<sup>159</sup>

203. Zapovijed je upućena zapovjednicima ZP Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić i Split te ZM Knin, dok je rukom dopisano da se upućuje na pozornost i pomoćniku MUP RH za specijalne postrojbe.

204. Jedan od poticaja za izdavanje zapovijedi je i dopis kojim je zapovjednik ZP Split general bojnik Ante Gotovina izravno general pukovniku Mladenu Markaču uputio zahtjev da:

*„... u svrhu osiguranja ljudskih života i materijalnih dobara, ZAHTJEVAM, da se iz sastava SP MUP-a izdvoji jedna bojna navedenih snaga i uputi u Zborno područje Split – IZM Knin...“<sup>160</sup>,*

što je general Markač odbio i zatražio da se takvi zahtjevi rješavaju preko načelnika GS HV. Stoga je načelnik GS HV u svojoj zapovijedi posebno regulirao:

*„1.1. Zapovjedništva su dužna predložiti koji će se prostori prioritetno pretraživati.*

<sup>159</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-503 od 21. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>160</sup> Zahtjev zapovjednika ZP Split za angažiranje snaga SP MUP, Klasa:SP 8/95-01/15, Ur.broj: 1080-01-95-4 od 18. kolovoza 1995.

1.2. *Za angažiranje snaga specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a i međusobno sudjelovanje sa snagama ZP bit će izdane posebne zapovijedi.*<sup>161</sup>

205. Na temelju zapovijedi, zapovjednik ZP Gospić stožerni brigadir Mirko Norac dostavlja načelniku GS HV svoju prosudbu ugroženosti od terorističkih skupina sa zemljovidima u kojem se, između ostaloga, navodi:

*„2. Zapovjedništvo zbornog područja Gospić organizirano je do demobilizacije dijelova postrojbi provodilo pretres terena i u stalnom je kontaktu sa specijalnim snagama MUP-a te upoznato sa prostorom kojeg su postrojbe MUP-a pretražile.*

*3. Od završetka napadajne operacije „Oluja“, naše postrojbe su dolazile u vatreni kontakt sa četničkim skupinama ili pojedincima u prostoru: Medak, Papuča, Mogorić, Pločanski klanac, Doljani, Rudopolje, Vrhovine, Mazin, Dobro selo kod L. Lapca, Prijeboj. Osim neprijateljske skupine koja je izvršila prepad u s.Mazin 13.08.1995. godine, kada su poginula dva pripadnika 8. dop, svi neprijateljski vojnici ili skupine su likvidirani ili zarobljeni. Od 23.08.1995. godine naše postrojbe nisu imale vatrene kontakata sa zaostalim skupinama.*

*4. Kako nismo detaljno pretresli cijeli prostor u pojasu odgovornosti ZP Gospić, prosuđujemo da se eventualne skupine odmetnika mogu nalaziti u širem prostoru Plitvičkih jezera, jugozapadne padine Plješivice i Kremen šuma, te smatramo potrebitim da se za pretrese tog terena angažiraju specijalne postrojbe MUP-a.*<sup>162</sup>

206. Iz ovog je izvješća vidljivo da su postrojbe ZP Gospić organizirano provodile pretres terena u svom području odgovornosti, da je dolazilo do vatrene kontakta s neprijateljskim skupinama i pojedincima u različitim mjestima te da postoje prostori za koje se sumnja da bi se u njima mogle nalaziti neprijateljske odmetnute skupine, a za koje ZP Gospić predlaže da ih pretraže specijalne postrojbe MUP-a.

### 9.3.1. Temeljna standardna operativna procedura za provedbu pretresa terena

207. Stožer SJ MUP-a je tijekom gotovo dvomjesečnih aktivnosti razvio standardnu proceduru za provedbu pretresa terena. Ona se načelno sastojala od nekoliko koraka:

- I. korak: Dobivanje zahtjeva za pretresom terena od GS HV (zbornih područja) ili MUP-a (policijskih uprava), njihova raščlamba po

<sup>161</sup> Zapovijed načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-503 od 21. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>162</sup> Dopis zapovjednika ZP Gospić načelniku GS HV, Klasa: 80-02/95-01/01, Ur.broj: 1043-04-95-154, od 1. rujna 1995.

prostoru i veličini te prioritizacija, tj. planiranje po danima. U sklopu planiranja posebno se vodilo računa o dovođenju postrojbi Specijalne policije u područje pretresa za što su se izdavale posebne zapovijedi.<sup>163</sup> <sup>164</sup> Postrojbe su se uobičajeno dovodile u Gračac gdje je zapovjednik dobivao potrebne upute i dokumente za pretres.

- II. korak: Upućivanje dopisa nadležnim PU i ZP kojim se izvješćuju o namjerama pretresa terena za sljedeći dan) i kojim se od njih traži da dostave sve raspoložive informacije i saznanja o mogućim DTG i MES-u kao i da izvijeste svoje snage o području pretresa. Informacije o DTG i MES prikupljali su djelatnici unutarnje kontrole od operativnih dežurstava PU, MUP-a ili od nadležnih zapovjedništava HV.
- III. korak: Izrada plana pretresa terena za sljedeći dan (na temelju prikupljenih informacija), priprema potrebne dokumentacije te određivanje zapovjednika akcije i postrojbe Specijalne policije koje će izvoditi pretres terena.
- IV. korak: Dovođenje snaga na polaznu crtu za pretres i provedba pretresa. Za vrijeme pretresa terena stožer SP MUP-a je bilježio dostignute crte snaga za pretres te po zahtjevu zapovjednika akcije odrađivao koordinaciju s drugim službama (dojava Temeljnoj policiji o potrebi prihvata civila, upućivanje kamiona i logističara za preuzimanje pronađenih MES, zahtjev za angažiranje civilne zaštite, itd.).
- V. korak: Dolaskom na krajnju crtu područja pretresa zapovjednici skupina Specijalne policije koji su sudjelovali u akciji daju pisana ili usmena izvješća zapovjedniku akcije o svim važnim zapažanjima tijekom pretresa.
- VI. korak: Na temelju izvješća svojih podređenih i osobnih zapažanja zapovjednik akcije piše izvješće o pretresu terena zapovjedniku

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<sup>163</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP SJP PU Istarske za realizaciju zadaća iz akcije „Oluja-Obruč“, Broj: 511-01-31-1151/95 od 24. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>164</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP SJP za dovođenje snaga za realizaciju zadaća iz akcije „Oluja-Obruč“, Broj: 511-01-31-1261/95 od 19. rujna 1995.

Specijalne policije (kad god je moguće izvješće se piše u stožeru u Gračacu).

- VII. korak: Zapovjednik specijalne policije izrađuje svoje izvješće, koje je u načelu istog sadržaja kao i izvješće zapovjednika akcije, uz eventualne osobne napomene zapovjednika Specijalne policije o mogućim logističkim potrebama i slično.

208. Dostupna dokumentacija i usporedba izvješća koja su rukom pisali zapovjednici akcije i izvješća koja su se slala načelniku GS HV s potpisom general pukovnika Mladena Markača (format izvješća je uvijek bio isti, pa i potpis na kraju izvješća bez obzira bio general Markač u Gračacu - ili na Plitvičkim jezerima kada se težište pretresa premješta tamo - ili ne) na kraju svakoga dana pokazuje da su ona u skoro 100% slučajeva istovjetna, što znači da general Markač nije niti na koji način intervenirao ili tražio promjenu izvješća koje je izradio zapovjednik akcije, već je imao puno povjerenje da su informacije u izvješću točne.

209. Aktivnostima pretresa terena upravlja se sa zapovjednog mjesta Skupnih snaga SP MUP-a u Gračacu, čiji se veći dio privremeno izmješta na područje Plitvičkih jezera od 6. do 13. rujna 1995. kada se težište pretresa seli na to područje. Međutim, budući da se paralelno provode i aktivnosti pretresa u širem području Gračaca, dio stožera ostaje u Gračacu.

9.3.2. Kronologija aktivnosti specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a u akciji pretresa na području Like, sjeverne Dalmacije i izvan područja Sektora Jug u razdoblju od 21. kolovoza do 9. listopada 1995.

210. Cilj prikaza kronologije pretresa terena je ukazati na činjenicu da se akcije pretresa s manjim prekidima provode svakodnevno nešto manje od dva mjeseca s minimalnim brojem incidenata, ne umanjujući njihove posljedice. Izvješća koja se redovito dnevno dostavljaju pokazuju da su akcije pretresa isključivo i jedino usmjerene na akcije kojima se uspostavljaju uvjeti za siguran povratak i život stanovništva.

211. Pretres terena pokrenut je zapovijedi načelnika Sektora SP zapovjednicima SJP PU Šibenske, PU Sisačko-moslavačke, skupina Kutina, PU Splitsko-

dalmatinske, PU Zagrebačke i PU Zadarsko-kninske za realizaciju akcije „Oluja – Obruč“.<sup>165</sup> Ovaj proces, kao i format zapovijedi postaje jedinstven za sve ostale zapovijedi koje su se izdavale tijekom operacije „Oluja – Obruč“ pa ga je potrebno ovdje opisati:

- zapovijed se upućuje načelniku/načelnicima PU s naznakom da se uruče zapovjedniku/zapovjednicima SJP,
- zapovijed regulira vrijeme i broj djelatnika koji moraju doći, najčešće, u zapovjedništvo/stožer Skupnih snaga u Gračac, gdje se načelno i smještaju,
- ponekad se imenom i prezimenom određuje osoba (načelno zapovjednik ili zamjenik zapovjednika SJP) koja vodi snage,
- navodi se okvirno vrijeme angažiranja snaga u pretresu terena,
- uređuje se način opremanja naoružanjem i opremom,
- određuje se vrijeme organizacije radnog sastanka u zapovjedništvu/stožeru Skupnih snaga u Gračacu na kojem se određuju zadaće,
- određuje na način uporabe službenih motornih vozila i brzina kretanja, te
- visina dnevnice.

212. Budući da je ovakvih zapovijedi tijekom dvomjesečnog pretresa puno, a kao što je rečeno, imaju isti format, neće biti posebno navođene po danima, a ovdje se kao primjer navode samo neke.<sup>166</sup>

213. **21. kolovoza 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 06,00 sati do 16,00 sati izvršile su pretragu šireg područja Gračaca, Udbine i Svetog Roka s ciljem pronalaska i uništenja razbijenih diverzantsko-terorističkih skupina neprijatelja, te pronalaska MTS.“<sup>167</sup> <sup>168</sup> dužine cca 15 km, širine cca 11 km i ukupne površine od cca 135 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>169</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 550 pripadnika SJP iz 4 policijske uprave (90 iz SJP PU Šibenska, 130 iz SJP PU Zadarsko-kninska, 130 iz SJP PU Zagrebačka i 200 iz SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačka). Niti jedna SJP tijekom pretresa nije naišla na neprijateljske zaostale skupine. Pripadnici SJP Zadarsko-kninske su u s.Ugarkovići, s.Čurčići i s.Lončari pronašli po jednu stariju civilnu osobu

<sup>165</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP SPJ PU Šibenske, PU Sisačko-moslavačke, PU Splitsko-dalmatinske, PU Zagrebačke i PU Zadarsko-kninske, Broj: 511-01-31-1129/95, od 18. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>166</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP SJP PU Požeško-slavonske, Broj: 511-01-31-1190/95, od 30. kolovoza 1995.; Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP SJP PU Požeško-slavonske, Broj: 511-01-31-1209/95, od 4. rujna 1995.; Zapovijed načelnika Sektora SP, Broj: 511-01-31-1261/95, od 19. rujna 1995.,

<sup>167</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 21. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 22. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>168</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 21. kolovoza 1995. – dokument pisan rukom s potpisom g. Željka Sačića i kasnije prepisan te poslan u GS HV.

<sup>169</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 21. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

i 4 komada pješačkog oružja.<sup>170</sup> Pripadnici SJP PU Zagrebačka pronašli su 1 MB 120 mm, mine za MB 120 mm, više sanduka pješačkog streljiva i topničkih granata različitog kalibra, dok su pripadnici SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačka u s. Zrmanja pronašli civilne osobe s malom djecom o čemu su izvijestili temeljnu policiju.<sup>171</sup> Pored toga u izvješću se navodi da:

*„U Kninu je u 12,00 sati održan kratak sastanak sa generalima Gotovinom i Čermakom.“<sup>172</sup>*, ali nije naznačen sadržaj sastanka.

214. Premda nije pronađen pisani dokument, ovaj je pretres očito usklađen sa zapovjednikom OG Zapad jer on izdaje zapovijed u kojoj regulira sljedeće:

*„Zbog čišćenja terena od preostalih snaga četnika koje će vršiti specijalne SNAGE MUP-a, po dubini prostora odgovornosti OG ZAPAD, a u cilju sigurnosti naših pripadnika*

#### Z A P O V J E D A M

1. *Zabranjuje se bilo kakvo kretanje po dubini prostora zapadno od komunikacije Gornji Lapac – Otrić počevši desno od komunikacije Gornji Lapac – Bijelo Brdo – Brotanja.*
2. *Ljudstvo koje je smješteno uz komunikaciju Brotnja – Otrić upoznati sa zapovjedni i zabraniti bilo kakvo kretanje po gore navedenom prostoru kojim se kreću specijalne snage MUP-a.*
3. *Akcija čišćenja specijalnih snaga MUP-a počinje u 06,00 sati 22.08.1995.godine pravcem kretanja zapad – istok i trajati će narednih par dana.<sup>173</sup>*

215. **22. kolovoza 1995.** SJP MUP-a izvršile su pretres šireg područja s. Bruvno, s. Mazin i Srb dužine cca 8,3 km, širine cca 7,5 km, ukupne površine cca 45 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>174</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 716 pripadnika SJP iz 6 policijskih uprava (SJP PU Zadarsko-kninska sa 118 pripadnika (pronađena jedna puška), SJP PU Šibenska s 80 pripadnika, SJP PU Splitsko-dalmatinska sa 108 pripadnika, SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačka sa 150 pripadnika (u s.Obradovići kod planinarske kućice pronađeno je desetak civilnih osoba, od kojih je dvoje mlađih privedeno u PP Srb), SJP PU Zagrebačka sa 140 pripadnika (u s.Krstaše pronađeno je pet starijih osoba) i SJP PU

<sup>170</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 21. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 22. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>171</sup> Isto.

<sup>172</sup> Isto.

<sup>173</sup> Zapovijed zapovjednika OG Zapad pukovnika Mladena Fuzula, Klasa: SP 8/95-01/17, Ur.broj: 1080/7-91-17 od 21. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>174</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 22. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

Ličko-senjska sa 120 djelatnika (u s.Manjlovići i s.Petrovići pronađeno je šest civilnih osoba), a za vrijeme cjelokupnog pretresa nije bilo vatrenog kontakta s neprijateljskim skupinama.<sup>175 176</sup>

216. **23. kolovoza 1995.** „*Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 do 19,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora Prezida – Manastir Krupa – s.Mandići – s.Vučipolje – Otrić – Potkom – Zrmanja Vrelo*“<sup>177</sup> dužine cca 11 km, širine cca 6 km i ukupne površine od oko 47 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>178</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 790 pripadnika SJP iz 7 policijskih uprava (SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorska s 90 pripadnika, SJP PU Karlovačka s 200 pripadnika (u s.Radakovići pronađene su starije civilne osobe), SJP PU Splitsko-dalmatinska (na poziciji Šipkovca uništena je teroristička skupina (3 naoružana v/o)), SJP PU Ličko-senjska sa 110 pripadnika, SJP PU Šibenska sa 60 pripadnika, SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačka sa 120 pripadnika (u s.Golubić i s.Trnovača pronađeno je nekoliko starijih osoba, po čijim se izjavama u okolnim brdima skriva oko deset starijih osoba) i SJP PU Zagrebačka sa 100 pripadnika).<sup>179</sup> Istoga dana general pukovnik Mladen Markač upućuje obavijest ZP Split – IZM Knin o planiranim djelovanjima za dan 24. kolovoza 1995:

*„U vremenu od 07,00 sati do 19,00 sati planirano je pretraživanje terena s ciljem uništenja razbijenih diverzantsko – terorističkih grupa na području između komunikacije s.Đevrske – s.Marasovići i s.Podkrš – s.Donje Tišme i s.Ivoševci.*

*Molimo Vas da o navedenom obavijestite postrojbe HV koje se eventualno nalaze na navedenom području.*

*Postrojbe specijalne policije bit će u službenim odorama SP s crvenom i svijetlo plavom vrpcom za obilježavanje.*

*U svezi navedene zadaće, molimo vas, da nam dostavite sva saznanja o mogućim minsko-eksplozivnim preprekama na navedenom području, najkasnije do 22,00 sata dana 23. kolovoza 1995. godine.*“<sup>180</sup>

<sup>175</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 22. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 23. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>176</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 22. kolovoza 1995. – dokument pisan rukom s potpisom g. Željka Sačića i kasnije prepisan te poslan u GS HV.

<sup>177</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 23. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 24. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>178</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 23. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

<sup>179</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 23. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 24. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>180</sup> Obavijest o planiranim djelovanjima SJP za 24. kolovoza 1995. upućeno ZP Split – IZM Knin 23. kolovoza 1995.

217. **24. kolovoza 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 do 18,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora s.Đevrske – Roški slap – s.Kistanje – Biočino selo – s.Ugrčiči“<sup>181</sup> <sup>182</sup> dužine 13 km, širine cca 10 km i ukupne površine od cca 130 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>183</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 462 pripadnika SJP iz 5 policijskih uprava (SJP PU Brodsko-posavska sa 120 pripadnika (pronađeno skladište streljiva, mine 82 mm i 3 komada pješačkog oružja), SJP PU Šibenska sa 60 pripadnika (u s.Tomašinović stanovi pronađene su starije civilne osobe, a u s.Kistanje pronađen je mrtav neprijateljski vojnik s oružjem), SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačka sa 120 pripadnika (u s.Kistanje i s.Popovići pronađeno je sedam starijih civilnih osoba), SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorska sa 120 djelatnika (na poziciji Budim tt. 256 pronađeno je skladište topničkog streljiva) i SJP PU zagrebačka s 42 pripadnika).<sup>184</sup>

218. **25. kolovoza 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 14,00 sati izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora s.Pađeni – Palanka jugoistočno u smjeru s.Strmica, s.Golubić i s.Vrpolje“<sup>185</sup> dužine cca 11 km, širine 8 km i ukupne površine od cca 88 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>186</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 675 pripadnika SJP iz 5 policijskih uprava i ATJ Lučko (SJP PU Sisačko-moslavačka sa 120 pripadnika (u s.Zadrovići, s.Stara Straža i s.Potkraj pronađeno je 10 starijih civilnih osoba), SJP PU zagrebačka (nađeno 60 sanduka streljiva 7,62 mm, 180 sanduka streljiva 7,9 mm i 40 sanduka protupješačkih mina PROM, a u s.Pašići pronađena je sumnjiva muška osoba koja je predana kriminalističkoj policiji na kriminalističku obradu), SJP PU Brodsko-posavska sa 120 pripadnika, SJP PU Splitsko-dalmatinska sa 120 djelatnika (u s.Vundići pronađen je raspadnuti leš muške osobe u čizmama vezanih ruku), SJP PU Osječko-baranjska sa 150 pripadnika (u selima na početnoj poziciji evidentirane su 54 civilne osobe) i ATJ Lučko s 45 pripadnika. Prema prvom izvješću tijekom pretresa terena nije ostvaren borbeni kontakt s neprijateljskim zaostalim skupinama.<sup>187</sup> Izvješće koje je dostavljeno načelniku GS HV izrađeno je na temelju rukom pisanog izvješća zapovjednika akcije, načelnika Odjela za borbu protiv

<sup>181</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 24. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 25. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>182</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 24. kolovoza 1995. – dokument pisan rukom adresiran na načelnika Sektora SP Željka Sačića i s potpisom načelnika Odjela za BPT Zdravka Janića, prepisan te poslan u GS HV.

<sup>183</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 24. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

<sup>184</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 24. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 25. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>185</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 25. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 26. kolovoza 1995. (na izvješću rukom napisano storno)

<sup>186</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 25. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

<sup>187</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 25. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 26. kolovoza 1995. (na izvješću rukom napisano storno)

terorizma Zdravka Janića.<sup>188</sup> Na temelju novih informacija dostavljeno je izmijenjeno izvješće GS HV o borbenom kontaktu u s. Grubori tijekom kojeg je smrtno stradalo 5 osoba:

*„Tijekom pretrage u s. Grubor uočeno je osam do deset neprijateljskih vojnika od kojih su dvojica otvorili vatru na pripadnike specijalne policije koji su odgovorili primjerenim naoružanjem što je imalo za posljedicu lišavanje života Đure karanovića starog cca. 45 g. sa stanom u Beogradu koji je bio naoružan snajperskom puškom cal. 7,9 mm i uhićenje Stevana karanovića naoružanog PAP-om cal. 7,62 mm, iz s.Plavno starog 30 g.*

*Narezeni (?) su bili pripadnici tzv „SVK“. Ostali pripadnici neprijateljske grupe pobjegli su u pravcu s.Strmica. Usljed borbenog djelovanja i uporabe ROB zapaljane su tri staje i dvije kuće, kojom prilikom su poginule dvije neidentificirane ženske osobe i dva muškarca starije dobi: Grubor Miloš i Grubor Jovo.“<sup>189</sup>*

219. **26. kolovoza 1995.** *„Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 19,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora a) brda Kozjak tt-1206 i s.Štikovo ukupne širine cca. 10 km i dužine 14 km zračne linije, b) brda Promine širine cca. 11 km i dužine 12 km zračne linije“<sup>190</sup> ukupne površine od cca. 272 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>191</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 700 pripadnika SJP iz 6 policijskih uprava i ATJ Lučko (SJP PU Zagrebačka s 80 pripadnika, SJP PU Primorko-goranska sa 100 pripadnika (u s.Kneževići pronađeni su evidentirani civili, u s.Karanovac pronađeno je 6 dotada neevidentiranih civila, a u s.Riđane pronađene su osobe koje su evidentirane od temeljne policije MUP-a), SJP PU Istarska s 90 pripadnika, SJP Osječko-baranjska sa 160 pripadnika (u s.Erakovići (10), s.Bure (4), s.Nenadići (1), s.Bogdanovići (2) i s.Grujići (4) pronađena je i evidentirana 21 civilna osoba), SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorska sa 130 pripadnika, SJP PU Brodsko-posavska sa 100 pripadnika (zatečeno je 17 civilnih osoba koje su već evidentirane od strane temeljne policije MUP-a i UNCRO, te manja količina pješačkog oružja i streljiva) i ATJ Lučko s 40 djelatnika („tijekom pretrage ostvaren je vatreni kontakt s dva naoružana uniformirana terorista u s.Ramljane koji su se izvlačili u pravcu s.Vujakovići gdje im*

<sup>188</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 25. kolovoza 1995. – dokument pisan rukom adresiran na načelnika Sektora SP Željka Sačića i s potpisom načelnika Odjela za BPT Zdravka Janića, prepisan te poslan u GS HV.

<sup>189</sup> Drugo izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 25. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 26. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>190</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 26. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 26. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>191</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 26. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

se izgubio svaki trag. Uslijed vatrene djelovanja (uporabe RBR „Zolja“) došlo je do zapaljenja tri štale i tri stoga sijena“).<sup>192</sup>

220. **27. kolovoza 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 19,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora Podinarje: s.Polača, s.Vrpolje, s.Golubić i istočnog zaleđa s.Strmica“<sup>193</sup> dužine cca. 11 km, širine 16 km i ukupne površine od cca. 176 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>194</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 493 pripadnika SJP iz 7 policijskih uprava (SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorska sa 60 pripadnika (pronađen jedan protuzračni top 40 mm i nešto streljiva), SJP PU Zagrebačka sa 60 pripadnika (u s.Baša – Mala Polača pronađen je neevidentirani civil Baša Jovan, bivši aktivni vodnik bivše JNA koji je priveden u ZM Knin, a potom u PU Knin), SJP PU Brodsko-posavska sa 60 pripadnika (pronađeno 8 komada pješačkog oružja i nešto streljiva), SJP PU Osječko-baranjska sa 73 pripadnika (u s.Silići (2), s.Milivojevići (4), s.Borovice (2) i s.Kukulji (2) pronađeno je ukupno 10 neevidentiranih civilnih osoba), SJP PU Primorsko-goranska sa 60 pripadnika (u s.Kovačevića Stanovi nakon napada vatrenim oružjem lišen je slobode i predan VP ZM Knin Dragan Volfat iz Pančeva, a u selu je zatečena jedna neevidentirane osoba), SJP PU Istarska sa 50 pripadnika i SJP PU Zadarsko-kninska sa 130 pripadnika (u s.Veliki Mračaj (1), s.Ševe (2), s.Rt (2), s.Radoši (1) i s.Novkovići (1) pronađeno je ukupno 7 neevidentiranih civilnih osoba).<sup>195</sup>

221. **28. kolovoza 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 19,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora s.Uništa, Podinarja i vrha Dinare“<sup>196</sup> dužine cca. 12 km, širine 10 km i ukupne površine od cca. 120 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>197</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 272 pripadnika SJP iz 7 policijskih uprava (SJP PU Primorsko-goranska s 20 pripadnika, SJP PU Zadarsko-kninska sa 120 pripadnika (u s.Grčići evidentirane 3 civilne osobe, u s.Kovačevića Stanovi jedna, u s.Kostića Stanovi jedna koja je privedena u PU Zadarsko-kninsku, u s.Lazića Stanovi sedam, dok je u istom zaseoku zatečeno i pet pripadnika „SVK“ koji su bili u društvu s

<sup>192</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 26. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 26. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>193</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 27. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 27. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>194</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 27. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

<sup>195</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 27. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 27. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>196</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 28. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 28. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>197</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 28. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

glasnogovornikom UNCRO-a za sektor Jug Alana Robertsa i tri promatrača UN-a), SJP PU Istarska s 30 pripadnika, SJP PU Zagrebačka s 32 pripadnika, SJP PU Osječko-baranjska s 30 pripadnika, SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorska s 20 pripadnika (pronađena 2 MB 82 mm) i SJP PU Brodsko-posavska s 20 pripadnika.<sup>198</sup>

222. Ovo je prvo izvješće koje je, pored načelnika GS HV, upućeno i na pozornost ministru unutarnjih poslova gosp. Ivanu Jarnjaku, zapovjedniku ZM Knin general pukovniku Ivanu Čermaku, te zapovjednicima ZP Split general pukovniku Anti Gotovini i ZP Gospić stožernom brigadiru Mirku Norcu-Kevi. Daljnja izvješća se uvijek šalju načelniku GS HV, dok se ostalim navedenim adresantima neki puta dostavljaju, a neki puta ne, što pokazuje da nema uobičajene prakse po tom pitanju već se adresanti razlikuju od dana do dana.

223. **29. kolovoza 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 14,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora Malog Alana, Balenove Plane i Prezida“<sup>199</sup> dužine cca. 13 km, širine 10 km i ukupne površine od cca. 130 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>200</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 340 pripadnika SJP iz 6 policijskih uprava (SJP PU Primorsko-goranska s 50 pripadnika, SJP PU Zadarsko-kninska sa 120 pripadnika, SJP PU Osječko-baranjska sa 60 pripadnika, SJP PU Istarska s 50 pripadnika, SJP PU Brodsko-posavska sa 60 pripadnika i SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorska sa 60 pripadnika).<sup>201</sup>

224. **31. kolovoza 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 04,00 sati do 20,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora planine Dinara“<sup>202</sup> dužine cca. 16 km, širine cca. 12 km i ukupne površine od cca. 192 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>203</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo oko 1150 pripadnika SJP iz 10 policijskih uprava (SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorska sa 100 pripadnika, SJP PU Istarska sa 100 pripadnika, SJP PU Brodsko-posavska sa 150 pripadnika, SJP PU Osječko-baranjska sa 150 pripadnika, SJP PU Primorsko-goranska sa 120 pripadnika, SJP PU Zadarsko-kninska s 200 pripadnika, SJP PU Zagrebačka sa 150 pripadnika, SJP PU Šibenska s 50 pripadnika, SJP PU

<sup>198</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 28. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 28 kolovoza 1995.

<sup>199</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 29. kolovoza 1995. godine upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 30. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>200</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 29. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

<sup>201</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 29. kolovoza 1995. godine upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 30. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>202</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 31. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 31. kolovoza 1995. godine.

<sup>203</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 31. kolovoza 1995.; tabelarno.

Splitsko-dalmatinska s 90 pripadnika i SJP PU Dubrovačka s 50 pripadnika) te 400 pripadnika temeljne policije koji su bili u blokadi prostora. Tijekom pretresa terena nije ostvaren borbeni kontakt s neprijateljem, a pronađene su manje količine pješačkog oružja i streljiva, kao i nekoliko minskih polja.<sup>204</sup>

**225. 1. rujna 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 09,00 sati do 14,30 sati, izvršile su pretragu šireg područja Velebita od Stojina do Razbojne drage.“<sup>205</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovala SJP PU Istarska sa 110 pripadnika, bez uspostave borbenog kontakta i pronalaska civila, oružja i streljiva, osim nekoliko minskih polja. Na kraju izvješća dana je i zadaća za 2. rujna 2009.:

“Tijekom današnjeg dana obavljeno je stožerno izviđanje područja između prometnice Udbina – Donji Lapac – Dnopolje – Kozja draga – Udbina, te izvršena priprema za pretragu terena koja će biti obavljena s 150 pripadnika specijalne policije tijekom 2. rujna na narečenom području.“<sup>206</sup> To je prvi puta da se u ovakvom izvješću daje informacija o zadaći za naredni dan što načelno postaje uobičajena praksa u svim narednim izvješćima.

**226. 2. rujna 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 16,00 sati, izvršile su pretragu područja između prometnice Udbina – Donji Lapac – Dnopolje – Kozja draga – Udbina“<sup>207</sup> dužine cca. 7,5 km, širine cca. 1,5 km i ukupne površine od cca. 8 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>208</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 460 pripadnika SJP raspoređenih u 4 grupe (nije specificirano iz kojih policijskih uprava). Tijekom pretresa uz komunikaciju Udbina – D. Lapac pronađena su četiri leša koja su već bila u fazi raspadanja, što je dojavljeno PP Donji Lapac.<sup>209</sup>

**227. 3. rujna 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije, u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 17,00 sati izvršile su pretragu područja između komunikacije Mogorić – Gornja Ploča i Srednja Gora - Đukići“<sup>210</sup> dužine cca. 10 km, širine cca. 9 km i ukupne površine od

<sup>204</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 31. kolovoza 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 31. kolovoza 1995.

<sup>205</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 1. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 1. rujna 1995.

<sup>206</sup> Isto.

<sup>207</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 2. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 2. rujna 1995.

<sup>208</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 2. rujna 1995.; tabelarno.

<sup>209</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 2. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 2. rujna 1995.

<sup>210</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 3. rujna 1995. godine upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 3. rujna 1995.

cca. 90 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>211</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 450 pripadnika SJP raspoređenih u četiri grupe. Tijekom pretresa prostora u s.Donja Ploča i s.Baste Donje pronađene su četiri starije neevidentirane osobe koje su predane djelatnicima Temeljne policije u PP Gračac, a još četiri starije neevidentirane osobe nađene su u s.Srednja Gora.<sup>212</sup>

228. **4. rujna 1995.** Za navedeni dan nije pronađeno pisano izvješće upućeno načelniku GS HV. Aktivnosti se mogu vidjeti iz dva izvješća pisana rukom, jedno od zapovjednika SJP PU Dubrovačke koji navodi da je od 09,05 do 12,30 sati s 30 pripadnika izvršio pretres terena oko Donjeg i Gornjeg Lapca bez posebnih zapažanja,<sup>213</sup> a drugo od zapovjednika SJP PU Ličko-senjske koji navodi da je od 10,00 sati s 50 pripadnika izvršio pretres na smjeru Medak – Ljubovo bez posebnih zapažanja.<sup>214</sup>

229. **5. rujna 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 05. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07,00 sati do 16,00 sati izvršile su pretragu područja između komunikacije Udbina – Bruvno – Donji Lapac - Udbina“.<sup>215</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 450 pripadnika SJP iz 4 PU. Tijekom pretresa je u zaseoku Podkuk zatečena jedna starija muška osoba koja zbog starosti nije u mogućnosti otići po isprave u PP.

230. Kako je i najavljeno u dnevnom izvješću od 5. rujna 1995.:

*„Tijekom dana izvršeno je stožerno izviđanje šireg područja Plitvičkih jezera između komunikacija Prijeboj – Plitvički Ljeskovac – Končarev Kraj – Homoljac – Vrelo Rodanovac – Korenička kapela – Prijeboj (zemljovid 1:50.000) te su izvršene pripreme za pretragu terena koja će biti obavljena sa cca 1000 djelatnika Specijalne policije dana 06. 09. 1995. godine.“*<sup>216</sup>

od 6. rujna nadalje stožer Skupnih snaga SJP MUP-a premješta se u hotel „Jezero“ odakle rukovodi aktivnostima pretresa terena na širem području Plitvičkih jezera. Zapovijedi za dolazak pripadnika SJP iz nekoliko PU upućene su 4. rujna 1995. godine. Tako Skupne snage po drugi puta izlaze iz područja ranijeg Sektora Jug i

<sup>211</sup> Izvješće Sektora SP MUP-a za dan 3. rujna 1995.; tabelarno.

<sup>212</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 3. rujna 1995. godine upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 3. rujna 1995.

<sup>213</sup> Izvješće zapovjednika SJP PU Dubrovačko-neretvanske o izvršenoj zadaći za 4. rujna 1995. pisano rukom

<sup>214</sup> Izvješće zapovjednika PU Ličko-senjske o izvršenoj zadaći za 4. rujna 1995. pisano rukom.

<sup>215</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 5. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 5. rujna 1995.

<sup>216</sup> Isto.

izvan njega ostaju do 13. rujna 1995., dok se ponovno vraćaju na jug tek 19. rujna 1995. kada pretražuju šire područje planine Svilaja.

231. **6. rujna 1995.** „Na temelju sigurnosnih saznanja vezanih za područje Plitvica, Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 06. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07.00 do 16.00 sati izvršile su pretragu područja od Plitvički Ljeskovac – Prijeboj – Čudin Klanac – Vrelo s ciljem pronalaska MTS-a ukupne površine cca 120 km<sup>2</sup>.“<sup>217</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 860 pripadnika SJP iz 5 policijskih uprava, a osim što je u blokadi uhićen jedan državljanin Bosne i Hercegovine, nisu zabilježeni drugi važni događaji.<sup>218</sup>

232. **7. rujna 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 07. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07.00 do 17.00 izvršile su pretragu područja Rakovica – Jelovečki klanac tt 449 – tt 591 – Božići, južno prema Selište Drežničko – Koranski most – Sertić poljana – Ravni lug – želj.st. Javornik, cca 200 km<sup>2</sup>.“<sup>219</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 840 pripadnika SJP iz 5 policijskih uprava dok su u blokadi područja sudjelovali pripadnici SJP iz 2 policijske uprave. Nije bilo važnijih zapažanja, osim da su pripadnici SJP PU Karlovačke pronašli leš neprijateljskog vojnika u odori.<sup>220</sup> Istoga dana general pukovnik Mladen Markač šalje zapovjednicima ZP Karlovac, ZP Split, ZP Gospić i ZM Knin obavijest o aktivnostima za 8. rujna 1995. u kojoj ih upoznaje s područjem pretresa, vrstom odore koju će nositi pripadnici SP te traži sva sigurnosna saznanja o području pretresa.<sup>221</sup>

233. **8. rujna 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 08. 09. 1995. godine izvršile su u vremenu od 07.00 do 17.00 sati pretragu prostora omeđenog s.Prijeboj – Ličko Petrovo Selo – s.Vaganac – s.Rastovača - Koranski most s ciljem uništenja DTG-a i pronalaska MTS-a, ukupan prostor pretrage iznosio je cca 150 km<sup>2</sup>.“<sup>222</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 480 pripadnika SJP iz 3 policijske uprave (na području Arapovog dola pronađeno 5 neevidentiranih starijih osoba i o tomu obaviještena Temeljna policija, a uhićena su dva državljanina BiH). Ronilačka skupina SP MUP-a

<sup>217</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 6. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Plitvice, 9. rujna 1995.

<sup>218</sup> Isto.

<sup>219</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 7. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Plitvice, 9. rujna 1995.

<sup>220</sup> Isto.

<sup>221</sup> Obavijest o planiranim aktivnostima Skupnih snaga specijalne policije za dan 8. rujna 1995., Plitvice, 7. rujna 1995.

<sup>222</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 8. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Plitvice, 10. rujna 1995.

izvršila je pregled jezera Kozjak i Milanovac, a speleološka pregled jame kod Velikog slapa.<sup>223</sup> Kao i prethodnoga dana dostavlja se posebna informacija o aktivnostima za 9. rujna 1995. Informacija se pored zapovjednika ZP Karlovac, Split i Gospić i ZM Knin, dostavlja i načelnicima PU Zadarsko-kninska, Karlovačka i Ličko-senjska.<sup>224</sup>

234. **9. rujna 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 09. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07.00 do 15.00 sati izvršile su pretragu područja od Poljanak – Sertić Poljana – Ravni Lug – Ljeskova strana – Rudopolje – Plitvička jezera – Plitvički Ljeskovac – Babin Potok s ciljem uništenja DTG-a i pronalaska MTS-a, ukupne površine pretrage cca 130 km<sup>2</sup>.... Tijekom dana skupina od 17 ronitelja izvršila je uron u jezera Kozjak, Gradinsko, Galovac, Batinovac i Prošćamnsko te je izvršeno podvodno snimanje jezera Kaluđerovac, Golanovac i Milanovac.“<sup>225</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 530 pripadnika SJP iz 4 policijske uprave, a nisu prikupljena nikakva posebna zapažanja.<sup>226</sup>

235. General pukovnik Mladen Markač šalje dopis načelniku GS HV u svezi problema koordinacije čišćenja na području Plješevice zbog nekontroliranog ulaska pripadnika V Korpusa Armije BiH na državni teritorij RH:

„... Tijekom 11. 09. 1995. godine sa početkom u 06.00 sati, Stožer skupnih snaga specijalne policije planirao je zadaću čišćenja šireg prostora uz međunarodno priznatu granicu RH definiranog polaznom crtom Prijeboj – Ličko Petrovo Selo – potom jugoistočno N.Selo Koreničko – Željava Javor tt 704 – Tisovac – vrh tt 1103 – Osinjak tt 1454 – Mala Plješevica tt 1576 – Balun tt 1446 – Gredoviti vrh 1429 – Šuputova poljana – potom jugozapadno Ponor Korenički – Kaljev brdo do komunikacije T.Korenica – Plitvička jezera (zemljovid 1:25.000).

Vršeći raščlambu očekujuće problematike na narečenom prostoru stožer akcije nailazi na problem suradnje sa snagama V Korpusa BiH poradi toga što je na tom prostoru pronađeno i hrvatskoj policiji privedeno više državljana BiH pripadnika snaga V Korpusa u civilu i odorama.

Molimo Vas da poradi što učinkovitijeg obnašanja narečene zadaće čišćenja iznađete mogućnost stupanja u kontakt sa zapovjedništvom V Korpusa Armije BiH s

<sup>223</sup> Isto.

<sup>224</sup> Obavijest o planiranim aktivnostima Skupnih snaga SP za dan 9. rujna 1995.; Plitvice, 8. rujna 1995.

<sup>225</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 9. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Plitvice, 10. rujna 1995.

<sup>226</sup> Isto.

*temeljnim ciljem koordinacije izvršenja planirane zadaće te da nas ŽURNO rebusom ili na drugi način izvijestite o načinu ostvarenja kontakata i sprovedbe traženog.*<sup>227</sup>

236. U svom dopisu od 10. rujna 1995. general zbora Zvonimir Červenko informira generala Markača da će se poduzeti potrebne mjere za rješenje problema koordinacije.<sup>228</sup>

237. **10. rujna 1995.** „Na temelju sigurnosnih saznanja vezanih za šire područje Plitvica, Skupne snage specijalne policije tijekom dana 10. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07.00 do 16.00 sati izvršile su pretragu prostora omeđenog Vrelo Koreničko – D.Babin Potok – Čanak – Bunić s ciljem pronalaska DTG-a i MTS-a, ukupne površine pretrage cca 200 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>229</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo oko 775 pripadnika SJP iz 6 policijskih uprava. Pripadnici SJP PU Zadarsko-kninske pronašli su 4 leša neprijateljskih vojnika, a pripadnici SJP PU Požeško-slavonske pronašli su veće količine skrivenog topničkog streljiva i protupješačkih i protutenkovskih mina. Ronilačka skupina pregledala je jezera Okrugljak, Gavanovac i Kaluđerovac<sup>230</sup>, a protudiverzijska grupa SJP PU Kutina razminirala je cestu Rakovica – Plavča Draga.<sup>231</sup> Istoga se dana dostavlja posebna informacija o aktivnostima za 11. rujna 1995. Informacija se pored zapovjednika ZP Karlovac, Split i Gospić i ZM Knin, dostavlja i načelnicima PU Zadarsko-kninska, Karlovačka i Ličko-senjska.<sup>232</sup>

238. **11. rujna 1995.** „Na temelju sigurnosnih saznanja vezanih za područje Plitvica, Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 11. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07.00 do 15.00 sati izvršile su pretragu područja Plješevice – s.Šeganovac – Šubutova poljana – Prijeboj do tt 1286 s ciljem pronalaska i uništenja DTG-a te pronalaska MTS-a ukupne površine cca 90 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>233</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 590 pripadnika SJP iz 5 policijskih uprava te speleološka i protudiverzijska skupina.

<sup>227</sup> Koordinacija aktivnosti čišćenja na području Plješevice, dopis general pukovnika Mladena Markača načelniku GS HV, Plitvice, 9. rujna 1995.

<sup>228</sup> Koordinacija aktivnosti čišćenja na području Plješevice, odgovor načelnika GS HV, Klasa: 80-01/95-02/08, Ur.broj: 512-06-05/01-95-535 od 10. rujna 1995.

<sup>229</sup> Izvješće o izvršenim zadaćama za dan 10. rujna 1995.; Plitvice, 11. rujna 1995.

<sup>230</sup> Ronjenje u Plitvičkim jezerima, izvješće zapovjednika ronitelja načelniku Sektora specijalne policije Željku Sačiću, Gračac, 10. rujna 1995.

<sup>231</sup> Izvješće o izvršenim zadaćama za dan 10. rujna 1995.; Plitvice, 11. rujna 1995.

<sup>232</sup> Obavijest o planiranim aktivnostima Skupnih snaga SP za dan 11. rujna 1995.; Plitvice, 10. rujna 1995.

<sup>233</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 11. rujna 1995. godine, Plitvice 12. rujna 1995. Upućeno ministru unutarnjih polova gosp. Ivanu Jarnjaku.

Tijekom pretresa uhićeno je i temeljnoj policiji predano 14 državljana BiH, a pronađeno je mrtvo tijelo neprijateljskog vojnika.<sup>234</sup>

239. **12. rujna 1995.** „Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja a u cilju pirotehničkog pregleda staza i komunikacija te jama tijekom dana 12. 09. 1995. godine angažirane su skupine pirotehničara i speleologa.“<sup>235</sup> Tijekom pretresa nije bilo nikakvih posebnih zapažanja ili pronalazaka.

240. **13. rujna 1995.** Prema izvješću zapovjednika protudiverzijske skupine s 20 djelatnika – pirotehničara nastavljeno je s pregledom staza, mostova i slapova oko Plitvičkih jezera. Tijekom pregleda pronađena je samo manja količina minsko-eksplozivnih sredstava.<sup>236</sup>

241. Istoga dana ZP Split uputilo je zahtjev ministru obrane RH Gojku Šušku za angažiranjem snaga specijalnih postrojba MUP-a:

*„Molim Vas da za potrebe pretresa i čišćenja terena u taktičko-operativnoj dubini postrojbi ZP Split – IZM Vrba odobrite uporabu Specijalnih postrojbi MUP-a RH.*

...

*Budući da se radi o velikom i zemljišno složenom prostoru molim Vas da SP MUP-a bude jakosti 2 bojne. U slučaju pozitivnog odgovora isti bi trebali biti na IZM ZP Split najkasnije do 06,00 sati 14. 09. 1995. godine.“*<sup>237</sup> Na dopisu je rukom napisano „nije odobreno“, a prema daljnjim događanjima taj zahtjev nije nikad realiziran.

242. Od 13. rujna 1995. nema posebnih aktivnosti pretresa terena, sve do 19. rujna 1995. kada načelnik Sektora SP izdaje, na temelju informacija iz PU Šibenske o mogućem boravku razbijenih neprijateljskih skupina na širem području planine Svilaja, zapovijed načelnicima 11 policijskih uprava za zapovjednike SJP da upute svoje snage 21. rujna 1995. u Gračac, odnosno 22. rujna u Drniš (SJP Zadarsko-kninska, SPJ Šibenska i SJP Ličko-senjska) i Vrliku (SJP Splitsko-dalmatinska).

*„Tijekom operacije „Oluja“, većina razbijenih neprijateljskih paravojnih formacija izvukla se prema okupiranim područjima R BiH-a. Međutim, postoji mogućnost da se manji broj neprijateljskih vojnika još uvijek prikriva na oslobođenim područjima,*

<sup>234</sup> Isto.

<sup>235</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 12. rujna 1995. godine, Plitvice 12. rujna 1995.

<sup>236</sup> Izvješće o aktivnostima kontradiverzione skupine u sklopu akcije „Obruč-Plitvice“ za dan 13. rujna 1995.

<sup>237</sup> Zahtjev Zapovjedništva ZP Split - IZM Vrba za uporabu SP MUP RH, Klasa: SP 8/95-01/15, Ur.broj 1080-01-95-34 od 13. rujna 1995.

*osobito na rubovima planinskih masiva uz naselja koja su bila napućena većinskim srpskim življem.*

*Tijekom proteklog vremena, Sektoru specijalne policije pristigle su informacije od PU Šibenske u kojima se navedene pretpostavke o možebitnom boravku razbijenih neprijateljskih skupina na širem području Svilaja.*

*Shodno gore narečenom a u cilju pretrage šireg područja planine Svilaja, te čišćenja tog prostora od eventualno zaostalih diverzantsko-terorističkih skupina, donosim sljedeću*

## **Z A P O V I J E D**

*a) Nadnevka 21. 09. 1995. g. do 19,00 sati dužne su u Gračacu biti sljedeće SJP:*

...

*b) Nadnevka 22. 09. 1995. g. do 06,00 sati dužne su biti na sjevernom ulazu u Drniš (od Knina) sljedeće SJP:*

...

*c) SJP PU Splitsko-dalmatinska dužna je 22. 09. 1995. g. u 06,00 sati biti u mjestu Vrlika sa cca 180 djelatnika (djelatnog i pričuvnog sastava).*

...

*Zapovjednici narečenih SJP ili njihovi zamjenici dužni su biti na radnom sastanku u Gračacu 21. 09. 1995. g. u 19,00 sati.<sup>238</sup>*

243. 21. rujna 1995. general pukovnik Mladen Markač dostavlja obavijest načelniku GS HV, zapovjedniku ZP Split i ZM Knin, kao i načelnicima PU Zadarsko-kninske i PU Šibenske o planiranim aktivnostima pretresa 22. rujna 1995.<sup>239</sup> Iste se obavijesti dostavljaju gotovo svaki dan za naredni dan pa se neće posebno navoditi po danima. Stoga treba ukazati na opći format obavijesti koji u prvom odlomku govori o prostoru koji će se pretresati sljedećega dana, u drugom se odlomku objašnjava u kakvu će odoru biti odjeveni pripadnici SJP i boje traka koje nose za prepoznavanje, u trećem se odlomku traži od osoba (vojni zapovjednici i načelnici PU) da upoznaju sve svoje podređene koji se nalaze u području pretresa o točnom vremenu i mjestu pretresa, dok se u četvrtom odlomku traži dostava svih sigurnosnih saznanja vezanih za područje pretresa najkasnije do 24.00 sata dana kada se upućuje obavijest.

<sup>238</sup> Zapovijed načelnika Sektora specijalne policije, Broj: 511-01-31-1261/95, od 19. rujna 1995.

<sup>239</sup> Obavijest o planiranim aktivnostima Skupnih snaga SP za dan 22. rujna 1995.; Gračac, 21. rujna 1995.

244. **22. rujna 1995.** „Na temelju sigurnosnih saznanja vezanih uz boravak razbijenih DTG-a te razmještaj MTS-a na širem području planine Svilaj, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su u vremenu od 06.00 do 18.00 sati pretragu šireg područja omeđenog kako slijedi: s.Zvjerinac – s.Čenić – Miočić – Otavice – Vrlika – Travice – Dragići – Dubrava-, ukupne površine cca 130 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>240</sup> Tijekom pretresa pronađena je veća količina oružja i streljiva te nekoliko starijih civilnih osoba bez potrebne dokumentacije o čemu je obaviještena Temeljna policija.<sup>241</sup>

245. **23. rujna 1995.** „Na temelju sigurnosnih saznanja a u cilju pronalaska i uništenja DTG-a te zaostalih MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 23. 09. 1995. godine izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora s.Bunić, s.Podlapača, Lički Osik i Široke Kule, ukupne površine cca 120 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>242</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo oko 800 pripadnika SJP iz 6 policijskih uprava. Pored toga što su pronađena 2 oklopna transportera i 2 netrajna topa nije bilo drugih važnih zapažanja.

246. **24. rujna 1995.** „Na temelju sigurnosnih saznanja a u cilju pronalaska i uništenja DTG-a te zaostalih MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije dana 24. 09. 1995. godine izvršile su, u vremenu od 07.00 do 15.00 sati, pretragu šireg prostora s.Bjelopolje – Korenice – s.Ševeri – Čusići – Debelo brdo, ukupne površine cca 50 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>243</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo oko 350 pripadnika SJP iz tri policijske uprave, bez posebnih zapažanja.

247. **25. rujna 1995.** „Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja a u cilju uništenja zaostalih DTG-a te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 25. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07.00 do 15.00 sati pretragu prostora omeđenog kako slijedi: Udbina – Bjelopolje – Donji Lapac – Udbina te šire područje podinarja oko lijeve obale Peručkog jezera, ukupne površine cca 200 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>244</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo 1200 pripadnika SJP iz 10 policijskih uprava. „Tijekom pretresa, u zoni djelovanja SJP PU Krapinsko-zagorske došlo je do vatrenog kontakta nedaleko od komunikacije Bjelopolje – Donji Lapac (Gradina), te je tom prilikom ubijen jedan

<sup>240</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 22. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 23. rujna 1995.

<sup>241</sup> Isto.

<sup>242</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 23. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 24. rujna 1995.

<sup>243</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 24. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 25. rujna 1995.

<sup>244</sup> Izvješće o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 25. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 25. rujna 1995.

*neprijateljski vojnik u odori tzv. vojske "RSK".<sup>245</sup> U pretresu podinara pronađena je veća količina streljiva.*

248. **26. rujna 1995.** „...Skupne snage specijalne policije u vremenu od 06.00 – 15.00 sati izvršile su pretragu šireg prostora: selo Brezovac Dobroselski, sjeverno komunikacija do Gornjeg Lapca, Kulen Vakuf, južno rijeka Una- selo Ponorac, Gornji i Donji Zaklopac s ciljem pronalaska MTS-a i DTG-a. Ukupna površina prostora pretrage iznosi 100 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>246</sup> Pripadnici SJP PU Osječko-baranjske pronašli su u selu Medići 3 žene i jedno dijete te jednu stariju mušku osobu koji nisu nigdje prijavljeni, dok nije bilo drugih značajnih zapažanja.

249. **27. rujna 1995.** „Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja, a u cilju uništenja DTG-a, te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 27. 09. 1995. godine u vremenu od 06.00 do 15.30 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: Željezno polje – Krčevine – Nebljusi – Opaljene klade – Banov vrh (tt 875) – Miškova Bašća (tt 1113) – Manita draga – Gubavi vršak (tt 1178) – Gradina – Frkašić – Donji Frkašić – Kvirgav vrh (tt 1445) – Tisov vrh (tt 1124) – Željezno polje.<sup>247</sup> U pretresu je sudjelovalo oko 1000 pripadnika SJP iz 9 policijskih uprava. Tijekom pretresa pronađen je leš neprijateljskog vojnika te dva kamiona.<sup>248</sup>

250. **28. rujna 1995.** Skupne snage specijalne policije nastavile su s pretresom istog područja od prethodnoga dana s istim snagama. Nisu zabilježene nikakve sigurnosno interesantne aktivnosti.<sup>249</sup>

251. **2. listopada 1995.** „Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja, a u cilju uništenja DTG-a, te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 02. 10. 1995. godine u vremenu od 05.30 do 20.00 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: komunikacija Palanka – Begovački klanac (tt 619) – istočno, selo Ševina poljana – južno, selo Dragaši (uključno) – selo Perići (uključno) – selo Čupkovići (uključno). U pretrazi narečenog terena (130 km<sup>2</sup>), sudjelovalo je 710 djelatnika iz SJP PU:

<sup>245</sup> Isto.

<sup>246</sup> Izvješća o izvršenoj zadaći za dan 26. rujna 1995. pisana rukom, Gračac, 26. rujna 1995.

<sup>247</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 27. rujna 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 27. rujna 1995.

<sup>248</sup> Isto.

<sup>249</sup> Obavijest o planiranim aktivnostima Skupnih snaga SP za dan 28. rujna 1995.; Gračac, 27. rujna 1995.

(ukupno 7 policijskih uprava)<sup>250</sup> Tijekom pretresa pronađen je leš starijeg muškarca te 9 pušaka.<sup>251</sup>

**252. 3. listopada 1995.** „*Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja, a u cilju uništenja DTG-a, te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 03. 10. 1995. godine u vremenu od 05.30 do 18.00 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: komunikacija Gornji Tiškovac – Lička Kaldrma – Golušica (tt 615) – s. Kunovac Kupinovački – s. Šašići – južno s. Podklanac – prijevoj Srpski klanac – Ljeskova draga – Pogledalo – s. Otrić – Begovački klanac – istočno Velika glava tt 697 – Inkuša tt 752 – Jokića glava – isključno Oklinak tt 1329 – isključno Cvijanovićeve strana tt 1206 – komunikacija Ševina poljana – Lička Kaldrma. U pretrazi narečenog terena (110 km<sup>2</sup>), sudjelovalo je ukupno cca 580 djelatnika iz SJP PU*“.<sup>252</sup> U selu Torbički Vagan pronađena je jedna muška osoba koja nije bila prijavljena, osobni podatci su predani temeljnoj policiji, dok nije bilo drugih interesantnih zapažanja.<sup>253</sup>

**253. 4. listopada 1995.** „*Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja, a u cilju uništenja DTG-a, te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 04. 10. 1995. godine u vremenu od 06.00 do 14.30 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: komunikacija Šašići – Srb – Raštele – Krka – tokom rijeke Krke – selo Kneževići (uključno) – s. Jajičići (uključno) – tt 658 – tt 651 – Gradina tt 676 - Kanjeva dol – Lička Kaldrma – zapadno, s. Zavlaka – tt 618 – tt 615 - Kunovac Kupirovački. Gornji Tiškovac – Lička Kaldrma – Golušica (tt 615) – s. Kunovac Kupinovački. U pretrazi narečenog terena sudjelovalo je ukupno 567 djelatnika iz SJP PU (ukupno 6 policijskih uprava)*“.<sup>254</sup> Tijekom pretresa pronađen je jedan muški leš i šest sanduka streljiva za top 130 mm.<sup>255</sup>

**254. 5. listopada 1995.** „*Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja, a u cilju uništenja DTG-a, te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 05. 10. 1995. godine u vremenu od 07.00 do 14.30 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: s.*

<sup>250</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 2. listopada 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 2. listopada 1995.

<sup>251</sup> Isto.

<sup>252</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 3. listopada 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 4. listopada 1995.

<sup>253</sup> Isto.

<sup>254</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 4. listopada 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 5. listopada 1995.

<sup>255</sup> Isto.

Vrebac – Kažinj – Tvrde drage – Jezerske drage – Zelića drage – Brljkovica – zaseoedenice – Košare – južno, Oblajac (tt 779) uključno – tt 726 – Gromila tt 679 – selo Krčevine – komunikacija Vrebac-Mogorić. U pretrazi narečenog terena sudjelovalo je ukupno 427 djelatnika iz SJP PU: (ukupno 5 policijskih uprava).<sup>256</sup> Tijekom pretresa nije bilo sigurnosno interesantnih zapažanja.

255. **6. listopada 1995.** „Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja, a u cilju uništenja DTG-a, te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 06. 10. 1995. godine u vremenu od 05.00 do 17.30 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: Tvornica glinice – komunikacijom do Malog Alana – Suvi vrh tt 1122 (isključno) – Kramarica tt 1054 – Prezid tt 763 – južno, komunikacijama do Kuk Bujanović tt 596, Buljova Dolina, Vulić tt 386, Babin grad – tokom rijeke Zrmanje do Obrovca. U pretrazi narečenog terena (90 km<sup>2</sup>), sudjelovalo je ukupno cca 576 djelatnika iz SJP PU: (ukupno 6 policijskih uprava).<sup>257</sup> Tijekom pretresa terena pronađen je veći broj pješačkog oružja i streljiva.

256. **7. listopada 1995.** „Temeljem sigurnosnih saznanja, a u cilju uništenja DTG-a, te pronalaska MTS-a, Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 07. 10. 1995. godine u vremenu od 05.00 do 18.00 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: komunikacija Gornja Bruška – Kaštel Žegarski – sjeverozapadno s. Ušljebrke – Zelići – Panin kuk – Obli kuk – Gazin kuk – s. Berberi – Klisina – Paravinje – Razovac – St. Obrovac – Ploča Kotorova – tt 86 – Obrovac – južno tt 108 – Vrtline – Stražbenica tt 218 – s. Župani – s. Veselinovići – s. Tepše – s. Sarići – s. Kapitanovići – s. Gende (komunikacija Obrovac-Gornja Bruška). U pretrazi narečenog terena (120 km<sup>2</sup>), sudjelovalo je ukupno cca 470 djelatnika iz SJP PU: (ukupno 5 policijskih uprava).<sup>258</sup> Tijekom pretrage terena u s. Sarići pronađena je jedna naoružana civilna osoba, bez dokumenata, koja je razoružana i privedena u PP Obrovac, a u selu su pronađene i dvije puške.<sup>259</sup>

<sup>256</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 5. listopada 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 6. listopada 1995.

<sup>257</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 6. listopada 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 7. listopada 1995.

<sup>258</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 7. listopada 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 7. listopada 1995.

<sup>259</sup> Isto.

257. **9. listopada 1995.** „Skupne snage specijalne policije izvršile su dana 09.10. 1995. godine u vremenu od 08,00 do 17,30 sati pretragu prostora omeđenu kako slijedi: komunikacija Kaštel Žegarski – Međuvode (uključno s.Gende) – južno s.Škorići – s.Pupavci – Opšeničino polje – tt 259.4 – Brađevke – Krčevine – zap. s.Budim – komunikacijom s.Korlati – s.Ljubovići – s.Šorgići – s.Medosi – s.Popovići – s.Obruč – s.Peslaći – isključno Butiga – sjeverno s.Vučkovići – Bioče – Tukovi – Jakovljevićev stan – s.Bundale – s.Kubati – Kaštel Žegarski. U pretrazi narečenog terena (110 km<sup>2</sup>), sudjelovalo je ukupno cca 460 djelatnika iz SJP PU: (ukupno 5 policijskih uprava).<sup>260</sup> Nije bilo posebnih zapažanja osim što su u s. Birkići pronađene manje količine pješачkog naoružanja i streljiva.<sup>261</sup>

#### 9.4. Zaključak

258. Nakon operacije „Oluja“ je u razdoblju od 13. kolovoza do 9. listopada 1995., u operacijama i aktivnostima čišćenja i pretresa terena ukupno je pretreseno preko 5000 kvadratnih kilometara, što je otprilike dva i pola puta više nego što su te iste postrojbe oslobodile tijekom operacije (2000 km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>262</sup> Prosječno je dnevno u aktivnostima pretresa sudjelovalo 625 pripadnika specijalne policije koji su prosječno pretresli 125 km<sup>2</sup>. U dva odvojena incidenta smrtno je stradalo 8 osoba, dok na strani specijalne policije nije bilo smrtno stradalih.

259. Sustav zapovijedanja i metodologija rada bili su potpuno razrađeni i omogućili su djelotvornu provedbu čišćenja i pretresa terena. Dva incidenta koja su se dogodila dan za danom od strane iste postrojbe nikako ne smiju dovesti do pogrešnog zaključka da sustav nije funkcionirao i da je tolerirao nestegovna ponašanja.

260. Aktivnosti pretresa se provode gotovo svakodnevno, što iziskuje velika fizička naprezanja sudionika budući da se pretres provodi isključivo pješke, često u vrlo složenim zemljišnim uvjetima, bez putova na kraškom zemljištu,

261. U dnevnim pretresima sudjeluju relativno velike snage od nekoliko stotina do preko 1000 djelatnika, iz većeg broja policijskih uprava, koje treba dobro koordinirati i sinkronizirati njihovo kretanje tako da između postroja ne bude pukotina u kojima bi se mogle sakriti zaostale neprijateljske skupine.

<sup>260</sup> Izvješće o sprovedenim aktivnostima tijekom dana 9. listopada 1995. upućeno načelniku GS HV; Sektor SP MUP-a, Gračac, 9. listopada 1995.

<sup>261</sup> Isto.

<sup>262</sup> Godišnje izvješće o radu Specijalne policije MUP-a RH u 1995. godini, Broj:511-01-30- /96, od 22. veljače 1996., str. 4.

262. Zapovjednik akcije nadzire snage u pretresu s određene točke izvan ili na granici područja pretresa, obično ih upućuje u pretres s jedne točke, a dočekuje na suprotno granici pretresa, ako je to fizički moguće i sigurno.

263. Tijekom pretresa zapovjednik akcije mora biti u neprekidnoj radio ili drugoj vezi s podređenim zapovjednicima kako bi mogao dati dodatne upute i odgovoriti na zahtjeve podređenih u slučaju potrebe; s obzirom na konfiguraciju terena i veličinu prostora to nije uvijek moguće postići,

264. Zapovjednik akcije po svršetku pretresa mora prikupiti sve zapovjednike postrojbi koje sudjeluju u pretresu kako bi od njih dobio izvješće, te napravio vlastito izvješće prema zapovjedniku Skupnih snaga. Prije toga obično zapovjednici SJP iz policijskih uprava primaju izvješća od svojih zapovjednika grupa.

265. Budući da najčešće nije u mogućnosti provjeravati i nadzirati način na koji podređeni provode pretres, zapovjednik akcije, pa tako i svi ostali u lancu zapovijedanja, mora u potpunosti vjerovati podređenima i njihovim izvješćima, na čemu se i temelji uspješno vođenje.

266. Sukladno navedenom, general Markač, kao zapovjednik Skupnih snaga, je najčešće tek četvrti u lancu izvješćivanja: zapovjednik grupe → zapovjednik SJP → zapovjednik akcije → zapovjednik Skupnih snaga SP MUP-a, i, kako ne ostvaruje osoban uvid u ono što skupne snage rade na terenu tijekom pretresa, potpisuje i dostavlja izvješća o pretresu načelniku GS HV na temelju informacija koje bilo usmeno, bilo pisano, dobiva od svojih podređenih.

## 10. Zaključak

267. Operacija „Oluja“ je bila operacija koja je planirana više mjeseci unaprijed, a završni planovi su se modificirali u ovisnosti o konkretnim događanjima na terenu neposredno prije njezine provedbe (operacija „Ljeto-95“ ZP Split).

268. Specijalne postrojbe MUP-a uključuju se u operaciju „Oluja“ na temelju dogovora i odobrenja ministra unutarnjih poslova tako da su stavljene pod zapovijedanje načelnika GS HV.

269. General pukovnik Mladen Markač je bio zapovjednik jednog od niza pomoćnih pravaca u operaciji „Oluja“, koji je, zbog ostvarenog zamaha i brzine djelovanja, te razarajućeg učinka postao puno važnijim nego što je to bilo izvorno zamišljeno u planu Glavnog stožera. Ograničena zadaća s ciljem probijanja prve crte i presijecanja putova Gospić – Gračac i Obrovac – Gračac ostvarena je vrlo brzo, čime su neprijateljske snage bile prisiljene na povlačenje koje se više nije moglo zaustaviti, ne samo zbog djelovanja specijalne policije, već i zbog unutarnjih slabosti neprijatelja.

270. U operaciji „Oluja“ su Specijalne policije MUP-a iskazale visoku sposobnost provedbe napadne operacije, primjenjujući znanja i iskustva koja su stekli kroz sustav obuke koji je Sektor specijalne policije MUP-a uspio izgraditi do tada te na temelju iskustava iz sudjelovanja u ranijim akcijama i operacijama u skladu s načelima izgradnje suvremenih specijalnih vojnih postrojbi osposobljenih za borbena djelovanja u brdsko-planinskom području.

271. Nakon provedbe operacije „Oluja“ Skupne snage SJP MUP-a započinju s operacijom „Oluja – Obruč“ koja je imala za cilj pretresti određena područja na kojima se sumnjalo da još uvijek postoje razbijene neprijateljske snage, ali i drugih područja u cilju pronalaženja skladišta oružja, minskih polja i drugih zapreka, odnosno svih onih aktivnosti potrebnih za odvijanje normalnog života na oslobođenom području. Za provedbu akcija pretresa bila je uspostavljena jasna metodologija koju su svi zapovjednici specijalnih jedinica policije znali i poštovali.

272. Sve se ove aktivnosti ne bi mogle uspješno provesti da Skupne snage SJP MUP-a nisu imale jasan lanac zapovijedanja i odgovornosti koji je funkcionirao za cijelo vrijeme trajanja operacije „Oluja“ i „Oluja – Obruč“. Taj je lanac zapovijedanja isključivo provodio zapovijedi koje je dobivao od načelnika Glavnog stožera HV na najbolji mogući način na koji su znali i za koji su bili osposobljeni pripadnici specijalnih jedinica policije, od general pukovnika Mladena Markača pa do svih ostalih sudionika u ovim dvjema operacijama.

## **APPENDIX B**

**EXPERT REPORT**  
**by Major General Dragutin Repinc**  
**FOR CASE IT-60-09-T**

**THE SPECIAL POLICE IN OPERATION STORM**

**Zagreb, December 2009**

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## 1. Biography

1. I was born in Zagreb on 19 November 1959. I completed primary school in Sesvete in 1974, and I graduated from the Military Gymnasium in 1978.
2. My military career began in 1982 after I graduated from the Land Forces Military Academy with a major in engineering, serving as a platoon commander with the rank of second lieutenant in the Reserve Engineering Officer School.
3. From 1984 to 1991, I worked as an instructor in general tactics and tactical engineering and I completed courses for platoon commander, company commander and battalion commander in the engineer corps. As a general tactics instructor, I provided instruction on tactics in the branches with which the engineer corps most often operates in combat (infantry, armoured and mechanized divisions).
4. In September 1991, I became a member of the Croatian Army, in which I performed a number of duties, generally in the fields of operations and training.
5. From 1992 to 1993, I served as advisor for operative combat planning in the command headquarters of the Zagreb Operative Zone. At this post, I participated in the formulation of operative plans, commands and decisions for conduct of the combat operations by the units under the Zagreb Operative Zone, maintained working maps, other graphic charts, and other combat documentation relevant to the operative section, collaborated with all other HQ sections concerning incorporation of their planning segments into operative and combat plans, and oversaw their implementation.
6. After completion of Command and General Staff School, I remained at the School from August to December 1994 as a tactics instructor, where I taught attendees combat unit deployment tactics up to brigade level (decision-making and drafting of combat documents).
7. From January 1995 to June 1996, I worked with the U.S. firm MPRI, and my fundamental field of expertise was training management. I also held instructions in

the field of organization management and leadership. In working on the introduction of the American training system to the Croatian Army, I became familiar with the organization of the United States armed forces and the organizational system for the combat missions of specially organized forces.

8. From June 1996 to June 1997, I attended the American Command and General Staff Course, at which, among other matters, I studied the tactics (planning, organization, decision-making, use and development of combat documents) of brigade-, division- and corps-level units, and I also selected Applied Tactics as an elective course.

9. From 1999 to 2003, I served as chief of the Operative Planning Department, where I was responsible for all aspects of planning, alignment and preparations for future planned and extraordinary operations, including development of war plans and alignment and planning for preparation and modification of land and infrastructure for combat readiness.

10. From that time until 2005, over and above my regular duties I was also departmental chief and lecturer in the War College for the courses Concepts in Warfare, Operative Expertise and Non-combat Operations.

11. From 2003 to the end of 2005, I served as Chief of Staff in the Headquarters of the Croatian Land Forces, where my fundamental duties were the organization and management of all activities and alignment of the operations of HQ departments, oversight of all assignments entrusted to HQ, management of requests for critical command information, organization, planning and implementation of training in HQ and ensuring that all HQ operations comply with assignments and orders of the commander.

12. From December 2005 to December 2007, I was appointed commander of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) with the mission of monitoring, surveillance and reporting on any violations of the ceasefire along the Line of Control in Kashmir.

13. Upon my return from this mission to the present, I have served as chief of the Planning Department in the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, where I was responsible for defence planning, force planning, budget planning, programming and development and bilateral and multilateral international military cooperation.

14. Besides standard military education, I completed a considerable number of NATO/PfP courses and seminars (operational use of English language, resource management, etc.).

15. I have translated several American manuals into the Croatian language (Train the Force, Battle Focused Training, Operations, Tactics), and I wrote the Military Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia.

16. During Operation Storm as a member of the MPRI-DTAP program staff, pursuant to the orders of the Chief of the Croatian Army's Main Staff, I was deployed to the Forward Command Post (FCP) of the Croatian Army's Main Staff in Đakovo as the operations officer, and I remained in Eastern Slavonia for the duration of Operation Storm. After the decommissioning of the Đakovo FCP, I was returned to my post in Zagreb. As a operations officer, I was charged with the preparation of operative documents (plans, commands, operational maps), oversight of the operative readiness of command posts and units, maintenance of combat journals and compilation of daily operative reports.

## 2. Methodology

17. By decision of the Defence Minister, I was assigned to the task force charged with conducting the analysis of Operation Storm. However, prior to commencement of work on this document, I served as commander of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) so that I did not participate in this analysis at all, for it was complete by July 2007, several months prior to my return.

18. Several months after returning from the UN mission, I was asked by the defence team of Colonel General Mladen Markač to draft a military expert report on the operations of the Joint Forces of Special Police in Operation Storm. For this purpose, I received the documents of the prosecution, including the expert report by Mr. Theunens, and many documents which were generally stored on CDs. As a member of the team, I also received the printed version of the document "Analysis of Operation Storm".

19. During preparations of the expert report, I toured the theatre of operations of the Joint Forces of Special Police in Sector South and familiarized myself with the tactical and geographic conditions of this zone.

20. During the trial, I attended two days of the testimony delivered by the prosecution's military expert, Mr. Theunens.

21. In preparation of the analysis, emphasis was placed on establishment of the relationship between Colonel General Mladen Markač and the Chief of the Croatian Army's Main Staff as the superior in the chain of command during the Operation and afterward in the course of field search operations, that is, to conclude whether Colonel General Mladen Markač exclusively carried out the commands of the Chief of the Croatian Army's Main Staff or if he made individual operational decisions at his own initiative. Additionally, the particularities of the organization and operation of special units of the police in comparison to classical military formations needed to be established, as well as how these particularities influence the manner of organization and functioning of the system of planning, organization and command of the Joint

Forces of Special Police during combat operations. The second objective was to ascertain whether the documents which the Headquarters of the Joint Forces of Special Police drafted and submitted to its commanding officer and subordinates contained anything which may indicate failure to adhere to the international laws of war.

22. A timeline of the actions of the Joint Forces of Special Police was compiled on the basis of available documents in order to show the extent, intensity and results of operations, while an analysis of the operations of the Gospić Military District and the Split Military District was conducted only in those areas where operations in these military districts had a direct impact on the operations of the Joint Forces. Graphic charts of the operations by days were compiled exclusively on the basis of the Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm, Special Police Sector, of 28 September 1995.

### 3. Introduction

23. The liberation of all occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia had been an imperative for the Croatian civilian and military authorities since 1991. All chiefs in the Main Staff (General Staff) were involved in the planning of offensives to achieve that goal, and plans mainly depended on the prevailing political and military circumstances at the time of their preparation.

24. On 10 October 1991, the Chief of the Croatian Army Main Staff (GS HV), General Anton Tus, issued an order to the headquarters of the Osijek, Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Rijeka and Split Operative Zones for *“long-term preparations and combat operations to destroy the enemy and liberate the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia.”*<sup>1</sup>

25. In that order, the Split Operative Zone (Split OZ) was tasked to take more resolute action with the goal of destroying the enemy and liberating the territories in the wider Dalmatian hinterland, while the Karlovac OZ and the Rijeka OZ were to liberate the wider territory of Lika and Kordun, and subsequently, together with the Split OZ's troops, the Knin Krajina region as well.

26. It is particularly important to highlight the next paragraph of the order:

*“In areas where Chetnik territorial forces, backed by JA [Yugoslav Army] hardware and troops, are positioned, as soon as possible undertake resolute offensive action to cut off and destroy enemy forces and swiftly take control of vital points, hills (elevations) and populated areas (settlements), creating the conditions for the rapid advance of stronger forces and widening the success. In the process, conduct strikes along the axes of attack, without extending the troops and clearing the entire territory, and avoid frontal engagements with stronger forces and slowing the pace.”*<sup>2</sup>

27. Tactical demands to quickly gain control of important points, hills and populated areas, to attack along specified axes, without overextending (dissipating) troops and clearing the entire territory (that is, to clear the terrain after the main objectives of the attack have been achieved), to avoid major frontal attacks and to maintain the pace of progress were the prevailing factors in the planning of Operation Storm.

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<sup>1</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV, Class: Strictly confidential no. 8/91-01/118, Ref.no: 5120-01-91-1, of 15 October 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., paragraph 3.

28. In the last paragraph of the order, the Chief of the GS HV assigns the commanders of the operations zones the responsibility, *"during the preparation and execution of activities and in combat ... of cooperation and coordination with all the forces in their zone of responsibility, municipalities and crisis staffs, commands and units of the MUP [Ministry of the Interior- MoI] ..."*<sup>3</sup>,

and such cooperation and coordination was regulated by almost all directives or orders for combat operations (offensive, defensive) issued by the Main Staff to subordinate commanders.

29. The basic idea of liberation of the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia is evident in the Directive of the Chief of the GS HV, of 1992:

*"Immediately intensify all preparations to raise the combat readiness of the Croatian Army commands and units to the highest degree in order to ensure the execution of sudden, simultaneous and energetic offensive operations against the enemy forces in all areas under their temporary occupation with the aim of crushing, destroying and expelling all enemy forces – YA (Yugoslav Army), Chetnik, territorial and other paramilitary units – from the territory of the State and liberating the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia."*<sup>4</sup>

30. This Directive, which was accepted and adopted at a session of the Defence and National Security Council (VONS) at the beginning of 1992, also emphasises the need to select the most favourable sectors – zones and axes of attack – and to avoid strong forces, heavily fortified and mined positions and large populated areas; to make rapid advances deep behind enemy lines with the aim of cutting off and encircling the forces in contact, with the full coordination of fire strikes, mine clearance and securing the freedom of movement; to plan and execute precision strikes against targets whose destruction/neutralisation would most affect enemy morale, prevent his fires and secure a swift advance for attacking units.<sup>5</sup>

31. In 1993 and 1994, headquarters map exercises, tactical exercises and intensive training for officers and non-commissioned officers continued at the Croatian Military Academy. Annual training orders were becoming more specific, providing precise guidance as to what kind of training and practical exercises had to be conducted at given levels.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., Para 12.

<sup>4</sup> Directive for the conduct of a strategic offensive by the Croatian Army, Croatian Army Main Staff, 1992.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., Para 2.

32. In his Annual Military Training and Education Order for the HV [Croatian Army] Commands and Units in 1994,<sup>6</sup> the Chief of the HV Main Staff chose “HV defensive operation transitioning to counter-attack” as his annual theme for command and unit training. Each Military District Command was assigned the task of conducting two headquarters map exercises, one in each half of the year, in their own area of responsibility.

33. Towards the end of 1994, in his Annual Military Training and Education Order for the HV Commands and Units in 1995,<sup>7</sup> the Chief of the HV Main Staff chose “HV offensive operation” as his annual theme for command training, focusing on command proficiency in planning, preparation and execution of combat operations and the conduct of mobilisation with the deployment of commands to command posts, the development of a communications system and security.

34. The shift in training focus from defensive to offensive shows that at the strategic decision-making level in the HV it was concluded that the issue of Croatia’s occupied territories would have to be dealt with militarily.

35. Final planning preparations in producing documents for the complete liberation of Croatia’s occupied territories were made early in 1995 when the plan for the operation was drafted and the integral Directive entitled Flash [*Blijesak*] (in which the tasks of each military district were numbered 1-5) was adopted. After the liberation of Western Slavonia under Directive *Flash-1*, directives to the military districts of Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split were renamed Storm [*Oluja*] and were issued under names Storm-1 through Storm-4 in the second half of June 1995. The operation was launched under that name at the beginning of August 1995.

36. The final decision to carry out Operation Storm was made by the Commander-in-Chief, Franjo Tuđman, in Brijuni on 31 July 1995.

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<sup>6</sup> Annual order for training, Class: Strictly confidential no. 813-01/94-01/03, Ref.no.: 512-06-18-94-1, of 15 January 1994.

<sup>7</sup> Annual order for training, Class: Strictly confidential no. 813-01/94-02/57, Ref.no.: 512-06-18-94-1, of 31 December 1994.

#### **4. The basis for joint combat operations by the Croatian Army and the Special Police**

37. Joint combat operations by Croatian Army units and police units of the Ministry of the Interior had been common since 1991. The intent was to ensure that Croatian Army operations/actions included all those who were in any way involved in the armed or non-armed resistance in areas where fighting was proceeding. For instance, on 27 October 1991 the Chief of the GS HV issued the following order to the commands of the Zagreb Operative Zone, the Bjelovar Operative Zone and the Posavina Operative Group:

*“Carry out a vigorous simultaneous attack using the forces of the Posavina OG, (ZNG [National Guard Corps] 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 125<sup>th</sup> Brigade, 121<sup>st</sup> Brigade and support units), the 105<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the Bjelovar OZ, all Mol forces, national protection forces and other forces in that area ...”<sup>8</sup>*

38. Command relations between the Croatian Army and police units of the Ministry of the Interior were established, developed and implemented already in 1991. They were outlined by the Assistant Minister of the Interior, Mr Joško Morić, in his letter to the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Main Staff:

*“The relationship between Croatian Army commanders and police commanders must be based on coordination and cooperation at all levels of responsibility. The possibility of one giving orders to the other is ruled out. However, when police are to be used for defence purposes at the request of any Croatian Army command, police units are placed under the command of the Croatian Army. The Croatian Army command has an obligation to supply and replenish the police unit with materiel and technical equipment in accordance with the task assigned to it.*

*We deem it necessary that requests for the participation of police in combat operations should be addressed to the Main Staff and the Mol, which will assess the purpose of their participation, approve it and take responsibility for it.”<sup>9</sup>*

39. Therefore, first and foremost, relations should have been based on cooperation as well as a clear command relationship, which was, in principle, always unidirectional, so that the commanders of military units could command attached -

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<sup>8</sup> Order by the ZNG Command, Class: Strictly confidential no. 8/91-01/169, Ref.no.: 5120-21-91, of 27 October 1991.

<sup>9</sup> Letter by the Assistant Minister of the Interior, No.: 511-01-22-30232/91, Zagreb, 12 December 1991.

subordinated units of the special police, while the situation in which military forces were attached - subordinated to a special police commander was unknown.

40. Joint operations of the Special Police and the Croatian Army were also regulated by the interim Regulations on the Internal Order of the Special Police:

*“Article 23*

*“Joint performance of tasks under the domain of the Special Police with members of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian Army Main Staff, is possible, subject to the approval of the Minister or his Deputy [the word “Deputy” is stricken and the words “his Assistant for Special Police” are added by hand].”<sup>10</sup>*

41. The process of participation of the Special Police in military operations begins with a request from the Chief of the GS HV to the Commander-in-Chief, and after approval of the request, the Minister of the Interior grants consent based on which the Special Police Sector begins preparations for participation in an operation. Thereafter, all other activities are carried out in accordance with orders of the Chief of the GS HV, but only for tasks the Special Police was authorised for.

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<sup>10</sup> Interim Rules on the Internal Order of the Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-46-1384/93 of 13 December 1993.

## 5. Qualification of the Special Police for participation in combat operations

42. The purpose of the Special Police is regulated in Article 24 of the Internal Affairs Act as follows:

*“The Special Police is established to fight against all forms of sabotage and terrorism, to prevent the abduction of persons and means of transport, free hostages, and perform other duties under the domain of the Ministry under special conditions.”<sup>11</sup>*

43. This definition indicates that long-term offensive or defensive combat operations at the battlefield are not among the tasks specified in the Internal Affairs Act.

44. However, as noted in the previous title, Special Police units had traditionally participated in combat operations since 1991 and had continually improved their proficiency through experience and know-how practically acquired in a series of operations and small-scale actions up to August 1995, through professional training either at their own training centres or at the Military Academy, and through joint headquarters training and exercises with the HV Main Staff.

45. At the practical level, most knowledge and experience was gained through participation in operational actions and operations. The first action, which marked the beginning of intensive deployment of Special Police units in the area on Mount Velebit whence Operation Storm was launched, was Viper-1 [*Poskok-1*], which began in late April and ended in late September 1992. Operation Viper-2 was initiated in August 1992 with the primary goal of reconnoitring and preventing enemy sabotage and terrorist groups from reaching roads leading from Velebit to the Adriatic Highway, as well as detecting, disrupting, arresting, disarming and destroying them.<sup>12</sup> Over the next three years, Special Police units were deployed in the Velebit area, which was divided into three sectors. Although the Special Police forces gained some ground and captured some small areas as part of this action over the next three years, they failed to gain the necessary experience and knowledge to conduct an operation such as Operation Storm due to two-week troop rotations and because their combat activities were limited to small groups. What they did gain was complete knowledge of living and working on Velebit, how to move around and psychophysical

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<sup>11</sup> Amendments to Internal Affairs Act, No.: PA4-92/1-94, of 12 October 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Proposal to initiate Operation Viper, No.: 511-01-34-19/92, of 18 August 1992.

ability through *“reconnaissance and sabotage actions and raids deep behind enemy lines.”*<sup>13</sup>

46. In 1993, two operations (which Special Police documents refer to as actions rather than operations) were launched on Velebit, namely Operation Maslenica (from 21 to 27 January, with the participation of approximately 1,000 Special Police personnel) and Operation Medak Pocket (from 9 to 14 September 1995, with about 750 Special Police personnel). Although both Special Police actions were carried out in a much smaller area and with the participation of fewer men than in Operation Storm, some experience in interaction and coordination with Croatian Army units was gained in both operations.

47. In May 1995 the Mol Collective Special Police Forces participated in Operation Flash [*Bljesak*] (from 1 to 4 May 1995, with a force strength of one brigade). In that operation the Mol special forces were directly subordinated to the Chief of the GS HV and were organisationally divided into one main headquarters and two subordinate headquarters.

48. In addition to the experience from practical work in the field, the Special Police Units (SPU) were also trained through the civilian and police system of education and training. The Special Police Training Centre was established in 1994. In his annual report for 1995, General Mladen Markač wrote:

*“Over the past year, in cooperation with other organisational units of the Mol and the GSHV, the Special Police Sector organised 20 different specialist courses that were attended by 1,134 Special Police members and 16 specialised seminars that were attended by 533 members.”*<sup>14</sup>

49. According to that report, in 1995, before the launch of Operation Storm, a course for SPU leaders was held, with 60 participants attending, and a course for specialist group leaders, which was attended by 75 participants.

50. The course for leaders covered almost all areas of police and military tactics.<sup>15</sup> Attendees studied, among other things, general military tactics from the individual level and the specialist group level to the special unit level (defence, attack, reconnaissance, ambush, field search, counter-measures against sabotage and

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<sup>13</sup> Analysis of the course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, page 2.

<sup>14</sup> Annual report on the work of the Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia in 1995, No.: 511-01-30-/96, Zagreb, 22 February 1996.

<sup>15</sup> Letter from the Chief of the Special Police Sector to the Assistant Minister, Mr Mladen Markač, entitled “Command, Persons responsible for teaching the Course for Leaders of Special Police Units, Requesting approval,” No.: 511-01-31-127/95 of 31 January 1995.

terrorist groups, and tactics of clearing populated areas), police tactics, mortars training, and they also studied the laws of war as part of a two-hour session devoted to theory.

51. With reference to international law, in 1992 the Ministry of the Interior issued the manual "Combat Stress Behaviours"<sup>16</sup> to train its personnel. The manual draws attention to non-functional behaviours in stressful combat situations, mainly caused by combat fatigue and insubordination. Special attention is accorded to behaviours that have to be reported and the perpetrators brought to justice and punished for breaches of discipline or, in extreme situations, violations of the laws of war. Such behaviour mainly pertains refusal to arrest enemy combatants (refusal to accept surrender), killing of enemy prisoners, mutilation of slain enemy combatants, torture of prisoners, pillage and rape, and killing of civilians (non-combatants).

52. Although a great deal was achieved by means of such courses, they could not cover all persons in leadership positions in such a short time, so the level of training of command personnel varied. For example, the internal structure of each special unit depended on the number of its members, and each unit had several command levels: commander, deputy, instructor, specialist group leader and deputy leader. The number of officers performing command duties at all levels depended on the number of unit personnel.

53. The strength of a unit varied from 100 to 250 (units could have 100, 120, 150, 180, 200 or 250 members), and the internal organisation of the unit was adjusted to its strength. For instance, a 100-strong unit would have one commander, 2 deputy commanders, 6 specialist training instructors, 11 specialist group leaders and 78 members, while a 200-strong unit would have one commander, 3 deputy commanders, 10 specialist training instructors, 23 specialist group leaders and 160 members.<sup>17</sup> According to that document, in 20 Special Police units there were over 280 group leaders, not counting higher levels of command, and such a structure required extensive training time.

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<sup>16</sup> Combat Stress Behaviours, Risk Factors and Leader Actions, Department of the Army, USA, 1991, published by MoI, Public Relations and Publishing Sector, Publishing and Documentation Department, translated by Irena Šarović.

<sup>17</sup> Proposed organisation of Special Police Units at Police Administrations in accordance with the administrative division of the Republic of Croatia into counties, No.: 511-01-34-576/93 of 9 July 1993.

## **6. Command relations within the Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia**

54. As in the Special Police Units, relations within the Special Police Sector were hierarchical. According to the Regulation on the Internal Structure and Operation of the MoI of the Republic of Croatia, the Special Police Sector is administered by the Assistant Minister and is under the control of the Sector Chief.<sup>18</sup>

55. When assigning tasks, the Assistant Minister, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač, did not issue orders directly to SPU commanders while they were in their native Police Departments. Each order for use of the SPU had to be addressed to the chief of the relevant Police Department personally, with the instruction “To be handed to SPU Commander“, so that the chief would know about the deployment of special units from his Department. An example of this is all orders that the Special Police Sector issued for the deployment of Special Police Units for Operation Storm, and since they were many, only some are cited here.<sup>19</sup>

56. Lieutenant General Mladen Markač directly commanded the special units when they had become an integral component of the Collective Special Police Forces in the operations area. Before this and after their return to their native Police Departments, the Special Police Units were commanded by the chiefs of the Police Departments to which they were assigned and the Police Department chiefs were obliged to inform the Special Police Sector about the tasks assigned to the units.

### *“Article 15*

*“The Commander of the Special Unit is responsible to the Chief of the Police Department for the operation of the Special Police Unit of the Police Department in the territory of the native Police Department. The Chief of the Police Department, or his Deputy, personally issues instructions for the performance of immediate tasks under the domain of the Special Police.*

*The Chief of the Police Department or his Deputy orders the use of the Special Unit for the performance of tasks within the domain of the Special (Police) Unit in the*

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<sup>18</sup> Regulation on the Internal Structure and Operation of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia of 23 February 1995, Article 27.

<sup>19</sup> Order of the Chief of the Special Police Sector to all PU chiefs (except the chiefs of the Virovitica-Podravina PU and the Međimurje PU) and the Lučko Anti-Terrorist Unit, No.: 511-01-31-1015/95, of 29 July 1995; Order of the Chief of the Special Police Sector of the Dubrovnik-Neretva PU, No.: 511-01-31-1038/95, of 30 July 1995; Order of the chiefs of the Special Police Sectors of the Šibenik, Sisak-Moslavina, Split-Dalmatia, Zagreb and Zadar-Knin Police Departments, No.: 511-01-31-1129/95, of 18 August 1995.

*territory of the Police Department, in accordance with his assessment of the security situation.*

*The commander carries out the task assigned directly by the Chief of the Police Department or his Deputy by taking the most appropriate course of action in compliance with rules. After completing the task, he submits a report to the Chief of the Police Department and the Chief of the MoI Special Police Sector.*

*“Article 16*

*“Special Police Units are used according to the decision of the Chief of the Police Department and the Deputy (Assistant) Minister or a person designated by the Deputy (Assistant) Minister.*

*Insofar as the Chief of the Police Department estimates that there is a need for the use of more than 50% of the personnel of the Police Department’s Special Unit for a period exceeding 7 days, he/she shall seek the consent of the Chief of the Special Police Sector (the Assistant Minister for Special Police)”<sup>20</sup>*

57. Besides, General Markač did not command the special forces which the Chief of the GS HV designated in his order to be part of the forces under his immediate command:

*“In the general area of Zadar (Šepurine), the GS HV continues to keep in reserve a unit of the MoI special forces”,<sup>21</sup>*

58. or the forces he assigned to his subordinates, as was the case with the SPU of the Karlovac Police Department which was assigned to the Commander of the Forward (Tactical) Command Post of the GS HV, Major General Marijan Mareković:

*“1. The MoI special forces of the Karlovac Police Department (160 police members) [are assigned] to the reserve of the Forward Command Post of the GSHV in Ogulin.*

*2. The Forward Command Post of the GSHV Ogulin will regulate their use pursuant to an order from the Chief of the GSHV.*

*3. The deadline for the execution of this order is 2000 hours on 3 August 1995. Notify me of its execution via the SOC of the GSHV.”<sup>22</sup>*

<sup>20</sup> Interim Rules on the Internal Order of the Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-46-1384/93, of 13 December 1993.

<sup>21</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV to the Commander of the Split Military District, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-334, of 30 July 1995.

59. Once the Collective Forces Staff (Headquarters) was established, the line of command clearly extended from the Operation Commander, which was mainly Lieutenant General Mladen Markač, via the Chief of the Collective Forces Staff (Brigadier Željko Sačić) and the commanders of the axes of attack to the commanders of special police units along the given axis.

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<sup>22</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV to Lieutenant General Mladen Markač, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-360 of 3 August 1995 at 1600.

## 7. Some considerations of significance to the functioning of the Collective Special Police Forces

### 7.1. Collective Special Police Forces of the MoI

#### 7.1.1. Introduction

60. Although the Special Police Units formed the foundation upon which the Croatian Army emerged and evolved in 1991, and although they played an active role in combat throughout the wartime years, they were a police and not a military organisation, just as the MoI Collective Special Police Forces Staff was not a military but a police headquarters. This should be underscored to avoid the assumption of any parallels or comparisons between, for example, a Military District Command and the Collective (Special Police) Forces Staff, regardless of the fact that they were both directly subordinate to the Chief of the GS HV and became part of the unified command and control system in Operation Storm without which it would have been impossible to execute that Operation successfully. So in his annual report, when Lieutenant General Mladen Markač, who at that time served as a special adviser to the Minister on the Special Police, told Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak:

*“In the military/police Operation Storm, the Special Police participated with a force strength of two infantry brigades ...”*<sup>23</sup>

he meant of the strength equivalent to a military unit in relation to the total number of Special Police personnel who took part in the operation, and not the manner of organisation. That would not have been possible because special units organised within Police Departments were simply called special units, without a name that might suggest an equivalent military unit, such as a platoon, company, battalion and so forth.

61. Such units can be assembled and reassembled within and between themselves because they are relatively flexible, but only to a certain degree. If one is to transform the Collective Police Forces of the MoI into a task organisation consisting of several units which grows in size equivalent to a battalion or higher unit, then there is the problem of lack of command (command structure) in such a

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<sup>23</sup> Annual report on the operation of the Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia in 1995, No.: 511-01-30- 96, of 22 February 1996.

battalion, which needs to be composed out of the unit's commanding personnel, weakening the command system of the units whose members form the interim command. The formation of interim commands and the appointment of interim commanders may work successfully only if there is absolute trust between them in the ability of the commander to lead the unit successfully.

#### 7.1.2. Organisation

62. 'Collective Special Police Forces' is a general term for the forces that performed the same task, and their size, composition, number of units and how they were led depended on a specific situation, notably the task they were assigned, the enemy, the terrain, available forces and assets, and other factors. In principle, they could be Special Police Units from a minimum of two Police Departments or from almost all Police Departments, as was the case in Operation Storm (except two). In that respect, the collective forces did not have a permanent organisational form or structure, but they were temporary make task organised for a specific task. In order for the Collective Forces to become truly collective, there should be a need for them to be directly commanded by the Special Police Sector, principally by forming a Collective Forces Staff.

63. In this manner, the Collective Forces were formed for participation in operations that were executed under the command of the Chief of the GS HV (Operations Maslenica, Medak Pocket, Flash and Storm), or by order of the Interior Minister (Operations Viper-1 and Viper-2).

64. Although it has been said that collective forces are task organised for a specific task, they do not have all the characteristics of classical task organised forces which are organised at the level of a brigade, battalion or company. Under task organised forces, we mean those that are temporarily assembled out of different units under a single commander for the performance of a specific operation or task. It can be a semi-permanent organisation of units under one commander for the performance of a specific constant task. After the completion of the assigned task, the task organised forces are disbanded and the troops return to their original organisations. For example, task organised brigade forces are a unit the size of a combat brigade, consisting of a brigade command with a minimum of one main subordinate unit (battalion) and a minimum of one attached battalion-size unit of

another combat arm or a combat support arm. Of course, the Collective Special Police Forces, either at their own or lower levels (e.g. at the level of forces that were organised under a single commander along advance routes in Operation Storm), did not meet these criteria because they did not have all the necessary combat arms and services.

65. The problem that arises in such a structure is the lack of firm bonds and relations between a commander and subordinate forces, because there was no routine practice and exercise of interaction and no mutual cross assignments among troops. Because of the constant use of special forces, for other tasks both in Operation Viper 2, which was conducted continually since 1992, and even after Operation Storm, the MoI Special Police Sector could not practise such relations. Even the three combat operations that preceded Operation Storm, although they certainly drew attention to both the positive and negative aspects of the organisation and identified the shortcomings, could not have greater effect on the establishment of routine relations, because two of the operations had been conducted in 1993 and one in 1995. For each day of Operation Storm, forces were task organised along the routes of various special police units from various Police Departments, under different commanders, as is evident from the timeline of Operation Storm from 4 to 9 August 1995.

### 7.1.3. Collective Special Police Forces Staff

66. After the Chief of the GS HV issued the following order on 21 July 1995, *“1. Relocate a 300-strong special police force from the Special Police of the MoI to the Zadar-Vir-Nin sector by 2000 hours on 23 July 1995,”*<sup>24</sup>

Lieutenant General Mladen Markač issued an order, co-signed by Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak, to organise and inaugurate the Collective Special Police Forces Staff.<sup>25</sup> Fifteen members were appointed to the Collective Forces Staff, headed by the Operation Commander, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač, and the Chief of the Collective Forces Staff, Brigadier Željko Sačić. Ten of the 15 Staff members were from the Special Police Sector, while five came directly from the Special Police Units (of whom three were SPU commanders and two were deputy commanders).

<sup>24</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV to relocate Special Police forces, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/1-95-303 of 21 July 1995.

<sup>25</sup> Order inaugurating the Collective Special Police Forces Staff, No.: 511-01-30-602/95, of 22 July 1995.

According to their duties, the Staff members covered the basic combat arms within the structure of the Collective Special Police Forces (infantry, artillery, signals), and certain combat operating systems (intelligence, logistics). This staff was supposed to establish an effective and continuous (round-the-clock) system of command and control of the Collective Special Police Forces for the entire duration of the operation, as well as all other staff functions, first and foremost planning, making of orders and decisions and supervision of their execution, and maintenance of combat documents (the order inaugurating the Staff required that only war diary and operative map should be retained).<sup>26</sup> The Collective Forces Staff was additionally divided between the Main Command Post (MCP) in Starigrad (Seline) at the foot of Velebit, where Lieutenant General Mladen Markač remained with a portion of the Internal Control Department and a portion of the Operations Duty Service, and the Tactical (Forward) Command Post (TCP) at Mali Golić, where the Chief of the Collective Forces Staff, Brigadier Željko Sačić, was positioned with most of the Staff, whereby the system had to be strained to the maximum in order to follow and manage the entire situation.

67. There was another problem – the departure of some of the Staff members at the onset of the Operation. Zdravko Janić, chief of the Anti-Terrorism Department, was appointed commander of the main axis of attack, the Commander of the SPU of the Zadar-Knin Police Department, Svemir Vrsaljko, returned to his unit to become deputy commander of the main axis of attack, and the Assistant Commander of the SPU of the Bjelovar-Bilogora Police Department, Zoran Maras, also returned to his unit. On the one hand, this weakened the operation of the Staff, while on the other, quality was gained in the field, where it was necessary for initial successes. This also shows that there was a shortage of qualified personnel, who had to be transferred first from Special Police Units to the Collective Forces Staff and then from the Collective Forces Staff back to their own units.

68. Returning to the earlier elaboration that such the Staff successfully commanded “two brigades”, the strain under which it was operating becomes obvious. For example, the Home Guard Regiment, which according to the Table of Organisation had approximately the equal number of men in the operation (2,180 compared to 2,200 members of the Special Police), had 43 persons in its

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

headquarters,<sup>27</sup> while the Guards Brigade, with its 2,994 members, had as many as 56.<sup>28</sup>

69. The question is: why such organisation and why was it not managed from a single place? First, it should be noted that in the normal organisation and division of command duties, the commander (General Markač) should have been at the TCP:

*“The Tactical Command Post is organised to ensure better monitoring of combat activities, more immediate influence of the commander on their course, restoration of a disrupted command and control system, especially when command and control from the (Main) Command Post is difficult.”<sup>29</sup>*

70. General Markač remained at the MCP because of the organisation of command and reporting communications between the Chief of the GS HV and the Collective Forces Staff, since those communications could not be established from the TCP due to specific terrain and other reasons. In addition to wire and fax communications with the MCP in Seline, another type of communication was established which could not have functioned from the TCP, using the Rebus encryption system for the transmission of information via a telephone wire line. The system was brought and operated by Major Petar Ričko, intelligence analyst of the GS HV Intelligence Department,<sup>30</sup> who sent daily reports to the GS HV Intelligence Department. All orders and other documents from the GS HV came to the MCP in Seline, while some of the tasks were received by wire communications, so it is important that General Markač spent his entire time at the MCP, or at least some of the time, after breaking the frontline and the capture of Gračac on 5 August 1995 and the daily relocation of the tCP to new locations.

71. Although there is no written document stipulating this, it can be inferred from the documents available that the command and control process at the commencement of the Operation, and partly thereafter, was such that General Markač received orders from the Chief of the GS HV, transmitted them to the TCP where the Staff headed by Brigadier Sačić analysed them, made decisions and passed on orders to commanders along the axes of attack. Therefore it is not strange that reports on the war paths of the Police Department SPUs of the MoI, which were

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<sup>27</sup> Muster no. 1106199, Home Guard Regiment, 1994.

<sup>28</sup> Muster no. 1105190, Guards Brigade, 1994.

<sup>29</sup> Brigade Rules (for infantry, motorised, mountain, Alpine, Marine and light brigades), Federal Secretariat of National Defence, JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ General Staff, Belgrade, 1984, page 80.

<sup>30</sup> Assessment of intelligence support tasks carried out in Operation Storm, Class: 804-08/95-172/02, Ref.no.: 512-06-06/1-95-2290, of 15 September 1995.

compiled after Operation Storm, almost explicitly state that they received orders from Brigadier Sačić.<sup>31</sup> However, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač continues to be responsible for the overall activity of the Collective Special Police Forces if there is a functioning command and control system.

72. The communications system was established by means of radio and wire communications. There was a UHF semi-duplex communication link between the Collective Forces Staff and the commanders of the axes of attack. The commanders of the axes of attack maintained simplex communications with their subordinate commanders (subgroup commanders and group commanders).<sup>32</sup> Since these two types of communication operate at different frequencies, the Collective Forces Staff could not hear communications between the commanders of the axes of attack and their subordinates.

## **7.2. Assessment of the situation**

73. As stated above, the Chief of the GS HV issued an order to Lieutenant General Mladen Markač clearly and unequivocally assigning him specific tasks for Operation Storm, and it was up to him to decide how he would execute it. In order to make such a decision, he needed to assess the situation with regard to the enemy, his own forces, the terrain and time. This report will focus on the assessment of the enemy, while the three other factors will be elaborated only to the extent necessary to determine why a certain course of action was chosen.

### **7.2.1. The enemy's doctrine**

74. In the intelligence preparation of battlefield and in considering how the enemy will fight, a doctrine, or a doctrinal model, was employed which was based on the assumed tactical doctrine of the enemy (which was deemed true). Doctrinal models show the disposition and activities of enemy forces and assets (primarily high-value targets) that are conducting a certain operation without limitations of the effects of the

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<sup>31</sup> Combat History of the Special Police of Bjelovar-Bilogora Police Department 1991-1995, p. 68; The Combat History of the Special Police Unit of the Karlovac Police Department 1 March 1991 - 24 May 1996, p. 30; Combat History of the SPU of the Vukovar-Srijem Police Department, No.: 511-15-08-VT-01/4-98, of 8 August 1998, p. 11; Combat History of the Special Police Unit of the Istria Police Department, No.: 511-08-08-01-VT-9/2-98, of 7 May 1998, p. 77; Combat History of the Special Police Unit of the Lika-Senj Police Department, No.: 511-04-08-VT-51/2-98, of 5 May 1998, p. 17.

<sup>32</sup> Analysis of the course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, p. 29.


combat environment. They normally show the usual organisation of the enemy for combat, widths, depths, distances between units, boundaries and other measures, assets available from other units, target depth, areas of operations, composition of forces, and the disposition of combat troops and combat and logistical support units for a certain operation.<sup>33</sup> The doctrine used by the enemy in conducting defensive operations is described in manuals of the former JNA and was identical to that used by the VSK [Serbian Krajina Army].

75. The operational disposition of corps in defence is shown in the following diagram.<sup>34</sup> It most often consists of forces operating at the front, forces operating from the enemy's rear, forces operating within the enemy's tactical combat formation, support forces, anti-armour forces, air defence forces, anti-airdrop forces, forces for defence of urban areas (towns), obstacle construction forces, security forces and reserve forces of varying strength and composition.

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<sup>33</sup> FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, HQ Department of the Army, July 1994, Washington, DC.

<sup>34</sup> Basics of the Operations of Armed Forces in the All-People's Defence War, General Ivan Gošnjak Ground Forces Military Technical Schools Centre, Zagreb, 1991.



76. These elements of the combat disposition are confirmed in the “Directive for the Use of the Serbian Krajina Army”<sup>35</sup> which was drawn up in case of “aggression against the RSK [Republic of Serbian Krajina]”:

“Group the following forces as part of operational deployment:

- Defence forces,
- Active operations and insertion forces,
- Anti-airdrop combat forces,
- Forces for strikes against selected targets,
- Support and air defence forces,

<sup>35</sup> Directive for the use of the Serbian Krajina Army, February 1995.

- *Forces for control of territory, protection of facilities and combat against DTG [sabotage/terrorist groups], and forces to defend populated areas,*
- *Rapid reaction forces and forces to prevent desertion”.*<sup>36</sup>

77. After defining the tasks of subordinate corps and other units, it separately regulates the defence of towns and larger populated areas:

*“In the areas of defence of corps and brigades, immediately begin preparations for the long, circular defence of larger populated areas and towns, focusing on laying barriers and preparation of firm structures for use as firing positions and for the protection of manpower and MS [materiel].*

*In preparations, engage all able-bodied personnel, Civil Defence units, commands and units of the SVK.*

*Focus on preparation of frontline towns and populated areas and preparation of the town of Knin, for which separate command and defence units are to be formed”.*<sup>37</sup>

78. At the theoretical, doctrinal level, the organisation of defence with reliance on populated areas is also confirmed at the brigade level:

*“Populated areas must be included in the defence system. A brigade can defend one large and several small populated areas, and sometimes a part of a large populated area or town. Under all circumstances, Territorial Defence forces ... and all residents are involved in the defence of a populated area”,*<sup>38</sup>

but also in practice, as evident in a defence order issued by the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade Gračac:

*“2. The 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade shall, with the support of ready forces and as soon as possible, conduct full mobilisation and organise defence in the area of Jajića Vrh (trig point [TP] 727) excluded, Visočica (TP 1617) Mali Alan and Vijoja (TP 997). Relying on populated areas and the northern slopes of Velebit and through determined defence, its task is to inflict the heaviest possible losses against the enemy in manpower and materiel and technical equipment.*

*Create conditions for sheltering the affected population and goods, and then launch flank attacks to break [the enemy's] offensive power and prevent them from reaching the line: village Pavlovac – village Medak.”*<sup>39</sup>

79. This order also indicates the deployment of a logistics company:

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, Para 4.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, Para 5.11.

<sup>38</sup> Brigade Rules (for infantry, motorised, mountain, Alpine, Marine and light brigades), Federal Secretariat of National Defence, JNA General Staff, Belgrade, 1984, pp. 217-218.

<sup>39</sup> Order for defence, Command of the 9th Motorised Brigade, Strictly confidential no. 100-2014 of 12 October 1993.

*“Deploy a logistical company to the area of Kruškovac (PKM) and Gračac (MIG). A weapons and ammunition depot within the compound of the RO MIG /metal processing plant/ and Kruškovac Primary School. A quartermaster depot within the RO MIG compound and Kruškovac Primary School”.*<sup>40</sup>

80. This combat deployment demonstrates that weapons and ammunition depots were located in facilities inside populated areas.

81. Based on an intelligence assessment made by the Internal Control Department, which the Chief of the Internal Control Department, Ante Šoljić, presented to commanders at a staff meeting at the TCP of the Collective Forces Staff at Mali Golić on 2 August 1995,<sup>41</sup> the MoI Collective Special Police Forces faced the Gračac 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade (two battalions) as the strongest unit of the 15<sup>th</sup> Lika Corps and elements of the 4<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade (3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade) of the 7<sup>th</sup> Knin Corps.<sup>42</sup> The Command Post of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade was located in Gračac and its TCP was in the village of Radoševići. Battalion command posts were located as follows: the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade had its CP in the vicinity of the village of Ruka, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion in the Medak area and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion in the vicinity of the village of Vrebac. The Brigade had a mixed artillery battalion (H-105 [105mm howitzers], H-155 [155mm howitzers] and MRL 128 [128mm multiple rocket launchers]) and a tank company (six tanks each in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalions and three in the Brigade reserve, or 15 tanks in all), along with 120mm mortars in the battalions and 82mm mortars in the companies. There was a possibility of an armoured train (H-105) being used on the railway line from Gračac to Medak, and the Corps Artillery Group providing support with one or two MRLs. A battalion-strength reserve unit backed by a tank platoon was expected from the direction of Bruvno. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade was in contact with the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade; the Brigade Command Post was in Obrovac and the Battalion Command Post in the Križ area. In his assessment, the Chief of the Internal Control Department, Ante Šoljić, drew the following conclusion: *“If the offensive operation ties all enemy forces down at the frontline [which actually happened], it is realistic to expect the engagement of the entire 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade, two companies of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade*

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., Para 17.

<sup>41</sup> Copy of the Duty Log of the Special Police of the MoI kept in Gračac in 1995, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup> Intelligence assessment of the enemy forces in the area of responsibility of the Collective Special Police Forces in the Velebit area, No.: 511-01-30- 95, of 28 June 1995 (0349-3505 0349-3507).

*and one company of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade, with a reserve force the strength of a company reinforced with a tank platoon.”<sup>43</sup>*

82. According to this assessment, the enemy could employ 800 soldiers, 12 tanks, 6 armoured personnel vehicles and 15 large-calibre rocket and artillery pieces, excluding 120mm and 82mm mortars, with evident supremacy over the Collective Special Police Forces in armour and heavy artillery, while the Special Police had an advantage in infantry of roughly 3:1.

83. In addition to the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade and elements of the 4<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade, it was known that the 103<sup>rd</sup> Light Brigade was positioned deep behind the defence lines, in the general area of Donji Lapac.<sup>44</sup>

84. The terrain in front of the forward line, in the Collective Special Police Forces' area of attack, was relatively sparsely populated and very rugged, which was one of the main reasons why the extremely difficult task of capturing that part of Velebit and its slopes towards Gračac and Medak was assigned to special units of the MoI, who had spent more than three years in the area, gaining sufficient experience, knowledge and the psychophysical readiness to complete this task.

#### 7.2.2. Centre of gravity

85. Just as the town of Knin was a centre of gravity for the Split Military District, so was the town of Gračac a centre of gravity for the Collective Special Police Forces of the MoI. Situated at the foot of Velebit, it was at a junction of roads leading to Gospić, Obrovac, Udbina and Otrić, and on to Knin and Srb. Its occupation caused a total disruption of road and rail transport and prevented troop deployment by roads running parallel to the front line. It also prevented intervention not just towards areas under threat, but also from the depth towards the frontline. A Directive issued by the Chief of the GS HV to the Split Military District Command shows that such an intervention was likely:

*“An intervention by brigade-strength forces is to be expected from the direction of Bosansko Grahovo and by a brigade from the direction of Gračac.”<sup>45</sup>*

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Directive for attack, No. 12-3/95, RP/12-3/95, Operation Storm-3 (Gospić Military District) of 26 June 1995, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Directive for attack no. 12-4/95, RP/12-4/95, Operation Storm-4 (Split Military District) of 26 June 1995.

86. Apart from being a transport hub, Gračac was also an important military centre where the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade, the strongest unit of the 15<sup>th</sup> Lika Corps, had its headquarters, along with its HQ company and logistics. Destruction or neutralisation of the Command Post of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade would cause total disintegration of the Brigade's command and control system, and expulsion of the Brigade Command from Gračac would disrupt the stationary communications system and consequently reduce the possibility of unobstructed and effective communication between the brigade commander and subordinate battalion commanders.

### 7.2.3. Terrain and time

87. Since intelligence reports showed that the enemy was preparing for defence and that he knew that an offensive operation was imminent, any strategic surprise was ruled out,<sup>46 47</sup> so it was decided that the MoI Collective Special Police Forces would move to attack with strong preparatory fire and attempt to breach enemy lines on a wide front to prevent regrouping and concentration on a narrow front. An attack in several directions, with a possible tactical surprise, would tie down almost all enemy forces at the forward line and a breach at just one point would threaten the flanks of the adjacent units, which would force them to pull back in order to avoid finding themselves in semi-encirclement or encirclement. The entire line of defence would thus collapse and a further rapid advance of the Collective Forces would prevent the enemy from taking up positions along the second line of defence and consolidating ranks, but would force successive withdrawals. At the same time, a very small number of long-range artillery and rocket weapons would be used to engage targets in depth in order to neutralise the enemy's command system and logistical support and to prevent or hamper the deployment of reserves. The time-sensitive imperative that the entire operation should be completed in 3-4 days and no later than 8 days until resistance was totally crushed and the state border was reached, required maximum effort on the part of the Collective Forces, because they had to cover the entire area on foot, as well as effort on the part of the Collective

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<sup>46</sup> Statement by General Petar Stipetić at a 17 July 1995 meeting in Brijuni, transcript, p. 20 "As for the arrival of General Mrkšić and the departure of Čeleketić, I think that the successes we achieved in Operation Flash won't be possible anymore."

<sup>47</sup> That the start of the offensive was known is confirmed in the Report on the Conduct of Combat Operations by the Commander of the 15<sup>th</sup> Corps, Strictly confidential no. 153-16/8 of 9 August 1995 (1D70-8370) ("On 3 August 1995, at ca 2030, information was received that Ustasha forces were expected to attack between 0400 and 0500 on 4 August 1995.")

Forces Staff who had to organise the forces along the axes of attack on a daily basis in order to maintain the momentum and pace of the attack.

### 7.3. Zone of operations and boundaries

88. Although in his analysis of the course of Operation Storm<sup>48</sup> Lieutenant General Mladen Markač stated that the Chief of the GS HV, General Červenko, had assigned a zone of responsibility to the Collective Special Police Forces, this is not borne out by the written order he received from the previous Chief of the GS HV, General Bobetko, on 26 June 1995<sup>49</sup> and the order given to him by General Červenko on 29 July 1995,<sup>50</sup> or by events in the field.

89. The only graphic control measure that can be seen in both orders (as has been emphasised earlier, these are almost the same orders, only with two different dates) is the operational base Bukva, TP 929 – Visočica, TP 1616.

90. For the successful completion of a task, a superior commander assigns a subordinate commander a zone or area of operations, while the Chief of the GS HV does not do so in any of his orders.

*“A zone of operations constitutes an area of land, limited in width and depth, in which a brigade organises and conducts combat activities.”<sup>51</sup>*

*“A zone of operations is an area of land, limited in width and depth, in which a division conducts its activities.”<sup>52</sup>*

*“Zones of operations are defined by four points (two at the forward line and two in depth), starting from the right at the forward line... In attack (pursuit), units are assigned a front and a direction of attack,... while a zone is designated by boundaries”.<sup>53</sup>*

91. A zone of operations and the boundaries delineating it are important because the commander to which it has been assigned has full responsibility for the organisation of an integrated combat system by objectives, place and time, and a unit

<sup>48</sup> Analysis of the course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, p. 3.

<sup>49</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV for Operation Storm, Class: 8/95-172/02, Ref.no.: 512-06-06/1-95-32, of 26 June 1995, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV for Operation Storm, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-328, of 29 July 1995 at 1200.

<sup>51</sup> Brigade Rules (for infantry, motorised, mountain, Alpine, Marine and light brigades), Federal Secretariat of National Defence, JNA General Staff, Belgrade, 1984.

<sup>52</sup> Rules for Ground Forces Divisions, Federal Secretariat of National Defence, JNA General Staff, Belgrade, 20 July 1984.

<sup>53</sup> Instructions for the Work of Commands – Headquarters, draft, JNA Marshal Tito Centre for Military Higher Education, Belgrade, 1983.

must not abandon the zone of combat operations assigned to it without the approval of the superior commander.<sup>54</sup>

92. The NATO and US concept (tactical control measures) of areas of operations and boundaries is almost identical to the concept of zones of operations.

*“An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces... A higher headquarters designates an area of operations using boundaries... Having an area of operations assigned both restricts and facilitates the movement of units and use of fires. It restricts units not assigned responsibility for the area of operations from moving through the area of operations. It also restricts outside units from firing into or allowing the effects of its fire to affect the area of operations. Both of these restrictions can be relaxed through coordination with the owning unit. It facilitates the movement and fires of the unit assigned responsibility for, or owning, the area of operations.”*<sup>55</sup>

*“A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. The commander uses graphic control measures to define the limits of an area of operations and, as such, establish ground forces' responsibilities.”*<sup>56</sup>

93. Assuming that the ultimate line of advance is the state border of the Republic of Croatia, together with the operational base we have two boundaries, but still lack two lateral boundaries.

94. The question of a lack of boundaries raised a series of problems which General Markač himself felt during execution of the Operation. In practice, the question of the right boundary with the Split Military District was resolved relatively easily and well, because cooperation with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade was an imperative for both sides in order to achieve common tasks, primarily placing the Jasenica-Zaton-Muškovci-Prezid road under control. On the other hand, the left boundary with the Gospić Military District was never clearly defined, and forces were moving and meeting throughout the area, but there were no plans for the time and place of their meeting. The request that the adjacent units should not open artillery and other fire on the area (zone) of operations of the unit responsible for that area was not met, because there were no boundaries, or rather those defined did not

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<sup>54</sup> Brigade Rules (for infantry, motorised, mountain, Alpine, Marine and light brigades), Federal Secretariat of National Defence, JNA General Staff, Belgrade, 1984, pages 16 and 17.

<sup>55</sup> Tactics, Field Manual No. 3-90, HQ Department of the Army, July 2001, Washington, DC, pp. 2-12.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-15.

serve their purpose. So it could happen that on 7 August 1995 units of the Gospić Military District opened heavy artillery fire on Mol special forces in Donji Lapac.<sup>57</sup>

95. The HV Main Staff most probably believed that defining the boundaries between the Collective Special Police Forces of the Mol and the Gospić and Split military districts was not so important and that it would not present any operational problem, so it simply kept the boundary between the two military districts as defined in the Decision on the Division of the Republic of Croatia into Military Districts, of February 1993.<sup>58</sup> That decision established Military Districts instead of Operative Zones, and the boundaries between them were defined by the boundaries of counties or municipalities.

96. However, in accordance with operational developments and for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the Military Districts, the Chief of the GS HV issued an order on 6 August 1995 changing the boundaries of areas of responsibility, so that the new boundaries no longer coincided with the administrative boundaries of counties, but followed operational needs for the continuation of offensive operations considering the successes that had been achieved by then. The order was transmitted to the commanders of the military districts, but not to General Markač. Under that order, the new boundary ran as follows:

*“Between the Split Military District and the Gospić Military District it runs along this line: Mali Alan-Gračac-Veliko Sedlo TP 1209-Međedak TP 639-Una railway station (all points belong to MD Split).”<sup>59</sup>*

97. Thus the Mol Collective Forces, which on 6 August 1995 were present from Medak to Gračac, and partly in Bruvno and Otrić, were again, just like as at the start of the operation, territorially divided between the Split MD and the Gospić MD. That confirms that Lieutenant General Markač did not have territorial responsibility or the task, the forces or the mechanisms to control, prohibit or allow entry or departure of any forces, except his own, along the axes of attack or in areas of deployment of the Mol Collective Special Police Forces, both in the course of Operation Storm and in the course of field searches in Operation Storm-Encirclement. Additionally, considering the speed and tempo of the attack and the need for rapid advances before the enemy had a chance to consolidate his ranks and possibly put up a defence in depth, and given available manpower, General Markač, even if he had

<sup>57</sup> Analysis of the course of Operation Storm, Mol Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, page 15.

<sup>58</sup> Decision on the Division of the Republic of Croatia into Military Districts, No.: PA7-3/1-93 of 1 February 1993.

<sup>59</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/1-95-408, of 6 August 1995.

wanted to, was in no position to establish checkpoints or roadblocks behind the lines reached in order to monitor the territory (leaving a large number of personnel at roadblocks or checkpoints would have jeopardised the further exploitation of the success of the offensive and execution of daily tasks which the Chief of the GS HV issued every day for the subsequent day). Establishment of such checkpoints and control of the liberated areas fell within the authority of the Military Police and the civilian police of the Mol, as did other tasks such as crime prevention, detection of offenders, prevention of violations of the law and order, protection of people's lives and personal safety, and traffic control.

## 8. Timeline of the MoI Collective Special Police Forces Participation in Operation Storm

98. The present timeline primarily pertains to involvement of the MoI Collective Special Police Forces, while engagement of adjacent formations of the Split and Gospić Military Districts is analysed to the extent necessary to understand the dynamics of their actions and their interaction with adjacent units.

99. On 26 June 1995, the Chief of the HV GS, General Janko Bobetko, sent excerpts from the Directive<sup>60</sup> to all Military District commands, and an Order<sup>61</sup> to the MoI Special Forces Command, instructing them to commence immediate preparations and to draft their own documents for execution of an offensive. At this point, it is necessary to explain the difference between a directive and order, to gain greater insight into planning and decision-making processes at the level of Military Districts and MoI Special Police commands; the definitions contained in the Manual for Commands and Staffs shall be used.<sup>62</sup>

*“Directives are issued by: the Supreme Command, army commands, other commands of the same level, and appropriate Territorial Defence staffs... Directives set tasks in less detail, highlighting the objective of the action, the general task of the unit and the command concept, and they should provide the elements necessary for independent action on the part of subordinates, in the spirit of the commander’s concept.”<sup>63</sup>*

100. As noted above, the directives transmitted by the Croatian Army Main Staff to the Military District commanders left them greater leeway in independent planning, i.e. decision-making as how to accomplish assigned tasks.

*“Orders categorically and instructively express the commander’s decision, setting tasks for subordinates clearly and unambiguously. All the commands use them.*

*As a rule, combat orders contain the following elements:*

- *information about the enemy;*

<sup>60</sup> Attack Directive, Operational no. 12-1/95, RP/12-1/95, Operation STORM-1 (Zagreb Military District) of 26 June 1995; Attack Directive Operational no. 12-2/95, RP/12-2/95, Operation STORM-2 (Karlovac Military District) of 26 June 1995; Attack Directive Operational no. 12-3/95, RP/12-3/95, Operation STORM-3 (Gospić Military District) of 26 June 1995; Attack Directive Operational no. 12-4/95, RP/12-4/95, Operation STORM-4 (Split Military District P) of 26 June 1995.

<sup>61</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV, SP Class: 8/95-172/02, Ref.no.: 512-06-06/01-95-32, of 26 June 1995.

<sup>62</sup> Manual for Commands and Staffs, Draft version, Marshal Tito Military Schools Centre of the JNA, Belgrade, 1983.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 69., translated into Croatian by the report's author.

- *the unit's mission, its reinforcements and support from superiors;*
- *information about adjacent units and boundaries, and*
- *the commander's decision.*<sup>64</sup>

101. From definition it is clear that Lieutenant General Mladen Markač did not have as much freedom in the planning process as the MD; the only element he had to decide upon was how to carry out the task assigned to him.

102. The Order<sup>65</sup> of the Chief of the GS HV stipulates the readiness of MoI Special Police Units for offensive operations on 29 June 1995; the objective was to capture the area bounded by Mali Golić, Sveti Rok, Gračac and Prezid. Although some preparations had been carried out and some elements were being brought in, new developments prompted the Chief of the GS HV to void the order.<sup>66</sup> The MoI Special Police Units continued with the tasks they had been executing out as part of the Operation Viper 2.

103. The new Chief of the GS HV, General Zvonimir Červenko, issued a new order on 29 July 1995:

*"1. MoI Special Forces: launch an attack with the objective of seizing the Mali Golić-Sveti Rok-Gračac-Prezid area from the operational base in the Velebit zone (Bukva, TP 929 – Visočica, TP 1616) and:*

*(1) cut the Gospić-Gračac road in the Sveti Rok-Štikada section,*

*(2) take the Čelavac radio relay facility,*

*(3) place the pass and tunnel at Prezid under control,*

*(4) link up with the Split Military District troops (2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade) and place the Jasenica-Zaton-Muškovci-Prezid road under control.*

*2. The operation is to be carried out in two stages, with a total duration of 3 days.*

*In the first stage, use tactical surprise by committing a sufficiently strong force and provide intense artillery support using own artillery to reach the Sveti Rok-Baleni-Bukova Kosa (TP 695)-Crni Vrh (TP 934)-Rastovača (TP 844) line and the Oščenica (TP 1182)-Kurcelji (TP 872)-Balanova Plana (TP 675) line.*

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, SP Class: 8/95-172/02, Ref.no.: 512-06-06/01-95-32, of 26 June 1995.

<sup>66</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, SP Class: 8/95-172/02, Ref.no.: 512-06-06/01-95-32/2, of 29 June 1995 at 1830.

*In the second stage, commit the main force and press the attack, reaching the Malinjak (TP 1631)-Veliki Crnopac (TP 1403)-Toplo Brdo (TP 897) and*

*(1) take the Čelavac radio relay facility,*

*(2) place the pass and tunnel at Prezid under control,*

*(3) link up with the forces of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade.*

*After the objectives of the second stage have been accomplished, keep the forces ready for the continuation of combat operations.*

*3. Other forces in the Velebit area are to engage in active defence; if they achieve a favourable tactical position, launch an attack to threaten the Medak-Sveti Rok road.*

*4. In the preparation and execution of combat operations, continually coordinate with the Split Military District Command - TCP Zadar, and the Gospić Military District Command...*

*5. The forces engaged in the execution of the task are to be ready by 1 August at 0400 ...*

*6. Lieutenant General Mladen Markač shall be personally responsible to me for the execution of the task and shall report to me on it by 31 July 1995 at 2400, through the GSHV Centre of Operative Commanding (COR).<sup>67</sup>*

104. The contents of the order are identical to the order Lieutenant General Mladen Markač received on 26 June, with one exception: Para 2 of the Order specifies artillery support provided not only by own artillery, but by the Artillery Group of the 7<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade, while the new order does not mention any artillery support by any unit outside the MoI Collective Special Police Forces.

105. The Order does not regulate the borders nor does it define the adjacent units or any other elements necessary for the regular planning and decision-making.

106. Several days before this order was issued, on 21 July 1995, the Chief of the GS HV issued the following order:

*“1. Special Police forces with a strength of 300 members are to be detached from the MoI Special Police contingent and moved to the Zadar-Vir-Nin sector by 2000 on 23 July 1995”,<sup>68</sup>*

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<sup>67</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-328, of 29 July 1995 at 1200.

thus setting in motion a chain of events that began with two orders by Lieutenant General Mladen Markač. The first order concerns the dispatch of reconnaissance operative groups into the Velebit area, intensifying intelligence efforts in the preparation of Operation Storm:

*“By 0900 on 23 July 1995 at the latest, you are to dispatch reconnaissance operative groups, about 16 strong, from the Special Police Units of the Zadar-Knin, Split-Dalmatia, Šibenik, and Brod-Posavina Police Departments to the Special Police logistics base in Lukovo Šugarje.*

*“The reconnaissance operative groups are to conduct reconnaissance activities in the Velebit area for a duration of approximately 15 days.”<sup>69</sup>*

107. Ante Šoljić, Chief of the Internal Control Department, notified the commanders of the specific tasks, main axes and areas of responsibility of each group. It was his responsibility to contact the reconnaissance formations in the adjacent Croatian Army units and intelligence departments in the Gospić and Split Military Districts, and to coordinate the work of reconnaissance operative groups.

108. On 29 July 1995, Ante Šoljić, Chief of the Internal Control Department, submitted to Lieutenant General Mladen Markač a summary report on the work done by reconnaissance operative units,<sup>70</sup> mentioning fortified defence positions, roads, mine fields and areas where special forces can infiltrate enemy defences. The work done by the reconnaissance operative groups is mentioned in the daily reports produced by the Internal Control Department. The last such written report produced by the Internal Control Department is dated 3 August 1995, and it shows that once the attack commenced, the Collective Forces Staff no longer had a full picture of the situation and the disposition of the enemy forces.

109. The second order issued by General Markač, co-signed by Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak, pertains to the establishment and activation of the Collective Forces Staff.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Order of the NGS HV to relocate forces SP, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/1-95-303 of 21 July 1995.

<sup>69</sup> Order of Lieutenant General Mladen Markač to dispatch reconnaissance operative units, no.: 511-01-30-597/95, Zagreb, 21 July 1995.

<sup>70</sup> Summary Report on the Performance of Reconnaissance Operative Groups in the Velebit area, no.: 511-01-30- 95, of 29 July 1995.

<sup>71</sup> Order Activating the Collective Special Police Forces Staff, No.: 511-01-30-602/95, of 22 July 1995.

110. Upon receiving the order from the Chief of the HV GS, the Chief of the Special Police Sector sent a preliminary order to the attention of all chiefs of police (with the exception of the Virovitica-Podravina and Međimurje Police Departments) and the Lučko Anti-terrorist Unit commander, requiring the SPU commanders to take the following action:

*“By 1900 on 29 July 1995, you are required to raise the level of readiness in the entire contingent (active and reserve) of the unit under your command so that the contingent can be assembled within two hours of receiving the order to do so”.*<sup>72</sup>

111. The forces assigned to participate in the operation were brought in as of 29 July 1995; this marked the actual creation of the Collective Special Police Forces. These administrative orders are virtually identical as the ones for participation in Operation Storm-Encirclement. Below is one present as an example:

*“Ministry of the Interior  
Special Police Sector  
No: 511-01-31-1024/95  
Zagreb, 29 July 1995.*

*“Attn: Chief, Krapina-Zagorje Police Department  
To the SPU commander*

*“With a view to the execution of the most complex tasks within the purview of the special police, I hereby issue the following*

*“O r d e r*

*“By 1700 on 30 July 1995, you are required to be at the arranged position, with the arranged number of personnel, with weapons, ammunition and all necessary equipment as arranged, and with a sufficient number of tents for temporary accommodation.*

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<sup>72</sup> Order of the Chief of the SP Sector to all Police Department chiefs (except Virovitica-Podravina and Međimurje Police Departments) and the Lučko Anti-terrorist Unit, No.: 511-01-31-1015/95, of 29 July 1995.

*“The acting chief of the Logistics Department, Branislav Bole, will receive the forces.*

*“Personnel are to be transported using vehicles from the Special Police fleet or buses.*

*“Vehicles must move in a proper column, comply with traffic regulations and not exceed the 80 kmh speed limit.*

*“The per diem for this task is set at 100 percent.*

*“Sector Chief*

*Željko Sačić”*

112. It is highly likely that the fact that the order of 29 July 1995 is identical with the order of 26 June 1995 made it easier for the Collective Forces Staff to plan the effort, because some of the work had been done before and after the receipt of the first order. The fact that they are identical also shows that there had been no changes in content regarding the tasks that were set and the manner in which they were to be executed after the first Brijuni meeting, on 17 July 1995, and the second Brijuni meeting on 31 July 1995.

113. In his Analysis of the Course of the Operation, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač lists a number of dates and events that are relevant for the planning process, as follows:

- on 21 June 1995, a staff reconnaissance mission was conducted at V. Golić of the planned area of attack towards Ličko Polje and Gračac, with participation of the core staff of the Special Police Sector and representatives from the Split Military District, led by the chief of the Intelligence Department of the HV GS, Rear Admiral Davor Domazet-Lošo,
- on 27 June 1995, the special police leadership conducted a staff map exercise; the objective was to elaborate the combat task in Zagreb. The commanders of main and auxiliary axes were given the specific tasks for their units and were given the appropriate documents,
- on 29 July, the Special Police Sector leadership received a written order for the attack in the Croatian Army Main Staff; the attack axes were plotted on the map,

- on 31 July 1995, the system of wireless and landline communications became operational, as was the relocated command post on the south face of V. Golić, the support tasks of the attached HV artillery and rocket units were defined in specific terms, and in the headquarters of the Collective Forces Staff in Starigrad, the commanders of attack axes and units were given all documents. The task was fully understood and elaborated down to the operational level.<sup>73</sup>

114. The tasks for the attached HV rocket and artillery units which were to provide support could be defined in greater detail only after 30 July 1995, when the Chief of the HV GS issued the order defining the chain of command in the Zadar sector (the order was sent to the Split Military District commander, with attention called to General Markač):

*"2. The forces on the slopes of Velebit are to be prepared for offensive action in cooperation with the Mol special forces on the Jasenice-Muškovci axis. An element of the forces on the left flank should be used to secure direct action with Mol forces on the Tulove Grede-Prezid axis, and another element of the forces should be used to leave (I assume that the word 'ostaviti', 'leave', is a misprint and should read 'ostvariti', 'achieve') control over the Zrmanja river canyon.*

...

*4. The forces operating on the slopes of Velebit must have a special artillery group to provide artillery support to those forces and the Mol forces.*

...

*6. In the broader Zadar area (Šepurine), the HV GS retains a Mol special force unit as its reserve".<sup>74</sup>*

115. In order to adapt the command and control system to a combat situation, the Chief of the GS HV issued an order establishing the Staff Operations Centre of the GS HV (SOC) with a staff operations team and special equipment to be used for the

<sup>73</sup> Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm, Mol – Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, pp. 3-

4.

<sup>74</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS regulating the chain of command in Sector Zadar, Class: 080-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-334, of 30 July 1995, 1300 hours.

command, control, communications and electronic data processing system.<sup>75</sup> In the order, the GS HV Chief stipulates:

*“The tasks of the Staff Operations Centre shall include gathering, processing and analysing data and controlling the units and commands at the operational and strategic levels. The operations team shall submit proposals for the use of forces to the Chief of the GS HV and shall be directly responsible for the monitoring and control of the situation in the military districts.”*<sup>76</sup>

116. It is clear from the provision quoted above that it does not pertain to the Special Police Units (Collective Forces) but solely to the military districts (the Mol SPUs are not mentioned at all in any of the Paragraphs in the order). Since Lieutenant General Markač was directly subordinated to the Main Staff, it is unclear why he was left out of the order, given that the order was issued on the eve of the operation, when it was already quite clear who would be participating therein. It is not the only order to be transmitted to all the Military District commanders but not to General Markač.<sup>77 78</sup>

117. On 3 August 1995, the Chief of the GS HV issued an order establishing the readiness of the forces for the attack:

*“1. The forces of the following Military Districts: Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split, and of the Mol special units shall be ready for the attack, and the forces of the Osijek Military District, the Southern Front and the HRM shall be ready for the defence by 0300 on 4 August 1995.*

...

*4. The attack shall begin at 0500 hours on 4 August 1995 on all axes, except for the main axis for the Gospić Military District, where the attack shall begin at 0600 on 4 August 1995.”*<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-340, of 2 August 1995 at 0900.


<sup>76</sup> Ibid., Para 2.

<sup>77</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-408; 6 August 1995 defining the new border between the Split and Gospić Military Districts, cutting the area of operations of the Collective Special Police Forces in two.

<sup>78</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-410, of 6 August 1995, on the prevention of looting of property and undisciplined behaviour of the HV troops entering the liberated territory.

<sup>79</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/1-95-364, of 3 August 1995 at 2115.

118. At 1650 on the same day, the Collective Forces Staff met with the SPU commanders to discuss intelligence, artillery, logistics and operational issues. After the meeting, the commanders returned to their units to await the beginning of the attack.



**Deployment of the Mol Collective Special Police Forces on the eve of the attack**

### 8.1. Activities on 4 August 1995

119. The attack began as planned at 0515, on one main axis and four auxiliary axes of attack, with intense artillery preparation on pre-selected targets, with the engagement of the six batteries of 120mm mortars, one 128mm rocket system battalion and ten 107 mm LRL (light rocket launchers), with the support by the TS-5 Tactical Group from the Zadar Operative Group.<sup>80</sup>

120. In accordance with the order<sup>81</sup> pertaining to the attack by the Collective Special Police Forces, they were to attack as follows:

<sup>80</sup> Operational Log of the 1st Sector (Zadar OG) – from 0955 to 1900, four artillery strikes on Gračac; about thirty 130mm rounds were fired.

<sup>81</sup> Order for the attack of the Collective Special Police Forces, undated and unsigned.

### *“MAIN ATTACK AXIS*

*Once the Special Police forces are brought to the line of advance from Mali Golić to Prosina, the forces on the main attack axis, one battalion strong, consisting of 140 SPU members from Varaždin Police Department, 180 from Split-Dalmatia Police Department, and 180 from Zadar-Knin Police Department under the command of the main axis commander Zdravko Janić, Chief of the Anti-Terrorism Department, using the call sign LED, and his deputy, Svemir Vrsaljko, commander of the Zadar-Knin Police Department SPU, using the call sign LED 50, shall execute a swift surprise incursion along the following axis of Mali Alan, Crveni Potoci, Male and Velike Žuljine, the Čelavac relay centre and Prezid pass...*

*c) Personnel from the Zadar-Knin Police Department's SPU, deployed in three groups, roughly 60 strong, under the command of their commander, Anton Dražina...*

*d) Personnel of the Osijek-Baranja Police Department's SPU, deployed in three groups roughly 50 strong... and personnel of the Šibenik Police Department's SPU, deployed in two groups, roughly 50 strong... in the first and second stages of the operations will operate as an intervention group at the disposal of the commander of the main attack axis...*

### *FIRST AUXILIARY AXIS*

*Once the Special Police forces, two companies strong, are brought to the line of advance at Božića Vršina, on the first auxiliary axis of attack comprising 150 members from the Karlovac Police Department's SPU and 170 members from the Bjelovar-Bilogora Police Department's SPU, under the command of the commander of the first auxiliary axis, Dražen Perković, commander of the Karlovac Police Department's SPU, with the call sign LED 1 and his deputy, Hamdija Mašinović, commander of the Bjelovar-Bilogora Police Department's SPU, with the call sign LED 10, shall execute a swift surprise incursion along the following axis: Božića Vršine, Plantaže, Markovac, village of Smolčići, village of Japundžići, the Gračac-Obrovac road...*

*a) Karlovac Special Police personnel, deployed in three groups, roughly 50 strong, under the command of Dražen Perković... will in the first stage capture... In the second stage, they will cut and seize the Gračac-Sveti Rok road... and set up active*

*defence on this axis in order to prevent an infantry assault by the enemy from the direction of Gračac, targeting the flank of our main force.*

*b) Personnel of the Bjelovar-Bilogora Police Department's SPU, deployed in three groups, roughly 60 strong, under the command of Hamdija Mašinović... will in the first stage capture... In the second stage, they will seize the dominant peaks around Gračac: Bukova Kosa (TP 695), TP 651 and Mala Gudura and will set up active defence in order to prevent an enemy attack from the direction of Gračac.*

*c) Personnel of the Dubrovnik-Neretva Police Department's SPU, deployed in a single group, some 40 strong... and personnel from the Vukovar-Srijem Police Department's SPU (Županja group), deployed in three groups, roughly 40 strong... will operate in the first and second stages of the operation as an intervention group at the disposal of the commander of the first auxiliary axis of attack...*

#### SECOND AUXILIARY AXIS

*Once the Special Police forces, two companies strong, are brought to the line of advance at Veliki Golić, at the second auxiliary axis of attack comprising 130 members of the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department's SPU (Kutina group) and 190 members of the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department's SPU (Sisak group), under the command of the second auxiliary attack axis commander, Boris Jambrešić, commander of the Sisak-Moslavina County Police Department's SPU, with the call sign LED 2 and his deputy, Mario Božić, assistant commander of the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department's SPU, with the call sign LED 20, will execute a swift surprise incursion along the following axis: Veliki Golić, Liščana Draga, Šilovići, Pilar up to the hills lying east of the road...*

*a) Personnel from the Sisak-Moslavina County Police Department's SPU (Kutina group), deployed in three groups, roughly 40 strong, under the command of Dragutin Vurnek... will in the first stage capture... In the second stage, they will capture the Gračac-Sveti Rok road... and set up active defence on that axis to prevent any infantry attacks by the enemy from the direction of Gračac.*

*b) Personnel from the Sisak-Moslavina County Police Department's SPU (Sisak group), deployed in three groups, roughly 50 strong, under the command of Mario Božić... will in the first stage capture... In the second stage, they will capture the*

*Gračac-Sveti Rok road and set up active defence in order to prevent any infantry attacks by the enemy from the direction of Gračac.*

*c) Personnel from the Vukovar-Srijem Police Department's SPU (Vinkovci group), deployed in three groups, roughly 40 strong... in the first and second stages of the operation will operate as an intervention group at the disposal of the commander of the second auxiliary attack axis...*

### THIRD AUXILIARY AXIS

*Once the Special Police forces, one company strong, are brought to the line of advance at Dušice, on the third auxiliary attack axis, consisting of 120 members from the Lika-Senj Police Department's SPU and 40 members from the Zagreb Police Department's SPU, under the command of the third auxiliary attack axis commander, Miroslav Cindrić (commander of the Lika-Senj Police Department's SPU) with the call sign LED 3 and his deputy, Darko Gešpاهر (specialist trainer in the Zagreb Police Department's SPU), with the call sign LED 30, shall execute a swift surprise incursion on the following axis: Biljevina, Staro Selo, Sveti Rok, Zmelovača hill (TP 609.7)...*

*a) Personnel from the Lika-Senj Police Department's SPU, deployed in two groups, roughly 60 strong, under the command of Miroslav Cindrić... will in the first stage capture... In the second stage, they will seize the Gračac-Sveti Rok road on the stretch from the village of Ruka to Zmelovača, including that hill, and will set up active defence on the axis in order to prevent any infantry attacks by the enemy from the direction of Lovinac.*

*b) Personnel from the Zagreb Police Department's SPU, deployed in a single group, roughly 40 strong, under the command of Darko Gešpاهر... will in the first stage capture... In the second stage, they will cut the Medak-Gračac road at the hamlet of Čovići and set up active defence in order to prevent any enemy attacks from the direction of Medak and Lovinac.*

*c) Personnel from the Lovinac Police Station, deployed in a single group, roughly 50 strong, ... in the first and second stages of the operation will operate as an intervention group at the disposal of the commander of the third auxiliary axis attack...*

#### FOURTH AUXILIARY AXIS

*Once the Special Police forces, two companies strong, are brought to the line of advance at the foot of the east face of Sveto Brdo, on the fourth auxiliary attack axis, consisting 130 members from the Primorje-Gorski Kotar Police Department's SPU, 140 members from Zagreb Police Department's SPU and 50 members from the Lučko Anti-Terrorist Unit, under the command of fourth auxiliary attack axis commander, Zoran Cvrk, (commander of the Zagreb Police Department's SPU), with the call sign LED 4, and his deputy, Tomislav Dizdar (commander of the Primorje-Gorski Kotar Police Department's SPU), with the call sign LED 40, shall execute a swift surprise incursion on the following axis: Bile Kuci, Tropolje, Palež, village of Jurjevići...*

*a) Personnel from the Primorje-Gorski Kotar Police Department's SPU, deployed in two groups, roughly 60 strong, under the command of Tomislav Dizdar... will in the first stage capture...*

*b) Personnel from the Zagreb Police Department's SPU, deployed in three groups, roughly 40 strong, under the command of Zoran Cvrk... will in the first stage capture... In the second stage, they will capture the village of Jurjevići and set up active defence in order to prevent any enemy attacks on the Medak-Gračac axis.*

*c) Personnel from the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department's SPU, deployed in three groups, roughly 40 strong... and members of the Istria County Police Department's SPU, deployed in two groups, roughly 40 strong... will operate in the first and second stages of the operation as an intervention group at the disposal of the commander of the first (a mistake, should read 'fourth') auxiliary attack axis...*

*...<sup>82</sup>*

121. Although this order was not signed and dated, its authenticity is confirmed by an analysis done by the Special Police Sector<sup>83</sup> and the war records submitted by the SPU commanders in all police departments to the Special Police Sector in 1996 and 1997.


<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, no.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, pp. 5-6.

122. In analysing this order, it is clear that although the system of command over the collective forces on each axis appears to be simple, it is in fact highly complex. Thus, the commander of the main attack axis was Zdravko Janić, the only commander who hailed directly from the Special Police Sector and was not a commander of any of the Police Department SPUs deployed on the axis. In effect, he exercised command over forces he had never commanded before. His deputy is the commander of the Zadar-Knin Police Department's SPU, Svemir Vrsaljko. The two of them had under their command a battalion-sized force (500 personnel engaged in the attack and 250 personnel used as an intervention force), and they constantly received reports from their subordinates and in turn reported all developments to the Collective Forces Staff.

123. The situation was even more complex on other axes. Thus, on the first auxiliary axis (320 personnel engaged in the attack and 150 personnel in an intervention force) the axis commander Dražen Perković was at the same time the commander of the Karlovac Police Department's SPU, 150 strong, while his deputy Hamdija Mašinović was at the same time the commander of the Bjelovar-Bilogora Police Department's SPU, 180 strong. In a system where a commander plays a dual role, his first priority should be to exercise command over the attached forces, not his own unit, where he is. However, in reality, each commander as a priority exercises command over the troops he sees and controls directly: his original unit, where he has built special interpersonal relations with its personnel, who he feels are his responsibility. His ability to exercise control is reduced for the most part to the area where his unit operates; as for developments on the rest of the axis, his knowledge is limited to the information he receives over the radio from his deputy (and vice versa); the deputy again as a priority exercises command over his own unit. The fact that they are physically in two different places makes the command and control system even more difficult.

124. The same dual-role situation can be observed on the auxiliary attack, where the deputy axis commander was at the same time the commander of the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department's SPU (Sisak group), and on the third and fourth axes, both with the axis commanders and deputy axis commanders.



Chain of command chart for the Collective Special Police Forces on 4 August 1995 (dual-role commanders are in bold font)

125. The axis commanders and their deputies mentioned above for the most part exercised command over the collective forces operating on various axes until the completion of the operation, i.e., until 9 August 1995, when the forces withdrew; however, the subordinate SPUs that comprised the forces operating on any given axis changed almost on a daily basis.

126. According to a report the Chief of the GS HV sent to the President of the Republic of Croatia at 1800 on 4 August 1995:

*'6. **The Mol special forces** operating in concert with the forces of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade succeeded in capturing the elevations on Mount Velebit on the following attack axis: Tulove Grede-Mali Alan-toward Sveti Rok, and managed to take control of the Babin Gaj-Krpani-Brkina Glavica-Sveti Rok-Grabar-V.Malovan-*

*Vršak TP 675-Kurcelji line. The casualties so far are two killed and eight wounded in action.*”<sup>84</sup>

However, the fighting lasted continuously until 2100, when the order to stop fighting for the day was received,<sup>85</sup> and the forces actually reached the following line: area west of the villages of Međuvode, Lipač Radučki and Žmelovača, Opsenica River, villages of Pilar, Poljana, Čuljeti, and Milska Glavica: the enemy forward defence line was penetrated along the whole length of the front. The fiercest resistance was mounted in the Mali Alan area and further on in the direction of Čelavac. Cutting the Gospić-Gračac road was of particular importance because it made it impossible for the enemy to engage in any longitudinal manoeuvres along this axis and the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Brigade forces were effectively cut in two: one element mounted its defence facing Gospić, and the other that gravitated towards Gračac. This reduced the manoeuvre capability of the entire 15<sup>th</sup> Corps; control of the road made it possible to press the attack the next day, when the units descended from the slopes of Velebit to reach terrain that was easier to negotiate. At the end of the first day of the attack, the Mol Collective Special Police Forces sustained casualties of 5 killed and 30 wounded in action.


127. In the course of the day, apart from the contact and concerted action with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade on the right flank, those forces did not achieve contact with any other forces of the Split and Gospić Military Districts.

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<sup>84</sup> Report by the Chief of the HV GS to the President of the Republic of Croatia, Class: 80-01/95-02/08. Log no. 512-06-05/01-95-381, 4 August 1995, 1800 hours.

<sup>85</sup> Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, no.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, p. 9.

### 1. DAY (4 August 1995) – ADVANCEMENT AND REACHED LINE IN ATTACK



Mol Special Police operations on 4 August 1995

## 8.2. Activities on 5 August 1995

128. At the end of the first day, the Chief of GS HV issued his order for 5 August (D+1), as follows:

*“1. Combat operations on 5 August 1995 are to commence and proceed in accordance with the orders and decisions issued by the commanders of the Military Districts, HRM, HRZ, JB and Mol special units.*

*2. Intensify combat operations using fire, movement, air support and infantry assaults..*

...

*3.5. Special units of the Mol*

*- launch a vigorous attack and manoeuvre forces to seize the town of Gračac.<sup>86</sup>*

<sup>86</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/1-95-384, of 5 August 1995, 2400.

129. The Collective Special Police Forces, not allowing the enemy to consolidate its ranks and set up a new defence line in the depth of the territory, pressed the attack along the entire frontline, and soon took the entire Gospić-Gračac road and the town of Gračac itself, as the Chief of the HV GS explicitly ordered. The attack proceeded along the same axes as the previous day (second stage of the attack), with the same commanders and virtually the same forces. In his report to the Chief of the HV GS, General Markač stated:

*'With the artillery support, by 1130 on 5 August 1995, the Collective Special Police Forces managed to take full control of Gračac; by 1200, they took Čelavac and Prezid... The task of the Collective Special Police Forces envisaged in the Plan has thus been fully implemented... The forces are now regrouping and will press the attack, in keeping with your order, on the main axis, Gračac-Bruvno and on the auxiliary axis, Gračac-Malovan...'*<sup>87</sup>

because the forces of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorized Brigade retreated along the same axes and as they retreated they engaged the Collective Special Police Forces which were advancing.

130. The commander of the Zadar TCP sent a similar report to the commander of the Split Military District:

*"MoI SPU's forces:*

*The Medak-Gračac road is under full control, following the capture of all heights north of the road.*

*According to the latest information, the following line has been reached and captured: MEDVIDOVAČA TP 832 – VRH MATINOVIĆA TP 988 – VRH BRSTANUŠA TP 911 – TRPOLOVAČKA GLAVA TP 817 – ŽUTIĆA VRH TP 909 – PLASE TP 920 – LJUBOVIĆ – GRAČAC (GRAČAC – ČELAVAC – PREZID road TP 766), and the forces were directed to MALOVAN and to the left, toward BRUVNO.*<sup>88</sup>

131. In his report to the President of the Republic of Croatia, the Chief of the HV GS corroborated what General Markač had stated in his report:

*"The HV forces reinforced by MoI Special Forces continued their attack, with the focus on North and Central Dalmatia and Lika..."*

<sup>87</sup> Report on the Combat Disposition of the Collective Special Police Forces, no.: 511-01-VT-104/95, Seline HQ, 5 August 1995.

<sup>88</sup> Daily Report from the Zadar FCP to the Split Military District commander, Class: 81/95-01/12, Ref.no.: 1080-01-95-269, of 5 August 1995.

*“In Lika, the Mol Special Forces and a part of the forces from the Gospić Military District have put under their control the whole of the Gospić-Gračac road and the Gračac communication junction.”<sup>89</sup>*

132. Other large settlements that were liberated apart from Gračac were Lovinac and Medak, and the Special Police forces linked up with the Gospić Military District forces on the fourth auxiliary axis in the village of Lički Ribnik.

133. According to intelligence, a battalion-strength reserve force with a tank platoon was expected to be committed from the direction of Bruvno, and it was vital to prevent any such action by active advance in the direction of Bruvno and Malovan.

134. On 5 August, the Split Military District commander issued an order, tasking the Fourth Guards Brigade as follows:

*“1. The commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade of the HV shall regroup the units in order to press the attack in the general direction of KNIN-VELEBIT, with the objective of taking control of the broad area which includes KOM, elevation 1003 – GORNJI ERVENIK and linking up with the forces of the Zadar OG (1st Croatian Guards Brigade, 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn/9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade and the Military Police Anti-terrorist Group Company) in the KAŠTEL ŽEGARSKI sector.*

*Once the units have linked up with the Zadar OG forces, they are to be redirected to mount attacks northwards, with the objective of reaching the following line: TOMAŠEV VRH, TP 1155 – SRBSKI KLANAC elevation 793, by linking up with the forces of the Mol Special Police in the Tomašev Vrh sector, and securing the Knin-Gračac road and railway line. Once the TOMAŠEV VRH elevation 1155 – SRBSKI KLANAC elevation 793 line is reached, start with persistent and active defence.”<sup>90</sup>*

135. However, the forces did not link up.

136. The Collective Forces Staff moved from Seline and from the TCP at V. Golić to Gračac as soon as the town was liberated; the Staff became operational by 1600, setting up in the Gračac Municipal Court building.<sup>91</sup> However, the Main Command

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
<sup>89</sup> Report of the Chief of the HV GS to the President of the Republic of Croatia, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-400, of 5 August 1995 at 2000.

<sup>90</sup> Order of the Split Military District, Class: SP 8/95-01/17, Ref.no.: 1080-01-95-342, of 5 August 1995.

<sup>91</sup> Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, no.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, p. 11.

Post in Seline did not cease to exist. It continued its work, but at a smaller scale. Major Petar Ričko from the Intelligence Department of the GS HV remained there. At around 1800 hours, Minister of Interior Ivan Jarnjak and head of the National Security Bureau, Miroslav Tuđman, arrived in the Staff on a working visit.

137. During the second day of combat, the casualties of the MoI Special Police on the Lika-Dalmatia front were one killed, 12 wounded and 5 injured in action.



MoI Special Police operations on 5 August 1995

### 8.3. Activities on 6 August 1995

138. As on the previous day, the Chief of the HV GS issued an order for the combat operations to continue on **D+2**, and a few additional orders:

*“1. Split Military District*

*- capture the broad area of Otrić and Srb, and then reach the state border in the sector defined by Medak and the railway station on the Una River...*

## *2. Gospić Military District*

*- a portion of the forces in the Ljubovo sector is to capture Udbina and press the attack in concerted action with the MoI Special Forces, with the objective of taking D. Lapac, and reach the state border only up to the sector defined by Međedak and the railway station on the Una River.*

## *3. MoI Special Forces*

*- once the Bruvno and Malovan passes have been taken, press the attack in the direction of D. Lapac, take that area in concerted action with the Gospić Military District troops on the left and the Split Military District troops on the right flank".<sup>92</sup>*

139. The Chief of the HV GS issued an order defining the boundaries of the areas of responsibility of the Split, Gospić and other Military Districts (as noted in the order, this was based on the operational development of the situation and the objective was to achieve concerted action by the military districts):

*"1. The operational boundaries of the areas of responsibility between the Military Districts are to be established as follows:*

*A/ The boundary between the Split and Gospić Military Districts shall follow the line: Mali Alan-Gračac-V.Sedlo TP 1209 – Međedak TP 639-Una railway station (all included in the AOR of the Split Military District)".<sup>93</sup>*

140. The order is not addressed to General Markač (the effect of this order has been analysed above).

141. In order to prevent looting of property and undisciplined behaviour, the Chief of the HV GS issued a new order:

*"1. All forms of undisciplined conduct are to be prevented following the entry of the HV troops into the liberated areas.*

*2. Attempts to loot property and war booty are to be vigorously prevented.*

*3. Vigorous measures are to be taken against undisciplined persons.*

*4. The Military District commanders shall answer to me personally for the implementation of this order."<sup>94</sup>*

<sup>92</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS to continue with combat operations on D+2, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-409, of 6 August 1995, at 1000 hours.

<sup>93</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-408; 6 August 1995, 0555 hours.

<sup>94</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-410 of 6 August 1995, 1100 hours.

The order is not addressed to General Markač.

142. The Chief of the HV GS also changed the reporting requirements, issuing an order to regulate the submission of operative reports:

*“1. Clear operative reports are to be sent each day, as follows:*

*- by 1200, with the status as of 1100,*

*- by 1900, with the status as of 1800,*

*...*

*3. Reports are to contain:*

*1. A brief description of the development of the situation, emergent problems, liberated points, objectives for every unit ...*

*2. Casualties: killed, seriously wounded, lightly wounded and b/k [expansion unknown] (as at 1900).*

*3. Losses and damage to materiel and equipment.*

*4. Consumption of materiel and equipment by type, in pieces and combat sets (as at 1900).*

*5. Captured enemy materiel and equipment and personnel.*

*6. Lines reached.*

*7. Clear concept for further use of the forces.*

*8. Requests.*

*“4. Interim reports are to be sent immediately using encrypted communications systems”.*<sup>95</sup>

143. The contents and the deadlines for the delivery of the reports were binding for all the commanders directly subordinated to the Chief of the HV GS, including General Markač. In order for him to be able to submit the requisite reports, the same reporting system had to be set up in the Collective Special Police Forces, with earlier deadlines (e.g. for reports to be sent by 1200, specifying the status as at 1100, the reports from subordinates had to reach the Collective Forces Staff by 1130 at the latest, specifying the status as at 1100, in order for the staff officers to be able to draft and transmit their reports on time).

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<sup>95</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS for the Submission of Operative Reports, Class: 80-01/95- 02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-407, of 6 August 1995, 0730 hours.

144. Mol Special Police Units continued with their advance, in pursuit of the enemy along two main axes: Gračac-Bruvno and Gračac-Malovan-Otrić; both roads were under control.

145. Most of the forces were deployed along the Medak-Lovinac-Gračac road, where they were clearing the area, and as the reserve in the general area of Gračac, where they were preparing to continue pursuit.

146. The regular daily report by the Gospić Military District Command to the Chief of the GS HV notes:

*“The Bunić-L. Osik road was completely liberated, our forces linked up with the Mol special forces on the outskirts of Medak. The Gospić-Gračac road is in use by the HV and the Mol special units. Other forces are engaged in crushing the resistance of the encircled enemy forces and in clear operations.*

*Further attacks are planned in the direction of D. Lapac to liberate the territory of the Republic of Croatia in the zone of responsibility”.*<sup>96</sup>

147. The intention of the Gospić Military District to advance towards D. Lapac is confirmed in the following intelligence report:

*“1. Enemy activities characteristics*

*The enemy is pulling out towards D. Lapac and Srb, and further to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

...

*4. Proposals for further action*

*- Launch a rapid incursion along the village of Debelo Brdo-Udbina-D.Lapac axis, take Udbina and airport “Krbava” and link up with the Mol special forces in the D. Lapac area”.*<sup>97</sup>

148. On 6 August, the establishment of the military police commenced in Gračac, Second Lieutenant Luka Matanić, standing in for the commander of the 71<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the Gospić Military District’s Military Police, sent a report to LTC Damir Kozić, an


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<sup>96</sup> Regular Daily Report no. 5 of the Gospić MILITARY DISTRICT Command, Class: 80-02/95-01/06, Ref.no.: 1043-04-95-17, of 6 August 1995.

<sup>97</sup> Intelligence Report of the Intelligence Department of the Gospić MILITARY DISTRICT, Class: 804-08/95-02/01, Ref.no.: 1043-14-95-260 of 6 August 1995. at 1720 hours

officer in the Military Police Department at the TCP of the GS HV in Ogulin, where he noted:

*“At around 1000, a regular Military Police squad was sent to Gračac; preparations for the establishment of a MP platoon in Gračac are underway. Preparations are also underway for the establishment of such platoons at the Plitvice Lakes and in Donji Lapac, to be dispatched there as soon as the locations are liberated.”<sup>98</sup>*



Mol Special Police operations on 6 August 1995

#### 8.4. Activities on 7 August 1995

149. In order to continue and successfully complete the HV offensive operation on D+3 and in order to fully implement the earlier order issued by the Chief of the GS HV for D+2, which had not been fully implemented, a new order was issued to continue combat operations, take the entire area and reach the state border by 1800 on 7 August 1995:

<sup>98</sup> Report on the implementation of tasks of the 71<sup>st</sup> MP Battalion in the combat zone and in the recently liberated area, Class: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ref.no.: 2232-01/02-95-20, of 6 August 1995.

*“1. In all military districts, in keeping with the aforementioned order by the Chief of the GS HV, exert maximum effort on all axes and press the attack vigorously. In the course of the day, implement the Order in full. By 1800 at the latest, take the entire territory and reach the state border, as ordered.*

*2. Commanders of the Split and Gospić Military Districts and the commander of the Mol Special Forces must coordinate their efforts and synchronise the attack times on the axes they have been ordered to take. They must report this to me promptly.*

*3. I warn again all subordinate commanders and order that the UNCRO personnel and other UN staff should be treated properly; their lives and property should not be put at risk”.*<sup>99</sup>

150. At 0430, the TCP of the Collective Forces Staff in Bruvno became operational, and the Mol Collective Special Police Forces, divided into five infantry battalions, launched an attack at 0600, with the following tasks:

*“a) take the southeast and east hinterland of the town of Udbina, using a battalion (390 members) of the special police from the Zagreb, Karlovac and Krapina-Zagorje Police Departments; the main task is to protect the left flank of the forces engaged in liberating Donji Lapac;*

*b) liberate Donji Lapac, using a battalion (400 members) of the Special Police from the Osijek-Baranja, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Sisak-Moslavina (Sisak group) and Split-Dalmatia Police Departments;*

*c) liberate Gornji Lapac and Dobro Selo using a battalion (330 members) of the Special Police from the Lika-Senj, Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Varaždin Police Departments and the Lučko Anti-terrorist Unit;*

*d) reach the wider area of the state border with Bosnia and Herzegovina at Kulen Vakuf, using a battalion (310 members) of the special police from the Sisak-Moslavina (Kutina group), Bjelovar-Bilogora, Požega-Slavonia and Primorje-Gorski Kotar Police Departments”.*<sup>100</sup>

151. Before the attack started at 0700, the commander of the Jordanian Battalion of UNCRO received notification about the plan for the rocket and artillery fire to be delivered by the Mol Special Police forces on the attack axes in the direction of Donji

<sup>99</sup> Order of the Chief of the HV GS, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-417, of 6 August 1995 at 2100.

<sup>100</sup> Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, no.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, p. 14.

and Gornji Lapac. The village of Mazin was liberated in a swift action at 0930, followed by Gornji Lapac at 1300, Donji Lapac at 1400 and finally Dobroselo at 1430.<sup>101</sup>

152. In his analysis, General Markač notes that after the liberation of Donji Lapac, the Mol Collective Special Police Forces were, from 1400 to 1440, exposed to fierce friendly fire from artillery weapons; it ended only at the intervention of General Markač. The War Diary of the Artillery and Rocket Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade contains a slightly different description, confirming that the unit was firing at the Lapac area, but specifying it was Gornji Lapac:

*“7 August 1995, 1330 1 ‘Grad’ fired 175 rockets on targets in Gornji Lapac.”*<sup>102</sup>

153. The Gospić Military District troops entered the town in the course of the afternoon:

*“1. At around 1800, the Gospić Military District units acting in concert with the Mol special units liberated the town of Donji Lapac, reaching the state border.*

*This means that the Gospić Military District fully implemented its task in the “Storm-3” offensive operation, liberating the entire area in the Gospić Military District zone. The units have furthermore been involved in the clearing, battlefield sanitations and collection of war spoils.”*<sup>103</sup>

154. The Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector indicates that at 1930 *“troops from the 118<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment of the HV entered Donji Lapac from the direction of Udbina, using a macadam road”*.<sup>104</sup> The units of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 118<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment, attached to the 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade entered Donji Lapac together with it:

*“On the third day of the operation, the 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade liberated Udbina, and on the fourth day, it entered Donji Lapac, linking up with the Mol forces which had been advancing from the direction of Gračac.”*<sup>105</sup>

155. After the liberation of Donji Lapac, most of the special police forces left the town and continued with their combat operations in the direction of Kulen Vakuf in the

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>102</sup> War Log, Artillery and Rocket Battalion, 9th Guards Brigade, p.189.

<sup>103</sup> Regular Daily Report no. 8. of the Gospić Military District, Class: 80-02/95-01/06, Ref.no.: 1043-04-95-31 of 7 August 1995.

<sup>104</sup> Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm by the Special Police Sector, no.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, p. 16.

<sup>105</sup> Analysis of the Course of Operation Storm 95 by the Gospić Military District Command, Class: 80-02/95-01/06, Ref.no.: 1043-04-95-43, of 30 August 1995.

sector around the G. Lapac-village of Boričevac-Kulen Vakuf road. By 1905, they took the area of the village of Boričevac, village of Ostrovica and western part of Kulen Vakuf (western bank of the Una River).

156. During the day, the Mol Collective Specila Police Forces linked up with the Gospić Military District troops on the access routes to Udbina at 1500, and with the 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade in Otrić at 1505.<sup>106</sup>

157. A report the Chief of the HV GS sent to the Croatian President notes:

***“Split Military District forces took the following line:***

– *STRMICA-PLAVNO-OTRIĆ-GRAČAC and are preparing to press the attack along the state border on the OTRIĆ-SRB axis.*

*“The units under the command of the Split Military District on the Knin front did not engage the enemy on 6 and 7 August 1995; they did not carry out the order of the Chief of the HV GS.*

*“After taking MALOVAN and BRUVNO, the **Mol Special Police** pressed the attack; an element linked up with the Gospić Military District units in the Udbina area.*

– *A portion of the Mol units took Gornji and Donji Lapac, with the artillery support of the Gospić Military District.*

– *The third element at the same time held the MALOVAN-OTRIĆ passes.*

***“The Gospić Military District forces continued fighting, liberating Udbina and taking the following line:***

– *D. LAPAC-UDBINA-PEĆANI-FRKAŠIĆ-STATE BORDER including SAVSKA GLAVA (TP 383), and are pressing the attack in concert with the Mol Special Police on the FRKAŠIĆ-ŽELJEZNO POLJE axis.”<sup>107</sup>*

158. On the evening of 7 August 1995, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač attended a meeting at the Zadar TCP of the Split Military District:

*“\*7 August – in the evening, the commanders of the Mol SPU, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion/9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade, the Croatian Guards Brigade and the coordinator (my representative at the coordination meeting at the Zadar TCP) held a meeting to elaborate a plan for*

<sup>106</sup> Operational Log of the 4th Guards Brigade (July 1995), p. 25.

<sup>107</sup> Report of the Chief of the HV GS to the President of the Republic of Croatia, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-427, 7 August 1995 at 1710.

*further action. They elaborated further the task I sent them and prepared, which I in turn had been ordered by the Chief of the GS HV.*

*The order pertained to an action to route and push back the enemy from the areas of Gračac, Malovan, Srb, and to take, together with the 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade, the area of the village of Begluci- Krčko brdo-Una railway station...<sup>108</sup>*

159. The attendance at this meeting was confirmed in an intelligence report from the Split Military District Intelligence Department, at the Zadar TCP, noting the line the Collective Special Police Forces had reached:

*“As the units advanced in concert, they took the Krupa area and proceeded to clear the Velebit area.*

*The Mol SP units reached the following positions: Dropolje-Ograđenik, TP 1122-Sekanski Vršak, TP 690 (Lapačko Polje-Dobroselo and along the Dobroselo-Gračac road, and the heights overlooking the Gračac-Malovan road up to the village of Otrić. A link-up with the 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade units from the direction of Udbina and Korenica is expected to be achieved in the Lapac sector.*

*An operational meeting is underway, attended by General Mareković (error, should read General Markač) and the commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade, to discuss the coordination of the actions for tomorrow.”<sup>109</sup>*

160. The order that was discussed on this meeting is the order of the Chief of the HV GS for D+3, implemented a day late. The Split Military District commander, General Gotovina, issued an order for its implementation, which is relevant because it covers the area where the Collective Special Police Forces of the Mol SPU are deployed:

**“1. 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade**

*Regroup and prepare the forces for an attack in the zone of responsibility as indicated on the map (attached to this Order), with the following task:*

*Bring in and group the forces from the current deployment area to the RASTIĆEVO-MALOVAN line, launching an attack along the OTRIĆ-SRB-*

<sup>108</sup> Analysis of Operation Kozjak-95 by the Split Military District Command – Excerpt from the analysis for the area of Jasenice-Obrovac-Velebit-Kaštel Žegarski-Otrić-Srb, Class: SP 81/95-01/20, Ref.no.: 1080-01-95-3, of 20 August 1995.

<sup>109</sup> Intelligence Report of the Zadar FCP – Intelligence Department; Class: SP/95-01/11; Ref.no.: 1060-02-10-95-214 of 7 August 1995 at 1845.

*RAĐENOVIĆI road. Take the village of SRB and once the BOSANSKI OSREDCI-KRČKO BRDO line is reached, halt the attack and start with active defence...*

*In the execution of the task, the units should act in concert with the Mol Special Police in the sector of the village of Otrić and with the 7<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade and 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion/9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade with the Croatian Guards Brigade.*

...

**3. ZADAR OG (for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion/9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade):**

*“2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion/9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade and the Croatian Guards Brigade are to prepare and regroup for an attack in the area of responsibility:*

*“See map (attached to this Order); their task is to act in concert with the 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade and the Gospić Military District units, and launch an attack from the MALOVAN –GRAČAC line along the axis of the village of VUČIPOLJE-OROŽOVAC-BEGLUCI to rout and push back the enemy forces, take the village of BEGLUCI, halt the attack once the KRIČKO BRDO-UNA railway station line is reached and mount active defence”.*<sup>110</sup>

161. The overall results of the operations on 7 August 1995 were summed up in a report Lieutenant General Mladen Markač submitted to the Chief of the HV GS in the early morning of 8 August 1995.

*“On 7 August 1995, the Collective Special Police Forces took the village of Mazin, Dobroselo and Donji Lapac, with rocket and artillery support and using armour; after reaching this line, the units regrouped and launched a swift advance toward the state border and the Una river. The objective was to liberate Kulen Vakuf.*

*In addition, a portion of the Special Police forces (force strength of two companies) cleared the terrain at the foot of Velebit, in an area stretching from Medak to Sveti Rok, in order to rout the remaining enemy groups.*

*At 1900, the Collective Special Police Forces took Kulen Vakuf and deployed on the dominant heights in the general area, in order to prevent any counter-attacks by Serb forces”.*<sup>111</sup>


162. In the course of the fourth day of combat, the casualties in the Mol special units totalled 7 wounded and 2 missing in action; the latter went missing together with

<sup>110</sup> Order of the Split Military District – Sajkovići FCP, Class: SP 8/95-01/17, Ref.no.: 1080-01-95-348, Zadar, 7 August 1995.

<sup>111</sup> Report on the line reached by the Collective Special Police Forces, no.: 511-01-VT-106/95, Seline HQ, of 8 August 1995.

their vehicle in the general area of the village of Mazin. The fact that two police members went missing – they were captured by the enemy and later exchanged – shows that there still remained elements of the enemy forces retreating in disarray.

163. A Military Police platoon was established and became operational on 7 August in Gračac, comprising 30 personnel with a wide range of specialties; one squad moved with the HV units towards Udbina and further on to D. Lapac, in order to start a search operation and to start the process of establishing an Military Police platoon in D. Lapac.<sup>112</sup>



## 8.5. Activities on 8 August 1995

164. Since the troops of the Split and Gospić Military Districts had still not set up positions on the state border, in the remainder of his report of 8 August 1995,

<sup>112</sup> Report on the implementation of the tasks of the 71<sup>st</sup> MP Battalion in the combat zone and recently liberated areas, Class: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ref.no.: 2232-01/02-95-22, of 7 August 1995.

General Markač sought from the Chief of the Croatian Army Main Staff (GS HV) in particular:

*“1. That the line of demarcation between the Military Districts be forwarded to the Special Police, as they are obliged to assume from the Collective Special Police Forces the combat security of the reached frontline at the border of the Republic of Croatia.*

*2. That the 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade forces link with the Special Police forces during the day at the state border on the Una River (wider area of Kulen Vakuf).*

*3. That the troops from Gospić Military District be redeployed toward their ultimate objective at the border of the Republic of Croatia and coordinate with the Collective Forces Staff stationed in Donji Lapac.*

*4. ...”<sup>113</sup>*

165. During the day, the Collective Special Police Forces reinforced their defence at the achieved line, and one battalion of the MoI Special Police (410 personnel from the Krapina-Zagorje, Vukovar-Srijem, Koprivnica-Križevci and Šibenik Police Departments) reinforced the area and extended the line toward Kulen Vakuf by occupying the villages of Kalati and Žegari, where preparations were made to relinquish their positions at the state border to the units of the Gospić and Split Military Districts as ordered by the Chief of the GS HV on the preceding day. Three companies of the regular police began to organize police stations in the towns of Udbina, Donji Lapac and Gornji Lapac.<sup>114</sup> After a meeting between the chief of the Collective Forces Staff with all commanders in the village of Boričevac, reserve forces were assigned for intervention at Kulen Vakuf, while the remaining units were sent to their own police department headquarters for a rest.<sup>115</sup> During active combat on the fifth day, the MoI Special Forces in the Lika/Dalmatia theatre of war recorded a total of 2 wounded and 4 injured members.

166. The troops from the Split Military District advanced in the direction of Otrić-Srb and Knin-Srb and broke through to the state border of the Republic of Croatia, while in the early morning hours of 8 August, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion/9<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade set off from the line of departure at Malovan-Gračac and mounted an attack together with the 1<sup>st</sup> Croatian Guards Brigade, which in their analysis of the operation stated:

<sup>113</sup> Report on the line achieved by the Collective Special Police Forces, No.: 511-01-VT-106/95, Seline HQ of 8 August 1995.

<sup>114</sup> Analysis of the course of Operation Storm, Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-30-771/95 of 28 September 1995, p. 17.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

*“On the night of 7/8 August, we transferred the unit to Gračac, where we received the task to direct the attack, with the participation of the 4<sup>th</sup> Guards Brigade and Gospić Military District units, setting off from the Malovan-Gračac line, toward the village of Vučipolje-Orožac-village of Begluci, to push back and destroy enemy forces and occupy the village of Begluci, to halt the attack on the Krčko brdo-Una train station line and organise defence.*

*The attack commenced at 0500, and an assault from movement was staged.*

*During the first day of the attack, the territory between the line of departure and the line running between the villages of D. Suvaja and Neteka was placed under control, and we advanced to the Srb-Donji Lapac road. On the second day of the attack, we reached the left bank of the Krka River.”<sup>116</sup>*

167. Based on this summary, it is apparent that other forces not under the authority of General Mladen Markač had entered the area in and around Gračac.

168. In its daily report to the GS HV, the Gospić Military District stated:

*“The organization of defence at the state border of the Republic of Croatia in the zone of responsibility of the Military District is under way. The focus of defence is along the Udbina-Donji Lapac-Kulen Vakuf route. The Military District’s zone of responsibility ... is divided into 5 belts in which reserve brigades – regiments have been engaged with one infantry battalion each....*

*The bulk of artillery and armoured vehicles are focused in defending the area of Donji Lapac and Udbina...*

*The remaining forces are engaged in clearing, battlefield sanitation, gathering of livestock and war spoils and extraction of damaged materiel and equipment.”<sup>117</sup>*

169. Although there was no longer any direct threat of a possible infantry assault, enemy forces continued to occasionally launch artillery salvos from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is reflected in the report of the Gospić Military District:

*“During the day, the enemy was active in the wider area of Donji Lapac, firing several artillery rounds from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”<sup>118</sup>*

<sup>116</sup> Analysis of Operation Storm, 1<sup>st</sup> Croatian Guards Brigade, Class: SP 8/95-01/01, Ref.no: 3311-10-01-95-2 of 23 August 1995


<sup>117</sup> Report of Gospić Military District; Class.: 80-02/95-01/01; Ref.no.: 1043-04-95-104 of 8 August 1995

<sup>118</sup> Intelligence report of Gospić Military District Command’s Intelligence Department, Class.: 804-08/95-02/01, Ref.no.: 1043-14-95-263, of 8 August 1995.

170. The Military Police Platoon was formed in Donji Lapac on 8 August 1995 and began executing its mission. In his daily report, the commander of the 71<sup>st</sup> Military Police Battalion stated, among other things:

*“A search of the terrain in Udbina and Donji Lapac was conducted, and upon entry of the Croatian Army units, no notable events were recorded, i.e. no one was taken into custody.”*<sup>119</sup>

171. At the same time the Military Police Platoon in Gračac established three checkpoints on the overpass in Štikada and Kontići.<sup>120</sup> The report of 9 August confirms that this indicated the establishment of a Military Police operations system which continued to function with stability over the subsequent period.<sup>121</sup>



**Mol Special Police operations on 8 August 1995**

<sup>119</sup> Report pertaining to execution of mission by 71<sup>st</sup> Military Police Battalion in the combat zone and the newly-liberated territories, Class.: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ref.no.: 2232-01/02-95-26, of 8 August 1995.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Report pertaining to execution of mission by 71<sup>st</sup> Military Police Battalion in the combat zone and the newly-liberated territories, Class.: SP.80-01/95-156/01, Ref.no.: 2232-01/02-95-26, of 9 August 1995.

## 8.6. Activities on 9 August 1995

172. According to the report submitted by Major Petar Ričko to the Intelligence Department of the GS HV on 10 August 1995, the Collective Specila Police Forces carried out the following missions:

*“During 9 August, the Collective Special Police Forces cleared the wider area of the northern section of Velebit (wider area of Bunavac, TP 1199)...*

*In wider zone of the border of the Republic of Croatia along the Una River (Kulen Vakuf area) in the pre-noon hours, the Special Police Forces endured major artillery rocket fire, and it responded with its own artillery along the right bank of the Una...*

*Pursuant to the order of the GS HV, the units of the Gospić Military District assumed the positions on the Una River (Croatian border) during the afternoon, and set up their artillery on the firing positions.*


*Additionally, during the afternoon the Special Police Forces regrouped to a force strength of one battalion (the remaining troops were sent on a two-day leave due to exhaustion), and a new TCP was established for better coordination of the command system and to secure logistics support to units in Gračac.”<sup>122</sup>*

173. The Collective Special Police Forces of the Ministry of the Interior formally turned over the border in the territory of Gornji and Donji Lapac to the units of the 118<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment and the Gospić Military District's 8<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment, while the Collective Forces Staff received an order<sup>123</sup> from the Chief of the GS HV for a new mission indicating a new phase in the Collective Special Police Force operations, i.e. a transition from offensive combat operations to clearing and searching the terrain, first by encircling enemy forces at Petrova Gora and then pushing forward to the state border.

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<sup>122</sup> Report of Major Petar Ričko to the Intelligence Department of the GS HV, Seline, 10 August 1995.

<sup>123</sup> Order from the Chief of the GS HV, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-444, of 9 August 1995 at 1220.



**Mol Special Police operations on 9 August 1995**

## 8.7. Conclusion

174. The Mol Collective Special Police Forces successfully executed all orders issued by the Chief of the GS HV from 4 to 8 August 1995. Lieutenant General Mladen Markač established a command system which allowed him to command his forces under very complex geographic conditions, particularly in the first two days of the operation, through the Collective Forces Staff, either directly or through the Chief of the Mol Collective Forces Staff. The almost daily repositioning of the TCP as close to the frontline as possible enabled uninterrupted communications and relatively rapid interventions in case subordinate commanders observed problems which they could not resolve. Of course, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač could have intervened only if he was aware of what was happening.

175. After fierce battles in the first two days, during which the enemy's frontline was severed and Gračac was taken as a vital communications hub, by the evening hours

of 5 August 1995, General Markač transitioned to pursuit of enemy forces to prevent their consolidation in depth and seized Bruvno, in which, according to earlier intelligence assessments armoured/infantry intervention forces equivalent to a battalion were posted, which was proven inaccurate. From that moment forward until 8 August, the Collective Special Police Forces in the territory of Medak (35 km from Gračac), Udbina (34 km from Gračac) and Donji Lapac (43 km from Gračac) merged with the Gospić Military District's troops and, in Otrić (21 km from Gračac), with the Split Military District's units, occasionally making contact with withdrawing enemy forces.

## 9. Activities of the MoI Special Police Units in Clear and Search Operations

176. Upon completion of Operation Storm, the MoI Special Police Units, concluding on 9 August 1995, withdrew from the border zone of the Republic of Croatia along the Una River (the positions reached were taken over by the forces of the Gospić Military District) and regrouped their forces to prepare for subsequent missions, and to allow rest time for personnel.<sup>124</sup> Special Police activities did not cease here, but their focus shifted from classic combat missions to clear (mop-up) and search operations. Even these missions, which the Special Police Forces of the Ministry of the Interior executed from 13 August to 9 October 1995, were not conducted at their own initiative but rather exclusively under orders from the Chief of the GS HV to whom the MoI Collective Special Police Forces were still subordinate. This is clearly apparent in the documents sent from the GS HV to General Markač, as well as the reports which General Markač sent to the Chief of the GS HV every day after the completion of search operations in a given area.

### 9.1. Conceptual definition of clear and search operation

#### 9.1.1. Clear (mop-up)

177. Prior to describing the timeline of events, it will be necessary to clarify certain terms. In the official documentation which was developed during and after Operation Storm, the terms clear (mop-up) and field search are frequently mentioned, sometimes separately:

*“A portion of forces is engaged in field mop-up, battlefield sanitation, gathering of livestock and war spoils and extraction of damaged materiel and equipment.”<sup>125</sup>*

*“1. The MoI Special Police Forces under the command of Lieutenant General Mladen Markač shall conduct clearing and complete seize of the Petrova Gora sector.”<sup>126</sup>*

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<sup>124</sup> Report of the Ministry of Interior Special Police Command to the Intelligence Department of the GS HV, Seline, of 10 August 1995.

<sup>125</sup> Daily report of the Gospić Military District to the Operative Centre of the GS HV, Class.: 80-02/95-01/06, Ref.no.: 1043-04-95-445, of 9 August 1995.

<sup>126</sup> Order issued by the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-459, of 10 August 1995 at 1640.

*“The Mol Special Police, in cooperation with the forces of the Gospić Military District, is working intensely on field clearing and neutralization of residual small enemy groups.”<sup>127</sup>*

*“1. The HQs of the Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split Military Districts shall be obliged to prepare and execute the following core tasks within their zones of responsibility:*

*...*

*b) Destruction of residual enemy groups and field clearing*

*...*

*f) Training of combat formations through a cycle of preparations and replacement guarding the state border and in search operations.”<sup>128</sup>*

*“3. On 16 August 1995, as of 0700, be ready for a field search of the liberated territory in the zone left of: Cerovac Caves (not inclusive) – TP 683, Rujevac – TP 1208, V.Sedlo, village of Dobašnica (inclusive) and right of: TP 821, Vodice – TP 1207, Maglaj with a task to search the terrain up to the line from the village of Dobašnica – Reljić – TP 855 according to a separate plan.”<sup>129</sup>*

and some places in the same sentence:

*“With the objective of organized planning and initiation of search and clearing of the terrain and buildings by the special units of the Ministry of Interior and Military Police and deployment of Croatian Army units for the basic mission of regulating and safeguarding the state border...”<sup>130</sup>*

so it is unclear as to whether these are synonyms or differing categories of activity or combat missions.

178. In an attempt to clarify these doubts it will be worthwhile to start with the definition of the tactical tasks *clearing*, *clear*.

*“Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces so they cannot interfere with the friendly unit's mission. In all cases, this task requires a*

<sup>127</sup> Report of the Chief of the GS HV to the President of the Republic of Croatia, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-438 at 1800, of 8 August 1995.

<sup>128</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-485 of 14 August 1995.

<sup>129</sup> Order to 134<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment for field search, Class.: 8/95-01/01, Ref.no.: 8286-01-95-502, of 14 August 1995.

<sup>130</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-503 of 21 August 1995.

*thorough reconnaissance to discover the enemy's locations. After discovering the location, the clearing force manoeuvres against the enemy force. [...] This task requires significant time and other resources. In his mission statement, a commander can modify the objective associated with this task to destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of only enemy forces larger than a stated size. In this case, the clearing force keeps smaller enemy forces under observation while the rest of the friendly force bypasses them.”<sup>131</sup>*

179. From this definition it is apparent that clearing operations are a classic combat mission in which a specified unit or task force first locates the enemy, and based on its strength, composition and deployment, undertakes a given manoeuvre (frontal attack, penetration, encirclement...) with the goal of the permanent clearing of an assigned area from all enemy forces, or to reduce residual forces to a size in which they have no capacity to threaten the operations of friendly forces.

180. The activities conducted during the actual operation from 4 to 10 August 1995, which are cited/described in the documents as clearing, can hardly be classified into this category in relation to the stated definition for the simple reason that clearing must be defined as the core mission of the unit conducting it, and not as ancillary to the attack, exploitation of success or pursuit of the enemy. Based on the reports received by the GS HV it is apparent that such clearing was widespread and that not only the special police forces, but also other Croatian Army units and the military police engaged in it. The examples are numerous, and only a few will be cited for the sake of illustration:

*“During the day, field clearing activities continued in the Golubić-Kaštel Žegarski-Ervenik area in the direction of Velebit.”<sup>132</sup>*

*“A day of rest followed, i.e. of preparation to execute a new mission, and on 7 August 1995 at 2130 we received orders to transfer to Gračac. We arrived in Gračac at 0030. and after a few hours of rest, at dawn we set off on clearing operations from the village of Brkljači – TP 1186, Mila – the village of Labusi (first combat group), while the second combat group set off on clear operations along the axis Novakovići*

<sup>131</sup> Field Manual No. 3-90 Tactics, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 4 July 2001, Appendix B, p. B-6.

<sup>132</sup> Intelligence report of the Zadar FCP – Intelligence Department; Class.: SP/95-01/11; Ref.no.: 1060-02-10-95-214 of 7 August 1995 at 1845.

– Škundrići – Podmila – Velika Popina – Vrpolje – the village of Labusi, where the two groups reassembled.”<sup>133</sup>

“Additionally, during the day the Special Police Forces (equivalent to 2 companies) conducted clearing of the sub-Velebit terrain in the area from Medak to Sveti Rok, with the aim of neutralizing residual enemy groups”.<sup>134</sup>

“MoI Special Police, in cooperation with the troops of the Gospić Military District, worked intensively on clearing the terrain and neutralizing small residual enemy groups.

The Gospić Military District troops conducted redeployment of units into newly specified zones of responsibility, clearing, battlefield sanitation, gathering of livestock and war spoils and extraction of damaged materiel and equipment.”<sup>135</sup>

“1. All Military Police units engaged in combat operations must be withdrawn from the combat zone at 0700 on 10 August 1995.

2. Anti-terrorists platoons and the remaining Military Police personnel participating in combat operations must be allowed to rest during 10 and 11 August 1995, and then as of 0700 on 12 August 1995 they must be engaged in a search (clearing) of the liberated territories of the Republic of Croatia in the zone of responsibility of the MP units according to the commander’s plan, with implementation of all security measures.”<sup>136</sup>

181. Most of these “clear” operations were carried out with relatively small formations, over limited areas and against even smaller enemy forces of which there was no knowledge that they were in a given area, rather they were usually “encountered” during an operation.

182. The only operation which demonstrated all of the elements of clearing was the clearing operation at Petrova Gora.

<sup>133</sup> Report on use of the anti-terrorist platoon/72<sup>nd</sup> Military Police Battalion in Operation Storm, Class.: 8/95-01/08, Ref.no.: 2233-01/1-95-17 of 14 August 1995.

<sup>134</sup> Report to the Chief of the GS HV on the achieved line of the MoI Collective Special Police Forces, No.: 511-01-VT-106/95 of 8 August 1995.

<sup>135</sup> Report of the Chief of the GS HV to the President of the Republic of Croatia, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-438 of 8 August 1995 at 1800

<sup>136</sup> Order of the Chief of the Military Police Department for withdrawal of Military Police Units from combat operations, Class.: SP 80-01/95-158, Ref.no. 512-19-01-95-504, of 9 August 1995.

### 9.1.2. Search

183. As opposed to clearing, the (field) search is described in the manual “Command and Combat Tactics in the Police”<sup>137</sup> used to train Special Police officers, as follows:

*“the organized and systematic examination of a specific physical area and the buildings on it in order to detect the presence and positions of belligerents or traces which may indicate the latter and initiation of armed contact”*.<sup>138</sup>

184. Therefore, the goal of the search in combat operations or outside of them is to primarily detect the presence of the enemy and initiate armed contact therewith, while their neutralization or capture primarily depends on the ratio of force and is not designated as an objective as in the case of clearing. Besides this task, the MoS Special Forces also searched the terrain to find depots and discarded components of weapons and military equipment and mine fields, and also to find, register, assist or evacuate civilians in order to establish normal living conditions in the liberated territories.

185. Since, according to the Internal Affairs Act,<sup>139</sup> and the Croatian Government’s Directive,<sup>140</sup> the struggle against terrorism (sabotage/terrorist groups) is stipulated as a fundamental task of the Special Police, the field search is a routine task for which the commanders and members of Special Police Units are trained as a part of police tactics. This training is generally conducted in compliance with Chapter 4, “Combat Tactics of Police Bodies”, where, under section 4.4.4., the work of the police group/sector in the search of land, settlements and buildings is described.<sup>141</sup> In the manual, it states that *“searches of land may be, depending on available forces and terrain conditions, conducted by skirmish line, patrols, squad columns or combined methods. Searching in a skirmish line would be the most thorough, for the distance between individual searchers can be arranged so that, depending on the landscape, they can communicate and work together”*.<sup>142</sup> In practice, this method was used to

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<sup>137</sup> Manual: “Command and Combat Tactics in the Police”, Tomo Radičević, Published by Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, 1991.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>139</sup> Amendments to the Internal Affairs Act, No.: PA4-92/1-94, of 12 October 1994, Article 11.

<sup>140</sup> Directive on the Internal Structure and Operating Methods of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia of 23 February 1995, Article 27.

<sup>141</sup> Manual: “Command and Combat Tactics in the Police”, Tomo Radičević, Published by Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, 1991, pp. 128-138.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., p. 130.

detect residual or infiltrated hostile forces, minefields and other obstacles and so forth. It was conducted in one of two ways:

- (1) The search unit sets off from the initial line in a skirmish line individually or in small groups of 3-5 individuals at a given distance from each other and the designated search zone to the termination line specified on the map, and
- (2) Besides the search unit, at the termination line the unit sets up blockade-combat checkpoints for intervention in case of individuals who may have withdrawn before the search team. This method was generally applied in terrain with difficult passability.

186. As an example of training for search missions, the letter from the acting chief of the Special Police Sector, Mr. Željko Sačić,<sup>143</sup> to Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak can be cited, in which the former seeks consent from the latter for the additional qualification of the leaders of the Moli Special Police Units. Based on consent from the assistant minister, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač, and approval from the Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak, a course was held in the training centre at Kovčanje from 9 February to 9 April 1995 with 60 participants, at which, as a part of general military tactics, the 10-hour subject "Special Police Units in Field Searches and the Suppression of Sabotage/Terrorist Groups" was studied.<sup>144</sup> A similar course for 75 specialist team leaders was held in Kovčanje from 15 April to 2 July 1995.<sup>145</sup>

187. As a part of this subject, participants were provided with search order form<sup>146</sup> which they completed themselves.

188. Based on the aforementioned aspects, it can be stated that the field search is a "natural" task for Moli Special Police Units, and this may also be confirmed by the compiled documentation which is rather detailed in the matter of searches, as opposed to the combat documentation which the special forces headquarters generated during Operation Storm.

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<sup>143</sup> Letter from acting chief of the Special Police Sector to the Interior Minister, No.: 511-01-30-67/95, of 31 January 1995.

<sup>144</sup> Letter from acting chief of the Special Police Sector to the Interior Minister, No.: 511-01-30-67/95, of 31 January 1995.

<sup>145</sup> Annual report on the work of the Ministry of Interior Special Police in 1995, No.:511-01-30- /96, of 22 February 1996.

<sup>146</sup> Model order for field search of the Special Police Sector, no.: 511-01-30- /95, Zagreb, 5 July 1995 with written command as an example of course work.

## 9.2. Operation to clear Petrova Gora – Storm-Encirclement

189. In compliance with the new operative situation after the surrender of the 21<sup>st</sup> Kordun Corps, and in the interest of establishing full control over the Petrova Gora area, the Chief of the GS HV issued an order on 10 August 1995, whereunder Lieutenant General Mladen Markač was assigned with the following mission in Para 1:

*“1. The Mol Special Police Forces under the command of Lieutenant General Mladen Markač shall clear and fully occupy the Petrova Gora sector.*

*The clear plan shall be drafted by Lieutenant General Markač in cooperation with Major General Marijan Mareković.”*<sup>147</sup>

190. The remaining Paragraphs of the order regulate the reinforcement of the Mol Special Units with the Croatian Army’s 153<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 102<sup>nd</sup> Brigade and the 110<sup>th</sup> Brigade’s Armoured Company, and artillery support to Mol forces provided by two artillery groups from the Croatian Army’s 110<sup>th</sup> and 137<sup>th</sup> Brigades, while Para 4 regulates the launch time for Operation Storm-Encirclement<sup>148</sup> as 13 August 1995 at 0400.

191. Lieutenant General Mladen Markač was appointed force commander, while the deputy chief of the GS HV for Army, Major General Marijan Mareković was appointed operational commander for Operation Storm-Encirclement with command post in Vojnić.

192. In compliance with this mission, the Mol Special Police Units from Northern Dalmatia and Lika, and those on leave from their core police departments, were transferred to the Petrova Gora area, which is geographically outside of Sector South, in which the Mol Collective Special Police Forces had operated until then, and they remained there until 21 August 1995. The order was issued to all Police Departments, except those of Dubrovnik-Neretva, Virovitica-Podravina, Lika-Senj and Zadar-Knin, to:

*“on 12 August 1995, by 1900, be at the given position, with the given number of personnel, equipped with the required arms, ammunition, gear and materiel and*

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<sup>147</sup> Order issued by the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-459, of 10 August 1995 at 1640.

<sup>148</sup> In this regard, in the written correspondence pertaining to clearing and search activities, Operation Storm-Encirclement is generally used to distinguish it operatively and chronologically from Operation Storm.

*equipment, in line with previous experience (Operation Storm), for stays in the field and performance of clearing the terrain of residual enemy groups.*<sup>149</sup>

193. As already noted previously, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač commanded only the Special Police Units within the Collective Special Police Forces, and these were the only troops engaged in clearing of the Petrova Gora area in Operation Storm-Encirclement. All other forces not part of the Collective Special Police Forces were under the command of the Police Departments they belonged to.

194. Although under an earlier order Major General Marijan Mareković was designated the commander of Operation Storm-Encirclement, the Chief of the GS HV issued a new order addressed to Lieutenant General Mladen Markač appointing him commander of Operation Storm-Encirclement. In this order, among other matters the following was regulated:

*“1. Establish a blockade of the Petrova Gora area with units reinforcing the Mol Special Forces, as follows:*

*– on the line between Vrginmost and the Glina River (between the forces of the 110<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment and the 99<sup>th</sup> Brigade on the eastern side of Petrova Gora), the forces of the 102<sup>nd</sup> Brigade and the 153<sup>rd</sup> Brigade of the Zagreb Military District,*

*– on the line north-west and south of Petrova Gora, the 110<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment, the 143<sup>rd</sup> Home Guard Regiment and the 99<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the Karlovac Military District.*

*2. These reinforcements shall be used exclusively to effect a blockade, and their possible deployment into the clearing area at the exclusively order of Lieutenant General Mladen Markač.*

...

*4. Establish a command post for the Mol Special Forces (Operation “Encirclement”) in Vojnić.”*<sup>150</sup>

195. As a part of preparations, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač held a final coordination meeting with the commanders of the Mol Special Units and the commanders of the brigades and Home Guard regiments, at which the following conclusions were drawn:

<sup>149</sup> Order issued by the Chief of the Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-31-1099/95, of 11 August 1995.

<sup>150</sup> Order issued by the Chief of the GS HV, Class: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-470 of 11 August 1995.

*“(1) Full initial coordination [illegible] of the operation has been effected in all elements, from the deployment of personnel to [illegible] units (signal, artillery, logistics, medical).*

*(2) All units are in the expected sectors [illegible] of operation ready to carry out the coming mission [illegible] readiness is 13 August at 0430, after which [illegible] will launch the planned operation”.*<sup>151</sup>

196. The clearing operation at Petrova Gora commenced on 13 August 1995 at 1732,<sup>152</sup> and based on reports sent to the Chief of the GS HV on that day<sup>153 154</sup> it proceeded with minimum resistance mounted by enemy groups (one enemy soldier was captured in the Magarčevac area), the entire area was placed under control and the operation concluded on 14 August 1995.

197. During Operation Storm-Encirclement, coordination between all participants was thorough, which enabled implementation of the Operation without extraordinary events, in line with all principles of planning, organization and conduct of clearing operation, as well as with command and control of such operations.

### **9.3. Search operations from 21 August to 9 October 1995 in the territory of Lika, Northern Dalmatia and outside of Sector South**

198. The commencement of a comprehensive field search operation was initiated at the order of the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, General Zvonimir Červenko issued to all Military District commanders, the commander of the Southern Front and the Croatian Air Force on 14 August 1995, which defined their paramount tasks in their zones of responsibility.<sup>155</sup>

199. The following paramount tasks were defined in the orders:

*“A) SAFEGUARD THE STATE BORDER*

...

*B) DESTROY REMAINING HOSTILE FORMATIONS AND CLEARING*

<sup>151</sup> Conclusions of the meeting between the commander of Operation Storm-Encirclement and the commanders of participating units, Vojnić, 12 August 1995.

<sup>152</sup> Report of the General Headquarters of the Operation at its onset, Vojnić, 13 August 1995.

<sup>153</sup> Report of the Operational Headquarters with status as at 13 August 1995 at 1000.

<sup>154</sup> Report of the Operational Headquarters with status as at 13 August 1995 at 1700.

<sup>155</sup> Command of the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-485 of 14 August 1995.

*Reserve forces (Home Guard and domicile units, and Guard intervention units), in organized, planned and consecutive way, shall conduct field search and clear operations to route and disperse residual or possibly infiltrated hostile formations.*

**C) SECURE ROUTES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION**

...

**D) RAPIDLY ESTABLISH PHYSICAL COMMAND STRUCTURES**

...

**E) REPLENISH COMBAT UNITS AND HOME GUARD FORMATIONS WITH PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES PER STRUCTURE**

**F) TRAIN WAR STRUCTURES IN UNITS THROUGH A CYCLE OF PREPARATIONS AND REPLACEMENTS TO SAFEGUARD THE STATE BORDER AND CONDUCT FIELD SEARCH.**<sup>156</sup>

200. As apparent from the order for clearing operations (Para B), and field search operations (Para F), formations of the Croatian Army were deployed too. The order was not forwarded to Lieutenant General Mladen Markač.

201. Although the Croatian Army reached the border of the Republic of Croatia, in the liberated territories the situation remained precarious due to residual as well as infiltrated enemy units and formations. An example of the threat to normal life is reflected in the following statements:

*“In the territory of Medak (Raduč), residual enemy formations attacked members of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia with automatic rifle-fire, during which four policemen (the number has not been confirmed) were wounded according to reports”.*<sup>157</sup>

*“On the evening of 12 into 13 August 1995, at approximately 0230, 2 (two) members of the 8<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment, 120 mm Mix Mortar Battery of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Battalion-Opatija were killed ... Probably a small group of Chetnik irregulars (3-4) entered the village ... our troops were hit with small arms fire ... the irregulars once more fled into the forest ...”*<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Intelligence Report of the Intelligence Sector of the Gospić Military District, Class.: 804-08/95-02/01, Ref.no.: 1043-14-95-266 of 11 August 1995.

<sup>158</sup> Extraordinary Report of the Gospić Military District to the Political Department of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, Class.: 818-01/95-01/05-2, Ref.no.: 1043-17-95-24, of 13 August 1995.

202. Since the security situation remained complicated, the Chief of the GS HV on 21 August 1995 issued an order to regulate delivery of data necessary for plans to search and clear facilities and the terrain by Interior Ministry special units and MPs:

*“In the interest of organized planning and implementation of search and clear operations in facilities and in the field by the special units of the Ministry of the Interior and the Military Police intended for this purpose and utilization of Croatian Army formations for the fundamental tasks of regulating and safeguarding the state border,*

*I DO HEREBY ORDER*

*1. The Headquarters of the Military District and Knin Garrison Command shall prepare and deliver to the Operations Department of the GS HV, descriptively and on maps on a 1:50,000 scale, the following data:*

- areas in which contact was made with residual or infiltrated enemy formations, the precise location and number of irregulars observed*
- areas in which it is assumed there are residual enemy formations*
- areas which have not been inspected or insufficiently checked and require check*

... „<sup>159</sup>

203. The order was forwarded to the commanders of the Military Districts Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split and the Knin Garrison Command, while a hand-written notation indicates that it was brought to the attention of the assistant to the Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia in charge of special units.

204. An additional motive for issuing the order was the letter which Major General Ante Gotovina, the commander of the Split Military District, sent to Lieutenant General Mladen Markač in which he directly requested:

*“... for the purpose of providing security to human life and physical property, I REQUEST that a battalion be detached from the structure of the Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior and deployed to the Split Military District – Knin TCP ...”<sup>160</sup>.*

<sup>159</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no: 512-06-05/01-95-503 of 21 August 1995.

<sup>160</sup> Request from Commander of the Split Military District for Deployment of Ministry of Interior Special Forces, Class.: SP 8/95-01/15, Ref.no.: 1080-01-95-4 of 18 August 1995.

which General Markač refused, seeking the resolution of such requests through the Chief of the GS HV. Therefore, in his order the Chief of the GS HV regulated in detail as follows:

*“1.1. Headquarters are obliged to propose the priority areas for search.*

*1.2. Separate orders shall be issued for the deployment of the Mol special units and their cooperation with the Military District troops.”<sup>161</sup>*

205. Pursuant to this order, the commander of the Gospić Military District, Staff Brigadier Mirko Norac forwarded to the Chief of the GS HV his assessment of the threat posed by terrorist groups with maps in which, among other things, he stated:

*2. The Headquarters of the Gospić Military District engaged in an organized field search until demobilization of certain units, and it is in permanent contact with the Mol special forces and aware of the area searched by the Mol units.*

*3. Since the end of the offensive Operation Storm, our units exchanged fire with Chetnik groups or individuals in these areas: Medak, Papuča, Mogorić, Pločanski Klanac, Doljani, Rudopolje, Vrhovine, Mazin, Dobro Selo at L. Lapac, and Prijeboj. Besides an enemy group which staged a raid into the village of Mazin on 13 August 1995, when two members of the 8<sup>th</sup> Home Guard Regiment were killed, all enemy soldiers or groups were liquidated or captured. From 23 August 1995, our troops neither encountered nor exchanged fire with residual groups.*

*4. Since we did not thoroughly examine the entire area in the zone of responsibility of the Gospić Military District, it is our assessment that possible groups of irregulars may be found in the wider area of the Plitvice Lakes, the south-west slopes of Plešivica and Kremen forest, and we deem it necessary to deploy the special units of the Ministry of the Interior to search this area.”<sup>162</sup>*

206. From this report it is apparent that the units of the Gospić Military District conducted an organized field search in their zone of responsibility, and that fire was exchanged with enemy groups and individuals at various locations and that there were areas in which the presence of enemy irregular formations was suspected, so that the Gospić Military District proposed that they be searched by Mol special units.

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<sup>161</sup> Order of the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-503 of 21 August 1995.

<sup>162</sup> Letter from the commander of the Gospić Military District to the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-02/95-01/01, Ref.no.: 1043-04-95-154, of 1 September 1995.

### 9.3.1. Basic standard operational procedure for search of terrain

207. Over the course of almost two months of activity, the Collective Forces Staff developed a standard procedure for the conduct of search of terrain. It essentially consisted of several steps:

- Step I: Receiving request from the GS HV (military districts) or the Ministry of the Interior (police department) to conduct a search, an analysis by area and size and prioritization, i.e. planning by days. As a part of planning, particular consideration was accorded to bringing the Special Police units to the search area for which special orders were issued.<sup>163</sup> <sup>164</sup> The units were normally brought to Gračac where the commander received the necessary instructions and documents.
- Step II: Sending letters to the Police Department and Military District with jurisdiction, which were notified of the intention to conduct a search on the following day and which were asked to deliver all available information and knowledge on possible sabotage/terrorist groups and mines and explosives and to notify their forces on the search area. Information on enemy groups and mines and explosives were gathered by internal oversight personnel from the operative duty staffs of the police units, Police Department, Ministry of the Interior or the relevant Croatian Army HQs.
- Step III: Drafting of the search plan for the following day (based on gathered information), preparation of the requisite documentation and assignment of operational commander of the action and Special Police units to conduct the search.
- Step IV: Deployment of forces to the staging point and conduct of the search. During the search, the Special Police Staff recorded progress of the search forces and at the request of the operational commander coordinated with other services

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<sup>163</sup> Order from the chief officer of the Special Police Sector of the Special Police Units to the Istria Police Department for completion of the tasks under Operation Storm-Encirclement, No.: 511-01-31-1151/95 of 24 August 1995.

<sup>164</sup> Order chief officer of the Special Police Sector of the Special Police Units for deployment of forces for completion of the tasks under Operation Storm-Encirclement, No.: 511-01-31-1261/95 of 19 September 1995.

(contacting the regular police on the need to receive civilians, deploying vehicles and logistics specialists to assume detected mines and explosives, requests for engagement of Civil Defence personnel, etc.).

- Step V: Upon arrival at the end-point of the search, the commanders of the Special Police units participating in the operation make written and verbal reports to the operational commander of the action on all relevant observations made during the search.
- Step VI: Pursuant to the reports of all subordinates and personal observations, the operational commander of the action writes a report on the field search to the commander of the Special Police (whenever possible the report is written in Headquarters in Gračac).
- Step VII: The commander of the Special Police issues his report, which generally has the same content as the report of the operational commander, possibly accompanied by notes by the commander of the Special Police on potential logistical needs, etc.

208. Available documentation and comparison of reports handwritten by the operational commanders and the report sent to the Chief of the GS HV bearing the signature of Lieutenant General Mladen Markač (the format of the reports was always the same, including the signature at the end, regardless of whether or not General Markač was in Gračac or at the Plitvice Lakes when the focus of the search moved there) at the end of each day indicates that they are identical in almost 100% of the cases, which means that General Markač neither intervened nor sought amendments in any way whatsoever to the reports drafted by the operational commander, rather he demonstrated full confidence that the information contained in the reports is accurate.

209. The search of terrain was managed from the command post of the Moli Collective Special Police Forces in Gračac, most of which was temporarily transferred to the Plitvice Lakes zones from 6 to 13 September 1995, when the focus of the search moved to that area. However, since parallel search activities were ongoing in the wider Gračac area, a part of the command staff remained in Gračac.

9.3.2. Timeline of activities of Mol Special Forces in the search operation in the territory of Lika, Northern Dalmatia and outside Sector South from 21 August to 9 October 1995

210. The objective of presenting the timeline of the field search is to demonstrate that search operations were conducted with minor interruptions every day in slightly less than two months with a minimum number of incidents, not diminishing their consequences. Regularly delivered daily reports show that the search operations were exclusively and solely oriented toward establishing the conditions for the safe return and normal life of local populations.

211. The search operation was initiated at the orders of the Chief of the Special Police Sector to the commanders of the Special Police Units in the Šibenik Police Department, the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department/Kutina Group, the Split-Dalmatia Police Department, the Zagreb Police Department and the Zadar-Knin Police Department to carry forward Operation Storm-Encirclement.<sup>165</sup> This process, like the format of the orders, became uniform for all other orders issued during Operations Storm-Encirclement so it must be described here:

- the order was issued to the Head of the Police Department with the instruction that it be handed over to the commander of the Special Police Unit,
  - the order regulated the time and number of personnel who must come, most often, to the Headquarters/Staff of the Collective Special Police Forces in Gračac, where they were generally lodging,
  - sometimes the name and surname of the person (generally commander or deputy commander of the Special Police Unit) leading the forces was indicated,
  - the general timeframe for deployment of forces in the search was specified,
  - the method for supplying weapons and gear was stipulated,
  - the time was specified for organization of the working meeting in the Headquarters/Staff of the Collective Special Police Forces in Gračac where tasks were given to the commanders,
  - the method for use of official vehicles and speed of movement was specified,
- and

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<sup>165</sup> Order of the chief officer of Special Police Sector to the Special Police Units – Šibenik Police Department, Sisak-Moslavina Police Department, Split-Dalmatia Police Department, Zagreb Police Department and Zadar-Knin Police Department, No.: 511-01-31-1129/95, of 18 August 1995.

- the rate of per diems was specified.

212. Since there were many such orders during the two-month search and, as stated, they share the same format, they shall not be separately cited by days, and here only some are cited as examples.<sup>166</sup>

213. **21 August 1995** *“The Collective Special Police Forces, from 1800 to 1600 conducted a search of the wider area of Gračac, Udbina and Sveti Rok with the objective of detecting and neutralizing dispersed enemy sabotage groups and finding materials and supplies”*<sup>167</sup> <sup>168</sup> over a length of 15 km, a width of ca 11 km and a total surface area of ca 135 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>169</sup> 550 members of the Special Police Units from 4 Police Departments participated in search operations (90 from Special Police Units/Šibenik Police Department, 130 from Special Police Units/Zadar-Knin Police Department, 130 from Special Police Units/Zagreb Police Department and 200 from Special Police Units/Sisak-Moslavina Police Department). Not one Special Police Unit encountered residual enemy groups during the course of search operations. In the villages of Ugarkovići, Čurčići and Lončari, the members of the Zadar-Knin Special Police Unit found one elderly civilian each and 4 light (hand-held) firearms.<sup>170</sup> The members of the Zagreb Special Police Unit found one 120 mm mortar and mortar shells, several cases of ammunition for light arms and artillery shells of varying calibre, while the members of the Sisak-Moslavina Special Police Unit found civilians with small children in the village of Zrmanja, of which they notified the regular police.<sup>171</sup> Additionally, the report specifies that:

*“In Knin at 1200, a brief meeting was held with General Gotovina and General Čermak,”*<sup>172</sup> but the content of the meeting was not indicated.

214. Although no written document has been found, this search operation was obviously coordinated with the commander of Operative Group West, for he issued an order in which the following is stipulated:

<sup>166</sup> Order of the chief officer of Special Police Sector to the Special Police Unit – Požega-Slavonia Police Department, No.: 511-01-31-1190/95, of 30 August 1995; Order of the chief officer of Special Police Sector to the Special Police Unit – Požega-Slavonia Police Department, No.: 511-01-31-1209/95, of 4 September 1995.; Order of the chief officer of the Special Police Sector, No.: 511-01-31-1261/95, of 19 September 1995.

<sup>167</sup> Report on completion of tasks for 21 August 1995 to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 22 August 1995.

<sup>168</sup> Report on completion of tasks for 21 August 1995 – handwritten document with signature of Mr. Željko Sačić and later transcribed and sent to the GS HV.

<sup>169</sup> Report of the Special Police Sector of the Ministry of Interior for 21 August 1995 – tabular.

<sup>170</sup> Report on completion of tasks for 21 August 1995 to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 22 August 1995.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

*“Due to clearing the terrain to remove residual Chetnik forces, to be conducted by the Mol Special Forces over the entirety of the zone of responsibility of Operative Group WEST, and in the interest of the safety of our members*

*“I DO HEREBY ORDER*

- 1. Any movement into the area west of the Gornji Lapac-Otrić line of communication, beginning right of the Gornji Lapac-Bijelo Brdo-Brotanja line of communication is prohibited.*
- 2. The personnel posted along the Brotnja-Otrić line of communication must be notified of the order and all movement in the aforementioned area in which the special forces of the Ministry of the Interior are progressing must be prohibited.*
- 3. The clear operation by the Special Forces of the Ministry of the Interior shall commence at 0600 on 22 August 1995, moving west to east and it shall have continue over several subsequent days.”<sup>173</sup>*

215. **22 August 1995.** Special Police Units of the Ministry of Interior conducted a search of the area bounded by the villages of Bruvno, Mazin and Srb over a length of ca 8.3 km, width of ca 7.5 km, and total surface of ca 45 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>174</sup> 716 members of Special Police Units from 6 Police Departments participated in the search (118 members from the Zadar-Knin Police Department’s Special Police Units (found a single rifle), 80 members from the Šibenik Police Department’s Special Police Units, 108 members from the Split-Dalmatia Police Department’s Special Police Units, 150 members from the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department’s Special Police Units (in the village of Obradovići near a mountaineer’s cottage, found ten civilians, of whom two younger ones were taken to the Srb Police Station), 140 members from the Zagreb Police Department’s Special Police Units (in the village of Krstaše, found five elderly persons) and 120 members of the Lika-Senj Police Department’s Special Police Units (found six civilians in the villages of Manojlovići and Petrovići)), and for the duration of search operations there were no hostilities (gunfire) with enemy formations.<sup>175 176</sup>

<sup>173</sup> Order from the commander of Operative Group West, Col. Mladen Fuzul, Class.: SP 8/95-01/17, Ref.no.: 1080/7-91-17 of 21 August 1995.

<sup>174</sup> Report of Mol Special Police Sector for 22 August 1995; tabular.

<sup>175</sup> Report on completed mission for 22 August 1995 forwarded to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, 23 August 1995.

<sup>176</sup> Report on completed mission for 22 August 1995 – handwritten document signed by Mr. Željko Sačić and later transcribed and forwarded to the GS HV.

216. **23 August 1995** *“Between 0700 and 1900, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area bounded by Prezida, Manastir Krupa, the villages of Mandići and Vučipolje, Otrić, Potkom and Zrmanja Vrelo”*<sup>177</sup> over a length of ca 11 km, a width of ca 6 km and a total surface of approximately 47 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>178</sup> 790 members of Special Police Units from 7 Police Departments participated in the search (90 members from the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department’s Special Police Units, 200 members from the Karlovac Police Department’s Special Police Units (found elderly civilians in the village of Radakovići), the Split-Dalmatia Police Department’s Special Police Units (at the Šipkovac location, neutralized a terrorist group consisting of 3 armed military personnel), 110 members from the Lika-Senj Police Department’s Special Police Units, 60 members from the Šibenik Police Department’s Special Police Units, 120 members from the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department’s Special Police Units (found several elderly persons in the villages of Golubić and Trnovača, according to whose statements there were approximately ten more elderly persons hiding in the surrounding hills) and 100 members from the Zagreb Police Department’s Special Police Units).<sup>179</sup> On that same day Lieutenant General Mladen Markač sent a report to the Split Operation Zone/Knin TCP on planned operations for 24 August 1995:

*“From 0700 to 1900, a field search is planned with the aim of neutralizing dispersed sabotage/terrorist groups in the territory between the communication line along the villages of Đevrske, Marasovići and Podkrš to the villages of Donje Tišme and Ivoševci.*

*Please notify the Croatian Army units which may be in this area.*

*The special police units will be wearing the official uniforms of the Special Police with red and light blue ribbons as designation.*

*With reference to these tasks, please provide us with all information on possible mines and explosive ordnance which may constitute obstacles in this area, not later than 2200 on 23 August 1995.”*<sup>180</sup>

<sup>177</sup> Report on completed mission for 22 August 1995 sent to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, 24 August 1995.

<sup>178</sup> Report of MoI Special Police Sector for 23 August 1995; tabular.

<sup>179</sup> Report on completed mission for 23 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, 24 August 1995.

<sup>180</sup> Report on planned operations of the Special Police Units for 24 August 1995 sent to Split Military District/Knin FCP, 23 August 1995.

217. **24 August 1995** *“Between 0700 and 1800, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area bounded by the village of Đevrske, Roški slap, the village of Kistanje, Biočino Selo and the village of Ugrčiči”*<sup>181</sup> <sup>182</sup> with a length of 13 km, a width of ca 10 km and a total surface of ca 130 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>183</sup> 462 members of Special Police Units from 5 Police Departments participated in the search (120 members from the Brod-Posavina Department’s Special Police Unit (found munitions depot, 82 mm shells and 3 light firearms), 60 members from the Šibenik Department’s Special Police Unit (found elderly civilians in the village of Tomašinović Stanovi, and found a slain enemy soldier with weapon in the village of Kistanje), 120 members from the Sisak-Moslavina Department’s Special Police Unit (found seven elderly civilians in the villages of Kistanje and Popovići), 120 members from the Krapina-Zagorje Department’s Special Police Unit (found artillery munitions depot at Budim, TP 256) and 42 members from the Zagreb Department’s Special Police Unit).<sup>184</sup>

218. **25 August 1995** *“Between 0700 and 1400, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area bounded by the village of Pađeni, Palanka southeast in the direction of the villages of Strmica, Golubić and Vrpolje”*<sup>185</sup> with a length of ca 11 km, width of 8 km and total surface of ca 88 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>186</sup> 675 members of Special Police Units from 5 Police Departments and the Lučko Anti-terrorist Unit participated in the search (120 members from the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department’s Special Police Units (found 10 elderly civilians in the villages of Zadrovići, Stara Straža and Potkraj), the Zagreb Police Department’s Special Police Units (found 60 cases of 7.62 mm ammunition, 180 cases of 7.9 mm ammunition and 40 cases of anti-personnel bouncing fragmentation land-mines, while a suspect male was found in the village of Pašiči, who was turned over to the criminal investigations police for processing), 120 members from the Brod-Posavina Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 120 members from the Split-Dalmatia Police Department’s

<sup>181</sup> Report on completed mission for 24 August 1995 forwarded to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, 25 August 1995.

<sup>182</sup> Report on completed mission for 24 August 1995 – handwritten document addressed to the chief officer of the Special Police Sector, Željko Sačić and signed by the head of the Anti-terrorism Department, Zdravko Janić, transcribed and sent to the GS HV.

<sup>183</sup> Report of the Mol Special Police Sector for 24 August 1995; tabular.

<sup>184</sup> Report on completed mission for 24 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 25 August 1995.

<sup>185</sup> Report on completed mission for 25 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 26 August 1995 (void handwritten on report).

<sup>186</sup> Report of the Mol Special Police Sector for 25 August 1995; tabular.

Special Police Unit (found decomposing corpse of human male wearing boots with arms bound in the village of Vundići), 150 members from Osijek-Baranja Police Department's Special Police Unit (54 civilians registered in the villages at the initial position) and 45 members from Lučko Anti-terrorist Unit). According to the first report, no hostilities with residual enemy formations occurred during search operations.<sup>187</sup> The report submitted to the Chief of the GS HV was drafted on the basis of a handwritten report by the operational commander, the head of the Anti-terrorism Department, Zdravko Janić.<sup>188</sup> Based on new information, an amended report was submitted to the GS HV on hostilities in the village of Grubori during which 5 persons were killed:

*“During search operations in the village of Grubor, eight to ten enemy soldiers were observed, two of whom opened fire on special police members, who responded with proportionate weapons fire, which resulted in the death of Đuro Karanović, aged ca 45, with domicile in Belgrade, who was bearing a 7.9 calibre sniper rifle, and the arrest of Stevan Karanović, armed with a 7.62 calibre semi-automatic rifle, from Plavno, aged 30.*

*The aforementioned were members of the so-called “Serbian Krajina Army”. The remaining members of the enemy group fled in the direction of the village of Strmica. During the course of combat operations and use of defensive hand-grenades, three barns and two houses were set ablaze, during which two unidentified women and two elderly men were killed: Miloš Grubor and Jovo Grubor.”<sup>189</sup>*

219. **26 August 1995** *“Between 0700 and 1900, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area bounded by a) Kozjak Hill, TP 1206 and the village of Štikovo with a total width of ca 10 km and length of 14 km by air, b) Promine Hill with a width of ca 11 km and a length of 12 km by air”<sup>190</sup> for a total surface of ca 272 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>191</sup> 700 members of Special Police Units from 6 Police Departments and the Lučko Anti-terrorist Unit participated in the search (80 members from the Zagreb Police Department's Special Police Unit, 100 members from the*

<sup>187</sup> Report on completed mission for 25 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 26 August 1995 ('void' handwritten on report).

<sup>188</sup> Report on completed mission for 25 August 1995 – handwritten document addressed to the chief officer of the Special Police Sector, Željko Sačić and signed by the head of the Anti-terrorism Department, Zdravko Janić, transcribed and sent to the GS HV.

<sup>189</sup> Second report on completed mission for 25 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV, Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 26 August 1995.

<sup>190</sup> Report on completed mission for 26 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 26 August 1995.

<sup>191</sup> Report of the Mol Special Police Sector for 26 August 1995; tabular.

Primorje-Gorski kotar Police Department's Special Police Unit (registered civilians in village of Kneževići, found 6 previously unregistered civilians in village of Karanovac, and found persons registered by MoI regular police members in the village of Riđane), 90 members from Istria Police Department's Special Police Unit, 160 members from the Osijek-Baranja Police Department's Special Police Unit (21 civilians found and registered in the villages of Erakovići (10), Bure (4), Nenadići (1), Bogdanovići (2) and Grujići (4)), 130 members from the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department's Special Police Unit, 100 members from the Brod-Posavina Police Department's Special Police Unit (17 civilians found who were registered by the regular police of the Ministry of Interior and UNCRO troops, also found small quantity of small arms and ammunition) and 40 members from the Lučko Anti-terrorist Unit (*"during search operations, gunfire was exchanged with two armed uniformed terrorists in the village of Ramljane who retreated in the direction of the village of Vujakovići where all trace of them was lost. During operation of "Zolja" hand-held rocket launcher, three barns and three haystacks caught fire"*).<sup>192</sup>

220. **27 August 1995** *"Between 0700 and 1900, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area bounded by Podinarje: villages of Polača, Vrpolje, Golubić and the eastern hinterland of the village of Strmica"*<sup>193</sup> with a length of ca 11 km, a width of 16 km and a total surface of ca 176 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>194</sup> 493 members of Special Police Units from 7 Police Departments participated in the search (60 members from the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department's Special Police Unit (found one 40 mm anti-aircraft gun and some ammunition), 60 members from the Zagreb Police Department's Special Police Unit (in village of Baša-Mala Polača, found unregistered civilian Jovan Baša, former active sergeant in the Yugoslav People's Army, who was taken to the Knin Garrison Command and then the Knin Police Department), 60 members from the Brod-Posavina Police Department's Special Police Unit (found 8 small arms and some ammunition), 73 members from the Osijek-Baranja Police Department's Special Police Unit (found a total of 10 unregistered civilians in the villages of Silići (2), Milivojevići (4), Borovice (2) and Kukulji (2)), 60 members from the Primorje-Gorski kotar Police Department's Special Police Unit (in

<sup>192</sup> Report on completed mission for 26 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 26 August 1995.

<sup>193</sup> Report on completed mission for 27 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 27 August 1995.

<sup>194</sup> Report of the MoI Special Police Sector for 27 August 1995; tabular.

village of Kovačevića Stanovi, after an assault with firearms, Dragan Volfat from Pančevo was apprehended and turned over to the military police of the Knin Garrison Command; one unregistered person also found in the village), 50 members from the Istria Police Department's Special Police Unit and 130 members from the Zadar-Knin Police Department's Special Police Unit (found a total of 7 unregistered civilians in the villages of Veliki Mračaj (1), Ševe (2), Rt (2), Radoši (1) and Novkovići (1)).<sup>195</sup>

221. **28 August 1995** *"Between 0700 and 1900, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area bounded by the villages of Uništa, Podinarja and the peak zone of the Dinaric Alps"*<sup>196</sup> with a length of ca 12 km, a width of 10 km and a total surface of ca 120 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>197</sup> 272 members of Special Police Unit from 7 Police Departments participated in the search (20 members from the Primorje-Gorski Kotar Police Department's Special Police Unit, 120 members from the Zadar-Knin Police Department's Special Police Unit (3 persons registered in the village of Grčići, one in the village of Kovačevića Stanovi, one in the village of Kostića Stanovi who was taken to the Zadar-Knin Police Department, 7 in the village of Lazića Stanovi, while 5 members of the "Serbian Krajina Army" accompanied by the UNCRO Sector South spokesman Alan Roberts and 3 UN monitors were also met in that same hamlet), 30 members from the Istria Police Department's Special Police Unit, 32 members from the Zagreb Police Department's Special Police Unit, 30 members from the Osijek-Baranja Police Department's Special Police Unit, 20 members from the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department's Special Police Unit (two 82 mm mortars found) and 20 members from the Brod-Posavina Police Department's Special Police Units.<sup>198</sup>

222. This is the first report which was, besides the Chief of the GS HV, also submitted for review to the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Ivan Jarnjak, the commander of the Knin Garrison Command, Lieutenant General Ivan Čermak, and the commanders of the Split MD, General Ante Gotovina, and the Gospić MD, Staff Brigadier Mirko Norac-Kevo. Further reports continued to be sent to the Chief of the GS HV, while they were not sent regularly to the remaining addressees, which

<sup>195</sup> Report on completed mission for 27 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 27 August 1995.

<sup>196</sup> Report on completed mission for 28 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 28 August 1995.

<sup>197</sup> Report of the MoI Special Police Sector for 28 August 1995; tabular.

<sup>198</sup> Report on completed mission for 28 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 28 August 1995.

indicates that there was no established practice on this matter and the addressees changed from day to day.

**223. 29 August 1995** *“Between 0700 and 1900, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area bounded by Mali Alan, Balenova Plana and Prezid”*<sup>199</sup> with a length of ca 13 km, a width of 10 km and a total surface of ca 130 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>200</sup> 340 members of Special Police Units from 6 Police Departments participated in the search (50 members from the Primorje-Gorski Kotar Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 120 members from the Zadar-Knin Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 60 members from the Osijek-Baranja Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 50 members from the Istria Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 60 members from the Brod-Posavina Police Department’s Special Police Unit and 60 members from the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department’s Special Police Unit).<sup>201</sup>

**224. 31 August 1995** *“Between 0400 and 2000, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area of the Dinaric mountains”*<sup>202</sup> with a length of ca 16 km, a width of ca 12 km and a total surface of ca 192 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>203</sup> 1,150 members of Special Police Units from 10 Police Departments participated in the search (100 members from the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 100 members from the Istria Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 150 members from the Brod-Posavina Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 150 members from the Osijek-Baranja Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 120 members from the Primorje-Gorski Kotar Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 200 members from the Zadar-Knin Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 150 members from the Zagreb Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 50 members from the Šibenik Police Department’s Special Police Unit, 90 members from the Split-Dalmatia Police Department’s Special Police Unit and 50 members from the Dubrovnik Police Department’s Special Police Unit) as well as 400 members from the regular police force who blockaded the area. During search operations no hostile contacts with

<sup>199</sup> Report on completed mission for 29 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 30 August 1995.

<sup>200</sup> Report of the Mol Special Police Sector for 29 August 1995; tabular.

<sup>201</sup> Report on completed mission for 29 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 30 August 1995.

<sup>202</sup> Report on completed mission for 31 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 31 August 1995.

<sup>203</sup> Report of the Mol Special Police Sector for 31 August 1995; tabular.

belligerents were made, while small quantities of small arms and ammunition and several mine fields were found.<sup>204</sup>

**225. 1 September 1995** *“Between 0900 and 1430, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the wider area of Velebit from Stojino to Razbojna Draga.”*<sup>205</sup>

110 members from the Istria Police Department’s Special Police Unit participated in the search, without engaging in combat nor discovering any civilians, arms or ammunition, with the exception of several mine fields. At the end of the report the mission for 2 September 2009 was specified:

*“During the day, staff reconnaissance conducted in the area bounded by the roads along the Udbina-Donji Lapac-Dnopolje-Kozja Draga-Udbina route, and preparations were made for a field search that will be carried forward by 150 special police members in this area on 2 September.”*<sup>206</sup> This is the first time in such reports that information is provided on the mission for the subsequent day, which became the general practice in all reports thereafter.

**226. 2 September 1995** *“Between 0700 and 1600, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by the roads along the Udbina-Donji Lapac-Dnopolje-Kozja Draga-Udbina route”*<sup>207</sup> with a length of ca 7,5 km, a width of ca 1.5 km and a total surface of ca 8 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>208</sup> 460 members from special police units deployed in 4 groups participated in the field search (the individual police departments are not specified). During the search along the Udbina-D. Lapac route, four corpses were found which were already in a state of decomposition, which was reported to the Donji Lapac Police Station.<sup>209</sup>

**227. 3 September 1995** *“Between 0700 and 1700, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by the roads along the Mogorić-Gornja*

<sup>204</sup> Report on completed mission for 31 August 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 31 August 1995.

<sup>205</sup> Report on completed mission for 1 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 1 September 1995.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Report on completed mission for 2 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 2 September 1995.

<sup>208</sup> Report of the MoI Special Police Sector for 2 September 1995; tabular.

<sup>209</sup> Report on completed mission for 2 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 2 September 1995.

*Ploča and Srednja Gora-Đukići route*<sup>210</sup> with a length of ca 10 km, a width of ca 9 km and a total surface of ca 90 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>211</sup> 450 members from special police units deployed in 4 groups participated in the field search. During the field search, four unregistered elderly persons were found in the villages of Donja Ploča and Baste Donje, who were turned over to the regular police in the Gračac Police Station, while four more unregistered elderly persons found in the village of Srednja Gora.<sup>212</sup>

228. **4 September 1995** No written report submitted to the Chief of the GS HV has been found. The activities completed can be seen in two handwritten reports, one from the commander of the Dubrovnik Police Department's Special Police Unit, which specifies that a field search around Donji and Gornji Lapac conducted by 30 members from 0905 to 1230 proceeded without any notable events observed,<sup>213</sup> while the other from the commander of the Lika-Senj Police Department's Special Police Unit specifies that the field search along the Medak-Ljubovo route conducted by 50 members as of 1000 proceeded without any notable events observed.<sup>214</sup>

229. **5 September 1995** *"On 5 September 1995, between 0700 and 1600, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by the roads along the Udbina-Bruvno-Donji Lapac-Udbina route".*<sup>215</sup> 450 members from the Special Police Units of four police departments participated in the search. During search operations, one elderly man was found in the hamlet of Podkuk, who due to his extreme age could not go to the nearest police station for identification documents.

230. As announced in the daily report of 5 September 1995:

*"During the course of the day, a staff reconnaissance was conducted of the wider area of the Plitvice Lakes bounded by the Prijeboj-Plitvički Ljeskovac-Končarev Kraj-Homoljac-Vrelo Rodanovac-Korenička Kapela-Prijeboj communication route (map*

<sup>210</sup> Report on completed mission for 3 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 3 September 1995.

<sup>211</sup> Report of the MoI Special Police Sector for 3 September 1995; tabular.

<sup>212</sup> Report on completed mission for 3 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 3 September 1995.

<sup>213</sup> Report of the commander of the Dubrovnik-Neretva Police Department Special Police Unit on the completed mission for 4 September 1995, handwritten

<sup>214</sup> Report of the commander of the Lika-Senj Police Department on the completed mission for 4 September 1995, handwritten.

<sup>215</sup> Report on completed mission for 5 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 5 September 1995.

*scale 1:50,000) and preparations were made for the field search to be conducted with ca 1,000 Special Police members on 6 Sept. 1995.*<sup>216</sup>

As of 6 September, the headquarters of the MoI Collective Special Police Forces moved to the Hotel Jezero, and continued to administer field search activities in the wider territory of the Plitvice Lakes. Orders for the arrival of Special Police members from several police departments were issued on 4 September 1995. In this fashion, the Collective Forces departed from Sector South for the second time and remained outside the sector until 13 September 1995, and they returned to the south only on 19 September 1995 when they searched the wider area around the mountain of Svilaja.

231. **6 September 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence from the Plitvice area, from 0700 to 1600 on 6 September 1995, the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the area of Plitvički Ljeskovac, Prijeboj, Čudin Klanac and Vrelo with the aim of finding materiel and equipment over a total surface of ca 120 km<sup>2</sup>.*<sup>217</sup> 860 members from the Special Police Units of five police departments participated in the search, and besides the arrest of a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the blockade, no other notable events were recorded.<sup>218</sup>

232. **7 September 1995** *“On 7 September 1995, from 0700 to 1700, the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the area of Rakovica, Jelovečki Klanac - TP 449, TP 591, Božići, south toward Selište Drežničko, Koranski Most, Sertić Poljana, Ravni Lug, and Javornik Train Station, ca 200 km<sup>2</sup>.*<sup>219</sup> 840 members from the Special Police Units of five police departments participated in the search while members from the Special Police Units of 2 police departments participated in the blockade. There were no notable events to report, except that the members of the Karlovac Police Department’s Special Police Unit found the corpse of an enemy soldier in uniform.<sup>220</sup> On the same day Lieutenant General Mladen Markač sent notification to the commanders of the Karlovac, Split, and Gospić Military Districts and the Knin Garrison Command on activities scheduled for 8 September 1995, in

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Report on completed mission for 6 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Plitvice, 9 September 1995.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> Report on completed mission for 7 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Plitvice, 9 September 1995.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

which he informed them of the search zone, the types of uniforms to be worn by Special Police members, and asks for all security-related intelligence concerning the search area.<sup>221</sup>

233. **8 September 1995** *“On 8 September 1995, from 0700 to 1700, the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the area bounded by the village of Prijeboj, Ličko Petrovo Selo, the village of Vaganac, the village of Rastovača, and Koranski most with the aim of neutralizing sabotage and terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, encompassing a total surface of ca 150 km<sup>2</sup>.”*<sup>222</sup> 480 members from the Special Police Units of three police departments participated in the search (5 unregistered elderly persons were found in the territory of Arapov Dol, of which the regular police were notified, while 2 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina were arrested). Mol Special Police diving groups conducted an inspection of Kozjak and Milanovac Lakes, while a speleological inspection of the cave at the Veliki falls was also conducted.<sup>223</sup> As on the preceding day, separate information on activities for 9 September 1995 was submitted. Besides the commanders of the Karlovac, Split, and Gospić Military Districts and the Knin Garrison Command, the information was also sent to the chiefs of the Zadar-Knin, Karlovac and Lika-Senj Police Departments.<sup>224</sup>

234. **9 September 1995** *“On 9 September 1995, from 0700 to 1700, the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the area Poljanak, Sertić Poljana, Ravni Lug, Ljeskova Strana, Rudopolje, Plitvice Lakes, Plitvički Ljeskovac, and Babin Potok with the aim of neutralizing sabotage and terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, encompassing a total surface of ca 130 km<sup>2</sup>. During the day, a group of 17 divers examined in Kozjak, Gradinsko, Galovac, Batinovac and Prošćamnsko Lakes and took underwater photographs in Kaluđerovac, Golanovac and Milanovac Lakes.”*<sup>225</sup> 530 members from the Special Police Units of four police departments participated in the search, and no notable incidents were recorded.<sup>226</sup>

<sup>221</sup> Notification on planned activities of the Collective Special Police Forces for 8 September 1995, Plitvice, 7 September 1995.

<sup>222</sup> Report on completed mission for 8 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Plitvice, 10 September 1995.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Notification on planned activities of the Collective Special Police Forces for 8 September 1995, Plitvice, 8 September 1995.

<sup>225</sup> Report on completed mission for 9 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Plitvice, 10 September 1995.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

235. Lieutenant General Mladen Markač sent an official letter to the Chief of the GS HV pertaining to the problem of coordinating clear operations in the area of Plješevica due to uncontrolled entry of members of the BH Army Fifth Corps into Croatian state territory:

*“... During the course of 11 September 1995, beginning at 0600, the HQ of the Collective Special Police Forces planned the mop-up mission for the wider area along the internationally recognized border of the Republic of Croatia defined by the following line of departure: Prijeboj – Ličko Petrovo Selo – then south-east to N.Selo Koreničko – Željava Javor, TP 704 – Tisovac – peak, TP 1103 – Osinjak TP 1454 – Mala Plješevica TP 1576 – Balun TP 1446 – Gredoviti Vrh 1429 – Šuputova Poljana – then south-west to Ponor Korenički – Kaljev Brdo to the communication route from T.Korenica to Plitvice Lakes (map scale 1:25,000).*

*In analyzing anticipated problems in this area, operational HQ is encountering problems in cooperation with the forces of the BH Army's Fifth Corps, because in this area a number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the Fifth Corps either in uniform or civilian attire, have been found and taken to the Croatian Police.*

*We therefore ask, in the interest of the most effective possible performance of the aforementioned mop-up operations, that you find a way to contact the command of the BH Army's Fifth Corps with the fundamental aim of coordinating completion of the planned mission and that you URGENTLY notify us by Rebus or other means of the manner of establishing contact and implementing our request.”<sup>227</sup>*

236. In his letter of 10 September 1995, General Zvonimir Červenko informed General Markač that he shall undertake the necessary measures to solve the problem of coordination.<sup>228</sup>

237. **10 September 1995** *“Based on security intelligence pertaining to the wider Plitvice area, from 0700 to 1600 on 10 September 1995, the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the area bounded by Vrelo Koreničko, D.Babin Potok, Čanak and Bunić with the objective of finding sabotage and terrorist groups and materiel and equipment, over a total surface of ca 200 km<sup>2</sup>.”<sup>229</sup> Approximately 775 members from the Special Police Units of 6 police departments participated in*

<sup>227</sup> Coordination of mop-up operations in the Plješevica area, formal letter from Lieutenant General Mladen Markač to the Chief of the GS HV, Plitvice, 9 September 1995.

<sup>228</sup> Coordination of mop-up operations in the Plješevica area, response from the Chief of the GS HV, Class.: 80-01/95-02/08, Ref.no.: 512-06-05/01-95-535 of 10 September 1995.

<sup>229</sup> Report on completed mission for 10 September 1995; Plitvice, 11 September 1995.

the search. Members from the Zadar-Knin Police Department's Special Police Unit found 4 corpses of enemy combatants, while members from the Požega-Slavonia Police Department's Special Police Unit found a large quantity of hidden artillery ordnance and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Diving teams inspected Okrugljak, Gavanovac and Kaluđerovac Lakes,<sup>230</sup> while the anti-sabotage group from the Kutina Police Department's Special Police Unit cleared mines along the Rakovica-Plavča Draga road.<sup>231</sup> On the same day, information on activities scheduled for 11 September 1995 was released. Besides the commanders of the Karlovac, Split, and Gospić Military Districts and the Knin Garrison Command, the information was also sent to the chiefs of the Zadar-Knin, Karlovac and Lika-Senj Police Departments.<sup>232</sup>

238. **11 September 1995** *"Based on security intelligence pertaining to the wider Plitvice area, from 0700 to 1500 on 11 September 1995, the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the area Plješevica, the village of Šeganovac, Šubutova Poljana and Prijeboj to TP 1286 with the aim of finding and neutralizing sabotage and terrorist groups and locating materiel and equipment, over a total surface of ca 90 km<sup>2</sup>."*<sup>233</sup> 590 members from the Special Police Units of Police 5 police departments and speleological and anti-sabotage groups participated in the search. During the search, 14 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were arrested and turned over to the regular police, and the corpse of an enemy combatant was found.<sup>234</sup>

239. **12 September 1995** *"Based on security intelligence and with the aim of land-mine inspections of trails, communication routes and caverns, on 12 September 1995 teams of explosive experts and speleologists were deployed."*<sup>235</sup> No notable incidents nor discoveries were recorded during the search.

240. **13 September 1995** According to the report of the commander of the anti-sabotage group with 20 members/explosives experts, the inspection of trails, bridges

<sup>230</sup> Diving in Plitvice Lakes, report of the dive commander to the chief of the Special Police Sector, Željko Sačić, Gračac, 10 September 1995.

<sup>231</sup> Report on completed mission for 10 September 1995; Plitvice, 11 September 1995.

<sup>232</sup> Notification on planned activities of the Collective Special Police Forces for 11 September 1995, Plitvice, 10 September 1995.

<sup>233</sup> Report on completed mission for 11 September 1995; Plitvice, 12 September 1995. Submitted to Minister of Interior Ivan Jarnjak.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> Report on completed mission for 12 September 1995; Plitvice, 12 September 1995.

and waterfalls around the Plitvice Lakes continued. During the inspection, only a minor quantity of mines and explosives were found.<sup>236</sup>

241. On the same day, the Split Military District forwarded a request to Defence Minister Gojko Šušak for the deployment of MoI Special Police Units:

*“Please approve the deployment of MoI Special Police Units for the needs of the Split Military District/Vrba TCP in search and clear operations in tactical and operative depth.*

...

*“Since this is a large and topographically complex area, please ensure a forces strength of 2 battalions of MoI Special Police. In case of a positive response, they should be at the Split Military District’s TCP not later than 1800 on 14 September 1995.”<sup>237</sup>* The notation “not approved” is handwritten on the letter, and further events indicate that this request was never acted upon.

242. From 13 September 1995 there were no specific field search activities, until 19 September 1995, when, based on reports from the Šibenik Police Department on the possible presence of destroyed enemy groups in the area of Svilja mountain, the chief of the Special Police Sector issued an order to the chiefs of 11 Police Departments for the Special Police Unit commanders to deploy their forces to Gračac on 21 September 1995 and to Drniš (Special Police Units of the Zadar-Knin, Šibenik and Lika-Senj Police Departments) and Vrlika (Split-Dalmatia Police Department’s Special Police Unit) on 22 September 1995.

*“During Operation Storm, most of destroyed enemy paramilitary formations retreated toward the occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there is a possibility that a smaller number of enemy combatants is still concealed in the liberated territories, particularly at the edges of mountain zones adjacent to settlements that were inhabited by a Serbian majority.*

*Recently, the Special Police Sector has obtained information from the Šibenik Police Department in which the hypothesis is put forward on the possible presence of dispersed enemy groups in the wider area of Svilaja.*

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<sup>236</sup> Report on activities of the anti-sabotage group as part of Operation Encirclement-Plitvice for 13 September 1995.

<sup>237</sup> Request of the Command of the Split Military District/Vrba FCP for Deployment of Ministry of Interior Special Police, Class.: SP 8/95-01/15, Ref.no. 1080-01-95-34 of 13 September 1995.

*“With reference to the aforementioned and in the interest of inspecting the wider area around the mountain of Svilaja and clearing this area of any residual sabotage/terrorist groups, I do hereby issue this*

**O R D E R**

*a) On 21 September 1995 by 1900, the following Special Police Units shall report to Gračac:*

...

*b) On 22 September 1995 by 0600 the following Special Police Units shall report to the northern access route to Drniš (in the direction of Knin):*

...

*c) The Special Police Unit of the Split-Dalmatia Police Department shall report to Vrljika on 22 September 1995 at 0600 with ca 180 members (active and reserve).*

...

*The commanders of these Special Police Units shall be obliged to attend a working meeting in Gračac on 21 September 1995 at 1900<sup>238</sup>*

243. On 21 September 1995, Lieutenant General Mladen Markač submitted a notification to the Chief of the GS HV, the commander of the Split Military District and the Knin Garrison Post, and the heads of the Zadar-Knin and Šibenik Police Departments on the planned field search activities on 22 September 1995.<sup>239</sup> The same notification was submitted every day for the subsequent day, so they will not be cited by days. It is therefore necessary to present the general format of this notification, which in the first section indicates the area that will be searched the next day, the second section explains the type of uniforms to be worn by Special Police Units and the colour of the ribbons to be worn for identification, the third section requests the authorized individuals (military commanders and police chiefs) to inform all of their subordinates in the search zone of the exact time and location of the search, while the fourth section requests the delivery of all security-related intelligence pertaining to the search zone not later than 0000 on the day on which the notification is sent.

<sup>238</sup> Order issued by the Chief of the Special Police Sector, no.: 511-01-31-1261/95, of 19 September 1995.

<sup>239</sup> Notification on planned activities of the Collective Special Police Forces for 22 September 1995, Plitvice, 21 September 1995.

244. **22 September 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence pertaining to the presence of dispersed sabotage and terrorist groups and the location of materiel and equipment in the wider area around the mountain of Svilaja, the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search from 0600 to 1800 in the wider area bounded by: the village of Zvjerinac, the village of Čenić, Miočić, Otavice, Vrlika, Travice, Dragići, and Dubrava, covering a total surface of ca 130 km<sup>2</sup>.”*<sup>240</sup> During search operations, a large quantity of weapons and ammunition and several elderly civilians without the proper documentation were found, of which the regular police were informed.<sup>241</sup>

245. **23 September 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence and in the interest of finding and neutralizing sabotage and terrorist groups and residual materiel and equipment, on 23 September 1995 the Collective Forces of Police conducted a field search in the wider area of the villages of Bunić and Podlapača, Lički Osik and Široke Kule, covering a total area of ca 120 km<sup>2</sup>.”*<sup>242</sup> Approximately 800 members of the Special Police Units of 6 police departments participated in the search. Besides the discovery of 2 armoured transporters and 2 recoilless guns, no other notable events were recorded.

246. **24 September 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence and in the interest of finding and neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and residual materiel and equipment, on 24 September 2009 from 0700 to 1500, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the wider area of the village of Bjelopolje, Korenica, the village of Ševeri, Čusići and Debelo brdo, covering a total surface of ca 50 km<sup>2</sup>.”*<sup>243</sup> Approximately 350 members of the Special Police Units of three police departments participated in the search, without any notable events recorded.

247. **25 September 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence and in the interest of finding and neutralizing sabotage and terrorist groups and residual materiel and equipment, on 25 September 2009 from 0700 to 1500, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the wider area bounded by: Udbina, Bjelopolje,*

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<sup>240</sup> Report on completed mission for 22 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 23 September 1995.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> Report on completed mission for 23 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 24 September 1995.

<sup>243</sup> Report on completed mission for 24 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; MoI Special Police Sector, Gračac, 25 September 1995.

*Donji Lapac and Udbina and the wider sub-Dinaric zone around the left bank of Peruča Lake, covering a total surface of ca 200 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>244</sup> 1,200 members of the Special Police Units from 10 police departments participated in the search. “During search operations, in the operational zone of the Krapina-Zagorje Police Department’s Special Police Units exchanged gunfire near the Bjelopolje-Donji Lapac (Gradina) communication route, and as a result one enemy combatant wearing the uniform of the so-called army of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” was killed.”<sup>245</sup> A large quantity of ammunition was found in the search of sub-Dinaric zone.*

248. **26 September 1995** “...From 0600 to 1500, Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the wider area of: the village of Brezovac Dobroselski, north of the communication route to Gornji Lapac, Kulen Vakuf, south of Una River/village of Ponorac, Gornji Zaklopac and Donji Zaklopac with the aim of finding materiel and equipment and sabotage/terrorist groups. The total surface of the search is 100 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>246</sup> The members of the Osijek-Baranja Police Department’s Special Police Unit found 3 women and a child and one elderly man not registered anywhere in the village of Mediči, while no other notable events were recorded.

249. **27 September 1995** “Based on security-related intelligence, and in the interest of neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, on 27 September 1995 from 0600 to 1530 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a field search of the area bounded by: Željezno Polje, Krčevine, Nebljusi, Opaljane Klade, Banov Vrh (TP 875), Miškova Bašća (TP 1113), Manita Draga, Gubavi Vršak (TP 1178), Gradina, Frkašić, Donji Frkašić, Kvirgav Vrh (TP 1445), Tisov Vrh (TP 1124) and Željezno Polje.<sup>247</sup> Approximately 1,000 members of the Special Police Units from 9 police departments participated in the search. During the search, the corpse of one enemy combatant and two lorries were found.<sup>248</sup>

<sup>244</sup> Report on completed mission for 25 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 25 September 1995.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Report on the completed mission for 26 September 1995, handwritten, Gračac, 26 September 1995.

<sup>247</sup> Report on completed mission for 27 September 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 27 September 1995.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

250. **28 September 1995** The Collective Special Police Forces continued their field search in the same area as the preceding day with the same forces. No matters of security-related interest were recorded.<sup>249</sup>

251. **2 October 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence, and in the interest of neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, on 2 October 1995 from 0530 to 2000 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by: the communication route of Palanka-Begovački Klanac (TP 619), east of the village of Ševina Poljana, south of the village of Dragaši (inclusive), the village of Perići (inclusive), and the village of Čupkovići (inclusive). 710 members of the Special Police Units (from a total of 7 police departments) participated in the search of this terrain (130 km<sup>2</sup>).”*<sup>250</sup> During the search, the corpse of an elderly man and 9 rifles were found.<sup>251</sup>

252. **3 October 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence, and in the interest of neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, on 3 October 1995 from 0530 to 1800 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by: the communication route of Gornji Tiškovac, Lička Kaldrma, Golušica (TP 615), village of Kunovac Kupinovački, village of Šašići, south of village of Podklanac, Srpski Klanac pass, Ljeskova Draga, Pogledalo, village of Otrić, Begovački Klanac, east of Velika Glava TP 697, Inkuša TP 752, Jokića Glava, up to but not including Oklinak TP 1329, up to but not including Cvijanovićeve Strana TP 1206, communication route of Ševina Poljana and Lička Kaldrma. Approximately 580 members of the Special Police Units (from a total of 6 police departments) participated in the search of this terrain (110 km<sup>2</sup>).”*<sup>252</sup> One unregistered male was found in the village of Torbički Vagan, personal data submitted to the regular police; no other notable incidents were recorded.<sup>253</sup>

<sup>249</sup> Notification on planned activities of the Collective Special Police Forces for 28 September 1995, Plitvice, 27 September 1995.

<sup>250</sup> Report on completed mission for 2 October 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 2 October 1995.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Report on completed mission for 3 October 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 4 October 1995.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid.

253. **4 October 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence, and in the interest of neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, on 4 October 1995 from 0600 to 1430 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by: communication route of Šašići, Srb, Raštele, Krka, along course of Krka River, village of Kneževići (inclusive), village of Jajičići (inclusive), TP 658, TP 651, Gradina TP 676, Kanjeva Dol, Lička Kaldrma – west, village of Zavlaka, TP 618 – TP 615, Kunovac Kupirovački, Gornji Tiškovac, Lička Kaldrma, Golušica (TP 615), and village of Kunovac Kupinovački. A total of 567 members of the Special Police Units (from a total of 6 police departments) participated in the search of this terrain”.*<sup>254</sup> During the search, one male corpse and six cases of 130 mm artillery ammunition were found.<sup>255</sup>

254. **5 October 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence, and in the interest of neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, on 5 October 1995 from 0700 to 1430 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by: village of Vrebac, Kažinj, Tvrde Drage, Jezerske Drage, Zelića Drage, Brljkovica, Zaseoedenica, Košare – south, Oblajac (TP 779) inclusive, TP 726, Gromila TP 679, village of Krčevine, and Vrebac-Mogorić communication route. A total of 427 members of the Special Police Units (from a total of 5 police departments) participated in the search of this terrain”.*<sup>256</sup> No matters of security-related interest were recorded.

255. **6 October 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence, and in the interest of neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, on 6 October 1995 from 0500 to 1730 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by: Alumina plant, communication route to Mali Alan, Suvi Vrh – TP 1122 (not inclusive), Kramarica – TP 1054, Prezid – TP 763, south, communication routes to Kuk Bujanović – TP 596, Buljova Dolina, Vulić – TP 386, Babin Grad, course of the Zrmanja River to Obrovac. Approximately 576 members of the Special Police Units (from a total of 6 police departments) participated in the*

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<sup>254</sup> Report on completed mission for 4 October 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 5 October 1995.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> Report on completed mission for 5 October 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 6 October 1995.

search of this terrain (90 km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>257</sup> During the search a large quantity of small arms and ammunition was found.

256. **7 October 1995** *“Based on security-related intelligence, and in the interest of neutralizing sabotage/terrorist groups and finding materiel and equipment, on 7 October 1995 from 0500 to 1800 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by: communication route of Gornja Bruška, Kaštel Žegarski, north-west of village of Ušljebrke, Zelići, Panin Kuk, Obli Kuk, Gazin Kuk, village of Berberi, Klisina, Paravinje, Razovac, St. Obrovac, Ploča Kotorova, TP 86, Obrovac, south TP 108, Vrtline, Stražbenica TP 218, village of Župani, village of Veselinovići, village of Tepše, village of Sarići, village of Kapitanovići, village of Gende (Obrovac-Gornja Bruška communication route). Approximately 470 members of the Special Police Units (from a total of 5 police departments) participated in the search of this terrain (120 km<sup>2</sup>).”<sup>258</sup>*

During the search, one armed civilian was found in the village of Sarići, without proper identification documents, who was disarmed and taken to the Obrovac Police Station; two rifles were also found in this village.<sup>259</sup>

257. **9 October 1995** *“On 9 October 1995 from 0800 to 1700 the Collective Special Police Forces conducted a search of the area bounded by: communication route of Kaštel Žegarski, Međuvode (including village of Gende), south of village of Škorići, village of Pupavci, Opšeničino Polje, TP 259.4, Brađevke, Krčevine, west of village of Budim, communication route of village of Korlati, village of Ljubovići, village of Šorgići, village of Medosi, village of Popovići, village of Obruč, village of Peslaći, up to but not inclusive of Butiga, north of village of Vučkovići, Bioče, Tukovi, Jakovljevićev Stan, village of Bundale, village of Kubati, and Kaštel Žegarski. Approximately 460 members of the Special Police Units (from a total of 5 police departments) participated in the search of this terrain (110 km<sup>2</sup>).”<sup>260</sup>* No notable

<sup>257</sup> Report on completed mission for 6 October 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 7 October 1995.

<sup>258</sup> Report on completed mission for 7 October 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 8 October 1995.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Report on completed mission for 9 October 1995 submitted to the Chief of the GS HV; Mol Special Police Sector, Gračac, 9 October 1995.

incidents were recorded, except that a minor quantity of small arms and ammunition were found in the village of Birkici.<sup>261</sup>

#### 9.4. Conclusion

258. After Operation Storm, during the period beginning on 13 August and concluding on 9 October 1995, over 5,000 square kilometres of territory were examined in field search operations and activities, which is roughly two and a half times more than the total liberated by these same units during the Operation itself (2,000 km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>262</sup> On average, 625 Special Police members participated in field searches each day, examining an average of 125 km<sup>2</sup>. In two separate incidents, 8 persons were killed, while the Special Police sustained no casualties.

259. The command system and operating methodology were fully developed and facilitated efficient mop-up and search operations. The two incidents which occurred on two consecutive days by the same unit should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that the system did not function and that undisciplined behaviour was tolerated.

260. Search activities proceeded almost every day, which demanded great physical exertion by its participants, since field searches are conducted exclusively on foot, often on very complex terrain, without trails, in karst zones.

261. Relatively numerous forces participated in daily searches, consisting of several hundred to over 1,000 members from a number of police departments, which had to be well coordinated and synchronized so that there are no gaps between units in which residual enemy groups could hide.

262. The operational commander supervised the forces in the search from a specific point outside or at the boundary of the search zone, normally seeing them off on the search from one point and then meeting them at the opposite boundary of the search, if this is physically possible and safe.

263. During the search, the operational commander had to be in constant radio or other contact with subordinate commanders in order to issue additional instructions and respond to requests from subordinates in case of need; given the configuration of the terrain and the size of the territory this is not always possible.

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<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>262</sup> Annual report on the work of the Ministry of Interior Special Police in 1995, No.:511-01-30- /96, of 22 February 1996, p. 4.

264. Upon completion of the search, the operational commander had to gather all units commanders participating in the search in order to receive their reports and then compile his own report to the commander of the Collective Forces. Prior to this, the commanders of the Special Police Units from police departments receive reports from their group commanders.

265. Since there is no way to verify and oversee the manner in which the search was being conducted, the operational commander, and all others up the chain of command, had to have full confidence in subordinates and their reports, upon which successful leadership is based.

266. In this regard, General Markač, as the commander of the Collective Forces, was most often the fourth in the chain of reporting: group commander → Special Police Unit commander → operational commander → commander of the MoI Collective Special Police Forces, and, as he did not personally observe the actions of the collective forces in the field during search operations, he signed and delivered search reports to the Chief of the GS HV based on the information which he received, verbally or in writing, from his subordinates.

## 10. Conclusion

267. Operation Storm was an action planned months in advance, and the final plans were modified depending on specific events in the field immediately prior to its launch (Operation Summer-95, Split Military District).

268. The MoI Special Forces were incorporated into Operation Storm pursuant to an agreement with and approval from the Minister of the Interior, so they were placed under the command of the Chief of the GS HV.

269. Lieutenant General Mladen Markač was the commander of one a series of auxiliary directions in Operation Storm, which, due to actual momentum and rapidity of action, and the devastating effect, became much more important than originally conceived in the Main Staff's plans. The limited mission with the aim of breaking through the front line and severing the Gospić-Gračac and Obrovac-Gračac routes was accomplished rather quickly, so that enemy forces were compelled to a retreat which could no longer be halted, not just because of the actions of the Special Police, but also because of the internal weakness of enemy forces.

270. In Operation Storm, the MoI Special Police demonstrated a high level of ability in the execution of offensives, applying the knowledge and experience they acquired through their training system, which the MoI Special Police Sector managed to develop up to that point, and on the basis of their experience in participation in earlier actions and operations in compliance with the principles of building contemporary special military units qualified for combat operations in hilly and mountainous terrain.

271. After the completion of Operation Storm, the MoI Collective Special Police Forces launched Operation Storm-Encirclement, which had as its objective the search of specific zones in which the presence of dispersed enemy formations was suspected, and also other zones with the aim of finding weapons depots, mine fields and other obstacles, and all activities necessary for the establishment of normal life in the liberated territories. A clear methodology was drafted to implement the

operation, with which all special unit commanders were familiar and to which they adhered.

272. All of these activities could not have been successfully implemented had the MoI Collective Special Police Forces not had a clear chain of command and responsibility which functioned for the duration of Operations Storm and Storm-Encirclement. This chain of command exclusively executed the orders issued by the Chief of the GS HV to the best of the knowledge and abilities of the members of the Special Police Units, from Lieutenant General Mladen Markač to all remaining participants in these two operations.