

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Case No. IT-03-67-T

IN TRIAL CHAMBER III

**Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, presiding
Judge Frederik Harhoff
Judge Flavia Lattanzi**

Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis

Date filed: 22 January 2008

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ

PUBLIC

**PROSECUTION'S NOTICE OF FILING OF THE REVISED
TRANSLATIONS OF EXPERT REPORT OF YVES TOMIĆ AND C.V.**

The Office of the Prosecutor:
Ms. Christine Dahl

The Accused:
Vojislav Šešelj

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

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VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ

Case No. IT-03-67-PT

**PROSECUTION'S NOTICE OF FILING OF THE REVISED
TRANSLATIONS OF EXPERT REPORT OF YVES TOMIĆ AND C.V.**

1. The Prosecution herewith files the CLSS revised translations of the Report of Yves Tomić in English and B/C/S. This filing relates to the original Expert Report of Yves Tomić in the French language filed on 14 January 2008 (appearing at Registry Pages D26641-D26617).
2. Also, Mr. Tomić has provided an updated C.V., attached hereto.

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Christine Dahl
Senior Trial Attorney

Dated This 22nd Day of January 2008
The Hague, The Netherlands

The Ideology of a Greater Serbia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Expert Report

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Université de Paris X-Nanterre)

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Introduction

The Serbian medieval state originated in the region of Rascia (Raška). As it developed, it spread towards the south (Kosovo, Macedonia), until it reached its apex during the reign of Tsar Dušan (1308-1355), who enlarged Serbia by adding to it the regions of Macedonia, Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly. As a result of the advance of the Ottomans from the south of the Balkan Peninsula towards the north in the second half of the fourteenth century, the Serbian state ceased to exist and the Serbian population of the more southerly regions (Macedonia, Kosovo, Metohija) moved towards the north along the Morava-Vardar (Skopje-Belgrade) axis and towards the northwest (along a line that connects Skopje, Kosovo, Sjenica, and Sarajevo). The Ottoman conquests changed the ethnic structure of the conquered regions. As the Catholic Croats and Hungarians withdrew to the north, the Ottomans, anxious not to leave unpopulated these border regions important for the defence of the empire, replaced them with Orthodox Christian and Muslim settlers. Thus in the sixteenth century the Orthodox population increased significantly in northern Bosnia (the region of Bosanska Krajina), but also in Slavonia. This population was charged with the defence of the northern frontier of the Ottoman Empire. The consequence of all these population movements was a growing dispersal of the Serbs in what would become in the twentieth century the territory of Yugoslavia.¹ A Serbian territorial complex was thus constituted in the east, connecting Serbia itself, situated in the valleys of the Morava and Vardar, with Vojvodina, which consisted of the provinces of Banat, Bačka, and Srem, in the Pannonian plain.² This complex extended westwards to the Dinaric regions: the *sandžak* of Novi Pazar, corresponding to the territory of what used to be Rascia, the cradle of the medieval Serbian kingdom of the NEMANJIĆ dynasty, Montenegro, and Herzegovina. Another territorial complex emerged in the west, consisting of northern Dalmatia, the Lika, Kordun, and Banija regions, western Slavonia (area

¹ Desimir TOŠIĆ, *Srpski nacionalni problemi /Serbian National Problems/* (Paris: Oslobođenje, 1952), p. 27.

² Part of Hungarian territory until the beginning of the twentieth century.

along the Military Frontier of the Habsburg Empire,³ see [Map 1](#) in Annex), and western Bosnia (Bosanska Krajina). These two territorial complexes, enclosed within the borders of different states, were separated by mixed or intermediate territories where Serbs lived alongside other population groups: the Croats in the north (the Military Frontier and northern Bosnia) and the Slav converts to Islam in Bosnia.

It is in this fragmentation of the territories populated by Serbs that we find the source of the Serbian national question.⁴ In fact, at the time when national states were being constituted in the nineteenth century, it was hard to create a unified national political territory because the Serbs were mixed with other populations. What should be the frontiers of such a territory? Should they encompass national minorities? The dispersal of the Serbian people is therefore a significant fact in the history of the Serbs: it gave rise to the elaboration of a national ideology and of a programme of state creation in which the ideas of unity (*jedinstvo*) and unification (*ujedinjenje*) became dominant in the work of some ideologues.

The different perceptions of Greater Serbia by the Serbian political and cultural elites of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be discussed and the political stands of Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, will be placed in this context.

The notion of a Greater Serbia (*Velika Srbija*) was used in Austrian governing circles in the early nineteenth century to designate the Serbian national movement, seen until the beginning of the twentieth century as a threat to the stability of the southern territories of the

³ The Military Frontier was created in the sixteenth century by the Austrian Empire. These border regions of the Ottoman Empire, which were devastated and depopulated by successive wars, were repopulated mostly by Orthodox Wallachian peasants who were later to call themselves Serbs. In exchange for their participation in the defence of the Empire, these peasant-soldiers were granted a number of privileges particularly by the Wallachian Statute of 1630 /Statuta Valachorum/: religious freedom, right to work the land, etc. The Military Boundary was a region specific to the Austrian Empire. It was dissolved in 1881 following the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 by the Austro-Hungarian army. Jean NOUZILLE, *Histoire de frontières: l'Autriche et l'Empire ottoman /A History of Boundaries: Austria and the Ottoman Empire/* (Paris: Berg International, 1991), p. 263.

⁴ By national question we mean the creation of a nation state and the relations among the various national groups which form part of that state.

Habsburg Empire.⁵ If the concept initially had pejorative connotations, Serbian nationalists appropriated it for their own use during the second half of the nineteenth century: several journals would be called *Greater Serbia*. During World War I the Serbian government would call upon two foreign experts to write books entitled *A Greater Serbia*, in which Serbian interests were promoted.⁶

The first part of this report focuses on how the Greater Serbian project emerged in the nineteenth century and how the Serbian national ideology evolved from Serbism to Yugoslavism. In the second part the development of the Serbian national ideology from Yugoslavism to Serbism during the lifetime of the first Yugoslav state (1918-1941) is analysed. The Greater-Serbia ideology of the Ravna Gora Movement (also known as the Chetnik movement) and its practices of ethnic cleansing will also be examined. The re-emergence of the Greater-Serbia ideology in communist Yugoslavia during the 1980s and the role played by the intellectuals who saw themselves as the heirs of the Chetnik movement of World War II will be reviewed. Finally, the establishment of the Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*, SRS) headed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, who adopted Greater Serbia as his main political goal, will be described.

⁵ Mihailo STANIŠIĆ, *Projekti "Velika Srbija" / "Greater Serbia" Projects/* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2000), pp. 13-20.

⁶ *Ibid.* The books were written by the Frenchman Ernest DENIS and the Russian V. N. JASTREBOV. Ernest DENIS, a professor at the Sorbonne, wrote in fact a history of Serbia in which the Yugoslav idea and the Serbian idea were placed on the same footing. The dominant idea at the time was that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were part of one and the same nation. There were two maps in the book: a map of the Serbian and Croatian lands and a map of Serbia in 1913. The project of the unification of the South Slavs was presented as an initiative that should be implemented under the authority of Belgrade (p. 313). The new state, described as the "new kingdom of Serbia", was to include Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the triune kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, in addition to Serbia. This State was to stretch to Slovenia and was also to include the south of Hungary (Vojvodina). Although the Yugoslav project was described as an "expansion of Serbia" (p. 305), the ideology of a Greater Serbia was not one of the subjects of the book.

1. Serbian national ideology in the nineteenth century: between Serbism and Yugoslavism

The principality of Serbia came into being in the wake of two uprisings in the early nineteenth century: the first took place from 1804 to 1813, and the second in 1815. Following the second uprising, Serbia was verbally granted a semi-autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. Its status was further confirmed by the Akkerman Convention of 1826, and by decrees issued by the Sultan, which made Serbia an autonomous principality, vassal to the Ottoman Empire in 1830. Serbia would not become fully independent until 1878.

In the course of the 1830s and 1840s, perceptions of the Serbian state and nation were defined by the intellectuals and political leaders of the age. The cultural perception of the Serbian nation expressed by Vuk KARADŽIĆ, reformer of the Serbian language, and the vision of a Serbian state developed by the political leader Ilija GARAŠANIN, who formulated the first Serbian national programme in 1844, will be discussed below.

1.1. The work of Vuk STEFANOVIĆ KARADŽIĆ (1787-1864)

Through his work as an ethnographer and linguist Vuk KARADŽIĆ played an important role in the nineteenth century in defining the Serb identity.⁷ Moreover, his work marks a break in the perception the Serbs could have of themselves. Indeed, Vuk KARADŽIĆ presented a secular vision of the Serbian nation, one that was not founded on religious

⁷ Born in Tršić, in western Serbia, in a family that had originally come from Herzegovina, KARADŽIĆ completed his education in Belgrade during the first Serbian uprising and became an official in the nascent Serbian state. Following the collapse of the uprising in 1813, he left Serbia for Vienna. In the Austrian capital he became acquainted with the Slovene linguist Irenej KOPITAR, who encouraged him to pursue his literary and linguistic work. In 1814 and 1815, Vuk KARADŽIĆ edited two collections of folk poetry, in which he presented the national tradition of his people as found among illiterate Serbian peasants. His work charmed German authors such as J. W. GOETHE and Jacob GRIMM, who were interested in the riches of folk poetry. The poetry was edited in a form of the Serbian language that KARADŽIĆ himself had codified in a grammar he had published in 1814. Vuk KARADŽIĆ simplified the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet by suppressing unnecessary letters and by introducing new ones, notably “j”, imported from the Latin alphabet. In doing this he made possible a certain rapprochement between the Orthodox and Catholic worlds. In 1818, KARADŽIĆ published a dictionary in which he showcased his reform of the literary language. In fact Vuk KARADŽIĆ had drawn inspiration from the writings of Dositej OBRADOVIĆ (1740-1811), an Orthodox monk who had embraced the values of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. He had undertaken to reform the Serbian literary language (Serbian-Slavonic, *slavenoserbski*), which had been used chiefly by ecclesiastics, in favour of popular speech.

affiliation. For this reason, he came into conflict with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which held that Serbs can be nothing but Orthodox. In spite of this important point of divergence, KARADŽIĆ's notions were taken up by numerous Serbian intellectuals in the nineteenth century.

He was active at the height of Romanticism, a movement that idealised the past and old traditions. There was a growing interest in history, especially of the Middle Ages, when folk ballads and folk epics had been composed. Language was of central importance to the Romantic Movement, and this is equally true of the Serbian cultural renaissance. According to J. G. HERDER, all the characteristics of a people, as well as its spirit, are inscribed in its language. In his research, Vuk KARADŽIĆ covered the fields of linguistics and history as much as ethnography. Without any doubt, the results of his work made possible the strengthening of the Serbs' national consciousness.

Thanks to his reform, which made ordinary speech the basis of the new literary language, literature and science became accessible to ordinary people, who had long been denied access to it. The reform did not become accepted automatically, however, and several decades would pass until its final triumph. In March 1850, some Serbian intellectuals, including Vuk KARADŽIĆ, agreed with a group of Croatian writers and linguists (Ivan MAŽURANIĆ, Ivan KUKULJEVIĆ, and others) that the Serbs and Croats should share the same literary language, with one and the same orthography. KARADŽIĆ's spelling reform would not be adopted in Serbia until 1868, four years after his death. Throughout the century, the Serbian Orthodox Church had been fiercely opposed to language reform. Stefan STRATIMIROVIĆ, metropolitan of Sremski Karlovci and leader of the Serbs in the Austrian Empire, was an especially vocal opponent of the reform.

In his work entitled "Serbs All and Everywhere" (*Srbi svi i svuda*), written in 1836 and published in 1849, Vuk KARADŽIĆ delimited the territories inhabited by Serbs:

We know for certain that the Serbs live in what is now Serbia (between the Drina and the Timok, and between the Danube and the Stara Planina mountain), in Metohija (from Kosovo, through the Stara Planina, with the towns of Prizren – Dušan's capital, the Serbian patriarchate of Peć, and the monastery of Dečani), in Bosnia, in Herzegovina, in Zeta, in Montenegro, in Banat, in Bačka, in Srem, on the right bank of the Danube upstream from Osijek to Sentandreja, in Slavonia, in Croatia (as well as in Turkey and the Austrian Krajina), in Dalmatia, and along the entire Dalmatian coast, roughly speaking from Trieste to the Bojana.⁸

Vuk KARADŽIĆ developed the notion of a multi-confessional Serbian nation united by one and the same language. According to him, and in agreement with Herderian ideology, language is the only valid criterion that can determine national affiliation, independently of religious factors. Thus he included in the Serbian nation all the speakers of the dialect, used at the time in Serbia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Bosnia, and certain parts of Dalmatia, including Dubrovnik. He did not take into account the designation of “Illyrian”, which had come to be used in Croatia in the 1830s and 1840s. According to him, the Croats are speakers of the čakavian dialect, while speakers of the kajkavian dialect are considered to be Slovenes.⁹ He estimated that there were five million Serbs: three million of the Orthodox faith, and two million Muslims and Catholics together. In fact, Vuk KARADŽIĆ's ideas had been largely shaped by the current state of scholarship on the South Slavs and their dialects. KOPITAR's ideas on the ethnic distribution of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had influenced the writings of Vuk KARADŽIĆ.¹⁰ KOPITAR himself had been inspired by the research of the Czech linguist Joseph DOBROWSKY.¹¹

Vuk KARADŽIĆ's definition of the Serbian nation is void of any Panserbism or Greater-Serbia political ideology. Indeed, his text does not deal with the problems of the

⁸ The /French/ translation taken from Mirko GRMEK, Marc GJIDARA and Neven ŠIMAC, eds., *Le nettoyage ethnique: documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe* /Ethnic Cleansing: Historical Documents Relating to a Serbian Ideology/ (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 42.

⁹ There are three different words for “what” in the Serbo-Croatian dialects: “što” is the most common, “ča” is used mostly on the Dalmatian coast, and “kaj” in the region around Zagreb.

¹⁰ Milorad EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918* /The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1790-1918/, vol. 1 (Beograd, Prosveta, 1989), p. 423.

¹¹ DOBROWSKY considered all the areas where the štokavian dialect was spoken as Serbian. He thought that western variants of the language, which used the Latin script for writing, were half Serbian, while the variant written in the Cyrillic script was the authentic Serbian form. The theories of DOBROWSKY and KOPITAR were accepted until 1849, but were later questioned. See EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 1, p. 423. Pavel ŠAFARIK took over the same concept of the Serbian nation in 1826, in his *History of the Slavic Literature and Language*. In his opinion, the Serbian nation could be divided into Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Serbs, whom he called Slavo-Serbs, drawing on DOBROWSKY (*ibid.*, p. 440).

political organisation of society and of the state; as a matter of fact, his notions have a cultural, rather than political, dimension.¹² In his study of Serbian and Croatian national ideologies in the nineteenth century, Wolf Dietrich BEHSCHNITT describes the national ideas of Vuk KARADŽIĆ as a “linguistic and cultural ideology of a Greater Serbia”.¹³ It is true that his ideas imply a reduction in the extent of the territory where the Croatian nation would be constituted in the nineteenth century. But it is of crucial importance to explain that these ideas were formulated at a time when local and regional affiliations were still predominant among the Croats and when a Bosnian Muslim identity was hard to identify. The Croatian territories were divided between Austria and Hungary. Dalmatia, which had been under Venetian domination until 1797, came under the jurisdiction of Vienna in 1814, along with the provinces inhabited by Slovenes (Carniola, Carinthia, Styria), while inland Croatia and Slavonia were under Hungarian administration. The fragmentation of the Croatian territories was intensified by the existence of the Military Frontier (*Vojna krajina*), created by Austria in the sixteenth century and inhabited by a Serbian population which had originally come from the Ottoman Empire [see [Map 1](#) in Annex].¹⁴ While the Illyrian movement of the 1830s and 1840s was not able to reach beyond the geographical limits of Croatia, it did contribute to a reinforcement of ties between the different provinces thought of as Croatian. Written at a time when national identities were still being forged, Vuk KARADŽIĆ’s text is not unduly shocking when read from the perspective of the age that saw its publication. What would become a problem is the persistence of this kind of concept of national identity in the twentieth century, by which time the national identities of the Croats and Bosnian Muslims

¹² Ljubomir TADIĆ, *O velikosrpskom hegemonizmu /On Greater Serbian Hegemony /* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga and Politika, 1992), pp. 126-127.

¹³ Wolf Dietrich BEHSCHNITT, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830-1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie /Serbian and Croatian Nationalism 1830-1914: Analysis and Typology of National Ideology/* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1980), p. 71. On this book see the review by Milorad EKMEČIĆ in *Istorijski glasnik /Historical Herald/* (1980: 1-2), pp. 151-160.

¹⁴ Yves TOMIĆ, “Le mouvement national croate au XIXe siècle: entre yougoslavisme (*jugoslovenstvo*) et croatisme (*hrvatstvo*)” /“The Croatian National Movement in the 19th Century: Between Yugoslavism and Croatism”/, *Revue des études slaves*, 68: 4 (1996), pp. 463-475.

had already become established.¹⁵ To accuse Vuk KARADŽIĆ of having wanted to deny the existence of the Croats and Bosnian Muslims is to falsify the historical perspective and to fail to take into account the historical parameters of the nineteenth century. Impelled by a desire to blacken the picture at any price, one forgets that the ideas of Vuk KARADŽIĆ were modern for his age and that they stemmed from European rationalism. Vuk KARADŽIĆ's idea that the Serbs and Croats were part of one and the same nation facilitated the emergence of a Yugoslavist tendency in Serbia at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the root of Yugoslav unitarism we find the Herderian notions of a nation defined by language. That said, history has shown that his concept of the Serbian nation, based primarily on his work as a philologist, was erroneous, since language proved unable to provide the principal criterion in the definition of a nation. Religion is one of the key elements of national distinctions, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the actual degree of religiousness. Linguistic nationalism, whether as defined by Vuk KARADŽIĆ or in its Illyrian form, offered a tolerant perspective. But the linguistic factor would not be enough to unite the South Slav populations. Starting from the end of the nineteenth century, and especially in the course of the twentieth, linguistic nationalism would be replaced by ethnic nationalism.

¹⁵ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's claim that Catholics who speak štokavian are Serbs is based on the categories inherited from Vuk KARADŽIĆ and other 19th-century intellectuals.

“Before the revival of the Illyrian Movement not a single Croat spoke the Serbian, štokavian, language. However, it was spoken by Serbian Catholics, the forerunners of the Illyrian Movement who refused to call that language Serbian for political reasons although they also considered it inappropriate to call it Croatian. Therefore they resorted to unbelievable mimicry and spoke of themselves as members of an extinct Balkan people - the Illyrians.” Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Emigrantski opus Profesora Laze M. Kostića* /Professor Lazo M. KOSTIĆ's Work in Exile/, Part One (Beograd: ZIPS, 1999), p. 13.

The Illyrian Movement developed in Croatia during the 1830's and 1840's. It demanded autonomy for Croatia and Slavonia and their unification with Dalmatia. It was opposed to the Hungarian domination of Croatia-Slavonia.

See also Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma: naučno i publicističko delo prof. dr. Laze M. Kostića* /The Ideology of Serbian Nationalism: the Scholarly and Political Writings of Professor Lazo M. Kostić/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 2002).

1.2. The formulation of a national programme: the *Načertanije* of Ilija GARAŠANIN (1812-1874)

The composition of this national programme was sparked off by contacts between the political leaders of the principality of Serbia and Polish political émigrés who had fled from their country after the failure of the 1830 revolution. Prince Adam CZARTORISKY, Russian minister of foreign affairs during the Napoleonic turmoil, founded in Paris a diplomatic bureau which was based on a network of agents spreading as far as the Balkans, the aim of which was to oppose the interests of Russia and Austria.¹⁶ In January 1843, he addressed to Serbia his “Advice on Conduct to be Followed” /original title: “Conseils sur la conduite à suivre”/, in which he counselled the leaders to extend the rights and territory of their principality by pursuing a conciliatory policy vis-à-vis the Porte. He suggested that the Serbian principality should gather around itself the other Slav countries and peoples living in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, but warned it to be very wary of Russia and Austria. In 1843 and 1844, CZARTORISKY’S agent in Belgrade, the Czech František A. ZACH, drafted a “plan for the Slavic policies of Serbia”, in which he advised Serbia’s governing circles to follow a “Panslavic policy”.¹⁷ In drafting his *Načertanije*, GARAŠANIN based himself to a great extent on these two texts, especially on František ZACH’s “Plan”, but without the Yugoslav dimension.¹⁸

The *Plan* or *Outline Draft Plan (Načertanije)* was the work of Ilija GARAŠANIN (1812-1874), minister of the interior. GARAŠANIN held the post from 1843 to 1852 and was one of the pillars of the Constitutionalist government. He was in charge not only of the police

¹⁶ Polish agents were in close touch with the Constitutionlists, whom they supported when they came to power in the principality of Serbia, especially with the help of French diplomacy. Radoš LJUŠIĆ, “Ilija Garašanin o srpskoj državnosti” /Ilija GARAŠANIN on Serbian Statehood/ in *Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874)* (Beograd, SANU, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, 1991), p. 64.

¹⁷ In Serbo-Croatian, František ZACH’s name often appears as “Franjo ZAH”.

¹⁸ In many ways, the *Načertanije* is a copy of František ZACH’s “Plan”. Nevertheless, Ilija GARAŠANIN deleted some parts of it, especially those that dealt with the relationship between Serbia and Croatia and the alliance with the Czechs, as well as those which discussed the harmonising of domestic and foreign policies.

but of the army, the economy, health, and transportation. He held high political offices in Serbia for close to three decades.¹⁹ After the fall of the Constitutionalist regime in 1858, Prince Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ would call upon him to lead the government and be in charge of foreign policy (1861-1867). A believer in order, he was opposed to liberal ideas and democratic institutions. In 1844 he formulated a national programme which had as its aim the liberation and unification of the Serbian people. It is very important to insist that this was a confidential document. It was known only to a restricted number of Serbian leaders. Austria-Hungary did not become aware of it until the 1880s, and Serbian public opinion only learned of its existence in 1906. Ilija GARAŠANIN believed that Serbia should have a plan for its future. According to him, the country was too small to ensure its survival: it had to extend its borders by encompassing the Serbs who lived outside the principality. GARAŠANIN based his assessment on the fact that the Ottoman Empire was in decline and that it would be succeeded either by Austria and Russia or by Balkan Christian states. In addition to the principality itself, a future Serbian state would comprise Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the northern parts of Albania. It would be based on the glorious past of the Serbian empire of the fourteenth century. Ilija GARAŠANIN invoked historical rights: the Serbs ask for nothing more than the continuity of the medieval Serbian state destroyed by the Ottomans in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The way he saw it, the unification of the Serbs would be brought about in stages: it would begin with the Serbs who lived in the Ottoman Empire, and proceed by including those in southern Hungary. GARAŠANIN did not exclude the possibility of a union, in a future Yugoslav state, with other South Slavs in the Habsburg Empire and with the Bulgarians. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav dimension of his programme was vague; it was not its most prominent aspect. Priority was given to the creation of an

¹⁹ During GARAŠANIN's long career as a statesman, there were two periods when he was not in charge of Serbian affairs: from 1853 to 1856 and again from 1859 to 1861.

independent Serbian state.²⁰ What were the means he had in mind for achieving the planned goals? While war is not excluded, and Ilija GARAŠANIN refers to it in talking about the necessity to be informed about “the existence of a warlike spirit” in the regions on which he had cast his eye, “how well armed are the people there, what is the state of their morale and how important is their regular army”, war was not explicitly defined as an instrument of the expansionist policy of the Serbian principality.²¹ Emphasis was placed on acquiring information from among the South Slavs in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. To this end, a network of intelligence agents was established in the territories populated by Serbs under the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian jurisdictions.²²

In order to be able to decide what can be done and how to proceed in this enterprise, the government must know at any moment what the situation is like among the peoples in the different provinces that surround Serbia. This is the main condition that will make it possible to choose the means wisely. With this aim in view, the first thing we have to do is send out perceptive men, free of prejudices and loyal to the government, to examine the situation among these populations and in these lands. On their return, these men should submit in writing an accurate report on the situation. We must be especially well informed about the situation in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and northern Albania. At the same time, we must also know exactly how things stand in Slavonia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Needless to say, this includes the populations of Srem, Banat, and Bačka as well.²³

The logic of the text is not one of confrontation with neighbouring Slav populations. On the contrary, Ilija GARAŠANIN insisted on the need to develop points of contact with them. He wrote that the Orthodox and Catholic peoples should agree on their national policies so that the goals defined by the *Načertanije* can be realised. With this end in view, he envisaged the principle of complete freedom of religion. The aim, therefore, was to gain the friendship or trust of the South Slavs in the Ottoman Empire and Austria by the publication and distribution of works published in Belgrade but intended for the Catholic Slavs and Muslim Bosnians. The

²⁰ LJUŠIĆ, p. 153.

²¹ In the “Plan” of the Czech Franjo ZAH, which inspired the *Načertanije*, war had been explicitly singled out as the principal means of resolving the South Slav question. This aspect was elaborated in Section VII of his “Plan”, but GARAŠANIN did not take it over. It would be interesting to know why this section was suppressed. It seems that no archival document exists that would allow us to answer this question. For Franjo ZAH’s text, see LJUŠIĆ, pp. 130-150.

²² David MACKENZIE, *Ilija GARAŠANIN: Balkan BISMARCK* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 62-91.

²³ Quoted from the translation appearing in *Le nettoyage ethnique : documents sur une idéologie serbe /Ethnic Cleansing: documents on a Serbian ideology/*, pp.67-68

same approach was in fact extended to Bulgaria and the Bulgarians.²⁴ The aim was to counter Russian influence on the Bulgarians and to supplant Russia in its role as the protector of Orthodox Bulgarians. Although the *Načertanije* did indeed envisage the territorial expansion of the principality of Serbia, centred on its political institutions and its princely dynasty, not once did it propose the expulsion of populations that would have been thought of as undesirable. While we can interpret it as a narrowly Serbian national programme, it still does not exclude cooperation with other South Slavs. Furthermore, it is a mistake to gauge how Yugoslav a particular national programme is solely on the basis of what it says about cooperation between Serbs and Croats. As a matter of fact, on several occasions Serbia considered the possibility of common state projects with the Bulgarians.

The first practical application of the *Načertanije* was the establishment of a network of agents in the Ottoman Empire and on the territory of Austria. Dozens of agents, most of them tradesmen, were recruited in the Ottoman provinces (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosovo).²⁵ Contacts were established with the ruler of Montenegro, Bishop Petar II PETROVIĆ – NJEGOŠ, to whom financial aid was granted. Catholic Albanians from the clan of Mirditë were approached and won over to the idea of a common struggle for liberation.²⁶ Relations were likewise established with prominent figures in the Illyrian movement (Ljudevit GAJ, Bogoslav ŠULEK, etc.) in Croatia.

When the neighbouring Austrian Empire was in the throes of the revolution of 1848, the principality of Serbia had an opportunity to confront its political and territorial ambitions

²⁴ A relatively lengthy section of the *Načertanije* deals with the Bulgarians and Bulgaria.

²⁵ Each agent covered two or three districts (*nahije*). He would appoint one man to be in charge of a district, and these men would proceed to recruit their own agents. No agents knew who the other agents were. Both Orthodox and Catholic agents were used. Michael PETROVICH, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918*, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 233-234. See also Vaso VOJVODIĆ, *U duhu Garašaninovih ideja: Srbija i neoslobodjeno srpstvo 1868-1876* /In the Spirit of GARAŠANIN's Ideas: Serbia and Unliberated Serbism 1868-1876/ (Beograd: Prosveta, 1994), p. 402.

²⁶ Starting from 1846, contact was established with the clan's chieftain Bib DODA, with the Croat Matija BAN and members of the Albanian Catholic clergy acting as intermediaries. Intelligence agents were recruited among Catholic Albanians, chief among them Karlo KRASNI(QI). For more information on the contacts between Serbian leaders and Albanian Catholic dignitaries see Petrit IMAMI, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove* /Serbs and Albanians through the Centuries/ (Belgrade: KVS, 2000), pp. 117-134.

with reality. The southern parts of Hungary (the region of Vojvodina), where the Serbian population rose against the rule of Budapest, was not among Serbia's priorities, oriented as it was primarily towards Bosnia, Herzegovina, and northern Albania. Its network of intelligence agents was much less developed there, compared with the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the authorities in Belgrade extended their support to the Serbian insurrectionists in southern Hungary, who were demanding the creation of an autonomous Serbian territory within the Habsburg monarchy. At the insistence of the Ottoman Empire, however, Serbia subsequently adopted a neutral position and withdrew its volunteers from Vojvodina. The revolutionary events of 1848 led Ilija GARAŠANIN to develop more ambitious ideas and to start thinking about the creation of an empire of the South Slavs, resting largely on the Serbs and the Croats.²⁷ Once the revolution was crushed in 1849, he went back to more modest notions and concentrated above all on the idea of the unification of Serbs. During the 1860s, when he was minister of foreign affairs and prime minister under the reign of Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ (1860-1868), GARAŠANIN held to the course charted in the *Načertanije*, according to which a future Serbian state would include the principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, northern Albania, and Montenegro. Nevertheless, his position as regards Montenegro was less clear-cut, for he had doubts about the willingness of its leaders to join Serbia. Whereas in the 1840s he had always seen Serbia as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, in the 1860s it was no longer an option to think of an enlarged Serbian state as part of an Empire whose disappearance was by then explicitly wished for. Accordingly, propaganda was now replaced by insurrectionist struggle or national liberation war, which at first took the form of the arming of "revolutionary movements" in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. At the initiative of Prince Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ, a system of alliances was put in place with Greece (1861), Montenegro (1866), and Romania (1868), with a view to freeing the Christian populations

²⁷ Dragan SIMEUNOVIĆ, *Iz riznice otadžbinskih ideja /From the Treasure of Patriotic Ideas/* (Belgrade: Vojška and Verzal Press, 2000), pp. 28-29.

from the Ottoman yoke once and for all. The idealistic vision of Prince Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ went beyond the expectations of Ilija GARAŠANIN, for the Serbian ruler was hoping for the creation of a large South Slav state that would include the Serbs and Croats from the Habsburg Empire, as well as the Bulgarians and Macedonians from the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, his vision exceeded the material capacity of Serbia to carry out such an enterprise. In 1861, Ilija GARAŠANIN spoke of the creation of a “confederation of Serbs, Bulgarians, and Albanians”, but he knew that European diplomatic circles had little inclination to support a project of this kind. In parallel with accords between states, in 1867 Serbia reached an agreement with Bulgarian nationalists on the creation of a Serbo-Bulgarian union.²⁸ In March that same year, Ilija GARAŠANIN, minister of foreign affairs, developed a “Programme for a Yugoslav Policy”, which he addressed to Josip Juraj STROSSMAYER, the leader of the Yugoslav movement in Croatia and Slavonia. The aim of this programme was the unification of the Slav tribes in a federal state, the two centres of which would be Belgrade and Zagreb. The state would be based on nationality, not religion, since, in Ilija GARAŠANIN’s view, the Serbs and the Croats shared the same Yugoslav nationality.²⁹ Therefore the *Načertanije* cannot be isolated and limited to the year 1844, when it first appeared. It is important to take into consideration the national or foreign policy of the principality of Serbia, especially under the influence of Ilija GARAŠANIN, between the years 1840 and 1860. A study of the foreign policy of the principality of Serbia reveals the presence of two tendencies or ideological options: a narrowly Serbian option and a Yugoslav (or, more broadly, Balkan) option. The question is, how exactly were these two approaches connected?

²⁸ The agreement of 26 January 1867, known as the “Programme for Serbo-Bulgarian (Bulgaro-Serbian) political relations or their entente cordiale”, consisted of twelve articles and envisaged the creation of a joint state under the name of Bulgaro-Serbia or Serbo-Bulgaria. Prince Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ was proclaimed “supreme head of the Serbo-Bulgarians and commander-in-chief of their armies” (Article 3). The text of the agreement is reproduced in George DEVAS, *La nouvelle Serbie: origines et bases sociales et politiques, renaissance de l’État et son développement historique, dynastie nationale et revendications libératrices* /The New Serbia: Origins and Social and Political Bases, Emergence and Historical Development of the State, National Dynasty and Claims for Freedom/ (Paris and Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1918), p. 205. At a second meeting held in Bucharest in April 1867, it was decided that the future state should be called the *Yugoslav Empire*.

²⁹ LJUŠIĆ, p. 112.

Although it is undeniable that the Serbian national policy was guided first and foremost by the interests of the Serbian people, it is also true that the unification of the Serbian people was seen as taking place in two distinct contexts: one Serbian and the other Yugoslav, the latter variable (relying on either the Croats or the Bulgarians). Nevertheless, within the framework of the Yugoslav option the role of initiator and decision-maker was reserved for Serbia (and its dynasty), at the time the principal military power among the Christian peoples of the Balkans. It is therefore simplistic to wish to see Ilija GARAŠANIN as no more than an exponent of the ideology of a Greater Serbia: in fact, when we trace his development we discover that his path was much more complex, that it oscillated between a narrowly Serbian perspective and the Yugoslav (or Balkan) one. Besides, the policy of liberating the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire was not constant in the nineteenth century. In fact, between 1867 and 1903 Serbia gave up its plans for the unification of Serbs in one and the same state, and fell under the influence of Austria-Hungary. From 1867, following a meeting with Count ANDRASSY, Hungarian prime minister and minister of defence, Prince Mihailo set out on a new political course by relieving Ilija GARAŠANIN, who was head of the Serbian government and in charge of the country's diplomacy, of his functions. The treaties concluded with the Balkan states lost their validity and relations with the Croats were broken off. Under the new prince, Milan OBRENOVIĆ, Serbia abandoned its national ideals.

1.3. Characteristic features of the Serbian national ideology at the close of the nineteenth century

It is hard to define a national ideology, because those who speak of the nation have a wide variety of political and social positions. Nevertheless, different discourses do have a number of points in common. A consensus eventually emerges on how to define the nation, its cultural traits, the institutions specific to it, and the goals it sets itself in view of its particular

situation. A national ideology makes it possible to define in detail how a national group sees itself and to determine its principal features. In this body of ideological notions, the delimitation of the nation's territory and the definition of its name occupy pride of place.

The Serbian nation-state developed in the course of the nineteenth century. Like the modernisation of Serbian society, that of the nation-state was slow and gradual. At first the Serbian national idea was to be found principally among the urban intellectuals, who were not very many. The intellectual centre of the Serbs was not located in the principality of Serbia but in Vojvodina, in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire. In 1839, 59.7 per cent of all the intellectuals who lived in the principality of Serbia came from southern Hungary.³⁰ The Serbian historian Milorad EKMEČIĆ notes that the development of the national movement in political terms was tied more to the government of the principality, whereas the "cultural renaissance" took place mostly in Vojvodina.³¹ The most difficult thing was to persuade the peasant masses to embrace this body of ideological notions. The national ideology was propagated by the political parties, the newspapers, the army, during the various conflicts in which Serbia clashed with the Ottoman Empire, but also through cultural institutions (readers' clubs, singing societies, and the like). Among such institutions, the *Matica Srpska*, founded in 1826 in Cisleithania,³² played an important role in the dissemination of national ideals and of Serbian literature in general. Because the rate of illiteracy was high, oral culture was also a significant factor in the dissemination of the national ideology. The Orthodox Church played a less important part in the national movement than it had done in the past. The concept of the nation developed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, namely a nation defined by the Orthodox faith, conflicted with the concept proposed by Vuk KARADŽIĆ and taken up by numerous intellectuals throughout the nineteenth century.

³⁰ Milorad EKMEČIĆ, *Srbija između srednje Evrope i Evrope /Serbia between Central Europe and Europe/* (Belgrade: Politika, 1992), p. 75.

³¹ EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 1, p. 441.

³² The territories of the Austrian Empire were divided by the river Leitha into two: Cisleithania in Austria and Transleithania in Hungary.

Schools too were an excellent channel for the dissemination of national ideas. True, the educational system did not include the entire population, but primary- and secondary-school textbooks are an important source of information about the way in which the Serbs represented themselves to themselves, the way they saw their past and their territories.³³ Geography textbooks occupy a central place among these works, to the extent that they offer a definition of Serbian nationality and a delimitation of national territories. Vladimir KARIĆ's geography textbooks were very influential, and subsequent authors of school textbooks found in his works an enormously important source of inspiration. According to Vladimir KARIĆ, the frontiers of the Serbian territories follow the Danube to the east, the basins of the rivers Timok, Morava and Vardar as far as the town of Strumica to the south, then along the basin of the river Crna all the way to Lake Prespa, and up north to Lake Ohrid, before following the course of the Crni Drim to the Adriatic Sea. On the coast, the frontier goes up to Trieste, extends to the east towards the eastern borders of Carniola and Styria and the river Drava, and reaches the towns of Pecs and Mohács. Thereafter the frontier of the Serbian lands crosses the Banat of Romania (Timișoara, Vršac, Bela Crkva), before returning to the Danube. KARIĆ's Serbia extends throughout the territory of the future Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia; it also includes parts of northern Albania and northern Greece, of southern Hungary and of western Romania [see [Map 2](#) in Annex]. Among the Serbian lands, KARIĆ distinguishes between independent ones, such as the kingdom of Serbia and the principality of Montenegro, those under Austro-Hungarian rule, such as Istria, the kingdom of Dalmatia, the kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, and finally those under the authority of the Ottoman Empire: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia (Kosovo), and Macedonia. He notes that Slavs used

³³ Charles JELAVICH, *South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 359 pp. On the development of the educational system in Serbia in the nineteenth century, see Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ, "Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije Srbije u XIX veku: analitička skica" /Education as a factor in the modernisation of Serbia in the nineteenth century: an analytical sketch/, in *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX. veka* /Serbia in Twentieth-Century Modernising Processes/ (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994), pp. 217-232.

to be known as Serbs, before they changed this designation and adopted distinct names. According to KARIĆ, the Serbs used to speak three main dialects: the štokavian, the čakavian, and the kajkavian. The first he identified as purely Serbian. It follows from these premises that the Croats and the Muslim Slavs are Serbs. The Serbian nation is therefore divided into three religious denominations: Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim. These claims rest on concepts developed by Vuk KARADŽIĆ. The same thesis is found in grammar and history textbooks, as well as in readers. All school textbooks championed the Serbian national cause, that is to say, the liberation and unification of the Serbian people. The Serbian nation was not defined on the basis of religion, even though the majority of its members were of the Orthodox faith, since Catholic Croats and Muslim Slavs in Bosnia also belonged to it. The principal criterion was that of language (basically the use of štokavian).

Throughout the process of national liberation and the formation of the modern Serbian state, the chief point of reference was the extent of the state under the NEMANJIĆ dynasty, especially in its golden age under Tsar Dušan. Unity and concord have pride of place in the different discourses on the nation, in the political arena as well as in literature. Unity became an end in itself: the important thing was not to repeat the mistakes of Serbian feudal lords, who did not know how to form groups efficient enough to withstand the Ottoman invaders.³⁴ In various literary productions of a patriotic nature, the troubles of the Serbian nation were portrayed as caused by discord among its rulers or leaders, by their lust for power, or by foreigners (Ottomans and others). Furthermore, liberty cannot be attained except by arms, by insurrectionary and revolutionary means. Liberty cannot be won without sacrifices. The construction of the modern Serbian state is founded on three principal traditions: the cult of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the cult of the uprisings of 1804-1813 and 1815, and later the cult of the wars of 1912-1918.

³⁴ Vladimir JOVIČIĆ, *Srpsko rodoljubivo pesništvo* /Serbian Patriotic Poetry/ (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976), pp. 134-135.

The main goal set by the national ideology was the unification of all the Serbs in one and the same state. The goal was no different from those set by other national movements of the time, notably in Germany and Italy. In the nineteenth century, demands of this kind did not provoke strong reactions; they were thought of as just, especially by liberals and radicals. In the second half of the nineteenth century, John Stuart MILL wrote:

It is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality ... Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart.³⁵

The Serbian national ideology belongs to the ethnic type of nationalism, where the goal of the national movement is to group together all its co-nationals living outside the borders of the national state, as well as the territories populated by them.³⁶ As a result, the national movement formulates irredentist demands and a pan-national ideology. Nevertheless, the French concept of nation is not entirely absent either. The definition of the ethnic or national group is relatively capacious, in that it includes the Croats and the Muslim Slavs. Such an understanding of the nation will facilitate the creation of Yugoslavia, but not its stability.³⁷ This comprehensive definition of the Serbian nation would be abandoned after World War I, between 1918 and 1941. Nevertheless, as shown by the historical events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ethnic concept would become dominant.

On the eve of World War I, Serbia was not a fully integrated national community. It had been enlarged when it obtained the region of Niš in 1878 and when it reconquered Old Serbia (*Stara Srbija* – the region of Kosovo) and Macedonia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The representation of Serbian ethnic territories was not clear to all the citizens. The

³⁵ John Stuart MILL, *Considerations on Representative Government* (London, 1872). The text quoted here is taken from Anthony D. SMITH, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), p. 9.

³⁶ This is based on the typology developed by Anthony D. SMITH in *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

³⁷ This concept of the nation will fit perfectly with the unitarist national ideology developed by the South Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, according to which the Serbs and Croats were part of one and the same nation. After 1918, this kind of ideology no longer had the same power of attraction and tended to exacerbate centrifugal tendencies in the Yugoslav state.

national ideology had not spread to the entire peasantry, which constituted more than 80 per cent of the population.³⁸ Nevertheless, after 1900 the national movement and its ideology changed from an elitist form to a more popular one, even though the conditions that characterise such a phase were not all present in Serbian society: in 1900, 79 per cent of the population was still illiterate and the introduction of universal suffrage was very recent (1903).³⁹

After 1903, Serbia freed itself from the control which Austria-Hungary had exercised over it since 1881.⁴⁰ Petar I KARADJORDJEVIĆ's accession to the Serbian throne in 1904, after the assassination of King Aleksandar OBRENOVIĆ and his wife in 1903, marked a turning point in Serbian national policy which led to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, culminating in the reconquest of Kosovo and the Vardar Macedonia, and also to the denunciation of the Austro-Hungarian 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a territory which the Serbian political authorities and public opinion saw as being Serbian. While Serbia's policy was mainly guided by the aim of unifying the Serbs within one single state, the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914 led to a redefinition of Serbian national objectives since the government headed by Nikola PAŠIĆ was in favour of a Yugoslav state (rather than a Greater Serbia) that would bring together the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes.

³⁸ EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 2, p. 475.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

⁴⁰ In 1881, Serbia signed a commercial agreement with Austria-Hungary which had a secret convention attached to it in which the Serbian authorities pledged not to support the Slav population in the south of the Habsburg Empire nor to sign treaties with other governments without prior notification of the authorities in Vienna.

2. The Serbian national ideology in the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941): from Yugoslavism to the ideology of a Greater Serbia

2.1. The position of the Serbs in the first Yugoslavia

In 1918, Serbia, once (before 1912-1913) nationally homogeneous, lost its political specificity and became part of the new state of Yugoslavia.⁴¹ Between 1918 and 1939, Serbism found itself supplanted by the Yugoslav national ideology, which rested on the premise that the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes were three tribes forming one and the same nation (this ideology is also referred to as unitarism). The principal political forces representing the Serbian population were favourable to the creation of a Yugoslav state. The Radical Party of Nikola PAŠIĆ and the Democratic Party of Ljubomir DAVIDOVIĆ and Svetozar PRIBIĆEVIĆ were the chief defenders of unitarism. In spite of this, Yugoslavism did not have profound roots in Serbia, where it was promoted by a small number of intellectuals. Between 1918 and 1939, the idea of the ethnic unity of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was upheld by other social groups and forces, in the first place the bureaucracy, the army, and the monarchy.⁴²

The Serbs secured a comfortable position in the new state by dominating the government, the administrative system, the diplomacy, and the army.⁴³ On the other hand, the Serbian people were dispersed and polycentric; the borders of the areas populated by it had not been formally drawn and established as internal borders. In any case, between 1918 and 1939 the Serbian political and social forces did not raise the question of Serbian integration. Their political ascendancy in the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was founded on

⁴¹ During the nineteenth century Serbia expanded in several stages on a north-south axis. The Muslim population, both Slav and Albanian, moved out of the newly conquered territories in great numbers. Consequently, the principality of Serbia, later the Kingdom of Serbia, had few national minorities before the Balkan Wars which in turn led to another enlargement of Serbia and to the integration of national minorities (the Albanians in particular).

⁴² TOŠIĆ, p. 102.

⁴³ Branko PETRANOVIĆ, *Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije* /The Yugoslav Experience of Serbian National Integration/ (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1993), p. 31.

a Yugoslav, not Serbian, national ideology. If the Serbian question had been opened at the time, the result would have been a deterioration in the relations among the nations, especially between the Serbs and the Croats. In addition, this would have provoked a stronger expression of other nationalisms (Slovene, Montenegrin). What was happening, in fact, was a kind of “national demobilisation” of the Serbs, to borrow an expression coined by Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ (1869-1958), an intellectual of that period. The historian Branko PETRANOVIĆ explains that the Serbian people were “worn out” at the time by the series of conflicts that had followed one another between 1912 and 1918: they were exhausted and weakened demographically (roughly a third of the Serbs perished, or 1,200,000 people out of a population of 4,000,000).

In structuring and organising the state, the elites of the time were guided by unitarist and centralist Yugoslav concepts. In 1922, the country was divided into thirty-three administrative units, so that the historical borders of the different components of the country, including Serbia, were erased. This ideology was not able to take root because national consciousness in the different components was too powerful to disappear so rapidly. Faced with opposition by the Croats, who favoured a federal or confederate constitutional order, King Aleksandar proclaimed a dictatorship on 6 January 1929, and further strengthened his pro-Yugoslav orientation by trying to establish a Yugoslav nation by coercion. He banned political parties and national symbols other than Yugoslav ones. He divided the country into nine administrative units (known as banovinas), and in so doing once again took no account of the borders of historical provinces [see [Map 4](#) in Annex]. In fact, the comprehensive Yugoslavism of King Aleksandar weakened the Yugoslav idea and encouraged, *inter alia*, the Croatian and Macedonian separatist forces. From 1931 onward, the regime relied on a political organisation meant to bring together all the political forces from before 1929 under the umbrella of a comprehensive Yugoslavism: the Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy

(*JRSD – Jugoslovenska radikalna seljačka demokratija*), and after 1933 the Yugoslav National Party (*Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka*). It would never wield much influence and would gradually disappear after the death of King Aleksandar in 1934. In 1935, Milan STOJADINOVIĆ, the new prime minister, founded the Yugoslav Radical Union (*Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica*), which included elements of the Serbian Radical Party, the Slovene People's Party, and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation. The party advocated national unitarism and was opposed to Croatian demands. Its policies drew inspiration from the European fascist movements, with their desire to unite capital with labour. Between 1935 and 1939, STOJADINOVIĆ's government oriented its foreign policy towards HITLER's Germany and MUSSOLINI's Italy.

2.2. The Serbian Cultural Club

From the 1920s to the end of the 1930s, the political authorities used Yugoslavism to legitimise their power. Not for a moment did they refer to an ideology of a Greater Serbia. In Serbia, such policies were opposed mostly by intellectuals, often members of political parties.⁴⁴ In the 1920s they advocated a middle way between centralism and federalism.⁴⁵ At the same time, most Serbian intellectuals supported, often passionately, the idea of the national unity of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Nevertheless, starting from 1937 part of the Serbian intellectual elite got together in order to defend the Serbian interests in Yugoslavia, and in Bosnia and Croatia in particular.⁴⁶ The Serbian Cultural Club (*Srpski kulturni klub*, *SKK*) was founded in January 1937 as a forum for the discussion of issues related to Serbian

⁴⁴ (Stojan PROTIĆ, Miša TRIFUNOVIĆ, Jaša PRODANOVIĆ, Ljubomir STOJANOVIĆ, Milan GROL, Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, and others.)

⁴⁵ Milosav JANIĆJEVIĆ, *Svaralačka inteligencija međuratne Jugoslavije /The Creative Intelligentsia in Yugoslavia Between the Two World Wars/* (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1984), p.125.

⁴⁶ Kosta NIKOLIĆ, "Dragiša Vasić: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara" /Dragiša VASIĆ: Outline Portrait of a National Revolutionary/, *Istorija 20. veka* (1997: 1), p. 99.

national culture – understood in its larger sense, as both spiritual and material culture.⁴⁷ At its founding assembly in Belgrade, on 4 February 1937, the club had seventy members, of whom twenty-two taught at the University of Belgrade and other institutions of higher education in the country. Former government ministers, retired army officers, industrialists, bankers, lawyers, and members of other professions, were also among the founding members of the organisation. At the founding assembly, the historian Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ was elected president, with Nikola STOJANOVIĆ, a lawyer, and Dragiša VASIĆ, a writer and lawyer, as vice-presidents, and Vasa /Vaso/ ČUBRILOVIĆ, a lecturer at the University of Belgrade, as secretary. The Serbian Cultural Club was set up by intellectuals who believed that the Yugoslav authorities were not able to protect Serbian national interests, especially in the south (Macedonia and Kosovo) and northwest (Bosnia and Croatia) of the country. It planned to extend its influence to the “border regions” (*granične oblasti*) where the Serbs were “threatened by foreign influences”.⁴⁸ While the creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had been seen as a solution to the Serbian national question, these intellectuals noted that the Serbian nation was still not integrated – nationally, culturally, and economically. The SKK set up subcommittees, especially in nationally mixed areas: Vojvodina, southern Serbia (Macedonia, Kosovo), Bosnia and Herzegovina. The subcommittees of the SKK were anxious to strengthen the Serbian national consciousness in the regions where the Serbs were mixed with other nationalities and to affirm the Serbian character of Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Macedonia. In 1939, the SKK started a journal called *Srpski glas* /Serbian Voice/, for the purpose of disseminating its ideas: its slogan was “Strong Serbdom for a Strong Yugoslavia”, anticipating the Chetnik

⁴⁷ The statutes of the Club were approved by the Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 15 January 1937. The purpose of the association was “to cultivate Serbian culture outside political life and the political parties”.

⁴⁸ Ljubodrag DIMIĆ, “Srpski kulturni klub između kulture i politike: prilog istoriji” /The Serbian Cultural Club between culture and politics: a contribution to history/, *Književnost* (1993: 9-10), p. 863.

programme of World War II: “A Greater Serbia in a Greater Yugoslavia”.⁴⁹ The writer Dragiša VASIĆ was the journal’s editor-in-chief. The Club also organised public talks on issues related to the position of the Serbs within Yugoslavia, but also on educational and economic matters, and on the international situation.⁵⁰ Even though many of its members had been educated abroad, the SKK rejected foreign influences on Serbian culture. (Modernist movements such as Dadaism, surrealism, cubism, and futurism were rejected; in the humanities and social sciences, foreign models such as Marxism were denounced.) The SKK preached a return to the traditions and norms of Serbian pre-war society, and promoted a culture based on the values embraced by Saint Sava, founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church.⁵¹

In the context of a search for a federalist solution to the Croatian national question in 1939, the activities of the Serbian Cultural Club took on a largely political dimension. All its activities were now oriented towards the solution of the Serbian national question within Yugoslavia. The SKK was clearly seen as the defender of Serbian interests in Yugoslavia.

When the Croatian opposition and the Yugoslav government were discussing an agreement on

⁴⁹ The first issue of *Srpski glas* came out on 16 November 1939. The journal would appear every Thursday until 13 June 1940, when it was banned by the Yugoslav government.

⁵⁰ Here are some of the lectures given in 1937 and 1938: Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, “The need for private initiative in matters of national culture” (7 February 1937); Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ, “The problem of internal colonisation in southern Serbia” (7 February 1937); Dragiša VASIĆ, “The notions of the fatherland and of social justice” (28 February 1937); Vladimir ČOROVIĆ, “Coordination of the activities of our cultural and educational associations” (15 April 1937); Josif MIHAJLOVIĆ, “The situation in Macedonia” (10 May 1937); Slobodan DRAŠKOVIĆ, “On Serbian culture” (26 May 1937); Radmilo VUČIĆ, “Popular songs and modern social life” (31 May 1937); Djoka PERIN, “The nationalisation of Vojvodina and southern Serbia” (17 June 1937); Nikola STOJANOVIĆ, “On Serbism and Yugoslavism” (14 November 1937); Ljubomir POKORNI, “The spiritual ties between the army and the people in modern war” (22 November 1937); Nikola DJONOVIC, “The situation in Montenegro” (29 November 1937); Mihajlo KONSTANTINOVIC, “Constitutional provisions relating to education” (13 December 1937); Djoko PERIN, “On the nationalisation of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (24 January 1938); Mehmed BEGOVIC, “On the Muslim problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (7 February 1938); Slobodan DRAŠKOVIĆ, “Young people and national culture” (14 February 1938); Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ, “The problem of religion in Yugoslavia” (21 March 1938); Orestije KRSTIĆ, “The battle for land in southern Serbia” (4 April 1938); Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, “Confederation and federation” (18 April 1938); Jovan DJORDJEVIĆ, “Nation, culture, and the State” (2 May 1938); Milan PETROVIĆ, “The situation in Vojvodina” (6 May 1938); and others. See Ljubodrag DIMIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 867.

⁵¹ Rastko, son of Stefan NEMANJA - founder of the NEMANJIĆ dynasty, dedicated himself to a religious life and became a monk known by the name Sava. It is thanks to him that the Serbian Orthodox Church became autocephalous in 1219. He was the first archbishop. He helped give the Orthodox Church a national character and anchored Serbia in the world of Eastern Christianity. The values of Saint Sava are consistent with Serbian national spirituality, with the State and with the Orthodox Church.

the creation of a Croatian territorial unit within the state, the Serbian Cultural Club (Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, Dragiša VASIĆ, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, and others) reacted strongly and warned the government of the risks that it was taking. Its leaders contested the borders and prerogatives of the new Croatian entity which was emerging [see [Map 4](#) in Annex]. On 30 January 1939, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, a lawyer from Banja Luka, gave a lecture on the *banovina* of Vrbas, in which he explained that the Croatian question must not be resolved by opening the Serbian question. But, in his opinion, the Serbian question *would* be opened if the territories populated by Serbs (Bosanska Krajina, Banija, Kordun, Lika, and northern Dalmatia) had to become part of the Croatian entity.⁵² The day after the agreement of 26 August 1939 was signed, the Serbian Cultural Club reacted strongly, contesting the borders of the newly created *banovina* of Croatia.⁵³ It believed that the political representatives of the Serbs had not been consulted. It refused to let the *banovina* of Croatia have districts with a majority Serbian population, since it suspected this to be the first step towards the creation of a Greater Croatia:

Our point of view is straightforward. We want an agreement, but only if it is founded on certain principles, which may be ethnic, historical, or geographic and economic. But they should apply to the entire territory where the Serbs and the Croats live. We shall never be willing to see districts with a Serbian majority inside the borders of Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Slavonia relinquished to the *banovina* of Croatia. In demanding that the would-be agreement be revised, we want the Serbs living within the borders of old Croatia and Slavonia to be given the full right freely to express their wishes with regard to whether their districts will remain in Croatia or whether they would become attached to the Serbian entity.⁵⁴

Reacting to the agreement, the Serbian Cultural Club demanded the creation of a Serbian administrative and political unit.

I have a piece of advice to give to the Serbs, which, being a Serb myself, I believe I am entitled to. We, the Serbs, must understand that we have a dual task to accomplish. First, we must protect Serbdom. In drawing the outlines of a Croatian ethnic unit, the outlines of a Serbian

⁵² According to Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, these territories constituted a compact unit of 1,200,000 inhabitants and a “living wall” separating the Croats in the north from the Croats in central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. D. TODOROVIĆ, *Dr Stevan MOLJEVIĆ: rečju, perom, delom i životom za Ujedinjeno Srpstvo* /Dr Stevan MOLJEVIĆ: Words, Writings, Works and a Life Dedicated to a Unified Serbia/ (Belgrade: Kalekom, 2000), p. 96.

⁵³ The *banovina* of Croatia included the Sava and Drava *banovinas*, the districts of Dubrovnik (in the Zeta *banovina*), Derventa and Gradačac (in the Vrbas *banovina*), Travnik, Fojnica and Brčko (in the Drina *banovina*), Šid and Ilok (in the Danube *banovina*).

⁵⁴ “Sporazum ili nesporazum” /Agreement or disagreement/, *Srpski glas*, 1 February 1940, no. 12.

ethnic unit must inevitably be drawn as well. It would be stupid to claim that in this state only the Croats have a national consciousness/, and that they are the only ones to have a history, while the Serbs would presumably have neither a national consciousness, nor a history but would represent a kind of amorphous mass to be shaped at will. The moment the Croatian question was opened, the Serbian question was opened too, and the Serbs must defend what is theirs by uniting their forces.⁵⁵

The committees of the SKK in the towns of Vukovar, Vinkovci and Dalj, in the west of the region of Srem, demanded that their territories be severed from the new *banovina* of Croatia, in which the Serbs accounted for one-fifth of the population, and attached to the future Serbian entity. The SKK relaunched the project of the national integration of all Serbs within the same state structure.⁵⁶ Although the Yugoslav ideology in its comprehensive form was severely criticised and denounced, the SKK remained attached to the idea of a Yugoslav state. According to Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, the enforced unification of the Serbs and the Croats had been counterproductive, and the combination of unitarism and centralism had poisoned their relations. The leaders of the SKK demanded that some regions with a Serbian population be detached from the Croatian *banovina* and that Bosnia and Herzegovina be attached to the Serbian entity.⁵⁷ A project for the establishment of a Serbian territorial unit was elaborated by the Yugoslav government in 1940. It envisaged the unification of the Vrbas, Drina, Danube, Morava, Zeta and Vardar *banovinas* in a singly entity called the “Serbian land” (*Srpska zemlja*), with Skopje, present-day capital of Macedonia, at its centre. Some towns situated in the Croatian entity were meant to become part of it (Brčko, Travnik,

⁵⁵ Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, *Srpski književni glasnik* /Serbian Literary Herald/ 1 January 1940.

⁵⁶ In the 1 January 1940 issue of the literary journal *Srpski književni glasnik*, Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ wrote: “In drawing the outlines of a Croatian ethnic unit, the outlines of a Serbian ethnic unit must inevitably be drawn as well. It would be absurd to claim that in this state only the Croats have a national conscience, and that they are the only ones to have a history, while the Serbs would presumably have neither a national conscience nor a history but would represent a kind of amorphous mass to be shaped at will. The moment the Croatian question was opened, the Serbian question was opened too, and the Serbs must defend what is theirs by uniting their forces”.

⁵⁷ The national ideas of the members of the Serbian Cultural Club are to be found in their official publication, *Srpski glas*, which was first published in 1939. On this journal, see Miodrag JOVIČIĆ, *Jako srpstvo – jaka Jugoslavija: izbor članaka iz Srpskog glasa, organa Srpskog kulturnog kluba* /Strong Serbdom for a Strong Yugoslavia: a Selection of Articles from *Srpski glas*, the Official Publication of the Serbian Cultural Club/ (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1991).

Fojnica). However, the reorganisation of the kingdom of Yugoslavia on a federalist and ethnic basis was cut short when World War II broke out.

The members of the SKK also pondered the solution to the problem of national minorities, which brought into question the foundations of the future Serbian entity. According to the 1921 population census, national minorities accounted for 17 per cent of the population. They were especially numerous in Vojvodina (60 per cent of the population) and in southern Serbia (Kosovo, with 40 per cent of the population). As some parts of these regions were densely populated by national minorities, the SKK held that they would have to be nationalised or, in other words, that the Serbian element there would have to be strengthened. In most reflections on this problem, the proposed solution was the displacement of national minorities, since the policy of the colonisation of Kosovo which was being implemented by the Yugoslav authorities had failed to change the population structure of southern Serbia. The Albanian minority was especially targeted; some of the areas which it inhabited cut through areas populated by Serbs. According to 1921 figures, Kosovo Albanians accounted for 66 per cent of the population of the region, as opposed to 25 per cent for the Serbs. In a lecture given to the SKK on 7 March 1937, Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ proposed the enforced displacement of Kosovo Albanians on a large scale. The Albanians were perceived as a political and national threat, since they were a compact population which broke the continuity of the areas populated by the Serbs:

It is impossible to push back the Albanians merely by gradual colonisation. For a thousand years they have been the only people that was able not only to resist the core of our state in Raška and Zeta but even to harm us, by pushing our ethnic borders towards the north and the east. As our own ethnic borders have shifted, over the past thousand years, to Subotica in the north and to the Kupa in the northwest, the Albanians have driven us out of the region of Skadar, Bodin's ancient capital and capital of Metohija and Kosovo. The only way that we can push them back is by using the brute force of an organised state, within which we have always dominated them. (...)⁵⁸

Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ specified which districts would have to be evacuated and described the process of repopulating these areas with settlers from Montenegro, Herzegovina, Lika, and

⁵⁸ See French translation in Mirko GRMEK, Marc GJIDARA, and Neven ŠIMAC, eds., p. 167.

Krajina. Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ's proposals were not isolated. They were very close to those made by Djoko PERIN in June 1937. PERIN had in fact suggested that part of the Kosovo Albanians should be transferred to Albania and the majority of the remainder displaced to other Yugoslav regions, so that the Serbs could become the majority population in this region.⁵⁹

Vojvodina, the wealthiest region in the country, and one on which Belgrade, the capital, was dependent, likewise preoccupied the members of the SKK, because the Serbs were not a majority there (474,000 inhabitants, representing 32 per cent of the population in 1936) and the Hungarian minority, contiguous with Hungary, was itself substantial (392,000 inhabitants, representing 26.5 per cent of the population in 1936), as was the German minority (338,000 or 23 per cent).⁶⁰ In order to strengthen the Serbian presence in Vojvodina, the SKK suggested enforced population exchanges rather than a colonisation of the province, which would be hard to implement. In fact, in order for the Serbs to become a majority there, it would have been necessary to settle more than 523,000 Serbian colonists in the region, and more than a million if they were to account for 60 per cent of the population. According to the SKK, the Hungarian, German and Bunjevac populations could be settled in Slavonia, which 200,000 Serbs would leave in order to move to Vojvodina.⁶¹ These reflections on national minorities show that the SKK was not concerned only to fix the borders of a (federal) Serbian unit within Yugoslavia, but also to ensure the homogeneity of the population by giving the Serbs more demographic clout through enforced displacements of non-Serbian minority populations or by means of population exchanges. Whether Kosovo or Vojvodina was at

⁵⁹ Djoko PERIN, "Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i Južne Srbije" /The Nationalisation of Vojvodina and Southern Serbia/, 16 p.

⁶⁰ According to data provided by Djoko PERIN in his lecture on "The Nationalisation of Vojvodina and Southern Serbia".

⁶¹ The Bunjevci are Catholics, and a national minority, who live between the Danube and Tisza rivers. They originally came to this region in the seventeenth century from Dalmatia and Herzegovina, fleeing Ottoman incursions. There are a number of conflicting theories on whether the Bunjevci belong to the Serb or Croat nation. On the Bunjevci, see Bojan TODOSIJEVIĆ, "Why Bunjevci did not Become a Nation: A Case Study", *East Central Europe*, vol. 29, no. 1-2, pp. 59-72.

issue, the principal reference point used in support of the proposed solution to the question of national minorities were the population exchanges between Turkey and Greece in 1921-1922. The debates that took place in the Serbian Cultural Club in the late 1930s marked a turning point in the development of the ideology of a Greater Serbia, in so far as enforced population transfers clearly became the means for the creation of the most homogeneous possible state entity. In the nineteenth century, the Serbian leaders had not thought in these terms.

The Serbian Cultural Club therefore played an important role in the strengthening of the Serbian national consciousness, within Yugoslavia in the late 1930s. The idea that Serbia was wherever Serbs were to be found dominated the SKK's publications and discussions. Its members insisted on the Serbian character of Vojvodina, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slavonia, Baranja, western Srem, as well as Macedonia.⁶² Vojislav ŠEŠELJ believes that this movement defended the Greater Serbia ideology, that it “knew what it wanted but it did not know how to achieve it in the most efficient way”.⁶³

⁶² DIMIĆ, p. 865.

⁶³ ŠEŠELJ, *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma*, p. 991.

3. The Chetnik movement during World War II

3.1. General context

Although the war did not break out in Yugoslavia until 1941, the position of the country was becoming increasingly precarious from 1938-1939. In March 1938, Yugoslavia found itself with a redoubtable new neighbour, Germany, which had annexed Austria. To its south, the situation was no better: in April 1939, Mussolini's Italy had occupied Albania. In the aftermath of the defeat of France in May-June 1940, Yugoslavia's chances of preserving its neutral orientation became even smaller. The first German units entered Romania in August 1940. Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary joined the Tripartite Pact.⁶⁴ The war finally reached the Balkans when Italian troops attacked Greece in October 1940. In 1940 and 1941, pressure by Nazi Germany and Italy continued to grow. The revisionist states, Bulgaria and Hungary, were asking for a revision of the peace agreements signed at the end of World War I. An unstable internal situation was exacerbated by the deterioration of Yugoslavia's international position. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia became an easy prey. Prince Pavle, who knew that the Yugoslav army was incapable of withstanding German troops and that the country had no real external support, was forced to yield to German pressure: on 25 March 1941, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact. Capitulation to Germany provoked resistance in the ranks of the army. In the night of 26 to 27 March 1941, General Dušan SIMOVIĆ (1882-1962) masterminded a plot against Prince Pavle. The participants in the coup proclaimed Petar II KARADJORDJEVIĆ (1923-1970) of age, and on 28 March he became King of Yugoslavia. Although the participants were mostly Serbs, the coup affected the entire country. A government of national unity composed of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was set up, with General SIMOVIĆ at its head. SIMOVIĆ tried to convince the Germans that

⁶⁴ The Tripartite Pact concluded on 27 September 1940 united Germany, Italy and Japan.

the coup had been provoked by the internal situation in the country rather than Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact. Nevertheless, war between Germany and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had become inevitable: HITLER wanted the situation in Southeast Europe clarified before his great offensive against the USSR. On 6 April 1941, the country was attacked by German and Italian troops. Although it had been declared an open city, Belgrade was savagely bombed by the German air force. The country was falling apart like a house of cards: on 10 April 1941, an independent Croatian state was proclaimed in Zagreb, and Slovene political representatives were suggesting to the Third Reich that Slovenia should be severed from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. On 14 and 15 April, the king and members of the government fled the country for Greece, and thence to London. The act of capitulation was signed in Belgrade on 17 April. In ten days or so, 375,000 Yugoslav soldiers and officers were made prisoners of war. The country created in 1918 ended in a staggering military defeat with the war of April 1941.

Yugoslavia was carved up: Germany swallowed up the north of Slovenia and exerted its military and political influence over the northern half of the country. Italy annexed the south of Slovenia, half of Dalmatia, and Montenegro; it integrated Kosovo and western Macedonia into Albania, which was under its control. Hungary appropriated parts of the Slovene and Croatian territories, as well as the region of Bačka in Vojvodina. Bulgaria incorporated into its territory three-quarters of Macedonia and some districts in southern Serbia (Pilot, Vranje). The Independent State of Croatia encompassed Croatia in its historical borders, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as western Srem, including the town of Zemun on Belgrade's doorstep [see [Map 5](#) in Annex]. Now reduced more or less to its borders of before 1912, Serbia first found itself under military rule and was then given a collaborationist government headed by General Milan NEDIĆ (1877-1946). The region of Banat was

dependent on the Serbian military command and was under the control of the local German population (some 120,000 *Volksdeutsche* for a total population of 640,000).

Following the capitulation of Yugoslavia, Serbia was placed under military administration. On 1 May 1941, a collaborationist government was set up, known as the Commission of Administrators. At its head was Milan AĆIMOVIĆ, former minister of the interior in Milan STOJADINOVIĆ's last government. The Commission of Administrators was divided and the Germans saw it as an inefficient instrument. Also, on 29 August 1941 the military commander of Serbia, General Heinrich DANCKELMANN, decided to entrust the government to General Milan NEDIĆ, counting on his more imposing personal authority. NEDIĆ was in favour of returning Serbia to its rural traditions and rejected Yugoslavia. He wished to work towards the national integration of the Serbs with the help of Germany. His collaborationist regime directed its propaganda against the communists, considered to be alien elements, and against the Allies, in the first place "plutocratic Great Britain". Milan NEDIĆ did not have much power, and by the end of 1943 his authority had become an empty shell. Nevertheless, he would keep his position until the end of German domination, in October 1944.

The new political order created in 1941 in the Yugoslav area was detrimental to the Serbs. At the beginning of the war they were its principal victims, especially in the Independent State of Croatia, created in April 1941 by the Ustasha movement, headed by Ante PAVELIĆ (1889-1959). The Independent State of Croatia had swallowed up Bosnia and Herzegovina, and extended all the way to Belgrade's doorstep in the east. According to German estimates, the total population of the state was around 6,285,000 out of which 3,300,000 were Croats (i.e. 52.5 per cent), 1,925,000 were Serbs (i.e. 30.6 per cent) and 700,000 were Muslims (i.e. 11.1 per cent) whom the Ustasha regime considered to be Croats

[see [Map 6](#) in Annex].⁶⁵ In order to resolve the Serbian question in Croatia, the Ustashi decided to exterminate one-third of the Serbian population, expel another third to Serbia, and convert the rest to Catholicism. The first massacres of Serbs took place at the end of April 1941 in the area around Bjelovar. They continued relentlessly in Krajina, Herzegovina, and western Bosnia. There were large numbers of victims, especially in western Bosnia, along the historical border with Croatia.⁶⁶ Concentration camps were set up for the Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies arrested by the Croatian police; a great number of people perished there. Towards the end of July 1941, there were nearly 140,000 Serbian refugees in Serbia.⁶⁷ The Germans, anxious to pacify the region and ensure the safety of the principal axes of communication, demanded that the authorities in Zagreb put a stop to the expulsion of the Serbs from Croatia and find a “constructive solution” to the Serbian question. Faced with such meddling by the Germans, the Ustashi came up with a thesis according to which the Serbs were “Croats of the Orthodox faith”: they were supposed to be Croats whom the Ottomans had forced to convert to the Orthodox religion. In 1941-1942, when the conversion campaign was under way, some 240,000 Serbs were converted to Roman Catholicism. In view of the practical impossibility of exterminating and converting all the Serbs, a Croatian Orthodox Church was founded in February 1942. These measures were aimed at weakening Serbian support for the partisan movement in Croatia.

This policy of terror against the Serbs explains why they were so clearly in the majority in the ranks of the communist partisans in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina until at least 1943.⁶⁸ It is because of these events that the Serbs ended up being over-represented in

⁶⁵ The figures are from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and date from May 1941. They are cited in Fikreta JELIĆ-BUTIĆ, *Ustaše i Nezavisna država Hrvatska, 1941-1945* /The Ustashi and the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945/ (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977), p. 106.

⁶⁶ Serbian and Croatian historians disagree on the number of World War II victims in Yugoslavia.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁶⁸ Out of 6,500 communist partisans in Croatia at the end of 1941, 5,400 (83.08%) were Serbs, 800 (12.31%) were Croats, and the balance was made up of other national groups. At the end of 1942, out of 25,000 partisans, 16,600 (66.4%) were Serbs and 8,270 (33.08%) were Croats. It was only at the end of 1943 that the Croats exceeded the Serbs in the ranks of the communist partisans: 29,300 (i.e. 48.8%) and 28,800 (i.e. 48%)

the communist apparatus and the security forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1945.⁶⁹ It is for the same reason that the Serbs were given the status of constitutive nation in the Socialist Republic of Croatia after 1945.

3.2. The origins of the Chetnik movement

The word Chetnik (*četnik*) derives from the word *četa*, meaning an armed band or detachment. A Chetnik is therefore a member of an armed guerrilla band. Chetnik detachments were irregular army forces which consisted of volunteers and could be used by the regular army as support units whose task was to carry out diversionary actions or to engage in intelligence work behind the frontlines. Guerrilla warfare had been practiced in most liberation struggles of the Serbian populations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Chetnik phenomenon thus refers primarily to a particular mode of armed or military action. It was an object of study as early as the nineteenth century.⁷⁰ At the beginning of the twentieth century, detachments of Chetnik fighters were set up as a result of private initiative and sent out to Macedonia, a territory coveted equally by Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Serbian government would eventually take control of these detachments. At that time, the Serbian Chetniks faced the Bulgarian *komitadjis* and the Greek *andartes*. These Chetnik forces were mobilised during the Balkan Wars and World War I. In February 1917, Chetnik detachments distinguished themselves by liberating part of the territory occupied by Bulgaria in the region of Toplica. Chetnik detachments also took part in the liberation of

respectively out of a total of 60,000 combatants. At the end of 1944 the ratio was even more in favour of the Croats: 73,327 (60.4%) Croats against 34,753 (28.6%) Serbs out of a total of 121,351 combatants. These figures are taken from: Čedomir VIŠNJIĆ, *Partizansko ljetovanje : Hrvatska i Srbi 1945-1950* /Partisan Summer: Croatia and the Serbs 1945-1950/ (Zagreb: SKD Prosvjeta, 2003), p. 26.

⁶⁹ At the beginning of 1950, the Communist Party of Croatia had 99,468 members and 34,532 applicants for membership. Out of this number 92,895 were Croatian members and candidates (i.e. 69.32% while 79% of the population was Croatian) compared to 35,284 Serbs (i.e. 26.33% while 14.8% of the population was Serb). *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁷⁰ Matija BAN, *Pravilo o četničkoj vojni* /The Rules of Chetnik Warfare/ (Belgrade, 1848), and Ljubomir IVANOVIĆ, *Četovanje ili četničko ratovanje* /Četovanje or Chetnik Warfare/ (1868).

Serbia in 1918, but before the end of the war the army ordered that such units be disbanded. A number of Chetnik combatants joined the regular army.⁷¹

Several Chetnik organisations were founded between the two world wars. In 1921, Chetnik veterans founded The Chetnik Association for the Liberty and Honour of the Fatherland. Its purpose was to preserve the memory of Chetnik fighters, to ensure the spread of the movement's patriotic ideas, and to take care of the widows and orphans of fighters killed in combat, as well as of disabled war veterans. This first organisation was under the influence of the Democratic Party. In response, the Radical Party of Nikola PAŠIĆ, the dominant party in the government, helped set up two new organisations in 1924: The Association of Serbian Chetniks for the King and the Fatherland, and the *Petar MRKONJIĆ* Association of Serbian Chetniks. These two organisations were merged in July 1925, to be known as the *Petar MRKONJIĆ* Association of Serbian Chetniks for the King and the Fatherland. Between 1925 and 1928 the new organisation was led by Puniša RAČIĆ. Elected deputy to the National Assembly in 1927, he would fire at Croatian deputies in the National Assembly on 20 June 1928, killing two of them, including Stjepan RADIĆ, chief representative of the Croatian opposition. The association was dissolved in 1929, after dictatorship was introduced in Yugoslavia. During the dictatorship only the first association continued to exist. Headed by Kosta PEĆANAC, a Chetnik leader who had distinguished himself in World War I, The Chetnik Association for the Liberty and Honour of the Fatherland was split by Ilija TRIFUNOVIĆ-BIRČANIN, leader of the patriotic organisation National Defence (*Narodna odbrana*). BIRČANIN then founded an organisation that would remain marginal, The Association of Chetnik Veterans. In 1938, the principal Chetnik organisation had around 500,000 members, organised into more than a thousand sections throughout the country. Between the two world wars, the teaching of military theory in

⁷¹ Jozo TOMASEVICH, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 118.

military academies paid very little attention to guerrilla warfare.⁷² In spite of this, the military authorities would set up a Chetnik Command (*Četnička komanda*) in April 1940, to oversee six battalions attached to different commands of the Yugoslav army (Novi Sad, Sarajevo, Skopje, Karlovac, Niš, and Mostar). The Chetnik command in Novi Sad would be transferred to Kraljevo, only to withdraw to Sarajevo during the German invasion in April 1941. Divided between the two world wars, the Chetniks would remain divided during World War II. While some of their leaders (Ilija TRIFUNOVIĆ- BIRČANIN, Dobroslav JEVDJEVIĆ) were to join the movement headed by Draža MIHAILOVIĆ, others (especially Kosta PEĆANAC) would play the game of collaboration with the occupying German forces from the very beginning. In spite of some cases of individual adherence to the Ravna Gora Movement, there was no direct link between the Chetnik organisations of the inter-war period and the movement launched by Colonel Draža MIHAILOVIĆ.

3.3. The Ravna Gora Movement

3.3.1 The structure of the movement

The Chetnik movement of Ravna Gora was started by officers of the Yugoslav army who had refused to give themselves up to the Germans after Yugoslavia signed its capitulation in April 1941. The movement was organised around the central figure of Colonel Draža MIHAILOVIĆ (1893-1946). Commander of the Second Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war of April 1941, he withdrew with his men to the region of Ravna Gora in western Serbia, between the towns of Valjevo and Čačak.⁷³ Having chosen to resist the forces of the Axis, during the summer of 1941 Draža MIHAILOVIĆ established the nucleus of a future general staff, known as the Command of Chetnik Detachments of the

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁷³ On 11 May 1941, MIHAILOVIĆ and his men arrived at Ravna Gora, having reached the slopes of Mt Suvobor, halfway between the towns of Čačak and Valjevo.

Yugoslav Army. Not long afterwards, the units were renamed, to be known henceforth as “military-Chetnik detachments” (*vojno-četnički odredi*). In November 1941, the Yugoslav government in exile appointed Draža MIHAILOVIĆ commander of the patriotic forces that had remained in Yugoslavia. On this occasion the Chetnik forces were again renamed, to be known now as the “Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland” (*Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini*, JVUO), in order to stress their continuity with the pre-war Yugoslav army and state. In the official documents of the Ravna Gora Movement the term Chetnik was not used to designate its soldiers, but it was extensively used by the population.⁷⁴ In January 1942, Draža MIHAILOVIĆ was appointed Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air Force by the Yugoslav government in exile. Although essentially of a military nature, the Ravna Gora Movement acquired a political wing in August 1941, by creating a Central National Committee of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (*Centralni nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije*, CNK), the purpose of which was to rally those leaders of political parties who had remained in the country, representatives of patriotic organisations, and prominent intellectuals.⁷⁵ Between 1941 and 1943, only its Executive Committee functioned normally, as the other members had been prevented from joining the movement by the vicissitudes of war. Consisting of Dragiša VASIĆ, Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ, and Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, the committee dealt with political matters and with propaganda, under precarious wartime conditions.⁷⁶ In the autumn of 1943,

⁷⁴ Kosta NIKOLIĆ, *Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta /A History of the Ravna Gora Movement/, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999), p. 74.*

⁷⁵ The CNK was founded at the initiative of Dragiša VASIĆ and Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ.

⁷⁶ Dragiša VASIĆ was born in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia, on 2 September 1885. He had taken part in the Balkan wars and in World War I. Member of the Republican Party from 1918, he worked as a lawyer and defended communists. Author of short stories and novels that belonged to the modernist stream in Serbian literature, Dragiša VASIĆ gradually changed his stance from a leftist to a nationalist one towards the end of the 1930s. Having edited the *Progres* newspapers in the early 1920s, Dragiša VASIĆ became editor of *Srpski glas*, mouthpiece of the Serbian Cultural Club in 1939.

Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ spent World War I in the ranks of the Serbian army. He then went to Paris and he studied law. In 1928 he wrote a thesis on constitutional power in Serbian constitutions. A lawyer and a fellow-member of the Republican Party, he worked in the same office as Dragiša VASIĆ. He became politically active on joining the Serbian Cultural Club.

Stevan MOLJEVIĆ was born on 6 January 1888. As a high-school student he joined the revolutionary youth movement opposed to Austro-Hungarian domination. In 1910 he took part in the attempted assassination of the governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Marijan VAREŠANIN. In 1913, having completed his studies in Zagreb,

the Central National Committee was complete and able fully to carry out its political functions. Considering the Chetnik movement as first and foremost a military one, Draža MIHAILOVIĆ strictly prohibited the officers from meddling in politics. Political work was left solely to the Central National Committee, which was entrusted with the elaboration of the movement's political programme. In order to disseminate its ideas, the Chetnik movement started its first journal, called *Sloboda ili smrt* (Freedom or Death), in 1941.⁷⁷ Once the high command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland had moved to Montenegro [see [Map 8](#) in Annex], the CNK launched another journal, in order to make sure that its instructions and directives reached the movement's units, but in the first place for the purpose of disseminating its political ideas and its propaganda. The first issue of the journal, entitled *Ravna Gora*, appeared on 1 February 1943. Dragiša VASIĆ was appointed its editor and would be in charge of the first eight issues, before he fell out with Stevan MOLJEVIĆ. Although it had not tried to create a large-scale political movement before 1944, the Ravna Gora Movement did create a youth organisation, on 6 September 1942. The Yugoslav Ravna Gora Youth (*Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina*, JURAO) was an organisation of young people aged from eight to twenty, and its cadres all came from the youth organisation of the Serbian Cultural Club (SKK). Indeed, the JURAO adopted as its own the slogan of the Serbian Cultural Club, "Strong Serbdom for a Strong Yugoslavia". In January 1944, the Command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland also founded a women's organisation, known as the Yugoslav Organisation of Ravna Gora Women (*Jugoslovenska organizacija ravnogorki*, JUORA).

he moved to Banja Luka. In 1913 he was one of the 156 people accused by the Austro-Hungarian authorities of treason and Greater-Serbian activities. After the war he became a lawyer and continued with his nationalist political activities, aimed at defending the Serbs from the influence of the Catholic Croats and the Muslim Slavs. Active in the cultural life of Banja Luka, he also contributed to the magazine *Razvitak* /Development/, launched in January 1935, as a political columnist. In November 1936, he helped relaunch the newspaper *Otadžbina* /Fatherland/, which had been published in Banja Luka in 1907 and 1908, and later in Sarajevo, from 1911 to 1914. As editor, he used its pages to defend Serbian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the political influence of the Muslims – under the umbrella of the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) - and the Croats.

⁷⁷ No more than four issues appeared in 1941, because the resistance uprising was defeated by the Germans in November 1941.

On the military plane, during the winter of 1941 and 1942 the Chetnik forces were transformed, with much difficulty, from a guerrilla force to a regular military force. During the summer of 1941, Draža MIHAILOVIĆ had worked to place under his authority all the armed groups that had appeared in Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia. In spite of repeated attempts to structure the Ravna Gora Movement, the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (JVUO) would remain very dispersed, although it did have a high command. Its various detachments in fact enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and did not always heed the directives of the central command. Local detachments of the JVUO were hard to mobilise or motivate outside the regions from which they had come. Likewise, the authority of the detachments' commanders was at times only relative, and their orders were not always obeyed.⁷⁸ In the spring of 1942, the forces of the JVUO were organised on a territorial basis: the detachments were linked to villages, communes or districts. Each administrative district had a battalion consisting of two or three detachments. Brigades were composed of three to five battalions, while army corps comprised two to five brigades.⁷⁹

Draža MIHAILOVIĆ was opposed to overhasty armed struggle against the Germans. He wished to protect the Serbian population as much as possible from unnecessary losses and preferred to wait for a more opportune time to launch an uprising against the occupying forces. The Yugoslav government in exile recognised Draža MIHAILOVIĆ as the leader of the armed resistance. As such, he was promoted to the position of Minister of Defence in January 1942. Although he was described by the western press, English and American, as the

⁷⁸ A report on the political and military situation in eastern Bosnia and the condition of Chetnik units there, submitted to Draža MIHAILOVIĆ by Major Radoslav DJURIĆ on 26 March 1942, illustrates this aspect of things very well. It is here quoted from *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, Tom XIV, Knj. 1, *Dokumenti četničkog pokreta Draže MIHAILOVIĆA 1941-1942* /Collected Documents and Information on the National Liberation War of Peoples of Yugoslavia, vol. 14, Book 1: Documents of the Chetnik Movement of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ, 1941-1942/ (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1981), pp. 173-182:

On the disorganisation and lack of discipline among the Chetnik units in Bosnia see the report submitted on 7 June 1942 to Major Petar BACOVIĆ by Captain Milorad MOMČILOVIĆ and dealing with events in eastern Bosnia from June 1941 to June 1942, in *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, vol. 14, Book 1, pp. 318-333.

⁷⁹ NIKOLIĆ, *Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta*, vol. 1, p. 216.

leader of the first guerrilla movement in occupied Europe, Draža MIHAJLOVIĆ initiated no significant combat operations against the occupying forces. On the contrary, having made the communist partisans his principal enemies, he would end up collaborating with the Italians and the Germans, especially in 1943.

3.3.2 The ideology and programme of the movement

The Ravna Gora Movement emerged in 1941 with the aim of resisting the German occupier. First and foremost a military movement, it also had political objectives. Draža MIHAJLOVIĆ's Chetniks wished to break free from the legacy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which had erased the borders of Serbia.⁸⁰ Their goal was to found a Serbian national state based on the principles of democracy and social justice. Such a state would bring together all the Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The ideologues of the Ravna Gora Movement developed their political programme in reaction to the negative experience of the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941), but also to the policy of extermination carried out against the Serbs by the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna država Hrvatske*), headed by Ante PAVELIĆ. In the opinion of the ideologues of the Ravna Gora Movement, from 1918 to 1941 the Serbian political and cultural elites had endorsed so strongly an ideology according to which the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were part of one and the same nation that as a result they had lost from view the Serbian national interests.⁸¹ Therefore they should now go back to the Serbian "spiritual, political, and national traditions".⁸² And yet it will be wrong to think that the Ravna Gora Movement's practice of ethnic cleansing emerged solely from the events of World War II. In fact, there is ideological continuity between the programme of the

⁸⁰ Milan VESOVIĆ and Kosta NIKOLIĆ, *Ujedinjene srpske zemlje: ravnogorski nacionalni program* /Unified Serbian Lands: the National Programme of the Ravna Gora Movement/ (Belgrade: Vreme knjige, 1996), pp. 35-37.

⁸¹ "Za naše ujedinjenje i naše jedinstvo" /Towards our unification and our unity/, *Ujedinjeno srpstvo* /United Serbdom/, no. 1, 2 April 1944.

⁸² "Na svom putu" /On our own path/, *Ravna Gora*, no. 3, 1 March 1943.

Chetnik movement and the Serbian Cultural Club (SKK). Beginning in the late 1930s, the intellectuals gathered in this organisation advocated the creation of a Serbian state entity, as nationally homogeneous as possible, within the Yugoslav state. In the lectures organised by the SKK between 1937 and 1939, forced population displacements and exchanges were proposed as a way to resolve the Serbian national question, especially in Kosovo and in Vojvodina, where the Serbian population was in a minority. Numerous intellectuals from the SKK joined the Ravna Gora Movement during the war. Dragiša VASIĆ and Stevan MOLJEVIĆ were among them.

One of the first political projects relating to the new Serbian state was developed in the spring of 1941 by Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, who was to become, in August 1941, a member of the Executive Board of the Central National Committee, the political wing of the Chetnik movement.⁸³ The document, entitled “Homogeneous Serbia”, was presented in June 1941 in Nikšić, Montenegro, where Stevan MOLJEVIĆ had sought refuge in April 1941.⁸⁴ It was not at first an official document of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s Chetnik movement, but the movement’s political positions would largely reflect its contents. In his text, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ set down as a goal the creation of a Greater Serbia within a Greater Yugoslavia transformed into a federal state composed of three units (Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene). The task was to unify the Serbian people’s ethnic territories within the same state [see [Map 7](#) in Annex]. In order for this goal to be achieved, MOLJEVIĆ envisaged the expulsion of non-Serbs from territories intended to become part of the Serbian entity, as well as population exchanges, especially between the Serbs and the Croats.

For this reason, the first and most important task facing the Serbs is the following:

to establish and to organise a homogeneous Serbia, which has to include the entire ethnic area populated by the Serbs, and to ensure that this territory disposes of the necessary lines of

⁸³ Appointed to the Central National Committee in August 1941, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ would meet Draža MIHAILOVIĆ for the first time only on 21 May 1942. See TODORVIĆ, pp. 130-131. It was not, therefore, until May 1942 that he actually joined the Ravna Gora Movement.

⁸⁴ Stevan MOLJEVIĆ had the opportunity to discuss his text with Vasilije POPOVIĆ and Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ, professors of history at the University of Belgrade.

communication, strategic points, and economically important regions in such a way as to ensure for it a free cultural, political, and economic life and future development for all time.

These lines of communication and strategic points, indispensable for the security, life and preservation of Serbia, must serve Serbia and the Serbian people even if the Serbs are not in a majority there, if we are to avoid the repetition of the grave sufferings that its neighbours would inflict on it as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

Population displacements and exchanges, especially between the Croats in the Serbian territories and the Serbs in the Croatian territories, are the only way to draw borders between them and improve relations between them, thereby making it absolutely impossible to repeat the horrible crimes committed in the last war, and especially in the present war, in all the territories where the Serbs and the Croats are mixed and where the Croats and the Muslims have planned to exterminate the Serbs.⁸⁵

In Stevan MOLJEVIĆ's opinion, the Serbian political authorities had made a grave mistake in 1918 by failing to draw the borders of Serbia within the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.⁸⁶ This mistake had to be rectified now by bringing together all the territories populated by the Serbs and giving them access to the Adriatic Sea. A Greater Serbia would therefore include Serbia and Southern Serbia (Macedonia and Kosovo) in the east and southeast, to which would be added the Bulgarian towns of Vidin and Kjustendil; in its south would be Montenegro, Herzegovina, and northern Albania; in the west Bosnia, northern Dalmatia, the Serbian parts of Lika, Kordun, and Banija, and part of Slavonia. The Dalmatian coast from Šibenik to Montenegro would belong to the Serbian territory.

Greater Yugoslavia would be constituted on a federal basis: it would in fact consist of a Greater Serbia, a rump Croatia, and a Greater Slovenia. Drawing his inspiration most probably from Ilija GARAŠANIN's *Načertanije*, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ was also in favour of a rapprochement with Bulgaria. In his view, since the Serbs had been the only ones to offer serious resistance to the Ottomans and the Germans, they had thereby acquired the right to be the Balkan leaders. In order to realise their historical mission, "the Serbs must enjoy hegemony in the Balkans, and in order to enjoy hegemony in the Balkans they must be in a position of hegemony in Yugoslavia".⁸⁷

⁸⁵ "Homogena Srbija" /Homogeneous Serbia/, 30 June 1941, cited from VESOVIĆ and NIKOLIĆ, p. 190.

⁸⁶ This is a view shared by other ideologues of the Ravna Gora Movement, most of all Dragiša VASIĆ.

⁸⁷ "Homogena Srbija", 30 June 1941, cited from VESOVIĆ and NIKOLIĆ, p. 193.

The first programmatic document of the Chetnik movement was actually drafted in the summer of 1941 by the Chetnik committee of Belgrade and was known as “Dr Miloš SEKULIĆ’s report”.⁸⁸ With respect to the creation of a strong and homogeneous Serbian state unit, its positions were the same as those of Stevan MOLJEVIĆ. Where it differed was in its explicit call for ethnic cleansing, first in the towns and then in the villages:

Point number II

Prepare to carry out of the following actions when a turning point has been reached:

- a: punish all those who have served the enemy as criminals and who have deliberately worked towards the extermination of the Serbian people;
- b: draw the *de facto* borders of the Serbian lands and make sure that only the Serbian population remains there;
- c: have in mind a speedy and radical cleansing of the towns and their strengthening by new Serbian elements;
- d: develop a plan for the cleansing or displacement of the rural population, with a view to achieving the homogeneity of the Serbian community in the state;
- e: approach the Muslim question in the Serbian entity as an especially difficult one, and resolve it as far as possible during this phase; and
- f: decide in advance which units should carry out points b, c, d, and e of the programme.

Point number III

- 1) Our ideal is a homogeneous Serbian state unit capable of surviving politically and economically. As such it will serve ... (illegible) large-scale political combinations; and
- 2) select experts to prepare documentation on this goal for the peace conference. [. . .]⁸⁹

This document on the situation in the country, was handed to the Yugoslav government in exile in London by Miloš SEKULIĆ. Momčilo NINČIĆ, minister of foreign affairs in the Yugoslav government, supposedly told Konstantin FOTIĆ, Yugoslavia’s ambassador to the United States, that to restore Yugoslavia would not be desirable; instead it would be

⁸⁸ Vojislav VUJANAC, Dragoslav STRANJAKOVIĆ, and Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ probably took part in the drafting of the document. The similitude of their views can be attributed to their membership in the Serbian Cultural Club. See STANIŠIĆ, *Projekti “Velika Srbija”*, p. 47. In July-August 1941, a committee was set up in Belgrade to support the activities of the Ravna Gora Movement. Its members included a certain number of officers of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, among them Boško and Žarko TODOROVIĆ.

⁸⁹ Text quoted from Jovan MARJANOVIĆ, “Prilozi istoriji sukoba narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta i četnika Draže MIHAILOVIĆ u Srbiji 1941. godine” /Contribution to the history of the conflict between the national liberation movement and the Chetniks of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ in Serbia in 1941/, in *Istorija XX. veka: zbornik radova*, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Kultura, 1959), pp. 179-180.

preferable to “create a Greater Serbia extending all the way to Ogulin”, the western borders of which would follow the “Karlovac – Ogulin – Našice line”.⁹⁰

Elements of the programme of the Belgrade Chetnik committee are found in a document issued by the High Command of the Chetnik movement in September 1941. The document envisages “the punishment of all those who served the enemy as criminals and who deliberately worked towards the extermination of the Serbian people”, the drawing of the “*de facto* borders of the Serbian lands, making sure that only the Serbian population remains there” (an ethnically pure Serbia), “the radical cleansing of the towns and their replenishment by new Serbian elements”, “the development of a plan for the cleansing or displacement of the rural population, with a view to homogenising the Serbian state community”, and “to deal with the Muslim question, an especially difficult one, in the Serbian entity with a view to resolving it during this phase”.⁹¹

In a directive by Draža MIHAILOVIĆ, issued on 20 December 1941 and addressed to Major Djordje LASIĆ, commander of the Chetnik detachments of the Yugoslav army in Montenegro, and to Captain Pavle I. DJURIŠIĆ, commander of the Chetnik detachments of the Yugoslav army in the region of the Lim (a river in Montenegro), the objectives of the military units were specified once again:

The objectives of our detachments are the following:

- 1/ To fight for the liberty of our entire people under the sceptre of His Highness King Petar II.
- 2/ To create a Greater Yugoslavia and, as part of it, an ethnically pure Greater Serbia within the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srem, Banat, and Bačka.
- 3/ To fight for the integration within our state of all the non-liberated Slovene territories under Italian and German domination (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Carinthia), as well as of Bulgaria and northern Albania, including Skadar.
- 4/ To cleanse the territory of the state of all national minorities and non-national elements.

⁹⁰ Quoted in STANIŠIĆ, *Projekti “Velika Srbija”*, p. 49.

⁹¹ The document is cited in Vladimir DEDIJER and Antun MILETIĆ, *Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941-1945: zbornik dokumenata i svjedočenja /Genocide against the Muslims, 1941-1945: Collected Documents and Evidence/* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990), pp. 18-19.

5/ To create a direct shared frontier between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and Slovenia, by cleansing the Muslim population of Sandžak and the Muslim and Croatian populations of Bosnia.

6/ To punish all the Ustashi and Muslims who have mercilessly destroyed our people in those tragic days.

7/ To punish all those responsible for the catastrophe of April 1941.⁹²

8/ To settle Montenegrins (strictly honest, nationally acceptable and poor families) in the areas cleansed of national minorities and non-national elements. [. . .]⁹³

Similar goals were set out in the programme of the Dinara Division (*Dinarska divizija*), commanded by Momčilo DJUJIĆ, in March 1942.⁹⁴ This Chetnik division had been created in January 1942 for the purpose of gathering under the same command different Chetnik combat units in the regions of the Knin Krajina, western Bosnia, and Lika.⁹⁵ This was part of the efforts to establish “a purely national political order in all the lands inhabited by the Serbs and those to which the Serbs have aspirations”.⁹⁶ The task of the division was to diffuse and implement the Serbian idea in the regions of Lika, northern Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bosnia:

1. The role of the Division:

In order to help realise the fundamental Serbian idea and the creation of a Serbian national state, a Chetnik division known as the Dinara Division will be established to help the implementation of the idea in the region of the plain of Kosovo. The division will consist of elements with an especially strong national consciousness. Originating from the plain that was once the graveyard of Serbian glory and Serbian heroism, the division must be an expression of the military power of the resurrected Serbs and, with an iron fist, establish a pure national order in all the lands inhabited by the Serbs, as well as those to which they aspire. The role of this division is therefore entirely political for at the moment, as long as the war is still being waged, it must provide shelter to all Serbian national elements, disseminate and implement the Serbian idea in parts of Lika, northern Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bosnia, and, at an opportune moment, use overwhelming power to establish a purely national order with King Petar at its head. [. . .]

⁹² The “disaster of April 1941” refers to the defeat of the Yugoslav forces by the Axis forces (Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, etc.). They were forced to capitulate after only three weeks of fighting.

⁹³ The document is cited in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ, p. 26.

⁹⁴ The document was drafted between 8 and 12 March 1942 in Mostar. Its authors were officers of the JAUO: Major Borivoje S. RADULOVIĆ, Captain (1st Class) Radovan S. IVANIŠEVIĆ, and Captain (2nd Class) Mile RAKOČEVIĆ. See Branko PETRANOVIĆ, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945* /Revolution and Counter-revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945/, vol. 2 (Belgrade: Rad, 1983), p. 93. The Chetnik Dinara Division consisted of five regiments and two units. Each regiment was composed of two battalions.

⁹⁵ Fikreta JELIĆ-BUTIĆ, *Četnici u Hrvatskoj, 1941-1945* /The Chetniks in Croatia, 1941-1945/ (Zagreb: Globus, 1986), pp. 79-85. In December 1941 and January 1942, these units became part of the Ravna Gora Movement under the command of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ.

⁹⁶ Djuro STANISAVLJEVIĆ, “Pojava i razvitak četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj 1941-1942. godine” /The emergence and development of the Chetnik movement in Croatia, 1941-1942/, in *Istorija XX. veka: zbornik radova*, vol. 4 (Belgrade, 1962), pp. 96-97.

It is precisely because of what is at stake with regard to this division that it is necessary clearly to display its national character, since its role is specifically Serbian. First of all, it must be composed solely of Serbs, “soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers alike”. Two identical names – Kosovo in southern Serbia and Kosovo in northern Dalmatia – as well as the historical connections between the two names show that the Serbs, having lost their state at Kosovo, must establish their national idea in Kosovo, in such a way as to make it possible to put into practice the Serbian idea of the creation of a Greater Serbia, which would include Serbia, Vojvodina, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dalmatia all the way to Šibenik, and Lika. As soon as such a Serbian entity has been created, it will be possible to discuss possible federal states or state alliances or, more generally, a Balkan confederation. Thus conceived, the Serbian entity should be inhabited by an exclusively Orthodox population.⁹⁷

Originally from Banja Luka (in the region of Bosanska Krajina), Stevan MOLJEVIĆ insisted that Draža MIHAILOVIĆ address the question of the unification of the Serbian regions in the west. He believed that Belgrade politicians had not shown enough interest in and understanding of these matters.⁹⁸ In 1943, the political advisers of the Ravna Gora movement split on the issue of British aid to the Chetnik movement. Dragiša VASIĆ thought that the British were undermining the Serbian people, whereas Stevan MOLJEVIĆ believed that the movement should rely on the English and the Americans.⁹⁹ Early in June 1943, when the high command of the Chetnik movement moved back to Serbia, Dragiša VASIĆ left the Central National Committee (until January 1944). Since Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ had taken over command of the armed detachments in western Bosnia following the death of Ilija TRIFUNOVIĆ-BIRČANIN, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ became in fact Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s principal political adviser and editor-in-chief of the journal *Ravna Gora*.

The Ravna Gora Movement saw the Germans and the communist partisans as its principal enemies. The main reason for its hostility to the communists was the solution proposed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for the national question. The latter in fact

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

⁹⁸ TODOROVIĆ, pp. 135-136.

⁹⁹ Differences of opinion between Dragiša VASIĆ and Draža MIHAILOVIĆ first appeared in the spring of 1943, after the defeats on the Neretva and the Drina. Dragiša VASIĆ was critical, among other things, of the merciless fighting against the partisans in Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Sandžak. On several occasions, in letters written to Draža MIHAILOVIĆ he wrote in detail and critically about the weaknesses of the Chetnik movement. He denounced the soldiers’ habit of wasting ammunition at weddings and other festivities, their propensity for bloodthirsty acts, such as slitting their enemies’ throats instead of shooting them, and the like. See N. NIKOLIĆ, “Dragiša VASIĆ: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara”, p. 103; Nikola MILOVANOVIĆ, *Dragiša VASIĆ: Od građanskog buntovnika do kontrarevolucionara* / Dragiša VASIĆ: From Bourgeois Rebel to Counter-revolutionary/ (Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1986), p. 35.

rejected the possibility of a unification of Serbian territories within the same state. According to the Chetniks, the communist partisans were planning to divide the Serbs into four “separate provinces”: Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. The Chetniks and the Yugoslav communists had very different visions of the Serbian nation: the latter recognised the existence of separate Macedonian and Montenegrin nations, whereas the former denied it. The Chetniks accused the communist partisans of wanting to cut up or break up the unity of the Serbian people while at the same time planning the creation of a Croatian federal unit, which would include Dalmatia and extend all the way to the Bay of Kotor.¹⁰⁰ Živko TOPALović (1887-1972), president of the Socialist Party of Yugoslavia (a political organisation with little influence), who joined the Ravna Gora Movement in 1943, presented the Chetnik ideology as anti-Croatian, anti-Muslim, and anticommunist:

[. . .] In other areas (the author means Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Chetnik movement, which had, however, emerged in defence against Croatian Ustashism, knew no other ideology but Serbism. It confused the fact of belonging to a state and a nation with religious affiliation. A Serb, that is to say a member of the Orthodox Church, thinks that every Catholic is a Croat and every Muslim a Turk. As enemies, they had to be uprooted or driven out of the Serbian state. This Serbism is opposed to Yugoslavism.¹⁰¹

Having lost some of its political initiative to the communist partisans, the Ravna Gora Movement convened a congress in the village of Ba from 25 to 28 January 1944. The intention was to adopt a programme on how to organise the new Yugoslavia. The gathering was organised in response to the Second Session of the communist-dominated Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), held in 1943, at which the foundations were laid for a future Yugoslav state as a federal state composed of six republics. More than three hundred delegates from all over the country took part in the congress, which was also an occasion to allow certain pre-war political parties (the Socialist Party of Yugoslavia, the Democratic Party, and others) back into the political game, contrary to the wishes of the principal ideologues of the Chetnik movement (Stevan MOLJEVIĆ and Dragiša

¹⁰⁰ *Ujedinjeno srpstvo* (1944: 2).

¹⁰¹ Živko TOPALović, *Kako su komunisti dograbili vlast u Jugoslaviji* /How the Communists Seized Power in Yugoslavia/ (Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2001), p. 204.

VASIĆ), who had an aversion to the Yugoslav political class of the interwar period and would have preferred to see a broadening of the movement rather than the creation of a new political organisation. With a view to improving the image of the movement and strengthening its democratic character, the representatives of certain political parties decided to come together, for the duration of the war, in a coalition known as the Yugoslav National Democratic Community (*Jugoslovenska demokratska narodna zajednica*) and to associate themselves with the Ravna Gora movement. In its resolution, the congress envisaged the restoration of the Yugoslav state and its expansion to territories populated by the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Its territory would be no less than the Yugoslav delegation's claim at the peace conference at the end of World War I [see [Map 3](#) in Annex].¹⁰² The new Yugoslavia was to be a parliamentary monarchy with King Petar II KARADJORDJEVIĆ at its head. The state would be organised on a federal basis and consist of three units: Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The Serbian federal unit would include the entire Serbian people. The same principle would apply to Croatia and Slovenia. The congress decided to annul all territorial changes effected before and during the war: the *Banovina* of Croatia, the dismantling of Yugoslavia by the occupying forces, the creation of the Independent State of Croatia. The Yugoslav orientation of the congress was in harmony with the positions of the Yugoslav government in exile, which had spoken out in favour of the creation of a federal state with three units (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia). But if the ideologues of the Ravna Gora Movement accepted the orientation at all, it was only on condition that Serbs should play a dominant role in the new state.¹⁰³ Moreover, this new Yugoslavia would be a “pure State with no national minorities”.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² At the time the Yugoslav delegation requested that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be extended to the regions of Skadar (Albania), Timisoara (Romania), Kjustendil and Vidin (Bulgaria), Szeged and Pécs (Hungary), Istria, Rijeka (Italy) and Carinthia (Austria).

¹⁰³ Kosta NIKOLIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹⁰⁴ Following the decisions of the Congress of Ba as recorded in *Pomoravlje* in the spring of 1944. Newspaper articles published in Milan B. MATIĆ, *Ravnogorska ideja u štampi i propagandi četnickog pokreta u Srbiji*

3.3.3 The practice of ethnic cleansing

In 1944, the Ravna Gora Movement announced that there would be no collective reprisals, only individual ones, against the perpetrators of crimes against the Serbian population. In reality, Chetnik detachments had indulged in operations of reprisal and revenge against the Croats and Muslims between 1941 and 1944. Throughout the conflict, the Command of the Chetnik movement continued to issue contradictory statements regarding measures of revenge. Nevertheless, explicit appeals for vengeance had been formulated by the leadership of the movement or by its ideologues in the press and in pamphlets. Furthermore, directives of this kind had been issued at the local level, especially in eastern Bosnia and northern Dalmatia. Revenge was associated with the policy of restructuring the Yugoslav state.¹⁰⁵ It also allowed for the cleansing of non-Serbian elements from the territories under Chetnik control. In MOLJEVIĆ's opinion, a policy of *fait accompli* had to be implemented. The mapped out territory had to be taken over, starting from the towns of Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Sunja, Karlovac, Knin, Šibenik, Mostar, and Metković, and non-Serbian elements were to be cleansed, killing those responsible for the massacres of the Serbs, driving out the Croats to Croatia and the Muslims to Turkey or Albania.¹⁰⁶ In a memorandum written on 26 February 1942 at Užice and entitled "The current situation in some Serbian regions and their role in the creation of a homogeneous Serbia", Stevan MOLJEVIĆ declared that the mixing of the Serbian population with the Croats and Muslims in Krajina, Bosnia, and Herzegovina should no longer be tolerated. Although they claimed to be fighting against fascism, the Chetnik armed forces used the same methods as their avowed enemies. While it must be noted

1941-1944 /The Ideology of the Ravna Gora Movement as Presented in the Press and Propaganda of the Chetnik Movement in Serbia (1941-1944)/ (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1995), pp. 198-204.

¹⁰⁵ Mihailo STANIŠIĆ, *Slom, genocid, odmazda* /Defeat, Genocide, Revenge/ (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1999), p. 378.

¹⁰⁶ These intentions were expressed in a letter to Dragiša VASIĆ (AVII, Ca, 32/2, k. 12). Extracts from the letter quoted in STANIŠIĆ, *Slom, genocid, odmazda*, p. 53. The document was published in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ, pp. 33-34, and in *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, vol. 14, Book 1, pp. 101-103.

that the massacres perpetrated by the Chetniks were on a smaller scale than those carried out by the armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia, we must ask what exactly was their nature. Were they solely operations of reprisal or were the Chetniks' punitive expeditions motivated by their national programme? It must be said that the Chetnik detachments did not attack only Croatian and Muslim soldiers who fought for the Independent State of Croatia but civilian populations as well, including women and children. It should likewise be noted that the civilian victims of the operations of reprisal (elderly people, women, and children) were decidedly more numerous than military victims (see examples cited below, pp. 55 and 56). The armed forces of the Ravna Gora movement indulged in a policy of terror against the Croats, whom they accused of having betrayed Yugoslavia, being responsible for the defeat of April 1941, and supporting the policy of extermination of the Serbs implemented by the Independent State of Croatia, especially in the areas where the Serbs and Croats were mixed and where the Ustashi had perpetrated massacres against the Serbs. The Muslims of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Sandžak, thought of as non-national elements and often referred to as Turks, were also the targets of the Chetniks' policy of terror, and so were the communist partisans, who had become the principal foes of the Chetnik movement. The ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims undertaken by Chetnik armed forces is a good illustration of the way that the political and military objectives set by the Ravna Gora movement were applied in practice. The first atrocities against the Muslims of Bosnia were committed as early as the summer of 1941. The first large-scale massacre took place in the district of Ljubinja (the Čavkarica pit), and further massacres followed in Kulen Vakuf (5 and 6 September 1941) and Koraj (26 and 27 November 1941). Between 5 December 1941 and 20 January 1942, a period during which the municipality of Foča was controlled by forces loyal to the Yugoslav government in exile, numerous massacres were perpetrated (in Foča itself, in Goražde, Vlasenica, and Srebrenica) in reprisal for the massacres of Serbs by the Ustasha militia,

composed of Muslims, among others. Several thousand Muslims were killed in this way. The operations of the JVUO took the form of punitive expeditions in which plunder and rape accompanied mass crimes. Knives were used to inflict serious injuries to the faces of Muslims (faces with ears or noses cut off or with eyes gouged out) and many people were killed by having their throats slit with a knife. These cruel practices were not limited to the Chetnik movement, since all the participants in the conflict in the territory of Yugoslavia had indulged in terror, but they were part of the Chetniks' combat techniques. However, cruelty of this kind is not a specialty of this part of Europe or of the world: for example, during the two world wars the eastern front was a place where the opposing sides (the Germans and the Russians) engaged in mutual animalisation and dehumanisation. Following a lull after the communist partisans set up a staff in the region of Foča, further massacres were carried out there on 19 August 1942: around two thousand people were killed and several thousands were forced to flee. The most significant massacres took place in the region of Sandžak and in south-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina in January and February 1943. On 10 January 1943, writing about the operations carried out in January 1943, the commander of the Chetnik detachments in the Lim and Sandžak areas, Pavle I. DJURIŠIĆ, reported to the chief of staff (Draž

MIHAILOVIĆ):

The action on the right bank of the Lim, in the district of Bijelo Polje, is over. It was carried out exactly as planned. Here are the results of the fighting:

The following Muslim villages have been completely destroyed (in the Pljevlje, Sjenica, Peć, and Kolašin sections): Voljevac, Gubovača, Radijelja, Ušanovići, Presečenik, Baturiče, Donji Vlah (Pljevlje section), Mirovići, Šolja, Radojeva glava, Medise, Pobretiče, Donja Kostenica, Stublo, Vrh, Zminjac, Šipovce, Negobratina, the village of Osman Beg, Dupljaci, Jasen, Kostiče, Kaševar, Ivanje, Godijevo, Žilići, Gornja Crnča, Gornji Radulići, Vrba, Crhalja, Kradenik, Sipanje, Ličine (Sjenica-Peć section).

A total of 33 villages.

Casualties: around 400 Muslim fighters.

Around 1,000 women and children.

Our casualties:

14 dead and

26 wounded, of whom

3 women.

The casualty figure is not due to negligent conduct of the operations by our officers but, in all likelihood, to the fact that our soldiers did not protect themselves well enough in their heroic attacks on the Muslims, who had shut themselves up in their homes.

All the villages listed above were burnt, even though I had issued orders not to do so. The burning of the villages was in reaction to losses among our fighters.¹⁰⁷

On 13 February 1943, Pavle I. DJURIŠIĆ sent the chief of staff a further report, in which he specified:

The action against the Muslims in the districts of Pljevlje, Čajniče, and Foča has been completed.

The operations were carried out in conformity with the orders and commands. The timing of the attack was as planned. All the commanders and units carried out their tasks in a satisfactory manner.

From the beginning to the end, the enemy offered little resistance. The only serious resistance was encountered on the hill of Trebeski. It lasted four hours, but was quickly countered.

On the night of the 7th (of February) our units reached the Drina and by then the fighting was practically over. We then proceeded to the mopping up of the liberated territory. All the Muslim villages in these three districts were burnt to the ground, so that not a single house remained intact.

All property has been destroyed, apart from livestock, corn, and hay. The gathering and stockpiling of fodder and food has been ordered in certain places, so that we can set up warehouses for reserve food for the units which have remained on the terrain in order to purge it and to search the wooded areas, as well as strengthen the organisation on the liberated territory.

During the operation the Muslim population was completely destroyed, irrespective of sex and age.

Casualties: we had 22 dead, two of whom were killed by accident, and 32 wounded.

Among the Muslims: 1,200 fighters and 8,000 women, elderly people, and children.

At the outset of the operation, the Muslims took flight towards Metaljka, Čajniče, and the river Drina. Part of the population took shelter in Metaljka. There are an estimated two thousand refugees in Čajniče, some of whom were able to get away before our units had blocked off possible escape routes in this sector. The rest of the population was completely destroyed.¹⁰⁸

The number of victims in the operations against the Muslims in January and February 1943 has been estimated at ten thousand.¹⁰⁹ The number of victims in Montenegro from 1942 to

¹⁰⁷ The document was published in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ, pp. 299-302.

¹⁰⁸ The document was published in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ, pp. 329-333.

¹⁰⁹ TOMASEVICH, p. 258. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ would cite the figure of ten thousand dead in speaking of the total number of victims of the Ravna Gora Movement. This figure, however, refers only to the operations of January and February 1943.

mid-1943 is estimated at around three thousand, or at seven thousand for all the war years (1941-1945). In Croatia massacres were numerous in northern Dalmatia (in the Knin Krajina), in the region of Lika, Gorski Kotar, and Kordun. In these areas the Chetnik forces were commanded by the priest Momčilo DJUJIĆ (1907-1999), head of the Chetnik Dinara Division (*Dinarska četnička divizija*) from January 1942. From the autumn of 1942 to the spring of 1943, Chetnik forces attacked numerous Croatian villages and massacred their inhabitants by slitting their throats. During the *Dinara* operation in October 1942, a detachment commanded by Momčilo DJUJIĆ burned down a number of villages (Gata, Tugari, Ostrvice, and others), and killed all their inhabitants. At the end of the war, Momčilo DJUJIĆ was held responsible for the deaths of around 1,800 people (including women and children).¹¹⁰ In 1947 the Yugoslav State Commission declared him a war criminal for war crimes committed during World War II. Having fled Croatia by way of Slovenia and then Italy, he settled in the United States in 1949. In 1957, he set up an organisation perpetuating the traditions of the Chetnik movement of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ (Movement of Serbian Chetniks Ravne Gore). The Yugoslav authorities filed extradition requests on several occasions with the American judicial authorities but to no avail.¹¹¹ In June 1989, Momčilo DJUJIĆ proclaimed Vojislav ŠEŠELJ a Chetnik Voivode (military leader). There is therefore a direct connection between the Chetnik movement of World War II and the political movement founded by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ in 1990.

¹¹⁰ For this reason Momčilo DJUJIĆ would end up on the list of war criminals drawn up by the Yugoslav authorities after 1945. See Jovo POPOVIĆ, Marko LOLIĆ, and Branko LATAS, *Pop izdaje /The Priest of Betrayal/* (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1988), pp. 169-170. In December 1944, Momčilo DJUJIĆ found refuge in Slovenia, whence he moved to Italy in May 1945. As the Yugoslav authorities had asked for his extradition, he went underground for several years before he moved to the United States and took over the leadership of the Ravna Gora Movement of Serbian Chetniks.

¹¹¹ The final request was filed in May 1991 by the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Justice and Administration. In May 1999, the Croatian Minister of Justice, Zvonimir ŠEPAROVIĆ, also requested the extradition of the former military Chetnik chief for the alleged killing of at least 1,500 persons in the regions of Knin, Vrljika, Sinj, Šibenik and Otočac. (*Voice of America*, <http://www.voa.gov/misc/croatia/dj53199.html>, consulted on 7 February 2005).

4. The emergence of the Serbian national movement in the 1980s and the ideology of a Greater Serbia

With the military victory of the communist partisans and their takeover of power, the status and influence of the Serbian political elites were reduced, to the advantage of a balance among the different republics of the Yugoslav socialist federation. In 1945-1946, the communists proclaimed that they had resolved the national question by having given power to the working class and made all the nations and national minorities equal. Nevertheless, political crises and public protests began to occur from the late 1960s: the Croatian crisis between 1967 and 1971, and Albanian protests in 1968 and 1981.¹¹²

4.1. The confederating of Yugoslavia and the dissatisfaction of the leaders of the Socialist Republic of Serbia

During the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, there emerged in the Serbian political and cultural elite a feeling of dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav state, which was accused of having marginalised Serbia. However, criticism of the situation and future of Yugoslavia was also voiced in the other republics. Following a period of political and economic centralism, the Yugoslav federation was reformed between 1967 and 1974. A new constitution was adopted at the conclusion of this process. Adopted in February 1974 and incorporating amendments drafted in earlier years (1968 and 1971), the new constitution strengthened the tendency towards the confederating of the country by giving greater prerogatives to the republics and autonomous provinces, at the expense of the federal centre. As a result, the position of the republic of Serbia became more complex, since the two autonomous provinces

¹¹² In Croatia the years 1967 – 1971 saw the rise of a national movement which aimed at strengthening the sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The main leaders of the Croatian League of Communists, Mika TRIPALO and Savka DABČEVIĆ-KUČAR, were disavowed by Tito in December 1971 for not having denounced the nationalist claims voiced by the Croatian intellectuals of the Matica Hrvatska Group. At the end of November 1968, Albanian demonstrators took to the streets of Priština demanding that the socialist autonomous province of Kosovo be granted the status of republic. These demonstrations were severely repressed as were those in the spring of 1981 which featured the same nationalist claims.

that were part of it were now defined as separate federal units. In the constitutions of 1946 and 1963, the power and institutions of the provinces were determined by the republic of Serbia itself. In the constitution of 1974, they were by and large determined by the federal government. The provinces became equal with the republics, and their relations with the Serbian centre were weakened and became problematic. The constitutional reforms had been elaborated between 1968 and 1972 by the “liberal” Serbian leadership headed by Marko NIKEZIĆ (1921-1990) and Latinka PEROVIĆ (1933-), who was in favour of curtailing the economic functions of the central government and strengthening the autonomy of the republics. In 1972, the “liberal” leadership was removed from power at Tito’s initiative, to the benefit of conservative forces; they proceeded to carry out numerous purges, which affected enterprises and institutions.

In 1975, the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, concerned at the internal contradictions in Serbia, opened the question of the relations among the three constituent entities of the republic.¹¹³ A working group was set up in June 1976 in order to study this thorny issue. The working group presented its findings to the Serbian Presidency in March 1977: the authors of the report concluded that the power structures of the republic of Serbia were not operative throughout the territory of the republic. They warned the authorities against the creation of three different legal systems and against the tendency of each of the constituent parts of Serbia to isolate itself from the others. They also examined the issue of the realisation of the Serbian people’s historical right to a national state within the Yugoslav federation.¹¹⁴ The contents of the document aroused the disapproval of the leaders of the autonomous provinces supported by the federal structures. At the time, the balance of forces

¹¹³ Dragoslav MARKOVIĆ, *Život i politika: 1967-1978 /Life and Politics: 1967-1978/*, vol. 2 (Beograd: Rad, 1987).

¹¹⁴ The text of the report was published in Žarko PAPIĆ, *Vreme zastoja /The Era of Stagnation/* (Beograd: Ekonomika, 1990), pp. 135-165.

was not conducive to a revision of the constitution, and because of this opposition the question was held in abeyance until the beginning of the 1980s.

The Serbian leaders, anxious to ensure the cohesion of their republic, made use of the events in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 in order to push the question of Serbian unity to the fore once again.¹¹⁵ In 1985, the differences between the political leaderships of Serbia proper and the autonomous provinces led the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to admit that there were internal conflicts in Serbia.¹¹⁶ The Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia acknowledged that the right of the Serbian people to have a state of its own, like the other nations in the federation, had not been fully implemented due to the non-realisation of the constitutional principle according to which the provinces belonged to Serbia, but it warned the leadership in Belgrade that it should respect the sovereign rights of workers, as well as of the nations and nationalities in the autonomous provinces, and not to try to solve the question of unity by centralist methods. It took ten years or so for the LCY /League of Communists of Yugoslavia/ to become fully aware of the gravity of disintegrative phenomena in Serbia.

4.2. Opening the Serbian national question

In the early 1980s Yugoslavia was plunged into a profound economic and social crisis, the escalation of which the authorities found themselves unable to stop. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade churchmen and intellectuals all contributed to the opening of the Serbian national question within communist Yugoslavia. The Albanian riots in the spring of

¹¹⁵ *Dokumenti SK Srbije: Četrnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije: uzroci i posledice kontrarevolucionarne akcije na Kosovu* /Documents of the League of Communists of Serbia: Fourteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia: Causes and Effects of Counter-revolutionary Action in Kosovo/ (Beograd: Komunist, 1981), pp. 72-73.

¹¹⁶ On the role of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in settling the question of Serbia's unity, see: "Šta kažu važeća partijska dokumenta o odnosima u SR Srbiji" /"What Current Party Documents Say on Relations within the Socialist Republic of Serbia"/, *Borba*, 8 July 1988, p. 5.

1981 were the starting point of this gradual process. Making use of the Party's weaknesses, churchmen (Atanasije JEVTIĆ, Irinej BULOVIĆ, Amfilohije RADOVIĆ) became active in the defence of the Serbian national cause in Kosovo, considered to be the Serbian people's "biological and spiritual essence" and the principal site of its collective memory. They issued appeals and wrote articles in journals published by the Serbian Orthodox Church (*Pravoslavlje /Orthodoxy/, Glas Crkve /The Voice of the Church/*), in which they denounced the "crimes" perpetrated by Albanian "separatists and nationalists".¹¹⁷ Beginning in 1982, Kosovo Serbs decided to act against the Albanisation of the region. They gradually formed a protest movement led by Kosta BULATOVIĆ, Boško BUDIMIROVIĆ, Miroslav ŠOLEVIĆ, and others. The movement played a crucial role in the awakening of the Serbian national feeling during the 1980s. In the autumn of 1985, the movement distributed a petition in which it denounced Albanian separatism, deeming it responsible for the exodus of the local Serbian population. The signing of the petition echoed the demands of the Serbian movement in Kosovo whose ranks, as of this point in time, started swelling. These activists increased their pressure on the political leadership of the republic of Serbia, the federation, and the LCY.

While Belgrade intellectuals had spent the first half of the 1980s actively engaged in the defence of human rights and freedom of expression, from 1985 the Serbian nation was to become the principal subject in their public and political appearances. The Writers' Union mobilised itself around the cause of the Kosovo Serbs, and prominent members of the Academy of Sciences and Arts (Pavle IVIĆ, Antonije ISAKOVIĆ, Mihailo MARKOVIĆ, Radovan SAMARDŽIĆ, Kosta MIHAILOVIĆ, and others) drew up a *Memorandum* in which they carried out a detailed study of the situation in Yugoslav society and the position of Serbia within it. This document, often erroneously described as an underground and conspiratorial product, was in fact formulated in the course of the everyday, lawful activities of the principal

¹¹⁷ Radmila RADIĆ, "Crkva i 'srpsko pitanje'" /"The Church and the 'Serbian Question'"/, in Nebojša POPOV, *Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju /The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis/* (Beograd: Republika, 1996), pp. 267-304.

scholarly Serbian institution.¹¹⁸ When its drafting had already reached an advanced stage, the document was leaked to and published in the Belgrade daily *Večernje novosti* /Evening News/ on 24 September 1986. Its publication was a political shock both for the public and for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The unfinished product of a number of authors, the *Memorandum*, a critical appraisal of the situation in the Yugoslav federation, was not a coherent document.

Contradictory in its contents, the *Memorandum* opened with an account of the economic and political crisis in pro-Yugoslav and universalist terms, with the authors deploring the dominance of the nationalist phenomenon over that of class, but it ended by defining the specific interests of the Serbian nation. In this last section, emphasis was placed on Serbia's economic lag, its complex constitutional situation, due to the existence of autonomous provinces, and the position of the Serbs in Kosovo. The authors believed that Serbia was economically exploited by the wealthiest republics, Slovenia and Croatia. In their view, these republics had a revanchist policy towards Serbia, in reaction to Serbia's dominant role in the first Yugoslav state (1918-1941). They believed that in 1981 the Albanian nationalists in Kosovo had declared "total war" against the Serbs, victims of a "physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide". They concluded that the Serbs in Croatia had never been under so much threat since the time of the independent Ustasha state (1941-1945). The academicians' goal was to redress the balance and place the Serbian people once again on an equal footing with the other nations of which Yugoslavia was composed.

¹¹⁸ Kosta MIHAILOVIĆ, Vasilije KRESTIĆ, *"Memorandum SANU": odgovori na kritike* (Beograd: SANU, 1995), p. 14. This work was published in English by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts under the title "Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to Criticisms". The French translation entitled "Le mémorandum de l'Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts : réponse aux critiques" was published in 1996 by *L'Age d'homme* (Paris, Lausanne).

4.3. The ideological transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia

A strong national movement in Serbia could not have emerged in the second half of the 1980s without the backing of the League of Communists of Serbia. As a matter of fact, the conversion to nationalism of one faction of this party favoured the expression of the Greater Serbia ideology which had previously been denounced. In 1986 the Serbian leaders were determined to find a solution to the constitutional crisis that was weakening the republic. For years they had tried to negotiate changes with their counterparts in the autonomous provinces. They were slowly moving towards the formulation of a compromise. Faced with growing nationalism, they had to show that their own demands for a unified republic of Serbia were not part of a nationalist strategy.¹¹⁹ Political leaders in the other republics observed the activities of their Serbian counterparts with suspicion. Many of them thought in fact that the president of Serbia, Ivan STAMBOLIĆ, was himself a nationalist. In 1986 the Party found itself confronted more and more overtly with the protest movement of the Kosovo Serbs, which enjoyed growing support among the intellectuals in the capital. In late September and early October the Party was shaken by the publication of extracts from the *Memorandum* of the Academy of Sciences and Arts. Its top leadership reacted strongly, condemning the nationalist contents of the *Memorandum*. Following the publication of the document, the communist elite of Serbia became increasingly divided. The division was not necessarily into dogmatic (or conservative) and reformist, even if the conservatives were more inclined to support the nationalist tendency. The reformist wing of the Party was likewise split on these issues.

In 1987 the League of Communists was divided into two groups, one led by Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, proclaiming its attachment to Titoism, denouncing Serbian nationalism, but

¹¹⁹ Ivan STAMBOLIĆ, *Put u bespuće: odgovori Ivana STAMBOLIĆA na pitanja Slobodana INIĆA* /The Dead End: Ivan STAMBOLIĆ Responds to Slobodan INIĆ's Questions/, (Beograd : Radio B92, 1995).

inexorably appropriating the demands of the Kosovo Serbs, and the other headed by Ivan STAMBOLIĆ, desirous of unifying Serbia while at the same time respecting the autonomy of the provinces and the federal structures of Yugoslavia. The former held the Party presidency, while the latter had his base in the Belgrade Committee of the LC /League of Communists/. The rift between the two factions deepened, until it became unbridgeable in September 1987.¹²⁰ The Kosovo issue led the Party to endorse the Serbian national cause. In just a few months, the president of the LC of Serbia, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, strengthened his power. He made his own the discontent of the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, who had organised themselves on a national basis and outside the Party structures. At a time when the Party's legitimacy was increasingly being questioned, due to the profound economic and social crisis, MILOŠEVIĆ succeeded in restoring its legitimacy and leadership.¹²¹

The so-called populist “anti-bureaucratic revolution” took place in 1988-1989 in the form of large-scale rallies in Vojvodina, central Serbia and Kosovo in support of the Kosovo Serbs and the new policy of centralising Serbia.¹²² Following large-scale public gatherings in Novi Sad on 5 and 6 October 1988, the political leadership of the province of Vojvodina, which had wished to preserve the province's autonomy, was forced to resign. After an initial failure on 7 and 8 October 1988, similar actions in Titograd on 10 and 11 January 1989 caused the downfall of the Montenegrin authorities. In October 1988 the communist organisation in Kosovo removed from power Kaqusha JASHARI and Azem VLLASI, thought to be too indulgent toward Albanian nationalism, which led to protest rallies by the

¹²⁰ Their differences centred on the ways and means used to implement party policy. Tension grew over the appointment of executives to the top positions in the LC of Serbia and to the strategic posts to be used to consolidate power and to control the state apparatus and the media.

¹²¹ Most astonishingly, he carried out this transformation of communism into nationalism with the support of the army (the leadership of which was staunchly communist and pro-Yugoslav) and of the highest echelons of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Between September and December 1987, he pushed aside his principal critics in the Party, among them the President of Serbia, Ivan STAMBOLIĆ, who had in fact significantly contributed to MILOŠEVIĆ's political ascent.

¹²² Yves TOMIC, “Milosevic et la mutation de la Ligue des communistes de Serbie : du communisme au nationalisme populiste (1986-1989)” /MILOŠEVIĆ and the Transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia: From Communism to Populist Nationalism/ (*L'Autre Europe*, no. 34-35, March 1997).

Albanians. The goal of popular mobilisation was control by the Serbs of the province of Kosovo, which was slipping from their grasp and whose population was by now almost 90 per cent Albanian. Amendments to the Constitution of Serbia by which the autonomy of the provinces was reduced were officially adopted on 28 March 1989. Following further demonstrations by Albanians, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Kosovo. In the course of 1989, conflicts within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia were intensified, especially between the leaderships of the republics of Serbia and Slovenia. The crisis deepened when Serbia broke off economic relations with Slovenia, after the Slovene authorities banned a rally by Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins in Ljubljana.

Whereas during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s the Serbian communist leaders, anxious to unify the Socialist Republic of Serbia, invoked the need to rationalise state functions in order to mitigate the economic and social crisis, in the second half of the 1980s their primary aim was to unify the Serbian people in their own republic. In the space of a few years, the demands of the nationalistic political elites shifted from “the unification of the Socialist Republic of Serbia” to “the unification of the Serbian people”. Following the logic of the unification principle, unification could not be limited to Serbia itself but had to include, in the relatively near future, the territories inhabited by the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As of 1989, as a matter of fact, Serbian nationalists began to focus on the position of the Serbs in Croatia. The leadership in Belgrade gave no opposition. On 9 July 1989, some 80,000 Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia gathered in the vicinity of Knin to celebrate the sixth centenary of the Battle of Kosovo. The League of Communists of Serbia increasingly appropriated the contents of the *Memorandum* of the Academy of Sciences and Arts which denounced the subordinate position of Serbia and the Serbs in communist Yugoslavia. Nationalist ideology was used as a means to restore the legitimacy of the Party and strengthen its power. While communist parties in the other

socialist countries of central and eastern Europe were not able to stop the erosion of their power, the Party in Serbia managed to energise its forces and consolidate its positions on the eve of the introduction of political pluralism and the institutions of representative democracy in 1990. The national movement in Serbia can be read as a reaction to the peripheral position of the republic within the Yugoslav federation and to the marginalisation and stagnation of its economy. Serbia experienced a conflict between modern forms of development and the preservation of archaic social structures. The Serbian leaders aimed to redefine the constitutional status of Serbia, as well as its relations with the other republics, by means of a centralisation of federal powers. The opening of the Serbian national question was facilitated by the economic and social crisis and by the weakness of the Yugoslav state, the cohesiveness of which was undermined by its economic and political fragmentation.

4.4. The political ideas of Vojislav ŠEŠELJ

At the age of sixteen-and-a-half Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became a member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, as a representative of the pupils of his secondary school.¹²³ At the University of Sarajevo he would hold important positions in the Students' Union. He read law at university and distinguished himself by completing his studies in two years and eight months instead of four years. In 1976 he continued his studies at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, where he obtained a master's degree in June 1978 and defended his doctoral thesis a year later, at the age of twenty-five.¹²⁴ Having failed to obtain a position as assistant lecturer at the Faculty of Law in Sarajevo, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was hired instead by the Faculty of Political Science. From December 1979 to November 1980 he did his military service in Belgrade, but during this time he lost the teaching position he had held. He held Muslim

¹²³ Nada BOJIĆ, *Ko ste vi, Vojislave ŠEŠELJU? / Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, Who Are You?* (Belgrade: Dereta, 1992), p. 40.

¹²⁴ The title of his thesis is: "The Political Essence of Militarism and Fascism". BOJIĆ, p. 75.

professors (Atif PURIVATRA, Hasan SUŠIĆ, Omer IBRAHIMAGIĆ) responsible for his stagnating career and described them as “pan-Islamists” and “nationalists”.¹²⁵ It is during this period that Vojislav ŠEŠELJ came to formulate his first political ideas clearly.¹²⁶ In September 1981 he rejoined the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, where he was asked to teach courses on international relations.

At the beginning of the 1980s Vojislav ŠEŠELJ started participating in intellectual debates. He drew attention to himself by coming out in support of Nenad KEČMANOVIĆ, who had been taken to task by the political authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina for his critical writings in the Belgrade weekly *NIN*.¹²⁷ ŠEŠELJ also attacked Branko MILJUŠ, secretary of the League of Communists of Sarajevo, for having allegedly plagiarised other people’s work in his master’s thesis (*magistarski rad*).¹²⁸ Likewise, in the journal *Književna reč* /Literary Word/ he criticised Muslim university professors (Atif PURIVATRA, Hasan SUŠIĆ, and Muhamed FILIPOVIĆ) for having harmed his professional career.¹²⁹ He reproached them with having taken part in an international conference in Madrid which had focused on Muammar GADDAFI’s *Green Book*. In their contributions, these intellectuals had supposedly expressed “pan-Islamist” views.¹³⁰ Because of the positions he adopted Vojislav

¹²⁵ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika* /Campaign against a Heretic/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), p 12.

¹²⁶ He published a number of articles in various journals and magazines (*Književna reč*, *NIN*, *Duga*, *Ideje*) denouncing the arguments of the “reactionary pan-Islamists” of a group of Muslim intellectuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina which was linked to the politician Hamdija POZDERAC, President of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ gave a historical account of the controversy and polemic in his book *Hajka na jeretika*, pp. 37-42.

¹²⁷ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Osvajanje slobode* /The Conquest of Freedom/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), p. 110. In 1981 Nenad KEČMANOVIĆ published several articles in the Belgrade weekly magazine *NIN* which were criticised by the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina for going against the ideological orientation of the League of Communists. ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika*, p. 18.

¹²⁸ ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika*, pp. 43-48. Branko MILJUŠ was a teaching assistant at the Faculty of Political Science and, like Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, taught international relations. His post, nevertheless, was frozen because of the political functions he had in the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo. According to Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, Branko MILJUŠ was one of the main leaders of the political campaign against Nenad KEČMANOVIĆ, also a university professor. ŠEŠELJ, *Osvajanje slobode*, p. 138.

¹²⁹ ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika*, p. 164.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, *Hajka na jeretika*, pp. 7-12.

ŠEŠELJ was expelled from the League of Communists on 4 December 1981.¹³¹ He was then relieved of his teaching duties at the Faculty of Political Science and in the spring of 1982 he was appointed researcher at the Institute for Social Research (*Institut za društvena istraživanja*), an institution affiliated with the Faculty.¹³² A number of Belgrade intellectuals, mostly writers and researchers in the social sciences, came to his defence by writing letters of protest to the government of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo.¹³³ Around this time Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became very critical of the way that the national question was dealt with in Yugoslavia: he spoke out in favour of the use of force against Kosovo Albanians and denounced the passivity of the Serbian political leadership in handling the Kosovo crisis. In his view, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not a nation but a religious group. He expressed his fear of seeing Bosnia and Herzegovina turn into a republic dominated by Muslims.

“Recently, Vojo argued for changing the Constitution of the SFRY which, according to him, gave too much power to the provinces. He believed that the powers of the Federation should be reinforced by a new Constitution. He cited as an example the fact that the political leadership of Serbia, of which he was critical because of its passive attitude toward Kosovo, could not take more radical steps to resolve the situation in Kosovo precisely because the provinces had too much power. He was of the opinion that Serbia had been wronged by the establishment of autonomous provinces within its borders only, and not in Croatia where, by analogy, autonomous provinces for Lika and Kordun, where the Serbs were dominant, should have been established. He pointed out that the Serbs there had fewer opportunities to express their national feelings and symbols than the Serbs in Serbia. I had the impression that he blamed comrade Tito for the establishment of the autonomous provinces. He also believed that the Montenegrin nation was deliberately promoted and that the Montenegrins were in fact Serbs who had accepted the Yugoslav identity more willingly than the other peoples of Yugoslavia. He also believed that the Muslims were not a nation but an Islamic religious group. Vojo feared that Bosnia and Herzegovina could become a pure Muslim republic and that some public figures had this as their final programme and aim which, in his view, could lead to an exodus of Serbs from Bosnia. Accordingly, he also believed that the Serbian intellectuals in Sarajevo were not on an equal footing with the Muslims, an argument he would support with numerous facts.”¹³⁴

¹³¹ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, “Zašto sam isključen iz Saveza komunista?” /“Why was I excluded from the League of Communists?”/ (*Književna reč*, 25 December 1981), published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika* /Campaign against a Heretic/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), pp. 27-36.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ The documents were published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Disidentski spomenar* /A Dissident’s Book of Keepsakes/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1991), pp. 28-30.

¹³⁴ According to evidence given by ŠEŠELJ’s colleagues from the Sarajevo Faculty of Political Science, published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Veleizdajnički proces* /On Trial for High Treason/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1991), p. 22.

In 1982-1983 in conversations with his Sarajevo acquaintances, ŠEŠELJ talked about a possible territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts: Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim.¹³⁵

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was first arrested (for twenty-seven hours) in February 1984, then in April 1984 (for three days). This latter arrest took place in Belgrade, in an apartment where a lecture had been organised by the Free University, an institution that gathered critical intellectuals, including the dissident Milovan DJILAS.¹³⁶ On 15 May 1984 ŠEŠELJ was arrested once again, and on 9 July that same year he was condemned to eight years in prison for counter-revolutionary activities against the established social order. He was accused of being responsible for the contents of a manuscript entitled *Answers to an Interview: What Is to Be Done? (Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi?)*, which the state security service (secret police) had found in his home. In the document he advocated the reorganisation of the Yugoslav federation into four republics (Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia), as well as a revision of the border between Serbia and Croatia.¹³⁷

[. . .] It is necessary to suppress the autonomous provinces, or at least to place them strictly under Serbian sovereignty, seeing that the majority of the population of Vojvodina is Serbian and that a large part of the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo has shown itself willing and determined to lead a separatist policy, so that it would be inconsistent and damaging from the perspective both of the interests of Yugoslavia in general and of reasons of state which are of decisive importance in such cases, to grant this group further political advantages. The Yugoslav federation would thus consist of four genuinely equal republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia. A redrawing of the borders between Serbia and Croatia is necessary. In view of the partially mixed nature of the territories inhabited by the Serbian and Croatian populations in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and Slavonia, the borders would be drawn in accordance with the principle that as many citizens of Serbian nationality should remain within the borders of Croatia as there are citizens of Croatian nationality in Serbia, based on the most recent population census figures. In this way the Serbo-Croatian national question would be resolved once and for all, on the basis of the principles of humanism and democracy; concord between the nations and the community would be strengthened, while one of the principal reasons for discord in the past would be removed.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ See evidence given by ŠEŠELJ's colleagues from the Faculty of Political Science, published in ŠEŠELJ, *Veleizdajnički proces*.

¹³⁶ ŠEŠELJ, *Veleizdajnički proces*, p. 42.

¹³⁷ The text was in fact a response to a survey carried out among prominent figures from the Yugoslav cultural scene by the journalists Dušan BOGAVAC and Slobodan KLJAKIĆ for publication in *Komunist /Communist/*, the journal of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The authors had not interviewed Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, but he wanted to give his response to the questions they asked. The text was published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Demokratija i dogma /Democracy and Dogma/* (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1991), pp. 117-137.

¹³⁸ ŠEŠELJ, *Demokratija i Dogma*, p. 130.

Thanks to the engagement of Yugoslav intellectuals, who gave his case international prominence, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ would serve no more than a year and ten months of his prison sentence.¹³⁹

In the early 1980s Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became ideologically closer to nationalist intellectuals such as the writer Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ (1946-), who had also lived in Herzegovina, whom ŠEŠELJ met in January 1982, and Dobrica ĆOSIĆ (1921-), a former member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia who had become a dissident in the late 1960s.¹⁴⁰ These two writers were ŠEŠELJ's best friends at the time.¹⁴¹ But if they agreed in their defence of the Serbian national cause, the two novelists had different political views: Dobrica ĆOSIĆ remained loyal to his participation in the movement of communist partisans during World War II, while Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ was in fact working on the rehabilitation of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ's Chetnik movement. Although a great admirer of Dobrica ĆOSIĆ at the ideological level, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ would find Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ much more congenial. Indeed, DRAŠKOVIĆ would become the godfather of ŠEŠELJ's eldest son. Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, a former journalist with Tanjug, the Yugoslav press agency, who had been expelled from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, turned into a defender of the Serbian national cause in the early 1980s. Most notably, he protested to the Croatian authorities against the "cultural genocide" allegedly carried out against the Serbian people in Croatia, and demanded the restoration of the "cultural and spiritual autonomy" that it had enjoyed before

¹³⁹ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Pravo na istinu* /Right to the Truth/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991). This work is a collection of all letters of protest, petitions and communications addressed by Yugoslav and foreign intellectuals to the Yugoslav authorities regarding the sentencing in 1984 of Vojislav Šešelj to eight years in prison.

¹⁴⁰ Born in 1946 in Vojvodina in a Serbian family which was originally from Herzegovina, Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ graduated from the Faculty of Law in Belgrade (1968). He worked as a journalist in the Yugoslav press agency TANJUG from 1969 to 1978 and then for the newspaper *Rad*. He wrote several novels in the first half of the 1980s and, in the 1990s, became the main opponent to the regime of Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ. He is currently Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro (official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Officials/draskovic_e.html, consulted on 7 February 2005, and BETA news of 24 June 1999 translated into French by the Balkans Courier: <http://www.balkans.eu.org/article3103.html>, consulted on 7 February 2005).

¹⁴¹ ŠEŠELJ, *Veleizdajnički proces*, pp. 15-17.

1941. He was of the opinion that the Serbs were a culturally and spiritually endangered minority in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they were threatened with liquidation in Kosovo, and that in Montenegro they were not allowed to use their ethnic name freely.¹⁴² Together with other writers, he denounced the political trials of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly underlined the exodus of 200,000 Serbs from the republic.¹⁴³ In 1986, the writers Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ and Milovan DANOJLIĆ travelled to North America with the historian Veselin DJURETIĆ to give a series of lectures.¹⁴⁴

After 1986, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ joined the powerful national movement whose aim was to strengthen the position of Serbia within the Yugoslav Federation. Thus, for example, he took part in demonstrations organised by Serbian activists in Kosovo; he was one of the demonstrators who travelled to Novi Sad on 8 July 1988 to protest against the leaders of the province of Vojvodina, accused of failing to support the Kosovo Serbs.¹⁴⁵ After the authorities in the republic of Serbia embarked on a constitutional reform in 1988, he took part in debates on the constitutional changes organised by the Writers' Union (22 February 1988), the Serbian Philosophical Society (22 March 1988), and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (17 and 18 March 1988). He proposed a restructuring of the Yugoslav federation which would consist of no more than three federal units instead of eight (six republics and two autonomous provinces) based on the existence of no more than three Yugoslav nations: the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. In ŠEŠELJ's view, the Macedonian and Muslim nations

¹⁴² This letter addressed to the political authorities of the republic of Croatia was published by the press of the Serbian political emigration, including *Četničke novine* /Chetnik Newspaper/, no. 279 of May 1986, p. 3, and *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca* /Serbia: The Voice of Serbian Fighters/, no. 263, March 1986, pp. 3-4.

¹⁴³ In a letter of 9 January 1986, addressed to the Yugoslav Presidency, the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia, and the press by Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, Vojislav LUBARDA, Gojko DJOGO, and Rajko NOGO. The letter was published in *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, no. 264, April 1986, p. 2.

¹⁴⁴ Attacked by *Vjesnik*, the official Zagreb daily, Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ would respond to its editors in September 1986. His response would be published in *Četničke novine* in November 1986. Veselin DJURETIĆ is the author of a book on the Allies and the Chetniks in World War II, in which he rehabilitates the Ravna Gora movement.

¹⁴⁵ In its September 1988 issue, *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, the mouthpiece of the Movement of Serbian Chetniks Ravne Gore, published ŠEŠELJ's open letter addressed to Boško KRUNIĆ, leader of the autonomous province of Vojvodina.

had been “invented”.¹⁴⁶ In addition to Serbia, the Serbian federal unit would thus include Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and other areas, and could be organised on the basis of regional autonomy for these historical provinces.¹⁴⁷ He spoke out in favour of the suppression of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.¹⁴⁸ In so doing Vojislav ŠEŠELJ placed himself within the conceptual framework of the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) which recognised no more than three constituent nations and in line with the solutions proposed by Serbian nationalists in the days of the first Yugoslavia, namely: a Yugoslav federation consisting of three units, Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene. He also believed at the time that “a new colonisation of Kosovo and Metohija” was necessary in order to deal with the crisis and tensions in this autonomous Yugoslav province. The large concentration of Albanians in one territory, a strategically important fact according to him, was a threat and he therefore advocated that most of the Albanian national minority be displaced throughout Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁹ In 1988 he outlined a revision of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 and the constitution of the republic of Serbia.¹⁵⁰ In 1989 he saw the downfall of the autonomist leaders of Vojvodina, the subordination of the political leadership of Kosovo to the leaders in Belgrade, and the change of leadership in the republic of Montenegro as the first stage in the unification of the Serbian people.

“The Serbs must regain their political power and influence and position themselves in accordance with their political power. I believe that the first stage has been completed in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija and Montenegro. In Montenegro, claims for incorporation into Serbia have been publicized. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Serbian regions of present-day Croatia have been harassed. There have been huge demonstrations there. A month ago, in Banja Luka, Drvar, in some town of Herzegovina, in Knin, in Srb in Lika, in Pakrac, the Serbian people have been stirring, rising and publicly expressing their demands. This suggests that the natural unification of the Serbian people as a whole in political, cultural and economic terms will be achieved.”¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav* /Plea for a Democratic Constitution/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1991), p. 26. His position evolved in comparison to that in *Answers to an Inquiry-Interview: What's to Be Done? (Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi?)* in which he refers to a federation of four republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.

¹⁴⁷ ŠEŠELJ, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁴⁹ ŠEŠELJ, *Osvajanje slobode*, p. 184.

¹⁵⁰ The texts were published in ŠEŠELJ, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav*.

¹⁵¹ Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the Serbian emigration press and published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Horvatove ustaške fantazmagorije i druge političke rasprave* /HORVAT's Ustashi Fantasies and Other Political Debates/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1992), pp. 96-97.

In the second half of the 1980s Vojislav ŠEŠELJ drew closer to the Serbian political emigration of the Chetnik persuasion, especially the movement led by Momčilo DJUJIĆ, former leader of the Chetnik Dinara Division. Known as the Movement of Serbian Chetniks of Ravna Gora/ in the Free World (*Pokret srpskih četnika Ravne Gore u slobodnom svetu*), this movement of former Chetnik fighters had as its goal the liberation of Serbs from communist dictatorship and the unification of “Serbian lands”.¹⁵² In 1989, having been given a passport at the end of a three-year ban, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ travelled to the United States, Canada, and Australia, where he spent three months meeting the representatives of different Serbian émigré organisations. He gave lectures, expounding his national programme.¹⁵³

We Serbs in Yugoslavia must define our national goals, our national programme, and the borders of our state, while allowing our supposed northern brothers, the Croats, complete freedom to decide whether they want to live in such a state or not. The Serbian people is not *a priori* opposed to the existence of Yugoslavia. I am deeply convinced that the Serbian people is in favour of the existence of Yugoslavia but it does not want Yugoslavia at any price. It only wants a Yugoslavia whose frontiers would respect the borders of Serbian statehood guaranteed by the Treaty of London. Therefore, should a federal Yugoslavia remain in existence, the Serbian federal unit should comprise within its borders not only the current territory of Serbia and the current provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija, but Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, Kordun, eastern Slavonia, and Baranja. These borders are not guaranteed by the Treaty of London but were drawn by Ante PAVELIĆ during World War II. He drew them with Serbian graves, Serbian mass burials, Serbian suffering, camps, massacre sites, and pits. And I think that the Serbian people must on no account allow a single Serbian mass grave to remain outside the borders of the Serbian state.¹⁵⁴

In his lectures, ŠEŠELJ demanded sanctions against the Croatian people, guilty of having given majority support to the regime of Ante PAVELIĆ during World War II. He considered Croatia to be an arbitrarily created state, having obtained, in 1945, territories that had never

¹⁵² See the editorial in the July 1986 issue of *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, under the headline “Our Position and Our Message” (Naš stav i naša poruka):

“The Ravna Gora Chetnik Movement was created by the Serbian people and shed its blood to help its foundation. The goals of the movement have been and remain the liberty, unification, and prosperity of Serbdom. [. . .]

We are not a party, a group, or a clique in the service of individuals. We are the living, fighting force of the Serbian people, ready to sacrifice ourselves for the liberty of Serbdom and the unity of all the Serbian lands.”

¹⁵³ The texts of his lectures were published in ŠEŠELJ, *Horvatove ustaške fantazmagorije i druge političke rasprave*. Some of them were also published by the Chetnik press in the United States.

¹⁵⁴ “Program Dr. Vojislava ŠEŠELJA: iz predavanja kod Gračanice u Americi” /Dr Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s programme: Gračanica Lecture delivered in the United States/, *Četničke novine*, no. 298, July 1989, p. 4.

been part of it before, such as the town of Dubrovnik. On the subject of Kosovo, he was even more vindictive:

As for Kosovo and Metohija, the Serbian people has fought for this region on several occasions in the course of its history. If necessary, the Serbian people will go to war again for Kosovo and Metohija. And rivers of blood will flow so that Kosovo and Metohija can remain a Serbian territory, if this is what they force us to do. We are not uttering any threats, but we promise to do this if we are forced to. I believe that one of the principles of the Serbian programme must be to insist on a new colonisation of Kosovo and Metohija. In what way?

[. . .] Meanwhile the capital of Yugoslavia and Serbia, all the organs of state, its organisations and institutions, could be moved to Kosovo and Metohija. This would imply the transfer of hundreds of thousands of state employees and the members of their families. Following this, all the military and police academies could be moved to Kosovo and Metohija, and all the military institutions that are not directly linked to the command of military districts. In this way we would have a large number of state employees and officials settling in Kosovo. Those who would not wish to move would simply be laid off from work and would have to fend for themselves. Officials who have enjoyed privileges for decades after the war must contribute to the solution of our key problem.¹⁵⁵

Before he returned to Serbia ŠEŠELJ appealed for the unity of the Serbian emigration, with a view to creating a “Serbian democratic movement”. In his view, the common platform could be as follows:

- 1 – The final destruction of the personality cult centred on Josip BROZ Tito, a criminal and tyrant who inflicted on us our biggest national defeats, as well as an end to communist dictatorship and to the arbitrary power of the anti-Serbian coalition over our fatherland.
- 2 – The redrawing of the borders of the Serbian state in accordance with historical and ethnic criteria on which its frontiers were based when set down in the text of the Treaty of London in 1915.
- 3 – The establishment of a democratic regime, with a multi-party political system and a free-market economy.¹⁵⁶

On 28 June 1989, Momčilo DJUJIĆ, who had just proclaimed Vojislav ŠEŠELJ military leader (*vojvoda*) of the Chetnik movement, issued a statement in which he spoke out in favour of the unification of Serbian lands:

The resurrection and revival of the Serbian state in the Balkans are nigh; all Serbdom will be united, and so will all the Serbian lands on which our churches, our homes, and our graves rests. To achieve this goal, we need to strengthen our Serbian national and spiritual unity with the blessing of the Church of Saint Sava, with faith in God and Saint Sava, ready to sacrifice all in this fight from which we shall emerge victorious and free, expecting the help of no one but Almighty God.

For centuries now, the Croats have been our greatest enemies and they remain so. They have exterminated more of us than the Turks did in five hundred years. There can be no negotiation

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁵⁶ *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, no. 303, July 1989, p. 2.

with them, nor any discussion. **We shall take possession of the borders of our Serbian lands and no force can prevent us** (emphasis added by Y. T.).¹⁵⁷

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ based his project of a Greater Serbia on both historical and ethnic rights. He frequently referred to international law in order to justify the territorial borders of the future Serbian state, especially towards Macedonia and Croatia. As regards the latter republic, he based his arguments on the Treaty of London, signed on 26 April 1915 by the countries of the Entente and Italy with a view to getting Italy to enter the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.¹⁵⁸ The Treaty, which the four participating states (Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy) secretly negotiated without consulting the Serbian government, was designed to satisfy the territorial claims of Italy in Dalmatia in exchange for its participation in the war on the side of the Entente.¹⁵⁹ Consequently, the Treaty did not deal directly with the issue of ceding territory to Serbia to create a Greater Serbia, as Vojislav ŠEŠELJ claims.¹⁶⁰

“The boundaries of the Serbian state guaranteed by the 1915 Treaty of London are the only acceptable boundaries of the Serbian federal unit. This means that Serbia shall encompass Serbia proper, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, eastern Slavonia and Baranja.”¹⁶¹

Although Article 5 of the Treaty of London clearly stated that all those territories which were not returned to Italy would, on the whole, be handed over to "Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro", this did not mean that the participating diplomacies did not have an understanding on the Treaty's territorial repercussions. Accordingly, Dalmatia was to be partitioned and apportioned to several states, and not to Serbia alone.¹⁶² Nevertheless the

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁵⁸ René ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 575.

¹⁵⁹ Milan MARJANOVIĆ, *Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915. : prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917. /The 1915 Treaty of London: A Contribution to the History of the Struggle for the Adriatic, 1914-1917/* (Zagreb: Jugoslovenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1960), pp. 232-233.

¹⁶⁰ The sections of the Treaty that deal with the South Slavic lands are available on the Internet on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/londonski_ugovor_s.html.

¹⁶¹ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Politika kao izazov savesti /Politics as a Challenge to Conscience/* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), p. 9.

¹⁶² The Italian government wanted to obtain the whole of Dalmatia. The Treaty of London presupposed the existence of three States: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Milan MARJANOVIĆ, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946:*

British, French, Russian and Italian diplomats envisaged that part of the Dalmatian coast between the promontory of Planka (“Ploča” in Serbian), situated to the north of Split, and Montenegro be given to Serbia, which would then stretch also to Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁶³ However, wanting to establish a certain balance between the powers in the region, during the negotiations of the Treaty of London (March – April 1915) it was not envisaged to have this enlarged Serbia include Croatia and Slavonia.¹⁶⁴ While it defines the dividing line along the Dalmatian Coast, the Treaty of London does not define any inland boundaries, let alone along the Karlobag - Ogulin - Karlovac - Virovitica line [see [Map 9](#) in Annex]. Moreover, the locality of Karlobag, which lies to the north of Zadar (Zara in Italian) on the Dalmatian coast, was not to go to Serbia but to Croatia.¹⁶⁵ During the summer of 1915, the Entente Powers

iredenta i imperijalizam /The Struggle for the Adriatic 1914-1946: Irredentism and Imperialism/ (Split: Redakcija listova JRM, 1953), p. 27.

¹⁶³ *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917 : d'après les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères à Petrograd /Secret Russian Diplomatic Documents, 1914-1917: From the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Saint Petersburg*, (Paris: Payot, 1928), pp. 229-230.

¹⁶⁴ René ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁵ MARJANOVIĆ, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam*, p. 26.

Article 5 of the Treaty of London states:

“Italy shall also be given the province of Dalmatia within its present borders, including Lisarica and Tribanj in the north, and in the south up to a line starting on the shore of the promontory of Planka and extending to the east following the peaks which create divides in such a way as to leave in the Italian territory all the valleys and watercourses descending towards Sibenik, such as Cikola, Krka and Butisnjica and their tributaries. In addition, Italy shall be given the isles situated in the north and in the west of Dalmatia, starting from the isles of Premuda, Silba, Olib, Skrda, Maun, Pag and Vir in the north up to Mljet in the south, including the isles of Sv. Andrija, Bisevo, Vis, Hvar, Torkul, Korcula, Kaciol and Lastovo, along with nearby reefs and islets, as well as Palagruz, but excluding the isles of Veliki Drvenik and Mali Drvenik, Ciovo, Solta and Brac.

The following shall be neutralised:

1. The entire coast from the promontory of Planka in the north to the southern coast of the peninsula of Peljesac in the south, so as to encompass the whole peninsula;
2. A part of the coast starting in the north at a point at a distance of 10 kilometres south of Cavtat and extending in the direction of the south all the way to the river Vojusa, encompassing the Bay and Port of Kotor, the ports of Bar, Ulcinj, Sv. Ivan Medovanski, Durres, without encroaching upon the rights of Montenegro based on the declarations of the Great Powers which they exchanged in April and May 1909; these rights shall apply only to the present territory of Montenegro and shall not be applicable to the lands and ports yet to be accorded to it; consequently, no part of the coast in possession of Montenegro at present shall be neutralised; the restrictions relating to the port of Bar consented to by Montenegro in 1909 shall remain in force;
3. Finally, all the islands which have not been granted to Italy.

Note:

The four allied Great Powers shall grant the following territories to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro: The entire coast in the upper Adriatic from Volosko on the border of Istria to the northern coast of Dalmatia, comprising the present Hungarian coast and the Croatian littoral, including the port of Rijeka and the small ports of Novi and Karlobag, as well as the isles of Krk, Prvic, Grgur, Goli and Rab. In the southern Adriatic, in the area in which Serbia and Montenegro are interested, the entire coast from the

(France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy) wanted Bulgaria and Romania to enter the war against Austria-Hungary and Germany and promised them territory (the eastern part of Macedonia and the Banat region respectively) which belonged to Serbia or was supposed to become part of the future Yugoslavia claimed at the time by the Serbian government of Nikola PAŠIĆ. In exchange for territorial concessions, the Entente Powers pledged, in a note of 4 August 1915, to compensate Serbia on the Adriatic coast, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by means of a common boundary with Greece but there is no mention of Croatia.¹⁶⁶ If an offer of a Greater Serbia was made to the Serbian government, it was made in July 1915 by Edward Grey, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, alone, and furthermore as part of a request sent to the Russian government.¹⁶⁷ During July and August 1915, while negotiating with Bulgaria and Romania to engage in the war against the Axis powers, the territories proposed as compensation to the Kingdom of Serbia varied in their geometry and never became part of any kind of diplomatic treaty whatsoever. Moreover, because of the opposition of the Italian diplomacy which was of the opinion that the question of the unification of Croatia and the south of Hungary (the

promontory of Planka to the River Drim, including the important ports of Split, Dubrovnik, Kotor, Bar, Ulcinj and St. Ivan Medovanski, as well as the isles of Veliki Drvenik, Mali Drvenik, Ciovo, Solta, Brač, Jakljan and Koločep. The port of Durres shall be left to the independent Muslim State of Albania.”

Source: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/london_treaty_e.html (consulted on 17 October 2005). English text posted on the internet site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro was taken from

MARJANOVIĆ, *Londonki ugovor iz godine 1915.: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917.*, pp. 445-449.

¹⁶⁶ Dragoslav JANKOVIĆ, *Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914-1915. godine /Serbia and the Yugoslav Question, 1914-1915/*, (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju), 1973, p. 127.

¹⁶⁷ Djordje Dj. STANKOVIĆ, *Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije /Nikola PAŠIĆ, the Allies and the Creation of Yugoslavia/*, (Beograd: Nolit, 1984), p. 128. As noted by the historian Djordje STANKOVIĆ of the University of Belgrade, this was the first time that the term “Greater Serbia” was mentioned.

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's reading of the Treaty of London of April 1915 is shared by a number of Serbian historians (EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 2, p. 747). In a paragraph entitled “The Treaty of London” in the 20th-century history textbook for high-school students in Serbia the authors claim that:

“In the second year of the conflict, Serbian unification through the creation of a Greater Serbia under the Treaty of London of 26 April 1915 appeared possible, in the form of an agreement between Italy and the Entente Powers on territorial concessions to Italy (Istria and the greater part of Dalmatia) so that Italy would enter the war. The Allies also offered Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia, Srem, Bačka, southern Dalmatia and northern Albania to Serbia. (...)”

Kosta NIKOLIĆ, Nikola ŽUTIĆ, Momčilo PAVLOVIĆ, Zorica ŠPADIJER, *Istorija 3/4 /History 3/4/*, (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2002), p. 132.

These assertions were hotly debated in the Belgrade weekly *Vreme* and contested by Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ, professor of history at the University of Belgrade (“On Methodology, Honesty and Scandals”, *Vreme*, no. 628, 16 January 2003, <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=331016>).

territories of Vojvodina) to Serbia should be left open, the Croatian territories were not to part of a possible Greater Serbia.¹⁶⁸ This was, among other things, the reason why the Head of the Serbian Government Nikola PAŠIĆ rejected the proposals of the Entente since they did not lead to the unification of Southern Slavs within a Yugoslav State.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Milan Marjanović, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam /The Struggle for the Adriatic, 1941-1946: irredentism and imperialism/*, Split, Redakcija listova JRM, 1953, pp. 27-29

¹⁶⁹ There was no mention of Croatia or of Slovenian territory in the proposals the Entente Powers presented to the Serbian Government. Moreover, the neutralisation of the Adriatic coast, which was supposed to go to Serbia, was unacceptable to the Serbian Head of Government. *Ibid.* pp. 127-128. STANKOVIĆ, p. 128. Djordje Dj. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije*, (Nikola Pašić, the Allies and the Creation of Yugoslavia), Beograd, Nolit, 1984, p. 128/

5. The Serbian Radical Party (SRS): the Greater Serbia party

5.1. From small Chetnik groups to Serbian Radical Party

The nationalist intellectuals who had come forward in defence of the cause of the Kosovo Serbs in the second half of the 1980s regrouped early in 1990 and founded their first political organisation, the Serbian Freedom Movement (*Srpski slobodarski pokret*), with Vojislav ŠEŠELJ as its president.¹⁷⁰ This marginal political group was notable for its attachment to the idea of the integration of all Serbs from the territory of Yugoslavia in one and the same state should Slovenia or Croatia secede from Yugoslavia:

The Movement is in favour of the restoration of the political, economic, cultural, and spiritual unity of the Serbian people, of complete mutual understanding and solidarity between religious Serbs and atheist Serbs, of brotherly concord between Orthodox Serbs, Muslim Serbs, Catholic Serbs, and Protestant Serbs.

All that has divided us in the past decades and centuries must be left behind and given over to historical scholarship to study and analyse dispassionately, in a manner free from ideological prejudice. The revival of our traditional popular values, of our cultural heritage, of our love of freedom and our democratic achievements marks a break with the entire dogmatic legacy, with all the aspects of totalitarian ideologies and with the political monopoly of the communists.

We believe that the Serbian people is not opposed to the existence of Yugoslavia in principle, but it can accept it as a future shared state only if its existence poses no threat to any of the achievements of the liberation wars waged by Serbia and Montenegro in the last two centuries. We must reject all the elements of the Yugoslav legal system that have been produced by communist revolutionary violence and by the explicitly anti-Serbian policies implemented in recent decades, the fatal consequences of which are most visible in the administrative divisions allocated by the state.

In view of this, we are especially strongly opposed to the artificial territorial division of the Serbian lands, and we insist first and foremost on the principle according to which no political party has the right to take away from the Serbian people the territories that were part of Serbia before the creation of Yugoslavia, nor does the Yugoslav regime have this right.

Should the Slovenes or Croats decide to withdraw from Yugoslavia, we would support the democratic integration of all the historical provinces in which the Serbian people is in a majority. In order to achieve the complete national reconciliation of all Serbs, it is necessary to get rid of all the political, legal, and ideological consequences of the artificially provoked civil war and to make it possible to study the events of our recent history freely and in a more scholarly way.

¹⁷⁰ The founding committee consisted of the following members: Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, lawyer; Djordje NIKOLIĆ, biologist; Vojislav LUBARDA, writer; Tripo ZIROJEVIĆ, physician; Aleksandar ČOTRIĆ, student; Radivoje PANIĆ, student; Vojin VULETIĆ, technician; Milija ŠĆEPANOVIĆ, retired army officer; Mladen MARKOV, writer; Miodrag GLIŠIĆ, economist; Todor BOŠKOVIĆ, worker; Bogoljub PEJČIĆ, publicist; Jovan RADULOVIĆ, writer; Rajko PETROV NOGO, writer; Slobodan RAKITIĆ, writer; Ljubica MILETIĆ, writer; Dušan VUKAJLOVIĆ, writer; Alek VUKADINOVIĆ, writer; Milorad VUKOSAVLJEVIĆ, writer.

We are convinced that special attention must be paid to the creation of favourable conditions for the return of all Serbian émigrés to the Fatherland, and to the strengthening of political, economic and cultural ties between the Fatherland and the diaspora.

Belgrade, 6 January 1990.¹⁷¹

The 540-member organisation did not last long under this name. On 14 March 1990 it joined some of the members of the Serbian National Renewal (*Srpska narodna obnova*, SNO), founded in January 1990 and headed by Mirko JOVIĆ, to form a new organisation known as the Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*, SPO).¹⁷² The writer Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ was elected president of the SPO, with Vojin VULETIĆ as secretary. The leadership of the movement consisted of thirty-one members, sixteen from the SNO and 15 from the SSP. On this occasion the SPO stated:

The Serbian Renewal Movement remembers with reverence the three million Serbs who died and were massacred in the wars of 1912 to 1918 and 1941 to 1945 so that Yugoslavia could be created and subsequently renewed. Since it respects the Yugoslav ideals . . . of our people, the Serbian Renewal Movement neither wishes nor will provoke the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

At the same time, the SPO does not contest the right of the Slovene and Croatian peoples to establish independent states of their own and to secede from Yugoslavia or to enter into a confederate relationship with Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, we must warn that in either of these two cases the Serbian Renewal Movement will respond in the same way: an independent or confederate Croatia or Slovenia will not be able to satisfy their separatist aspirations until they have paid their debts to Yugoslavia (and war damages to the Serbian people in the case of Croatia). Above all, no piece of land drenched in Serbian blood and marked with Serbian churches and graves can be detached or confederated. No one can separate from Yugoslavia the territories which on the day when Yugoslavia was created in 1918 were part of the Kingdom of Serbia, or from the territories where Serbs were in a majority before the genocide carried out by the Croatian Ustashi.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ *Četničke novine*, no. 302, March 1990, p. 3.

¹⁷² The SNO likewise aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia, which would include not only Serbia itself but Bosnia, Slavonia, Herzegovina, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and the Knin Krajina. The party is in favour of the redrawing of the western borders of Serbia, which should be determined on the basis of the ethnic map as it was on 6 April 1941, when the forces of the Axis invaded Yugoslavia. All the territories that used to have a predominantly Serbian population before 1941 must become part of Serbia, for no Croatian state must profit from the genocide against the Serbs from 1941 to 1945. The SNO proposed that Serbia should be divided into several administrative regions: the Sava and Danube region, with Novi Sad as its centre; the Vrbas region, with Banja Luka as its centre; the Drina region, with Sarajevo as its centre; the Zeta region, with Cetinje as its centre; the Vardar region, with Skopje as its centre; and the Morava region, with Kruševac as its centre. See the draft programme published in *Četničke novine*, no. 302, March 1990, pp. 1, 2, and 5.

The membership figures for the Serbian Freedom Movement were cited by V. ŠEŠELJ in an interview given to the *ON* magazine in April 1990 and published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića /The Destruction of the Serbian National Being/* (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1992), p. 53.

¹⁷³ *Velika Srbija /A Greater Serbia/*, July 1990, no. 1, p. 18.

The SPO showed the same desire to reattach to Yugoslavia (or rather to Serbia) the territories in the west where crimes were committed against the Serbs during World War II. In April 1990, Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, and Milan KOMNENIĆ travelled to the United States to enlist the support of the Serbs living in that country.¹⁷⁴ The journal *Četničke novine* described the foundation of the SPO as the beginning of a new Serbian uprising.¹⁷⁵ A conflict soon erupted within the ranks of the SPO leadership. On 5 June 1990, one part of the leadership relieved Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ of his presidential functions.¹⁷⁶ On 18 June 1990, the faction headed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ decided to create a new organisation, known as the Serbian Chetnik Movement (*Srpski četnički pokret, SČP*). The new party was more explicit about the creation of a Greater Serbia as one of its goals and its programme clearly stated which territories should become part of an expanded Serbia:

1. The restoration of a democratic, independent and free Serbian state in the Balkans, which would encompass all of Serbdom, all the Serbian lands; that is to say, in addition to the Serbian federal unit as currently defined, it will include within its borders Serbian Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, the Serbian town of Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Banija, Serbian Slavonia, and Serbian Baranja.

2. The full realisation of the political, economic, cultural, spiritual, and national unity of the Serbian people; mutual understanding and solidarity with Muslim Serbs, Catholic Serbs, and Protestant Serbs. This means that the civil war imposed on Serbs by communists half a century ago will end once and for all. [. . .]

5. To make possible – economically, politically, and from the perspective of international law – the systematic settlement in Serbia of all the members of the Serbian minority in Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, as well as the return of all émigrés who wish to return, both from Europe and from overseas. [. . .]

20. To suppress by all possible means the Albanians' separatist rebellion in Kosovo and Metohija. In order to avoid the repetition of such occurrences we would like to see the following measures put in place immediately:


- The effective prevention of the introduction of any kind of autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija,

¹⁷⁴ *Četničke novine*, no. 305, Juillet 1990, pp. 2 and 4. These three SPO leaders stayed about ten days in the United States with the aim of rallying the support of the Serbian Expatriate community. They made public appearances in Cleveland and Chicago.

¹⁷⁵ *Četničke novine: glas srpskih boraca (Chetniks Newspaper: Voice of Serbian Fighters for Freedom)*, published in Milwaukee (Wisconsin) is one of the Chetnik expatriate papers in North America. Djoko P. MARIĆ, a former Chetnik commander, was editor-in-chief at the time.

¹⁷⁶ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ wanted Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ to resign because the latter had criticised a group of SPO members, including Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, for violently interrupting the play "Sveti Sava" in the Yugoslav Drama Theatre. *Vjesnik*, 7 June 1990, published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Bal vampira /Ball of the Vampires/*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1992), p. 119.

- The immediate expulsion from Yugoslav territory of the 360,000 Albanian immigrants and their descendants. Those who entered Yugoslavia from Albania after 6 April 1941 should be placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. There are countries in this world that are incomparably larger, richer and less densely populated than Yugoslavia; let them receive these immigrants and show us some proof of their humanism.¹⁷⁷



Velika Srbija /Greater Serbia/, organ of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, No. 2, August 1990. On the cover page is a map of Greater Serbia as claimed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's political movement. To the west (in Croatian territory), Serbia stretches to the Karlobag – Karlovac – Virovitica line.

¹⁷⁷ Programme published in *Velika Srbija*, the organ of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, in July 1990, no. 1, pp. 2-3.

The Serbian Chetnik Movement's programme features the same desire to unify all Serbs into one state entity and the same kind of solution advocated by the Serbian intellectuals of the Serbian Cultural Club in the late 1930s, i.e. to create a state that would be as homogenous as possible in national terms through the expulsion of national minorities, the Albanians in the first place. Indeed, the Serbian Cultural Club was founded anew on 18 September 1990.¹⁷⁸ At its second session, on 20 September 1990, the Serbian Cultural Club unanimously decided to join collectively the Serbian Chetnik Movement.¹⁷⁹ During the summer of 1990, the Liberal Party of Valjevo, headed by Aleksandar STEFANOVIĆ, merged with the Serbian Chetnik Movement. The party then organised several meetings (in Valjevo, Velika Plana, Mali Zvornik, and other places) at which it presented its programme to the broader public. In August 1990, the Serbian Chetnik Movement failed to get itself registered as a political party, after the authorities rejected its application. Thus it could not take part in the first multi-party parliamentary elections in December 1990. Nevertheless, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ would present himself as an independent candidate at the presidential election representing, as he said, the "Serbian Chetniks".¹⁸⁰ During the electoral campaign Vojislav ŠEŠELJ warned the Croatian political leaders that Croatia would not be able to detach itself from Yugoslavia without losing territory:

As for the Croats, we the Serbian Chetniks advise the new Ustasha chief Franjo TUDJMAN and the new Ustasha authorities in Croatia not to play games with the Serbian people living in the territory of the present-day improvised Croatian state community. That territory is Serbian territory, inhabited by the Serbian people, and we will never allow it to be separated from the rest of the mother nation. The Croats can secede from Yugoslavia, they can form an independent state or attach themselves to another state, but they must know that we shall never allow them, at the cost of further rivers of blood, to take away from us any part of the territory that contains Serbian villages, Serbian mass graves, sites where Serbs were massacred, pits that Serbs were thrown in, camps where Serbs were imprisoned, such as Jasenovac, Serbian churches that were destroyed ... We will never allow this.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ With Želimir MARKOVIĆ as president, Branislav FILIPOVIĆ and Srdjan OBRADOVIĆ as vice-presidents, Rajko BUKVIĆ as secretary, and Radmila NIKOLIĆ as treasurer.

¹⁷⁹ *Velika Srbija*, November 1990, no. 6, p. 31.

¹⁸⁰ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Filipike četničkog vojvode: dr Vojislav ŠEŠELJ u objektivu Siniše AKSENTIJEVIĆA /A Chetnik Vojvoda's Philippics: Dr Vojislav ŠEŠELJ as Seen by Siniša AKSENTIJEVIĆ/* (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1994), p. 24.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

What Vojislav ŠEŠELJ and his party are aiming for is in fact the amputation of Croatia. His statements on the subject are explicit:

The Croats must be punished in the way that peoples and states are punished for the crimes committed by their regimes in wartime; this is to say, they must be punished by loss of territory.¹⁸²

In fact, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ denies the Croats the right to their own state:

“Look, what is the basis of the Croats’ right to a state? What arguments do the Croats have against this? Was Slovenia ever a state? No, it wasn’t. And we don’t want to live with them. We don’t care whose territory it is. The Serbian army entered Slovenia in 1918. The Serbian army is now withdrawing from Slovenia. And it is a fact that the Slovenes know where they are going. The Croats have had no state since 1102. They surrendered their state to the Hungarians in the Treaty of 1102. Therefore, we don’t know who owns this territory. There is only one international legal instrument which tackles the question of Serbia’s western borders and that is the 1915 Treaty of London. And according to the provisions of the Treaty of London we can claim the territory up to the Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica line. We have no idea who owns the territory to the west of the line. It might belong to the Italians since it was promised to them in the Treaty of London. It might belong to the Austrians since it was part of the Austrian Empire before the end of World War I. It might be Hungarian since, at the time, the Croats gave their country to them of their own free will. In fact this is more likely since the Hungarians built their big port on the Adriatic coast. The port of Rijeka is a Hungarian port. It may actually be Croatian. We are not interested in finding out who owns it. We shall inform the United Nations; we have withdrawn our troops from that territory. There is no state authority there. Let the United Nations, the major powers and the neighbouring countries decide who owns it.”¹⁸³

“Croatia has no international legal basis for its statehood. Neither has Slovenia . . . When Yugoslavia ceases to exist only Serbia will survive. Since the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), i.e. the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, is the legal successor of the Kingdom of Serbia, only Serbia can be the legal successor of Yugoslavia. It is possible to draw the western border of in accordance with the provisions of the 1915 Treaty of London. And it can follow the Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica line if we want it to be an ethnic, historical and strategic border.”¹⁸⁴

Moreover, he contests the existence of the Croatian nation:

“The Croats are not a historical nation. Consider the Czechs and the Germans, for instance. ‘Czech’ is synonymous with ‘coward’, while the Germans are a warrior nation. The same goes for the Serbs and the Croats. The Croats are a depraved nation. I have yet to meet a decent Croat.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁸³ Cited from an interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ in 1991 to Radio Čačak. The interview was published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Branković je ustao iz groba /Branković has risen from the Dead/*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), p. 6.

¹⁸⁴ In an interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Svet* (4 September 1991) and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, p. 97.

¹⁸⁵ Interview given to the Yugoslav press agency TANJUG on 8 August 1991 and published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Crveni tiranin sa Dedinja /The Red Tyrant from Dedinje/*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), p. 7. In his work entitled *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma: naučno i publicističko delo prof. dr. Laze M. Kostića*, p. 323, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ refers to the Croats as an “artificial nation”:

“It is obvious that today’s Croats are a completely new, artificial nation made up of Serbs who have lost their national identity. They have as little in common with the original Croats, the ratio of čakavian speakers to kajkavian speakers in the Croatian population.”

5.2. The Serbian Radical Party

On 23 February 1991 in Kragujevac, the Serbian Chetnik Movement and most local committees of the People's Radical Party (*Narodna radikalna stranka*) united to form the Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*, SRS), which claimed to be the heir of the Radical Party founded by Nikola PAŠIĆ in 1881 (Article 1 of the Party Statute). The latter played an important part in the political life of both pre-World-War-I Serbia and the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941). Its leader, Nikola PAŠIĆ, was head of the Serb and Yugoslav governments on several occasions. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was elected president of the new party, with 489 votes out of 509. The programme of the SRS took over elements of the programmes of the first political parties founded or co-founded by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ. Its principal goal was the “restoration of a democratic, independent and free Serbian state in the Balkans which would encompass all of Serbdom, all the Serbian lands; that is to say, in addition to the extant Serbian federal unit as established by decree it will include within its borders Serbian Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, the Serbian town of Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Banija, Serbian Slavonia, and Serbian Baranja”.¹⁸⁶ The actual aim of the programme is the creation of a Greater Serbia. The reference to a “restoration” of the Serbian state implies that Serbia was once composed of the territories listed above. Some territories however have never been part of the Serbian state (Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonia and Baranja). As regards the frontiers of a future Greater Serbia, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ popularised the idea of a western frontier running along the “Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica” line, a notion that he repeated again and again in his media appearances. This differs little from the notion proposed by Stevan MOLJEVIĆ during World War II, which significantly reduced Croatia's territory:

¹⁸⁶ “Programska deklaracija Srpske radikalne stranke” /Programme of the Serbian Radical Party/, *Velika Srbija*, no. 9, May 1991, pp. 6-7.

“First of all we are fighting to make the secession of Slovenia possible in the hope that a wise government in Belgrade will amputate Croatia, that is to say what we consider to be Croatia, i.e. the territory to the west of the **Karlobag - Ogulin - Karlovac - Virovitica line (emphasis added by Yves TOMIC)**. Whether this is really Croatian territory is of no concern to us. They are probably Italian. Then we will make a deal with the Italians so that they take what belongs to them . . . Then again they might belong to Austria or Hungary.”¹⁸⁷

“We hope to see Yugoslavia disappear from the historical scene. The most likely scenario is that Yugoslavia will disintegrate into three states: a greater Serbia, a small Slovenia and an even smaller Croatia. As for the Serbian Radical Party, if we get a share of the power, or win it over, we pledge that Serbia will conclude, in the shortest possible time, an agreement with Italy, that the Treaty of London will be revived and that the Serbian - Italian border will be established along the **Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line (emphasis added by Yves TOMIC)**.”¹⁸⁸

“Our western borders lie on the **Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line (emphasis added by Yves TOMIC)**. Of course, Rijeka will not be in our territory. Neither will Zagreb and some other towns but we have no option but to exchange population with Croatia. One can hardly imagine Serbs living under a Croatian regime. Furthermore, what would the Croats do on our territory? We shall exchange population as best we can, and we shall live separately.”¹⁸⁹

Although the leader of the Serbian Radical Party had benefited from the Chetnik credentials conferred on him by Momčilo DJUJIĆ, leader of the Ravna Gora Movement of Serbian Chetniks in the Free World, his political orientation distanced him from the Chetnik émigrés. As he was not in favour either of the monarchy or of the KARADJORDJEVIĆ dynasty, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became the target of Momčilo DJUJIĆ’s fulminations. He was accused of collaborating with Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ’s Socialist Party of Serbia and was stripped of his voivode title in 1998 after a meeting with a delegation of DJUJIĆ’s movement.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, people with different kinds of intellectual or other ties to the Ravna Gora Movement of World War II were not at all unanimous in their attitude to Vojislav ŠEŠELJ. Intellectuals who were working towards the rehabilitation of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s Chetnik movement thought, as a matter of fact, that the radical leader, with his comments full of hate and his violent provocations, was detrimental to the image of the historical Chetnik movement.

“One day comrade ŠEŠELJ vows to expel all the Croats living in Serbia. The next day he physically attacks teachers who have been striking for days for a minimum salary of DM 20. The day after he vows to expel the

¹⁸⁷ Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Glas Podrinja*, 21 March 1991, and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića*, p. 179.

¹⁸⁸ Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the journal *Pogledi /Views/* of 31 May 1991, p. 36.

¹⁸⁹ Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Adresa* (5 – 18 November 1991) and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, p. 111.

¹⁹⁰ *Večernje novosti*, 24 November 1998.

Slovenes. Then, in fascist style, he reads out a list of journalists about to be shot and then he resumes his fight with the teachers.

This is Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's ultimate moral downfall. He has clearly shown that he is in the hands of the party in power and that he is following instructions. At first he might have thought that he would use the communists. It so happened that the communists used him and reduced him to the level of an obedient servant.

[. . .] As for brutality, ŠEŠELJ's own justification is: "This is how any Chetnik voivode would act". Firstly, a genuine Chetnik does not behave in this way. The Chetniks, at least those I have met, are well behaved *gentlemen*. Secondly, ŠEŠELJ knows that he is a fake voivode and that as an instant Serb – and a Chetnik and voivode on top of it – his wild behaviour (which might be intentional) causes most offence to the members of the Ravna Gora Movement. This is the best proof that ŠEŠELJ, although once a victim of the communist regime, has become its most loyal servant."¹⁹¹

The Serbian Radical Party differed from most political organisations in Serbia in that its network had spread beyond the borders of the Republic of Serbia. Thus it set up branches in the Republic of Serbian Krajina (under the leadership of Rade LESKOVAC), in Republika Srpska (under the leadership of Nikola POPLAŠEN) and in Montenegro (under the leadership of Drago BAKRAČ). In 1993, the SRS became the second most important political force in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. In Republika Srpska, the SRS supported Radovan KARADŽIĆ's Serbian Democratic Party in its defence "of the vital Serbian space, the Serbian lands, the Serbian people", even though it remained critical of the way it wielded its power.¹⁹² In 1993, the SRS had 70,000 members in Republika Srpska, where the party published the *Western Serbia (Zapadna Srbija)* monthly.

5.3. The political positions of the SRS during the war (1991-1995)

In the spring of 1991, armed incidents broke out in Croatia. The Serbian Radical Party sent volunteers to fight there. Associated with the political organisation headed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ these volunteers also depended on the remote authority of Momčilo DJUJIĆ who awarded medals and the title of voivode (military leader) to men who distinguished

¹⁹¹ Aleksandar I. POPOVIĆ's forum in *Pogledi*, no. 107, 24 April 1992, p. 21. The magazine was founded in 1982 by the students of the University of Kragujevac (a town in central Serbia). In 1990, the magazine became a political publication dedicated entirely to the rehabilitation of the Ravna Gora Movement (Internet site: <http://www.pogledi.co.yu>).

¹⁹² Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka /The Serbian Radical Party/* (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1995), p. 26.

themselves in clashes with the Croatian security forces.¹⁹³ This is how a link was established between the Chetniks of World War II and the men who claimed to be Draža MIHAILOVIĆ's heirs. This link is also apparent in the national symbols used by the combatants of the Serbian Radical Party. The war in Croatia, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was for the radicals an opportunity to define their objectives and positions on the enlarged Serbian state which they wanted to promote. Although the national aims, primarily the creation of a unitary Serbian state under the name of Greater Serbia, were clearly defined before the war broke out in Croatia in the spring of 1991, during the years of armed conflict (1991 – 1995) the Radicals adjusted and adapted their positions to the reality of the moment.

One of Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's major proposals during the war years was the exchange of population between Serbia and Croatia. This idea echoes the solutions proposed by some members of the Serbian Cultural Club at the end of the 1930s.

“The Croats are a nation of cowards. They are not a nation in the real sense of the term. No wonder that Marx and Engels said that the Croats were the scum of European nations. These texts still exist and they can be consulted. And how will that war end? In my opinion, it will end very quickly with a Serb victory and the establishment of Serbia's western borders. And the Croats will have to pay war damages. As for the Serbs living in Zagreb and in those regions of present-day Croatia which are not Serbian, in my opinion, they should move to Serbia since they cannot survive in places where the Croats are a majority and which are under Croatian rule. A Serb under Croatian rule can only be a slave and live an undignified life. I also know that no Serb will accept this and that they will do anything to move to Serbia. Therefore, an exchange of population is inevitable.”¹⁹⁴

While the war was raging in Croatia, the Radicals considered retaliatory measures against the Croats living in Serbia, more specifically in the province of Vojvodina. They wanted to organise a “civilised exchange of population” between the Serbs in Croatia and the Croats in Serbia. Referring to this exchange, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ stated that it was a matter of sending

¹⁹³ Thus, following the victory of Chetnik fighters in Borovo Selo in early May 1991, the commander of the Chetnik unit, Miladin TODOSIJEVIĆ, was given the rank of major by a decree issued by *vojvoda* Momčilo DJUJIĆ and signed on 9 May 1991, at a ceremony commemorating the “Third Serbian Uprising” at Ravna Gora in 1941. Momčilo DJUJIĆ's organisation thought of the Serbian Chetnik Movement headed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ as one of its constituent parts (*Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, no. 328, August 1991, p. 2). Indeed, Momčilo DJUJIĆ was president of the Council of Voivodes /*Vojvodski savet*/, an organ which acted as the high command of all the Chetnik units active in the fatherland (according to an interview that Vojislav ŠEŠELJ gave to the fortnightly magazine *Pogledi*, 31 May 1991, p. 35). The volunteers sent to Croatia were aged between 25 and 45. Many of them had family connections with the Chetnik movement of World War II.

¹⁹⁴ *Ratne novine*, 18 August 1991 published in ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića*, p. 296.

home those Croats who had been moved to Vojvodina by the Croatian authorities during World War II.¹⁹⁵ However, in the spring of 1991, he declared that 100,000 Croats had to leave Serbia so that Serbian refugees from Croatia could be settled there.¹⁹⁶ In 1992 he reiterated this aim, adding that the Croats in Serbia were not loyal and that many of them were members of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party in power in Croatia, and “collaborators of the Ustashi”.¹⁹⁷ On 1 April 1992, in the National Assembly of Serbia, he clearly advocated the exchange of populations as a measure of retaliation:

One other thing, if the Croats are expelling the Serbs in such huge numbers, what are the Croats here in Belgrade and those throughout Serbia waiting for? An exchange of populations – we will expel from Belgrade the same number of Croats as the number of Serbs Tudjman has expelled from Zagreb. When a Serbian family from Zagreb arrives, they will live in the home of Croats from Belgrade in return for the keys to their home in Zagreb – an exchange. . . .

After the next or other elections, when the power in Serbia changes, there will be no pardon. The same law as the one used by Tudjman to expel the Serbs from Croatia will be used to expel the Croats from Serbia. And we will not allow the Croats from Slankamen to offer their old, crumbling, houses turned into stables to Serbs in exchange for villas on the Adriatic coast which they had to abandon. The Croats in Slankamen, Zemun, and other places will not sleep peacefully if they stay since we have to find homes for the Serbian refugees from Zagreb, Rijeka, a Varaždin and other Croatian towns and we have to compensate them for having been expelled from their homes.¹⁹⁸

On 6 May 1992, he went to Hrtkovci to attend a meeting during which some Croatian residents were being threatened with expulsion.¹⁹⁹ This meeting paved the way for a campaign of intimidation against non-Serbs in the Srem area (Vojvodina) which led to the exodus of several thousands of people.²⁰⁰ A change in the ethnic structure of the population was also sought in Kosovo through a programmed settlement of Serbs and the creation of Serb enclaves in a region where the Serbs and Albanians would be completely separated.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ According to Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, Ante PAVELIĆ, head of the Independent State of Croatia, had settled Croats from western Herzegovina in some localities in Vojvodina (Slankamen, Hrtkovci, Petrovaradin). Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Milošević hapsi radikale /MILOŠEVIĆ Arrests the Radicals/*, (Beograd: ABC Glas), 1994, p. 20.

¹⁹⁶ *Politika*, 14 May 1991.

¹⁹⁷ *Vreme*, 13 July 1992.

¹⁹⁸ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Poslaničke besede /Speeches by Parliamentarians/* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), pp. 173-174. On 7 April 1992, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ claimed in the National Assembly again that his position was well founded (*ibid.*, p. 175).

¹⁹⁹ *Vjesnik*, 9 May 2004, (<http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/05/09/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=3>, consulted on 23 February 2005). The village of Hrtkovci is in the Ruma municipality. In the spring of 1992 its population was made up of 70% Croats, 20% Hungarians and 10% Serbs (*Vreme*, 13 July 1992).

²⁰⁰ *Dnevnik*, 7 May 2003, (<http://www.dnevnik.co.yu/arhiva/07-05-2003/Strane/dogadjaji.htm>, consulted on 23 February 2005).

²⁰¹ ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, pp. 175-176.

According to the SRS, if the 400,000 Albanians who had settled in Kosovo during World War II – their descendants included – were expelled, Serbia could resettle in their place the 400,000 Serbian refugees from the former Yugoslav republics.²⁰²

In the winter and spring of 1992, when the Serbian and Montenegrin political authorities were working on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (known as the Third Yugoslavia), Vojislav ŠEŠELJ expounded his vision of the future of this Yugoslav federation and its neighbours on numerous occasions. Speaking about Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president of the Serbian Radical Party declared on 23 January 1992 that if the Muslims did not wish to be part of the federation, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to be divided. In this case the Muslims could count on eighteen per cent of the territory of the republic.²⁰³ Western Herzegovina, that is, the right bank of the Neretva, could be attached to Croatia.²⁰⁴ ŠEŠELJ had in mind two scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina: either the preservation of a state that would be integrated into a smaller Yugoslavia or its division. Any other solution would mean war.²⁰⁵ In March 1992, the SRS expressed a preference for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along national lines:²⁰⁶

We believe that any solution accepted by the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its legitimate representatives, in the first place the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party, which we likewise support, will suit all other Serbs. We believe that when the final map of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three territories is drawn up, the Serbian representatives must be extremely vigilant to make sure that the Serbian territories are not too fragmented and that the division is based on the principle of two territorial units for each people, within the framework of a single national territory.

Thus if the Muslim territory is divided into two entities, the Cazin Krajina and Central Bosnia, and if the same is true of Croatian territory (western Herzegovina and areas along the Sava), the Serbian territory cannot be divided into more than two entities. This means that the region of Semberija, that is, northeast Bosnia, must be territorially linked with Bosanska Krajina, and the autonomous territories of Romanija and Ozren with the region of eastern Herzegovina.²⁰⁷

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

²⁰³ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Milan Panić mora pasti: konferencije za štampu 1992. godine* /Milan PANIĆ must fall: Press Conferences in 1992/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1994), p. 19.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 52 (press conference of 27 February 1992).

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59 (press conference of 19 March 1992).

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 59 (press conference of 19 March 1992).

In Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's view, the Serbian state entity (the Republic of Serbian Krajina) constituted on the territory of the Republic of Croatia should become part of this smaller Yugoslavia.²⁰⁸ He did not envisage that the territory of "Serbian Krajina" could once again be part of Croatia.²⁰⁹ As early as February 1992 he announced that the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Chetnik Movement within it had been placed on alert and were ready for action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²¹⁰ The head of the SRS was opposed to any recognition of the sovereignty of Macedonia, which used to belong to Serbia before Yugoslavia was created. Believing that this republic should become one of the units of the new Yugoslav federation, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ spoke out in favour of the use of force should the Macedonian authorities decide to proclaim the independence of their state. If the army proved unable to defeat Macedonian separatists, the territory of Macedonia should be divided among Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania.²¹¹ Eastern Macedonia would become part of Bulgaria, its western parts would go to Albania, the territories in the south to Greece, while Serbia would be given northern Macedonia. Serbia would keep the frontier with Greece in the Vardar valley.

In 1993, estimating that most Serbian "vital areas" have been liberated, the SRS declared itself in favour of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the establishment of new borders which would coincide with the front lines.²¹² Bosnia and Herzegovina should be divided into three separate independent states.²¹³ Vojislav ŠEŠELJ believed that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republika Srpska should unite and form a single state, to be called "Western Serbia" (*Zapadna Srbija*).²¹⁴

At the third congress of the SRS held on 30 January 1994 a new programme was adopted. In the spirit of the previous congress, a plan for the unification of "Serbian lands"

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 52 (press conference of 27 February 1992).

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41 (press conference of 20 January 1992).

²¹² Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Partijski bilansi i politički balansi /Party Results and Political Balancing/* (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1993), p. 127.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

was put forward.²¹⁵ The new articles adopted on the same day stated that “[t]he primary aim of the Party is unifying all Serbian lands into one single state, protecting the Serbs living in other states, seizing and holding onto power in order to implement the Party programme” (Article 3).²¹⁶ Once again the SRS pronounced itself in favour of abolishing the autonomous provinces inside Serbia and taking repressive measures against Kosovo Albanians.²¹⁷ The goal of creating a unitary Serbian state is mentioned once again on 2 February 1994 when a coalition agreement was signed by the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina, headed by Milan BABIĆ. In fact, the agreement defined “the unification of all Serbian lands and the establishment of a unified Serbian state” as its primary objective.²¹⁸ In Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s opinion, national minorities should not account for more than eight per cent of the population of a Greater Serbia and its different territorial components.²¹⁹

In the autumn of 1995, when the territories which had been under the control of the Serbian authorities for several years fell to the Croat and Croat-Bosnian forces, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ accused Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ of having betrayed the Serbs of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.²²⁰ He argued for the “destruction of Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ’s treacherous regime”²²¹ as a way of defending Serbian national interests.

²¹⁵ Jovan BAZIĆ, *Srpsko pitanje: političke koncepcije rešavanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja* /The Serbian Question: Political Approaches to Settling the Serbian National Question/, (Beograd: Službeni list SCG, Institut za političke studije, 2003), p. 268.

²¹⁶ ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, p. 99.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 96: expulsion of all Albanian immigrants and their descendants (400,000 persons according to SRS estimates); closure of all state-funded institutions working in the Albanian language; stripping of their Serbian citizenship all *Šiptars* /Albanians/ living abroad who furthered the separatist cause activities, etc.

²¹⁸ ŠEŠELJ, *Filipike četničkog vojvode*, p. 185.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

²²⁰ ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, p. 20.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

5.4. The electoral weight of the Serbian Radical Party and its ambiguous relationship with the Socialist Party of Serbia

During the 1990s the SRS maintained an ambiguous relationship with the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia. Strongly opposed to communism and the personality cult of Tito, the Serbian Chetnik Movement was not recognised by the authorities, who saw the organisation as the heir of the Chetnik movement of World War II, which the communists had defeated in 1945-1946. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was sentenced to 45 days in prison for having disturbed the peace on 2 October 1990 in the centre of Belgrade by setting up a stall with placards urging the citizens of Belgrade to sign a petition for the transfer of the House of Flowers – with the tomb of Josip BROZ Tito – from Belgrade to Kumrovec (Croatia) and to enrol as volunteers to go to Knin to support the Serbs living in Croatia.²²² Imprisoned on 23 October, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was freed on 15 November 1990 and managed to have himself put forward as a candidate at the presidential election of 9 December 1990. It was in June 1991 that Vojislav ŠEŠELJ emerged as a more serious political contender when he competed for the constituency of Rakovica, a working-class neighbourhood on the outskirts of Belgrade.²²³ ŠEŠELJ defeated the novelist Borislav PEKIĆ, candidate of the Democratic Party, with 23 per cent of the votes in an election in which voter turnout was less than 50 per cent. Although the authorities had marginalised him in 1990, the Socialist Party of Serbia now gave him its unofficial support and allowed him free access to the principal media in Serbia, in the first place the state television. When the SRS became the second most important political power in the country, the two principal parties in Serbian political life entered an informal alliance. The alliance was made possible by their ideological convergence with regard to the Serbian national question. The nature and seriousness of this endorsement of the ruling party's

²²² The Prosecution's documents are published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski četnički pokret /The Serbian Chetnik Movement/* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), pp. 187-189.

²²³ The by-election was held to fill a seat that fell vacant when writer Miodrag BULATOVIĆ, an SPS member of parliament, died. *Vreme*, 17 June 1991, p. 8.

policies remains difficult to fathom. In the spring of 1992, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ declared that Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was his favourite opposition politician. In May 1992 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ had his first talks with the President of Serbia at the latter's request. Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ allegedly asked him to send more volunteers to Bosnia and Herzegovina:

“MILOŠEVIĆ asked us, the Radicals, to send more volunteers across the river Drina and, in exchange, promised adequate supplies of arms, uniforms and means of transport. This collaboration worked smoothly until September 1993. [. . .]”²²⁴

In the presidential election of December 1992, the SRS supported Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ when he faced the Serbian-American Milan PANIĆ in the second round. This unnatural alliance between the former communists and the heirs of the Chetnik movement did not have very strong foundations and in the spring of 1993, when Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ gave his support to the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SRS distanced itself from the regime and provoked the fall of the government of the republic of Serbia headed by Nikola ŠAINOVIĆ. The Socialist Party of Serbia then embarked on a propaganda campaign against the Serbian Radical Party and its leader Vojislav ŠEŠELJ. From then on the radicals were portrayed as fascists and louts, and no longer had access to the state media.²²⁵ The police arrested a number of SRS militants allegedly for the possession of weapons.²²⁶ The state-controlled media began to portray the leader of the SRS as a war criminal. The SRS, on the other hand, accused Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ of betraying the Serbian national cause²²⁷ and of being responsible for corruption and organised crime in Serbia.²²⁸ In the autumn of 1994 the leader of the SRS was arrested after he insulted and

²²⁴ *Svet*, 13 January 1995 published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski bračni par “Čaušescu”* /The Serbian “Causescu” Couple/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), p. 158.

²²⁵ “And when we submitted our request to proceed with a vote of no-confidence in Nikola ŠAINOVIĆ’s government, the Socialists lashed out. They accused us of being fascists, criminals, a paramilitary organization. What did they not accuse us of? [. . .]”; Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Preći li nam slobotomija* /Are We Being Threatened with a Slobotomy?/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), p. 6.

²²⁶ ŠEŠELJ, *Milošević hapsi radikale*, pp. 33, 52, 72, 73.

²²⁷ “Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ is a traitor to the fatherland. He is leading the people into utter poverty. His sole aim is to cling to power. We want to bring about his downfall as soon as possible.” Extract from an interview given to the Italian daily *Il Mondo* of 8 May 1995 and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski bračni par “Čaušescu”*, p. 226.

²²⁸ In an interview given to the magazine *Velika Srbija*, January 1995, and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Crveni tiranin sa Dedinja*, pp. 220-221.

attacked the speaker of the Yugoslav parliament, Radoman BOŽOVIĆ. Sentenced to three months in prison, he would be released on 29 January 1995.

In October 1994, there was a schism in the SRS: a group of seven radical deputies in the federal parliament founded the “Nikola PAŠIĆ” parliamentary group, which would create a dissident party of its own in order to consolidate its positions: the inconsequential “Nikola PAŠIĆ” Serbian Radical Party. After five years of marginalisation in the media the Serbian Radical Party returned to the centre of the political stage thanks to the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo. Between 1998 and 2000 it would share power with the Socialist Party of Serbia.

In electoral terms, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s party evolved rapidly from a marginal to a nation-wide political force. After the administrative authorities refused to recognise it in August 1990, the Serbian Chetnik Movement was unable to present candidates at the first multi-party parliamentary elections in Serbia, on 9 and 23 December 1990. Nevertheless, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was able to collect enough signatures to appear as an independent candidate at the presidential election of 9 December 1990. He was placed fifth, with 96,277 votes (or 1.91 per cent of the ballots cast), compared to 3,285,799 votes for Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ of the Serbian Socialist Party and 824,674 votes for Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, who, like Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, situated himself in the tradition of the Ravna Gora Movement.²²⁹ In February 1991, the Serbian Chetnik Movement became part of the Serbian Radical Party which was able to have itself legalised under this name in March of the same year. From a marginal political force Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s party became the second most important political organisation in Serbia in just a year. At the first parliamentary elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 31 May 1992, the SRS won 1,166,933 votes (30 per cent).²³⁰ The Yugoslav

²²⁹ Vladimir GOATI, *Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998.: volja građana ili izborna manipulacija* /Elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1990 – 1998: The Will of the Citizens or Electoral Manipulations/, (Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju), 1999, p. 287.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

and Serbian parliamentary elections in December 1992 confirmed the radicals' electoral power: in both elections they were placed second, behind Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ's Socialist Party, having obtained 1,024,983 (21.8 per cent) and 1,066,765 (22.6 per cent) votes respectively.²³¹

After supporting Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ's party and cooperating with it, the SRS caused the fall of the Serbian government in the autumn of 1993. When the SRS was targeted by the ruling party's propaganda, it lost nearly half of its voters at the parliamentary elections of 19 December 1993, obtaining no more than 595,467 votes (13.8 per cent).²³² In the general elections of 1997, the radicals regained the popularity they had enjoyed in 1992: they received the support of 1,162,216 voters (28.1 per cent) and on 5 October 1997 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ won the second round of the presidential election against the socialist candidate, Zoran LILIĆ.²³³ However, due to low voter turnout (less than fifty per cent) the result was pronounced invalid. When votes were cast anew, on 7 and 21 December 1997, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was left behind Milan MILUTINOVIĆ, candidate of the Socialist Party of Serbia, in the second round, having received 1,383,868 votes to MILUTINOVIĆ's 2,181,808.²³⁴

In 2000, when it shared power with Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ's party, the SRS saw another drop in the number of its voters. At the elections for the federal parliament it won no more than 472,820 votes, while its candidate for the presidency of the Yugoslav federation, Tomislav NIKOLIĆ, did badly and obtained only 289,013 votes (5.9 per cent). After the fall of Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ on 5 October 2000, the SRS's electoral base showed further signs of erosion at the general elections of 23 December 2000: no more than 322,333 voters placed their confidence in the radicals.²³⁵

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

²³² Vladimir GOATI, *Partije i partijski sistem Srbije /Parties and the Party System in Serbia/*, (Niš: Odbor za građansku inicijativu, 2004), p. 251.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

Conclusion

As formulated in the nineteenth century, the project of the unification of Serbs in one and the same state was no different from the programmes of other national movements in Europe, especially the Italian and German unification movements, as well as national movements in the countries of central and eastern Europe and the Balkans. At the time, the ideology of a Greater Serbia did not have as its goal the expulsion of non-Serbs from a future state in which all the Balkan Serbs would live together. The important thing for the leaders was to obtain the support of other South Slavs who lived in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. While national identities were still being constructed, numerous intellectuals and politicians believed that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were part of one and the same nation. The concept of a Greater Serbia was not clearly defined and it was often confused with aspirations to unite the South Slavs. Its basic principle was not the exclusion of other South Slavs but their inclusion, regardless of religion. The few maps of Greater Serbia published in the nineteenth century correspond in fact to the territory of Yugoslavia. Moreover, this ideology developed at a time when the Balkans were dominated by the Austrian and Ottoman empires.

After the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, we notice that the ideology of a Greater Serbia begins to evolve, especially on the eve of World War II, and from then on it features the idea that non-Serbs should be expelled from the Greater Serbia that is aspired to, in order to achieve ethnic homogeneity. In this sense the ideology of Greater Serbia acquires a new dimension, which will be translated into military terms during World War II. This transformation of the ideology of a Greater Serbia occurred in the late 1930s and was given impetus by the intellectuals gathered around the Serbian Cultural Club, some of whom would subsequently be active in the Ravna Gora Movement of Draža

MIHAILOVIĆ, which was defeated by the communist partisans in 1945-1946. It was these intellectuals who formulated the Movement's national and political programme.

The idea of gathering all the Serbs in one and the same state entity emerged forcefully during the second half of the 1980s, as Yugoslavia was plunged into a severe political, economic, and social crisis. From the unification of Serbia, a republic divided into three entities (Serbia proper and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo), the leadership in Belgrade moved on to support for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose right to self-determination it would defend. In the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1992), the Serbian president, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, expressed the opinion that all Serbs should live in the same state. Expressions of extreme nationalism were facilitated by the ideological transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia, which had acted as the defender of the Serbian national cause since 1987-1988.


During this period, numerous intellectuals contributed to the formulation of a project for the unification of all Serbs in one and the same state. Beginning in 1983-1984, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ proposed a redrawing of Yugoslavia's internal borders and thereby the enlargement of the republic of Serbia. In subsequent years he would continue to expound his political project, aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia. In fact, his programme was elaborated a long time before the advent of political pluralism in 1990 and the accession to power of Franjo TUDJMAN's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) that same year. TUDJMAN's policies, which were far from favourable to Croatian Serbs, would provide a justification for the armed engagement of Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's party. But the idea of reducing or territorially amputating Croatia is one that he had already had for several years. Politically and ideologically, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ saw himself as a descendant in the direct line of Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, Dragiša VASIĆ, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, and Draža MIHAILOVIĆ.²³⁶ And he is

²³⁶ According to an interview with the weekly *Slobodni Tjednik* of 4 May 1990, reprinted in ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića*, p. 61.

indeed an intellectual descendant of the Serbian Cultural Club and the Ravna Gora Movement, from which he took over the intention to create a Serbian state entity as ethnically homogeneous as possible, by means of forced population transfers or displacements.


A n n e x e s

Map 1 – The Military Frontier in the eighteenth century




Source: Jean NOUZILLE, *Histoire de frontières : l'Autriche et l'Empire ottoman / A History of Boundaries: Austria and the Ottoman Empire/* (Paris: Berg International, 1991) 232.

Map 2 - Serbia according to geographer Vladimir KARIĆ




Source: Charles JELAVICH, *South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914*, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, cop. 1990), p. 142

Map 3 - Yugoslav territorial demands and the final boundaries, 1918-1921



Source: John R. LAMPE, *Yugoslavia As History: Twice There Was a Country*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 113

Map 4 - The Administrative Partition of Yugoslavia and the Croatian Banovina (1939)




Source: John R. LAMPE, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 165

Map 5 - The partition of Yugoslavia in 1941



Source: Jozo TOMASEVICH, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 90.

Map 6 - Distribution of nationalities in partitioned Yugoslavia (1941)




Source: Lucien KARCHMAR, *Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Četnik Movement, 1941-1942*, (New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1987), Vol. 1, p. 28.

Map 7 - Map of Greater Serbia as drawn by Stevan MOLJEVIĆ




Source: Jozo TOMASEVICH, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 168.

Map 8 - Travels of the JVUO High Command during World War II




Source: Lucien KARCHMAR, *Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Četnik Movement, 1941-1942*, (New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1987), Vol. 2, pp. 528-529.

**Map 9 - Map of territorial negotiations for the Treaty of London
(26 April 1915)**



Source: René ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 27.

Map 10 – Map of Greater Serbia published in *Velika Srbija*, organ of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, in August 1990



Velika Srbija /Greater Serbia/, organ of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, No. 2, August 1990. On the cover page is a map of Greater Serbia as claimed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's political movement. To the west (in Croatian territory), Serbia stretches to the Karlobag – Karlovac – Virovitica line.

Quotations/statements by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ on Greater Serbia

The following is a selection, not an exhaustive list.

“[. . .] The autonomous provinces should be abolished or at least put strictly under Serbian sovereignty since the majority of the population in Vojvodina is Serbian, while in Kosovo a large part of the Albanian ethnic group have shown their readiness and determination to follow a separatist policy. Granting it more political advantages would therefore be inappropriate and harmful in terms of general Yugoslav interests and interests of the state which, in cases like this, are decisive. The Yugoslav federation would thus consist of four truly equal republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia. A new territorial division between Serbia and Croatia would be necessary. Given that part of the Serbian and Croatian population in the territory of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija and Slavonia is territorially mixed, the partition would be done on the principle whereby the same number of persons of Serbian nationality would remain within the borders of Croatia as that of Croats in Serbia, based on the latest population census. This is how the Serbo-Croat national question would finally be resolved on the principles of humanism and democracy, thus strengthening inter-ethnic unity and communal spirit, and avoiding one of the main causes of past discord. [. . .]”

Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi? /Response to a Survey-Interview: What is to be done?/, September 1993, published in ŠEŠELJ, *Demokratija i dogma*, p. 130.

“[. . .] We, Serbs, within the framework of Yugoslavia, must define our national goals, our national programme and the boundaries of our state and allow our so-called northern brothers, the Croats and Slovenes, to determine freely whether they wish to live in that state. The Serbian people are not a priori opposed to the existence of Yugoslavia. I am fully convinced that the Serbian people are in favour of the existence of Yugoslavia, but not at any cost. Only of a Yugoslavia whose borders would be consistent with Serbia's state borders as guaranteed by the Treaty of London. If a federal Yugoslavia is to be maintained, the Serbian federal unit must therefore encompass within its borders not only present-day Serbia, its present-day provinces of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija but also Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, Kordun, eastern Slavonia and Baranja. These borders were not all guaranteed by the Treaty of London. They were drawn by Ante PAVELIĆ during World War II. He drew them with Serbian graves, mass graves, places of suffering, camps and murder sites. And I believe that the Serbian people must under no circumstances allow one single Serbian mass cemetery to remain outside the borders of the Serbian state.”

“Program Dr. Vojislava ŠEŠELJA: iz predavanja kod Gračanice u Americi” /Dr. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ's Programme: From a Gračanica Lecture delivered in America”, *Četničke novine*, no. 298, July 1989, p. 4.

“Our main task is the reconstruction of Serbia’s state independence within boundaries that would encompass all Serbian lands. Beside the territory of the present day reduced Serbian federal unit, we simply cannot imagine a Serbian state without Serbian Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Banija, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Slavonia and Serbian Baranja.”

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s statement of intent during the presidential elections of December 1990, *Velika Srbija*, no. 7, 1990, published in ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski četnički pokret*, p. 220.

“Monitor: What is your concept of the future of this country?”

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ: We hope that Yugoslavia will not survive, that we will soon see the demise of Yugoslavia.

One possibility in the region would be to create three independent states: a Greater Serbia, a small Slovenia and an even smaller Croatia. The other possibility would be that we Serbs come to an agreement with the Italians to revive the 1915 Treaty of London and establish the Serbian-Italian border along the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line.”

Interview given to the weekly *Monitor* and published on 31 May 1991. Also published in ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranja srpskog nacionalnog bića*, p. 220.

“What, according to you, are the prospects of Yugoslavia?”

I believe everybody is aware that Yugoslavia has no future and that, in the very near future, it will be divided into three separate states, i.e. “greater” Serbia, a small Slovenia, and an even smaller Croatia. Personally, I expect that Italy will claim back its territory. This is the part of the Adriatic sea which it had to relinquish after the two world wars. This means that Istria will be Italian again as well as Rijeka and part of the islands, particularly those in the Kvarner. Serbia will establish its western boundary along the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line. [. . .]”

Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Svet* (9 August 1991) and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, p. 92.

“- These last few days there has been talk of creating some kind of union of Serbian lands and you are one of its main advocates. In your opinion, is there any possibility that it will be created soon or is this merely propaganda?”

- I think it is a very timely idea and that it should be implemented in two stages. The first would be the unification of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. And this should be done immediately. This is a question of survival for both Republika Srpska and the RSK, especially for the latter. The second stage would then be the unification of such a state with the FRY as distinct federal units. I think the first part of the plan should be carried out immediately and radically.

- Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK says this state should be called ‘New Serbia’

- I feel that the name ‘Western Serbia’ would be better since ‘New Serbia’ would not go down well with the West.”

Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to *MI Svet* (17 April 1993) and published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Aktuelni politički izazovi /Political Challenges of Today/*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), p. 210.

Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|---|
| AVNOJ | Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia |
| CNK | Central National Committee of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (<i>Centralni nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije</i>) |
| HDZ | Croatian Democratic Union |
| JRSD | Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy (<i>Jugoslovenska radikalna seljačka demokratija</i>) and after 1933 the Yugoslav National Party (<i>Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka</i>) |
| JUORA | Yugoslav Organisation of Ravna Gora Women (<i>Jugoslovenska organizacija ravnogorki</i>) |
| JURAO | Yugoslav Ravna Gora Youth (<i>Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina</i>) |
| JVUO | Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (<i>Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini</i>) |
| LC | League of Communists |
| LCY | League of Communists of Yugoslavia |
| RSK | Republic of Serbian Krajina |
| SČP | Serbian Chetnik Movement (<i>Srpski četnički pokret</i>). |
| SHS | Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes |
| SKK | Serbian Cultural Club (<i>Srpski kulturni klub</i> .) |
| SNO | Serbian National Renewal (<i>Srpska narodna obnova</i>) |
| SPO | Serbian Renewal Movement (<i>Srpski pokret obnove</i>) |
| SRS | Serbian Radical Party (<i>Srpska radikalna stranka</i>) |

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**Ideologija Velike Srbije
u XIX i XX veku**

Izveštaj veštaka

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Uvod

Srednjovekovna srpska država nastala je u Raškoj oblasti. Kako se razvijala, tako se širila prema jugu (Kosovo, Makedonija), da bi svoj vrhunac dostigla za vreme vladavine cara Dušana (1308-1355), koji je proširio njene granice pripojivši područja Makedonije, Albanije, Epira i Tesalije. Zbog prodiranja Turaka sa juga Balkanskog poluostrva na sever u drugoj polovini XIV veka, srpska država je prestala da postoji, a Srbi iz južnijih krajeva (Makedonija, Kosovo, Metohija) selili su se na sever, pravcem Morava-Vardar (Skoplje-Beograd), i na severozapad (duž linije koja povezuje Skoplje, Kosovo, Sjenicu i Sarajevo). Usled otomanskih osvajanja izmenio se etnički sastav na osvojenim područjima. Pošto su se katolici Hrvati i Mađari povlačili na sever, Turci su se bojali da bi ova pogranična područja, bitna za odbranu carstva, mogla ostati nenaseljena, pa su na njihovo mesto naseljavali pravoslavne hrišćane i muslimane. Tako je u šesnaestom veku došlo do značajnog porasta pravoslavnog življa u severnoj Bosni (oblast Bosanske Krajine), ali i u Slavoniji. Ovom stanovništvu bila je poverena odbrana severne granice Otomanskog carstva. Usled svih tih pomeranja stanovništva, Srbi su se sve više širili po onoj teritoriji koja će u dvadesetom veku činiti Jugoslaviju.¹ Na istoku je, dakle, nastao jedan srpski teritorijalni kompleks u kojem je Srbija, u dolinama reka Morave i Vardara, bila povezana sa Vojvodinom, koju su činili Banat, Bačka i Srem, u Panoniji.² Na zapadu se taj kompleks prostirao do Dinarskih oblasti – do Novopazarskog sandžaka, koji odgovara teritoriji nekadašnje Raške, kolecvi srednjovekovne srpske kraljevine dinastije Nemanjića, te do Crne Gore i Hercegovine. Drugi teritorijalni kompleks nastao je na zapadu i u njegovom sastavu su bili severna Dalmacija, Lika, Kordun, Banija,

¹ Desimir Tošić, *Srpski nacionalni problemi* (Pariz: Oslobođenje, 1952), str. 27.

² U sklopu Mađarske sve do početka XX veka.

zapadna Slavonija (područje duž vojne granice Habzburškog carstva,³ vidi [geografsku kartu 1](#) u Dodatku i zapadna Bosna (Bosanska Krajina).

Ova dva teritorijalna kompleksa, oguhvaćena granicama različitih država, delile su teritorije mešovite, odnosno prelaznog nacionalnog sastava, na kojima su Srbi živeli zajedno sa drugim zajednicama – Hrvatima na severu (Vojna krajina i severna Bosna) i islamiziranim Slovenima u Bosni.

Upravo u toj rasepkanosti teritorije koju su naseljavali Srbi treba tražiti korene srpskog nacionalnog pitanja.⁴ Naime, u doba formiranja nacionalnih država u XIX veku, Srbima je zbog izmešanosti sa drugim narodima bilo teško da stvore jedinstvenu nacionalnu političku teritoriju. Gde je trebalo da budu granice te teritorije? Da li je u tim granicama trebalo da bude nacionalnih manjina? Raštrkanost srpskog naroda igrala je, dakle, značajnu ulogu u njegovoj istoriji i dovela do stvaranja nacionalne ideologije i državotvornog programa u kojima će koncepti *jedinstva* i *ujedinjenja* postati dominantni u radovima nekih ideologa.

Ovo je kontekst u kojem ćemo razmotriti različite vizije koje su o Velikoj Srbiji imale srpska politička i kulturna elita XIX i XX stoleća, i u koji ćemo smestiti političke stavove Vojislava Šešelja, lidera Srpske radikalne stranke.

Početak XIX veka, u austrijskim vladajućim krugovima se pod pojmom Velika Srbija podrazumevao srpski nacionalni pokret, za koji se sve do početka XX veka verovalo da ugrožava stabilnost južnih teritorija Habzburškog carstva.⁵ Pojam je s početka imao negativne konotacije, da bi ga srpski nacionalisti u drugoj polovini XIX

³ Austrijsko carstvo je Vojnu krajinu uspostavilo u XVI veku. Ove pogranične oblasti Otomanskog carstva, razrušene i opustošene uzastopnim ratovima, naselili su većinom seljaci pravoslavni Vlasi, koji su se kasnije prozvali Srbima. Ti seljaci-vojnici učestvovali su u odbrani carstva, a zauzvrat su, pre svega Vlaškim Statutom /Statuta Valachorum/ iz 1630, dobili niz povlastica, kao što su sloboda veroispovesti, pravo da obraduju zamlju, itd. Vojna krajina je oblast specifična za Austrijsko carstvo. Rasformirana je 1881. godine, nakon što je austrougarska vojska zauzela Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1878. Jean NOUZILLE, *Histoire de frontières: l'Autriche et l'Empire ottoman* /Istorija granica: Austrija i Otomansko carstvo/ (Pariz: Berg International, 1991), str. 263.

⁴ Pod nacionalnim pitanjem podrazumevamo stvaranje nacionalne države i odnose među različitim nacionalnostima koje ulaze u njen sastav.

⁵ Mihailo Stanišić, *Projekti "Velika Srbija"* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 2000), str. 13-20.

veka prisvojili za postizanje sopstvenih ciljeva, pa je čak nekoliko časopisa nosilo naziv *Velika Srbija*. Za vreme Prvog svetskog rata srpska vlada je pozvala dva strana stručnjaka da napišu knjige koje će promovisati srpske interese i biti naslovljene “Velika Srbija”.⁶

U prvom delu ovog izveštaja bavićemo se nastankom koncepta Velike Srbije u XIX veku i evolucijom srpske nacionalne ideologije od srpstva do jugoslovenstva. U drugom delu analiziraćemo evoluciju srpske nacionalne ideologije od jugoslovenstva do srpstva, za vreme prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941). Takođe ćemo obraditi ideologiju Velike Srbije Ravnogorskog pokreta (poznatog i kao četnički pokret) i način na koji je on sprovodio etničko čišćenje. Osvrnućemo se na oživljavanje ideologije Velike Srbije u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji tokom 80-ih godina i ulogu onih intelektualaca koji su sebe videli kao naslednike četničkog pokreta iz Drugog svetskog rata. Na kraju ćemo opisati osnivanje Srpske radikalne stranke (SRS) na čelu s Vojislavom Šešeljem, čiji je glavni politički cilj bilo stvaranje Velike Srbije.

⁶ *Ibid.* Autori tih knjiga bili su Francuz Ernest Denis i Rus V. N. Jastrebov. Ernest Denis, profesor na Sorboni, napisao je, zapravo, istoriju Srbije, u kojoj su ideja jugoslovenstva i srpska ideja tretirane kao jednake. Vladajuća ideja u to vreme bila je da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci deo jednog te istog naroda. U knjizi su date dve geografske karte: karta srpskih i hrvatskih zemalja i karta Srbije 1913. godine. Projekat ujedinjenja Južnih Slovena predstavljen je kao inicijativa koju treba da sprovedu vlasti u Beogradu (str. 313). Nova država, koja se pominje kao “nova kraljevina Srbija”, trebalo je da, osim Srbije, obuhvati i Bosnu, Hercegovinu i trojednu Kraljevinu Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije. Ta država prostirala bi se do Slovenije, a u njenom sastavu bio bi i jug Mađarske (Vojvodina). Premda se za jugoslovenski projekat kaže da on znači “ekspanziju Srbije” (str. 305), u knjizi se ne raspravlja o ideologiji Velike Srbije.

1. Srpska nacionalna ideologija u XIX veku: između srpstva i jugoslovenstva

Kneževina Srbija nastala je iz dva ustanka koja su se dogodila početkom XIX veka – prvi od 1804. do 1813. godine, a drugi 1815. godine. Nakon tog drugog ustanka Srbija je usmeno dobila poluautonomni status u okviru Otomanskog carstva. Ovaj njen status je zatim potvrđen Akermanskom konvencijom iz 1826. godine, kao i sultanovim hatišerifom Sultana kojim je Srbija 1830. postala autonomna kneževina, u vazalnom položaju u odnosu na Otomansko carstvo. Punu nezavisnost Srbija će steći tek 1878. godine.

Tokom tridesetih i četrdesetih godina XIX veka, ondašnji intelektualci i političke vođe definisali su svoja shvatanja srpske države i srpskog naroda. Sada ćemo razmotriti kulturne ideje o srpskom narodu Vuka Karadžića, reformatora srpskog jezika, kao i viziju srpske države političkog vođe Ilije Garašanina, koji je 1844. godine formulisao prvi srpski nacionalni program.

1.1. Rad Vuka Stefanovića Karadžića (1787-1864)

Kao etnograf i lingvista, Vuk Karadžić je svojim radom odigrao značajnu ulogu u definisanju srpskog identiteta u XIX veku.⁷ Štaviše, njegovo delo predstavlja zaokret u mogućem poimanju sopstvenog identiteta kod Srba. Vuk Karadžić je, naime, ponudio

⁷ Karadžić, koji je rođen u Tršiću, u zapadnoj Srbiji, u porodici koja se tu doselila iz Hercegovine, obrazovao se u Beogradu za vreme prvog srpskog ustanka i postao zvaničnik srpske države koja je tad tek bila u začetku. Nakon neuspeha ustanka 1813. godine, napustio je Srbiju i otišao u Beč. U austrijskoj prestonici upoznao se sa slovenačkim lingvistom Jernejem Kopitarem, koji ga je podstakao da nastavi svoj književni i lingvistički rad. Godine 1814. i 1815, Vuk Karadžić je priredio dve zbirke narodne poezije, u kojima je zabeležio usmeno predanje svoga naroda, onako kako su ga prenosili nepismeni srpski seljaci. Njegov rad oduševio je nemačke pisce poput J. V. Geta i Jakoba Grima, koji su se zanimali za bogatstvo narodne poezije. Tu poeziju Karadžić je priredio na onom srpskom jeziku koji je sam kodifikovao u svojoj gramatici objavljenoj 1814. godine. Vuk Karadžić je uprostio srpsko ćirilčno pismo izbacivši nepotrebna slova i uvevši neka nova, pre svega “j”, koje je preuzeo iz latiničnog pisma. Time je unekoliko omogućio približavanje pravoslavnog i katoličkog sveta. Godine 1818, Karadžić je objavio rečnik, kojim je predstavio svoju reformu književnog jezika. Inspiracija Vuka Karadžića bilo je, zapravo, delo Dositeja Obradovića, pravoslavnog kaludera koji je prihvatio ideje prostvetiteljstva i Francuske revolucije. On se, u korist narodnog govora, poduhvatio reforme srpskog književnog jezika (slavenoserbskog), kojim se uglavnom služilo sveštenstvo.

sekularno shvatanje srpskog naroda, koje se nije zasnivalo na verskoj pripadnosti. Zbog toga je došao u sukob sa Srpskom pravoslavnom crkvom, koja je držala da Srbi ne mogu biti drugo do pravoslavci. Uprkos ovako bitnom razmimoilaženju, mnogobrojni srpski intelektualci XIX veka prihvatili su Karadžićeve ideje.

On je bio aktivan na vrhuncu romantizma, pokreta koji je idealizovao prošlost i vekovne tradicije. Raslo je zanimanje za istoriju, posebno srednji vek, kada su nastale narodne balade i epovi. Za romantičarski pokret jezik je bio od suštinske važnosti, pa je to važilo i za spsku kulturnu renesansu. Po mišljenju J. G. Herdera, sve karakteristike naroda i njegov duh ogledaju se u jeziku. Polja istraživačkog rada Vuka Karadžića bila su kako lingvistika i istorija, tako i etnografija. Nesumnjivo je da je njegov rad omogućio jačanje srpske nacionalne svesti.

Zahvaljujući reformi Vuka Karadžića, kojom je svakodnevni govor uzet za osnovu novog književnog jezika, književnost i nauka, dotak nedostupni, konačno su postali pristupačni običnom narodu. Njegova reforma, međutim, nije automatski prihvaćena i za njen konačan uspeh moralo je da prođe nekoliko decenija. U martu 1850. jedan broj srpskih intelektualaca, među kojima i Vuk Karadžić, dogovorio se sa grupom hrvatskih pisaca i lingvista (Ivan Mažuranić, Ivan Kukuljević i drugi) da će Srbi i Hrvati imati isti književni jezik i istu ortografiju. Karadžićeva reforma pravopisa je Srbiji je prihvaćena tek 1868, četiri godine nakon njegove smrti. Tokom čitavog veka, Srpska pravoslavna crkva žestoko se suprotstavljala jezičkoj reformi. Stefan Stratimirović, sremsko-karlovački mitropolit i voda Srba u Austrijskom carstvu bio je posebno glasan protivnik reforme.

U svom radu "Srbi svi i svuda", napisanom 1836. godine, a objavljenom 1849, Vuk Karadžić je precizirao koje teritorije naseljavaju Srbi:

Zaista se zna da Srbi sad žive u današnjoj Srbiji (između Drine i Timoka, i između Dunava i Stare planine), u Metohiji (od Kosova preko Stare planine, gdje je Dušanova stolica Prizren, srpska patrijaršija Peć, i manastir Dečani), u Bosni, u Hercegovini, u Zeti, u Crnoj Gori, u Banatu, u Bačkoj, u Srijemu, u desnom Podunavlju od više Osijeka do

Sentandrije, u Slavoniji, u Hrvatskoj (i Turskoj i Austrijskoj krajini), u Dalmaciji, i u svemu Adrijatičkom primorju gotovo od Trsta do Bojane.⁸

Vuk Karadžić je začetnik ideje o Srbima kao narodu sa više veroispovesti objedinjenom istim jezikom. Po njemu, a u skladu s herderovskom ideologijom, jezik je, nezavisno od verskih faktora, jedini važeći kriterijum za određivanje nacionalne pripadnosti. Tako je on u srpski narod ubrojao sve govornike dijalekata koji su se u to vreme mogli čuti u Srbiji, Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini, Vojvodini, Bosni i izvesnim delovima Dalmacije, uključujući Dubrovnik. Nije pridavao značaj oznaci “ilirski”, koja je u tridesetim i četrdesetim godinama XIX veka ušla u upotrebu u Hrvatskoj. Smatrao je da su Hrvati govornici čakavskog dijalekta, a Slovenci kajkavskog.⁹ Po njegovoj proceni bilo je pet miliona Srba – tri miliona pravoslavaca i dva miliona muslimana i katolika. U suštini, ideje Vuka Karadžića bile su u velikoj meri određene tadašnjom naukom o Južnim Slovenima i njihovim dijalektima. Pisanje Vuka Karadžića bilo je pod uticajem Kopitarevih ideja o etničkoj rasprostranjenosti Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.¹⁰ Sam Kopitar bio je inspirisan istaživanjima češkog lingviste Josifa Dobrovskog.¹¹

Definicija srpskog naroda Vuka Karadžića lišena je svakog pansrbizma ili velikosrpske političke ideologije. On se u svome delu, zapravo, i ne bavi problemima političke organizacije društva ili države; njegove ideje imaju kulturnu, a ne političku dimenziju.¹² U svojoj studiji o srpskoj i hrvatskoj nacionalnoj ideologiji XIX veka, Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt za nacionalne ideje Vuka Karadžića kaže da predstavljaju “jezičku i

⁸ Francuski prevod preuzet je iz knjige koju su uredili Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara i Neven Šimac, *Le nettoyage ethnique: documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe* /Etničko čišćenje: istorijski spisi o jednoj srpskoj ideologiji/ (Pariz: Fayard, 1993), str. 42.

⁹ U dijalektima srpskohrvatskog jezika javljaju se tri reči koje znače “šta”: “što” je najčešća, “ča” se koristi uglavnom u priobalnoj Dalmaciji, a “kaj” u okolini Zagreba.

¹⁰ Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, I tom (Beograd, Prosveta, 1989), str. 423.

¹¹ Dobrovski je smatrao da su sva područja gde se govorio štokavski dijalekat srpska. Smatrao je da su zapadne varijante tog jezika, gde se pisalo latinicom, polu-srpske, a da je varijanta koja se pisala ćirilicnim pismom autentično sprska. Teorije Dobrovskog i Kopitara bile su prihvaćene do 1849, ali su kasnije dovodene u pitanje. Vidi Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, I tom, str. 423. Pavel ŠAFARIK je 1826. godine preuzeo isti koncept srpskog naroda u svojoj *Istoriji slovenske književnosti i jezika*. On je, oslanjajući se na Dobrovskog, bio mišljenja da se srpski narod može podeliti na pravoslavne Srbe i katoličke Srbe, koje je nazivao Slavo-Srbima (*ibid*, str. 440).

¹² Ljubomir Tadić, *O velikosrpskom hegemonizmu* (Beograd: Stručna knjiga i Politika, 1992), str. 126-127.

kulturnu ideologiju Velike Srbije”.¹³ Istina je da njegove ideje impliciraju sužavanje teritorije na kojoj će se u XIX veku konstituisati hrvatski narod. Međutim, od suštinskog je značaja objasniti da su te ideje formulisane u vreme kada su kod Hrvata još uvek preovladavala osećanja lokalne i regionalne pripadnosti, dok identitet bosanskih Muslimana još uvek nije bio sasvim jasan. Hrvatske teritorije bile su podeljene između Austrije i Mađarske. Dalmacija, koja je do 1797. bila pod Mletačkom republikom, došla je 1814. pod nadležnost Beča, isto kao i pokrajine koje su naseljavali Slovenci (Kranjska, Koruška, Štajerska), dok su unutrašnjost Hrvatske i Slavonija potpale pod mađarsku upravu. Fragmentaciju hrvatskih teritorija pojačalo je postojanje Vojne krajine, koju je Austrija osnovala u XVI veku, naselivši tu oblast srpskim življem koji je stigao iz Otomanskog carstva vidi [geografsku kartu 1](#) u Dodatku.¹⁴ Premda Ilirski pokret iz tridesetih i četrdesetih godina XIX veka nije uspeo da prekorači geografske granice Hrvatske, on je ipak doprineo jačanju veza između različitih provincija koje su se smatrale hrvatskim. Taj tekst Vuka Karadžića, napisan u vreme kada su se nacionalni identiteti tek stvarali, nije posebno iznenađujući kada se čita iz perspektive doba u kojem je objavljen. Ono što će se javiti kao problem jeste insistiranje na takvom konceptu nacionalnog identiteta u XX veku, kada su nacionalni identiteti Hrvata i bosanskih Muslimana već utvrđeni.¹⁵ Optužiti Vuka Karadžića da je hteo da negira postojanje

¹³ Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830-1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie / Srpski i hrvatski nacionalizam 1830-1914: analiza i tipologija nacionalne ideologije/* (Minhen: Oldenbourg, 1980), str. 71. Vidi recenziju ove knjige Milorada Ekmečića objavljenu u *Istorijskom glasniku* (1980: 1-2), str. 151-160.

¹⁴ Yves Tomić, “*Le mouvement national croate au XIXe siècle: entre yougoslavisme (jugoslovenstvo) et croatisme (hrvatstvo)*” / “Hrvatski nacionalni pokret u 19. veku: između jugoslovenstva i hrvatstva”, *Revue des études slaves*, 68: 4 (1996), str. 463-475.

¹⁵ Tvrdnja Vojislava Šešelja da su katolici koji govore štokavskim dijalektom Srbi, zasnovana je na kategorijama nasleđenim od Vuka Karadžića i drugih intelektualaca XIX veka.

“Pre ilirskog preporoda srpski, štokavski jezik nije govorio ni jedan Hrvat, ali su govorili Srbi katolici, predvodnici ilirizma iz političkih razloga nisu hteli da taj jezik nazovu srpskim, ali im se činilo neprimerenim da ga predstave kao hrvatski, pa su pribegli neverovatnoj mimikriji predstavljajući se pripadnicima izumrlog balkanskog naroda - Ilirima.” Vojislav Šešelj, *Emigrantski opus Profesora Laze M. Kostića*, I deo, (Beograd: ZIPS, 1999), str. 13.

Ilirski pokret javio se u Hrvatskoj tridesetih i četrdesetih godina XIX veka. Tražio je autonomiju Hrvatske i Slavonije i njihovo ujedinjenje sa Dalmacijom. Suprotstavljao se mađarskoj dominaciji nad Hrvatskom i Slavonijom.

Hrvata i bosanskih Muslimana značilo bi falsifikovati istorijsku perspektivu i ignorisati istorijske parametre XIX veka. Iz želje da se Vuk Karadžić ocrni po svaku cenu, zaboravlja se da su njegove ideje za ono doba bile moderne i da su proistekle iz evropskog racionalizma. Ideja Vuka Karadžića da su Srbi i Hrvati deo istoga naroda utrla je put ideji jugoslovenstva u Srbiji na početku XX veka. U korenu jugoslovenskog unitarizma kriju se herderovske ideje o tome da naciju određuje jezik. Međutim, istorija je pokazala da je takav koncept srpskog naroda, prevashodno utemeljen na filološkom radu Vuka Karadžića, pogrešan, pošto se ispostavilo da jezik ne može služiti kao glavni kriterijum za definisanje nacije. Verospovest je jedan od ključnih distinktivnih elemenata nacionalne pripadnosti, posebno u Bosni i Hercegovini, i to nezavisno od stvarnog stepena religioznosti. Lingvistički nacionalizam, bilo onaj koji je definisao Vuk Karadžić bilo njegov ilirski oblik, nudio je tolerantnu perspektivu. Ali jezički faktor neće biti dovoljan za ujedinjenje južnoslovenskih naroda. Od kraja XIX veka, a posebno u XX veku, jezički nacionalizam ustupiće mesto etničkom nacionalizmu.

Vidi i Vojislav Šešelj, *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma: naučno i publicističko delo prof. dr. Laze M. Kostića* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 2002).

1.2. Formulisanje nacionalnog programa: *Načertanije* Ilije Garašanina (1812-1874)

Do sastavljanja ovog nacionalnog programa došlo je usled konakata između političkih voda kneževine Srbije i poljskih političkih emigranata koji su pobjegli iz svoje zemlje nakon neuspjeha revolucije 1830. godine. Kako bi se suprotstavio interesima Rusije i Austrije knez Adam Čartoriski, ruski ministar inostranih poslova u burnom napoleonskom periodu, osnovao je diplomatsku kancelariju u Parizu s mrežom agenata sve do Balkana.¹⁶ U januaru 1843. godine, posvetio je Srbiji svoj spis “Saveti koje treba slediti” /originalni naslov: “Conseils sur la conduite à suivre”, u kojem je savetovao vode da prava i teritoriju svoje kneževine prošire na taj način što će voditi pomirljivu politiku prema Porti. Predlagao je da Kneževina Srbija oko sebe okupi druge slovenske zemlje i narode koji žive u Otomanskom i Habzburškom carstvu, opominjući da se treba čuvati Rusije i Austrije. Godine 1843. i 1844, agent Čartoriskog u Beogradu, Čeh po imenu František A. Zach, napravio je “plan za slovensku politiku Srbije”, kojim je savetovao vladajuće krugove u Srbiji da slede “panslovensku politiku”.¹⁷ Pri sastavljanju svog *Načertanija*, Garašanin se u velikoj meri oslanjao na ta dva teksta, posebno na “Plan” Františkega Zacha, ali je pritom izostavio njegovu jugoslovensku dimenziju.¹⁸

Načertanije je delo Ilije Garašanina (1812-1874), ministra unutrašnjih poslova. Garašanin je tu funkciju obavljao od 1843. do 1852. i bio je jedan od stubova ustavobraniteljske vlade. Nije bio zadužen samo za policiju, već i za vojsku, privredu,

¹⁶ Poljski agenti su bili u bliskoj vezi s ustavobraniteljima i podržali su ih kada su ovi došli na vlast u Kneževini Srbiji, u čemu im je najviše pomogla francuska diplomatija. Radoš Ljušić, “Ilija Garašanin o srpskoj državnosti”, u *Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874)* (Beograd, SANU, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, 1991), str. 64.

¹⁷ Na srpskohrvatskom se ime Františkega Zacha često pojavljuje kao Franjo Zah.

¹⁸ U nekom smislu, *Načertanije* je kopija “Plana” Františkega Zacha. Ipak, Ilija Garašanin je izostavio neke delove, pre svega onaj koji se bavio odnosom Srba i Hrvata i savezom sa Česima, kao i delove u kojima se govorilo o usklađivanju unutrašnje i spoljne politike.

zdravstvo i transport. Gotovo tri decenije vršio je visoke političke funkcije u Srbiji.¹⁹ Nakon pada ustavobraniteljskog režima 1858. godine, knez Mihailo Obrenović ga je pozvao da bude na čelu vlade i da vodi spoljnu politiku (1861-1867). Pristaša reda, bio je protivnik liberalnih ideja i demokratskih institucija. Godine 1844. formulisao je nacionalni program za oslobođenje i ujedinjenje srpskog naroda. Vrlo je važno podvući da se radi o jednom poverljivom spisu. Sa njime je bila upoznata samo nekolicina srpskih vođa – Austrougarska je za njega saznala tek osamdesetih godina XIX veka, a srpska javnost je sa njegovim postojanjem upoznata tek 1906. Ilija Garašanin je verovao da Srbija treba da ima plan za budućnost. Smatrao je da je država premala da bi joj opstanak bio zagarantovan, da je, drugim rečima, morala da proširi granice tako da one obuhvate Srbe koji su živeli van kneževine. Garašanin je ovaj svoj sud zasnovao na činjenici da je Otomansko carstvo na zalasku i da će ga naslediti ili Austrija i Rusija, ili hrišćanske države Balkana. Osim same kneževine, buduća srpska država obuhvatila bi Bosnu, Hercegovinu, Crnu Goru i severne delove Albanije. Počivala bi na slavnoj prošlosti srpskoga carstva iz XIV veka. Ilija Garašanin se pozivao na istorijska prava: Srbi, naime, ne traže ništa drugo do kontinuitet srpske srednjovekovne države koju su u XIV i XV veku razorili Turci. Do ujedinjenja Srba trebalo je da dođe u etapama: počelo bi sa Srbima koji žive u Otomanskom carstvu, a zatim bi se pripojili i oni u južnoj Madarskoj. Garašanin nije isključio mogućnost ujedinjenja – u buduću jugoslovensku državu – sa drugim Južnim Slovenima u Habzburškom carstvu, kao i sa Bugarima. Pa ipak, jugoslovenska dimenzija njegovog programa nije bila jasno izražena; ona nije predstavljala njegov ključni aspekt. Prednost je imalo stvaranje nezavisne srpske države.²⁰ Koja je sredstva Garašanin predvideo za ostvarivanje planiranih ciljeva? Mada rat nije bio isključen kao mogućnost - Ilija Garašanin ga pominje kada govori o tome da

¹⁹ U Garašaninovoju dugoj državničkoj karijeri bila su dva perioda u kojima nije vodio poslove Srbije: od 1853. do 1856. i ponovo od 1859. do 1861.

²⁰ Ljušić, str. 153.

treba znati da su u oblastima koje je on imao prilike da vidi prisutni “ratni duh, naoružanost naroda, posle čislo i raspoloženje pravilne vojske” – rat ipak nije bio izričito predviđen kao instument ekspanzionističke politike srpske kneževine.²¹ Naglasak je bio na prikupljanju informacija od Južnih Slovena u Otomanskom i Habzburškom carstvu. U tu svrhu kreirana je mreža obaveštajaca na područjima naseljenim Srbima pod otomanskom i austrougarskom upravom.²²

Da bi se opredjeliti moglo šta se učiniti može i kako se u poslu postupiti ima, mora praviteljstvo znati u kakvom se položenu svagdar nalaze narodi raznih provincija Srbiju okružavajućih. Ovo je glavno uslovije tačnog opredelenija sredstva. Za ovu cjel treba pre svega oštroomne, od predponjatija ne zauzete i praviteljstvu verne ljude kao ispitatelje stanja ovih naroda i zemalja poslati i ovi bi morali posle svog povratka tačno pismeno izvestije o stvari dati. Naročito se treba izvestiti o Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori i Severnoj Albaniji. U isto vreme nužno je da se tačno poznaje i stanje Slavonije, Hrvatske i Dalmacije a razume se da u ovo spadaju i narodi Srema, Banata i Bačke.²³

U osnovi ovog rezonovanja nije konfrontacija sa susednim slovenskim narodima. Naprotiv, Ilija Garašanin je insistirao na potrebi da se nađu dodirne tačke sa njima. Pisao je o tome da pravoslavci i katolici treba da se dogovore o nacionalnoj politici, kako bi ostvarili ciljeve iz *Načertanija*. Rukovodeći se tim stavom, zastupao je načelo potpune slobode veroispovesti. Tako je štampanjem i širenjem dela objavljenih u Beogradu a namenjenih katoličkim Slovenima i muslimanskim Bosancima trebalo uspostaviti prijateljske odnose sa Južnim Slovenima u Otomanskom carstvu i Austriji i zadobiti njihovo poverenje. Isti pristup imao je i prema Bugarskoj i Bugarima.²⁴ Cilj je bio suzbiti ruski uticaj na Bugare i oslabiti ulogu Rusije kao zaštitnice pravoslavnih Bugara. Iako je, istini za volju, *Načertanije* predviđalo teritorijalno širenje Kneževine Srbije, sa njenim političkim institucijama i kneževskom dinastijom kao okosnicama, u njemu se nijednom ne predlaže proterivanje eventualno nepoželjnih naroda. Premda *Načertanije* možemo

²¹ U “Planu” Čeha Franje Zaha, koji je dao ideje za *Načertanije*, izričito se navodi da je rat osnovno sredstvo za rešavanje južnoslovenskog pitanja. O tome se detaljno govori u VII Delu “Plana”, ali Garašanin to nije preuzeo. Bilo bi zanimljivo znati zašto je taj deo izostavljen. Po svemu sudeći ne postoje arhivski spisi koji bi pružili odgovor na ovo pitanje. Za tekst Franje Zaha vidi Ljušić, str. 130-150.

²² David Mackenzie, “*Ilija Garašanin: Balkan BISMARCK*” *Ilija Garašanin - balkanski BIZMARK* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), str. 62-91.

²³ Citirano prema prevodu u knjizi *Etničko čišćenje: istorijski spisi o jednoj srpskoj ideologiji*, str. 67-68.

²⁴ Jedan poduži deo *Načertanija* posvećen je Bugarima i Bugarskoj.

shvatiti kao striktno srpski nacionalni program, u njemu se ipak ne isključuje saradnja sa drugim Južnim Slovenima. Osim toga, bilo bi pogrešno ocenjivati jugoslovenski karakter nekog nacionalnog programa jedino na osnovu onoga što se u njemu kaže o saradnji Srba i Hrvata. Ustvari, Srbija je u više navrata razmatrala mogućnost zajedničke države sa Bugarima.

Prvi primer sprovođenja *Načertanija* u praksu bio je stvaranje mreže agenata u Otomanskom carstvu i na teritoriji Austrije. u provincijama Otomanskog carstva (Bosna, Hercegovina, Kosovo) regrutovano je na desetine agenata, mahom trgovaca.²⁵ Uspostavljeni su konakti sa vladarem Crne Gore, vladikom Petrom II Petrovićem Njegošem, kojem je odobrena novčana pomoć. Katolički Albanci iz plemena Mirdita pridobijeni su za zajedničku borbu za oslobođenje.²⁶ Veze su uspostavljene i sa istaknutim ličnostima Ilirskog pokreta u Hrvatskoj (Ljudevit Gaj, Bogoslav Šulek, itd.).

Kada je 1848. godine susedno Austrijsko carstvo potresala revolucija, kneževina Srbija je dobila priliku da svoje političke i teritorijalne ambicije isproba u realnosti. Južni delovi Mađarske (Vojvodina), gde se srpsko stanovništvo podiglo protiv Budimpešte, nisu bili prioritetni za Srbiju, koja je bila prvenstveno okrenuta Bosni, Hercegovini i severnoj Albaniji. Njena obaveštajna mreža bila je tamo mnogo manje razvijena nego u Otomanskom carstvu. Bez obzira na to, vlasti u Beogradu podržale su srpske pobunjenike u južnoj Mađarskoj, koji su tražili stvaranje autonomne srpske teritorije u okviru Habzburškog carstva. Na insistiranje Otomanskog carstva, Srbija je ipak zauzela neutralan stav i povukla svoje dobrovoljce iz Vojvodine. Revolucionarna zbivanja 1848.

²⁵ Svaki agent pokrivao je dve ili tri nahije (oblasti). On bi za svaku nahiju zadužio po jednog čoveka, koji bi onda dalje regrutovao svoje agente. Nijedan agent nije znao ko su drugi agenti. Za agente su korišćeni i pravoslavci i katolici. Michael Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918* (Istorija moderne Srbije, 1804-1918), I tom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), str. 233-234. Vidi i Vaso VOJVODIĆ, *U duhu Garašaninovih ideja: Srbija i neoslobodeno srpstvo 1868-1876*, (Beograd: Prosveta, 1994), str. 402.

²⁶ Počevši od 1846. godine postojao je kontakt sa plemenskim starešinom Bibom Dodom, u kojem su posredovali Hrvat Matija Ban i ličnosti iz redova albanskog katoličkog sveštenstva. Obaveštajci su regrutovani među katoličkim Albancima, od kojih je najznačajniji bio Karlo Krasnići. Više o kontaktima srpskih vođa i albanskih katoličkih velikodostojnika može se pročitati u knjizi Petrita IMAMIJA, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove* (Beograd: KVS, 2000), str. 117-134.

godine navela su Iliju Garašanina na još ambicioznije ideje i razmišljanja o stvaranju jednog carstva Južnih Slovena, čiji bi nosioci bili pretežno Srbi i Hrvati.²⁷ Po gušenju revolucije 1849. godine, vratio se skromnijim zamislima i prevashodno se usredsredio na ideju o ujedinjenju Srba. Tokom sedme decenije XIX veka, kao ministar spoljnih poslova i predsednik vlade za vreme vladavine Mihaila Obrenovića (1860-1868), Garašanin se držao smernica iz *Nečertanija*, prema kojima bi buduća srpska država obuhvatala Kneževinu Srbiju, Bosnu, Hercegovinu, severnu Albaniju i Crnu Goru. Kada je reč o njegovom stavu prema Crnoj Gori, tu je bio manje jasan, jer je sumnjao u spremnost njenih vođa da se priključe Srbiji. Dok je tokom četrdesetih godina XIX veka Srbiju uvek video kao vazalnu državu Otomanskog carstva, tokom šezdesetih godina XIX veka više nije bilo moguće razmišljati o proširenoj srpskoj državi kao delu carstva čija se čiji se kraj tada već otvoreno priželjkivao. U skladu s time, sa propagandnog rada prešlo se na pobunjeničku borbu ili rat za nacionalno oslobođenje, najpre u vidu naoružavanja “revolucionarnih pokreta” u Bosni, Hercegovini i Bugarskoj. Kako bi se hrišćanski narodi jednom za svagda oslobodili osmanlijskog jarma, na inicijativu kneza Mihaila Obrenovića uspostavljen je sistem savezničkih odnosa sa Grčkom (1861), Crnom Gorom (1866) i Rumunijom (1868). Idealističke vizije kneza Mihaila Obrenovića prevazilazile su očekivanja Ilije Garašanina, jer je srpski vladar polagao nade u stvaranje jedne velike države Južnih Slovena u čijem će sastavu biti Srbi i Hrvati iz Habzburškog carstva, kao i Bugari i Makedonci iz Otomanskog carstva. Štaviše, njegove zamisli prevazilazile su i realne mogućnosti Srbije da sprovede jedan takav poduhvat. Godine 1861, Ilija Garašanin je govorio o “konfederaciji Srba, Bugara i Albanaca”, mada je znao da evropski diplomatski krugovi nisu bili raspoloženi da podrže jedan takav projekat. Paralelno sa sporazumima među državama, Srbija je 1867. godine sa bugarskim nacionalistima

²⁷ Dragan Simeunović, *Iz riznice otadžbinskih ideja* (Beograd: Vojska i Verzal Press, 2000), str. 28-29.

postigla dogovor o stvaranju srpsko-bugarske zajednice.²⁸ U martu iste godine, Ilija Garašanin, ministar spoljnih poslova, napisao je program za jugoslovensku politiku, koji je poslao Josipu Jurju Štrosmajeru, vodi jugoslovenskog pokreta u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji. Program je imao za cilj ujedinjenje slovenskih plemena u jednu saveznu državu sa dva centra - Beogradom i Zagrebom. Država bi se temeljila na principu nacionalne pripadnosti, a ne veroispovesti, pošto je Ilija Garašanin smatrao da su Srbi i Hrvati iste nacionalnosti, odnosno da su Jugosloveni.²⁹ Zato se *Nečertanije* ne može izolovati i ograničiti na 1844. godinu, kada se pojavilo. Važno je imati u vidu nacionalnu ili spoljnu politiku kneževine Srbije, a posebno uticaj Ilije Garašanin u periodu od 1840. do 1860. godine. Detaljnim uvidom u spoljnu politiku Kneževine Srbije može se uočiti da su bile prisutne dve tendencije ili ideološke opcije: usko srpska opcija i jugoslovenska (ili, šire, balkanska) opcija. Kakva je tačno veza između ova dva pristupa? Premda se ne može poreći da je srpska nacionalna politika pre svega išla za ostvarivanjem interesa srpskog naroda, isto tako je istina da se ujedinjenje srpskog naroda razmatralo u dva različita konteksta - u srpskom i u jugoslovenskom, s tim da je ovaj drugi varirao (figurirali su ili Hrvati ili Bugari). Bez obzira na to, i u okviru jugoslovenske opcije uloga inicijatora i donosioca odluka bila je rezervisana za Srbiju (i njenu dinastiju), koja je u to vreme bila glavna vojna sila među hrišćanskim narodima Balkana. Predstaviti Iliju Garašanina kao običnog eksponenta velikosrpske ideologije značilo bi, dakle, suviše uprostiti stvar, jer ako pažljivo sagledamo njegov razvoj, videćemo da je put kojim je on išao mnogo složeniji, odnosno da je oscilovao između jedne usko srpske i jedne jugoslovenske (ili

²⁸ Sporazum od 26. januara 1867. godine, poznat i kao "Program srpsko-bugarskih (bugarsko-srpskih) političkih odnosa ili njihova "srdačna antanta", imao je dvanaest članova i predviđao je stvaranje zajedničke države pod nazivom Bugaro-Srbija ili Srbo-Bugarska. Knez Mihailo Obrenović proglašen je "poglavarem Srbo-Bugara i vrhovnim zapovednikom njihovih vojski" (član 3). Tekst ovog sporazuma može se naći u knjizi Georgea Devasa, *La nouvelle Serbie: origines et bases sociales et politiques, renaissance de l'État et son développement historique, dynastie nationale et revendications libératrices* /Nova Srbija: poreklo i društveni i politički osnovi, obnova i istorijski razvoj države, narodna dinastija i polaganje prava na slobodu/ (Pariz i Nansi: Berger-Levrault, 1918), str. 205. Na drugom po redu sastanku održanom u Bukureštu u aprilu 1867. odlučeno je da će se buduća država zvati *Jugoslovensko carstvo*.

²⁹ Ljušić, str. 112.

balkanske) perspektive. Osim toga, politika oslobađanja Srba u Otomanskom carstvu u XIX veku nije bila konstantna. Od 1867. do 1903. godine, Srbija je, zapravo, bila odustala od svojih planova za ujedinjenje Srba u jedinstvenu državu i pala pod uticaj Austrougarske. Od 1867. godine, nakon sastanka sa grofom Andrasijem, mađarskim predsednikom vlade i ministrom odbrane, knez Mihailo je promenio politički kurs, te je razrešio dužnosti Iliju Garašanina, koji se nalazio na čelu srpske vlade i diplomatije. Sporazumi postignuti sa balkanskim državama prestali su da važe i odnosi sa Hrvatima su prekinuti. Pod novim knezom Milanom Obrenovićem Srbija je napustila svoje nacionalne ideale.

1.3. Karakteristike srpske nacionalne ideologije na kraju XIX veka

Nacionalne ideologije je teško definisati, jer oni koji govore o nekoj naciji čine to sa veoma različitih političkih i društvenih stanovišta. Bez obzira na to, ti različiti diskursi imaju više zajedničkih tačaka. Tako se, konačno, iskristališu definicija nacije, karakteristike njene kulture, specifične institucije i ciljevi koje ona sebi postavlja u vezi s određenom situacijom. Nacionalna ideologija omogućava nam da precizno utvrimo kako određena nacionalna grupa sebe vidi i koje su joj glavne karakteristike. U mnoštvu ideoloških stavki, određivanje teritorijalnih granica i naziva nacije zauzimaju najistaknutije mesto.

Srpska nacionalna država razvila se tokom XIX veka. Kao i u slučaju modernizacije srpskog društva, nastanak nacionalne države bio je spor i postepen. U početku je srpska nacionalna ideja živela uglavnom među urbanim intelektualcima, koji su bili malobrojni. Intelektualni centar Srba nije se nalazio u Kneževini Srbiji, već u Vojvodini, u mađarskom delu Habzburškog carstva. Godine 1839, 59,7% svih

intelektualaca koji su živeli u Kneževini Srbiji bilo je iz južne Mađarske.³⁰ Srpski istoričar Milorad Ekmečić zapaža da se razvoj nacionalnog pokreta u političkim smislu vezuje više za vlasti u Kneževini, dok se “kulturna renesansa” odvijala mahom u Vojvodini.³¹ Najteže je bilo ubediti seljaštvo da prihvati taj korpus ideoloških koncepata. Tokom raznih sukoba između Srbije i Otomanskog carstva nacionalnu ideologiju propagirale su političke stranke, štampa, vojska, pa i kulturne insitucije (klubovi čitalaca, pevačka društva i slično). Među takvim institucijama najznačajniju ulogu u širenju nacionalnih ideala i srpske književnosti uopšte odigrala je “Matica srpska”, osnovana 1826. u Cislajtaniji.³² Zbog visokog stepena nepismenosti, usmena kultura je bila značajan faktor u širenju nacionalne ideologije. U odnosu na prethodni period, Pravoslavna crkva je sada imala manje udela u nacionalnom pokretu. Koncept nacije koji je gajila Srpska pravoslavna crkva, tj. nacije definisane pravoslavnom verom, bio je u suprotnosti sa konceptom koji je ponudio Vuk Karadžić, konceptom koji su tokom XIX veka prihvatili mnogobrojni intelektualci.

Škole su bile još jedan dobar način za širenje nacionalnih ideja. U obrazovni sistem, doduše, nije bilo uključeno celokupno stanovništvo, ali udžbenici osnovnih i srednjih škola važan su izvor informacija o tome kako su Srbi želeli da se prikažu sopstvenom narodu, o tome kako su videli svoju prošlost i svoje teritorije.³³ Među tim publikacijama središnje mesto zauzimaju udžbenici geografije, u kojima se mogu naći definicije srpskog naroda, a ucrtane su i granice nacionalnih teritorija. Udžbenici geografije Vladimira Karića bili su vrlo uticajni i potonji autori udžbenika našli su u njegovim delima izuzetno značajan izvor inspiracije. Po Vladimiru Kariću, granica

³⁰ Milorad Ekmečić, *Srbija između srednje Evrope i Evrope* (Beograd: Politika, 1992), str. 75.

³¹ Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, 1. tom, str. 441.

³² Reka Lajta delila je teritoriju Austrijskog carstva na dva dela – Cislajtaniju u Austriji i Translajtaniju u Mađarskoj.

³³ Charles Jalvich, *South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914* /Južnoslovenski nacionalizam: udžbenici i jugoslovenska zajednica pre 1914. godine/ (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), str. 359. U vezi sa razvojem obrazovnog sistema u Srbiji u XIX veku vidi tekst Ljubinke Trgovčević “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije Srbije u XIX veku: analitička skica”, u *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994), str. 217-232.

srpskih zemalja išla je Dunavom na istoku, koritom reka Timoka, Morave i Vardara sve do grada Strumice na jugu, odatle je vodila koritom Crne Reke sve do Prespanskog jezera i prema severu do Ohridskog jezera, da bi se zatim Crnim Drimom spustila do Jadranskog mora. Obalom se granica penje do Trsta, na istoku prati istočne granice Kranjske i Štajerske i reku Dravu, sve do Pečuja i Mohača. Granica srpskih zemalja zatim seče rumunski Banat (linijom Temišvar, Vršac, Bela Crkva) i vraća se do Dunava. Karićeva Srbija prostire se preko čitave teritorije buduće Jugoslavije, sa izuzetkom Slovenije; obuhvata i delove severne Albanije i severne Grčke, kao i južne Mađarske i zapadne Rumunije vidi [geografsku kartu 2](#) u Dodatku. Među srpskim zemljama Karić pravi razliku između onih nezavisnih, kao što su Kraljevina Srbija i Kneževina Crna Gora, onih pod austrougarskom vlašću, kao što su Istra, Kraljevina Dalmacija i Kraljevina Hrvatska i Slavonija, i konačno, onih pod Otomanskim carstvom - Bosna, Hercegovina, Stara Srbija (Kosovo) i Makedonija. On nampominje da su se Sloveni nazivali Srbima pre nego što su počeli da koriste različita imena. Karić je bio mišljenja da Srbi govore tri glavna dijalekta: štokavski, čakavski i kajkavski. Prvi je za njega predstavljao čist srpski dijalekat. Iz ovih pretpostavki sledi da su Hrvati i Sloveni muslimanske vere Srbi. Srpski narod je, dakle, bio podeljen na tri verske zajednice: pravoslavnu, katoličku i muslimansku. Ove tvrdnje zasnovane su na idejama Vuka Karadžića. Ista teza može se naći u gramatikama, udžbenicima istorije i čitankama. Svi školski udžbenici propagirali su srpski nacionalni cilj, odnosno oslobođenje i ujedinjenje srpskog naroda. Definicija srpskog naroda nije bila zasnovana na religiji, iako je većina njegovih pripadnika bila pravoslavne vere, nego su se u njega ubrajali i katolici Hrvati i muslimanski Sloveni u Bosni. Glavni kriterijum bio je jezički (svodio se na upotrebu štokavskog).

Tokom celog procesa nacionalnog oslobođenja i formiranja moderne srpske države, za merilo se uzimala teritorija srpske države pod dinastijom Nemanjića, posebno iz zlatnog doba cara Dušana. U različitim diskursima o naciji, kako u politici tako i u

književnosti, dominiraju koncepti jedinstva i sloge. Jedinstvo je postalo cilj za sebe: najvažnije je ne ponoviti greške srpskih feudalnih vladara, koji nisu umeli da oforme skupine dovoljno jake da se odupru otomanskom osvajaču.³⁴ U raznim književnim tvorevinama u patriotskom duhu, nevolje srpskoga naroda prikazivane su kao posledica nesloge i vlastoljubivosti njegovih vladara i voda, ili pak stranog uticaja (Turaka i drugih). Pored toga, sloboda se mogla osvojiti jedino oružjem, podizanjem ustanka i revolucije. Sloboda se nije mogla izvojevati bez žrtava. Stvaranje moderne srpske države temeljilo se na tri osnovne tradicije: na kultu Kosovskog boja iz 1389, kultu ustanaka iz perioda 1804-1813. i 1815. i, kasnije, na kultu ratova vođenih od 1912. do 1918. godine.

Nacionalna ideologija je za osnovni cilj postavila ujedinjenje svih Srba u jednu državu. Taj cilj se ni po čemu nije razlikovao od onog koji su sebi postavili drugi nacionalni pokreti tog doba, pre svega u Nemačkoj i Italiji. U XIX veku ovakvi zahtevi nisu izazivali burne reakcije; smatrani su opravdanim, posebno među liberalima i radikalima. U drugoj polovini XIX veka John Stuart Mill je pisao:

Upšte uzevši, za slobodne institucije nužan je uslov da se granice vlasti manje više poklapaju sa granicama naroda ... Tamo gde postoji iole jako osećanje nacionalne pripadnosti, postoje *prima facie* dobri razlozi da se svi pripadnici tog naroda ujedine i stave pod istu, i to sopstvenu, vlast.³⁵

Po svom tipu, srpska nacionalna ideologija spada u tzv. etnički nacionalizam, za koji važi da je cilj nacionalnog pokreta okupljanje svih sunarodnika koji žive van granica nacionalne države, kao i teritorija na kojima oni žive.³⁶ Nacionalni pokret, stoga, formuliše iredentističke zahteve i ideologiju pan-nacionalizma. Doduše, ni francuski koncept nacije nije bio sasvim odsutan. Definicija etničke ili nacionalne grupe relativno je rastegljiva, budući da uključuje Hrvate i Slovence muslimanske vere. Ovakvo shvatanje

³⁴ Vladimir Jovičić, *Srpsko rodoljubivo pesništvo* (Beograd: Nolit, 1976), str. 134-135.

³⁵ John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* /Razmatranja o predstavničkoj vladi/ (London, 1872). Citiran tekst preuzet je iz Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* /Teorije nacionalizma/ (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), str. 9.

³⁶ Osnov za ovo je tipologija koju Anthony D. Smith daje u *National Identity* /Nacionalni identitet/ (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

nacije pogodovaće stvaranju Jugoslavije, ali ne i njenoj stabilnosti.³⁷ Ovakva sveobuhvatna definicija srpskog naroda biće napuštena tek posle Prvog svetskog rata, u periodu od 1918. do 1941. godine. Ipak, kao što se vidi iz istorijskih događaja u XIX i XX veku, dominiraće etnički koncept.

Uoči Prvog svetskog rata Srbija nije bila potpuno integrisana nacionalna zajednica. Dobivši 1878. godine oblast Niša i povrativši Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913 Staru Srbiju (oblast Kosova) i Makedoniju, Srbija je proširila granice. Nisu svi njeni građani imali jasnu sliku o srpskim etničkim teritorijama. Nacionalna ideologija nije doprla do svih seljaka, koji su činili preko 80% stanovništva.³⁸ Ipak, posle 1900. godine, nacionalni pokret i njegova ideologija promenili su svoj karakter iz elitističkog u opštenarodni, uprkos tome što u srpskom društvu nisu bili sazreli svi uslovi koji bi se očekivali za tu fazu – 1900. godine 79% stanovništva i dalje je bilo nepismeno, a opšte pravo glasa uvedeno je tek 1903.³⁹

Posle 1903. godine Srbija se oslobodila austrougarskog uticaja, pod kojim je bila od 1881.⁴⁰ Dolazak na srpski presto Petra I Karadorđevića 1904. godine, nakon ubistva kralja Aleksandra Obrenovića i njegove supruge 1903. godine, predstavljao je prekretnicu u srpskoj nacionalnoj politici, koja će dovesti do Balkanskih ratova 1912-1913. i čiji će vrhunac biti ponovno osvajanje Kosova i vardarske Makedonije, kao i protest protiv austrougarske aneksije Bosne i Hercegovine 1908. godine, za koju su srpske političke vlasti i javnost smatrali da je srpska. Dok je srpska politika prevashodno stremila ujedinjenju Srba u istu državu, po izbijanju Prvog svetskog rata u leto 1914. godine došlo je do redefinisanja srpskih nacionalnih ciljeva, jer je vlada na čelu s Nikolom Pašićem

³⁷ Ovaj koncept nacije savršeno se uklapa u unitarističku nacionalnu ideologiju koju su razvili Južni Sloveni u Austroguarskom carstvu, a po kojoj su Srbi i Hrvati deo jedno te istog naroda. Posle 1918. ovakva ideologije bila je slabije prihvaćena i dovela je do jačanja centrifugalnih tendencija u jugoslovenskoj državi.

³⁸ Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, II tom, str. 475.

³⁹ *Ibid*, str. 476.

⁴⁰ Godine 1881, Srbija je s Austrougarskom potpisala jedan sporazum o trgovini čiji je sastavni deo bila i "Tajna konvencija" kojom se srpska vlada obavezala da neće pružati podršku slovenskom stanovništvu na jugu Habzburškog carstva, kao i da sa vladama drugih država neće zaključiti nijedan sporazum a da prethodno o tome ne obavesti vlasti u Beču.

zagovarala stvaranje jugoslovenske države (a ne Velike Srbije), koja bi objedinila Srbe, Hrvate i Slovence.

2. Srpska nacionalna ideologija u prvoj Jugoslaviji (1918-1941): od jugoslovenstva do velikosrpstva

2.1. Položaj Srba u prvoj Jugoslaviji

Nekada (pre 1912-1913) nacionalno homogena Srbija, izgubila je 1918. svoju političku posebnost i postala deo nove države Jugoslavije.⁴¹ U periodu od 1918. do 1939 godine, srpski nacionalizam zamenila je ideologija jugoslovenstva, koja je polazila od toga da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci tri plemena koja čine istu naciju (ova ideologija je poznata i kao unitarizam). Glavne političke snage u srpskom narodu podržavale su stvaranje Jugoslavije. Najistaknutiji pobornici unitarizma bile su Radikalna stranka Nikole Pašića i Demokratska stranka Ljubomira Davidovića i Svetozara Pribićevića. Uprkos tome jugoslovenska ideja nije uspjela da pusti dublje korene u Srbiji, gde ju je zastupala samo šaćica intelektualaca. Od 1918. do 1939. godine ideju etničkog jedinstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca podržavale su i druge društvene grupe i snage, pre svega birokratija, vojska i monarhija.⁴²

U novoj državi Srbi su za sebe uspjeli da obezbede zavidan položaj, sa dominantnom ulogom u vladi, administraciji, diplomatiji i vojsci.⁴³ S druge strane, srpski narod je bio raštrkan i policentričan; granice područja na kojima je živio nisu bile zvanično povučene i utvrđene kao unutrašnje granice. U svakom slučaju, političke i društvene snage Srba u periodu od 1918. do 1939. nisu pokretale pitanje srpskog ujedinjenja. Njihova politička dominacija u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca zasnivala se na jugoslovenskoj, a ne na srpskoj nacionalnoj ideologiji. Da je srpsko pitanje tada

⁴¹ Tokom XIX veka Srbija se u nekoliko navrata proširivala pravcem sever-jug. Muslimansko stanovništvo, kako slovensko tako i albansko, masovno se iselilo sa novoosvojenih teritorija. Usled toga u Kneževini Srbiji, a kasnije Kraljevini Srbiji, gotovo da nije bilo nacionalnih manjina sve do Balkanskih ratova, koji su pak doveli do nove ekspanzije Srbije i integracije nacionalnih manjina (posebno Albanaca).

⁴² Tošić, str. 102.

⁴³ Branko Petranović, *Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1993), str. 31.

pokrenuto, odnosi među narodima bili bi narušeni, posebno između Srba i Hrvata. Osim toga, to bi izazvalo izraženije ispoljavanje drugih nacionalizama (slovenačkog, crnogorskog). Ono što se događalo bila je, ustvari, neka vrsta “nacionalne demobilizacije” Srba, da se poslužimo izrazom Slobodana JOVANOVIĆA (1869-1958), intelektualca iz tog perioda. Istoričar Branko Petranović objašnjava da je srpski narod u to vreme bio “istrošen” nizom uzastopnih sukoba od 1912. do 1918. godine, koji su ga iznurili i demografski oslabili (oko trećine Srba je izgubilo život, odnosno 1.200.000 u populaciji od 4.000.000).

U strukturiranju i organizaciji države ondašnji elitni krugovi rukovodili su se unitarističkim i centralističkim idejama jugoslovenstva. Država je 1922. podeljena na trideset i tri administrativne jedinice tako da su istorijske granice njenih sastavnih delova, uključujući Srbiju, bile izbrisane. Ova ideologija nije imala prilike da se učvrsti, jer je nacionalna svest u različitim delovima zemlje bila suviše jaka da bi mogla tako brzo da nestane. Suočen sa otporom Hrvata, koji su bili za federativni ili konfederativni ustavni poredak, kralj Aleksandar je 6. januara 1929. godine proglasio diktaturu, i dodatno učvrstio svoju projugoslovensku orijentaciju pokušajem da na silu stvori jugoslovensku naciju. Zabranio je političke partije i nacionalne ambleme koji nisu jugoslovenski. Zemlju je podelio na devet administrativnih jedinica (banovina), a pritom je, još jednom, zanemario granice istorijskih provincija vidi [geografsku kartu 4](#) u Dodatku. Ovakvim dalekosežnim sprovođenjem ideologije jugoslovenstva kralj Aleksandar je, zapravo, oslabio jugoslovensku ideju i ohrabrio, između ostalih, hrvatske i makedonske separatističke snage. Počevši od 1931. godine, režim se oslanjao na jednu političku organizaciju koja je sve političke snage iz perioda pre 1929. trebalo da okupi pod isti krov sveobuhvatnog jugoslovenstva - u Jugoslovensku radikalnu seljačku demokratiju (JRSD), odnosno Jugoslovensku nacionalnu stranku (JNS) nakon 1933. Ona nikada neće imati mnogo uticaja i posle smrti kralja Aleksandra 1934. godine postepeno će nestati. Godine

1935, novi predsjednik vlade Milan Stojadinović osnovao je Jugoslovensku radikalnu zajednicu, koja je obuhvatala elemente Srpske radikalne stranke i Jugoslovenske muslimanske organizacije. Ta partija je zagovarala nacionalni unitarizam i suprotstavljala se hrvatskim zahtevima. Njen politički program bio je inspirisan evropskim fašističkim pokretima i njihovom željom da ujedine kapital i rad. U periodu od 1935. do 1939. godine Stojadinovićeva vlada je svoju spoljnu politiku usmerila prema Hitlerovoj Nemačkoj i Musolinijevoj Italiji.

2.2. Srpski kulturni klub

Od 1920-ih pa do kraja 1930-ih, vladajuća politička struktura koristila je jugoslovenstvo da bi legitimisala svoju vlast. Ni u jednom trenutku nije pominjala velikosrpsku ideologiju. U Srbiji su se takvoj politici suprotstavljali uglavnom intelektualci, koji su obično bili članovi političkih partija.⁴⁴ Oni su 1920-ih godina zagovarali kompromis između centralizma i federalizma.⁴⁵ Istovremeno je većina srpskih intelektualaca, često i strastveno, podržavala ideju nacionalnog jedinstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Uprkos tome, jedan deo srpske intelektualne elite dao se 1937. godine u odbranu srpskih interesa u Jugoslaviji, pre svega u Bosni i Hrvatskoj.⁴⁶ U januaru 1937. godine osnovan je Srpski kulturni klub (SKK), koji je trebalo da bude debatni forum za teme koje se tiču kulture srpskog naroda shvaćene u širem smislu, tj. i duhovne i materijalne.⁴⁷ Na osnivačkoj skupštini u Beogradu 4. februara 1937, klub je imao sedamdeset članova, od kojih je 22 predavalo na Univerzitetu u Beogradu i drugim

⁴⁴ (Stojan Protić, Miša Trifunović, Jaša Prodanović, Ljubomir Stojanović, Milan Grol, Slobodan Jovanović i drugi.)

⁴⁵ Milosav Jančićević, *Stvaralačka inteligencija međuratne Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1984), str.125.

⁴⁶ Kosta Nikolić, "Dragiša Vasić: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara", *Istorija 20. veka* (1997: 1), str. 99.

⁴⁷ Pravila Kluba odobrilo je Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Kraljevine Jugoslavije 15. januara 1937. Zadatak društva je bio "da radi na negovanju srpske kulture u okviru jugoslovenstva, sa strogim isključenjem dnevne i partijske politike".

ustanovama višeg obrazovanja u zemlji. Među članovima-osnivačima ove organizacije bili su bivši ministri vlade, oficiri u penziji, industrijalci, bankari, advokati, kao i pripadnici drugih profesija. Na osnivačkoj skupštini je za predsednika izabran Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, za potpredsednike advokat Nikola Stojanović i pisac i advokat Dragiša Vasić, a za sekretara Vasa /Vaso/ Čubrilović, predavač na Univerzitetu u Beogradu.

Srpski kulturni klub osnovali su intelektualci koji su verovali da jugoslovenske vlasti nisu u stanju da odbrane srpske nacionalne interese, posebno na jugu (Makedonija i Kosovo) i severozapadu (Bosna i Hrvatska) zemlje. Njihov plan bio je širenje uticaja u “graničnim oblastima”, gde su Srbi bili “ugroženi tuđinskim uticajima”.⁴⁸ Dok se stvaranje Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca ranije smatralo rešenjem za srpsko nacionalno pitanje, ovi intelektualci su isticali da Srbi još uvek nisu nacionalno, kulturno i ekonomski ujedinjeni.

SKK je formirao pododbore, posebno u sredinama mešovitog nacionalnog sastava, odnosno u Vojvodini, južnoj Srbiji (Makedonija, Kosovo) i Bosni i Hercegovini.

Pododbori SKK radili su na jačanju srpske nacionalne svesti u krajevima gde su Srbi bili pomešani sa drugim nacionalnostima, kao i na utvrđivanju srpskog karaktera Vojvodine, Bosne i Hercegovine i Makedonije. SKK je 1939. godine pokrenuo nedeljnik “Srpski glas”, čija je uloga bila širenje ideja Kluba i čiji je slogan “Jako srpstvo – jaka Jugoslavija” bio prethodnica četničkog programa iz vremena Drugog svetskog rata: “Velika Srbija u velikoj Jugoslaviji”.⁴⁹ Glavni urednik ovog nedeljnika bio je pisac Dragiša Vasić. Klub je organizovao i javna predavanja o pitanjima položaja Srba u Jugoslaviji, ali i o obrazovnim i privrednim pitanjima, kao o međunarodnoj situaciji.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Ljubodrag Dimić, “Srpski kulturni klub između kulture i politike: prilog istoriji”, *Književnost* (1993: 9-10), str. 863.

⁴⁹ Prvi broj *Srpskog glasa* izašao je 16. novembra 1939. Ovaj list izlazio je svakog četvrtka do 13. juna 1940, kad ga je jugoslovenska vlada zabranila.

⁵⁰ Ovo su neka od predavanja održanih 1937. i 1938. godine: Slobodan Jovanović, “Potreba privatne inicijative u pitanjima nacionalne kulture” (7. februar 1937); Vasa Čubrilović, “Problem unutrašnje kolonizacije u južnoj Srbiji” (7. februar 1937); Dragiša Vasić, “Ideja otadžbine i društvene pravde” (28. februar 1937); Vladimir Ćorović, “Koordiniranje rada naših kulturno-prosvetnih društava” (15. april 1937); Josif Mihajlović, “Prilike u Makedoniji” (10. maj 1937); Slobodan Drašković, “O srpskoj kulturi” (26. maj 1937); Radmilo Vučić, “Narodne pesme i savremeni društveni život” (31. maj 1937); Đoka Perin, “Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i južne Srbije” (17. juni 1937); Nikola Stojanović, “O srpstvu i

Iako su mnogi članovi SKK stekli obrazovanje u inostranstvu, SKK je bio protiv stranog uticaja na srpsku kulturu. (Odbacivao je modernističke pokrete kao što su dadaizam, nadrealizam, kubizam i futurizam i osuđivao strane modele poput marksizma.) SKK je propovedao povratak tradicijama i normama srpskog predratnog društva i propagirao kulturu utemeljenu na vrednostima Svetog Save, osnivača Srpske pravoslavne crkve.⁵¹

Kada se 1939. godine tragaloz federalističkim rešenjem hrvatskog nacionalnog pitanja, aktivnosti Srpskog kulturnog kluba mahom su poprimile političku dimenziju. Sve njegove aktivnosti sada su bile usmerene na rešavanje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja unutar Jugoslavije. Nema sumnje da je SKK doživljavan kao branilac srpskih interesa u Jugoslaviji. Prilikom pregovora hrvatske opozicije i jugoslovenske vlade o sporazumu o stvaranju hrvatske teritorijalne jedinice u državnom okviru, Srpski kulturni klub (Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, Dragiša Vasić, Stevan Moljević i drugi) oštro je protestovao i upozoravao vladu na to u kakve se rizike upušta. Njegove vode su osporavale granice i prerogative novog hrvatskog entiteta u nastanku vidigeografsku kartu 4 u Dodatku. Stevan Moljević, advokat iz Banjaluke, održao je 30. januara 1939. predavanje o Vrbaskoj banovini i objasnio da se hrvatsko pitanje ne sme rešavati otvaranjem srpskog pitanja. A upravo do toga će, po njegovom mišljenju, doći ako teritorije koje naseljavaju Srbi (Bosanska Krajina, Banija, Kordun, Lika i severna Dalmacija) postanu deo

jugoslovenstvu" (14. novembar 1937); Ljubomir POKORNI, "Duhovna veza između vojske i naroda u savremenom ratu" (22. novembar 1937); Nikola ĐONOVIĆ, "Prilike u Crnoj Gori" (29. novembar 1937); Mihajlo Konstantinović, "Ustavni propisi o prosveti" (13. decembar 1937); Đoko Perin, "O nacionalizovanju bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana" (24. januar 1938); Mehmed Begović, "O muslimanskom problemu u Bosni i Hercegovini" (7. februar 1938); Slobodan Drašković, "Nacionalna kultura i omladina" (14. februar 1938), Vasa Čubriloović, "Verski problem u Jugoslaviji" (21. mart 1938); Orestije KRSTIĆ, "Borba za zemlju u južnoj Srbiji" (4. april 1938); Slobodan Jovanović, "Konfederacija i federacija" (18. april 1938); Jovan Đorđević, "Nacija, kultura i država" (2. maja 1938); Milan Petrović, "Prilike u Vojvodini" (6. maj 1938). Vidi Ljubodrag Dimić, *op. cit.*, str. 867.

⁵¹ Rastko, sin Stefana Nemanje, osnivača dinastije Nemanjića, posvetio se religioznom životu i stupanjem u monaški red dobio je ime Sava. Zahvaljujući njemu Srpska pravoslavna crkva je 1219. godine postala autokefalna. On je bio njen prvi arhiepiskop. Doprineo je stvaranju nacionalnog karaktera Pravoslavne crkve i učvrstio mesto Srbije u istočnohrišćanskom svetu. Vrednosti za koje se zalagao Sveti Sava konsistentne su sa srpskom nacionalnom duhovnošću, državom i Pravoslavnom crkvom.

hrvatskog entiteta.⁵² Dan posle potpisivanja Sporazuma od 26. avgusta 1939, Srpski kulturni klub se burno oglasio, osporavajući granice novostvorene banovine Hrvatske.⁵³ Klub je smatrao da politički predstavnici Srba nisu pitani za mišljenje. Odbio je da prihvati stvaranje Banovine Hrvatske sa oblastima sa većinskim srpskim stanovništvom, zbog sumnje da je to prvi korak ka stvaranju Velike Hrvatske:

Naše gledište je jasno. Mi hoćemo sporazum, ali po određenim principima. Bilo etničkim, bilo istorijskim, bilo privredno-geografskim. Ali za celo područje na kom žive Srbi i Hrvati. Mi ne mislimo nikad ostaviti srezove sa čisto srpskom većinom u granicama Hrvatske, Dalmacije, Bosne i Slavonije, Banovini Hrvatskoj. Tražeći reviziju takozvanog sporazuma mi hoćemo da se i Srbima iz granica bivše Hrvatske i Slavonije dade puno pravo da se slobodno izjasne, da li će njihovi srezovi ostati u Hrvatskoj ili će se pridružiti svojoj srpskoj jedinici.⁵⁴

U odgovoru na Sporazum Srpski kulturni klub je tražio stvaranje srpske administrativne i političke jedinice.

Ja ostavljam na stranu Hrvate - nisam pozvan da im dajem savete - ali kao Srbin mislim da mogu da kažem Srbima ovo. Mi Srbi treba da razumemo da pred nama stoji dvojak zadatak. Imamo, prvo, da branimo srpstvo. Kad se obeležava hrvatska etnička celina, onda se neminovno mora obeležavati i srpska etnička celina. Bilo bi besmisleno tvrditi da u ovoj državi samo Hrvati imaju nacionalnu svest, i da samo oni imaju istoriju, dokle Srbi nemaju ni nacionalne svesti ni istorije, nego predstavljaju jednu amorfnu masu koja se da mesiti kako se hoće. Čim se otvorilo hrvatsko pitanje, otvorilo se i srpsko i Srbi moraju ujedinjenim snagama braniti ono što je njihovo.⁵⁵

Odbori SKK u Vukovaru, Vinkovcima i Dalju (zapadni Srem), tražili su da se njihove teritorije otepe od novostvorene Banovine Hrvatske, u kojoj su Srbi činili petinu stanovništva, i da se pripoje budućem srpskom entitetu. SKK je ponovo pokrenuo projekat nacionalnog ujedinjenja svih Srba u istu državnu strukturu.⁵⁶ Premda je jugoslovenstvo u svom sveobuhvatnom obliku oštro kritikovano i osuđivano, SKK je ostao privržen ideji države Jugoslavije. Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ je smatrao da je nasilno

⁵² Stevan Moljević navodi da su ove teritorije predstavljale kompaktni entitet od 1.200.000 stanovnika i "živi zid" koji je delio Hrvate na severu od Hrvata u srednjoj Bosni i zapadnoj Hercegovini. D. Todorović, *Dr Stevan Moljević: rečju, perom, delom i životom za Ujedinjeno Srpstvo* (Beograd: Kalekom, 2000), str. 96.

⁵³ Banovina Hrvatska obuhvatala je Savsku i Dravsku banovinu, kao i područja Dubrovnika (u Zetskoj banovini), Dervente i Gradačca (u Vrbaskoj banovini), Travnika, Fojnice i Brčkog (u Drinskoj banovini) i Šida i Iloka (u Dunavskoj banovini).

⁵⁴ "Sporazum ili nesporazum", *Srpski glas*, 1. februar 1940, br. 12.

⁵⁵ Slobodan Jovanović, "Srpski književni glasnik", 1. januar 1940.

⁵⁶ U broju književnog časopisa "Srpski književni glasnik" od 1. januara 1940, Slobodan Jovanović je pisao: "Kad se obeležava hrvatska etnička celina, onda se neminovno mora obeležavati i srpska etnička celina. Bilo bi besmisleno tvrditi da u ovoj državi samo Hrvati imaju nacionalnu svest, i da samo oni imaju istoriju, dokle Srbi nemaju ni nacionalne svesti ni istorije, nego predstavljaju jednu amorfnu masu koja se da mesiti kako se hoće. Čim se otvorilo hrvatsko pitanje, otvorilo se i srpsko i Srbi moraju ujedinjenim snagama braniti ono što je njihovo".

ujedinjenje Srba i Hrvata bilo kontraproduktivno i da im je kombinacija unitarizma i centralizma zatrovala odnose. Vode SKK su tražile da se neke oblasti sa srpskim stanovništvom odvoje od Banovine Hrvatske i da se Bosna i Hercegovina pripoji srpskom entitetu.⁵⁷ Godine 1940. jugoslovenska vlada je izradila Projekat uspostavljanja srpske teritorijalne jedinice. Njim je bilo predviđeno ujedinjenje Vrbaske, Drinske, Dunavske, Moravske, Zetske i Vardarske banovine u jedan entitet koji bi se zvao "Srpska zemlja" i čiji bi centar bilo Skoplje, sadašnji glavni grad Makedonije. U njega je trebalo da uđu neki gradovi koji su pripali hrvatskom entitetu (Brčko, Travnik, Fojnica). Međutim, reorganizaciju Kraljevine Jugoslavije na federativnoj i etničkoj osnovi naglo je prekinuo Drugi svetski rat.

Članovi SKK razmatrali su i kako rešiti problem nacionalnih manjina, koji je podrivao temelje budućeg srpskog entiteta. Prema popisu stanovništva iz 1921. godine, nacionalne manjine činile su 17% ukupnog stanovništva. Najbrojnije su bile u Vojvodini (60% stanovništva) i u južnoj Srbiji (Kosovo, 40% stanovništva). Pošto su neki delovi tih oblasti bili gusto naseljeni nacionalnim manjinama, SKK je smatrao da tamo treba izvršiti nacionalizovanje, tj. da treba ojačati tamošnji srpski element. Oni koji su se bavili ovim problemom uglavnom su kao rešenje predlagali raseljavanje nacionalnih manjina, s obzirom da politika kolonizacije Kosova koju su sprovodile jugoslovenske vlasti nije uspevala da izmeni nacionalni sastav južne Srbije. Ovo je posebno važilo za albansku manjinu, pošto su neka područja koja je ona naseljavala presecala područja naseljena Srbima. Prema podacima popisa iz 1921, kosovski Albanci činili su 66% stanovništva na tom području, spram 25% Srba. U svom predavanju održanom pred SKK 7. marta 1937. godine, VASA Čubrilović je predlagao masovno prisilno raseljavanje kosovskih

⁵⁷ Nacionalne ideje članova Srpskog kulturnog kluba mogu se naći u njihovoj zvaničnoj publikaciji, "Srpskom glasu", koji je počeo da izlazi 1939. U vezi s ovom publikacijom vidi Miodrag Jovičić, *Jako srpstvo – jaka Jugoslavija: izbor članaka iz Srpskog glasa, organa Srpskog kulturnog kluba* (Beograd: Naučna knjiga, 1991).

Albanaca. Vladalo je uverenje da od Albanaca preti politička i nacionalna opasnost, jer su kompaktno stanovništvo koje narušava kontinuitet područja naseljenih Srbima:

Albance nije moguće potisnuti jedino postepenom kolonizacijom. Tokom hiljadu godina oni su bili jedini narod koji ne samo da je odolevao u jezgru naše države u Raškoj i Zeti, već je uspeo i da nam naudi, pomerivši naše nacionalne granice na sever i istok. I dok su naše nacionalne granice u zadnjih hiljadu godina stigle do Subotice na severu i Kupe na severozapadu, Albanci su nas proterali sa područja Skadra, drevnog Bodinovog stolnog grada i glavnog grada Methoije i Kosova. Jedini način da ih potisnemo nazad je upotrebom gole sile i organizovanom državom, u okviru koje smo uvek imali dominaciju nad njima. (...)⁵⁸

Vasa Čubrilović je konkretno naveo koje okruge treba evakuisati i opisao proces ponovnog naseljavanja tih područja stanovništvom iz Crne Gore, Hercegovine, Like i Krajine. Vasa Čubrilović nije bio usamljen u ovakvim predlozima. Nešto vrlo slično predlagao je i Đoko Perin u junu 1937. godine. Perin je bio za to da se deo Albanaca sa Kosova premesti u Albaniju, a da se ostatak većinom raseli u druge krajeve Jugoslavije, kako bi u toj oblasti Srbi postali većina.⁵⁹

Vojvodina, najbogatija oblast u zemlji od koje je zavisila prestonica Beograd, takođe je preokupirala članove SKK, jer Srbi ni tamo nisu činili većinu (bilo ih je 474.000, što je 1936. činilo 32% stanovništva) - mađarska manjina, susedna Mađarskoj, bila je brojna (392.000, što je 1936. predstavljalo 26.5% stanovništva), kao i nemačka (338.000 ili 23%).⁶⁰ Da bi se ojačao srpski element u Vojvodini, SKK je predlagao prinudne razmene stanovništva, a ne kolonizaciju pokrajine, koju bi bilo teško sprovesti. Naime, da bi Srbi u Vojvodini postali većinsko stanovništvo, trebalo je naseliti više od 523.000 srpskih kolonista, a da ih bude 60%, trebalo ih je naseliti čak više od million. SKK je smatrao da je Madare, Nemce i Bunjevce bilo moguće iseliti u Slavoniju, iz koje bi se 200.000 Srba doselilo u Vojvodinu.⁶¹ Ovakvo razmišljanje o nacionalnim

⁵⁸ Vidi francuski prevod u Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara i Neven Šimac (urednici), str. 167.

⁵⁹ Đoko Perin, "Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i Južne Srbije", str. 16.

⁶⁰ Prema podacima iz predavanja Đoke Perina "Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i Južne Srbije".

⁶¹ Bunjevci su katolička nacionalna manjina između Dunava i Tise. Tu su se doselili u XVII veku iz Dalmacije i Hercegovine, bežeći pred upadima Turaka. Ima više kontroverznih teorija o tome da li su Bunjevci Srbi ili Hrvati. U vezi sa Bunjvcima vidi Bojan Todosijević, "Why Bunjevci did not Become a Nation: A Case Study" /Zašto Bunjevci nisu postali nacija - studija slučaja/, *East Central Europe*, tom 29, br. 1-2, str. 59-72.

manjinama pokazuje da Srpskom kulturnom klubu nije bilo stalo samo do toga da utvrdi granice (federalne) srpske jedinice u okviru Jugoslavije, već i do toga da obezbedi homogenost stanovništva, i to jačanjem demografskog udela Srba putem prisilnog raseljavanja nesrpskih manjina ili razmena stanovništva. Bilo da se radilo o Kosovu ili o Vojvodini, oni koji su predlagali ovakvo rešenje pitanja nacionalnih manjina uvek su se pozivali na razmenu stanovništva koju su Turska i Grčka sprovele 1921-1922. godine. Debate vodene u Srpskom kulturnom klubu u poznim 1930-im godinama predstavljale su prekretnicu u evoluciji velikosrpske ideologije, utoliko što su prisilna premeštanja stanovništva jasno postavljena kao metod za stvaranje što homogenijeg mogućeg državnog entiteta. U XIX veku srpske vode nisu razmišljale na takav način.

Srpski kulturni klub igrao je, dakle, značajnu ulogu u jačanju srpske nacionalne svesti u Jugoslaviji poznih 1930-ih godina. Ideja “gde god je Srba – tu je Srbija” dominirala je u publikacijama i diskusijama SKK. Njegovi članovi insistirali su na srpskom karakteru Vojvodine, Bosne, Hercegovine, Slavonije, Baranje, zapadnog Srema i Makedonije.⁶² Po mišljenju Vojislava Šešelja, pokret je branio velikosrpsku ideologiju i “Srpski kulturni klub je znao šta želi, ali nije znao kako da to najefikasnije ostvari”.⁶³

⁶² Dimić, str. 865.

⁶³ Šešelj, *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma*, str. 991.

3. Četnički pokret u Drugom svetskom ratu

3.1. Opšti kontekst

Mada je rat u Jugoslaviji izbio tek 1941. godine, položaj zemlje bivao je sve neizvesniji od 1938-1939. U martu 1938. godine Jugoslaviji je zapretila opasnost od novog suseda – Nemačke, koja je anektirala Austriju. Ni na jugu situacija nije bila ništa bolja – u aprilu 1939. godine Musolinijeva Italija je okupirala Albaniju. Posle poraza Francuske u maju-junu 1940, šanse Jugoslavije da očuva neutralnost postale su još manje. Prve nemačke trupe ušle su u Rumuniju u avgustu 1940. godine. Rumunija, Bugarska i Mađarska pristupile su Trojnom paktu.⁶⁴ Napadom italijanskih trupa na Grčku u oktobru 1940. rat je konačno zahvatio Balkan. Tokom 1940. i 1941. godine, pritisak nacističke Nemačke i Italije je rastao. Revizionističke zemlje, Bugarska i Mađarska, tražile su reviziju mirovnih sporazuma potpisanih na kraju Prvog svetskog rata. Ugrožen međunarodni položaj Jugoslavije samo je dodatno pogoršao nestabilnu situaciju u zemlji. Kraljevina Jugoslavije postala je lak plen. Svestan da vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije nije u stanju da se suprostavi nemačkoj vojsci i da zemlja nema nikakvu stvarnu podršku sa strane, princ Pavle je bio primoran da popusti pred nemačkim pritiskom, pa je 25. marta 1941. godine Kraljevina Jugoslavije potpisala Trojni pakt. Objava kapitulacije Nemačkoj izazvala je otpor u redovima vojske. U noći između 26. i 27. marta 1941, general Dušan Simović (1882-1962) organizovao je zaveru protiv kneza Pavla. Učesnici državnog udara proglasili su Petra II Karadorđevića (1923-1970) punoletnim i 28. marta ga proglasili za kralja Jugoslavije. Iako su državni udar izvršili uglavnom Srbi, on je imao posledica po celu zemlju. Formirana je vlada nacionalnog jedinstva, u kojoj su bili Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci, sa generalom Simovićem na čelu. Simović je pokušao da ubedi Nemce da je do

⁶⁴ Nemačka, Italija i Japan zaključile su Trojni pakt 27. septembra 1940. godine.

udara došlo zbog unutrašnjih prilika, a ne zbog činjenice da je Jugoslavija pristupila Trojnom paktu. Ipak, rat između Nemačke i Kraljevine Jugoslavije nije se mogao izbjeći, jer je HITLER želeo da raščisti situaciju na jugoistoku Evrope pre nego što započne svoju veliku ofanzivu na SSSR. Dana 6. aprila 1941. godine nemačka i italijanska vojska napale su Jugoslaviju. Uprkos tome što je Beograd proglašen otvorenim gradom, nemačka avijacija ga je surovo bombardovala. Zemlja se raspala kao kula od karata: dana 10. aprila 1941. Hrvatska se u Zagrebu proglasila nezavisnom državom, a slovenački politički predstavnici su Trećem Rajhu dali do znanja da bi Slovenija da se otcepi od Kraljevine Jugoslavije. Dana 14. i 15. aprila, kralj i članovi vlade pobjegli su iz zemlje u Grčku, a odatle u London. Kapitulacija je potpisana u Beogradu 17. aprila. U roku od nekih deset dana, 375.000 jugoslovenskih vojnika i oficira postali su ratni zarobljenici. U aprilu 1941. godine, država stvorena 1918. godine nestale je u katastrofalnom vojnom porazu.

Jugoslavija je raskomadana – Nemačka je prigrabila severnu Sloveniju i imala vojnu i političku vlast nad severnim delom zemlje. Italija je anektirala jug Slovenije, pola Dalmacije i Crnu Goru, dok je Kosovo i zapadnu Makedoniju pripojila Albaniji, koja je bila pod njenom kontrolom. Mađarska je prisvojila delove Slovenije i Hrvatske, kao i Bačku u Vojvodini. Bugarska je svojoj teritoriji pripojila tri četvrtine Makedonije i neke oblasti u južnoj Srbiji (Pirot, Vranje). Nezavisna Država Hrvatska obuhvatala je Hrvatsku u njenim istorijskim granicama, Bosnu i Hercegovinu, kao i zapadni Srem, uključujući Zemun, čime je došla na prag Beograda vidi [geografsku kartu 5](#) u Dodatku. Svedena na svoje granice od pre 1912, Srbija se najpre našla pod vojnom vlašću, a zatim je dobila kolaboracionističku vladu na čelu s generalom Milanom Nedićem (1877-1946). Banat je bio vezan za vojnu komandu u Srbiji, a kontrolisali su ga Nemci iz Banata (Folksdojčeri, kojih je bilo 120.000 od ukupno 640.000 stanovnika).

Po kapitulaciji Jugoslavije Srbija je stavljena pod vojnu upravu. Dana 1. maja 1941. formirana je kolaboracionistička vladu nazvana Komesarskom upravom. Na

njenom čelu bio je Milan Aćimović, bivši ministar unutrašnjih poslova u poslednjoj vladi Milana Stojadinovića. Komesarska uprava bila je podeljena i Nemci su je smatrali neefikasnom. Osim toga, 29. avgusta 1941. vojni komandant za Srbiju general Heinrich Danckelmann odlučio je da vlast poveri generalu Milanu Nediću, jer je računao na njegov veći lični autoritet. Nedić je bio za to da se Srbija vrati svojim ruralnim tradicijama i odbacivao je Jugoslaviju. Hteo je da se posveti nacionalnom ujedinjenju Srba, u čemu bi pomogla Nemačka. Njegov kolaboracionistički režim je propagandu usmerio protiv komunista, koje je smatrao stranim elementima, kao i protiv Saveznika, pre svega “plutokratske Velike Britanije”. Milan Nedić je imao ograničenu vlast i do kraja 1943. od njegovog autoriteta ostala je samo ljuštura. Uprkos tome, on će ostati na svom položaju sve do kraja nemačke okupacije u oktobru 1944.

Novi politički poredak koji je 1941. godine uspostavljen na području Jugoslavije bio je poguban za Srbe. Na početku rata oni su bili glavne žrtve, posebno u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj, koju je u aprilu 1941. godine stvorio ustaški pokret na čelu s Antom Pavelićem (1889-1959). Nezavisna Država Hrvatska prigrabila je Bosnu i Hercegovinu i pomerila svoju istočnu granicu sve do pred sam Beograd. Po nemačkim procenama, ukupan broj stanovnika te države iznosio je 6.285.000, od kojih su 3.300.000 bili Hrvati (odnosno 52,5%), 1.925.000 Srbi (odnosno 30,6%) i 700.000 Muslimani (odnosno 11,1%), koje je ustaški režim smatrao Hrvatima vidi [geografsku kartu 6](#) u Dodatku.⁶⁵ U cilju rešavanja srpskog pitanja u Hrvatskoj, ustaše su odlučile da trećinu srpskog stanovništva istrebe, trećinu proteraju u Srbiju, a ostale prevedu u katoličanstvo. Prvi masakri Srba dogodili su se krajem aprila 1941. godine u okolini Bjelovara. Nemilosredno su se nastavili u Krajini, Hercegovini i zapadnoj Bosni. Broj žrtava je bio velik, posebno u zapadnoj Bosni duž istorijske granice sa Hrvatskom.⁶⁶ Organizovani su

⁶⁵ Podaci Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Nemačke iz maja 1941. godine. Navodi ih Fikreta Jelić-Butić u *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 1941-1945.* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977), str. 106.

⁶⁶ Srpski i hrvatski istoričari ne slažu se o broju žrtava Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji.

koncentracioni logori za Srbe, Jevereje i Rome, koje je hapsila hrvatska policija; u njima je izgubio život veliki broj ljudi. Krajem jula 1941. godine, u Srbiji je bilo gotovo 140.000 srpskih izbeglica.⁶⁷ U želji da smire region i osiguraju bezbednost osnovnih linija komunikacije, Nemci su od vlasti u Zagrebu tražili da prekinu progon Srba iz Hrvatske i nadu “konstruktivno rešenje” za srpsko pitanje. Pred ovim uplitanjem Nemaca, ustaše su izašle s tezom da su Srbi ustvari “Hrvati pravoslavne vere”, odnosno Hrvati koje su Turci primorali da prihvate pravoslavlje. Godine 1941-1942, za vreme kampanje pokrštanja, oko 240.000 Srba prevedeno je u rimokatoličku veru. S obzirom da je bilo praktično nemoguće iskoreniti i pokrstiti sve Srbe, u februaru 1942. godine osnovana je Hrvatska pravoslavna crkva. Te mere imale su za cilj slabljenje srpske podrške partizanskom pokretu u Hrvatskoj.

Politika terora nad Srbima objašnjava činjenicu da su oni u redovima partizana (komunista) u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini činili očiglednu većinu, bar do 1943. godine.⁶⁸ Ti događaji objašnjavaju i to zašto su posle 1945. godine Srbi bili znatno zastupljeniji od drugih u komunističkom aparatu i snagama bezbednosti Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine.⁶⁹ Iz istog razloga Srbi su posle 1945. godine dobili status konstitutivnog naroda u Socijalističkoj Republici Hrvatskoj.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, str. 170.

⁶⁸ Od 6.500 partizana komunista koliko ih je bilo u Hrvatskoj krajem 1941. godine, 5.400 (83,08%) su bili Srbi, 800 (12,31%) Hrvati, a ostatak druge nacionalnosti. Krajem 1942, od 25.000 partizana, 16.600 (66,4%) su bili Srbi i 8.270 (33,08%) Hrvati. Tek krajem 1943. godine broj Hrvata premašio je broj Srba u redovima parizana komunista: od ukupno 60.000 boraca Hrvata je bilo 29.300 (odnosno 48,8%), a Srba 28.800 (odnosno 48%). Krajem 1944. godine Hrvati odnose još veću prevagu, tj. od ukupno 121.351 boraca 73.327 (60,4%) su bili Hrvati, a 34.753 (28,6%) Srbi. Ovi podaci preuzeti su iz dela Čedomira VIŠNJIĆA, *Partizansko ljetovanje: Hrvatska i Srbi 1945-1950* (Zagreb: SKD Prosvjeta, 2003), str. 26.

⁶⁹ Početkom 1950, Komunistička partija Hrvatske brojala je 99.468 članova i 34.532 članova-kandidata. Od tog broja njih 92.895 bilo je hrvatske nacionalnosti (što predstavlja 69,32%, naspram 79% stanovništva hrvatske nacionalnosti), a 35.284 srpske (što predstavlja 26,33%, naspram 14,8% stanovništva srpske nacionalnosti). *Ibid*, str. 115.

3.2. Nastanak četničkog pokreta

Reč "četnik" dolazi od reči "četa", odnosno naoružana grupa ili odred. Četnik je, dakle, pripadnik naoružane gerilske grupe. Četnički odredi su bili neregularna vojska sastavljena od dobrovoljaca, ali je regularna vojska mogla da ih angažuje kao jedinice podrške za diverzantske akcije ili obaveštajne poslove iza linija fronta. Gerilsko ratovanje bilo je tipično za većinu oslobodilačkih borbi srpskog naroda u XIX veku i na početku XX veka. Četnički fenomen, dakle, pre svega označava određeni vid oružane ili vojne aktivnosti. Već u XIX veku bio je predmet proučavanja.⁷⁰ Početkom XX veka odredi četnika organizovani su na ličnu inicijativu i upućivani u Makedoniju, teritoriju koju su za sebe jednako priželjkivale Srbija, Grčka i Bugarska. Srpska vlada će konačno preuzeti kontrolu nad ovim odredima. U to doba srpski četnici nisu bili jedini četnici – Bugarski su imali svoje komite, a Grci svoje andarte. Te četničke snage su mobilisane tokom Balkanskih ratova i Prvog svetskog rata. U februaru 1917. godine četnički odredi su se istakli oslobađenjem dela teritorije koju je Bugarska okupirala u oblasti Toplice. Četnički odredi su učestvovali i u oslobađanju Srbije 1918. godine, ali pred kraj rata vojska je naredila da se takve jedinice raspuste. Jedan broj četničkih boraca priključio se regularnoj vojsci.⁷¹

U međuratnom periodu osnovano je više četničkih organizacija. Veterani četnici osnovali su 1921. godine Udruženje četnika za slobodu i čast Otadžbine. Njegovi zadaci bili su negovanje sećanja na četničke borce, širenje rodoljubivih ideja pokreta i briga o udovicama i siročadi boraca koji su život izgubili u borbi, kao i o invalidima veteranima rata. To prvo udruženje bilo je pod uticajem Demokratske stranke. Radikalna stranka

⁷⁰ Matija Ban, *Pravilo o četničkoj vojsci* (Belgrad, 1848), i Ljubomir Ivanović, *Četovanje ili četničko ratovanje* (1868).

⁷¹ Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks /Rat i revolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945: četnici/* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), str. 118.

Nikole Pašića, najuticajnija stranka u vladi, odgovorila je tako što je 1924. pomogla osnivanje dve nove organizacije – Udruženje srpskih četnika za kralja i otadžbinu i Udruženje srpskih četnika “Petar Mrkonjić”. Te dve organizacije su se u julu 1925. spojile u Udruženje srpskih četnika za kralja i otadžbinu “Petar Mrkonjić”. Od 1925. do 1928. na čelu tog novog udruženja bio je Puniša Račić. On je 1927. godine izabran za narodnog poslanika, da bi 20. juna 1928. godine u Narodnoj skupštini pucao na hrvatske poslanike i usmratio dvojicu, od kojih je jedan bio Stjepan Radić, glavni predstavnik hrvatske opozicije. Udruženje je rasformirano 1929. godine, po uvođenju diktature u Jugoslaviji. Za vreme diktature nastavilo je da postoji samo prvo udruženje. Iz Udruženja četnika za slobodu i čast Otadžbine, na čijem čelu je bio istaknuti četnički vođa iz Prvog svetskog rata Kosta Pećanac, izdvojio se Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, vođa patriotske organizacije Narodna odbrana. Birčanin je tada osnovao jednu organizaciju koja će ostati marginalna – Udruženje starih četnika. Godine 1938, glavno četničko udruženje brojalo je oko 500.000 članova, organizovanih u preko hiljadu pododbora u čitavoj zemlji. Između dva svetska rata, vojna teorija se na vojnim akademijama predavala bez poklanjanja mnogo pažnje gerilskom ratovanju.⁷² Uprkos tome, vojne vlasti će u aprilu 1940. uspostaviti Četničku komandu za nadgledanje šest bataljona pripojenih različitim komandama Jugoslovenske vojske (Novi Sad, Sarajevo, Skoplje, Karlovac, Niš i Mostar). Novosadska Četnička komanda biće premeštena u Kraljevo, ali će se prilikom nemačke invazije u aprilu 1941. povući u Sarajevo. Četnici, podeljeni u međuratnom periodu, ostaće podeljeni i tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Dok će se neke njihove vođe (Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, Dobroslav Jevđević) priključiti pokretu Draže Mihailovića, neke druge (pre svega Kosta Pećanac) će od samog početka postati kolaboracionisti nemačkog okupatora. Premda postoji nekoliko primera individualnog članstva u Ravnogorskom

⁷² *Ibid*, str. 120.

pokretu, nije bilo direktne veze između četničkih organizacija iz međuratnog perioda i pokreta koji je pokrenuo pukovnik Draža Mihailović.

3.3. Ravnogorski pokret

3.3.1 Struktura pokreta

Ravnogorski četnički pokret osnovali su oficiri Jugoslovenske vojske koji su odbili da se predaju Nemcima nakon što je Jugoslavija potpisala kapitulaciju u aprilu 1941. Centralna ličnost u pokretu bio je pukovnik Draža Mihailović (1893-1946). On je bio komandant 2. Armije u Bosni i Hercegovini u aprilskom ratu 1941. godine, i sa svojim ljudima povukao se u Ravnu Goru, oblast u zapadnoj Srbiji između Valjeva i Čačka.⁷³ Odlučivši da se suprotstavi silama Osovine, Draža Mihailović je u leto 1941. godine organizovao jezgro buduće glavne komande, poznate kao Komanda četničkih odreda Jugoslovenske vojske. Ubrzo potom jedinice su preimenovane u “vojno-četničke odrede”. U novembru 1941, jugoslovenska vlada u izbeglištvu postavila je Dražu Mihailovića za komandanta rodoljubivih snaga koje su ostale u Jugoslaviji. Tom prilikom četničke snage opet su preimenovane, ovoga puta u Jugoslovensku vojsku u Otadžbini (JVUO), kako bi se naglasio kontinuitet s predratnom jugoslovenskom vojskom i državom. U svojim zvaničnim dokumentima Ravnogorski pokret za svoje vojnike nije upotrebljavao pojam “četnik”, ali ga je narod masovno koristio.⁷⁴ U januaru 1942. godine, jugoslovenska izbeglička vlada imenovala je Dražu Mihailovića za ministra vojske, mornarice i ratnog vazduhoplovstva. Iako je Ravnogorski pokret pre svega bio vojnog karaktera, u avgustu 1941. dobija političko krilo formiranjem Centralnog nacionalnog komiteta Kraljevine Jugoslavije (CNK), čija je svrha bila da okupi vode političkih partija

⁷³ Mihailović i njegovi ljudi stigli su na Ravnu Goru 11. maja 1941, na obroncima Suvobora, koji leže na pola puta između Čačka i Valjeva.

⁷⁴ Kosta Nikolić, *Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta*, I tom (Beograd: Srpska reč, 1999), str. 74.

koje su ostale u zemlji, pripadnike patriotskih organizacija i istaknute intelektualce.⁷⁵ Od 1941. do 1943. godine jedino je njegov Izvršni odbor uredno funkcionisao, dok su drugi članovi usled ratnih događaja bili sprečeni da aktivno učestvuju u pokretu. Komitet, u čijem su sastavu bili Dragiša Vasić, Mladen Žujović i Stevan Moljević, bavio se političkim pitanjima i propagandom u neizvesnim ratnim uslovima.⁷⁶ U jesen 1943. godine, Centralni nacionalni komitet bio je u punom sastavu i mogao je u potpunosti da izvršava svoje političke funkcije. Smatrajući Četnički pokret pre svega vojnim pokretom, Draža Mihailović je oficirima strogo zabranio da se mešaju u politiku. Bavljenje politikom prepušteno je isključivo Centralnom nacionalnom komitetu, kojem je poverena izrada političkog programa pokreta. Radi širenja svojih ideja Četnički pokret je 1941. pokrenuo svoj prvi časopis pod nazivom “Sloboda ili smrt”.⁷⁷ Kada je Vrhovna komanda Jugoslovenske vojske u Otažbini premeštena u Crnu Goru vidigeografsku kartu 8 u Dodatku, CNK je pokrenuo i drugi časopis, kako bi bio siguran da će njegova uputstva i naredbe stići do jedinica pokreta, ali najviše zato da bi širio svoje političke ideje i propagandu. Prvi broj časopisa “Ravna Gora” izašao je 1. februara 1943. Za urednika je bio imenovan Dragiša Vasić, koji će urediti prvih osam brojeva, kada će doći u sukob sa

⁷⁵ CNK je osnovan na inicijativu Dragiše Vasića i Mladena Žujovića.

⁷⁶ Dragiša Vasić je rođen u Gornjem Milanovcu u Srbiji 2. septembra 1885. Učestvovao je u Balkanskim ratovima i Prvom svetskom ratu. Kao član Republikanske stranke od 1918. godine radio je kao advokat i branio komuniste. Dragiša Vasić, pisac priča i romana modernističke struje u srpskoj književnosti, postepeno je krajem 1930-ih godina iz levičara prerastao u nacionalistu. Pošto je u ranim 1920-tim godinama uređivao novine “Progres”, Dragiša Vasić je 1939. godine postao urednik “Srpskog glasa”, glasila Srpskog kulturnog kluba.

Mladen Žujović je Prvi svetski rat proveo u redovima srpske vojske. Onda je otišao u Pariz na studije prava. Godine 1928. napisao je tezu o ustavnoj vlasti u srpskim ustavima. Kao advokat i član Republikanske stranke, radio je u istoj kancelariji kao i Dragiša Vasić. Postao je politički aktivan kada je ušao u Srpski kulturni klub.

Stevan Moljević je rođen 6. januara 1888. Kao srednjoškolar se uključio u revolucionarni omladinski pokret koji su borio protiv austrougarske dominacije. Godine 1910. učestvovao je u pokušaju ubistva zemaljskog poglavara Bosne i Hercegovine Marijana Varešanina. Po završetku studija u Zagrebu 1913, preselio se u Banjaluku. Iste 1913. godine bio je među 156 osoba koje su austrougarske vlasti optužile za izdaju i velikosrpsku delatnost. Posle rata je postao advokat i nastavio sa svojim nacionalističkim aktivnostima usmerenim na odbranu Srba od uticaja katoličkih Hrvata i muslimanskih Slovena. Aktivno je učestvovao u kulturnom životu Banjaluke i objavljivao priloge u političkoj kolumni časopisa *Razvitak*, koji je pokrenut u januaru 1935. U novembru 1936. godine pomogao je da se ponovo pokrenu novine *Otažbina*, koje su 1907. i 1908. izlazile u Banjaluci, a zatim, od 1911. do 1914. u Sarajevu. Kao urednik koristio je stranice tih novina da brani srpske interese u Bosni i Hercegovini od političkog uticaja Muslimana, okupljenih oko Jugoslovenske muslimanske organizacije (JMO), i Hrvata.

⁷⁷ Izašlo je samo četiri broja 1941. godine, jer su Nemci u novembru 1941. godine slomili otpor pobunjenika.

Stavanom Moljevićem. Mada Ravnogorski pokret pre 1944. nije pretendovao da bude masovan politički pokret, 6. septembra 1942. osnovao je jednu omladinsku organizaciju. Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina (JURAO) okupljala je mlade starosnog doba od osam do dvadeset godina i svi njeni kadrovi su bili iz omladinske organizacije Srpskog kulturnog kluba (SKK). Štaviše, JURAO je preuzeo slogan Srpskog kulturnog kluba “Jako srpstvo – jaka Jugoslavija”. U januaru 1944. godine Komanda Jugoslovenske vojske u Otadžbini osnovala je i jednu organizaciju žena, Jugoslovensku organizaciju Ravnogorki (JUORA).

Na vojnom planu, četničke snage su se u zimu 1941-42. uz mnogo muke transformisale iz gerilskih jedinica u regularnu vojsku. U leto 1941. godine Draža Mihailović je radio na tome da pod svoju komandu stavi sve oružane grupe koje su se pojavile u Srbiji, Bosni, Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori i Hrvatskoj. Uprkos mnogobrojnim pokušajima čvršće organizacije Ravnogorskog pokreta, Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini (JVUO) ostaće veoma razbijena, uprkos postojanju Vrhovne komande. Njeni odredi su, zapravo, uživali veliki stepen autonomije i nisu se uvek pridržavali direktiva centralne komande. Lokalne odrede JVUO bilo je teško mobilisati ili motivisati izvan njihovog kraja. Slično tome, autoritet komandanata odreda umeo je da bude relativan i njihova naređenja nisu uvek izvršavana.⁷⁸ U proleće 1942. godine snage JVUO bile su organizovane na teritorijalnom principu: odredi su bili vezani za sela, opštine ili okruge. Svaki administrativni okrug imao je bataljon od dva ili tri odreda. Brigade su bile sastavljene od tri do pet bataljona, a armijski korpus sastojao se od dve do pet brigada⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Izveštaj o političkoj i vojnoj situaciji u istočnoj Bosni i stanju četničkih jedinica na tom području, koji je major Radoslav Đurić podneo Draži Mihailoviću 26. marta 1942, dobra je ilustracija ove strane stvari. Ovdje se citira iz *Zbornika dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, tom XIV, knj. 1, *Dokumenti četničkog pokreta Draže Mihailovića 1941-1942* (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1981), str. 173-182.

O nedostatku organizacije i discipline u četničkim jedinicama u Bosni vidi izveštaj koji je kapetan Milorad Momčilović podneo 7. juna 1942. majoru Petru Bačoviću o događajima u istočnoj Bosni od juna 1941. do juna 1942, u *Zborniku dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, tom 14, knj. 1, str. 318-333.

⁷⁹ Nikolić, *Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta*, tom. 1, str. 216.

Stav Draže Mihailovića bio je da ne treba žuriti s ulaskom u oružanu borbu s Nemcima. Želeo je da što je više moguće sačuva srpski narod od nepotrebnih gubitaka i mislio je da je bolje sačekati pogodniji trenutak za podizanje ustanka protiv okupatora. Jugoslovenska vlada u izbeglištvu priznala je Dražu Mihailovića za vođu oružanog otpora. U skladu s tim, on je unapređen u ministra odbrane u januaru 1942. Iako ga je zapadna štampa – engleska i američka – predstavljala kao vođu prvog gerilskog pokreta u okupiranoj Evropi, Draža Mihailović nije pokrenuo neke značajne vojne akcije protiv okupatora. Naprotiv, proglasivši partizane-komuniste za svoje glavne neprijatelje, na kraju je čak i saradivao sa Italijanima i Nemcima, naročito 1943.

3.3.2 Ideologija i program pokreta

Ravnogorski pokret nastao je 1941. godine sa ciljem suprotstavljanja nemačkom okupatoru. Iako je pre svega bio vojni pokret, imao je i političkih ciljeva. Četnici Draže Mihailovića želeli su da se oslobode nasleđa Kraljevine Jugoslavije, koja je izbrisala granice Srbije.⁸⁰ Njihov cilj je bio stvaranje srpske nacionalne države na načelima demokratije i socijalne pravde. Ta država je trebalo da obuhvati sve Srbe u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Politički program ideologa Ravnogorskog pokreta predstavljao je reakciju na negativno iskustvo prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941), ali i na politiku istrebljenja Srba koju je sprovodila Nezavisna Država Hrvatska na čelu s Antom Pavelićem. Po mišljenju ideologa Ravnogorskog pokreta, srpska politička i kulturna elita se u periodu od 1918. do 1941. tako grčevito držala ideologije prema kojoj su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci deo istog naroda, da je izgubila iz vida srpske nacionalne interese.⁸¹ Zato je sada trebalo vratiti se duhovnim, političkim i nacionalnim tradicijama srpskog naroda.⁸² Ipak, bilo bi pogrešno misliti da su isključivo događaji Drugog svetskog rata dali povod za etničko čišćenje koje je sprovodio Ravnogorski pokret. Program četničkog pokreta se, zapravo, ideološki nadovezuje na program Srpskog kulturnog kluba (SKK). Počevši od kasnih 1930-ih godina, intelektualci iz ove organizacije zagovarali su stvaranje jednog, nacionalno što homogenijeg srpskog državnog entiteta u sklopu jugoslovenske države. U predavanjima koja je od 1937. do 1939. organizovao SKK, prisilna premeštanja i razmene stanovništva predlagani su kao način rešavanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja, posebno na Kosovu i u Vojvodini, gde je srpsko stanovništvo bilo u manjini. Mnogobrojni intelektualci iz SKK za vreme rata priključili su se Ravnogorskom pokretu. Među njima su bili Dragiša Vasić i Stevan Moljević.

⁸⁰ Milan Vasović i Kosta Nikolić, *Ujedinjene srpske zemlje: ravnogorski nacionalni program* (Beograd: Vreme knjige, 1996), str. 35-37.

⁸¹ "Za naše ujedinjenje i naše jedinstvo", *Ujedinjeno srpstvo*, br. 1, 2. april 1944.

⁸² "Na svom putu", *Ravna Gora*, br. 3, 1. mart 1943.

Jedan od prvih političkih projekata za novu srpsku državu napravio je u proleće 1941. godine Stevan Moljević, koji će u avgustu 1941. godine postati član Izvršnog odbora Centralnog nacionalnog komiteta, političkog krila četničkog pokreta.⁸³ Dokument "Homogena Srbija" predstavljen je u junu 1941. u Nikšiću u Crnoj Gori, u koju se Stevan Moljević sklonio u aprilu 1941.⁸⁴ Ovo u početku nije bio zvanični dokument četničkog pokreta Draže Mihailovića, ali je u velikoj meri odražavao njegove političke stavove. Stevan Moljević je u tom svom tekstu kao cilj postavio stvaranje Velike Srbije u jednoj Velikoj Jugoslaviji, transformisanoj u federalnu državu sastavljenu od tri jedinice (srpske, hrvatske i slovenačke). Etničke teritorije na kojima živi srpski narod vidigeografsku kartu 7 u Dodatku, trebalo je ujediniti u jednoj državi. Moljević je predvideo da se taj cilj ostvari proterivanjem nesrpskog stanovništva sa teritorija koje je trebalo da uđu u sklop srpske jedinice, kao i razmenom stanovništva, posebno između Srba i Hrvata.

Stoga se Srbima nameće danas prva i osnovna dužnost:

da stvore i organizuju homogenu Srbiju koja ima da obuhvati celo etničko područje na kome Srbi žive, i da joj osiguraju potrebne strateške i saobraćajne linije i čvorove, te privredna područja kako bi joj bio omogućen i obezbeđen slobodan privredni, politički i kulturni život i razvitak za sva vremena.

Te strateške i saobraćajne linije i čvorovi, potrebni za sigurnost, život i opstanak Srbije, iako negde danas ne bi imali srpsku većinu, imaju da posluže Srbiji i srpskom narodu da se ne bi više ponavljala teška stradanja koja Srbima nanose njihovi susedi čim se pruži prilika.

Preseljavanje i izmena žiteljstva, naročito Hrvata sa srpskog i Srba sa hrvatskog područja, jedini je put da se izvrši razgraničenje i stvore bolji odnosi između njih, a time otkloni mogućnost da se ponove strašni zločini koji su se dešavali u prošlom ratu, a naročito u ovom sadanjem, na svemu području na kome su Srbi i Hrvati bili izmešani, a gde su Hrvati i Muslimani s planom išli za istrebljenjem Srba.⁸⁵

Stevan Moljević je smatrao da su Srpske političke vlasti napravile ogromnu grešku što 1918. nisu odredile granice Srbije u okviru Kraljvine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.⁸⁶ Tu grešku je sada trebalo ispraviti objedinjavanjem svih teritorija naseljenih Srbima i dobijanjem izlaza na Jadransko more. Velika Srbija bi, dakle, na istoku i jugoistoku

⁸³ Stevan Moljević, izabran za člana Centralnog nacionalnog komiteta u avgustu 1941, prvi put se sreo sa Dražom Mihailovićem tek 21. maja 1942. Vidi Todorović, str. 130-131. Tako se on Ravnogorskom pokretu zapravo priključio tek u maju 1942.

⁸⁴ Stevan Moljević je bio u prilici da svoj tekst prodiskutuje sa Vasilijem Popovićem i Vasom Čubrilićem, profesorima istorije na Univerzitetu u Beogradu.

⁸⁵ "Homogena Srbija", 30. juni 1941, citirano iz Vesović i Nikolić, str. 190.

⁸⁶ Ovo je bilo stanovište i drugih ideologa Ravnogorskog pokreta, pre svega Dragiše Vasića.

obuhvatala Srbiju i Južnu Srbiju (Makedonija i Kosovo), kojima je trebalo priključiti bugarske gradove Vidin i Čustendil; na jugu – Crnu Goru, Hercegovinu i severnu Albaniju; na zapadu – Bosnu, severnu Dalmaciju, srpske delove Like, Korduna i Banije i deo Slavonije. Dalmatinska obala bi od Šibenika do Crne Gore pripala Srbiji.

Velika Jugoslavija bila bi konstituisana na federalnoj osnovi: sastojala bi se od Velike Srbije, krnje Hrvatske i Velike Slovenije. Verovatno po uzoru na *Načertanije* Ilije Garašanina, Stevan Moljević je bio za zbližavanje s Bugarskom. Po njegovom mišljenju, kao jedini koji su pružili ozbiljan otpor Turcima i Nemcima, Srbi su stekli pravo na vodeću ulogu na Balkanu. Da bi ostvarili svoju istorijsku misiju, “Srbi moraju imati hegemoniju na Balkanu, a da imaju hegemoniju na Balkanu, moraju imati prethodno hegemoniju u Jugoslaviji”.⁸⁷

Prvi programski dokument Četničkog pokreta sastavio je u leto 1941. četnički odbor Beograda pod nazivom “Izveštaj Miloša Sekulića”.⁸⁸ Po pitanju stvaranja jake i homogene srpske državne jedinice imao je iste stavove kao i Stevan Moljević. Jedina razlika bila je u tome što je on izričito pozivao na etničko čišćenje, najpre u gradovima, a onda po selima:

II Tačka

Pripremati se da bi u danima sloma mogli izvršiti ove akcije:

- a: da kazni sve one koji su na zločinački način služili neprijatelja i koji su svesno radili na istrebljenju srpskog naroda;
- b: omediti *de facto* srpske zemlje i učiniti da u njima ostane samo srpski živalj;
- c: posebno imati u vidu brzo i radikalno čišćenje gradova i njihovo popunjenje svežim srpskim elementom;
- d: izraditi plan za čišćenje ili pomeranje seoskog stanovništva sa ciljem homogenosti srpske državne zajednice;
- e: u srpskoj jedinici kao naročito težak problem uzeti pitanje muslimana i po mogućnosti rešiti ga u ovoj fazi, i

⁸⁷ “Homogena Srbija”, 30. juni 1941, citirano iz Vesović i Nikolić, str. 193.

⁸⁸ U sastavljanju ovog spisa verovatno su učestvovali Vojislav Vujanac, Dragoslav Stranjaković i Mladen Žujović. Sličnost u njihovim stavovima može se objasniti činjenicom da su svi bili članovi Srpskog kulturnog kluba. Vidi Stanišić, *Projekti “Velika Srbija”*, str. 47. U julu i avgustu 1941, u Beogradu je osnovan odbor za pružanje podrške Ravnogorskom pokretu. Među članovima tog odbora bio je jedan broj oficira Vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije, među kojima su bili Boško i Žarko Todorović.

f: unapred odrediti koje i kakve jedinice treba da sprovede izvršenje programskih tačaka pod b,c,d,e.

III Tačka

1.) Ideal je jaka i homogena srpska državna jedinica politički i ekonomski sposobna za život. Ona će poslužiti kao takva /nečitko/ širim političkim kombinacijama, i

2.) izabrati stručne ljude za pripremanje dokumentacije ovog cilja za konferenciju mira Š...Ć⁸⁹

Ovaj dokument o stanju u zemlji Miloš Sekulić je dostavio jugoslovenskoj izbegličkoj vladi, koja se nalazila u Londonu. Momčilo Ninčić, ministar inostranih poslova u jugoslovenskoj vladi, navodno je rekao jugoslovenskom ambasadoru u Sjedinjenim Državama Konstantinu Fotiću da obnavljanje Jugoslavije ne bi bilo poželjno, već da bi pre trebalo “stvorištić Veliku Srbiju sve do Ogulina”, sa zapadnim granicama na liniji “Karlovac-Ogulin-Našice”.⁹⁰

Elementi programa četničkog odbora u Beogradu mogu se naći u jednom dokumentu koji je u septembru 1941. godine objavila Vrhovna komanda Četničkog pokreta. Dokumentom je predviđeno da treba “kazništić sve one koji su na zločinački način služili neprijatelju i koji su svesno radili na istrebljenju srpskog naroda”, “omeđiti ždefakto’ srpske zemlje i učiniti da u njima ostane samo srpski živalj” (etnički čista Srbija), “posebno imati u vidu brzo i radikalno čišćenje gradova i njihovo popunjenje svežim srpskim elementom”, “izgraditi plan za čišćenje ili pomeranje seoskog stanovništva sa ciljem homogenosti srpske državne zajednice”, a “u srpskoj jedinici kao naročito težak problem uzeti pitanje muslimana i po mogućnosti rešiti ga u ovoj fazi”.⁹¹

U Instrukciji Draže Mihailovića majoru Đordu Lasiću, komandantu četničkih odreda Jugoslovenske vojske u Crnoj Gori, i kapetanu Pavlu I. Đurišiću, komandantu

⁸⁹ Citirano iz Jovan Marjanović, “Prilozi istoriji sukoba narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta i četnika Draže Mihailovića u Srbiji 1941. godine”, u *Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova*, tom 1 (Beograd: Kultura, 1959), str. 179-180.

⁹⁰ Citirano u Stanišić, *Projekti “Velika Srbija”*, str. 49.

⁹¹ Ovaj dokument citiraju Vladimir Dedijer i Antun Miletić u *Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941-1945: zbornik dokumenata i svjedočenja*, (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990), str. 18-19.

četničkih odreda Jugoslovenske vojske na području Lima (reka u Crnoj Gori), od 20.

decembra 1941, još jednom se navode ciljevi vojske:

Ciljevi naših odreda jesu:

1/ Borba za slobodu celokupnog našeg naroda pod skiptrom Njegovog Veličanstva Kralja Petra II.

2/ Stvoriti veliku Jugoslaviju i u njoj veliku Srbiju, etnički čistu u granicama Srbije – Crne Gore - Bosne i Hercegovine – Srema – Banata i Bačke.

3/ Borba za uključenje u naš državni život i svih još neoslobodjenih, slovenačkih teritorija pod Italijanima i Nemcima (Trst – Gorica - Istra i Koruška) kao i Bugarske, severne Albanije sa Skadrom..

4/ Čišćenje državne teritorije od svih narodnih manjina i ne-nacionalnih elemenata.

5/ Stvoriti neposredne zajedničke granice između Srbije i Crne Gore, kao i Srbije i Slovenije čišćenjem Sandžaka od Muslimanskog življa i Bosne od Muslimanskog i Hrvatskog življa.

6/ Kazniti sve Ustaše i Muslimane koji su u tragičnim danima nemilosredno uništavali naš narod.

7/ Kazniti sve one koji su krivi za našu aprilsku katastrofu.⁹²

8/ U krajevima očišćenim od narodnih manjina i ne-nacionalnih elemenata izvršiti naseljavnje Crnogorcima (u obzir dolaze siromašne nacionalno ispravne i poštene porodice) Š. . .⁹³

Slični ciljevi izloženi su i u programu Dinarske divizije, kojom je komandovao Momčilo Đujić, iz marta 1942.⁹⁴ Ova četnička divizija formirana je u januaru 1942. s ciljem stavljanja pod istu komandu borbenih jedinica u Kninskoj Krajini, zapadnoj Slavoniji i Lici.⁹⁵ Ovo je bilo u sklopu napora da se “vaspostavi čisto nacionalni poredak u svim zemljama, gde žive Srbi, pa i onima na koje Srbi aspiriraju”.⁹⁶ Divizija je imala zadatak da širi i sprovodi u delo srpsku ideju u Lici, severnoj Dalmaciji, Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori i Bosni:

⁹² “Aprilaska katastrofa iz 1941.” odnosi se na poraz jugoslovenskih snaga od sila osovine (Nemačka, Italija, Bugarska, Madarska, itd.). One su primorane da kapituliraju posle samo tri nedelje pružanja otpora.

⁹³ Ovaj dokument citira se u Dedijer i Miletić, str. 26.

⁹⁴ Taj dokument sačinjen je između 8. i 12. marta 1942. godine u Mostaru. Autori su bili starešine JAUO: major Borivoje S. Radulović, kapetan (1. kl.) Radovan S. Ivanišević i kapetan (2.kl.) Mile Rakočević. Vidi Branko Petranović, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945*, tom 2 (Beograd: Rad, 1983), str. 93. Četnička Dinarska divizija sastojala se od pet pukova i dve jedinice. Svaki puk sastojao se od dva bataljona.

⁹⁵ Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Četnici u Hrvatskoj, 1941-1945*, str. 79-85. U decembru 1941. i januaru 1942, ove jedinice ušle su u Ravnogorski pokret pod komandom Draže Mihailovića.

⁹⁶ Đuro Stanisavljević, “Pojava i razvitak četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj 1941-1942. godine”, u *Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova*, tom 4 (Beograd, 1962), str. 96-97.

1. Uloga divizije:

Radi ostvarenja Srbinove osnovne zamisli i stvaranja srpske nacionalne države, formiraće se kao jedan činilac te zamisli u reonu Kosova polja, "Dinarska četnička divizija" od izrazito nacionalnog elementa. Ta divizija ponikla na istoimenom polju, gde je nekada bilo groblje srpske slave i srpskog junaštva, ima da da izraza vaskrsnute Srbinove vojničke moći i da, kao jedan veliki gvozdeni malj vaspostavi čisto nacionalni poredak u svim zemljama, gde žive Srbi, pa i onima na koje Srbi aspiriraju. Prema tome uloga ove divizije ima čisto politički karakter, jer ona za sada dok rat još uvijek traje ima da bude utočište svih nacionalnih elemenata srpskog karaktera, da širi i ostvaruje srpsku ideju u delovima Like, severne Dalmacije, Hercegovine, Crne Gore i Bosne i da u danom momentu, blagodareći impozantnim snagama, sa kojima raspolaže, vaspostavi čisto nacionalni poredak, sa kraljem Petrom na čelu Š. . . Ć

Baš zbog napred iznete uloge ove divizije potrebno će biti izneti njeno nacionalno obeležje, zbog toga što je njena uloga izrazito srpska. U prvom redu ona se mora popunjavati čisto Srbima "kako borcima, tako podoficirima i oficirima". Dva ista imena: Kosovo u Južnoj Srbiji i Kosovo u Severnoj Dalmaciji i istoriske povezanosti ovoga imena, ukazuju na to, da je na Kosovu Srbin izgubio svoju državu i da na Kosovu Srbin mora vaspostaviti svoju nacionalnu misao, kako bi se mogla ostvariti Srbinova zamisao o stvaranju jedne velike Srbije, koja bi obuhvatala: Srbiju, Vojvodinu, Bosnu, Hercegovinu, Crnu Goru, Dalmaciju (do Šibenika) i Liku. Pošto se završi stvaranje ovakve jedne srpske jedinice, tek onda može biti reči o nekim saveznim državama ili državnim savezima ili u najširem smislu te reči o Balkanskoj konfederaciji. U tako zamišljenoj srpskoj jedinici ima isključivo živeti pravoslavno stanovništvo.⁹⁷

Stevan Moljević, poreklom iz Banjaluke (oblast Bosanske Krajine), insistirao je na tome da Draža Mihailović treba da se pozabavi ujedinjenjem zapadnih srpskih zemalja. Smatrao je da beogradski političari ne pokazuju dovoljno interesovanja i razumevanja za to pitanje.⁹⁸ Godine 1943, među političkim savetodavcima Ravnogorskog pokreta došlo je do razilaženja po pitanju britanske pomoći Četničkom pokretu. Dragiša Vasić je verovao da Britanci podrivaju srpski narod, a Stevan Moljević da pokret treba da se osloni upravo na Engleze i Amerikance.⁹⁹ Početkom juna 1943, kada je Vrhovna komanda Četničkog pokreta vratila u Srbiju, Dragiša Vasić je istupio iz Centralnog nacionalnog komiteta (do januara 1944). Otkad Mladen Žujović, po smrti Ilije Trifunovića-Birčanina, preuzima komandu nad oružanim odredima u zapadnoj Bosni,

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, str. 96-97.

⁹⁸ Todorović, str. 135-136.

⁹⁹ Razlike u mišljenju između Dragiša Vasića i Draže Mihailovića javile su se u proleće 1943, posle poraza na Neretvi i Drini. Dragiša Vasić je kritikovao, pored ostalog, bespoštednu borbu s partizanima u Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini i Sandžaku. Više puta je u pismima Draži Mihailoviću kritikovao slabosti Četničkog pokreta. Osuđivao je običaje vojnika da rasipaju municiju na svadbama i drugim svečanostima, sklonost kao krvoločnim postupcima, kao što je rezanje grkljana neprijatelju umesto usmrćivanja vatrenim oružjem i slično. Vidi N. Nikolić, "Dragiša Vasić: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara", str. 103; Nikola Milovanović, *Dragiša Vasić: Od gradanskog buntovnika do kontrarevolucionara*, (Beograd: Nova knjiga, 1986), str. 35.

Stevan Moljević je, zapravo, postao glavni politički savetnik Draže Mihailovića i glavni urednik lista “Ravna Gora”.

Ravnogorski pokret je svoje glavne neprijatelje video u Nemcima i komunistima-partizanima. Glavni razlog za netrpeljivost prema komunistima bilo je rešenje nacionalnog pitanja koje je predlagala Komunistička partija Jugoslavije. Njime se, naime, odbacivala mogućnost objedinjavanja srpskih teritorija u jednoj državi. Četnici su tvrdili da se komunisti, odnosno partizani, spremaju da podele Srbe u četiri “odvojene oblasti” – Srbiju, Makedoniju, Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Crnu Goru. Četnici i jugoslovenski komunisti imali su veoma različito viđenje srpskog naroda – komunisti su priznavali postojanje posebne makedonske i crnogorske nacije, koje su četnici poricali. Četnici su komuniste, odnosno partizane, optuživali da žele da razore ili razbiju jedinstvo srpskog naroda, a da s druge strane planiraju stvaranje hrvatske federalne jedinice, koja bi obuhvatala Dalmaciju sve do Bokokotorskog zaliva.¹⁰⁰ Živko Topalović (1887-1972), predsednik Socijalističke partije Jugoslavije (bezuticajna politička organizacija), koji se 1943. priključio Ravnogorskom pokretu, opisao je četničku ideologiju kao antihrvatsku, antimuslimansku i antikomunističku:

Š. . .Ć U ostalim krajevima pak Šautor misli na Bosnu i HercegovinuĆ srpsko četništvo, poniklo iz odbrane od hrvatskog ustaštva ideološki je znalo samo za srbizam. Ono je izjednačavalo nacionalno pitanje i državno pripadništvo sa verom. Srbin, to je pripadnik pravoslavne crkve kome je svaki katolik Hrvat a svaki musliman Turčin. Njih u srpskoj državi valja kao neprijatelje iskoreniti, ili proterati. Ovaj srbizam je sušta suprotnost jugoslovenstvu.¹⁰¹

Izgubivši nešto od svoje političke prednosti nad komunistima, odnosno partizanima, Ravnogorski pokret je sazvaio kongres u selu Ba od 25. do 28. januara 1944. Trebalo je usvojiti program buduće organizacije nove Jugoslavije. Skup je organizovan kao odgovor na drugo zasedanje prevashodno komunističkog Antifašističkog veća narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, održano 1943. godine, na kojem su postavljeni temelji buduće jugoslovenske države kao federativne države sastavljene od šest republika. Na

¹⁰⁰ *Ujedinjeno srpstvo* (1944: 2).

¹⁰¹ Živko Topalović, *Kako su komunisti dograbili vlast u Jugoslaviji*, (Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2001), str. 204.

kongresu je učestvovalo više od tri stotine delegata iz čitave zemlje i to je bila prilika da se izvesnim predratnim političkim strankama (Socijalistička partija Jugoslavije, Demokratska stranka i dr.) dozvoli povratak na političku scenu, što se kosilo sa željama glavnih ideologa Četničkog pokreta (Stevan Moljević i Dragiša Vasić), koji su osećali averziju prema jugoslovenskim međuratnim političarima i koji su bili za to da se pokret proširi, umesto da se stvara neka nova politička organizacija. Da bi poboljšali imidž pokreta i učvstili njegov demokratski karakter, predstavnici izvesnih političkih stranaka rešili su da se okupe, dok se ne završi rat, u koaliciju nazvanu Jugoslovenska demokratska narodna zajednica i da se svrstaju uz Ravnogorski pokret. U svojim zaključcima Kongres je predvideo restauraciju jugoslovenske države i njeno proširenje teritorijama naseljenim Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima. Teritorija te države ne bi bila ništa manja od one koju je jugoslovenska delegacija zatražila na mirovnoj konferenciji po završetku Prvog svetskog rata vidigeografsku kartu br. 3 u Dodatku.¹⁰² Nova Jugoslavija je trebalo da bude parlamentarna monarhija na čelu sa kraljem Petrom II Karadorđevićem. Država bi bila organizovana na federalnoj osnovi i sastojala bi se od tri jedinice – Srbije, Hrvatske i Slovenije. Srpska federalna jedinica bi obuhvatila čitav srpski narod. Isti princip važio bi i za Hrvatsku i Sloveniju. Kongres je proglasio nevažećim sve teritorijalne izmene sprovedene pre i za vreme rata: Banovinu Hrvatsku, razbijanje Jugoslavije od strane okupatora i stvaranje Nezavisne Države Hrvatske. Jugoslovenska orijentacija kongresa bila je u skladu sa stavovima jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu, koja se izjasnila za stvaranje federativne države sa tri jedinice (Srbija, Hrvatska, Slovenija). Međutim, ako su ideološke vođe Ravnogorskog pokreta uopšte prihvatale takvo rešenje, bilo je to jedino pod uslovom da Srbi u toj novoj državi dobiju

¹⁰² U to vreme jugoslovenska delegacija je tražila da se Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca proširi područjima Skadra (Albanija), Temišvara (Rumunija), Čustendila i Vidina (Bugarska), Segedina i Pečuja (Madarska), Istre, Rijeke (Italija) i Koruške (Austrija).

dominantnu ulogu.¹⁰³ Pored toga, nova Jugoslavija je trebalo da bude “čista država bez nacionalnih manjina”.¹⁰⁴

3.3.3 Praksa etničkog čišćenja

Ravnogorski pokret je 1944. godine objavio da neće biti kolektivnih odmazdi, već jedino pojedinačnih, protiv počinitelja zločina nad srpskim stanovništvom. Istina je, međutim, bila da su četnički odredi u periodu od 1941. do 1944 sprovodili akcije odmazde i osvete nad Hrvatima i Muslimanima. Tokom celog sukoba komanda Četničkog pokreta nastavila je da daje kontradiktorne izjave o merama osvete. Ipak, vodstvo pokreta ili njegovi ideolozi su putem štampe i pamfleta izričito pozivali na osvetu. Osim toga, takve direktive izdavane su i na lokalnom nivou, posebno u istočnoj Bosni i severnoj Dalmaciji. Osveta je dovođena u vezu sa politikom restrukturiranja jugoslovenske države.¹⁰⁵ Ona je služila i kao opravdanje za čišćenje nesrpskog elementa sa teritorija pod četničkom kontrolom. Moljević je smatrao da se mora voditi politika svršenog čina. Zacrtnu teritoriju je trebalo zauzeti počevši od Osijeka, Slavenskog Broda, Sunje, Karlovca, Knina, Šibenika, Mostara i Metkovića, a nesrpske elemente očistiti ubijanjem onih koji su bili odgovorni za masakre nad Srbima, i proterivanjem Hrvata u Hrvatsku, a muslimana u Tursku ili Albaniju.¹⁰⁶ U memorandumu koji je 26. februara 1942. napisao u Užicu pod naslovom “Trenutna situacija u nekim srpskim oblastima i njihova uloga u stvaranju homogene Srbije”, Stevan Moljević je rekao da se mešanje srpskog naroda sa Hrvatima i Muslimanima u Krajini, Bosni i Hercegovini više ne može tolerisati. Premda su četnici tvrdili da se bore protiv fašizma, četnička vojska služila se istim metodama kao i njihovi zakleti neprijatelji. Iako treba napomenuti da su

¹⁰³ Kosta Nikolić, *op. cit.*, str. 67.

¹⁰⁴ Ovo je bilo u skladu s odlukama kongresa održanog u selu Ba, a kako je prenelo “Pomoravlje” u proleće 1944. godine. Novinski članci objavljeni u Milan B. Matić, *Ravnogorska ideja u štampi i propagandi četničkog pokreta u Srbiji 1941-1944* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1995), str. 198-204.

¹⁰⁵ Mihailo Stanišić, *Slom, genocid, odmazda*, (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1999), str. 378.

¹⁰⁶ O ovim namerama govori se u jednom pismu upućenom Dragiši Vasiću (AVII, Ca, 32/2, k. 12). Delovi tog pisma citirani su u Stanišić, *Slom, genocid, odmazda*, str. 53. Dokument je objavljen u Dedijer i Miletić, str. 33-34, kao i u *Zborniku dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije*, tom 14, knj. 1, str. 101-103.

masakri koje su vršili četnici bili manjeg obima od onih koje je vršila vojska Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, treba razmotriti koja je tačno bila njihova priroda. Jesu li oni predstavljali puke akcije odmazde ili su pak kaznene ekspedicije četnika bile motivisane njihovim nacionalnim programom? Mora se konstatovati da četnički odredi nisu napadali samo hrvatske i muslimanske vojnike koji su se borili za Nezavisnu Državu Hrvatsku, već i civilno stanovništvo, uključujući žene i decu. Takođe treba istaći da je civilnih žrtava akcija odmazde (starih, žena i dece) bilo znatno više nego vojnih (vidi dole navedene primere, str. 55 i 56). Vojska Ravnogorskog pokreta terorizala je Hrvate koje je optuživala za izdaju Jugoslavije, odgovornost za poraz u aprilu 1941, i podršku politici istrebljivanja Srba koju je vodila Nezavisna Država Hrvatske, posebno na područjima gde je živelo mešovito stanovništvo Srba i Hrvata i gde su ustaše izvršile masakre nad Srbima. Muslimani Bosne, Hercegovine i Sandžaka, o kojima se nije razmišljalo kao o naciji i koji su često nazivani Turcima, takode su bili žrtva četničkog terora, kao i komunisti-partizani, koji su postali glavni neprijatelji četničkog pokreta. Etničko čišćenje bosanskih Muslimana koje je sprovodila četnička vojska adekvatno ilustruje kako su politički i vojni ciljevi Ravnogorskog pokreta sprovedeni u delo. Prva zverstva nad Muslimanima u Bosni počinjena su već u leto 1941. Prvi veliki masakr dogodio se u oblasti Ljubinja (jama Čavkarica), a za njim su usledili masakri u Kulen Vakufu (5. i 6. septembar 1941) i Koraju (26. i 27. novembar 1941). U periodu od 5. decembra 1941. do 20. januara 1942, kada su opštinu Foča kontrolisale snage lojalne jugoslovenskoj vladi u izbeglištvu, izvršeni su mnogobrojni masakri (u samoj Foči, u Goraždu, Vlasenici i Srebrenici), kao odmazda za masakre Srba koje su počinile ustaške formacije, u kojima je bilo i Muslimana. Na ovaj način ubijeno je nekoliko hiljada Muslimana. Operacije JVUO poprimile su oblik kaznenih ekspedicija u kojima su uz masovne zločine pljačka i silovanje bile redovne pojave. Muslimanim su nanošene teške povrede nožem (odsecani su uši ili nosevi ili su vadene oči), a mnogi su doživeli smrt klanjem. Ovi surovi običaji

nisu bili tipični samo za četnički pokret, jer su svi učesnici sukoba na teritoriji Jugoslavije vršili teror, ali za četnike su oni bili deo borbene tehnike. Medutim, surovosti ove vrste nisu specijalnost samo ovog dela Evrope ili sveta: na primer, u oba svetska rata neprijateljske strane na istočnom frontu (Nemci i Rusi) počinile su jedna nad drugom zverstva i nehumana dela. Nakon zatišja do kojeg je došlo po uspostavljanju partizanskog štaba na području Foče usledili su dalji masakri 19. avgusta 1942 – tada je ubijeno oko dve hiljade ljudi, a nekoliko hiljada moralo je da pobagne. Najveći masakri dogodili su se na području Sandžaka i u jugoistočnoj Bosni i Hercegovini u januaru i februaru 1943. Dana 10. januara 1943, pišući o operacijama izvedenim u januaru 1943, komandant četničkih odreda na području Lima i Sandžaka Pavle I. Đurišić izvestio je načelnika Vrhovnog štaba (Dražu Mihailovića) o sledećem:

Akcija na desnoj obali Lima u srezu Bjelopoljskom završena je. Ista je izvedena tačno po utvrđenom planu. Rezultat ove borbe je:

Potpuno su uništena sledeća muslimanska sela (Sekcije: Pljevlje, Sjenica, Peć, Kolašin): Voljevac, Gubovača, Radijelja, Ušanovići, Presečenik, Baturiće, Donji Vlah (Sekcija Pljevlja), Mirovići, Šolja, Radojeva Glava, Mediše, Pobretiće, Donja Kostenica, Stublo, Vrh, Zminjac, Šipovice, Negobratina, Osmanbegovo selo, Dupljaci, Jasen, Kostiće, Kaševar, Ivanje, Godijevo, Žilići, Gornja Crnča, Gornji Radulići, Vrba, Crhalja, Kradenik, Sipanje, Ličine (Sekcija Sjenica - Peć).

Ukupno 33 sela.

Žrtve: Muslimana boraca oko 400 (stotine)

Žena i dece oko ... 1000. -

Naše žrtve:

14 mrtvih i

26 ranjenih od kojih

3 žene

Do ovolikog broja naših žrtava došlo je ne usled nepravilnog vođenja od strane starešina, već očiglednog nečuvanja samih vojnika i njihovih herojskih juriša na muslimane, koji su bili zatvoreni u svojim kućama.

Sve kuće u gore navedenim selima bile su popaljene, mada sam bio izdao naredenje da se ne pale. Do ovog paljenja došlo je usled pogibije iznetih naših boraca.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Ovaj dokument je objavljen u Dedijer i Miletić, str. 299-302.

Dana 13. februara 1943, Pavle I. Đurišić podneo je načelniku vrhovnog štaba sledeći izveštaj, u kojem navodi:

Akcija u Pljevljanskom, Čajničkom i Fočanskom srezu protivu muslimana izvršena je.

Operacije su izvedene tačno po naređenju i izdatoj zapovesti. Napad je počeo u određeno vreme. Svi komandanti i jedinice izvršile su dobivene zadatke na opšte zadovoljstvo.

Otpor neprijatelja bio je od početka do kraja slab. Jedini veći otpor bio je na Trebeškom brdu, koji je trajao 4. časa, ali i on je brzo savladan.

Naši odredi 7. ovog meseca u toku noći, već su izbili na r. Drinu, te su borbe zaključno sa tim danom bile uglavnom završene, a zatim je nastalo čišćenje oslobođene teritorije. Sva muslimanska sela u tri pomenuta srezu su potpuno spaljena tako, da nijedan njihov dom nije ostao čitav.

Sva imovina je uništena sem stoke, žita i sena. Naređeno je i predviđeno prikupljanje ljudske i stočne hrane u određenim mestima, za stvaranje magacina rezervne hrane i ishranu jedinica, koje su ostale na terenu radi čišćenja i pretresanja terena i šumovitih predela, kao i radi sprovođenja i učvršćavanja organizacije na oslobođenoj teritoriji.

Za vreme operacija se pristupilo potpunom uništavanju muslimanskog življa bez obzira na pol i godine starosti.

Žrtve: - Naše ukupne žrtve su bile 22 mrtva od kojih 2 nesretnim slučajem i 32 ranjena.

Kod muslimana oko 1.200 boraca i do 8.000 ostalih žrtava: žena, staraca i dece.

Za vreme početnih operacija, muslimani su se dali u begstvo ka Metaljci, Čajniču i r. Drini. Na Metaljci je našao sklonište mali deo stanovništva. U Čajniču se računa da ima oko 2.000 izbeglica, a jedan deo je uspeo da umakne preko Drine pre nego što su određene jedinice izvršile presecanje mogućih odstupnih pravaca na tom sektoru. Sve ostalo stanovništvo je uništeno.¹⁰⁸

Broj žrtava u dejstvima protiv Muslimana u januaru i februaru 1943. godine procenjen je na deset hiljada.¹⁰⁹ Broj žrtava u Crnoj Gori od 1942. do sredine 1943. procenjen je na oko tri hiljade, ili na sedam hiljada za sve ratne godine zajedno (1941-1945). U Hrvatskoj su masakri bili brojni u severnoj Dalmaciji (u Kninskoj krajini), u oblastima Like, Gorskog Kotora i Korduna. Na tim područjima četničkim snagama je komandovao pop Momčilo Đujić (1907-1999), koji se od januara 1942. nalazio na čelu Dinarske četničke divizije. Od jeseni 1942. do proleća 1943. godine četničke snage su izvršile napade na brojna hrvatska sela i masakrirale stanovnike klanjem. Tokom operacije "Dinara" u oktobru 1942, pripadnici odreda kojim je komandovao Momčilo Đujić zapalili su više

¹⁰⁸ Ovaj dokument je objavljen u Dedijer i Miletić, str. 329-333.

¹⁰⁹ Tomasevich, str. 258. Kada govori o ukupnom broju žrtava Ravnogorskog pokreta, Vojislav Šešeljić će navesti cifru od deset hiljada mrtvih. Ta cifra odnosi se, međutim, samo na operacije iz januara i februara 1943.

sela (Gata, Tugari, Ostrvice i dr.) i pobili celopkupno stanovništvo. Po završetku rata Momčilo Đujić je proglašen odgovornim za smrt oko 1.800 osoba (uključujući žene i decu).¹¹⁰ Jugoslovenska državna komisija proglasila ga je 1947. ratnim zločincem zbog ratnih zločina počinjenih u Drugom svetskom ratu. Pošto je iz Hrvatske pobjegao u Italiju preko Slovenije, konačno se 1949. nastanio u Sjedinjenim Državama. Godine 1957. osnovao je organizaciju (Četnički pokret “Ravna Gora”) koja je nastavila tradiciju četničkog pokreta Draže Mihailovića. Jugoslovenske vlasti su američkih sudskim vlastima u više navrata podnosile zahteve za njegovo izručenje, ali bez uspeha.¹¹¹ U junu 1989, Momčilo Đujić je Vojislava Šešelja proglasio četničkim vojvodom (odnosno vojskodom). Prema tome, između četničkog pokreta iz Drugog svetskog rata i političkog pokreta koji je 1990. godine osnovao Vojislav Šešelj postoji direktna veza.

¹¹⁰ Iz tog razloga Momčilo Đujić je dospao na spisak ratnih zločinaca koje su jugoslovenske vlasti sastavile posle 1945. Vidi Jovo Popović, Marko Lolić i Branko Latas, *Pop izdaje* (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1988), str. 169-170. U decembru 1944, Momčilo Đujić je prebegao u Sloveniju, odakle se u maju 1945. prebacio u Italiju. Pošto su jugoslovenske vlasti tražile njegovo izručenje, nekoliko godina je proveo krijući se, a onda se preselio u Sjedinjene Države i preuzeo vodstvo nad Četnički pokret “Ravna Gora”.

¹¹¹ Svoj poslednji zahtev Savezni sekretarijat za pravosuđe i opštu upravu SFRJ podneo je u maju 1991. U maju 1999, hrvatski ministar pravde Zvonimir Šeparović takode je zatražio izručenje bivšeg četničkog vojnog vode zbog optužbe za ubistvo najmanje 1.500 osoba u oblasti Knina, Vrlike, Sinja, Šibenika i Otočca. (*Voice of America*, <http://www.voan.gov/miscl/croatia/dj53199.html>, stranica konsultovana 7. februara 2005).

4. Pojava srpskog nacionalnog pokreta 1980-ih godina i ideologija Velike Srbije

Vojnom pobedom partizana, odnosno, komunista, i njihovim dolaskom na vlast, status i uticaj srpske političke elite se smanjio u korist ravnoteže između republika jugoslovenske socijalističke federacije. Godine 1945-1946, komunisti su nacionalno pitanje proglasili rešenim dolaskom na vlast radničke klase i izjednačavanjem svih naroda i narodnosti. Uprkos tome, pred kraj 1960-ih godina počele su političke krize i javni protesti: kriza u Hrvatskoj trajala je od 1967. do 1971, a protesti Albanaca od 1968. do 1981.¹¹²

4.1. Konfederalizacija Jugoslavije i nezadovoljstvo rukovodstva Socijalističke Republike Srbije

Tokom 1970-ih, a posebno 1980-ih godina, u vodećim krugovima srpske političke i kulturne scene javilo se nezadovoljstvo Jugoslavijom, koja je optuživana za marginalizaciju Srbije. Međutim, situaciju i budućnost Jugoslavije kritikovale su i druge republike. Nakon perioda političkog i ekonomskog centralizma jugoslovenska federacija je u periodu od 1967. do 1974. godine reformisana. Na kraju tog procesa usvojen je novi ustav. Tim novim ustavom, koji je usvojen u februaru 1974. i kojim su obuhvaćene izmene predložene prethodnih godina (1968. i 1971), stvoren je teren za konfederalizaciju zemlje, pošto su republike i autonomne pokrajine dobile veća prava na uštrb centralne vlasti federacije. Kao rezultat toga, položaj republike Srbije postao je složeniji, pošto su dve autonomne pokrajine u njenom sklopu definisane kao zasebne federalne jedinice.

¹¹² U periodu 1967 – 1971. u Hrvatskoj se javio nacionalistički pokret koji je stremio jačanju suverenosti Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske. Glavne lidere Saveza Komunisti Hrvatske, Miku Tripala i Savku Dabčević-Kučar, Tito je smenio u decembru 1971, zbog toga što nisu osudili nacionalističke pretenzije hrvatskih intelektualaca okupljenih oko Matice Hrvatske. Krajem novembra 1968, Albanci su demonstrirali na ulicama Prištine tražeći da Socijalističkoj Autonomnoj Pokrajini Kosovo bude dat status republike. Ove demonstracije su nemilosrdno ugušene, kao i one iz proleća 1981, kada su izneti isti nacionalistički zahtevi.

Prema ustavima iz 1946. i 1963. godine, pokrajinska ovlašćenja i ustanove utvrđivala je sama republika Srbija. Prema ustavu iz 1974. godine, njih je, u konačnoj instanci, utvrđivala savezna vlada. Pokrajine su izjednačene sa republikama, a njihovi odnosi sa centrom u Srbiji postali su labavi i problematični. Ustavne promene elaboriralo je između 1968. i 1972. “liberalno” srpsko rukovodstvo na čelu sa Markom Nikezićem (1921-1990) i Latinkom Perović (1933-), koje je zagovaralo ograničavanje privrednih funkcija centralne vlade i jačanje autonomije republika. Godine 1972, “liberalno” rukovodstvo je na Titovu inicijativu smenjeno u korist konzervativnih snaga, koje su nastavile sa mnogobrojnim čistkama po preduzećima i institucijama.

Godine 1975, Predsedništvo Socijalističke Republike Srbije, zabrinuto zbog unutrašnjih napetosti u Srbiji, pokrenulo je pitanje međusobnih odnosa tri jedinice u sastavu republike.¹¹³ U junu 1976. godine osnovana je radna grupa koja je trebalo da prouči ovo osetljivo pitanje. Radna grupa je u martu 1977. iznela svoje zaključke srpskom Predsedništvu – u svom zaključku autori izveštaja su naveli da strukture vlasti Republike Srbije ne funkcionišu na čitavoj teritoriji republike. Upozorili su vlasti na stvaranje tri različita pravna sistema i tendenciju konstitutivnih delova Srbije ka udaljavaju jednih od drugih. Takođe su razmotrili kako se ostvaruje istorijsko pravo srpskog naroda na nacionalnu državu u sklopu jugoslovenske federacije.¹¹⁴ Sadržaj ovog dokumenta naišao je na neodobranje rukovodstava autonomnih pokrajina, koja su imala podršku federalnih struktura. U to vreme ravnoteža snaga nije bila pogodna za izmenu Ustava i zbog ovog protivljenja pitanje je držano na ledu sve do početka 1980-ih godina.

U želji da obezbedi jedinstvo republike, srpsko rukovodstvo je iskoristilo događaje na Kosovo u proleće 1981. da ponovo aktualizuje pitanje jedinstva Srbije.¹¹⁵ Godine 1985, nesuglasice između političkog rukovodstva uže Srbije i rukovodstava

¹¹³ Dragoslav Marković, *Život i politika: 1967-1978*, II tom (Beograd: Rad, 1987).

¹¹⁴ Ovaj izveštaj objavljen je u Žarko Papić, *Vreme zastoja* (Beograd: Ekonomika, 1990), str. 135-165.

¹¹⁵ *Dokumenti SK Srbije: Četrnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije: uzroci i posledice kontrarevolucionarne akcije na Kosovu*, (Beograd: Komunist, 1981), str. 72-73.

autonomnih pokrajina navele su Savez komunista Jugoslavije da prizna da u Srbiji postoje unutrašnji sukobi.¹¹⁶ Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Jugoslavije priznao je da se pravo srpskog naroda na sopstvenu državu, koje imaju i svi drugi narodi u federaciji, ne ostvaruje u potpunosti zbog toga što se u stvarnosti ne poštuje ustavni princip prema kojem pokrajine pripadaju Srbiji, ali je upozorio rukovodstvo u Beogradu da mora da poštuje suverena prava radnika, kao i svih naroda i narodnosti u autonomnim pokrajinama, i da problem jedinstva ne pokušava da reši centralističkim metodama. Savezu komunista Jugoslavije (SKJ) trebalo je oko deset godina da postane sasvim svestan ozbiljnosti dezintegracionih pojava u Srbiji.

4.2. Pokretanje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja

Početkom 1980-ih godina Jugoslavija je upala u duboku ekonomsku i društvenu krizu, čije produbljivanje vlasti nisu bile u stanju da zaustave. U isto vreme, kosovski Srbi i beogradski verski i intelektualni krugovi doprineli su pokretanju srpskog nacionalnog pitanja u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji. Demonstracije Albanaca u proleće 1981. označile su početak tog postepenog procesa. Koristeći slabost Partije, sveštenici (Atanasije Jevtić, Irinej Bulović, Amfilohije Radović) su stali u odbranu srpskog nacionalnog interesa na Kosovu, koje se smatralo “biološkom i duhovnom suštinom” srpskog naroda i glavnim mestom u njegovom kolektivnom pamćenju. Oni su upućivali apele i pisali članke za časopise koje je objavljivala Srpska pravoslavna Crkva (*Pravoslavlje, Glas Crkve*), u kojima su osuđivali “zločine” albanskih “separatista i nacionalista”.¹¹⁷ Od 1982. godine, kosovski Srbi bili su odlučni u tome da se suprotstave albanizaciji te oblasti. Postepeno su stvorili pokret otpora, koji su predvodili Kosta Bulatović, Boško Budimirović, Miroslav

¹¹⁶ U vezi s ulogom Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije u rešavanju pitanja srpskog jedinstva vidi “Šta kažu važeća partijska dokumenta o odnosima u SR Srbiji”, *Borba*, 8. juli 1988, str. 5.

¹¹⁷ Radmila Radić, “Crkva i žsrpsko pitanje”, u Nebojša POPOV, *Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju* (Beograd: Republika, 1996), str. 267-304.

Šolević i drugi. Pokret je odigrao presidnu ulogu u buđenju srpske nacionalne svesti tokom 1980-ih godina. U jesen 1985, pokret je delio jednu peticiju kojom je osuđivao albanski separatizam, smatrajući ga odgovornim za egzodus tamošnjih Srba. Potpisivanje peticije predstavljalo je ponavljanje zahteva srpskog pokreta na Kosovu, koji je od tog trenutka postajao sve masovniji. Ovi aktivisti su pojačali pritisak na političko rukovodstvo republike Srbije, federacije i SKJ.

Dok su beogradski intelektualci prvu polovinu 1980-ih proveli aktivno braneci ljudska prava i slobodu izražavanja, od 1985. glavna tema njihovih javnih i političkih nastupa bio je srpski narod. Udruženje književnika podržavalo je kosovske Srbe, a istaknuti članovi Akademije nauka i umetnosti (Pavle Ivić, Antonije Isaković, Mihailo Marković, Radovan Samardžić, Kosta Mihailović i drugi) napisali su *Memorandum* u kojem su detaljno analizirali stanje u jugoslovenskom društvu i položaj Srbije u njemu. Taj dokument, za koji se često pogrešno navodilo da je tajni i zaverenički, zapravo je sačinjen u okviru obavljanja svakodnevnih legalnih aktivnosti glavne sprske naučne ustanove.¹¹⁸ Kada je nacrt dokumenta već bio u podmakloj fazi, on je nekim kanalom stigao do beogradskih dnevnih novina "Večernjih novosti", u kojima je objavljen 24. septembra 1986. Njegovo objavljivanje je u političkom smilu šokiralo i javnost i Savez komunista Jugoslavije. Nedovršeno delo više autora, *Memorandum*, kritička ocena situacije u jugoslovenskoj federaciji, nije bio koherentan spis.

Kontradiktoran po sadržaju, *Memorandum* počinje opisom privredne i političke krize iskazanim projugoslovenskim i univerzalističkim jezikom, pri čemu se izražava žaljenje zbog toga što je fenomen nacije dobio primat nad konceptom klase, ali se završava definisanjem konkretnih interesa srpskog naroda. U tom završnom delu naglasak je na privrednom zaostajanju Srbije, njenom složenom ustavnom položaju zbog

¹¹⁸ Kosta Mihailović, Vasilije Krestić, *"Memorandum SANU": odgovori na kritike* (Beograd: SANU, 1995), str. 14. Ovaj tekst Srpska Akademija nauka i umetnosti objavila je na engleskom jeziku pod naslovom *"Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to Criticisms"*. Prevod na francuski naslovljen *"Le mémorandum de l'Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts : réponse aux critiques"* objavio je *L'Age d'homme* 1996, (Paris, Lausanne).

postojanja autonomnih pokrajina, kao i na položaju Srba na Kosovu. Autori su verovali da najbogatije republike, Slovenija i Hrvatska, ekonomski eksploatišu Srbiju i da je njihov odnos revanšistički zbog njene dominacije u prvoj Jugoslaviji (1918-1941). Verovali su da su albanski nacionalisti na Kosovu 1981. godine objavili “totalni rat” Srbima, žrtvama “fizičkog, političkog, pravnog i kulturnog genocida”. Zaključili su da Srbima u Hrvatskoj još od vremena nezavisne ustaške države (1941-1945) nije pretila tolika opasnost. Cilj ovih akademika bio je ponovno uspostavljanje ravnoteže i izjednačavanje srpskog naroda s ostalim narodima u sastavu Jugoslavije.

4.3. Ideološka transformacija Saveza komunista Srbije

U drugoj polovini 1980-ih godina u Srbiji se nije se mogao javiti snažan nacionalni pokret bez podrške Saveza komunista Srbije. Zapravo, nacionalističko preobraćenje jedne frakcije ove partije poogodovalo je izražavanju dotad osuđivane velikosrpske ideologije. Godine 1986. srpsko rukovodstvo je odlučilo da nađe rešenje za ustavnu krizu koja je nagrizala republiku. Ono je godinama pokušavalo da pregovorima sa drugom stranom izdejstvuje promene u autonomnim pokrajinama. Polako se išlo ka kompromisu. Suočeni sa rastućim nacionalizmom, ti rukovodioci su morali da dokažu da njihovi zahtevi za jedinstvenu republiku Srbiju nisu deo nacionalističke strategije.¹¹⁹ Političke vođe u drugim republikama su sa sumnjičavošću motrile aktivnosti svojih kolega u Srbiji. Mnogi od njih su, zapravo, smatrali da je tadašnji predsednik Srbije, Ivan Stambolić, i sam nacionalista. Godine 1986. Partija se suočila sa sve otvorenijim pokretom otpora kosovskih Srba, kojem su sve veću podršku davali intelektualci u prestonici. Krajem septembra i početkom oktobra, Partiju je potreslo objavljivanje delova *Memoranduma* Akademije nauka i umetnosti. Njen vrh je žustro reagovao, osuđujući

¹¹⁹ Ivan Stambolić, *Put u bespuće: odgovori Ivana Stambolića na pitanja Slobodana INIĆA*, (Beograd : Radio B92, 1995).

nacionalistički sadržaj *Memoranduma*. Nakon objavljivanja tog dokumenta među komunističkom elitom Srbije došlo je do sve većih podela. Podela nije nužno bila na dogmatsko (ili konzervativno) i reformističko krilo, mada je konzervativno bilo sklonije nacionalističkom opredeljenju. Reformsko krilo Partije je takode bilo podeljeno po ovim pitanjima.

Godine 1987. Savez komunista se podelio u dve grupe – jednu je predvodio Slobodan Milošević, koji je proklamovao privrženost titoizmu i osudio srpski nacionalizam, ali i bezrezervno preuzeo zahteve kosovskih Srba, dok je drugu grupu predvodio Ivan Stambolić, koji je bio za ujedinjenje Srbije, ali uz poštovanje autonomije pokrajina i jugoslovenskih saveznih struktura. Prvi je bio predsednik Partije, dok je drugi imao bazu u beogradskom komitetu SK (Saveza komunista). Jaz između te dve frakcije stalno će se produbljivati i u septembru 1987. postaće nepremostiv.¹²⁰ Zbog kosovskog pitanja Partija konačno usvaja srpski nacionalni cilj. Za samo nekoliko meseci predsednik SK Srbije Slobodan Milošević uspeva da učvrsti svoju vlast. On je prisvojio nezadovoljstvo kosovskih Srba i Crnogoraca, koji su bili organizovani na nacionalnoj osnovi i van partijskih struktura. U trenutku kada je legitimitet Partije sve više dolazio u pitanje zbog duboke privredne i društvene krize, Miloševiću je uspelo da joj vrati legitimitet i predvodničku ulogu.¹²¹

Godine 1988-1989. došlo je to tzv. populističke “anti-birokratske revolucije” u vidu masovnih okupljanja u Vojvodini, centralnoj Srbiji i na Kosovu, radi davanja podrške kosovskim Srbima i novoj politici centralizacije Srbije.¹²² Posle masovnih javnih

¹²⁰ Razilazili su se pre svega u načinima i sredstvima sprovođenja politike partije. Odnosi su se zategli po pitanju imenovanja na najviše položaje u SK Srbije, kao i na položaje od strateškog značaja za konsolidaciju moći i kontrolu nad državnim aparatom i medijima.

¹²¹ Najviše zapanjuje to što je transformaciju komunizma u nacionalizam Milošević sproveo uz podršku vojske (čiji su čeoniljudi bili okoreli komunisti i pristalice Jugoslavije) i najviših ešalona Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Od septembra do decembra 1987. uklonio je svoje najvažnije kritičare iz Partije, među kojima i predsednika Srbije Ivana Stambolića, koji je, zapravo, odgirao značajnu ulogu u Miloševićevom političkom usponu.

¹²² Yves Tomić, “Milosevic et la mutation de la Ligue des communistes de Serbie: du communisme au nationalisme populiste (1986-1989)” / “Milošević i transformacija Saveza komunista Srbije: od komunizma do populističkog nacionalizma” / (*L'Autre Europe*, br. 34-35, mart 1997).

okupljanja u Novom Sadu 5. i 6. oktobra 1988, političko rukovodstvo Vojvodine, koje je želelo da sačuva autonomiju te pokrajine, primorano je na ostavke. Posle prvog neuspešnog pokušaja 7. i 8. oktobra 1988, slične akcije u Titogradu dovele su do pada crnogorskih vlasti, 10. i 11. januara 1989. U oktobru 1988. organizacija komunista na Kosovu uklonila je sa vlasti Kaćušu Jašari i Azema Vlasija, koje je smatrala suviše blagonaklonim prema albanskom nacionalizmu, što je dovelo do protestnih okupljanja Albanaca. Cilj mobilizacije naroda bio je da Srbi ostvare kontrolu nad Kosovom, koje im je izmicalo iz ruku i čije stanovništvo je sada bilo 90 % albansko. Izmene Ustava Srbije kojima je sužena autonomija pokrajina zvanično su usvojene 28. marta 1989. Posle daljih demonstracija Albanaca, na Kosovu je proglašeno vanredno stanje. Tokom 1989. sukobi u Savezu komunista Jugoslavije su se intenzivirali, posebno između rukovodstva Srbije i rukovodstva Slovenije. Kriza se produbila kada je Srbija prekinula ekonomske odnose sa Slovenijom, pošto su slovenačke vlasti zabranile okupljanje kosovskih Srba i Crnogoraca u Ljubljani.

Za razliku od 1970-ih i prve polovine 1980-ih godina, kada se srpsko komunističko rukovodstvo u težnji za jedinstvenom Socijalističkom Republikom Srbijom pozivalo na potrebu racionalizacije državnih funkcija radi ublažavanja privredne i društvene krize, u drugoj polovini 1980. godina njegov glavni cilj je bio objedinjavanje srpskog narodu u sopstvenoj republici. U rasponu od nekoliko godina, nacionalistički orijentisane političke elite prešle su sa zahteva za “objedinjavanje Socijalističke Republike Srbije” na zahtev za “objedinjavanje srpskog naroda”. Pošto je to bila logika načela jedinstva, jedinstvo se nije moglo ograničiti na Srbiju, već je moralo obuhvatiti, u relativno bliskoj budućnosti, teritorije naseljene Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini. Srpski nacionalisti, tako, od 1989. počinju da se usredsreduju na položaj Srba u Hrvatskoj. Rukovodstvo u Beogradu se tome nije protivilo. Dana 9. jula 1989, nekih 80.000 Srba iz Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine i Srbije okupilo se u blizini Knina na

proslavi šestote godišnjice Kosovske bitke. Savez komunista Srbije je sve više usvajao sadžaj *Memoranduma* Akademije nauka i umetnosti, u kojem se osuđivao podređen položaj Srbije i Srba u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji. Nacionalistička ideologija se koristila kao sredstvo za vraćanje legitimiteta Partiji i za njeno jačanje. I dok komunističke partije u drugim socijalističkim zemljama centralne i istočne Evrope nisu uspevale da zaustave osipanje svoje moći, Partija u Srbiji je uspela da ojača svoju moć i konsoliduje svoju poziciju uoči uvođenja političkog pluralizma i institucija reprezentativne demokratije 1990. godine. Narodni pokret u Srbiji može se protumačiti kao reakcija na marginalni položaj te republike u jugoslovenskoj federaciji i stagnaciju njene privrede. Srbija se našla u procepu modernih razvojnih tokova i želje za očuvanjem zastarelih društvenih struktura. Srpske vođe su stremile redefinisanju ustavnog statusa Srbije, kao i njenih odnosa sa drugim republikama, putem centralizacije saveznih ovlašćenja. Otvaranje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja olakšale su privredna i društvena kriza i slabost jugoslovenske države, čiju su koheziju podrivale ekonomske i političke deobe.

4.4. Političke ideje Vojislava Šešelja

Vojislav Šešelj je postao član Saveza komunista Jugoslavije sa šesnaest i po godina, kao predstavnik učenika svoje srednje škole.¹²³ Na Univerzitetu u Sarajevu nalazio se na važnim položajima u Savezu studenata. Studirao je pravo i istakao se time što je, umesto za četiri, diplomirao za dve godine i osam meseci. Godine 1976. nastavio je studije na Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu, stekavši titulu magistra u junu 1978, a godinu dana kasnije, sa dvadeset i pet godina, odbranio je doktorsku disertaciju.¹²⁴ Nakon što na konkursu za asistenta na Pravnom fakultetu u Sarajevu nije izabran u to zvanje, Vojislav Šešelj se zaposlio na Fakultetu političkih nauka. Od decembra 1979. do novembra 1980.

¹²³ Nada BOJIĆ, *Ko ste vi, Vojislave Šešelju?* (Beograd: Dereta, 1992), str. 40.

¹²⁴ Naslov disertacije bio je: "Politička suština militarizna i fašizma". BOJIĆ, str. 75.

godine služio je vojni rok u Beogradu, ali je za to vreme izgubio mesto na fakultetu. Za taj zastoj u karijeri optužio je profesore muslimanske nacionalnosti (Atifa Purivatru, Hasana Sušića i Omera Ibrahimagića), nazvavši ih “panislamistima” i “nacionalistima”.¹²⁵ U to vreme Vojislav Šešelj prvi put jasno formuliše svoje tadašnje političke ideje.¹²⁶ Od septembra 1981. ponovo drži nastavu na Fakultetu političkih nauka u Sarajevu, iz oblasti međunarodnih odnosa.

Početakom 1980-ih godina Vojislav Šešelj počinje da učestvuje u intelektualnim raspravama. Skrenuo je pažnju na sebe time što je podržao Nenada Kecmanovića, kojeg su političke vlasti Bosne i Hercegovine napale zbog njegovih kritičkih članaka u beogradskom nedeljniku “NIN”.¹²⁷ Takođe, Šešelj je napao Branka Miljuša, sekretara Saveza komunista Sarajeva, da je u svom magistarskom radu, navodno, prepisivao od drugih.¹²⁸ Ujedno je u “Književnoj reči” kritikovao univerzitetske profesore muslimanske nacionalnosti (Atifa Purivatru, Hasana Sušića i Muhameda Filipovića) zbog osujećivanja njegove karijere.¹²⁹ Prebacivao im je učešće na jednoj međunarodnoj konferenciji u Madridu posvećenoj “Zelenoj knjizi” Muamera Gadafiya. Tvrdio je da su u svojim radovima pomenuti intelektualci zastupali “panislamska” gledišta.¹³⁰ Zbog svojih stavova Vojislav Šešelj je isključen iz Saveza komunista 4. decembra 1981.¹³¹ Oslobođen je izvođenja nastave na Fakultetu političkih nauka, a u proleće 1982. imenovan je za

¹²⁵ Vojislav Šešelj, *Hajka na jeretika* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 12.

¹²⁶ Objavio je niz članaka u raznim časopisima (*Književna reč*, *NIN*, *Duga*, *Ideje*) osuđujući argumente “reakcionarnih panislamista”, grupe muslimanskih intelektualaca iz Bosne i Hercegovine koja je bila povezana sa Hamdijom Pozdercem, predsednikom Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine. Vojislav Šešelj je dao istorijski prikaz te kontroverze i polemike u svojoj knjizi *Hajka na jeretika*, str. 37-42.

¹²⁷ Vojislav Šešelj, *Osvajanje slobode*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 110. Nenad Kecmanović je 1981. objavio nekoliko članaka u beogradskom nedeljniku “NIN”, u kojima je kritikovao Savez komunista Bosne i Hercegovine zbog suprotstavljanja ideološkom usmerenju Saveza komunista. Šešelj, *Hajka na jeretika*, str. 18.

¹²⁸ Šešelj, *Hajka na jeretika*, str. 43-48. Branko Miljuš je bio asistent na Fakultetu političkih nauka i, isto kao i Vojislav Šešelj, predavao je međunarodne odnose. Mesto mu je, međutim, zamrznuto zbog političke funkcije koju je imao u Savezu komunista Bosne i Hercegovine. Prema tvrdjenju Vojislava Šešelja, Branko Miljuš je bio jedan od predvodnika političke kampanje protiv Nenada Kecmanovića, takođe univerzitetskog profesora. Šešelj, *Osvajanje slobode*, str. 138.

¹²⁹ Šešelj, *Hajka na jeretika*, str. 164.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, *Hajka na jeretika*, str. 7-12.

¹³¹ Vojislav Šešelj, “Zašto sam isključen iz Saveza komunista?” (*Književna reč*, 25. decembar 1981), objavljeno u Vojislav Šešelj, *Hajka na jeretika*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 27-36.

istraživača u Insitutu za društvena istraživanja, ustanovi pri tom Fakultetu.¹³² Jedan broj beogradskih intelektualaca, uglavnom pisaca i istaživača u oblasti društvenih nauka, stao je u njegovu odbranu, pisanjem protestnih pisama vladi Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Centralnom komitetu Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine i Fakultetu političkih nauka u Sarajevu.¹³³ Negde u to vreme Vojislav Šešelj je počeo veoma oštro da kritikuje način na koji se u okviru Jugoslavije rešavalo nacionalno pitanje: zagovarao je upotrebu sile protiv kosovskih Albanaca i osuđivao pasivnost srpskog političkog rukovodstva u rešavanju kosovske krize. Po njegovom mišljenju, Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini nisu bili narod, već verska grupa. Izražavao je zebnju da će Bosna i Hercegovina postati republika u kojoj će odlučujuću reč imati Muslimani.

“U poslednje vrijeme, Vojo je bio zagovornik ideje mijenjanja Ustava SFRJ, koji po njegovom mišljenju, daje prevelika ovlaštenja pokrajinama. Smatrao je da bi novim Ustavom trebalo ojačati nadležnosti Federacije. Kao primjer navodio je da političko rukovodstvo Srbije, na koje je inače imao određenih primjedbi, zbog pasivnog držanja prema Kosovu, ne može da povuče neki radikalniji potez za sređivanje situacije na Kosovu, upravo zbog toga što autonomne pokrajine u okviru Srbije imaju suviše vlasti. Smatrao je da je Srbiji napravljena nepravda što su samo u njenim granicama formirane autonomne pokrajine, a što nije učinjeno u Hrvatskoj, gdje je po istoj analogiji, trebalo formirati autonomnu pokrajinu za Liku i Kordun, gdje je dominantno srpsko stanovništvo. U tom smislu je isticao da su tamo mogućnosti Srba da iskažu svoja nacionalna osjećanja i obilježja, manja nego u Srbiji. Stekla sam dojam da je za formiranje autonomnih pokrajina okrivljivao druga Tita. Stajao je na stanovištvu da je i crnogorska nacija svjesno isforsirana i da se tu u stvari radi o Srbima, za koje, inače, tvrdi da su daleko svesrdnije prihvatili jugoslovenstvo nego drugi narodi u Jugoslaviji. Isto tako, smatrao je da Muslimani nisu nacija, odnosno narod, te da se tu radi o jednoj islamskoj konfesionalnoj skupini. Bio je zaplašen da bi Bosna i Hercegovina mogla da se razvije u čistu muslimansku republiku i da djelatnost pojedinaca iz javnog života to ima kao konačan program i cilj, što bi, po njegovom mišljenju, moglo dovesti do iseljavanja Srba iz Bosne. U tom smislu smatrao je da je i položaj intelektualaca srpske nacionalnosti u Sarajevu neravno pravan u odnosu na Muslimane, što bi znao argumentovati sa nizom činjenica.”¹³⁴

U periodu 1982-1983, u razgovorima sa svojim sarajevskim poznanicima Šešelj je govorio o mogućoj teritorijalnoj podeli Bosne i Hercegovine u tri dela: srpski, hrvatski i muslimanski.¹³⁵

Prvi put Vojislav Šešelj je pritvoren (na dvadesetsedam sati) u februaru 1984, a potom u aprilu 1984 (na tri dana). Ovo drugo hapšenje dogodilo se u u jednom stanu u Beogradu gde je Slobodni univerzitet organizovao predavanje, a oko te ustanove bili su

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ Ovi spisi objavljeni su u Vojislav Šešelj, *Disidentski spomenar* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 28-30.

¹³⁴ Prema svedočenjima Šešeljevih kolega sa Fakulteta političkih nauka u Sarajevu, objavljenim u Vojislav Šešelj, *Veleizdajnički proces* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 22.

¹³⁵ Vidi svedočenja Šešeljevih kolega sa Fakulteta političkih nauka u Sarajevu, objavljenim u Šešelj, *Veleizdajnički proces*.

okupljeni kritički nastrojeni intelektualci, među kojima i disident Milovan Đilas.¹³⁶ Dana 15. maja 1984. Šešelj je ponovo uhapšen, da bi 9. jula te godine bio osuđen na osam godina zatvora za kontrarevolucionarnu delatnost protiv društvenog poretka. Optužen je da je odgovoran za sadržaj rukopisa *Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi?*, koji je Služba državne bezbednosti (tajna policija) pronašla u njegovom stanu. U tom dokumentu on je zagovarao reorganizaciju jugoslovenske federacije u četiri republike (Srbiju, Makedoniju, Hrvatsku i Sloveniju), kao i reviziju granice između Srbije i Hrvatske.¹³⁷

Š. . . Ć Nužno je ukidanje autonomnih pokrajina, ili bar njihovo striktno podvođenje pod srbijanski suverenitet, s obzirom da je u Vojvodini većinsko stanovništvo srpsko, a na Kosovu je pretežan dio albanske etičke skupine pokazao spremnost i odlučnost za vođenje separatističke politike, pa bi mu svako dalje davanje političkih beneficija bilo nesvršishodno i štetno sa stanovišta opštejugoslovenskih interesa i državnog razloga koji u ovakvim slučajevima ima presudan značaj. Jugoslovenska federacija bi se sastojala od četiri stvarno ravnopravne republike: Slovenije, Hrvatske, Srbije i Makedonije. Nužno je i novo teritorijalno razgraničenje između Srbije i Hrvatske. S obzirom na djelimičnu teritorijalnu izmiješanost srpskog i hrvatskog stanovništva na području Bosne, Hercegovine, Dalmacije, Like, Korduna, Banije i Slavonije, razgraničenje bi se ostvarilo na principu koji podrazumijeva da u granicama Hrvatske ostane isti broj građana srpske nacionalnosti kao u Srbiji hrvatske, prema podacima iz posljednjeg popisa stanovništva. Time bi konačno bilo riješeno srpsko-hrvatsko nacionalno pitanje na načelima humanizma i demokratije, te učvršćena međunacionalna sloga i zajedništvo, a izbjegnuta jedan od osnovnih uzroka razdora iz prošlosti.¹³⁸

Zahvaljujući angažovanju jugoslovenskih intelektualaca slučaj Vojislava Šešelja dobio je međunarodnu vidljivost, pa će on odslužiti samo godinu dana i deset meseci od izrečene zatvorske kazne.¹³⁹

Početak 1980-ih, Vojislav Šešelj se ideološki približio nacionalistički orijentisanim intelektualcima, poput Vuka Draškovića (1946-), koji je ranije takođe živio u Hercegovini i s kojim se Šešelj upoznao u januaru 1982, i Dobrice Ćosića (1921-), bivšeg člana Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i od 1960-ih godina političkog disidenta.¹⁴⁰ U

¹³⁶ Šešelj, *Veleizdanički proces*, str. 42.

¹³⁷ Ovaj tekst je, zapravo, bio odgovor na anketu koju su novinari Dušan Bogavac i Slobodan Kljakić sproveli za "Komunist", list Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, među videnim ličnostima jugoslovenske kulturne scene. Autori Vojislava Šešelja nisu intervjuisali, ali on je želeo da odgovori na njihova pitanja. Tekst je objavljen u Vojislav Šešelj, *Demokratija i dogma*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 117-137.

¹³⁸ Šešelj, *Demokratija i Dogma*, str. 130.

¹³⁹ Vojislav Šešelj, *Pravo na istinu*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991). Ovo delo je zbirka protestnih pisama, peticija i dopisa koje su jugoslovenski i strani intelektualci upućivali jugoslovenskim vlastima povodom kazne od osam godina zatvora izrečene Vojislavu Šešelju 1984. godine.

¹⁴⁰ Vuk Drašković, rođen 1946. u Vojvodini, u srpskoj porodici poreklom iz Hercegovine, diplomirao je na Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu (1968). Od 1969. do 1978. radio je kao novinar Jugoslovenke novinske agencije TANJUG, a zatim za novine "Rad". U prvoj polovini 1980-ih godina napisao je nekoliko romana, a tokom 1990-ih postao je glavni protivnik režima Slobodana Miloševića. Trenutno je ministar spoljnih

to vreme ova dva pisca bili su najbolji Šešeljevi prijatelji.¹⁴¹ Međutim, mada su obojica branili srpski nacionalni interes, ovi književnici nisu bili i politički istomišljenici: Dobrica Ćosić je ostao privržen svom učešću u partizanskom komunističkom pokretu tokom Drugog svetskog rata, dok je Vuk Drašković radio na rehabilitaciji četničkog pokreta Draže Mihailovića. Iako je Vojislav Šešelj bio veliki poštovalac Dobrice Ćosića, na ideološkom planu mu je bio mnogo bliži Vuk Drašković. Tako je Drašković čak krstio Šešeljevog najstarijeg sina. Vuk Drašković, bivši novinar jugoslovenske novinske agencije Tanjug, koji je bio isključen iz Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, počeo je da zastupa srpske nacionalne interese početkom 1980-ih. Poznato je njegovo pismo hrvatskim vlastima u kojem je protestovao zbog “kulturnog genocida” za koji je tvrdio da se sprovodi nad Srbima u Hrvatskoj, tražeći da im se vrati “kulturna i duhovna autonomija” koju su uživali pre 1941. Smatrao je da su Srbi u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini ugrožena manjina, da im na Kosovu pretili istrebljenje i da im u Crnoj Gori nije dozvoljeno da se slobodno nazivaju svojim etničkim imenom.¹⁴² Sa drugim piscima on je osuđivao politička suđenja Srbima u Bosni i Hercegovini, a posebno je naglašavao egzodus 200.000 Srba iz te republike.¹⁴³ Godine 1986, pisci Vuk Drašković i Milan Danajlić održali su, zajedno s istoričarem Veselinom Đuretićem, seriju predavanja po Severnoj Americi.¹⁴⁴

Posle 1986. godine, Vojislav Šešelj se priključio moćnom nacionalnom pokretu za jačanje položaja Srbije u okviru jugoslovenske federacije. Učestvovao je, na primer, u

poslova Srbije i Crne Gore (zvanična web-stranica Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Officials/draskovic_e.html, konsultovana 7. februara 2005, i vesti BETA od 24. juna 1999. godine u prevodu na Francuski “Balkans Courier”-a: <http://www.balkans.eu.org/article3103.html>, konsultovana 7. februara 2005).

¹⁴¹ Šešelj, *Veleizdajnički proces*, str. 15-17.

¹⁴² To pismo upućeno političkim vlastima Republike Hrvatske objavljeno je u štampi srpske dijaspore, između ostalog u “Četničkim novinama”, br. 279 iz maja 1986, str. 3, kao i u “Srbiji: glasu srpskih boraca”, br. 263, mart 1986, str. 3-4.

¹⁴³ U pismu od 9. januara 1986. koje su Predsedništvu Jugoslavije, Predsedništvu Republike Srbije i sredstvima informisanja uputili Vuk Drašković, Vojislav Lubarda, Gojko Đogo i Rajko Nogo. Pismo je objavljeno u novinama “Srbija: glas srpskih boraca”, br. 264, april 1986, str. 2.

¹⁴⁴ Na napad *Vjesnika*, zvaničnih zagrebačkih dnevnih novina, Vuk Drašković će uredništvu odgovoriti u septembru 1986. Njegov odgovor “Četničke novine” će objaviti u novembru 1986. Veselin Đuretić je autor knjige o Saveznicima i četnicima u Drugom svetskom ratu, u kojoj se rehabilituje Ravnogorski pokret.

demonstracijama koje su organizovali srpski aktivisti na Kosovu; bio je među demonstrantima koji su 8. jula 1988. otputovali u Novi Sad, da bi tamo protestovali protiv pokrajinskih vođa u Vojvodini, koje su optuživali da ne podržavaju kosovske Srbe.¹⁴⁵ Nakon što su vlasti u republici Srbiji započele s ustavnim reformama 1988, učestvovao je u debatama koje su o ustavnim promenama organizovali Udruženje književnika (22. februar 1988), Srpsko filozofsko društvo (22. mart 1988) i Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (17. i 18. mart 1988). Predlagao je da se jugoslovenska federacija preuredi tako da, umesto osam federalnih jedinica (šest republika i dve autonomne pokrajine), obuhvati samo tri federalne jedinice utemeljene na postojanju samo tri nacije u Jugoslaviji – Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Šešelj je smatrao da su Makedonci i Muslimani “izmišljene” nacije.¹⁴⁶ Srpska federalna jedinica je, pored Srbije, trebalo da obuhvati Bosnu, Hercegovinu, Crnu Goru, Makedoniju i druga područja, i mogla je biti organizovana na principu regionalne autonomije ovih istorijskih provincija.¹⁴⁷ Zagovarao je ukidanje ovlašćenja Autonomnim pokrajinama Vojvodini i Kosovu.¹⁴⁸ Time se Vojislav Šešelj uklapao u konceptualne okvire prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941), koja je priznavala samo tri konstitutivna naroda, i bio je na liniji rešenja koja su vreme prve Jugoslavije predlagali srpski nacionalisti, odnosno da jugoslovenska federacija treba da se sastoji od tri jedinice – srpske, hrvatske i slovenačke. On je u to vreme verovao i da je potrebna “nova kolonizacija Kosova i Metohije”, da bi se razrešile kriza i napetosti u toj autonomnoj jugoslovenskoj provinciji. Velika koncentracija Albanaca na jednoj teritoriji, po njegovom mišljenju činjenica od strateškog značaja, predstavljala je opasnost, zbog čega

¹⁴⁵ U septembarskom broju iz 1988. godine “Srbije: glasa srpskih boraca”, glasnika Pokreta srpskih četnika Ravne Gore, objavljeno je Šešeljevo otvoreno pismo Bošku Krunicu, koji se tada nalazio na čelu Autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine.

¹⁴⁶ Vojislav Šešelj, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 26. Došlo je do izmene stava u odnosu na tekst *Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi?*, gde je govorio o federaciji sa četiri republike: Srbijom, Hrvatskom, Slovenijom i Makedonijom.

¹⁴⁷ Šešelj, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav*, str. 32-33.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, str. 40.

je predlagao raseljavanje većeg dela albanske nacionalne manjine po celoj Jugoslaviji.¹⁴⁹

Godine 1988. sačinio je nacrt za izmenu Ustava Jugoslavije iz 1974. godine i Ustava republike Srbije.¹⁵⁰ Godine 1989. on je pad autonomaškog rukovodstva Vojvodine, potčinjavanje političkog rukovodstva Kosova rukovodstvu u Beogradu, i promenu garniture na vlasti u Crnoj Gori video kao prvu fazu u ujedinjavanju srpskog naroda.

“Srbi treba da povrate svoju političku moć i uticaj, treba da se postave shodno svojoj političkoj snazi. Što se tiče etapa, mislim da je prva etapa sa Vojvodinom, Kosovom i Metohijom i Crnom Gorom postignuta. U Crnoj Gori je bilo javnih zahteva da bude Crna Gora priključena Srbiji a u Bosni i Hercegovini i u srpskim delovima sadašnje Hrvatske, došlo je do velikih uznemirenja Srba. Tamo je bilo i velikih demonstracija. Pre mesec dana recimo u Banja Luci, Drvaru i nekim hercegovačkim mestima, u Kninu, Srbu u Lici, u Pakracu srpski narod se i tamo sve više budi, ustaje i javno izražava svoje zahteve. I to je povod razmišljanju da će dovesti do prirodnog ujedinjenja srpskog naroda u celini i politički i kulturno i ekonomski.”¹⁵¹

U drugoj polovini 1980-ih godina Vojislav Šešelj je produbljivao veze sa srpskom političkom emigracijom četničke orijentacije, posebno sa pokretom Momčila Đujića, bivšeg komandanta Četničke dinarske divizije. Ovaj pokret četničkih veterana, poznat pod nazivom Pokret srpskih četnika Ravne Gore u slobodnom svetu, imao je za cilj oslobađanje Srba od komunističke diktature i ujedinjavanje “srpskih zemalja”.¹⁵² Kada je posle trogodišnje zabrane dobio pasoš, Vojislav Šešelj je 1989. godine otputovao u Sjedinjene Države, Kanadu i Australiju i tamo proveo tri meseca, sastajući se sa predstavnicima raznih organizacija srpske dijaspore. Držao je predavanja u kojima je izlagao svoj nacionalni program:¹⁵³

Mi Srbi treba da u okviru Jugoslavije odredimo svoje nacionalne ciljeve, svoj nacionalni program i granice svoje državnosti i da prepustimo toj našoj, navodnoj sjevernoj braći Hrvatima i Slovenima, njihovoj slobodnoj volji, da se izjasne da li žele da žive u takvoj državi ili ne žele. Srpski narod nije apriori protiv postojanja Jugoslavije. Srpski narod je, duboko sam ubijeden, za postojanje Jugoslavije ali ne Jugoslavije po svaku cijenu. Samo one Jugoslavije koja bi svojim granicama poštovala granice srpske državnosti garantovane Londonskim ugovorom. Dakle, u slučaju opstanka federalne Jugoslavije,

¹⁴⁹ Šešelj, *Osvajanje slobode*, str. 184.

¹⁵⁰ Ovi tekstovi objavljeni su u Šešelj, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav*.

¹⁵¹ Intervju koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao štampi srpske dijaspore, objavljen i u Vojislav Šešelj, *Horvatove ustaške fantazmagorije i druge političke rasprave* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1992), str. 96-97.

¹⁵² Vidi reč urednika iz julske broja “Srbije: glasa srpskih boraca” iz 1986. godine, pod naslovom “Naš stav i naša poruka”:

/prevod s engleskog:/ “Četnički pokret Ravne Gore stvorio je srpski narod, koji je prolio krv radi njegovog osnivanja. Ciljevi tog pokreta bili su i ostali sloboda, jedinstvo i napredak svega srpskog. Š. . . Ć

Mi nismo stranka, grupa ili klika u službi pojedinaca. Mi smo živa, borbena snaga srpskog naroda, spremni smo da se žrtvuemo za slobodu Srpstva i jedinstvo svih srpskih zemalja.”

¹⁵³ Ta njegova predavanja objavljena su u Šešelj, *Horvatove ustaške fantazmagorije i druge političke rasprave*. Neka je takode objavila i četnička štampa u Sjedinjenim Državama.

srpska federalna jedinica u svojim granicama mora da ima, ne samo današnju Srbiju, današnje pokrajine Vojvodinu, Kosovo i Metohiju, nego i Makedoniju, Crnu Goru, Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Dubrovnik, Dalmaciju, Liku, Baniju, Kordun, istočnu Slavoniju i Baranju. Sve ove granice nisu garantovane Londonskim ugovorom; njih je obilježio Ante Pavelić u toku Drugog svjetskog rata. Obilježio ih je srpskim grobljima, masovnim grobnicama, srpskim stratištima, logorima, klanicama, jamama. A mišljenja sam da srpski narod ni po koju cijenu ne smije dozvoliti da bilo koje masovno groblje ostane van granica srpske države.¹⁵⁴

U svojim predavanjima Šešelj je tražio uvođenje sankcija Hrvatima, krivim za većinsku podršku režimu Ante Pavelića tokom Drugog svjetskog rata. Smatrao je da je Hrvatska jedna proizvoljno kreirana država kojoj su 1945. godine pripale teritorije koje nikada ranije nije imala, kao npr. Dubrovnik. U vezi s Kosovom bio je još osvetoljubiviji:

Što se tiče Kosova i Metohije srpski narod je kroz svoju istoriju više puta ratovao za Kosovo i Metohiju. Ako bude potrebno, srpski narod će ponovo ratovati za Kosovo i Metohiju. I rijeke krvi će se propliti da Kosovo i Metohija ostanu srpska teritorija, ako nas na to prisile. Mi ne prijetimo ali obećavamo, ako budemo prisiljeni, tako ćemo uraditi. Smatram da jedno od načela tog Srpskog programa treba da bude zahtev za novom kolonizacijom Kosova i Metohije. Na koji način?

Š...ĆMedutim, na Kosovo i Metohiju bi se mogli preseliti srpska i jugoslovenska prestonica, svi državni organi, ustanove i institucije. To bi podrazumjevalo preseljenje više stotina hiljada državnih činovnika i članova njihovih porodica. Zatim na Kosovo i Metohiju bi se mogle preseliti sve vojne i policijske akademije, sve vojne ustanove koje nisu direktno vezane za komandovanje pojedinim armijskim oblastima. Na taj način počinjalo bi se naseljavati što više državnih činovnika, državnih službenika na Kosovu. Onaj ko neće da se preseli da bude jednostavno otpušten iz državne službe i neka se sam snalazi. Državni činovnici koji su decenijama posle rata uživali najviše privilegije treba da daju svoj doprinos rješavanju našeg ključnog problema.¹⁵⁵

Pre povratka u Srbiju Šešelj je srpsku emigraciju pozvao da bude ujedinjena, kako bi mogao da se formira jedan “srpski demokratski pokret”. Po njegovom mišljenju, njihova zajednička platforma mogla je biti:

1 – Definitivno rušenje kulta ličnosti Josipa Broza Tita kao zlikovca i tiranina koji nam je najveće nacionalne poraze naneo, kao i okončanje komunističke diktature i samovolje antisrpske koalicije nad našom otadžbinom.

2 – Obnavljanje granice srpske državnosti po istorijskim i etničkim kriterijumima, na kojima su one zasnovane i u tekstu Londonskog ugovora iz 1915. godine.

3 – Uspostavljanje demokratskog režima s višepartijskim sistemom i slobodnom tržišnom privredom.¹⁵⁶

Dana 28. juna 1989, Momčilo Đujić, koji je Vojislava Šešelja upravo proglasio vojvodom četničkog pokreta, dao je izjavu u kojoj se izjasnio za ujedinjenje srpskih zemalja:

¹⁵⁴ “Program Dr. Vojislava Šešelja: iz predavanja kod Gračanice u Americi”, *Četničke novine*, br. 298, juli 1989, str. 4.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, str. 5.

¹⁵⁶ “Srbija: glas srpskih boraca”, br. 303, juli 1989, str. 2.

Dolaze dani vaskrsa i obnove SRPSKE DRŽAVE na Balkanu u kojoj će biti ujedinjeno svo Srpstvo i sve srpske zemlje sa granicama dokle dopiru naši hramovi, domovi i grobovi. Da to što pre postignemo, treba da utvrdimo naše srpsko duhovno i nacionalno jedinstvo pod blagoslovom naše Svetosavske Crkve, sa vjerom u Boga i Svetoga Savu, spremni na svekolike žrtve u borbi u kojoj ćemo izvojevati pobjedu i slobodu, ne očekujući od nikoga pomoć osim od Boga Svemogućeg.

Hrvati su nam kroz vjekove bili i ostali najveći dušmani koji su nas u prošlom ratu poklali više nego Turci za pet stotina godina. Sa njima nema nikakvog pregovora, razgovora i nagadanja. **Mi ćemo zaposjesti granice naših srpskih zemalja i nema sile koja će nas maknuti sa tih granica.** (podvukao Y. T.).¹⁵⁷

Vojislav Šešelj je svoj projekat Velike Srbije zasnivao i na istorijskim i na etničkim pravima. Često se pozivao na međunarodno pravo da bi opravdao teritorijalne granice buduće srpske države, posebno one prema Makedoniji i Hrvatskoj. Što se tiče Hrvatske, svoje argumente je temeljio na Londonskom ugovoru, koji su 26. aprila 1915. potpisale države Antante i Italija, da bi Italiju navele da ude u rat protiv Nemačke i Austrougarske.¹⁵⁸ Taj Ugovor, sa četiri države potpisnice (Velika Britanija, Francuska, Rusija i Italija), nastao u tajnim pregovorima bez konsultovanja srpske vlade, trebalo je da udovolji teritorijalnim pretenzijama Italije u Dalmaciji, u zamenu za njen ulazak u rat na strani Antante.¹⁵⁹ U Ugovoru se, dakle, nisu direktno pominjali nikakvi teritorijalni ustupci Srbiji za stvaranje Velike Srbije, kako to tvrdi Vojislav Šešelj.¹⁶⁰

“A granice Srpske federalne jedinice mogu biti samo one granice Srpske države, koje su garantovane Londonskim paktom 1915. godine. To znači, u granicama Srbije treba da bude i sadašnja uža Srbija, Vojvodina, Kosovo i Metohija, Crna Gora, Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija, Dubrovnik, Dalmacija, Lika, Kordun, Banija, istočna Slavonija i Baranja.”¹⁶¹

Mada se u članu 5 Londonskog ugovora jasno kaže da će sve teritorije koje nisu vraćene Italiji generalno biti dodeljene “Hrvatskoj, Srbiji i Crnoj Gori”, to nije značilo da države učesnice nisu imale dogovor o teritorijalnim prekusijama Ugovora. Tako je Dalmaciju

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, str. 4.

¹⁵⁸ René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference /Italija na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu/*, (Njujork: Columbia University Press, 1938), str. 575.

¹⁵⁹ Milan Marjanović, *Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917.* (Zagreb: Jugoslovenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1960), str. 232-233.

¹⁶⁰ Delovi Ugovora koji se odnose na južnoslovenske zemlje mogu se naći na stranici Interneta Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/londonski_ugovor_s.html.

¹⁶¹ Vojislav Šešelj, *Politika kao izazov savesti* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), str. 9.

trebalo podeliti i dodeliti nekolikim državama, a ne samo Srbiji.¹⁶² Ipak, britanske, francuske, ruske i italijanske diplomate predvidele su da deo dalmatinske obale između rta Planka (Ploča na srpskom), severno od Splita, i Crne Gore pripadne Srbiji, koja bi se onda prostirala i do Bosne i Hercegovine.¹⁶³ Međutim, u želji da se uspostavi određena ravnoteža među silama u regionu, tokom pregovora o Londonskom ugovoru (u martu i aprilu 1915) nije bilo predviđeno da ova proširena Srbija obuhvati Hrvatsku i Slavoniju.¹⁶⁴ Premda definiše liniju razgraničenja duž dalmatinska obale, Londonski ugovor ne definiše granice u unutrašnjosti zemlje, pogotovo ne granicu duž linije Karlobag - Ogulin - Karlovac - Virovitica vidigeografsku kartu 9 u Dodatku. Osim toga, Karlobag, koji se nalazi severno od Zadra (Zara na italijanskom) na dalmatinskoj obali, nije trebao da pripadne Srbiji, već Hrvatskoj.¹⁶⁵ Tokom leta 1915, sile Antante

¹⁶² Italijanska vlada želela je da uzme celu Dalmaciju. Londonski ugovor je za pretpostavku uzeo postojanje tri države: Hrvatske, Srbije i Crne Gore. Milan Marjanović, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam* (Split: Redakcija listova JRM, 1953), str. 27.

¹⁶³ *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917: d'après les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères à Petrograd* (Tajni dokumenti ruske diplomatije, 1914-1917: iz arhive Ministarstva spoljnih poslova u Petrogradu), (Paris: Payot, 1928), str. 229-230.

¹⁶⁴ René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference /Italija na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu*, str. 31.

¹⁶⁵ Marjanović, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam*, str. 26.

Član 5 Londonskog sporazuma predviđa sledeće:

“Italija će dobiti i provinciju Dalmaciju u njenim sadašnjim granicama, obuhvatajući na severu Lisaricu i Tribanj, a na jugu do jedne linije, koja počinje na obali rta Planka i koja se proteže na istok prateći vrhove, koje stvaraju razvode na način, da će na italijanskoj teritoriji ostati sve doline i vodene žile, koje silaze prema Šibeniku, kao što su Čikola, Krka i Butišnjica i njihove pritoke. Italija će, takode, dobiti ostrva, koja se nalaze na severu i na zapadu Dalmacije počev od ostrva Premude, Silbe, Oliba, Škrde, Maun, Pag i Vir na severu, do Mljeta na jugu, obuhvatajući ostrva Sv. Andrija, Biševo, Vis, Hvar, Torkul, Korčula, Kaciol i Lastovo, sa susednim grebenima i ostrvcima, zatim Palagruž, izuzev ostrva Veliki i Mali Drvenik, Čiovo, Šolta i Brač.

Neutralizovano će biti:

1. - Cela obala od rta Planka na severu do južne obale poluostrva Pelješac na jugu tako da se obuhvati celo poluostrvo;
2. - deo obale, koji počinje na severu na jednoj tački udaljenoj 10 kilometara južno od Cavtata, pa se zatim prostire prema jugu sve do reke Vojuše tako da obuhvata zaliv i luke Kotor, Bar, Ulcinj, Sv. Ivan Medovanski, Drač, ne kršeći prava koje ima Crna Gora na osnovu izjava koje su velike Sile izmenile aprila i maja 1909; ova prava se odnose samo na sadašnju teritoriju Crne Gore i neće važiti za one zemlje i luke koje će joj tek biti dodeljene; prema tome, nijedan deo obale, koju danas ima Crna Gora, neće biti neutralizovan; na snazi će ostati ograničenja koja se odnose na luku Bar na koja je pristala Crna Gora 1909;
3. - i na kraju sva ostrva koja nisu dodeljena Italiji.

Primedba:

Četiri velike Sile saveznice dodeliće Hrvatskoj, Srbiji i Crnoj Gori sledeće teritorije: Na gornjem Jadranu čitavu obalu od Voloskog na granici Istre do severne obale Dalmacije, obuhvatajući sadašnju ugarsku obalu i hrvatsko primorje, sa lukom Rijeka i malim lukama Novi i Karlobag, kao i ostrva Krk, Prvić, Grgur, Goli i Rab. Na južnom Jadranu, u oblasti za koju su zainteresovane Srbija i Crna Gora, cela obala od rta Planka do reke Drim, sa važnim lukama Split,

(Francuska, Velika Britanija, Rusija, Italija) su želele da Bugarska i Rumunija uđu u rat protiv Austrougarske i Nemačke i obećale su im teritorije (prvoj istočni deo Makedonije, drugoj Banat), koje su pripadale Srbiji ili je trebalo da uđu u buduću Jugoslaviju u skladu s pretenzijama tadašnje srpske vlade Nikole Pašića. Sile Antante su se u jednoj noti od 4. avgusta 1915. obavezale da će Srbiji te teritorijalne ustupke nadoknaditi na jadranskoj obali i u Bosni i Hercegovini, kao i uspostavljanjem zajedničke granice sa Grčkom, dok se Hrvatska nigde nije pominjala.¹⁶⁶ Ukoliko je srpskoj vladi iko ponudio Veliku Srbiju, bio je to 1915. godine ministar spoljnih poslova Velike Britanije, Edward Grey, koji je to učinio samostalno, i to samo u sklopu jednog zahteva upućenog ruskoj vladi.¹⁶⁷ Tokom jula i avgusta 1915. godine, za vreme pregovora sa Bugarskom i Rumunijom o njihovom ulasku u rat protiv snaga Osovine, teritorije koje su predložene kao kompenzacija Kraljevini Srbiji menjale su oblik i nikada nisu ušle ni u jedan jedini diplomatski sporazum. Štaviše, zbog protivljenja italijanske diplomatije, koja je smatrala da pitanje ujedinjenja Hrvatske i južne Mađarske (Vojvodine) sa Srbijom treba da ostane otvoreno,

Dubrovnik, Kotor, Bar, Ulcinj i Sv. Ivan Medovanski, i sa ostrvima Veliki Drvenik, Mali Drvenik, Čiovo, Šolta, Brač, Jakljan i Koločep. Luka Drač ostaće nezavisnoj muslimanskoj državi Albaniji.”

Izvor: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/london_treaty_e.html (konsultovano 17. oktobra 2005). Engleski tekst na stranici interneta Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore preuzet je iz Marjanović, *Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915.: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917.*, str. 445-449.

¹⁶⁶ Dragoslav Janković, *Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914-1915. godine*, (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju), 1973, str. 127.

¹⁶⁷ Đorđe Đ. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije*, (Beograd: Nolit, 1984), str. 128. Kako je uočio istoričar Đorđe Stanković sa Univerziteta u Beogradu, tu se prvi put pominje sintagma “Velika Srbija”.

Pored Vojislava Šešelja, takvo tumačenje Londonskog ugovora iz aprila 1915. ima i izvestan broj drugih srpskih istoričara (Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, tom 2, str. 747). U pasusu naslovljenom “Londonski ugovor” u jednom srednjoškolskom užbeniku istorije XX veka koji je objavljen u Srbiji, autori tvrde sledeće:

/prevod s engleskog:/ “U drugoj godini sukoba, izgledalo je da će ujedinjenje Srba i stvaranje velike Srbije biti mogući prema Londonskom ugovoru od 26. aprila 1915. godine, u vidu sporazuma Italije i sila Antante o teritorijalnim ustupcima Italiji (Istra i veći deo Dalmacije), da bi Italija ušla u rat. Saveznici su takode ponudili Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Slavoniju, Srem, Bačku, južnu Dalmaciju i severnu Albaniju Srbiji. Š...Ć”

Kosta Nikolić, Nikola Žutić, Momčilo Pavlović, Zorica Špadijer, *Istorija 3/4*, (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2002), str. 132.

Ove tvrdnje izazvale su žestoku polemiku u beogradskom nedeljniku “Vreme”, a pobijala ih je Dubravka Stojanović, profesor istorije sa Univerziteta u Beogradu (“O metodologiji, poštenju i skandalima”, *Vreme*, br. 628, 16. januar 2003, <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=331016>).

hrvatske teritorije nisu bile deo moguće Velike Srbije.¹⁶⁸ To je, između ostalog, i bio razlog da predsednik srpske vlade Nikola Pašić odbije predloge Antante, jer oni nisu vodili ka ujedinjavanju Južnih Slovena u državu Jugoslaviju.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Marjanović, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam*, str. 27-29.

¹⁶⁹ U predlozima sila Antante koji su predočeni srpskoj vladi nisu se pominjale teritorije Hrvatske ili Slovenije. Osim toga, neutralizacija jadranske obale, koja je trebalo da pripadne Srbiji, bila je neprihvatljiva šefu srpske vlade. *Ibid*, str. 127-128. Stanković, str. 128.

5. Srpska radikalna stranka (SRS) – stranka za Veliku Srbiju

5.1 Od četničkih grupica do Srpske radikalne stranke

Nacionalistički orijentisani intelektualci koji su u drugoj polovini 1980-ih ustali u odbranu kosovskih Srba pregrupisali su se početkom 1990-ih i osnovali svoju prvu političku organizaciju – Srpski slobodarski pokret, sa Vojislavom Šešeljem kao predsednikom.¹⁷⁰ Ova marginalna politička grupa isticala se svojom privrženošću ideji da svi Srbi na teritoriji Jugoslavije treba da se ujedine u jednu državu, ukoliko bi se Slovenija ili Hrvatska otcpile od Jugoslavije:

1. Pokret se zalaže za obnovu punog, nacionalnog, duhovnog, kulturnog, ekonomskog i političkog jedinstva srpskog naroda, za puno međusobno razumevanje i solidarnost Srba vernika i Srba ateista, za bratsku slogu Srba pravoslavaca, Srba muslimana, Srba katolika i Srba protestanata.

Sve ono što nas je proteklih decenija i vekova delilo treba da bude ostavljeno prošlosti i prepušteno istorijskoj nauci radi objektivnog istraživanja i objašnjavanja, lišeno bilo kakvih ideoloških predrasuda. Obnova naših tradicionalnih narodnih vrednosti, kulturnih tekovina, slobodarskih htenja i demokratskih dostignuća znači ujedno i raskid s celokupnim dogmatskim nasledem, svim vidovima totalitarnih ideologija i komunističkim političkim monopolizmom.

Smatramo da srpski narod u principu nije protiv postojanja Jugoslavije, ali je kao zajedničku državu u budućnosti može prihvatiti samo pod uslovom da njeno postojanje ne dovodi u pitanje ni jednu tekovinu oslobodilačkih ratova Srbije i Crne Gore u protekla dva veka. U jugoslovenskom pravnom poretku treba da bude odbačeno sve ono što je rezultat komunističkog revolucionarnog nasilja i decenijama vodene izrazito antisrpske politike, čije su pogubne posledice najočitije u oktroisanoj administrativnoj podeli države.

U tom smislu posebno se deklariramo kao protivnici veštačkih teritorijalnih podela srpskih zemalja i insistiramo prevashodno na principu da nijedna politička stranka ili jugoslovenski režim nema pravo da srpskom narodu oduzme one teritorije koje je Srbija imala u svom sastavu pre stvaranja Jugoslavije.

U slučaju da Slovenci i Hrvati odluče da istupe iz Jugoslavije, zalažemo se za demokratsku integraciju svih istorijskih pokrajina u kojima u većini živi srpski narod.

Da bi se postiglo potpuno nacionalno pomirenje svih Srba neophodno je odstraniti sve ideološke, pravne i političke posledice veštački izazvanog krvavog građanskog rata, kao i omogućiti potpuno slobodno istoriografsko i uopšte naučno proučavanje svih zbivanja iz naše novije istorije.

¹⁷⁰ U osnivačkom odboru bili su: Vojislav Šešelj, pravnik; Đorđe Nikolić, biolog; Vojislav Lubarda, pisac; Tripo Zirojević, lekar; Aleksandar Čotrić, student; Radivoje PANIĆ, student; Vojin Vuletić, tehničar; Milija Šćepanović, oficir u penziji; Mladen Markov, pisac; Miodrag Glišić, ekonomista; Todor Bošković, radnik; Bogoljub Pejčić, publicista; Jovan Radulović, pisac; Rajko Petrov Nogo, pisac; Slobodan Rakitić, pisac; Ljubica Miletić, pisac; Dušan Vukajlović, pisac; Alek Vukadinović, pisac; Milorad Vukosavljević, pisac.

Ubedeni smo da je neophodno posebnu pažnju posvetiti stvaranju mogućnosti za slobodan i nesmetan povratak u Otadžbinu svim srpskim iseljenicima, kao i stalnom jačanju kulturnih, ekonomskih i političkih veza Otadžbine i dijaspore.

Beograd, 6. januar 1990.¹⁷¹

Ova organizacija, koja je brojala 540 članova, nije dugo postojala pod tim imenom. Dana 14. marta 1990. priključila se nekim članovima Srpske narodne obnove (SNO), stranke osnovane u januaru 1990, na čijem čelu je bio Mirko Jović, pa je tako osnovana nova organizacija poznata pod nazivom Srpski pokret obnove (SPO).¹⁷² Pisac Vuk Drašković izabran je za predsednika SPO, a Vojin Vuletić za sekretara. Partijsko rukovodstvo brojalo je tridesetjednog člana – šesnaest iz SNO i petnaest iz SSO. Tom prilikom SPO je zaključio sledeće:

Srpski pokret obnove iskazuje dužni prioritet prema tri miliona Srba koji su izginuli i poklani u ratovima od 1912. do 1918. i od 1941. do 1945. godine, da bi Jugoslavija bila stvorena, odnosno obnovljena. Poštujući jugoslovenske ideale te najveće kosturnice našeg naroda, Srpski pokret obnove ne želi i neće da razbija Jugoslaviju.

Istovremeno, SPO ne osporava pravo ni slovenačkog ni hrvatskog naroda da osnuju svoje samostalne države i otepe se od Jugoslavije ili proglaše konfederalni odnos sa Jugoslavijom.

Opominjemo, međutim, da će, u oba slučaja, Srpski pokret obnove imati isti odgovor: Ni samostalna ni konfederalna Slovenija i Hrvatska ne mogu zadovoljiti svoj separatizam sve dok ne podmire dugovanja Jugoslaviji (Hrvatska i ratnu štetu srpskom narodu), a pogotovu se neće moći otepeti ili konfederalizovati nijedan pedalj zemlje natopljen srpskom krvlju i obeležen srpskim crkvama i grobovima. Od Jugoslavije niko ne može odvojiti teritorije koje su 1918. godine, na dan stvaranja Jugoslavije, bile u sastavu Kraljevine Srbije i teritorije u kojima su Srbi bili u većini pre počinjenog genocida hrvatskih ustaša nad njima.¹⁷³

SPO je pokazivao istu želju za prisajedinjenje Jugoslaviji (ili, tačnije, Srbiji) zapadnih teritorija na kojima su tokom Drugog svetskog rata počinjeni zločini nad

¹⁷¹ *Četničke novine*, br. 302, mart 1990, str. 3.

¹⁷² Cilj SNO je takode bio stvaranje Velike Srbije, koja bi obuhvatila ne samo Srbiju, već i Bosnu, Slavoniju, Hercegovinu, Liku, Kordun, Baniju i Kninsku Krajinu. Stranka je bila za izmenu zapadnih granica Srbije, koje je trebalo utvrditi na osnovu etničke karte kakva je bila 6. aprila 1941, kada su sile Osovine napale Jugoslaviju. Sve teritorije koje su pre 1941. imale većinsko srpsko stanovništvo morale su ući u sastav Srbije, jer nikakva hrvatska država nije smela da profitira od genocida koji je izvršen nad Srbima od 1941. do 1945. SNO je predlagao podelu Srbije na nekoliko administrativnih oblasti: savsko-dunavski region, sa centrom u Novom Sadu; vrbaski region, sa centrom u Banjaluci; drinski region, sa centrom u Sarajevu, zetski region, sa centrom u Cetinju, vardarski region, sa centrom u Skoplju; i moravski region, sa centrom u Kruševcu. Vidi radnu verziju programa objavljenju u "Četničkim novinama", br. 302, mart 1990, str. 1, 2, i 5.

Podaci o članstvu Srpskog slobodarskog pokreta mogu se naći u intervjuu koji je V. Šešelj dao časopisu "ON" u aprilu 1990, a koji je objavljen i u Vojislav Šešelj, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1992), str. 53.

¹⁷³ "Velika Srbija", juli 1990, br. 1, str. 18.

Srbima. U aprilu 1990. godine Vuk Drašković, Vojislav Šešelj i Milan Komnenić otputovali su u Sjedinjene Države da bi zatražili podršku tamošnjih Srba.¹⁷⁴ “Četničke novine” su osnivanje SPO nazvale početkom novog srpskog ustanka.¹⁷⁵ U redovima rukovodstva SPO uskoro je došlo do sukoba. Jedan deo rukovodstva je 5. juna 1990. godine Vuka Draškovića razrešio predsedničkih funkcija.¹⁷⁶ Dana 18. juna 1990, frakcija na čelu s Vojislavom Šešeljem odlučila je da osnuje novu organizaciju - Srpski četnički pokret (SČP). Nova stranka bila je eksplicitnija po pitanju stvaranja Velike Srbije i u njenom programu jasno se navodilo koje teritorije je trebalo da postanu deo te proširene Srbije:

1. Obnavljanje slobodne, nezavisne i demokratske srpske države na Balkanu koja će obuhvatiti celokupno srpstvo, sve srpske zemlje, što znači da će u svojim granicama imati, pored sadašnje oktroisane srbijanske federalne jedinice, srpsku Makedoniju, srpsku Crnu Goru, srpsku Bosnu, srpsku Hercegovinu, srpski Dubrovnik, srpsku Dalmaciju, srpsku Liku, srpski Kordun, srpsku Baniju, srpsku Slavoniju i srpsku Baranju.

2. Postizanje punog nacionalnog, duhovnog, kulturnog, ekonomskog i političkog jedinstva srpskog naroda, kao i međusobnog razumevanja i solidarnosti Srba pravoslavaca, Srba muslimana, Srba katolika i Srba protestanata. To podrazumeva i definitivno okončanje građanskog rata koji su komunisti pre pola veka nametnuli Srbima. Š. . .Ć

5. /prevod s engleskog:/ Sistematsko ekonomsko, međunarodno i političko omogućavanje preseljenja svih pripadnika srpske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije Albanije, Rumunije, Bugarske i Grčke u Srbiju, kao i povratak svih emigranata koji žele da se vrate, bilo iz Evrope, bilo s drugih kontinenata. Š. . .Ć


20. Gušenje svim sredstvima albanske separatističke pobune na Kosovu i Metohiji, a da bi recidivi te pobune bili nemogući, zalažemo se da se hitno sprovedu sledeće mere: - da se efikasno onemogući uspostavljanje bilo kakvog oblika kosovsko-metohijske političke i teritorijalne autonomije; - da se odmah protera svih 360 hiljada albanskih emigranata i njihovih potomaka; /prevod s engleskog:/ One koji su u Jugoslaviju došli iz Albanije posle 6. aprila 1941. godine, treba staviti pod nadležnost visokog komesara za izbeglice Ujedinjenih nacija. Ima na ovom svetu država neuporedivo većih, bogatijih i manje gusto naseljenih od Jugoslavije; neka one prime ove imigrante i daju nam neki dokaz svog humanizma.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ “Četničke novine”, br. 305, juli 1990, str. 2 i 4. Ova trojica vođa SPO provela su desetak dana u Sjedinjenim Državama kako bi obezbedila podršku srpske dijaspore. U Klivlendu i Čikagu su imali javne nastupe.

¹⁷⁵ “Četničke novine: glas srpskih boraca”, koje izlaze u Milvokiju (Viskonsin), jedno je od glasila četničke dijaspore u Severnoj Americi. Tadašnji glavni urednik bio je Đoko P. Marić, bivši četnički komandant.

¹⁷⁶ Vojislav Šešelj je želeo da Vuk Drašković da ostavku, jer je kritikovao grupu članova SPO, među kojima je bio i Vojislav Šešelj, zato što su nasilnički prekinuli predstavu “Sveti Sava” u Jugoslovenskom dramskom pozorištu. “Vjesnik”, 7. juni 1990, objavljeno u Vojislav Šešelj, *Bal vampira*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1992), str. 119.

¹⁷⁷ Program objavljen u “Velikoj Srbiji”, novinama Srpskog četničkog pokreta, juli 1990, br. 1, str. 2-3.



“Velika Srbija”, novine Srpskog četničkog pokreta, br. 2, avgust 1990. Na naslovnoj strani je geografska karta Velike Srbije kako ju je zamišljao politički pokret Vojislava Šešelja. Na zapadu (na teritoriji Hrvatske) Srbija prostire do linije Karlobag – Karlovac – Virovitica.

Program Srpskog četničkog pokreta govori o istoj želji za ujedinjenjem svih Srba u jednu državu i o istom tipu rešenja kakvo su zagovarali srpski intelektualci okupljeni oko Srpskog kulturnog kluba u poznim 1930-im godinama, odnosno stvaranje, u nacionalnom smislu, što homogenije države putem proterivanja nacionalnih manjina, pre

svega Albanaca. Tako je 18. septembra 1990. ponovo osnovan Srpski kulturni klub.¹⁷⁸ Na svom drugom sastanku, održanom 20. septembra 1990, Srpski kulturni klub je doneo jednoglasnu odluku o kolektivnom pristupanju Srpskom četničkom pokretu.¹⁷⁹ U leto 1990, Liberalna stranka Valjeva, na čelu s Aleskandrom Stefanovićem, priključila se Srpskom četničkom pokretu. Stranka je zatim organizovala nekoliko sastanaka (u Valjevu, Velikoj Plani, Malom Zvorniku i drugim mestima) na kojima je sa svojim programom upoznala širu javnost. U avgustu 1990, Srpski četnički pokret nije uspeo da se registuje kao politička stranka, pošto su vlasti odbile njegovu prijavu. To je značilo da nije mogao da učestvuje na prvim višestranačkim parlamentarnim izborima u decembru 1990. Uprkos tome, Vojislav Šešeljiće na predsedničkim izborima nastupiti kao nezavisni kandidat i, kako je sam rekao, kao predstavnik srpskih četnika.¹⁸⁰ Za vreme izborne kampanje Vojislav Šešeljiće upozoravao hrvatske političke vode da Hrvatska neće moći da se odvoji od Jugoslavije bez gubitka teritorije:

Što se Hrvata tiče, mi srpski četnici neprekidno poručujemo novom ustaškom poglavniku Franji Tudmanu i novoj ustaškoj vlasti u Hrvatskoj da se ne igraju sa srpskim narodom koji živi na području današnje improvizovane hrvatske državne zajednice. To je srpska teritorija na kojoj živi srpski narod i mi nikada nećemo dozvoliti da ona bude odvojena od matice zemlje. Mogu Hrvati da se izdvajaju iz Jugoslavije, mogu da formiraju samostalnu državu, da se priključuju nekome drugom, ali moraju uvek znati da mi ni po koju cenu, po cenu novih potoka krvi, nećemo dozvoliti da nam odvajaju ni jednu teritoriju na kojoj se nalaze srpska sela, srpska masovna groblja, srpske klanice, srpske jame, srpski logori, srpski Jasenovci, srpske porušene crkve ... To nikada nećemo dozvoliti.¹⁸¹

Ono čemu zapravo teže Vojislav Šešelji i njegova stranka jeste amputacija delova Hrvatske. On to izričito i kaže:

“Hrvati moraju da budu kažnjeni na onaj način na koji se inače u civilizovanom svetu kažnjavaju narodi i države za zločine koje počine u ratnim uslovima njihovi režimi, a to je - gubitak teritorija.”¹⁸²

Vojislav Šešelji Hrvatima, zapravo, odriče pravo na sopstvenu državu:

¹⁷⁸ Predsednik je bio Želimir Marković, potpredsednici Branislav Filipović i Srdan Obradović, sekretar Rajko Bukvić i blagajnik Radmila Nikolić.

¹⁷⁹ “Velika Srbija”, novembar 1990, br. 6, str. 31.

¹⁸⁰ Vojislav Šešeljić, *Filipike četničkog vojvode: dr Vojislav Šešeljić u objektivu Siniše Aksentijevića* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), str. 24.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, str. 24.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, str. 24.

“Gledajte, otkuda Hrvatima neko državno pravo. Šta Hrvati imaju kao argument da se suprostave ovome. Je li Slovenija ikada kao država igde postojala? Nije. A mi nećemo sa njima. Nas ne interesuje čija je to teritorija. Srpska vojska je 1918. godine ušla u Sloveniju. Srpska vojska sada se povlači iz Slovenije. I jedno faktičko stanje jeste, da Slovenci vide dalje kuda će. Hrvati od 1102. godine, nikakve države nemaju. Oni su svoju državu predali Madarima ugovorom, Paktom konvencije 1102. godine. Prema tome, čija je to teritorija, mi ne znamo. Postoji jedan jedini međunarodni pravni akt koji reguliše pitanje zapadnih srpskih granica, to je Londonski pakt iz 1915. godine. I mi po odredbama Londonskog pakta možemo pretendovati na teritoriju do linije Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica. Ono zapadno od te linije mi ne znamo čije je. Možda je italijansko pošto je to Italijanima obećano po odredbama Londonskog pakta. Možda je austrijsko pošto je bilo u sastavu austrijske države pre okončanja Prvog svetskog rata, možda je madarsko pošto su Hrvati svoju zemlju svojevremeno dali dobrovoljno. Pa uostalom, možda je najpre madarsko pošto su Madari na Jadranskom obali izgradili svoju veliku luku. Luka Rijeka je madarska luka. A možda je to zaista Hrvatsko. Nas to ne interesuje čije je. Mi ćemo obavestiti Ujedinjene nacije, povukli smo svoje trupe sa te teritorije. Tamo ne postoji državna vlast, pa neka vide Ujedinjene nacije, velike sile i susedne države čija je to zemlja.”¹⁸³

“Hrvatska nema nikakvog međunarodno-pravnog osnova za svoju državnost, kao uostalom, ni Slovenija ... po prestanku postojanja Jugoslavije, opstaje jedino Srbija. Pošto je Kraljevina SHS, odnosno Kraljevina Jugoslavija, pravni sledbenik Jugoslavije, može da bude jedino država Srbija. Shodno odredbama Londonskog pakta iz 1915. moguće je kreirati zapadnu srpsku granicu. I ona može da bude na liniji Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica, ako želimo da ta granica bude i etnička i istorijska i strateška.”¹⁸⁴

Štaviše, on Hrvatima poriče i to da su narod:

“Hrvati nisu nikakav istorijski narod. Uzmite Nemce i Čeha. Čeh je sinonim za kukavicu, dok su Nemci ratnički narod. Isto je i sa Srbima i Hrvatima. Hrvati su jedan iskvaren narod. Još nikada nisam sreo pristojnog Hrvata.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Citat iz intervjua koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao Radio Čačku 1991. Intervju je objavljen u Vojislav Šešelj, *Branković je ustao iz groba*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), str. 6.

¹⁸⁴ Iz intervjua Vojislava Šešelja časopisu “Svet” (4. septembar 1991), kasnije objavljenog i u Šešelj, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, str. 97.

¹⁸⁵ Iz intervjua Jugoslovenskoj novinskoj agenciji TANJUG od 8. avgusta 1991, kasnije objavljenog i u Vojislav Šešelj, *Crveni tiranin sa Dedinja*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), str. 7. U svom delu *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma: naučno i publicističko delo prof. dr. Laze M. Kostića*, na str. 323, Vojislav Šešelj za Hrvate kaže da su “veštački narod”:

“Današnji Hrvati su očigledno, potpuno nov, veštački narod, sačinjen od odnarođenih Srba, a imaju veoma malo zajedničkog sa izvornim Hrvatima, zapravo u onoj meri u kojoj danas rođeni čakavci i kajkavci procentualno učestvuju u ukupnom broju hrvatskog stanovništva.”

5.2. Srpska radikalna stranka

Dana 23. februara 1991. u Kragujevcu, Srpski četnički pokret i većina lokalnih odbora Narodne radikalne stranke ujedinili su se u Srpsku radikalnu stranku (SRS), koja je tvrdila da je naslednica Radikalne stranke koju je 1881. osnovao Nikola Pašić (član 1 Statuta ove partije). Pašićeva stranka je igrala značajnu ulogu u političkom životu Srbije pre Prvog svetskog rata, kao i prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941). Njen vođa Nikola Pašić je više puta bio na čelu srpske ili jugoslovenske vlade. Vojislav Šešelj je izabran za predsednika novostvorene stranke, dobivši 489 od ukupno 509 glasova. Program SRS je preuzeo elemente programa ranijih političkih partija čiji je osnivač ili suosnivač bio Vojislav Šešelj. Glavni cilj bio je “obnavljanje slobodne, nezavisne i demokratske srpske države na Balkanu koja će obuhvatiti celokupno srpstvo, sve srpske zemlje, što znači da će u svojim granicama imati, pored sadašnje oktroisane srbijanske federalne jedinice, srpsku Makedoniju, srpsku Crnu Goru, srpsku Bosnu, srpsku Hercegovinu, srpski Dubrovnik, srpsku Dalmaciju, srpsku Liku, srpski Kordun, srpsku Baniju, srpsku Slavoniju i srpsku Baranju”.¹⁸⁶ Stvarni cilj programa je stvaranje Velike Srbije. Izbor reči “obnavljanje” podrazumeva da je Srbija nekada obuhvatala gorenavedene teritorije. Međutim, od tih teritorija nikada nisu bile deo srpske države (Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonija i Baranja). Što se tiče granica buduće Velike Srbije, Vojislav Šešelj je promovisao ideju zapadne granice koja bi išla linijom “Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica” i neumorno ju je ponavljao u svojim medijskim nastupima. Ovo se nije mnogo razlikovalo od zamisli koju je za vreme Drugog svetskog rata imao Stevan Moljević, a prema kojoj se teritorija Hrvatske drastično smanjuje:

“Mi se borimo da se, pre svega, omogući otepljenje Slovenije, a onda će jedna umna i pametna vlada u Beogradu izvršiti amputaciju Hrvatske. Razume se onoga što mi smatramo Hrvatskom. To su teritorije zapadno od linije **Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica** (podvukao Yves Tomić). Da li su to zaista

¹⁸⁶ “Programska deklaracija Srpske radikalne stranke”, *Velika Srbija*, br. 9, maj 1991, str. 6-7.

hrvatske teritorije, to nas zaista ne interesuje, verovatno su italijanske. Onda ćemo se nagoditi sa Italijanima, da oni preuzmu ono što je njihovo ... ili su Austrijske ili su Madarske .”¹⁸⁷

“Mi se nadamo nestanku Jugoslavije sa istorijske scene. Najverovatnija projekcija je da će se Jugoslavija raspasti na tri države, veliku Srbiju, malu Sloveniju i još manju Hrvatsku. Što se Srpske radikalne stranke tiče mi ćemo se zalagati ukoliko ostvarimo neku participaciju u vlasti, ili eventualno osvojimo vlast, da Srbija što pre sklopi ugovor sa Italijom, da se revitalizuje Londonski pakt i da se uspostavi srpsko-italijanska granica na liniji **Karlobag, Ogulin, Karlovac, Virovitica (podvukao Yves Tomić)**.”¹⁸⁸

“Naše zapadne granice su na liniji **Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica (podvukao Yves Tomić)**. Razume se, Rijeka neće biti na našoj teritoriji. Neće Zagreb, neće drugi neki gradovi, ali mi nemamo drugog izlaza nego razmenu stanovništva sa Hrvatskom. Srbi da žive pod hrvatskim režimom teško je zamislivo, a, usotalom, i šta će Hrvati na našoj strani? Razmjeničemo, lepo, stanovništvo i svako neka živi svojim životom.”¹⁸⁹

Premda je vođa Srpske radikalne stranke imao koristi od četničkih odlikovanja koja mu je dodelio Momčilo Đujić, vođa Pokreta srpskih četnika Ravne Gore u slobodnom svetu, njegova politička orijentacija udaljavala ga je od četničke emigracije. Kako Vojislav Šešelj nije bio ni za monarhiju ni za dinastiju Karadordevića, na njega se obrušio Momčilo Đujić. Optužen je da saraduje sa Socijalističkom partijom Srbije Slobodana Miloševića i 1998. godine, nakon jednog sastanka sa delegacijom Đujićevog pokreta, oduzeta mu je titula vojvode.¹⁹⁰ Činjenica je da ljudi koji su intelektualno ili ne neki drugi način bili bliski Ranogorskom pokretu iz Drugog svetskog rata uopšte nisu bili jedinstveni u stavu prema Vojislavu Šešelju. Intelektualci koji su se zalagali za vraćanje ugleda četničkom pokretu Draže Mihailovića smatrali su, zapravo, da lider radikala svojim komentarima punim mržnje i svojim nasilničkim ispadima samo kalja ime istorijskog četničkog pokreta.

“Drug Šešelj jednog dana obećava proterivanje svih Hrvata iz Srbije, onda se sutradan fizički obračunava sa prosvetnim radnicima koji danima štrajkuju i traže platu veću od 20. maraka, sledećeg dana obećava proterivanje Slovenaca, posle toga po fašističkom receptu čita spisak novinara spremnih za odstrel, onda se opet malo bije sa profesorima.

Ovo je potpuni moralni krah Vojislava Šešelja. Jasno je pokazao da je potpuno u rukama vladajuće partije i da radi po njihovim instrukcijama. Možda je, u početku, mislio kako će iskoristiti komuniste. Ispalo je da su oni iskoristili njega i sveli ga na rang poslušnog slugu.

Š. . . Č Što se tiče siledžijstva Šešelj se opravdava time da: ‘Tako postupa svaki četnički vojvoda’. Prvo, autentični četnici tako se ne ponašaju. Četnici su, bar one koje sam ja upoznao, pre svega gospoda. Drugo, Šešelj i sam zna da je lažni vojvoda, a kao instant Srbin, i još na sve to četnik i vojvoda, svojim divljačkim ponašanjem najviše (možda i smišljeno) radi na daljem difamiranju

¹⁸⁷ Iz intervjuja koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao listu “Glas Podrinja”, 21. mart 1991, objavljeno i u Šešelj, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića*, str. 179.

¹⁸⁸ Iz intervjuja koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao listu “Pogledi”, 31. maj 1991, str. 36.

¹⁸⁹ Iz intervjuja koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao listu “Adresa” (5 – 18. novembar 1991), objavljeno i u Šešelj, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, str. 111.

¹⁹⁰ “Večernje novosti”, 24. november 1998.

pripadnika ravnogorskog pokreta. Ovo je ujedno najbolji dokaz da je Šešelj, iako žrtva komunističkog režima, postao najverniji sluga istog tog režima.”¹⁹¹

Srpska radikalna stranka se razlikovala od većine političkih organizacija u Srbiji po tome što je imala ogranke i van granica Republike Srbije. Tako je imala ogranak u Republici Srpskoj Krajini (na čijem čelu je bio Rade Leskovic), u Republici Srpskoj (Nikola Poplašen) i u Crnoj Gori (Drago Bakrač). SRS je 1993. bio druga najznačajnija politička snaga u Republici Srpskoj Krajini. U Republici Srpskoj, SRS je podržavao Srpsku demokratsku stranku Radovana Karadžića u odbrani “srpskog životnog prostora, srpskih zemalja, srpskog naroda”, iako je nastavio da kritikuje način na koji ona sprovodi svoju vlast.¹⁹² Godine 1993, SRS je imao 70.000 članova u Republici Srpskoj, gde je jednom mesečno izdavao list pod nazivom “Zapadna Srbija”.

5.3. Politička pozicija SRS za vreme rata (1991-1995)

U proleće 1991. godine u Hrvatskoj je došlo do oružanih incidenata. Srpska radikalna stranka je tamo u borbu uputila svoje dobrovoljce. Ti dobrovoljci su bili povezani sa političkom organizacijom koju je predvodio Vojislav Šešelj, ali su takode bili podređeni, sa daljine, Momčilu Đujiću, koji je dodeljivao odlikovanja i titule vojvoda onim dobrovoljcima koji su se istakli u sukobima sa hrvatskim snagama bezbednosti.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Forum Aleksandra I. Popovića u “Pogledima”, br. 107, 24. april 1992, str. 21. Ovaj list su osnovali studenti Univerziteta u Kragujevcu, u centralnoj Srbiji, 1982. godine. Godine 1990, list postaje politička publikacija u potpunosti posvećena rehabilitaciji Ravnogorskog pokreta (stranica interneta: <http://www.pogledi.co.yu>).

¹⁹² Vojislav Šešelj, *Srpska radikalna stranka* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), str. 26.

¹⁹³ Tako je, posle pobeđe četničkih boraca u Borovu Selu početkom maja 1991. godine, komandant četničke jedinice Miladin Todorović dobio rang majora, na osnovu dekreta koji je izdao i potpisao vojvoda Momčilo Đujić 9. maja 1991, na proslavi kojom se obeležavao “Treći srpski ustanak” iz 1941. na Ravnoj Gori. Organizacija Momčila Đujića je na Srpski četnički pokret pod Vojislava Šešelja gledala kao na svoj sastavni deo (“Srbija: glas srpskih boraca”, br. 328, avgust 1991, str. 2). Štaviše, Momčilo Đujić je bio predsednik Vojvodskog saveta, organa koji je obavljao funkciju vrhovne komande svih četničkih jedinica aktivnih u otadžbini (u skladu s intervjuom koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao dvonedeljnom listu “Pogledi”, 31. maj 1991, str. 35). Dobrovoljci upućeni u Hrvatsku imali su između 25 i 45 godina. Mnogi od njih bili su u srodstvu sa članovima četničkog pokreta iz Drugog svetskog rata.

Na ovaj način uspostavljena je veza između četnika iz Drugog svetskog rata i onih koji su se proglasili naslednicima Draže Mihailovića. Veza se takode mogla videti i u nacionalnim simbolima koje su koristili borci Srpske radikalne stranke. Rat u Hrvatskoj, a zatim i u Bosni i Hercegovini, pružio je priliku radikalima da definišu svoje ciljeve i stavove o proširenoj srpskoj državi koju su hteli da propagiraju. Iako su nacionalni ciljevi, pre svega stvaranje unitarne srpske države pod nazivom Velika Srbija, bili jasno definisani pre izbijanja rata u Hrvatskoj u proleće 1991. godine, radikali su tokom ratnih godina (1991 – 1995) svoje svatove preinačili i prilagodili aktuelnom trenutku.

Jedan od najbitnijih predloga Vojislava Šešelja tokom ratnih godina bila je razmena stanovništva između Srbije i Hrvatske. U ovoj ideji nalazimo odjek rešenja koja su predlagali neki članovi Srpskog kulturnog kluba u poznim 1930-im godinama.

“Hrvati su narod kukavica, Hrvati nisu narod u pravom smislu reči. Nisu nimalo slučajno Marks i Engels govorili za Hrvate da su otpad evropskih naroda. Ti tekstovi su sačuvani, mogu se pronaći i videti. A kako će se taj rat završiti? Završiće se, po mom mišljenju, veoma brzo srpskom pobedom i uspostavljanjem zapadnih srpskih granica, a Hrvati će morati da plaćaju i ratnu odštetu. Što se tiče Srba koji žive u Zagrebu i u onim krajevima današnje Hrvatske koji nisu srpski, oni će po mom mišljenju morati da se presele u Srbiju i njima nema opstanka tamo gde su Hrvati u većini, tamo gde će postojati hrvatska vlast. Srbin pod hrvatskom vlašću može da bude samo rob, može da živi život nedostojan čoveka, a znam da se niko od Srba sa tim neće pomiriti i da će oni tražiti načina da pređu u Srbiju, a to opet govori da će biti neminovna razmena stanovništva.”¹⁹⁴

Dok je u Hrvatskoj besneo rat, radikali su razmatrali mere osvete nad Hrvatima u Srbiji, tačnije u Vojvodini. Želeli su da organizuju “civilizovanu razmenu stanovništva” između Srba u Hrvatskoj i Hrvata u Srbiji. Vojislav Šešelj je o tome izjavio da samo treba poslati kući one Hrvate koje su u Vojvodinu dovele hrvatske vlasti tokom Drugog svetskog rata.¹⁹⁵ Međutim, u proleće 1991, izjavio je da 100.000 Hrvata treba da napusti Srbiju, kako bi tu mogle da se nastane srpske izbeglice iz Hrvatske.¹⁹⁶ Godine 1992. ponavlja taj zahtev, dodajući da Hrvati u Srbiji nisu lojalni, i da su mnogi od njih članovi Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ), stranke na vlasti u Hrvatskoj, i “ustaški

¹⁹⁴ “Ratne novine”, 18. avgust 1991, objavljeno i u Šešelj, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića*, str. 296.

¹⁹⁵ Prema Vojislavu Šešelju, Ante Pavelić, koji se nalazio na čelu Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, naseljavao je Hrvate iz zapadne Hercegovine u neka mesta po Vojvodini (Slankamen, Hrtkovci, Petrovaradin). Vojislav Šešelj, *Milošević hapsi radikale*, (Beograd: ABC Glas), 1994, str. 20.

¹⁹⁶ “Politika”, 14. maj 1991.

kolaboracionisti”.¹⁹⁷ U Narodnoj skupštini Srbije je 1. aprila 1992. godine nedvosmisleno zagovarao razmenu stanovništva kao meru odmazde:

Druga jedna stvar, ako Hrvati ovako masovno isteruju Srbe iz njihovih domova, pa šta čekaju Hrvati ovde u Beogradu, šta čekaju Hrvati po Srbiji. Razmena stanovništva, koliko je Tudman isterao Srba iz Zagreba, toliko mi Hrvata iz Beograda. Koja srpska porodica dode iz Zagreba, lepo na adresu Hrvata u Beograd, pa mu da svoje ključeve, idi tamo u Zagreb, razmena.

...
Posle sledećih ili nekih drugih izbora, kada se promeni vlast u Srbiji, neće biti pardona, po istom onom pravu po kome je Tudman proterao Srbe iz Hrvatske, mi ćemo proterati Hrvate iz Srbije. I nećemo dozvoliti da Hrvati kao danas u Slankamenu svoje stare, razrušene kuće, kuće pretvorene u štale nude Srbima, izbeglicama u zamenu za vile na jadranskoj obali, koje su svi morali da napuste. Hrvati u Slankamenu, Zemunu i drugim mestima neće imati miran san, dok se ne presele, jer mi srpske izbeglice iz Zagreba, Rijeke, Varaždina i drugih hrvatskih mesta moramo udomiti, moramo im naći krov nad glavom i moramo im nadoknaditi onu štetu, koju su pretrpeli kada su isterivani iz svojih domova.¹⁹⁸

Dana 6. maja 1992. bio je na mitingu u Hrtkovcima, i tom prilikom je nekim hrvatskim žiteljima zaprećeno proterivanjem.¹⁹⁹ Taj miting je pripremio teren za kampanju zastrašivanja nesrpskog stanovništva Srema (Vojvodina), koja je za rezultat imala egzodus nekoliko hiljada ljudi.²⁰⁰ Izmeni etničkog sastava težilo se i na Kosovu, putem programiranog naseljavanja Srba i stvaranja srpskih enklava u kojima bi Srbi i Albanci bili potpuno razdvojeni.²⁰¹ Po tvrdjenju SRS, ukoliko bi se 400.000 Albanaca koji su se naselili na Kosovo tokom Drugog svetskog rata – uključujući i njihove potomke – proterali, Srbija bi na njihovo mesto mogla da naseli 400.000 srpskih izbelgica iz bivših jugoslovenskih republika.²⁰²

U zimu i proleće 1992, dok su srpske i crnogorske političke vlasti radile na Ustavu Savezne Republike Jugoslavije (koja se naziva i trećom Jugoslavijom), Vojislav Šešelj je u više navrata izložio svoju viziju budućnosti te jugoslovenske federacije i njenih suseda. Govoreći o Bosni i Hercegovini, predsednik Srpske radikalne stranke je 23. januara 1992. godine izjavio da će Bosna i Hercegovina, ukoliko Muslimani ne žele da budu deo te

¹⁹⁷ “Vreme”, 13. juli 1992.

¹⁹⁸ Vojislav Šešelj, *Poslaničke besede*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), str. 173-174. Vojislav Šešelj je 7. aprila 1992. u Narodnoj skupštini još jednom tvrdio da ima dobrih osnova za taj svoj stav (*ibid*, str. 175).

¹⁹⁹ “Vjesnik”, 9. maj 2004, (<http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/05/09/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=3>, stranica konsultovana 23. februara 2005). Hrtkovci se nalaze u opštini Ruma. U proleće 1992. godine sastav stanovništva te opštine bio je sledeći Hrvati - 70%, Mađari - 20% i Srbi - 10% (“Vreme”, 13. juli 1992).

²⁰⁰ “Dnevnik”, 7. maj 2003, (<http://www.dnevnik.co.yu/arhiva/07-05-2003/Strane/dogadaji.htm>, stranica konsultovana 23. februara 2005).

²⁰¹ Šešelj, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, str. 175-176.

²⁰² *Ibid*, str. 173.

federacije, morati da se podeli. U tom slučaju bi Muslimani mogli da računaju na osamnaest posto teritorije te republike.²⁰³ Zapadna Hercegovina, odnosno desna obala Neretve, mogla bi se pripojiti Hrvatskoj.²⁰⁴ Šešelj je za Bosnu i Hercegovinu planirao dva alternativna scenarija: ili će se ona očuvati kao jedinica koja će ući u sastav skraćene Jugoslavije, ili će se podeliti. Svako drugo rešenje značilo bi rat.²⁰⁵ U martu 1992. godine SRS je prednost davao podeli Bosne i Hercegovine duž nacionalnih linija.²⁰⁶

Mi smatramo da svako rešenje koje prihvati srpski narod Bosne i Hercegovine i njegovi legitimni predstavnici, pre svega, rukovodstvo Srpske demokratske stranke, koje takode podržavamo, da odgovara i svim drugim Srbima. Smatramo da, kada bude urađena definitivna karta o podeli Bosne i Hercegovine na tri nacionalne teritorije, srpski predstavnici treba strogo da vode računa da ne dozvole da se srpske teritorije suviše iscepaju i da bi bilo najbolje da ta podela bude izvršena na principu - srpski narod dve teritorijalne celine u okviru jedinstvene nacionalne teritorije.

Znači, ako se muslimanska teritorija deli na dve celine, Cazinska krajina i Centralna Bosna, ako se hrvatska teritorija deli na dve celine (zapadna Hercegovina i delovi uz reku Savu), da se i srpska teritorija može podeliti najviše u dve celine. To podrazumeva da bi Semberija, odnosno severoistočna Bosna po svaku cenu morala imati teritorijalnu vezu sa Bosanskom krajinom, a SAO Romanija i SAO Ozren teritorijalnu vezu sa područjem istočne Hercegovine.²⁰⁷

Vojislav Šešelj je smatrao da je srpska državna jedinica (Republika Srpska Krajina) konstituisana na teritoriji Republike Hrvatske trebalo da bude u sastavu te skraćene Jugoslavije.²⁰⁸ Nije mogao da zamisli da teritorija "Srpske Krajine" ponovo bude u sklopu Hrvatske.²⁰⁹ Već u februaru 1992. godine objavio je da su Srpska radikalna stranka i njen Srpski četnički pokret u stanju pripravnosti i da su spremni za akciju u Bosni i Hercegovini.²¹⁰ Lider SRS bio je protiv priznavanja suverenosti Makedonije, koja je pre stvaranja Jugoslavije pripadala Srbiji. Verujući da ta republika treba da bude jedna od jedinica nove jugoslovenske federacije, Vojislav Šešelj je zagovarao upotrebu sile u slučaju da makedonske vlasti odluče da proglase državnu nezavisnost. Ako vojska ne bi bila u stanju da porazi makedonske separatiste, onda bi teritoriju Makedonije trebalo

²⁰³ Vojislav Šešelj, *Milan Panić mora pasti: konferencije za štampu 1992. godine* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), str. 19.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, str. 23.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, str. 52 (konferencija za novinare od 27. februara 1992).

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, str. 59 (konferencija za novinare od 19. marta 1992).

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, str. 59 (konferencija za novinare od 19. marta 1992).

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, str. 19.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, str. 21.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, str. 52 (konferencija za novinare od 27. februara 1992).

podeliti između Srbije, Grčke, Bugarske i Albanije.²¹¹ Istočna Makedonija bi se pripojila Bugarskoj, dok bi zapadni delovi pripali Albaniji, teritorije na jugu Grčkoj, a Srbija bi dobila severnu Makedoniju. Srbija bi zadržala granicu sa Grčkom u dolini Vardara.

Godine 1993, ocenjujući da je većina “područja od vitalnog značaja” za srpski narod oslobođena, SRS se izjasnio za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini i za uspostavljanje novih granica koje bi se poklapale sa linijama fronta.²¹² Bosna i Hercegovina je trebalo da se podeli u tri odvojene nezavisne države.²¹³ Vojislav Šešelj je bio uveren da Republika Srpska Krajina i Republika Srpska treba da se ujedine u jednu državu koja bi se zvala Zapadna Srbija.²¹⁴

Na trećem kongresu SRS održanom 30. januara 1994, usvojen je novi program. U duhu prethodnog kongresa predložen je plan za ujedinjenje “srpskih zemalja”.²¹⁵ U novim članovima usvojenim tog dana pisalo je da je “Šoćsnovni cilj Stranke borba za ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja u jednu državu, zaštita Srba na prostorima koji pripadaju drugim državama, osvajanje vlasti radi realizacije stranačkog programa” (član 3).²¹⁶ SRS se još jednom izjasnio za ukidanje autonomnih pokrajina u Srbiji i preduzimanje represivnih mera protiv kosovskih Albanaca.²¹⁷ Cilj stvaranja jedinstvene srpske države pominje se ponovo 2. februara 1994, kada su Srpska Radikalna Stranka i Srpska Demokratska Stranka Krajine, na čelu sa Milanom Babićem, potpisale sporazum o formiranju koalicije. Štaviše, “ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja i formiranje jedinstvene srpske države” definisano je kao osnovni cilj sporazuma.²¹⁸ Vojislav Šešelj je smatrao da

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, str. 41 (konferencija za novinare od 20. januara 1992).

²¹² Vojislav Šešelj, *Partijski bilansi i politički balansi* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), str. 127.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, str. 140.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, str. 167.

²¹⁵ Jovan BAZIĆ, *Srpsko pitanje: političke koncepcije rešavanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja*, (Beograd: Službeni list SCG, Institut za političke studije, 2003), str. 268.

²¹⁶ Šešelj, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, str. 99.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, str. 96: proterivanje svih albanskih imigranata i njihovih potomaka (njih 400.000 prema procenama SRS); zatvaranje svih ustanova koje finansira država, a koje rade na albanskom jeziku; oduzimanje srpskog državljanstva svim Šiptarima koji žive u inostranstvu i pomažu separatističku delatnost, itd.

²¹⁸ Šešelj, *Filipike četničkog vojvode*, str. 185.

nacionalne manjine ne treba da čine više od osam procenata stanovništva u Velikoj Srbiji i njenim teritorijalnim jedinicama.²¹⁹

U jesen 1995. godine, kada su teritorije koje su nekoliko godina bile pod kontrolom srpskih vlasti pale pod kontrolu hrvatskih i hrvatsko-bosanskih snaga, Vojislav Šešelj je optužio Slobodana Miloševića za izdaju Srba u Republici Srpskoj Krajini i Republici Srpskoj.²²⁰ Založio se za “rušenje izdajničkog režima Slobodana Miloševića”²²¹ kao način da se odbrane srpski nacionalni interesi.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, str. 188.

²²⁰ Šešelj, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, str. 20.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, str. 197.

5.4. Uloga Srpske radikalne stranke na izborima i njen dvosmislen odnos sa Socijalističkom partijom Srbije.

Tokom 1990-ih godina SRS je održavao dvosmislen odnos sa vladajućom Socijalističkom partijom Srbije. Vlasti nisu priznavale Srpski četnički pokret, koji je bio protiv komunizma i kulta Titove ličnosti, smatrajući ga organizacijom koja je nasledila četnički pokret iz Drugog svetskog rata, nad kojim su komunisti odneli pobjedu 1945-1946. godine. Vojislav Šešelj je osuđen na 45 dana zatvora zbog narušavanja javnog reda 2. oktobra 1990. godine, kada je u centru Beograda, postavio štand sa plakatima na kojima se građani Beograda pozivaju da potpišu peticiju za premeštanje “Kuće cveća” – u kojoj se nalazi grobnica Josipa Broza Tita – iz Beograda u Kumrovec (Hrvatska), kao i da priteknu u pomoć Srbima u Hrvatskoj tako što će se prijaviti kao dobrovoljci za Knin.²²² Vojislav Šešelj je uhapšen 23. oktobra, a oslobođen 15. novembra 1990, tako da je uspeo da se kandiduje na predsedničkim izborima 9. decembra 1990. godine. U junu 1991. Vojislav Šešelj izbija na pozornicu kao ozbiljniji politički suparnik u borbi za vlast u Rakovici, radničkom naselju na obodu Beograda.²²³ Šešelj je pobedio književnika Borislava Pekića, kandidata Demokratske stranke, sa 23 procenta glasova na izborima na kojima je odziv bio ispod 50 procenata. Iako su ga vlasti 1990. godine marginalizovale, Socijalistička partija Srbije ga je sada nezvanično podržala i dala mu slobodan pristup glavnim medijima u Srbiji, pre svega državnoj televiziji. Kada je SRS postao druga najznačajnija politička sila u zemlji, dve glavne stranke u političkom životu Srbije postaju nezvanične saveznice. Savezništvo im je omogućavao isti ideološki okvir u pogledu srpskog nacionalnog pitanja. Prirodu i ozbiljnost ovog prihvatanja politike vladajuće stranke teško je proceniti. U proleće 1992. godine, Slobodan Milošević je izjavio da je

²²² Dokumentacija Tužilaštva objavljena je u Vojislav Šešelj, *Srpski četnički pokret* (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), str. 187-189.

²²³ Dopunski izbor održani su da bi se popunilo mesto pokojnog pisca Miodraga Bulatovića, poslanika SPS-a u Skupštini. “Vreme”, 17. juni 1991, str. 8.

Vojislav Šešelj njegov omiljeni opozicioni političar. U maju 1992. Vojislav Šešelj je prvi put imao razgovore sa predsednikom Srbije, i to na njegov zahtev. Slobodan Milošević je od njega navodno tražio još dobrovoljaca za Bosnu i Hercegovinu:

“Milošević me je zamolio da mi radikali još intenzivnije organizujemo slanje dobrovoljaca preko Drine, sa svoje strane obećavajući adekvatnu pomoć u oružju, u uniformama i prevoznim sredstvima. Po tom pitanju saradnja je besprekorno funkcionisala sve do septembra 1993. godine Š. . .Ć”²²⁴

U predsedničkim izborima decembra 1992, SRS je u drugom krugu podržao Slobodana Miloševića, kada mu je protivkandidat bio američki Srbin Milan Panić. To neprirodno savezništvo bivših komunista i naslednika četničkog pokreta nije imalo čvrstu osnovu, pa se SRS u proleće 1993, kada je Slobodan Milošević podržao Vance-Owenov mirovni plan za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, distancirao od režima i izazvao pad vlade Republike Srbije na čijem čelu se nalazio Nikola Šainović. Socijalistička partija Srbije je krenula u propagandnu kampanju protiv Srpske radikalne stranke i njenog lidera Vojislava Šešelja. Od tada se radikali prikazuju kao fašisti i primitivci, i ukida im se pristup državnim medijima.²²⁵ Policija je uhapsila neke militantne članove SRS zbog navodnog posedovanja oružja.²²⁶ Državni mediji počeli su da prikazuju lidera SRS kao ratnog zločinca. Sa svoje strane, SRS je optuživao Slobodana Miloševića za izdaju srpskog nacionalnog interesa²²⁷ i pripisivao mu odgovornost za korupciju i organizovani kriminal u Srbiji.²²⁸ U jesen 1994. lider SRS je uhapšen zbog uvreda i napada na predsednika Skupštine Jugoslavije Radomana Božovića. Osuđen je na tri meseca zatvora i pušten je na slobodu 29. januara 1995.

²²⁴ “Svet” od 13. januara 1995, objavljeno i u Vojislav Šešelj, *Srpski bračni par “Čaušescu”*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), str. 158.

²²⁵ “A kada smo podneli zahtev za izglasavanje nepoverenja vladi Nikole Šainovića, socijalisti su krenuli donom. Počeli su da nas optužuju da smo fašisti, da smo kriminalci, da smo paravojna organizacija, šta sve nisu rekli na naš račun. Š. . .Ć”, Vojislav Šešelj, *Preti li nam slobotomija*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), str. 6.

²²⁶ Šešelj, *Milošević hapsi radikale*, str. 33, 52, 72,73.

²²⁷ “Slobodan Milošević je izdajnik otadžbine. On samo vodi narod u bedu i misli isključivo na to da zadrži vlast. Želimo da što pre izazovemo njegov pad.” Deo iz intervju koji je dao italijakom dnevnom listu “Il Mondo” od 8. maja 1995, i koji je objavljen u Šešelj, *Srpski bračni par “Čaušescu”*, str. 226.

²²⁸ U intervjuu datom “Velikoj Srbiji”, januar 1995, a objavljenom i u Šešelj, *Crveni tiranin sa Dedinja*, str. 220-221.

U oktobru 1994. u SRS je došlo do rascepa: grupa od sedam poslanika radikala u saveznoj skupštini osnovala je parlamentarnu grupu “Nikola Pašić”, koja će prerasti u zasebnu disidentsku stranku kako bi konsolidovala svoje položaje – nevažnu Srpsku radikalnu stranku “Nikola Pašić”. Posle pet godina marginalizacije u medijima, Srpska radikalna stranka se vratila u centar političke pozornice zahvaljujući pogoršavanju situacije na Kosovu. Od 1998. do 2000. godine, on će deliti vlast sa Socijalističkom partijom Srbije.

Na izbornom planu, stranka Vojislava Šešelja je iz marginalne brzo prerasla u političku snagu s kojom je trebalo računati na prostoru cele države. Nakon što su upravne vlasti odbile da ga registruju u avgustu 1990. godine, Srpski četnički pokret nije mogao imati svoje kandidate na prvim višestranačkim parlamentarnim izborima u Srbiji, 9. i 23. decembra 1990. Bez obzira na to, Vojislav Šešelj je uspeo da prikupi dovoljno glasova da nastupi kao nezavisni kandidat na predsedničkim izborima 9. decembra 1990. Na tim izborima je bio na petom mestu, sa 96.277 glasova (ili 1,91 procenata od onih koji su glasali), nasuprot 3.285.799 glasova za Slobodana Miloševića iz Socijalističke partije Srbije i 824.674 glasa za Vuka Draškovića, koji se, poput Šešelja, predstavljao kao nastavljajući tradicije Ravnogorskog pokreta.²²⁹ U februaru 1991, Srpski četnički pokret ušao je u sastav Srpske radikalne stranke, koja je u martu iste godine uspela da legalizuje svoj status pod tim imenom. Od marginalne političke snage partija Vojislava Šešelja je za samo godinu dana postala druga najznačajnija politička organizacija u Srbiji. Na prvim parlamentarnim izborima u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji, održanim 31. maja 1992. godine, SRS je osvojio 1.166.933 glasa (30 procenata).²³⁰ Izbori za Skupštine Jugoslavije i Srbije iz decembra 1992. godine potvrdili su izborni uspeh radikala: i na jednim i na

²²⁹ Vladimir Goati, *Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998.: volja građana ili izborna manipulacija*, (Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju), 1999, str. 287.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, str. 290.

drugim izborima bili su drugi, posle Socijalističke partije Slobodana Miloševića, osvojivši 1.024.983 (21,8 procenata), odnosno 1.066.765 (22,6 procenata) glasova.²³¹

Pošto je prethodno podržao partiju Slobodana Miloševića i saradjivao s njom, SRS je u jesen 1993. doveo do pada srpske vlade. Kada je vladajuća stranka zasula Srpsku radikalnu stranku svojom propagandom, ona je na parlamentarnim izborima 19. decembra 1993. izgubila gotovo polovinu svojih glasača, dobivši tek 595.467 glasova (13,8 procenata).²³² Na opštim izborima 1997, radikali su povratili popularnost koju su imali 1992; dobili su podršku 1.162.216 glasača (28,1 procenat), a 5. oktobra 1997. Vojislav Šešelj u drugom krugu predsedničkih izbora pobeđuje socijalističkog kandidata Zorana Lilića.²³³ Međutim, zbog nedovoljnog odziva glasača (manje od pedeset posto) rezultat je proglašen nevažećim. Na ponovljenom glasanju, 7. i 21. decembra 1997, Vojislav Šešelj je izgubio od Milana Milutinovića, kandidata Socijalističke partije Srbije, dobivši u drugom krugu 1.383.868 glasova naspram Milutinovićevih 2.181.808.²³⁴

Dok je 2000. godine delio vlast sa partijom Slobodana Miloševića, SRS je doživeo još jedan pad u broju svojih glasača. Na izborima za Saveznu skupštinu osvojio je samo 472.820 glasova, dok je njegov kandidat za saveznog predsednika, Tomislav Nikolić, prošao loše, osvojivši samo 289.013 glasova (5,9 procenata). Posle pada Slobodana Miloševića 5. oktobra 2000, biračko telo SRS pokazalo je dalje znake erozije na opštim izborima održanim 23. decembra 2000: tek 322.333 glasača iskazalo je poverenje radikalima.²³⁵

²³¹ *Ibid*, str. 291.

²³² Vladimir Goati, *Partije i partijski sistem Srbije*, (Niš: Odbor za gradansku inicijativu, 2004), str. 251.

²³³ *Ibid*, str. 257.

²³⁴ *Ibid*, str. 258.

²³⁵ *Ibid*, str. 253.

Zaključak

Onako kako je bio formulisan u XIX veku, projekat ujedinjenja Srba u jednu državu nije se razlikovao od programa drugih nacionalnih pokreta u Evropi, posebno pokreta za ujedinjenje Italije i Nemačke, kao ni nacionalnih pokreta zemalja srednje i istočne Evrope i Balkana. U to doba, velikosrpska ideologija nije postavljala kao cilj proterivanje nesrpskog stanovništva iz buduće države u kojoj bi svi Srbi na Balkanu živeli zajedno. Za vode je bilo bitno da se dobije podrška drugih Južnih Slovena iz Otomanskog i Habzburškog carstva. Dok su nacionalni identiteti još uvek bili u nastajanju, brojni intelektualci i političari su verovatli da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci deo jednog istog naroda. Koncept Velike Srbije nije bio jasno definisan i često se zamenjivao s aspiracijama ka ujedinjenju Južnih Slovena. Osnovno načelo nije bilo isključivanje drugih Južnih Slovena, već njihovo uključivanje, bez obzira na verosipovest. Na ono malo geografskih karti Velike Srbije objavljenih u XIX veku, ona se, zapravo, poklapa sa teritorijom Jugoslavije. Pored toga, ta ideologija nastala je u vreme kada su Balkanom vladali Austijsko i Otomansko carstvo.

Po stvaranju Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918. godine, uočljiv je razvoj velikosrpske ideologije, posebno uoči Drugog svetskog rata, i od tada je prisutna ideja da nesrpsko stanovništvo treba proterati iz Velike Srbije postavljene kao cilj, kako bi se postigla etnička homogenost. U tom smislu velikosrpska ideologija poprima novu dimenziju, koja će u Drugom svetskom ratu poprimiti vojni oblik. Ova transformacija velikosrpske ideologije dogodila se u poznim 1930-im godinama i podsticaj su joj dali intelektualci okupljeni oko Srpskog kulturnog kluba, od kojih će neki potom biti aktivni u Ravnogorskom pokretu Draže Mihailovića, poraženom od strane komunista partizana 1945-46. godine. Upravo ovi intelektualci formulisli su nacionalni i politički program tog Pokreta.


Ideja okupljanja svih Srba u jednoj državi svom snagom je zaživela u drugoj polovini 1980-ih, kada se Jugoslavija strmoglavljivala u tešku političku, privrednu i društvenu krizu. Od cilja jedinstvene Srbije, republike podeljene u tri jedinice (užu Srbiju i Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodinu i Kosovo), rukovodstvo u Beogradu prešlo je na davanje podrške Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, braneći njihovo pravo na samoopredeljenje. U kontekstu dezintegracije Jugoslavije (1991-1992), srpski predsednik Slobodan Milošević izražavao je mišljenje da svi Srbi treba da žive u istoj državi. Ispoljavanje ekstremnog nacionalizma olakšala je ideološka transformacija Saveza komunista Srbije, koji je od 1987-1988. na sebe preuzeo ulogu branioca srpskog nacionalnog interesa.

Tokom tog perioda mnogi intelektualci doprineli su formulisanju projekta za ujedinjenje svih Srba u istu državu. Počevši od 1983-1984, Vojislav Šešelj je predlagao izmenu unutrašnjih granica u Jugoslaviji, pri čemu bi se uvećala teritorija republike Srbije. U potonjim godinama on će nastaviti da obrazlaže ovaj svoj politički projekat stvaranja Velike Srbije. On je svoj program, zapravo, elaborirao mnogo pre uvođenja političkog pluralizma 1990. i dolaska na vlast Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ) Franje Tuđmana te godine. Tuđmanova politika, koja uopšte nije bila povoljna za hrvatske Srbe, poslužiće kao opravdanje za vojno angažovanje stranke Vojislava Šešelja. Ali smanjenje ili teritorijalna amputacija Hrvatske je ideja koju je on gajio već više godina. Politički i ideološki, Vojislav Šešelj je sebe video kao direktnog naslednika Slobodana JOVANOVIĆA, Dragiše Vasića, Stevana Moljevića i Draže Mihailovića.²³⁶ I, zaista, on i jeste intelektualni potomak Srpskog kulturnog kluba i Ravnogorskog pokreta, od kojih je preuzeo cilj stvaranja srpskog državnog entiteta, što etnički homogenijeg, nasilnim premeštanjem i raseljavanjem stanovništva.

²³⁶ Prema intervjuu u nedeljniku "Slobodni Tjednik" od 4. maja 1990, ponovo objavljenom u Šešelj, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića*, str. 61.

D o d a c i

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 1 – Vojna krajina u osamnaestom veku




Izvor: Jean Nouzille, *Histoire de frontières : l'Autriche et l'Empire ottoman* /Istorija granica: Austrija i Otomansko carstvo / (Pariz: Berg International, 1991) 232.

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 2 – Srbija prema geografu Vladimiru Kariću




Izvor: Charles Jelavich, *South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914* /*Južnoslovenski nacionalizam: udžbenici i jugoslovenska zajednica pre 1914. godine*/, (Kolumbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, cop. 1990), str. 142

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 3 – Teritorijalni zahtevi Jugoslavije i konačne granice, 1918-1921



Izvor: John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia As History: Twice There Was a Country /Jugoslavija kao prošlost: bila dvaput jedna zemlja/*, (Kembridž: Cambridge University Press, 1996), str. 113

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 4 – Administrativna podela Jugoslavije i Banovina Hrvatska (1939)




Izvor: John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country /Jugoslavija kao prošlost: bila dvaput jedna zemlja/*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), str. 165

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 5 – Rasparčavanje Jugoslavije 1941.



Izvor: Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks /Rat i revolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945: četnici*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), str. 90.

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 6 – Nacionalni sastav u delovima rasparčane Jugoslaviji (1941)




Izvor: Lucien Karchmar, *Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Četnik Movement, 1941-1942* /*Draža Mihailović i nastanak četničkog pokreta, 1941-1942*/ (Njujork, London: Garland Publishing, 1987), tom. 1, str. 28.

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 7 – Karta Velike Srbije Stevana Moljevića




Izvor: Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks /Rat i revolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945: četnici*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), str. 168.

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 8 – Kretanje Vrhovne komande JVUO tokom Drugog svetskog rata




Izvor: Lucien Karchmar, *Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Četnik Movement, 1941-1942* /*Draža Mihailović i nastanak četničkog pokreta, 1941-1942*/, (Njujork, London: Garland Publishing, 1987), tom 2, str. 528-529.

**GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 9 – Karta teritorijalnih pregovora za
Londonski ugovor
(26. april 1915)**



Izvor: René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference /Italija na Pariskoj mirovnoj konferenciji/*, (Njujork: Columbia University Press, 1938), str. 27.

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 10 – Karta Velike Srbije objavljena u novinama Srpskog četničkog pokreta “Velika Srbija”, u avgustu 1990.



“Velika Srbija”, novine Srpskog četničkog pokreta, br. 2, avgust 1990. Na naslovnoj strani je geografska karta Velike Srbije kako ju je zamišljao politički pokret Vojislava Šešelja. Na zapadu (na teritoriji Hrvatske) Srbija se prostire do linije Karlobag – Karlovac – Virovitica.

Citati/izjave Vojislava Šešelja o Velikoj Srbiji

Ovde dajemo izbor, a ne iscrpan pregled.

“[. . .] Nužno je i ukidanje autonomnih pokrajina, ili bar njihovo striktno podvođenje pod srbijanski suverenitet, s obzirom da je u Vojvodini većinsko stanovništvo srpsko, a na Kosovu je pretežan dio albanske etničke skupine pokazao spremnost i odlučnost za vođenje separatističke politike, pa bi mu svako dalje davanje političkih beneficija bilo nesvrshodno i štetno sa stanovišta opštejugoslovenskih interesa i državnog razloga koji u ovakvim slučajevima ima presudan značaj. Jugoslovenska federacija bi se sastojala od četiri stvarno ravnopravne republike: Slovenije, Hrvatske, Srbije i Makedonije. Nužno je i novo teritorijalno razgraničenje između Srbije i Hrvatske. S obzirom na djelimičnu teritorijalnu izmiješanost srpskog i hrvatskog stanovništva na području Bosne, Hercegovine, Dalmacije, Like, Korduna, Banije i Slavonije, razgraničenje bi se ostvarilo na principu koji podrazumijeva da u granicama Hrvatske ostane isti broj građana srpske nacionalnosti kao u Srbiji Hrvatske, prema podacima iz poslednjeg popisa stanovništva. Time bi konačno bilo riješeno srpsko-hrvatsko nacionalno pitanje na načelima humanizma i demokratije, te učvršćena međunacionalna sloga i zajedništvo, a izbjegnuta jedan od osnovnih uzroka razdora iz prošlosti [. . .]”

Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi?, septembar 1993, objavljeno u Šešelj, *Demokratija i dogma*, str. 130.

“[. . .] Mi Srbi treba da u okviru Jugoslavije odredimo svoje nacionalne ciljeve, svoj nacionalni program i granice svoje državnosti i da prepustimo to našoj, navodnoj sjevernoj braći Hrvatima i Slovencima, njihovoj slobodnoj volji, da se izjasne da li žele da žive u takvoj državi ili ne žele. Srpski narod nije apriori protiv postojanja Jugoslavije. Srpski narod je, duboko sam ubijeden, za postojanje Jugoslavije ali ne Jugoslavije po svaku cijenu. Samo one Jugoslavije koja bi svojim granicama poštovala granice srpske državnosti garantovane Londonskim ugovorom. Dakle, u slučaju opstanka federalne Jugoslavije, srpska federalna jedinica u svojim granicama mora da ima, ne samo današnju Srbiju, današnje pokrajine Vojvodinu, Kosovo i Metohiju, nego i Makedoniju, Crnu Goru, Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Dubrovnik, Dalmaciju, Liku, Baniju, Kordun, istočnu Slavoniju i Baranju. Sve ove granice nisu garantovane Londonskim ugovorom; njih je obilježio Ante Pavelić u toku Drugog svjetskog rata. Obilježio ih je srpskim grobljima, masovnim grobnicama, srpskim stratištima, logorima, klanicama, jamama. A mišljenja sam da srpski narod ni po koju cijenu ne smije dozvoliti da bilo koje masovno groblje ostane van granica srpske države [. . .]”

“Program Dr. Vojislava Šešelja: iz predavanja kod Gračanice u Americi”, *Četničke novine*, br. 298, juli 1989, str. 4.

“Naš glavni zadatak predstavlja obnova srpske državne nezavisnosti u granicama koje bi obuhvatale sve srpske zemlje. Pored teritorije sadašnje sužene srbijanske federalne jedinice, mi jednostavno srpsku državu ne možemo zamisliti bez srpske Makedonije, srpske Crne Gore, srpske Bosne, srpske Hercegovine, srpskog Dubrovnika, srpske Banije, srpskog Korduna, srpske Slavonije i srpske Baranje.”

Programska izjava Vojislava Šešelja za vreme predsedničkih izbora u decembru 1990, “Velika Srbija”, br. 7, 1990, objavljeno u Šešelj, *Srpski četnički pokret*, str. 220.

“Monitor: Kakav je Vaš koncept budućnosti ove zemlje?”

Vojislav Šešelj: Mi se nadamo da Jugoslavija neće opstati, da ćemo Jugoslaviji vrlo brzo sagledati definitivni kraj.

Jedna je od varijanti da se na ovim prostorima stvore tri nezavisne države: Velika Srbija, mala Slovenija i još manja Hrvatska. Druga, moguća, varijanta je da ćemo mi Srbi postići sporazum sa Talijanima, da će se oživeti Londonski pakt iz 1915. godine i da će se srpsko-talijanska granica postaviti na liniji Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica.”

Intervju objavljen u nedeljniku “Monitor” 31. maja 1991. Takođe objavljen u Šešelj, *Razaranja srpskog nacionalnog bića*, str. 220.

“Kakva je, po Vama, perspektiva Jugoslavije?”

“Mislim da je svima jasno da Jugoslavija nema nikakve budućnosti i da će se u najskorije vreme podeliti na tri posebne države. Biće to žvelika’ Srbija, žmala’ Slovenija i žjoš manja’ Hrvatska. Lično očekujem da će Italija tražiti nazad svoje teritorije. To je deo Jadranskog mora koji joj je otet nakon oba svetska rata. To znači da će Istra opet biti italijanska kao i Rijeka kao i deo ostrva, pre svega u Kvarneru. Srbija će svoju zapadnu granicu uspostaviti na liniji Karlobag-Ogulin, Karlovac-Virovitica. [. .]”

Intervju koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao časopisu “Svet” (9. avgust 1991), objavljen i u Šešelj, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, str. 92.

“- Govori se zadnjih dana o stvaranju nekakvog Saveza srpskih zemalja, a Vi ste jedan od njenih glavnih promotera. Postoji li, po Vama, ikakva mogućnost da to u dogledno vreme bude ostvareno, ili je, pak, reč o propagandnom triku?”

- Mislim da je ta ideja vrlo sazrela i da je treba ostvariti u dve faze. Prva faza bi bilo ujedinjenje Republike Srpske i Republike Srpske Krajine. I to treba odmah uraditi. To je pitanje opstanka i za Republiku Srpsku i za RSK, naročito za ovu drugu. Druga faza bi onda bilo ujedinjenje te i takve države u SRJ, kao posebne federalne jedinice. Smatram da bi prvi deo plana morali odmah i radikalno sprovesti.

- Momčilo Krajišnik reče da bi se ta država zvala žNova Srbija’

- Meni se nešto čini da je onaj naziv "Zapadna Srbija" bolji, jer bi to "Nova Srbija" teško prošlo na Zapadu.”

Intervju koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao “NI Svet” (17. april 1993), objavljen i u Vojislav Šešelj, *Aktuelni politički izazovi*, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), str. 210.

Skraćenice

| | |
|-------|--|
| AVNOJ | Antifašističko veće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije |
| CNK | Centralni nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije |
| HDZ | Hrvatska demokratska zajednica |
| JRSD | Jugoslovenska radikalna seljačka demokratija i nakon 1933. Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka |
| JUORA | Jugoslovenska organizacija ravnogorki |
| JURAO | Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina |
| JVUO | Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini |
| SK | Savez komunista |
| SKJ | Savez komunista Jugoslavije |
| RSK | Republika Srpska Krajina |
| SČP | Srpski četnički pokret |
| SHS | Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca |
| SKK | Srpski kulturni klub |
| SNO | Srpska narodna obnova |
| SPO | Srpski pokret obnove |
| SRS | Srpska radikalna stranka |

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Expérience professionnelle

Ingénieur d'études à la Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC, Université de Paris X-Nanterre), responsable du secteur Balkans, depuis octobre 1995.

Expert-Témoin auprès du Tribunal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie depuis 2004.

Chercheur associé à l'Institut des sciences sociales du politique (CNRS/Université Paris X-Nanterre), depuis 2004.

Etudes et notes de consultance sur les pays balkaniques pour la Délégation aux affaires stratégiques (ministère de la Défense) et le Centre d'analyse et de prévision du ministère des Affaires étrangères français.

Chargé de cours à l'université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), UFR d'études slaves, enseignement de l'histoire des pays yougoslaves, 1999-2000 et 2000-2001.

Commissaire de l'exposition "De l'unification à l'éclatement : l'espace yougoslave, un siècle d'histoire", Musée d'histoire contemporaine (MHC-BDIC), mars-mai 1998.

Etudes supérieures

D.E.A. d'Etudes Slaves et Est-Européennes, obtenu en novembre 1992, mention très bien, I.N.A.L.C.O. (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales).

D.R.E.A (Diplôme de Recherche et d'Etudes Approfondies) de serbo-croate, option civilisation, I.N.A.L.C.O., 1991.

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« Regarder la Serbie autrement », *Libération*, 22.12.2000

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« Ensemble contre Milosevic », *Le Monde*, 06.12.1996.

Colloques, séminaires, conférences

Année 2006

- Intervention au séminaire, « L'Europe centrale. Populations, identités et territoires (19e-20e siècles) », 01.02.2006, Centre d'histoire de l'Europe centrale contemporaine (Université Paris I), sous le titre : « Le réveil du mouvement national serbe à la fin des années 1930 et la question des échanges de population (1937-1941) »

- Intervention à la conférence « Une ère nouvelle dans les Balkans ? », Association des Journalistes Européens, 29.03.2006

- Intervention à la conférence « Le Kosovo : Statut et perspectives d'avenir », Sciences Po - 1er cycle européen - Europe centrale et orientale, Dijon, 03.05.2006

- Intervention à la conférence « Le Monténégro après le référendum du 21 mai 2006 », Association française d'études sur les Balkans, 23.05.2006
- Intervention à la soirée de présentation du livre de Jean-Arnault Dérens, *Kosovo, année zéro*, Maison d'Europe et d'Orient, 01.06.2007

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Année 2005

- Participation au colloque « La France et les migrants des Balkans : un état des lieux », organisé par le Courrier des Balkans, 20.01.2005
- Intervention au séminaire du LASP-CNRS, 24.01.2005, sous le titre : Le réveil national serbe à la fin des années 1930
- Intervention au colloque « Vers un statut définitif du Kosovo », organisé par le Sénat de Belgique, 26.04.2005
- Intervention au séminaire « Les sociétés balkaniques de l'empire aux Etats-nations, figures mythifiées, figures oubliées », EHESS, 30.05.2005, sous le titre : « Le réveil du nationalisme serbe à la fin des années 1930 à travers le parcours de Stevan Moljević »
- Intervention au colloque international « L'ex-Yougoslavie dix ans après Dayton : De nouveaux Etats entre déchirements communautaires et intégration européenne », organisé par la Commission de Géographie Politique (Union Géographique Internationale), 07-08.06.2005, sous le titre : Serbie, quelle assise géographique ?
- Intervention à la Conférence « La Serbie et Monténégro », Bureau parisien du Conseil de l'Europe, 16.06.2005
- Intervention à un colloque restreint sur la Bosnie-Herzégovine, organisé par le Groupe d'amitié France-Bosnie-Herzégovine de l'Assemblée nationale, 20.06.2005
- Intervention à la journée d'étude « Les Eglises orthodoxes en Europe », organisé par le Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales Sciences-Po CNRS, 07.10.2005, sous le titre : Du réveil national au 'réveil' religieux : la Serbie des années 1990
- Intervention au colloque « Serbia in Europe : neighbourhood relations and european integration », Belgrade, 19-20.10.2005, organisé par l'Austrian Institute of East and Southeast European Studies/OSI (Vienna), sous le titre : Serbia's historical heritage
- Intervention à la table ronde « La Serbie-et-Monténégro cinq ans après la chute de Slobodan Milosevic : bilan des changements et perspectives d'avenir » organisé par l'Association française d'études sur les Balkans, 28.10.2005

Année 2004

- Intervention à la conférence 'Où va la Serbie', Courrier des Balkans, Paris, 12.01.2004
- Intervention aux Entretiens de l'information «Après la guerre, le silence des médias», Ecole supérieure de journalisme, Lille, 16.01.2004
- Intervention à la conférence 'Les diasporas balkaniques entre incompréhension et intégration, Courrier des Balkans, Paris, 16.02.2004
- Intervention à la Commémoration du bicentenaire de l'Etat moderne de Serbie, UNESCO, Paris, 01.03.2004
- Intervention à la Rencontre-débat sur les identités nationales dans les Balkans, Journée du Courrier des Balkans, Arcueil, 06.03.2004
- Intervention au séminaire du GASPPECO, La Serbie dans les années 90, Université libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 11.05.2004
- Intervention au colloque 'Construire la nation, construire le socialisme (2e journée)', La nation dans la Yougoslavie communiste, INALCO, Paris, 13.05.2004
- Intervention au séminaire 'Institution universitaire et mouvements étudiants', Juin 1968 : la contestation étudiante en Yougoslavie, Centre d'histoire de Sciences Po, 16.06.2004

Autres activités

Vice-président de l'Association française d'études sur les Balkans (AFEBALK, www.afebalk.org), mandat 2007-2008.

Consultant sur les Balkans (ministère des Affaires étrangères, Centre d'analyse et de prévision)

Langues (par ordre décroissant de maîtrise de la langue)

Serbo-croate, anglais, bulgare, russe, macédonien, albanais.

Yves TOMIĆ

Professional Experience

Design Engineer at the International Contemporary Documentation Library (BDIC, University of Paris X – Nanterre), in charge of the Balkan sector, since October 1995

Expert Witness at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia since 2004

Studies and consultancies on Balkan countries for the Delegation for Strategic Affairs (Ministry of Defence) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Analysis and Projection

Lecturer at the University of Paris – Sorbonne (Paris IV), Slavic Studies training and research unit, instruction of the history of Yugoslav countries, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001

Curator of the exhibition “From Unification to Break-Up: the Yugoslav space, a century of history”, Museum of Contemporary History (MHC-BDIC), March-May 1998

Higher Education

Post-graduate diploma (D.E.A.), Slavic and East-European Studies, obtained in November 1992, first-class honours, I.N.A.L.C.O. (National Institute of Eastern Languages and Civilisations)

Post-graduate research diploma (D.R.E.A.) in Serbo-Croatian, Civilisation option, I.N.A.L.C.O., 1991.

Publications and Editorial Activities

Books

Yves Tomić, *Serbia from Prince Miloš to Milošević*, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2003 and 2004, 165 p.

Laurent Gervereau, Yves Tomić (Ed.), *From Unification to Break-Up: the Yugoslav Space, a Century of History*, Nanterre -BDIC, 1998, 320 p.

Consultancy Studies

Democratic Transition in Serbia, 31 May 2007, for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Analysis and Projection.

Political Transition in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: security aspects, ongoing project (July 2002-March 2003), Nanterre, BDIC, for the Delegation for Strategic Affairs (Ministry of Defence)

The Serbian Question following the Kosovo Conflict, Lyon, Observatory for European Geopolitics (OEG), 2000, study conducted in collaboration with Jacqueline Marković for the Delegation for Strategic Affairs (Ministry of Defence).

Bosnia: An Alternative to the Protectorate? Lyon, OEG, 1999, study conducted in collaboration with Jacqueline Marković.

Articles

“From National Awakening to Religious Revival? The Case of Serbia at the Turn of the 21st Century,” *Balkanologie*, Vol. IX, nos. 1-2, December 2005.

“Serbia: What Geographical Basis?” Regarding Drafts of the New Serbian Constitution”, in André-Louis Sanguin, Amaël Cattaruzza, Emmanuelle Chaveneau-Le Brun (Ed.), *The Former Yugoslavia, Ten Years After Dayton*, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005.

“Political Life in Serbia from 1987 to 2004: a Chronology,” Review of East-West Comparative Studies, Volume 35, Nos. 1-2, March-June 2004.

Yearly Assessment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in *L’Etat du Monde*, Editions 1996-2007, Paris, *La Découverte*.

“*The Authoritarian and Nationalist Drift in Serbia: 1987-2000*”, Stéphane Yerasimos (Ed.), *The Return of the Balkans, 1991-2001*, Paris, Autrement, 2002.

“The League of Communists in Serbia and Opening the Serbian National Question: 1977-1987”, *Balkanologie*, Vol. III, no. 1, September 1999, pp. 89-119.

“The Use of the Kosovo Myth”, Ideas in Movement: Education League Monthly, Special Edition, June 1999

“The Utilitarian Nationalism of Slobodan Milošević’s Regime”, *Cahiers Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu* (FNSP-IEP Paris), no. 4, May 1999

“Serbia: An Unfinished Democratic Transition”, *Balkanologie*, Vol. 1, no. 1, July 1997, pp. 119-124.

“Milošević and the Transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia: From Communism to Populist Nationalism (1986-1989)”, *L’Autre Europe*, no. 34-35, March 1997

“The Lengthy Disintegration Process of the Yugoslav Federation: Attempts at Periodization”, *Revue d’Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, 1997, 1 (March) pp. 147-161.

“The 19th Century Croatian National Movement: Between Yugoslavism (*Jugoslavenstvo*) and Croatianism (*Hrvatstvo*)”, *Revue des Etudes Slaves*, Paris, LXVIII/4, 1996, pp. 463-475.

“Was There Ever Yugoslav Integration?”, *Les Temps Modernes*, no. 574 (May 1994), pp. 87-96.

“To the Origins of the Break-Up of Yugoslavia, in Connection with some Recent Works”, *Revue Européenne d’Histoire*, no. 2 (1994), pp. 199-201.

Newspaper Articles

- “Open the Negotiations on Kosovo”, *Libération*, 30 March 2004
- “Serbia in Search of a Future”, *Libération*, 07 January 2004
- “Kosovo: a Path Toward Independence”, *Libération*, 12 December 2001
- “The Last Yugoslav Fiction”, *Libération*, 04 July 2001
- “Looking at Serbia Differently”, *Libération*, 22 December 2000
- “Yugoslavia, a Chaotic Transition”, *Libération*, 28 September 2000
- “Together Against Milošević”, *Le Monde*, 06 December 1996

Colloquia, Seminars, Conferences

2006

- Presentation at the seminar “Central Europe. People, Identities and Territories (19th-20th Centuries)”, 01 February 2006, Centre for Contemporary Central European History (University of Paris I), titled “The Resurgence of the Serbian National Movement in the Late 1930s and the Issue of Population Exchanges (1937-1941)”
- Presentation at the conference “A New Era in the Balkans?”, Association of European Journalists, 29 March 2006
- Presentation at the conference “Kosovo: Status and Future Perspectives”, Sciences Po – European First and Second Year – Central and Eastern Europe, Dijon, 03 May 2006
- Presentation at the conference “Montenegro After the Referendum of 21 May 2006”, French Association of Balkan Studies, 23 May 2006
- Speech at the Evening Presentation of the book by Jean-Arnault Dérens, *Kosovo, Year Zero, Maison d’Europe et d’Orient*, 01 June 2007

2005

- Participation in the colloquium “France and Balkan Migrants: Baseline Survey”, organised by *Le Courrier des Balkans*, 20 January 2005
- Presentation at the seminar of the LASP-CNRS /Political Systems Analysis Laboratory-National Centre for Scientific Research/ 24 January 2005, titled “Serbian National Awakening in the late 1930’s”.
- Presentation at the colloquium “Toward a Definitive Status in Kosovo”, organised by the Belgian Senate, 26 April 2005

- Presentation at the seminar “Balkan Societies from Empires to Nation-States, mythical figures, forgotten figures”, EHESS /School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences/, 30 May 2005, titled “Serbian National Resurgence in the late 1930’s seen through the journey of Stevan Moljević”
- Presentation at the international colloquium “The Former Yugoslavia Ten Years After Dayton: New States Between Community Division and European Integration”, organised by the Commission of Political Geography (International Geographic Union), 7-8 June 2005, titled: Serbia: What Geographical Basis?.”.
- Presentation at the Conference “Serbia and Montenegro”, Parisian Office of the Council of Europe, 16 June 2005
- Presentation at the select colloquium on Bosnia and Herzegovina, organised by the France-Bosnia-Herzegovina Friendship Association of the National Assembly, 20 June 2005
- Presentation during the workshop “Orthodox Churches in Europe”, organised by the Centre for International Study and Research of Sciences-Po CNRS, 07 October 2005, titled From National Awakening to Religious Revival: Serbia in the 1990’s.
- Presentation at the colloquium “Serbia in Europe: Neighbourhood Relations and European Integration”, Belgrade 19-20 October 2005, organised by the Austrian Institute of East and Southeast European Studies/OSI (Vienna), titled “Serbia’s Historical Heritage”.
- Presentation at the round table “Serbia and Montenegro Five Years After the Fall of Slobodan Milošević: Status of Changes and Prospects for the Future” organised by the French Association of Balkan Studies, 28 October 2005

2004

- Presentation at the conference “Where is Serbia Headed?”, *Courrier des Balkans*, Paris 12 January 2004
- Presentation at the Entretiens des Information /Information Meetings/ “After the War, Media Silence”, Advanced School for Journalism, Lille, 16 January 2004
- Presentation at the conference “Balkan Diasporas In Between Misunderstanding and Integration”, *Courrier des Balkans*, Paris, 16 February 2004
- Presentation at the Commemoration of the Bicentennial of the Modern Serbian State, UNESCO, Paris, 01 March 2004
- Presentation at the meeting-debate on national identities in the Balkans, *Journée du Courrier des Balkans*, Arcueil, 06 March 2004
- Presentation at the GASPPPECO /Socio-Political Analysis Group of Central and Eastern European Countries/ seminar, Serbia in the 90s, Brussels Free University, Brussels, 11 May 2004

- Presentation at the colloquium “Build the Nation, Build Socialism (2nd day)”, The Nation in Communist Yugoslavia, INALCO, Paris, 13 May 2004.

- Presentation at the seminar “University Institution and Student Movements”, June 1968: Student Protest in Yugoslavia, Sciences-Po History Centre, 16 June 2004

Other Activities

Vice-President of the French Association of Balkan Studies (AFELBALK www.afelbalk.org), term 2007-2008.

Consultant on the Balkans (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Centre for Analysis and Projection)

Languages (in descending order of fluency)

Serbo-Croatian, English, Bulgarian, Russian, Macedonian, Albanian

YVES TOMIC

Profesionalno iskustvo

Voda istraživanja nadležan za područje Balkana pri *Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine* /Biblioteka za međunarodnu dokumentaciju/ (BDIC, Univerzitet Pariz X - Nanterre), od oktobra 1995.

Veštak na Međunarodnom krivičnom sudu za bivšu Jugoslaviju od 2004.

Istraživač-spoljni saradnik pri *Institut des sciences sociales du politique* /Institutu za društvene nauke i politiku/ (CNRS-Državni centar za naučna istraživanja/Univerzitet Pariz X - Nanterre) od 2004.

Provođenje istraživanja i izrada radnog materijala o balkanskim zemljama za Delegaciju za strateška pitanja (Ministarstvo odbrane) u okviru Centra za analizu i predviđanja francuskog Ministarstva spoljnih poslova.

Predavač na Univerzitetu Pariz-Sorbona (Pariz-IV), Katedra za slovenske studije, predavanja o istoriji jugoslovenskih zemalja, 1999-2000. i 2000-2001.

Kustos izložbe *De l'unification à l'éclatement: l'espace yougoslave, un siècle d'histoire* /Od ujedinjenja do raspada: jugoslovenski prostor, jedan vek istorije/, Muzej savremene istorije (MHC-BDIC), mart-maj 1998.

Poslediplomske studije

D.E.A. /magistratura/ iz slovenskih i istočnoevropskih studija, titula stečena u novembru 1992. s ocenom odličan, I.N.A.L.C.O. /Nacionalni institut za orijentalne jezike i civilizacije/.

D.R.E.A. /magistratura i istraživački rad/ iz srpskohrvatskog, smer civilizacija, I.N.A.L.C.O, 1991.

Publikacije i izdavačka delatnost

Radovi

Yves Tomic, *La Serbie du prince Milos à Milosevic /Srbija od kneza Miloša do Miloševića/*, Bruxelles, P. I. E. Peter Lang, 2003. i 2004, 165 str.

Laurent Gerverau, Yves Tomic (ur.), *De l'unification à l'éclatement, l'espace yougoslave, un siècle d'histoire /Od ujedinjenja do raspada, jugoslovenski prostor, jedan vek istorije/*, Nanterre, BDIC, 1998, 320 str.

RADNA VERZIJA

Elaborati:

La transition démocratique en Serbie /Demokratska tranzicija u Srbiji/, 31. 05. 2007, za Centar za analizu i predviđanja Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Francuske.

La transition politique en RF Yougoslavie: aspects sécuritaires /Politička tranzicija u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji: bezbednosni aspekti/, projekt u toku (juli 2002-mart 2003), Nanterre, BDIC, za Delegaciju za strateška pitanja (Ministarstvo odbrane).

La question serbe après le conflit au Kosovo /Srpsko pitanje nakon kosovskog sukoba/, Lyon, OEG /Evropska geografska organizacija/ 2000, studija realizovana u saradnji sa Jacqueline Markovic za Delegaciju za strateška pitanja (Ministarstvo odbrane).

Bosnie: une alternative au protectorat ? /Bosna: alternativa protektoratu?/, Lyon, OEG, 1999, elaborat realizovan u saradnji sa Jacqueline Markovic.

Članci

"Du réveil national au réveil religieux? Le cas de la Serbie au tournant du XXI^e siècle" /Od nacionalnog do verskog buđenja? Primer Srbije na prelazu u 21. vek/, *Balkanologie*, sv. IX, broj 1-2, decembar 2005.

"Serbie: quelle assise géographique? A propos des projets de nouvelle Constitution de la Serbie" /Srbija: koje geografsko uporište? O pitanju projekta novog Ustava Srbije/, u André-Louis Sanguin, Amaël Cattaruzza, Emmanuelle Chaveneau-Le Brun (ur.), *L'ex-Yougoslavie, dix ans après Dayton* /Bivša Jugoslavija deset godina nakon Dayton/, Pariz, L'Harmattan, 2005.

"La vie politique en Serbie de 1987 à 2004: une chronologie" /Hronologija političkog života u Srbiji od 1987. do 2004./, *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* /Časopis za komparativne studije Istok-Zapad/, sv. 35, br. 1-2, mart-juni 2004.

"Le bilan de l'année en RF Yougoslavie" /Jednodišnji bilans u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji/, u publikaciji *L'état du monde* /Stanje u svetu/, izdanje 1996-2007, Pariz, La Découverte.

"La dérive autoritaire et nationaliste en Serbie: 1987-2000" /Razvoj autoritarnosti i nacionalizma u Srbiji: 1987-2000/ u Stéphane Yerasimos (ur.), *Le retour des Balkans, 1991-2001* /Povratak Balkana, 1991-2001/, Pariz, Autrement, 2002.

"La Ligue des communistes de Serbie et l'ouverture de la question nationale serbe: 1977-1987" /Savez komunista Srbije i pokretanje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja: 1977-1987/, *Balkanologie*, sv. III, br. 1, septembar 1999, str. 89-119.

"De l'usage du mythe du Kosovo" /Upotreba kosovskog mita/, *Les idées en mouvement: mensuel de la Lige de l'enseignement* /Ideje u pokretu, mesečnik Prosvetnog saveza/, izvanredni broj, juni 1999.

"Le nationalisme utilitariste du régime de Slobodan Milošević" /Utilitarni nacionalizam režima Slobodana Miloševića/, edicija Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu (FNSP-IEP /Državna fondacija za političke nauke-Institut za političke studije/, Pariz), br. 4, maj 1999.

"Serbie: une transition démocratique inachevée" /Srbija: nedovršena demokratska tranzicija/, *Balkanologie*, sv. I, br. 1, juli 1997, str. 119-124.

"Milošević et la mutation de la Ligue des communistes de Serbie: du communisme au nationalisme populiste (1986-1989)" /Milošević i promene u Savezu komunista Srbije: od komunizma do populističkog nacionalizma (1986-1989)/, *L'autre Europe*, br. 34-35, mart 1997.

"Le long processus de désintégration de la Fédération yougoslave: tentative de périodisation" /Dugi proces dezintegracije jugoslovenske federacije: pokušaj periodizacije/, *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* /Časopis za komparativne studije Istok-Zapad/, 1997, 1 (mart) str. 147-161.

"Le mouvement national croate au XIXème siècle: entre yougoslavisme (*jugoslavenstvo*) et croatisme (*hrvatstvo*)" /Hrvatski nacionalni pokret u 19 veku: između jugoslovenstva i hrvatstva/, *Revue des Etudes Slaves*, /Časopis za slovenske studije/, Pariz, LXXVIII/4, 1996, str. 463-475.

"Y a-t-il jamais eu une intégration yougoslave" /Da li je jugoslovenska integracija ikada postojala/, *Les Temps Modernes* /Moderna vremena/, br. 574 (maj 1994), str. 87-96.

"Aux origines du déchirement de la Yougoslavie, à propos de quelques ouvrages récents" /Uzroci raspada Jugoslavije, o nekoliko najnovijih dela/, *Revue Européene d'Histoire* /Evropski časopis za istoriju/, br. 2 (1994), str. 199-201.

Kolumne

"Ouvrons les négociations sur le Kosovo" /Otvorimo pregovore o Kosovu/, *Libération*, 30. 03. 2004.

"La Serbie en quête d'avenir" /Srbija u potrazi za budućnošću/, *Libération*, 07. 01. 2004.

"Kosovo: une voie vers l'indépendance" /Kosovo: put prema nezavisnosti/, *Libération*, 12. 12. 2001.

"La dernière fiction yougoslave" /Poslednja jugoslovenska fikcija/, *Libération*, 04. 07. 2001.

"Regarder la Serbie autrement" /Drugi pogled na Srbiju/, *Libération*, 22. 12. 2000.

"Yougoslavie, une transition chaotique" /Jugoslavija, haotična tranzicija/, *Libération*, 28. 09. 2000.

"Ensemble contre Milošević" /Zajedno protiv Miloševića/, *Le Monde*, 06. 12. 1996.

Skupovi, seminari, predavanja

2006. godina

- Predavanje na seminaru "L'Europe centrale. Populations, identité et territoires (19^e-20^e siècles)" /Srednja Evropa. Stanovništvo, identitet i teritorije (19-20. vek)/, 01. 02. 2006, Centar za savremenu istoriju Srednje Evrope (Univerzitet Pariz I), pod naslovom: "Le réveil du mouvement national serbe à la fin des années 1930 et la question des échanges de population (1937-1941)" /Buđenje srpskog narodnog pokreta krajem 1930-ih godina i pitanje razmene stanovništva (1937-1941),

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Une ère nouvelle dans les Balkans?" /Nova era na Balkanu?/, Udruženje evropskih novinara, 29. 03. 2006.

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Le Kosovo: Statut et perspectives d'avenir" /Kosovo: budući status i perspektive/, Sciences Po – 1er cycle européen – Europe centrale et orientale /Fakultet političkih nauka – 1. evropski ciklus – Srednja i istočna Evropa/, Dijon, 03. 05. 2006.
- Predavanje na konferenciji "Le Monténégro après le référendum du 21 mai 2006" /Crna Gora nakon referenduma održanog 21. maja 2006./, Association française d'études sur les Balkans /Francusko udruženje za balkanske studije/, 23. 05. 2006.
- Predavanje na prezentaciji knjige Jean-Arnaluta Dérensa, *Kosovo, année zéro* /Kosovo, godina nulta/, Maison d'Europe et d'Orient /Dom Evrope i Orijenta/, 01. 06. 2007.

2005. godina

- Učestvovanje na skupu "La France et les migrants des Balkans: un état des lieux" /Francuska i migranti s Balkana: pregled stanja/ u organizaciji Courrier des Balkans, 20. 01. 2005.
- Predavanje na seminaru LASP-CNRS (Laboratorije za analizu političkih sistema-Centra za naučna istraživanja) održanom 24. 01. 2005. pod naslovom "Le réveil national serbe à la fin des années 1930" /Srpsko nacionalno buđenje krajem 1930-ih godina/.
- Predavanje na skupu "Vers un statut définitif du Kosovo" /Prema konačnom statusu Kosova/ u organizaciji Senata Kraljevine Belgije, 26. 04. 2005.
- Predavanje na seminaru "Les sociétés balkaniques de l'empire aux Etats-nations, figures mythifiées, figures oubliées" /Balkanska društva od carstva do država-nacija, mitske i zaboravljene forme/, EHESS /Fakultet za društvene nauke/, 30. 05. 2005. pod naslovom "Le réveil du nationalisme serbe à la fin des années 1930 à travers le parcours de Stevan Moljević" /Buđenje srpskog nacionalizma krajem 1930-ih godina na primeru Stevana Moljevića/.
- Predavanje na međunarodnom skupu "L'ex-Yougoslavie dix ans après Dayton: De nouveaux Etats entre déchirements communautaires et intégration européenne" /Bivša Jugoslavija deset godina posle Dayton: nove države između nacionalnih rastrzanosti i evropskih integracija/ u organizaciji Komisije za političku geografiju (Međunarodno geografsko udruženje), 07-08. 06. 2005., pod naslovom: "Serbie, quelle assise géographique?" /Srbija: koje geografsko uporište?/.
- Predavanje na konferenciji "La Serbie et Monténégro" /Srbija i Crna Gora/, Pariska kancelarija Saveta Evrope, 16. 06. 2005.

- Predavanje na skupu o Bosni i Hercegovini u organizaciji Grupe za prijateljstvo Francuske i Bosne i Hercegovine u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Francuske, 20. 06. 2005.
- Predavanje na skupu "Les Eglises orthodoxes en Europe" /Pravoslavne Crkve u Evropi/, u organizaciji Centra za međunarodne studije i istraživanja i Fakulteta političkih nauka-Centra za naučna istraživanja, 07. 10. 2005, pod naslovom: "Du réveil national au 'réveil' religieux: la Serbie des années 1990" /Od nacionalnog do 'verskog' buđenja: Srbija 1990-ih godina /.
- Predavanje na skupu "Serbia in Europe: neighbourhood relations and european integration" /Srbija u Evropi: odnosi između susedskih zemalja i evropske integracije/, Beograd, 19-20. 10. 2005, u organizaciji Austrijskog instituta za studije o Istočnoj i Jugoistočnoj Evropi iz Beča.
- Predavanje na okruglom stolu "La Serbie-et-Monténégro cinq ans après la chute de Slobodan Milosevic: bilan des changements et perspectives d'avenir" /Srbija i Crna Gora pet godina posle pada Slobodana Miloševića: bilansa promena i perspektive za budućnost/, u organizaciji Francuskog udruženja za balkanske studije, 28. 10. 2005.

2004. godina

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Où va la Serbie" /Kuda ide Srbija?/, Courier des Balkans, Paris, 12. 01. 2004.
- Predavanje "Après la guerre, le silence des médias" /Nakon rata, šutnja medija/, Fakultet za novinarstvo, Lille, 16. 01. 2004.
- Predavanje na konferenciji "Les diasporas balkaniques entre incompréhension et intégration" /Balkanske dijaspore između nerazumevanja i integracije/, Courier des Balkans, Pariz, 16. 02. 2004.
- Predavanje na obeležavanju dvestagodišnjice moderne srpske države, UNESCO, Pariz, 01. 03. 2004.
- Predavanje na diskusiji o nacionalnim identitetima na Balkanu, Courier des Balkans, Arcueil, 06. 03. 2004.
- Predavanje na seminaru GASPPECO-a /Grupe za društveno-političku analizu država srednje i istočne Evrope/, "La Serbie dans les années 90" /Srbija u devedesetim godinama/, Slobodni univerzitet u Bruxellesu, Bruxelles, 11. 05. 2004.
- Predavanje na skupu "Construire la nation, construire le socialisme" /Stvaranje nacije, stvaranje socijalizma/ (2. dan), "La nation dans la Yougoslavie communiste" /Nacija u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji/, INALCO, Pariz, 13. 05. 2004.

- Predavanje na seminaru "Institution universitaire et mouvements étudiants" /Univerzitet i studentski pokreti/, "Juin 1968: la contestation étudiante en Yougoslavie" /Juni 1968: studentski pokret u Jugoslaviji/, Centar za istoriju Fakulteta političkih nauka, 16. 06. 2004.

Druge aktivnosti

Potpredsednik Francuskog udruženja za balkanske studije (AFEBALK, www.afebalk.org), mandat 2007-2008.

Konsultant za Balkan (Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, Centar za analizu i predviđanja)

Jezici (navedeni po opadajućem redosledu poznavanja jezika)

Srpsko-hrvatski, engleski, bugarski, ruski, makedonski, albanski