

**UNITED
NATIONS**



International Residual Mechanism
for Criminal Tribunals

Case No.	MICT-15-96-T
Date:	15 January 2019
Original:	English

IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Burton Hall, Presiding
Judge Joseph E. Chiondo Masanche
Judge Seon Ki Park

Registrar: Mr. Olufemi Elias

Order of: 15 January 2019

PROSECUTOR

v.

**JOVICA STANIŠIĆ
FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ**

PUBLIC

**ORDER IN RELATION TO PROSECUTION REQUEST FOR
CLARIFICATION OF DECISION ON ADJUDICATED FACTS**

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Serge Brammertz
Mr. Douglas Stringer

Counsel for the Defence:

Mr. Wayne Jordash and Mr. Iain Edwards for Mr. Jovica Stanišić
Mr. Mihajlo Bakrač and Mr. Vladimir Petrović for Mr. Franko Simatović

THE TRIAL CHAMBER OF the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (“Trial Chamber” and “Mechanism”, respectively);¹

RECALLING that, on 15 October 2018, the Trial Chamber issued a decision taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts, or portions thereof, as indicated in the decision and annex, in the manner formulated therein;²

BEING SEISED OF a request filed on 13 November 2018 (“Request”),³ in which the Prosecution seeks clarification of certain discrepancies between the text of the Decision and the annex;⁴

NOTING that Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović did not respond to the Request;

CONSIDERING that the discrepancies identified by the Prosecution are due to clerical errors in preparation of the annex;


HEREBY CONFIRMS that it has:

1. taken judicial notice of Prosecution Proposed Facts 1260, 1261, and 1298 through 1320;
2. taken judicial notice of Prosecution Proposed Fact 1383, adding the phrase “in the period between end of May to August 1992”;
3. declined to take judicial notice of Prosecution Proposed Fact 1259; and

ORDERS that adjudicated facts 1169, 1170, 1203 through 1226, and 1287 shall read as indicated in the corrected Annex attached to the present order, which now supersedes the annex to the Decision and is the operative list of adjudicated facts accepted by the Trial Chamber.

Done in English and French, the English version being authoritative.

Done this 15th day of January 2019,
At The Hague,
The Netherlands



Judge Burton Hall, Presiding

[Seal of the Mechanism]

¹ Order Replacing a Judge in a Case Before a Trial Chamber, 21 February 2017, p. 1.

² Decision on Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 15 October 2018 (“Decision”), para. 49.

³ Prosecution Request for Clarification of Decision on Adjudicated Facts, 13 November 2018.

⁴ Request, paras. 2-4, *referring to* Prosecution Proposed Facts 1259-1261, 1298-1320, 1383.

**ANNEX TO DECISION ON JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
ADJUDICATED FACTS
*CORRECTED***

TABLE OF ADJUDICATED FACTS

<u>TC AF No.⁵</u>	<u>Proposed Fact No.</u>	<u>The Adjudicated Fact as Admitted and/or Modified by the Trial Chamber</u>
1. Historical and Political Background and Structure of the SFRY, FRY, and Serbia		
1	P1	Immediately after the First World War, and as part of the break-up of the Hapsburg empire, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created out of the union of the Kingdom of Serbia, which in the nineteenth century had already achieved independence from Turkey, with Montenegro, which had also been an independent principality, and with Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2	P2	In 1929 that Kingdom changed its name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, that is, the Kingdom of the southern Slavs.
3	P3	For many centuries Roman Catholicism had predominated in the northern and western sectors, whereas Orthodox Christianity and Islam prevailed in its southern and eastern sectors under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.
4	P4	This same general religious division persisted into the 20 th century and indeed still persisted in 1997.
5	P5	During the time of Axis occupation, a portion of the territory of the state was annexed by Italy and two other areas were transferred to Bulgarian and Hungarian control respectively.
6	P6	Much of what remained became the formally independent but in fact Axis puppet state of Croatia, extending far beyond previous, and subsequent, Croatian boundaries and divided between Italian and German zones.
7	P7	The Second World War was a time of prolonged armed conflict in Yugoslavia, in part the product of civil war, in part a struggle against foreign invasion and subsequent occupation.
8	P8	Although this wartime situation was short-lived, lasting only from 1941 to 1945, it left bitter memories, not least in Bosnia and Herzegovina, large parts of which, including opština Prijedor, were included in the puppet state of Croatia.
9	P9	However, at least in opština Prijedor, particularly in rural areas, the three populations, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, tended to live separately so that in very many villages one or another nationality so predominated that they were generally regarded as Serb or Croat or Muslim villages.
10	P10	There were good intercommunal relations, friendships across ethnic and coincident religious divides, intermarriages and generally harmonious relations.
11	P11	Marshal Tito and his communist regime took stern measures to suppress and keep suppressed all nationalist tendencies.
12	P12	Under its Constitution of 1946, the country was to be composed of six Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro and two autonomous regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo.
13	P13	According to the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution, the peoples of the Republics, other than Bosnia and Herzegovina, were regarded

⁵ Trial Chamber Adjudicated Fact Number.

		as distinct nations of federal Yugoslav.
14	P14	The situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was unique; although it was one of the six Republics, it, unlike the others, possessed no one single majority ethnic grouping and thus there was no recognition of a distinct Bosnian nation.
15	P15	However, by 1974 the Muslims were considered to be one of the nations or peoples of federal Yugoslavia.
16	P16	Throughout the years of Marshal Tito's communist Yugoslavia, religious observance was discouraged.
17	P17	Nevertheless, the population remained very conscious of so-called ethnic identity, as Serb, Croat or Muslim.
18	P18	In 1997, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether practising or non-practising, the great majority of Serbs remained Orthodox Christian and the Croats Roman Catholic, while the title Muslim speaks for itself.
19	P19	Post-war Yugoslavia was, at first, a highly centralist State, with substantial power exercised federally from Belgrade.
20	P20	Then, in the 1960s and on into the 1970s, there was a trend towards devolution of power to the governments of the Republics, a trend enhanced by a new Constitution adopted in 1974 and which continued on into the 1980s.
21	P21	In October 1988, the authorities governing Vojvodina were removed and in March 1989 a new Constitution was adopted in Serbia which removed the autonomy of the province of Kosovo.
22	P22	In the mid to late 1980s, the Republic of Serbia had already begun measures to deprive Yugoslavia's two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, of their separate identity and effectively to incorporate them into the Republic. This it achieved in substance in 1990, thereby ending what Serbs regarded as a discriminatory feature of the federation, that the one entire nation of Serbs, consisting of Serbia and the two provinces, was, alone of the Republics, denied a single, united identity.
23	P23	Kosovo is part of the historical homeland of the Serbs of past centuries and has particular significance for present-day Serbs who regarded its autonomy as a province to be especially hurtful, depriving Serbia of coherent statehood and control over what it considered to be ancestral Serbian territory.
24	P24	Yugoslavia had long pursued its own unique system of socialist self-management which set it apart from the rest of the communist world.
25	P25	During the 1980s this system came to be widely regarded as responsible for Yugoslavia's protracted economic crisis.
26	P26	Towards the end of the 1980s, the economic crisis in Yugoslavia developed into a major political one.
27	P27	Yugoslavia's one-party state, with all political power in the hands of the League of Communists, was increasingly regarded as outmoded.
28	P28	In 1988, a sweeping reform of the political and constitutional scene occurred. The whole structure of socialist self-management, entrenched as it had been in the federal Constitution, was abolished.
29	P29	The many constitutional references to the Yugoslav working class as the political actors and possessors of political power were removed and the leading political role of the League of Communists was brought to an end.
30	P30	Marshal Tito's death in 1980 and the rapid disintegration of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the first months of 1990 resulted in a power vacuum and the emergence of national parties throughout the country.
31	P31	In 1988 and 1989 events in both Serbia and Slovenia suggested impending threats to the unity of the federation.

32	P32	In 1989 at the fourteenth Congress of the League of Communists, Serbian delegates also sought to alter to the advantage of more populous Republics such as Serbia a fundamental feature of the Constitution, that of the voting equality of Republics, substituting for it the one person one vote principle.
33	P33	This caused the resignation of the Slovenian leadership from the League and a walkout from the Congress of the representatives of Croatia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
34	P34	Slobodan Milošević, already a powerful political figure in Serbia as a party chief, spoke at a mass rally at the site of the Kosovo battlefield itself.
35	P35	Slobodan Milošević spoke at the Kosovo battlefield as the protector and patron of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia and declared that he would not allow anyone to beat the Serb people.
36	P36	Slobodan Milošević's speech greatly enhanced his role as the charismatic leader of the Serb people in each of the Republics, after which he rapidly rose in power.
37	P37	In 1989 Slovenia formally amended the Republic's Constitution to empower the Slovene Assembly to take measures to protect the Republic's status and rights from violation by organs of the federation.
38	P38	This amendment was declared unconstitutional by Yugoslavia's Constitutional Court.
39	P39	In December 1989 Slovenia chose to ignore the decision of the court.
40	P40	In the following 18 months other Republics increasingly ignored federal authority.
41	P41	In May 1990, a new government was elected into office in Slovenia after its first multi-party elections.
42	P42	In December 1990, a plebiscite was held in Slovenia, resulting in an overwhelming majority vote for independence from Yugoslavia.
43	P43	In Croatia the elections of 1990 produced a strongly nationalistic government led by Franjo Tuđman who, upon assuming power, amended the Republic's Constitution to recreate Croatia as the national state of the Croatian nation, with citizens of other ethnic groups as minorities, not having the status of nations.
44	P44	A plebiscite in Croatia in May 1991 produced an overwhelming majority for independence.
45	P45	Just before the holding of the Croatian plebiscite, Serbia and Montenegro, aided by the votes of the two formerly autonomous provinces now controlled by Serbia, blocked for a time the customary rotation of the collective Presidency of the federation, preventing the appointment of a Croat whose turn it was, according to the convention, to be President of the federation.
46	P46	On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
47	P47	The concept of a Greater Serbia has a long history. It emerged at the forefront of political consciousness, in close to its modern form, as early as 150 years ago and gained momentum between the two World Wars.
48	P48	Greater Serbia involved two distinct aspects: first, the incorporation of the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo into Serbia, and secondly, the extension of the enlarged Serbia, together with Montenegro, into those portions of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina containing substantial Serb populations.

49	P49	Associated with the first of these aspects was the Serbian opposition to the equal representation of each of the Republics, regardless of population size. The two provinces were effectively incorporated into Serbia in 1990, but the move to achieve federal representation by population rather than by Republics, with a resulting increased power for Serbia, was not achieved before the break-up of the federation.
50	P50	The second aspect of a Greater Serbia was strongly pursued in the late 1980s and on into the 1990s, much encouraged by nationalist writings of earlier days, some of which advocated a Serbian state extending throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and including the Dalmatian coast and parts of Croatia north of the River Sava. It was actively promoted by Serb propaganda, a key element of the campaign. By recalling the atrocities of the Croat Ustaša in the Second World War, its proponents sought to arouse the fears of Serbs everywhere and in the end to have them seek protection within a Greater Serbia.
51	P51	The propaganda campaign that accompanied this movement began as early as 1989, with the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. During this celebration, the Serb-controlled media declared that Serbs had been let down by others in the area when the Ottoman Turks invaded.
52	P52	Through public speeches and the media, Serbian political leaders emphasised a glorious past, and informed their audiences that if Serbs did not join together they would be again subject to attack by "Ustaša", a term used to inspire fear in Serbs. The danger of a "fundamentalist, politicised" Muslim community was also represented as a threat.
53	P53	After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia began, the theme of the Serb-dominated media was that "if for any one reason Serbs would become a minority population ... their whole existence could be very perilous and endangered ... [and therefore] they had no choice but a full-scale war against everyone else, or to be subjected to the old type concentration camp, the symbol being Jasenovac."
54	P54	Colonel Vukelić, the Assistant for Ethics of the Commander of the 5th Corps of the 1st Military District of the JNA in 1991 and 1992, a Bosnian Serb responsible for moral and ethical preparation of military units and for maintaining relations with the media, political bodies and socio-political organizations, made many declarations against Muslim and Croat populations.
55	P55	Colonel Vukelić characterized Croats and Muslims as the enemies of Serbs and proclaimed that the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were in danger and needed to be protected, a need which should inspire Serb members of the JNA to join the struggle to save the Serbs from genocide.
56	P56	Over time, the propaganda escalated in intensity and began repeatedly to accuse non-Serbs of being extremists plotting genocide against the Serbs.
57	P57	Periodicals from Belgrade featured stories on the remote history of Serbs. In articles, announcements, television programmes and public proclamations, Serbs were told that they needed to protect themselves from a fundamentalist Muslim threat and must arm themselves and that the Croats and Muslims were preparing a plan of genocide against them.
58	P60	Slovenia, containing very few Serbs and playing no part in the history and traditions of the Serb nation, was allowed to secede with relatively little intervention from Belgrade. The JNA was mainly intent on securing the successful withdrawal of JNA units and equipment once it became clear that Slovenia, having retained substantial supplies of arms and equipment for its TO units, would not readily succumb to such JNA forces as Belgrade was prepared to venture in an effort to retain it within the federation.

59	P61	It was a different story with Croatia; it too had retained for its own TO substantial weaponry but Croatia, unlike Slovenia, had a large Serb population and what were regarded as Serb lands, which were not to be allowed to remain unchallenged with the boundaries of the now independent Republic of Croatia.
60	P62	War ensued between the JNA and the Croatian Serbs on the one hand and, on the other, the forces that the Croatian government could rally. The outcome of the initial phase of that conflict was substantial success for the Serbs.
61	P63	By the end of 1991 those portions of the old Republic of Croatia in which large numbers of Serbs lived had been occupied by the JNA, including, of course, the two self-declared autonomous Serb territories.
62	P64	The JNA, although by now a substantially Serbian and Montenegrin force, had its constitutional function of ensuring the integrity of the federation and its attack on Croatia could be represented in that light.
63	P65	In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Parliament declared the sovereignty of the Republic on 15 October 1991.
64	P66	In response to the growing tensions in Croatia and the unfolding of a war also in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Carrington, who was appointed by the President of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, the Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, was asked to broker a comprehensive peace settlement in Yugoslavia. During the Dutch Presidency of the EC, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was introduced into the region. Lord Carrington chaired the first session of a peace conference in The Hague on 7 September 1991 attended by the Presidents of the six Yugoslav republics. On 8 November 1991, an EC summit in Rome recommended trade sanctions, including an oil embargo, on Yugoslavia.
65	P67	The international peace process shifted from the EC to the UN when the UN Secretary General appointed Cyrus Vance, a former US Secretary of State, as the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General to Yugoslavia. Cyrus Vance's plan was to deploy a UN peace-keeping force in Croatia.
66	P68	The Republic of Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later to become the Republika Srpska) was declared on 9 January 1992, to come into force upon any international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
67	P69	In March 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence following a referendum held in February 1992 sponsored by the Bosnian Muslims with some support from Bosnian Croats.
68	P70	The holding of the February referendum had been opposed by Bosnian Serbs, who very largely abstained from voting.
69	P71	The European Community and the United States of America recognised the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992.
70	P72	The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a State member of the United Nations, following decisions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, on 22 May 1992, two days before the shelling and take-over of Kozarac.
71	P73	Even before 22 May 1992, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an organised political entity, as one of the republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, having its own republican secretariat for defence and its own TO.
72	P74	Serbia and Montenegro meanwhile continued to support the concept of a federal state, no longer under its old name, but to be called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and wholly Serb dominated, consisting only of Serbia and Montenegro.
73	P75	What had taken the place of state socialism in Yugoslavia were the separate nationalisms of each of the Republics of the former Yugoslavia, other than Bosnia and Herzegovina, which alone possessed no single national majority.

74	P77	The President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, publicly supported the preservation of Yugoslavia as a federation of which, inter alia, the SAO Krajina would form a part.
75	P78	Through the summer of 1991, the objective of the JNA was to protect the Serbs against attacks by Croatian armed formations and prevent occupation of cities under Serb control. At the end of the summer 1991 and coinciding with the attack on Kijevo, the JNA became an active participant in Croatia on the side of the SAO Krajina.
76	P79	On 3 October 1991, Veljko Kadijević stated that the objective of the JNA in the conflict was “to restore control in crisis areas, to protect the Serbian population from persecution and annihilation”. On 12 October 1991, General Blagoje Adžić, Chief of the General Staff of the JNA, stated that the main task of the JNA was to prevent “the spread of interethnic conflicts and the recurrence of genocide against the Serbian people in Croatia”. On 25 October 1991, at a meeting of, among others, Slobodan Milošević, Veljko Kadijević and Blagoje Adžić, Slobodan Milošević stated that “we have helped [the Serbs in Croatia] abundantly and [we] will continue to do so until the end.”
77	P80	The SAO Krajina, and subsequently the RSK, leadership endorsed Slobodan Milošević’s vision to create a Serb-dominated state. In early July 1991, Milan Martić stated that the Milicija Krajine were “defending Serbian land and the Serbs’ ethnic area”. Similarly, on 19 August 1991 Milan Martić stated that he would accept no autonomy and that “the territories controlled by the police and the Territorial Defence of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina will forever remain Serbian”. Milan Babić embraced the same view, stating on 5 September 1991 that “the Serbs are recognised in every part of Yugoslav State territory as a nation, which they will continue to be [w]ithin the part of the state that remains as a whole following the secession of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia’s real territory and all Slovenia.” On 12 December 1991, Milan Martić stated that “nobody [...] has the right to deny the Serbian people the right to live in their own country”.
78	P81	On 14 May 1992, Mile Pašpalj, the President of the RSK Parliament, expressed the need to establish “the State of Serbian Krajina” in order to survive. On 3 July 1992, Milan Martić criticized the presidents of the Banija and Kordun municipal assemblies for their decision to form autonomous districts because the RSK had “paid in blood the corridor we won and [linked] up Serbian territories”.
79	P82	At a meeting on 14 June 1993 with Cedric Thornberry, the UNPROFOR Director of Civil Affairs, Milan Martić stated that the “joint life of Croats and Serbs in one State is impossible because of genocide politic [sic] of Croatia. We want to separate in 2 states [...] I am convinced that we will be good neighbors as separate states.”
80	P83	Efforts to unify the Croatian Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina continued throughout 1992 until 1995. The RSK leadership sought an alliance, and eventually unification, with the RS in BiH and Milan Martić was in favour of such unification. A letter dated 3 April 1993 of, inter alia, Milan Martić as Minister of the Interior to the Assembly of the RS, written on behalf of “the Serbs from the RSK”, advocates a joinder of the “two Serbian states as the first stage in the establishment of a state of all Serbs”.
81	P84	On 21 January 1994, during the election campaign for the RSK presidential elections, Milan Martić stated that he would “speed up the process of unification” and “pass on the baton to our all Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.”
82	P85	The armed forces of Yugoslavia [...] had a specific constitutional role under the 1974 Constitution not only to protect against external threat but also to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and social system established by that Constitution.

83	P86	A defence system known as "All People's Defence" (or "Total National Defence") was devised to protect the SFRY from external attack.
84	P87	[Prior to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia,] the totality of Yugoslav armed forces included the regular army, navy and air force, collectively known as the JNA, consisting of an officer corps, non-commissioned officers and conscripts, together with a reserve force, and, as well as and distinct from the JNA, the TOs.
85	P88	The JNA was an entirely federal force with its headquarters in Belgrade.
86	P89	There was a distinct TO in each Republic, funded by that Republic and under the control of the Minister of Defence of that Republic.
87	P90	Both the JNA and TO were subordinated to the Supreme Defence Council. This reflected the governing principle of singleness or unity of command, according to which, at all relevant levels, command must be exercised by one single person.
88	P91	The JNA was a powerful national army, comprised of 45,000 - 70,000 regular officers and soldiers along with 110,000-135,000 conscripts who served on a more short-term basis, equipped with all the conventional weapons and equipment that modern European armies possess.
89	P92	The TOs were equipped with essentially infantry weapons; rifles, light machine-guns, some small calibre artillery, mortars, anti-personnel mines and the like.
90	P93	The TOs had no tanks and their transport would vary depending on the adequacy of a particular Republic's funding of its TO and on how much each received by way of JNA cast-offs.
91	P94	Traditionally all TO weapons were stored locally, within each municipality.
92	P95	In 1991, the federal government formally controlled the armed forces of the SFRY, the JNA and the Territorial Defence (TO). The JNA and the TO were under the Supreme Command of the SFRY Presidency.
93	P96	The Federal Secretary for National Defence [in 1991] was General Kadijević and his deputy was Admiral Brovet.
94	P97	In the early 1990s the traditional predominance of Serb officers in the JNA swiftly increased so that very soon very few non-Serb officers remained in the JNA.
95	P98	The change that overtook the JNA in the early 1990s is best illustrated by the change in the ethnic mix of conscripts between pre-June 1991 and early 1992. During that time, the Serb component rose from just over 35 to some 90 percent.
96	P100	The JNA experienced a shortage of manpower, especially when it came to play the role of an occupying force in hostile territory, as was the case in Croatia and, during 1992, in non-Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
97	P101	In consequence, increasing reliance was placed on Serbian paramilitary forces, recruited in Serbia and Montenegro and much employed in control of non-Serb communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Membership in them was attractive to those Serbs who wished to aid the Serb cause in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina but who regarded the JNA as retaining to a degree a Yugoslav, as distinct from Serb, character and accordingly as being insufficiently single-minded in the Serb cause.
98	P102	These paramilitary forces operated in conjunction with the JNA and were used as infantry shock troops to make up for declining numbers in the regular army. They included Željko Ražnatović's Serbian Volunteer Guard (later known as "Arkan's Tigers") and Vojislav Šešelj's Četniks, both of which came to be particularly feared by the Muslim population for their brutality and indiscipline.

99	P103	The JNA and in particular its Air Force arm actively cooperated with and assisted these paramilitary units during 1991 and 1992 in operations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and liberally supplied them with arms and equipment.
100	P104	In July 1991, on instructions from headquarters in Belgrade, the JNA seized from the Republic's Secretariat for Defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and from municipalities all the documentation relating to conscription including all the registers of conscripts.
101	P105	Bosnia and Herzegovina was a vital base for JNA operations in Croatia in the second half of 1991, and Bosnian Serbs were an important source of manpower both for the JNA and for the TO.
102	P106	Those TO units in predominantly Muslim and Croat areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina were at the same time largely disbanded by the JNA.
103	P107	The independence of Slovenia and Croatia, ultimately recognised by the European Community on 15 January 1992, was challenged militarily by the JNA.
104	P109	In September 1991, the Prijedor Territorial Defence (TO) and the Fifth Kozara Brigade were mobilised and deployed to Western Slavonia as part of the JNA's war against Croatia.
105	P110	In 1991 and on into 1992 the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb paramilitary forces cooperated with [...] the JNA. These forces included Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard and various forces styling themselves as Cetniks, a name which is of significance from the fighting in the Second World War against the German, Italian and Croat forces in Yugoslavia.
106	P111	In October 1991, the Government of the Republic of Croatia declared that the JNA was an invading force.
107	P119	The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established on 27 April 1992 with the approval of a new Constitution superseding the prior SFRY Constitution. The new Constitution provided that the FRY was a sovereign federal state and consisted of Serbia and Montenegro and the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.
108	P120	The establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia completed the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
109	P121	The FRY Constitution provided that the FRY should have an army, composed of Yugoslav citizens, and which should "defend [FRY] sovereignty, territory, independence and constitutional order".
110	P122	On 20 May 1992, the FRY Presidency adopted a decision on renaming the JNA as the Army of Yugoslavia ("VJ"). The Law on the VJ came into force in October 1993; Article 346 provides that JNA members became VJ members as of the date the law came into force.
111	P123	Article 135 of the Constitution provides that in peacetime and wartime the VJ was under the command of the FRY President, in accordance with decisions of the SDC. Under the Constitution, the SDC could reach command decisions to be implemented by the FRY President.
112	P124	The FRY was organised on the principle of the separation of powers, between the legislature, executive and judiciary. Principal federal organs of the FRY included the Federal Assembly, FRY President, Federal Government, the Supreme Defence Council ("SDC") and the Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army ("VJ"). The federal judicial organs were the Federal Court, Federal Public Prosecutor and a Constitutional Court.

113	P125	According to the Constitution of the FRY, the SDC was formally composed of the President of the FRY and the Presidents of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. In practice, the SDC meeting were also attended by other high-level federal officials, such as the FRY Prime Minister, the FRY Minister of Defence, the Chief of the VJ General Staff and, occasionally, high-ranking military officers.
114	P126	The President of the FRY presided over the SDC. The Law on Defence empowered the SDC to adopt the plan for the defence of the country, which "all subjects of the national defence", including the VJ, should pursue.
115	P127	In its work, the SDC made use of reports, analyses and other materials prepared by the MOD, the VJ General Staff and other state organs.
116	P128	According to the Rules of Procedure adopted by the SDC in 1992, the SDC had to conduct its work in sessions, and adopt final decisions when the majority of SDC members were present. Decisions were approved by consensus, and the FRY President would issue the appropriate orders in his name. The Rules of Procedure of the SDC also provided for the possibility to make decisions and reach conclusions without holding a session, "on the basis of consultations among the [SDC] members".
117	P129	Minutes were kept of sessions of the SDC. Those minutes, as well as the material for discussion and the stenographic records, constituted archival material.
118	P130	On 30 June 1992, the SDC held its first session presided over by Dobrica Ćosić as FRY President. From that moment on, regular sessions of the SDC were held throughout the war.
119	P131	When the JNA withdrew from Croatia in 1991, the SVK took possession of a variety of weaponry and military equipment the JNA left behind. This included military tanks, armoured personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles and ammunition with a total estimated value of at least 174,207,980 U.S. dollars.
120	P132	Among the weapons left behind by the JNA in the territory of the RSK in 1991 was a sole Orkan rocket system. On 8 April 1993, the RSK MOD wrote to the Chief of the VJ General Staff requesting 200 Orkan rockets. In October 1993, the SVK Main Staff sought approval from the VJ General Staff to have an Orkan rocket system "tested in RSK Army on real targets and in real conditions".
121	P133	By June 1993, the SVK began to report serious shortages in military resources and looked more frequently for replenishment to the VJ.
122	P134	In June 1993, the RSK political leadership also appealed to Slobodan Milošević to continue to secure through the VJ General Staff "help in technical maintenance of weapons and acquisition of ammunition".
123	P135	On 4 June 1993, Goran Hadžić, the RSK President, admitted to Slobodan Milošević that "[t]he amount of artillery ammunition is minimal, and fuel and grease are sufficient only for fire engagement for a short period of time" and that the RSK was "not financially in [a] position to make up for medium and general service which may be done by the institutions of the Yugoslav Army".
124	P136	Perišić assented to the SVK's requests for assistance once he became VJ Chief of General Staff [on 26 August 1993].
125	P137	There were instances of training sessions organised by the VJ for the benefit of SVK soldiers. On 7 January 1994, the SVK Main Staff informed Perišić and Milošević that "the decision on dispatching the recruits to the VJ for training was well-received". That month, the SVK reported that 976 of its recruits had been sent for training with the VJ.

126	P139	In July 1994 requests from the President of the RSK to Perišić for assistance contained declarations that "the planned development and reinforcement of the SVK is directly dependent on the delivery of military and technical equipment by the VJ in accordance with the achieved agreement" and that "past co-operation created [an] important foundation for further development of the SVK".
127	P140	The VJ's provision of assistance to the SVK continued into 1994 and 1995. A VJ Report on Coordination with the SVK notably stated that "valuable assistance" was provided to the SVK in the maintenance of their equipment from the Čačak technical and maintenance facility.
128	P141	On 10 April 1995, the SVK Main Staff informed Perišić and Milošević that "[the] 44th Air-Force Brigade has continued with the reinforcement of [...] the units in depth, so that all the equipment we received from the VJ [...] is being used", and added: "Having received the material sources [sic] from the Republic of Serbia and from the VJ in February and March of 1995, the necessary materiel reserves (of ammunition and foodstuff) for the military needs have been created".
129	P143	The high representatives of the SVK, the VRS and the VJ held monthly coordination meetings in Belgrade in order to exchange data and strengthen the cooperation between these armies. [...] Among those participants in those meetings were Perišić, Ratko Mladić, Mile Novaković and subsequently Milan Čeleketić or Dušan Lončar. Items of their agenda concerned "exchange of information and harmonisation of positions between the VJ, VRS and SVK" including, <i>inter alia</i> , the issues of activity and assessment of the enemy, the results of combat operations and activities of the SVK and VRS forces, the security situation in the RSK and RS, logistical requests and personnel problems.
130	P144	Slobodan Milošević and Perišić held several meetings with prominent members of the SVK and VRS. Some of these meetings were also attended by the highest authorities of the RSK and/or RS.
131	P145	Perišić was also receiving ad hoc reports from prominent figures in the SVK and the VRS. [...] The VJ General Staff was also copied on some reports sent by Mladić to various RS political and military authorities.
132	P146	There were also encoded lines of communication between the VJ General Staff and the SVK Main Staff, the SVK and Slobodan Milošević, as well as the VJ General Staff and the VRS Main Staff. Such lines and their supporting infrastructure already existed before Perišić assumed the position of the VJ General Staff Commander.
133	P147	There existed an intelligence centre in Petrova Gora – in the area of the SVK 21st Kordun Corps. This centre was part of the intelligence department of the VJ General Staff and was in charge of monitoring activities of foreign military formations and reporting this to the intelligence administration of the VJ General Staff. This centre was not subordinated to the SVK.
134	P149	On 10 January 1994, the Supreme Defence Council convened to discuss the VJ's funding [...] Perišić stated that 522 million dollars and 307 million dollars were respectively required for the needs of the VRS and SVK. He subsequently pled: "We cannot abandon Ratko and the others - they are asking for extremely expensive ammunition they use to fire on land targets. Why? Because it is very effective [...]".
135	P150	[On 7 February 1994, at the 18th Session of the SDC] Perišić told the SDC that it should either give him the authority to give logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK or allow the Law on Property to regulate the logistical assistance process. Perišić advised the SDC to give him that authority because "if the two Krajinas [sic] are not defended, we will be significantly jeopardised. And they certainly can't be defended without our assistance in weapons and military equipment".

136	P151	Eleven days later, Zoran Lilić directed that, "in accordance with a decision of the Supreme Defence Council", the VJ "shall supply the 30th and 40th Personnel Centre[s] with weapons and military equipment".
137	P152	On 16 March 1994, the SDC again discussed the provision of weapons and military equipment to the VRS and SVK.
138	P153	On 7 June 1994, Perišić personally advised the SDC that logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK was necessary and must continue: "If we stop helping them in the area of education, financing of educated personnel and materiel assistance for certain combat operations, they'll start losing territories. [...] This means we have to help them somehow".
139	P154	On 21 July 1994, Perišić told the SDC that it was necessary to consider "how much longer we can extend assistance to the [VRS] and [SVK]". [...] Perišić did not propose discontinuing military assistance to the VRS and SVK, instead urging the SDC to increase the VJ's budget. [...] Slobodan Milošević and Zoran Lilić agreed with Perišić that the VJ's budget should be raised accordingly, and the SDC went on to reach that conclusion.
140	P155	The flow of military supplies from the VJ General Staff to the VRS continued after August 1994, notwithstanding the FRY's decision to officially seal its border with the RS except for medical equipment and other humanitarian supplies as part of its sanctions on the RS for having refused to accept a proposed peace plan.
141	P156	On 7 June 1995, Perišić again encouraged the SDC to keep on authorising the VJ's assistance to the VRS and SVK.
142	P157	On 29 July 1995, pursuant to another briefing by Perišić, the SDC decided to "[c]ontinue to extend certain assistance to the Armies of the [RS] and the [RSK] within limits that do not jeopardise the combat readiness of the [VJ]". The SDC agreed that it was "immediately" necessary to "continue extending materiel and expert assistance to the VRS and SVK, to the extent of VJ abilities".
143	P158	Slobodan Milošević, who took an active role on the SDC along with Perišić, admitted in 2001 that the FRY had given significant military assistance to the VRS and SVK throughout the war, emphasising "we helped our people with all the resources we had at our disposal".
144	P167	The VRS's general state of dependence on VJ support was acknowledged by Perišić himself, as well as Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić.
2. Croatia		
145	P168	In April and May 1990, multi-party elections were held in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The Croatian Democratic Union ("HDZ") won 41.5% of the votes and two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament. On 30 May 1990, the HDZ candidate Franjo Tuđman was elected President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia.
146	P169	As a result of the elections, the Serbian Democratic Party ("SDS") gained power in the municipalities of Benkovac, Donji Lapac, Gračac, Glina, Korenica, Knin, Obrovac, and Vojnić.
147	P170	On 25 July 1990, a Serbian Assembly was established in Srb, north of Knin, as the political representation of the Serbian people in Croatia. The Serbian Assembly declared sovereignty and autonomy of the Serb people in Croatia. On 31 July 1990, Milan Babić became president of the Serbian National Council ("SNC"), the executive body of the Serbian Assembly.

148	P171	On 16 August 1990, the SNC called for a referendum on the autonomy of Serbs in Croatia to be held between 19 August and 2 September 1990. The following day, 17 August 1990, the Government of Croatia declared the referendum illegal. The Croatian police moved towards several Serb-majority towns in the Krajina region and removed weaponry from the SJBs. Serbs responded by putting up barricades in Knin and surroundings. The referendum was held between 19 August and 2 September 1990: 97.7% voted in favour of autonomy.
149	P172	On 21 December 1990, the SAO Krajina was proclaimed by the municipalities of the regions of Northern Dalmatia and Lika, in southwestern Croatia. Article 1 of the Statute of the SAO Krajina defined the SAO Krajina as “a form of territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia” on which the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, state laws and the Statute of the SAO Krajina were applied.
150	P173	On 22 December 1990, the Parliament of Croatia adopted a new constitution, wherein Croatia was defined as “the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are citizens: Serbs [...] who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality [...]”. The Serb population in the Krajina region considered that by the adoption of the new constitution, they had been deprived of the right to be a constituent nation in Croatia, which would include the right of self-determination.
151	P174	On 4 January 1991, Milan Martić was appointed the Secretary for Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina. On 5 January 1991, the Executive Council informed the MUP of Croatia that the establishment of the SUP revoked the authority of the MUP of Croatia in the SAO Krajina territory.
152	P175	[In the spring of 1991] "Ustahas" once again came to be a term frequently used by Serbs to describe Croats [in various parts of Eastern Slavonia]. It is a derogatory reference back to bitter WWII conflicts when it was generally used as a reference to Croatian Nazi forces.
153	P176	In March 1991, there were armed clashes in Pakrac in Western Slavonia and in Plitvice between Titova Korenica and Saborsko between Croatian MUP special police forces and the police of the SAO Krajina. In both of these clashes, the JNA intervened to separate the two sides.
154	P177	On 1 April 1991, Milan Babić as President of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina ordered mobilisation of the TO and volunteer units of the SAO Krajina. [...] In the same order, Milan Babić requested the MUP of Serbia to provide technical and personnel support to the SUP of the SAO Krajina
155	P178	Also on 1 April 1991, the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina passed a decision joining the SAO Krajina to Serbia, wherein it was stipulated that the constitution and laws of Serbia, as well as the constitutional-legal system of the SFRY, were to apply in the SAO Krajina.
156	P179	It was also decided that a referendum was to be held on the question: “[a]re you in favour of the annexation of the SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia on the 30th of April?” The President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, publicly opposed the referendum on joining the SAO Krajina with Serbia, stating that the ballot would have to read instead “in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia”; moreover, he asked that the decision on the annexation of the SAO Krajina to Serbia, be withdrawn.

157	P180	On 12 May 1991, after the intervention of Slobodan Milošević, the referendum was held on the following question: “[a]re you in favour of the SAO Krajina joining the Republic of Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and others who wish to preserve Yugoslavia?” with 99.8% voting in favour.
158	P181	On 16 May 1991, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina approved the outcome of the referendum and stated that “the territory of the SAO Krajina is a constitutive part of the unified state territory of the Republic of Serbia”. Both Milan Babić and Milan Martić publicly expressed views that SAO Krajina belonged with Serbia. On 19 May 1991, a referendum was held in Croatia, except in predominantly Serb areas, concerning independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia. 94.1% of those voting came out in favour of independence.
159	P182	On 29 May 1991, the SAO Krajina government was established with Milan Babić as President. Milan Babić appointed Milan Martić as Minister of Defence. [...] On 27 June 1991, Milan Martić was appointed Minister of Interior.
160	P183	[...] On 29 May 1991, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina established “special purpose police units” named <i>Milicija Krajine</i> , in addition to the previously established Public Security Service police and State Security Service police. The Public Security Service was responsible for maintaining law and order. The SDB handled political crime, terrorism, extremism, and intelligence work. The <i>Milicija Krajine</i> units defended the territorial integrity of the [SAO Krajina], secured vital facilities, infiltrated sabotage groups, and could also be used in military operations. The <i>Milicija Krajine</i> was established within the MUP, but was put under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The <i>Milicija Krajine</i> units wore patches on the sleeves of their uniforms reading in Cyrillic “ <i>Milicija Krajine</i> ”.
161	P185	On 1 August 1991, the SAO Krajina government decided to apply the Law on Defence of Serbia in the SAO Krajina. Accordingly, the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> units together with the TO made up the armed forces of the SAO Krajina.
162	P186	The TO used JNA solid-colour uniforms with patches reading “SAO position of Minister of the Interior while he was Deputy Commander of the TO. Krajina” in Cyrillic, on the sleeve. Milan Babić, as President, was the Commander of the TO of the SAO Krajina. On 8 August 1991, Milan Martić was appointed Deputy Commander of the TO of the SAO Krajina, in which position he remained until 30 September 1991. He continued to hold the position of Minister of the Interior while he was Deputy Commander of the TO.
163	P188	On 23 November 1991, the Vance Plan was signed by the President of Croatia Franjo Tuđman, the President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević and the SFRY Federal Secretary for Defence General Veljko Kadijević. The Vance Plan made provision for the deployment of a United Nations Protection Force (“UNPROFOR”) in the Krajina, Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia, for demilitarisation, and eventual return of refugees and displaced persons. Importantly, the Vance Plan stated that “[t]he role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarised and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack.”

164	P189	The Vance Plan defined three UNPAs [United Nations Protected Areas], which covered four sectors: UNPA Krajina, covering Sector South (Lika and Dalmatia) and Sector North (Banija and Kordun), UNPA Western Slavonia, covering Sector West, and UNPA Eastern Slavonia, covering Sector East. [T]he plan foresaw maintaining the local police who could carry weapons and wear uniforms. The weapons were to be placed under a double-key system; one key for UNPROFOR and one key for the RSK authorities. UN police monitors, UNCIVPOL, were to ensure that the local police carried out their duties without discriminating or violating human rights. UNCIVPOL reported any incidents both within its own chain of command, as well as to the relevant Croatian or RSK local police, however in serious cases reports were also sent directly to the relevant government.
165	P190	On 30 November 1991, the SAO Krajina adopted its own Law on Defence, whereby the Law on Defence of Serbia ceased to apply in the SAO Krajina. According to the new law, the TO was "part of the unified armed forces of the [SFRY]" and the President of the SAO Krajina led "the armed forces in times of peace and in times of war."
166	P192	On 21 February 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 743, implementing the Vance Plan and establishing the UN Protection Force ("UNPROFOR"), resulting in the deployment of forces to certain areas of Croatia designated as "United Nations Protected Areas" ("UNPAs"). The UNPAs were areas where inter-communal tensions had previously led to armed conflict.
167	P193	In April 1992, UNPROFOR troops began arriving in the UNPAs.
2.1. SAO Krajina		
168	P198	The SFRY Federal Secretariat of National Defence of the JNA ("SSNO") made unit and personnel changes within the SAO Krajina armed forces. Beginning after the summer of 1991, the SAO Krajina TO was subordinate to the JNA. There was operational cooperation between the JNA and the armed forces of the SAO Krajina.
169	P199	Any resubordination of MUP units to the JNA for temporary assignment required prior approval of the Minister of Interior of the SAO Krajina. When resubordinated, the MUP unit would be under the command of the JNA unit commander. However, if the MUP unit was merely acting in cooperation or concert with the JNA unit, it would remain under the command of the MUP commander. After the completion of a mission where it had been resubordinated, the MUP unit would return into the structure of the MUP. For the purpose of combat operations, TO units could also be resubordinated to JNA units. When resubordinating, the largest unit of either the TO or the JNA would command, which would normally be the JNA unit in a given area. Such resubordination of TO units would be carried out by the JNA.
170	P201	From around June 1991 through December 1991, military operations and raids were carried out against predominantly Croat villages in the SAO Krajina, including by the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> , the JNA and the TO. The attacked villages included Potkonije, Vrpolje, Glina, Kijevo, Drniš, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Cerovljani, Hrvatska Dubica, Baćin, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovaca, Škabrnja, Nadin and Bruška.
171	P202	Villagers were left with no choice but to flee. During or immediately after the attacks, villagers who stayed behind were killed and beaten. [...] Hundreds of Croat and other non-Serb civilians and members of Croatian armed forces and formations were captured during and after the attacks and were detained in Knin and other locations, where they were subjected to severe mistreatment.

172	P203	Armed clashes erupted between Serbs and Croats from April 1991 in the territory of Croatia. The police and local people from both sides participated in the hostilities.
173	S9-Krajina	Several armed clashes occurred during the spring and early summer of 1991 between SAO Krajina and Croatian armed forces and formations. Initially, these clashes were the result of tensions between the Croatian and SAO Krajina police and the climate of fear and mistrust between the Serb and Croat inhabitants.
174	P204	From June 1991, military operations were carried out by the SAO Krajina police, including the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> , the JNA and the TO against predominantly Croat villages, including Lovinac, Ljubovo, Glina, and Struga. This further raised the tensions. In August 1991, Croat civilians were displaced from the areas of Knin and Glina to areas under Croatian control.
175	P205	In June 1991, there was a Croatian Public Security Station in Lovinac, in Gračac municipality north-west of Knin. The village was attacked by the police of the SAO Krajina. Milan Martić participated in the attack.
176	P206	On 2 July 1991, the village of Ljubovo, south-west of Titova Korenica, was attacked by the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> . Members of the Croatian MUP had stationed themselves there following the conflict in Plitvice.
177	P207	In public statements, Milan Martić said that this attack was carried out because an ultimatum of the SAO Krajina government had expired which required that all members and units of the Croatian MUP withdraw from the SAO Krajina territory and because of arrests and mistreatment by Croats of Serbs in the area of Lika.
178	P208	In mid-July 1991, the town of Glina, located in the Banija area north-west of Dvor, was attacked by a unit under the command of Captain Dragan Vasiljković. The JNA intervened after the attack by creating a buffer zone.
179	P209	On 25 July 1991, the village of Struga, a few kilometres north of Dvor along the Una river, was attacked by units under the command of Captain Dragan Vasiljković and the Glina War Staff: 50 members of a "special forces" unit, 50 policemen and 700 civilians participated in the operation. Following the attack, the JNA intervened and created a buffer zone
180	S8-Krajina	[...] After the attack on Struga, captain Dragan Vasiljkovic arrested ten members of the TO in Dvor, who were allegedly responsible for killing several civilians. Subsequently, Milan Martić arrived in Dvor and ordered captain Dragan Vasiljkovic to release the ten men, which he did.
181	P210	On 26 August 1991, the Croat village of Kijevo, situated 15 kilometres east of Knin, was attacked because the MUP of Croatia had established a Public Security Station in the village. The decision to attack Kijevo was taken by Milan Martić in coordination with the JNA and followed an ultimatum issued by him to the Croatian SJB, in which he stated that "[y]ou and your leadership have brought relations between the Serbian and Croatian populations to such a state that further co-existence in our Serbian territories of the SAO Krajina is impossible".
182	P211	In relation to the civilian population in Kijevo, the ultimatum provided that: "We also want to advise the population of Kijevo to find safe shelters on time so that there should be no casualties among them. We would like to stress that we want co-existence and understanding between the residents of the Serbian villages and the Croatian population in Kijevo, and we guarantee civil and human rights to everyone."

183	P212	Units of the JNA 9th Corps in Knin, the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> and the local TO participated in the attack. There was coordination between the JNA and the MUP, and the JNA was in command of the participating forces. Prior to the attack, between 23 and 25 August 1991, the commander of the Croatian Public Security Station evacuated almost the entire civilian population of Kijevo.
184	P213	The attack on Kijevo on 26 August 1991 only lasted a few hours.
185	P214	The Catholic church in Kijevo was damaged during the attack, and was later destroyed. Private houses were looted and torched.
186	P215	On 28 August 1991, Tactical Group 1 of the JNA 9th Corps also attacked the mixed Croat and Serb village of Vrlika, located south of Knin near Kijevo. After the attack, a Public Security Station of the SAO Krajina MUP was established in Vrlika. Subsequently, members of this Public Security allowed lorries carrying looted goods to proceed towards Knin.
187	P216	On 16 September 1991, Drniš, which is located near Knin and at the time was 75% Croat, was attacked by forces and artillery of Tactical Group 1 of the JNA 9th Corps. During the attack, and the following days, the centre of Drniš was almost completely destroyed. Widespread looting was committed by members of the JNA and the MUP and by local citizens. Approximately 10-15 days after the attack, a Public Security Station of the SAO Krajina MUP was set up in Drniš.
188	P217	In 1990, Hrvatska Dubica, Cerovljani and Baćin were mixed or predominantly Croat villages in the Hrvatska Kostajnica municipality situated in north-eastern Croatia.
189	P218	In 1990, Hrvatska Dubica had around 2,000 to 2,500 inhabitants.
190	P219	In 1991, the population was 50% Croat and 38% Serb.
191	P220	Cerovljani is situated about three to six kilometres north of Hrvatska Dubica and in 1990 its population was some 500 people.
192	P221	In 1991, 52.9% were Croats, and 39.5% were Serbs
193	P222	Baćin is situated about three to five kilometres west of Hrvatska Dubica and in 1990 it had 200 to 500 inhabitants.
194	P223	In 1991 the population in Baćin was 95 % Croat, and 1.5 % Serb
195	P224	In 1991, the Croatian MUP took over the Public Security Station in Hrvatska Dubica. From mid-1991, ZNG units were formed in Hrvatska Dubica.
196	P225	There were about four units, each made up of four to five men, who did not have uniforms. The units had one firearm between them and some carried personal hunting rifles. The headquarters was in Hrvatska Dubica, close to the bridge between Hrvatska Dubica and Bosanska Dubica.
197	P226	Around the same time, the Serb inhabitants started to move out of Hrvatska Dubica.
198	P227	In the area of Hrvatska Kostajnica, there was intensive fighting during August and September 1991, which lasted until the beginning of October. In September 1991, Milan Martić went together with Colonel Dušan Smiljanić, Chief of Security of the JNA 10th Zagreb Corps, to coordinate combat activities in relation to the "liberation of Kostajnica".

199	P228	On 12 or 13 September 1991, Serb forces, including the SAO Krajina TO, took control over Hrvatska Kostajnica. The special police unit of the SAO Krajina police at Dvor na Uni participated and cooperated with the TO. Following the takeover of Hrvatska Kostajnica, the operation continued in order to take over the rest of the villages along the axis between Kostajnica and Novska, including the villages of Hrvatska Dubica, Cerovljani and Baćin. A front line was established from Sunja to Hrvatska Dubica and further towards Novska. Following this operation, there were daily conflicts on the front line.
200	P229	After the occupation of Hrvatska Kostajnica around 12 or 13 September, Hrvatska Dubica was shelled from Hrvatska Kostajnica and from Bosanska Dubica, BiH. Subsequently, the ZNG and Croatian MUP withdrew from Hrvatska Dubica and the surrounding villages and the civilian inhabitants started to leave.
201	P230	After 13 September 1991, only about 60 Croats, mainly elderly and women, remained in Hrvatska Dubica.
202	P231	An SAO Krajina TO force and a police force, including a unit of the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> consisting of 30 policemen from the area, were set up in Hrvatska Dubica. Veljko "Velja" Rađunović, his son Stevo Rađunović and Momčilo Kovačević were in charge of the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> unit, which had a command post at the old school building in Hrvatska Dubica. There were "reservists" in Živaja under the command of Stevo Borojević. The reservists wore old military olive-green-grey uniforms.
203	P232	The Serb forces in the area at the time wore a variety of insignia, including the five-pointed star and emblems with the inscription "SAO Krajina", with " <i>Milicija Krajine</i> ", with a double-headed eagle and crossed swords, with four Cyrillic "S". It was not possible to tell to which unit soldiers belonged.
204	P233	On 15 September 1991, the JNA, the TO and the police surrounded Predore, approximately 8 kilometres from Hrvatska Dubica, and proceeded to search houses. They rounded up people and took six or seven, including Josip Josipović, a ZNG member, to the Sava river to reconnoitre the area using them as a live shield, and then returned them to the village.
205	P234	Josip Josipović and his cousin Mićo Ćorić were then taken to Dubička Brda where they were detained for one month. Thereafter, they were transferred to the school building in Hrvatska Dubica, which was used as a command post by Serb forces, including the TO and the police. Present at the school building were Momčilo Kovačević and Veljko Radjunović, who issued orders and participated in the beatings of detainees at the school building. Josip Josipović overheard the soldiers discussing amongst themselves and understood them as saying that they were receiving orders from Milan Martić.
206	P235	After the take-over of Hrvatska Dubica until mid-October 1991, some houses were torched in Hrvatska Dubica: approximately eight belonged to Croats, two belonged to couples of mixed marriages, and one belonged to a Serb. There was also widespread looting, committed by the JNA, the TO, the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> , and local Serbs. Detained Croats were also forced to loot. All the houses of people who had fled, both Croats and Serbs, were looted and cars, tractors, tools, machinery, furniture and cattle were stolen. Serbs who had withdrawn from the areas of Pakrac and Lipik moved into the houses of the people who had fled.
207	P236	In the morning on 20 October 1991, a truck bearing the insignia "Milicija SAO Krajina" with Veljko Rađunović, Radovan Šoša and a man nicknamed "Janjeta" came to Ana Kesić's house. The men told her and her sister-in-law Katarina to come with them and attend a meeting. Thereafter the truck picked up several other civilians and brought them to the fire station in Hrvatska Dubica.
208	P237	Those who were picked up included Vera Franković, Vera Stanković, Pavao Kropf, Barbara Kropf and her daughter, an 80-year old man nicknamed "Brico", Danica Krizmanović, Ruza Dikulić, Sofija Dikulić, and Nikola Lončarević.

209	P238	On the same date, Tomislav Kozarčanin was told by Branko Majstorović, who was wearing a JNA uniform, to go to the fire station to attend a meeting, which he did. A second bus arrived at the fire station after ten minutes bringing another 20 people. In total, there were then more than 40 people in the fire station but more people arrived later. They were mostly Croats, although there were also Serbs and Muslims.
210	P239	The people in the fire station were guarded by Katarina “Kaća” Pekić and Stevo Rađunović, who were armed and wore JNA uniforms, and a man with the last name Kovačević. The detainees were not free to leave. Every two or three hours there was a change of guard, and the detainees’ names would be read out from a list to check no one was missing.
211	P240	Three Serbs managed to leave the fire station and seven Croats managed to leave the fire station after their Serb neighbours or friends had contacted the guards.
212	P241	The following persons were detained in the fire station in Hrvatska Dubica on 20 October 1991 and killed the following day at Krečane near Baćin: Katarina Alavančić, Terezija Alavančić Josip Antolović, Marija Batinović, Mara Ćorić, Mijo Ćović, Marija Delić, Ana Dikulić, Ruža Dikulić, Sofija Dikulić, Štepan Dikulić, Antun Đukić, Marija Đukić, Antun Đurinović, Ana Ferić, Juraj Ferić, Kata Ferić, Filip Jukić, Marija Jukić, Jozo Karanović, Antun Krivajić, Reza Krivajić, Barbara Kropf, Pavao Kropf, Ivan Kulisić, Nikola Lončarić, Antun Mucavac, Ivo Pezo, Sofija Pezo, Anka Piktaja, Štepan Sabljari, Veronika Stanković, Antun Švračić, Marija Švračić, Ana Tepić, Dušan Tepić, Ivan Trninić, Ivo Trninić, Kata Trninić, Terezija Trninić, and Katarina Vladić.
213	P242	All of the victims were Croats, except for Ana Tepić and Dušan Tepić, who were Serbs.
214	P244	Following the advice of the Croatian police and ZNG, most of the residents of Cerovljani left the village in August and early September 1991, after which only elderly people remained.
215	P245	On 13 and 21 [...] September 1991, armed Serbs from Živaja under the command of Nikola Begović burnt six houses in Cerovljani.
216	P246	On 24 September, the armed Serbs came again in the afternoon and shooting could be heard; that night three dead bodies were found. On the same date, the houses of Đuro Petrović, Nikola Dragocajać, Anka Barišić and Željko Blinja were torched by the Serbs and rocket launchers were fired at the Catholic church which damaged the bell tower. Some of the armed Serbs also stole the car of Antun Blažević.
217	P247	Some time in October 1991, unidentified armed Serbs gathered the remaining civilians in Cerovljani into the local community centre under the pretext of having a meeting, following which they were detained for the night. The next morning they were taken away.
218	P248	The following persons from Cerovljani were killed on or around 20 or 21 October 1991 either by the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> , or units of the JNA or the TO, or a combination of some of them: Marija Antolović, Ana Blinja, Josip Blinja, Katarina Blinja, Nikola Blinja, Andrija Likić, Ana Lončar, Antun Lončar, and Kata Lončar (born 1906).
219	P249	Another woman also by the name of Kata Lončar, who was a Croat, remained in the village throughout the occupation because she had “connections with the Serbs”.
220	P250	Following the take-over of Baćin, all the inhabitants left, with the exception of around thirty mostly elderly civilians [...].

221	P252	Željko Abaza was detained in mid-October in a toilet in the old school building in Hrvatska Dubica. He was later killed by members of the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> , and his body was thrown into the Una river by those members.
222	P253	Josip Josipović was detained together with Željko Abaza, Antun Knežević and Idriz Čaušević. Idriz Čaušević was killed by persons under Veljko Rađunović's and Momčilo Kovačević's command at the old school building in Hrvatska Dubica. Three days later, Željko Abaza and Ante Knežević had their throats slit and Josip Josipović and Mićo Ćorić were forced by Stevo Rađunović, Momčilo Kovačević, Mirko Sarac, Milan Petrović, Đorđe Ratković, Đuro Jerinić, Marjan Prvalo, and Mladen Pozar to load the dead bodies of Željko Abaza and Antun Knežević onto a truck. Subsequently, the truck drove the three of them and the two bodies to the river and the bodies were thrown into the water by the same Serb.
223	P254	Krečane is on the outskirts of Baćin and less than a ten-minute walk from the Catholic church in Baćin.
224	P255	Prior to August 1993, a Catholic church in Hrvatska Dubica was razed to the ground and its foundations were removed. The Orthodox church remained intact and was still standing in 1995. Towards the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993, looting and torching of houses was carried out by local Serbs. By 1995, many houses in Hrvatska Dubica belonging to Croats had been destroyed. The part of the village which contained both Serb and Croat houses remained intact. By 1995, most houses had been looted.
225	P256	By 1995, Croat houses in Cerovljani had been burnt or blown up, and that the Catholic church had been destroyed.
226	P257	By 1995, half of the houses in Baćin were destroyed or torched. The Catholic church in Baćin had been completely destroyed.
227	P258	Saborsko is located in north-western Croatia and stretches seven kilometres along the Korenica-Ogulin road, which goes through Plitvice, Poljanak, Saborsko, Lička Jasenica, Plaški, and Josipdol before reaching Ogulin. Purely or predominantly Croat villages were located south of Saborsko near the Plitvice Lakes whereas Serb villages, such as Plaški and Lička Jasenica, were located to the north of Saborsko.
228	P259	Lipovača was in the municipality of Slunj, approximately 25 kilometres from Saborsko and 18 kilometres from the town of Slunj and the former training ground of the JNA 5th Military District in Slunj. In 1991, Lipovača was a predominantly Croat village with a total of 267 inhabitants.
229	P260	About 60 houses belonged to Croats and about 15 houses belonged to Serbs. 83,15 % were Croats, and 16,48 % were Serbs.
230	P261	The Croat inhabitants of Lipovača had guards with a few rifles mounted along the road that passed through the village in case the JNA troops would arrive. There were a few ZNG forces in the nearby Drežnik Grad, Rakovica and Slunj.
231	P262	In 1991, helicopters were used by the JNA to carry weapons and ammunition, which were distributed to local Serbs.
232	P263	At the end of September or in early October 1991, the JNA entered Lipovača and almost all civilian inhabitants fled, with the exception of about 20-50 people. The JNA stayed for seven to eight days and fired from tanks at the Croatian police in Drežnik Grad and Rakovica and a Catholic church in Drežnik Grad. During this stay, some JNA soldiers warned a witness that "[w]hen we leave, beware of the reserve forces of those paramilitary units "who would" beat the people, set houses on fire, loot "and who would kill" regardless of age." When the JNA troops left, several of the people who remained in the village fled to the forest and spent the night there.

233	P264	Sometime in October 1991, after the JNA had left, armed units from the region and outside of the region arrived in Lipovača. These forces were called “reserve forces, Martić’s troops or Martić’s army”, and that they wore uniforms “like the ones that the army had”.
234	P265	On 27 October 1991, a JNA Military Police unit led by Milan Popović, together with members of the TO and uniformed local Serbs, arrived in the village of Nova Kršlja adjacent to Lipovača. The JNA soldiers wore JNA uniforms whereas the TO soldiers wore black uniforms. They arrested all of the young Croat men, including Ivan Marjanović’s son Marijan, and searched Ivan Marjanović’s house for weapons. On the next day, the soldiers returned to Ivan Marjanović’s house and demanded that he surrender his rifle to them, even though he did not have one. The soldiers then beat him severely, kicked him in the groin and broke his wrist. They again returned the next day and told him he was not allowed to leave his house or its immediate surroundings.
235	P266	Ivan Marjanović’s son was released after 15 days with bruises all over his body.
236	P267	At the end of October 1991, some time after the arrival of the paramilitary units, the bodies of Franjo Brozinčević, Marija Brozinčević, Mira Brozinčević, and Katarina Cindrić were found in Franjo Brozinčević’s house in Lipovača. All four victims were dressed in civilian clothes and had been killed by gunshots.
237	P268	These killings were perpetrated by Serb paramilitary forces.
238	P269	Between 29 and 31 October 1991, Neđo Kotur, a local Serb commander, came to the house of Ivan Marjanović and told him that “the Serbs” had killed some Croats and told Ivan Marjanović to go with him to Lipovača to bury the victims. Neđo Kotur, Ivan Marjanović, and three other Croat villagers, drove to Lipovača and passed a checkpoint manned by “Martić’s men”.
239	P270	The group of men arrived in Lipovača at 0900 hours and went to the house of Mate Brozinčević, where they found his body in the kitchen with several bullet holes in the stomach. Mate’s wife, Roža, had also been shot, and the body of their son Mirko was lying at the entrance to the bedroom with a bullet hole in the neck. All victims wore civilian clothing.
240	P271	In June 1996, the above-mentioned seven individuals were exhumed from mass graves in Lipovača Drežnička.
241	P272	Also the following persons were killed in Lipovača: Ana Pemper, Barbara Vuković, Juraj Šebalj, Juraj Conjar, and Milan Smolčić.
242	P273	Milan Babić travelled to Lipovača and villages in the surrounding area in 1993. He saw “villages which used to be populated by Croats and Croat houses were devastated and there were no Croat residents any more.”
243	P274	In early 1991, there were 600 to 850 people, mostly Croats, living in the 300 households of Saborsko. In the centre of Saborsko, there was a large church called the church of St. John. Slightly outside the centre, there was a smaller church, the church of the Mother of God.
244	P275	In 1991, Saborsko had 852 inhabitants (93.9% were Croat, and 3.3% were Serbs).

245	P276	On 2 April 1991, the Croat members of the Ogulin Public Security Station established an outpost in Saborsko. There were around 30 policemen, armed with automatic rifles and pistols, who engaged in regular police work but also manned checkpoints in case of an attack on Saborsko. Between April and August 1991, JNA armoured vehicles were allowed to pass through roadblocks and patrolled daily through Saborsko going between Plitvice and Lička Jasenica. From around June 1991, about 20 or 30 local men were organised in Saborsko and patrolled the village at night carrying "hunting guns or some military rifles." Between June and August 1991, Saborsko was fired upon with rifle and artillery fire. It was mostly one of the churches and the school that were shot at and the fire came from Lička Jasenica and from Pištenik hill.
246	P277	As a result of the attacks in June and July 1991, 10 people were killed, [...] and there was a large number of wounded.
247	P278	In the early morning of 5 August 1991, Saborsko was shelled by mortars from the direction of the Lička Jasenica JNA barracks. Shells fell on the cemetery and central parts of the village.
248	P279	On the night of 5 August 1991, most of the civilian population of Saborsko fled through Rakovica to Grabovac, where the Red Cross had arrived with three buses. About 100 to 150 civilians were evacuated to areas under Croatian control, whereas around 400 persons returned to Saborsko in the following days.
249	P280	After 5 August 1991, Saborsko was shelled almost every day from various directions, including from the direction of the barracks at Lička Jasenica.
250	P281	Poljanak is located about 14 kilometres south-east of Saborsko and 8 km north-west of Plitvice. In 1991, there were around 30-50 predominantly Croat households in Poljanak.
251	P282	Poljanak was shelled for the first time on 28 August 1991 and was shelled daily after that. There were no Croatian military units in Poljanak in the summer and autumn of 1991. However, there was a civilian protection force that would keep watch, but the members were either unarmed or had two to three hunting rifles at their disposal.
252	P283	[S]everal houses, sheds and cars were burnt in Poljanak on 7 November 1991, by the soldiers present in the village. Before the houses were burnt private property was looted or destroyed. When torching the houses, some soldiers made comments, such as "Milošević built the house and Milošević is going to destroy it" and "what's Tuđman done for you? All you are going to get from him is a bullet in your head".
253	P284	Saborsko was attacked mid-morning on 12 November 1991 by Tactical Group 2 ("TG-2"), under the command of Colonel Čedomir Bulat, and the 5th Partisan Brigade, both of which were within the structure of the JNA 13th Corps. A unit of the Plaški State Security Service, the Plaški TO Brigade and <i>Milicija Krajine</i> units participated in the attack. Within the Plaški TO Brigade, a battalion consisting of three companies under the command of Bogdan Grba participated.
254	P285	The attack commenced with aerial bombing followed by an artillery attack. Afterwards, ground units, including tanks, moved in on Saborsko from three axes.
255	P286	During the aerial bombing of 12 November 1991, Ana Bičanić and her husband Milan Bičanić, took shelter in the basement of Petar "Krtan" Bičanić's house, where around 20 people had gathered, including the young boy, Jure Vuković.

256	P287	Once it became quiet outside in the afternoon, Milan Bićanić heard someone say “give me the matches” which led him to believe that soldiers, who had entered the village, were burning houses and that they were going to be burned inside. In order to prevent this, they waved a white undershirt tied to a piece of wood through the basement door, shouting that they were civilians. There were soldiers outside wearing camouflage and olive-grey uniforms, as well as two soldiers dressed in “Serbian dark grey uniforms and wearing helmets with a five pointed red star”. The soldiers told all of the villagers to come out of the basement. The soldiers were armed and spoke in a Serbian dialect. Some of the soldiers swore at them, saying “fuck your Ustaša mother” and that all of them should be slaughtered.
257	P288	One of the soldiers threw a hand grenade into the empty basement. The soldiers separated the men from the women and lined them up opposite each other. The soldiers searched the men and took their money and valuables. While the men were being searched, one soldier hit Jure Štrk and Milan Bićanić. After about 15 minutes, the men were taken around a corner of Ivan Bicanic’s house. Two soldiers wearing Serbian dark grey uniforms shot and killed the men with automatic rifle fire.
258	P289	After the killings, the two soldiers returned to the rest of the group. One of the two soldiers pointed the gun at Ana Bićanić and told them that they had an hour to leave or they would be killed. As they ran away the soldiers shot at them. Jeka Vuković fell, and that was the last time that Jure Vukovic saw her. They fled towards Borik and after three days, on 15 November 1991, they came to the HVO barracks in Lipice, east of Saborsko.
259	P290	20 persons were killed in Saborsko on 12 November 1991: Ana Bićanić, Milan Bićanić, Nikola Bićanić, Petar Bićanić, Darko Dumenčić, Ivica Dumenčić, Kata Dumenčić, Nikola Dumenčić, Kata Matovina (born 1920), Mate Matovina (born 1895), Milan Matovina, Slavko Sertić, Mate Špehar, Josip Štrk, Jure/Juraj Štrk, Ivan Vuković, Jeka/Jela Vuković, Jure Vuković (born 1929), Jure Vuković (born 1930), and Petar Vuković.
260	P291	After the attack on Saborsko, Nikola Medaković, in his capacity as president of the municipality of Plaški, issued an order to bury human corpses after which he received a report that the bodies of more than 20 people had been buried, including civilian women and elderly men.
261	P292	After the attack, there were many Serb soldiers and policemen in the centre of Saborsko. A shop was looted by Zdravko Pejić and individuals with the last names Cekić or Cvekić, and Momčilović, both of whom were members of Đuro “Snjaka” Ogrizović’s company. An individual identified as “Peić” together with Željko “Buba” Mudrić and Nedeljko “Kiča” Trbojević, as well as “other Martić’s men” drove away in private cars they found in Saborsko.
262	P293	All the tractors in Saborsko were driven away, subsequently to be put up for auction, and household goods were stolen by plunderers. More than 50 cattle from Saborsko were brought to Plaški and 17 sheep were taken to Kunić. Many houses in Saborsko were set alight and burnt after the attack. The perpetrators, who were engaged in the burning of the houses included Nedeljko “Kiča” Trbojević, “Peić”, Željko “Buba” Mudrić, as well as “other Martić’s men”. Houses in the hamlets of Tuk and Dumenčići, and in the Serb hamlet of Solaje, were also set alight. In Borik, both Croat and Serb houses were burned.
263	P294	Following the attack, most of the inhabitants of Saborsko fled to Karlovac, Zagreb, and Ogulin. However, about 30 to 60 elderly villagers remained in the village and were brought to the Lička Jasenica barracks by the Plaški TO. After spending the night at the barracks, they were taken by bus towards Ogulin and released in territory controlled by the Croatian side.

264	P295	By 1995, the whole of Saborsko, including the school, had been destroyed. The only houses left standing were two Serb houses, which had been very badly damaged.
265	P296	Škabrnja is located in south-western Croatia and in 1991 formed part of the municipality of Zadar, which bordered the Benkovac municipality to the south-east. Škabrnja had about 2,000 inhabitants and was almost exclusively Croat.
266	P297	1991, 97.59% were Croats, and 2.15% were Serbs
267	P298	Croat villages were located to the south of Škabrnja, whereas predominantly Serb villages were located to the north and north-east of Škabrnja, towards Benkovac municipality.
268	P299	There were three churches in and around Škabrnja, the church of the Assumption of the Virgin in the centre of Škabrnja, St. Mary's Church in the hamlet of Ambar, and St. Luke's Church to the west of the centre of Škabrnja.
269	P301	In 1991, units of the JNA 9th Corps, of the Benkovac TO and of the SAO Krajina police were active in the area of Northern Dalmatia, including in the areas around Škabrnja, Nadin and Bruska.
270	S6-Krajina (P300)	In August 1991, running water and electricity to Nadin had been switched off from Benkovac. Around September 1991, approximately 240 Croatian reserve police members and local volunteers were present in Škabrnja. In September 1991, Škabrnja and Nadin were shelled and subjected to aerial bombings, including by cluster bombs. On 2 October 1991, three villagers were killed, and it was decided to evacuate the civilian population, following which only members of the reserve police force and the volunteers remained in Škabrnja to guard the village. Around 2 October 1991, Nadin was attacked by the JNA, whereupon two men were killed. This attack was conducted in order to deblockade the road from Benkovac to the airport in Zemunik. On 9 October 1991, an agreement was concluded between, inter alia, the 9th corps command located in Knin and representatives of the Zadar municipality on cessation of combat operations, raising of the blockade of Zadar, and a pullout of JNA from the Zadar garrison and the Zemunik airport to Benkovac.
271	P302	The JNA units present in Škabrnja on 18 November 1991 were composed of soldiers of different ethnicities. The JNA units were composed of regular soldiers and reservists from neighbouring Serb villages. In addition to the uniforms ordinarily worn by members of the JNA, officers of the JNA present in Škabrnja wore a mix of camouflage uniforms and ceremonial uniforms.
272	P303	The TO present in Škabrnja wore the same uniforms, caps and helmets as the JNA. However, the TO also wore the Serbian flag on their uniforms and some members had a white band on the left shoulder. Some TO soldiers wore SAO Krajina patches on their uniforms.
273	P304	Paramilitary units, often referred to simply as "Chetniks", were present in Škabrnja and wore various kinds of JNA uniforms, some with an insignia with four Cyrillic "S", and different kinds of hats, including berets, fur hats with cockades and hats. Their faces were painted, however, at least some of them appeared to be local.
274	P305	Goran Opačić was a member of the Benkovac Public Security Station special unit on 18 and 19 November 1991. He was present in Škabrnja at some point on 18 November 1991.

275	P306	Between 0600 and 0700 hours in the morning of 18 November 1991, a JNA mechanised infantry unit of between 80 to 200 men with eight to nine APCs and three tanks advanced from the Serb village of Smilčić towards Škabrnja. The TO, including members of the Benkovac TO, also participated in this operation and were resubordinated to the JNA. [...] Both the Croatian and the Serb sides had mortars and artillery. From around 0700 hours, Nadin was shelled from the direction of the Serb villages of Biljane or Lišane, and the shelling continued throughout the day. Most of the women and children left Nadin and went to Polaca, Zaton and Zadar, while only men and a few women remained in the village. At around 0730 hours, Škabrnja was subjected to intensive shelling, also from the direction of Biljane or Lišane, which lasted until 1230 hours.
276	P307	When the column reached the junction of the roads leading to Biljani Donji and Zadar, Lieutenant Miodrag Stevanović and a soldier were killed after having left their APC. [...] Thereafter, intensive fire commenced. Croatian forces shot at the JNA tanks and soldiers including from some of the houses. A ZNG unit fired rockets at the JNA column from the elevation Ražovljeva Glavica. Helicopters were also used by the JNA to deploy ground troops in the vicinity of Škabrnja. Cluster bombs dropped from JNA aircraft were also used in the attack.
277	P308	During the attack on 18 and 19 November 1991 cluster bombs were dropped on Škabrnja with resulting damage to buildings. Moreover, private houses and the school were shot at by tanks and with hand-held rockets, and the church of the Assumption of the Virgin was also shot at by a tank.
278	P309	The church of the Assumption of the Virgin in the centre of Škabrnja was shot at by a JNA tank. At one point, tanks attempted to enter the church of the Assumption of the Virgin but were stopped by Captain Janković, a member of the JNA. Following this, and without authorisation by Captain Janković, several soldiers entered the church and fired their weapons. A tank opened fire in the direction of the school in Škabrnja. Fire was opened on private houses by tanks and using hand-held rocket launchers.
279	P311	During the fighting, civilians fled south. Civilians were also taken out of Škabrnja by JNA and TO forces and transported to territory under the control of Croat forces.
280	P312	More than 1,500 civilians of Škabrnja withdrew in the direction of Zadar. Around 100 villagers fled to a quarry in the forest, a pre-arranged meeting point should the village come under attack, after which they went by foot to Prkos where buses eventually picked them up.
281	P313	[...] About half of Škabrnja was controlled by the Serb forces by 1400 hours. The fighting in Škabrnja lasted until dusk. There were two dead and several wounded on the Serb side, whereas the Croatian side suffered about 15 killed.
282	P315	In the morning of 18 November 1991, Neven Šegarić, Ivica Bilaver (age 14 or 15), Lucia Šegarić (age 62), Krsto Šegarić (age 60 or 61), Maja Grgica Šegarić (age 94), Željko Šegarić (age 14 or 15), Josip Miljanić and Stana Vicković were hiding in the cellar of Slavko Šegarić's house in Ambar.
283	P316	Right before the attack, Maja Grgica Šegarić was brought back to Neven Šegarić's father Mile Šegarić's house.

284	P317	Shortly after the first shelling, there was banging on the door and they heard a voice outside asking who was in the cellar. They heard someone outside say "Come out you Ustase, we are going to slaughter you all". When the people in the cellar opened the door, about ten JNA soldiers entered. The soldiers' faces were painted, and they wore plain olive green uniforms with a red star on the buttons and on the epaulets. After having taken a rifle and a pistol which were elsewhere in the house, some of the soldiers left.
285	P318	Shortly thereafter five or six "Serb volunteers, who were from the neighbouring villages" arrived. They threatened the people in the cellar and forced them out; everyone left the cellar except Lucia Šegarić. Just as the people exited the cellar, Neven Šegarić saw a "Chetnik" fire a burst of gunfire into the cellar. About five minutes later, when Neven Šegarić and Željko Šegarić were forced to enter the cellar to look for weapons, Neven Šegarić saw that Lucia Šegarić was lying dead a few metres from the door.
286	P319	As Neven Šegarić again left the cellar he saw Stana Vicković and Josip Miljanić being forced to kneel after which a soldier, wearing a camouflage uniform with a patch on his sleeve reading "SAO Krajina", shot them in the head. After this, Krsto Šegarić was beaten by five or six soldiers wearing green camouflage uniforms with SAO Krajina patches on their sleeves and red stars on the buttons, including Đuro Kosović, whom Neven Šegarić recognised. Đuro Kosović then shot Krsto Šegarić in the back of the head. The soldiers standing around outside at this point in time were a mix of JNA soldiers and soldiers with SAO Krajina patches on their camouflage uniforms.
287	P320	After this, Đuro Kosović, using a list of inhabitants in the village, questioned Neven Šegarić about where some of the inhabitants lived and if they had weapons. When Neven Šegarić said that he did not know, Đuro Kosović left. Subsequently, the soldier who had killed Stana Vicković and Josip Miljanić forced Neven Šegarić and Željko Šegarić against the wall of the house, however a "JNA officer" intervened and prevented their killing. The soldiers then took Ivica Bilaver, Neven Šegarić and Željko Šegarić to Smilcic.
288	P321	When the attack on Škabrnja started, Tomislav Šegarić hid in the cellar of Petar "Peso" Pavičić's house in Škabrnja together with about 25 to 30 civilians, including women, children and elderly people. Around 1230 hours the shelling ceased, and there was silence for around 20 minutes whereupon Eva Šegarić went outside the cellar. Shortly thereafter, Tomislav Šegarić heard men shouting that everyone should come out of the cellar or they would throw in hand grenades. The people in the cellar started to leave with their hands up. Outside near the entrance to the cellar, there was a group of more than ten armed "Chetniks" from the local area who wore camouflage uniforms and a variety of headgear.
289	P322	As they left the cellar, people were pulled to the side and killed by the "Chetniks". Some of these people were first beaten with rifle butts and then killed. [...] After this, women and children were lined up and insulted and asked where their men were. Subsequently, they were made to walk towards Ambar while being threatened by the "Chetniks".
290	P323	Jozo Brkić, Jozo Miljanić, Slavka Miljanić, Petar Pavičić, Mile Pavičić, Ilija Ražov, Kata "Soka" Rogić, Ivica Šegarić, Rade Šegarić and Vice Šegarić were killed outside Petar Pavičić's house in Škabrnja on 18 November 1991. The perpetrators of these killings were members of local paramilitary units, who participated, together with other SAO Krajina forces, in the attack on Škabrnja and who wore camouflage uniforms and different sorts of headgear.

291	P324	Grgica "Maja" Šegarić, who was between 80 and 96 years old and infirm as a result of a stroke, was killed in Mile Šegarić's house in Ambar on 18 November 1991.
292	P325	Ante Ražov was killed on 18 November 1991 in Škabrnja. He was beaten and had one of his ears cut off before being shot in the head in front of his mother. Ante Ražov was a member of the Croatian defence force in Škabrnja. Nevertheless, he was not taking an active part in the hostilities when he was killed.
293	P326	On 18 November 1991, several "Chetniks" beat on the road from the centre of Škabrnja towards Ambar. Thereafter, the "Chetniks" put Šime Šegarić and Bude Šegarić in a JNA APC, which drove away in the direction of Biljani. Subsequently, their bodies were handed over to their relatives.
294	P327	The following civilians were killed in Škabrnja, Nadin or Benkovac on 18 and 19 November 1991: Ivan Babić, Luka Bilaver, Marija Brkić (born 1943), Marko Brkić, Željko Čurković, Marija Dražina, Ana Jurić, Grgo Jurić, Petar Jurić, Niko Pavičići, Josip Perica, Ljubo Perica, Ivan Ražov, Jela Ražov, Branko Rogić, Nikola Rogić, Petar Rogić, Kljajo Šegarić, Lucka/Luca Šegarić, Grgica "Maja" Šegarić, Mara Žilić, Milka Žilić, Pavica Žilić, Roko Žilić, Tadija Žilić, and Marko Župan.
295	P328	These victims, with the exception of Petar Rogić, were killed by members of the units, including JNA and TO units, which took part in the attack on Škabrnja and Nadin on 18 and 19 November 1991.
296	P329	Petar Rogić [...] was killed in Benkovac by unidentified perpetrators after having been taken from Škabrnja.
297	P330	The following members of the Croatian defence forces present in Škabrnja and Nadin were killed on 18 and 19 November 1991: Vladimir Horvat, Nediljko Jurić, Slavko Miljanić, Gašpar Perica, Ante Ražov, Marko Rogić, Bude Šegarić, Miljenko Šegarić, Šime Šegarić, Nediljko Škara and Stanko Vicković. Ante Ražov, Šime Šegarić, Miljenko Šegarić, Vladimir Horvat, Gašpar Perica, and Marko Rogić were not taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of their deaths. These victims, with the exception of Šime Šegarić and Miljenko Šegarić, were killed by members of the units, including JNA and TO units, which took part in the attack on Škabrnja and Nadin on 18 and 19 November 1991. Miljenko Šegarić was killed in Benkovac by unidentified perpetrators after having been taken from Škabrnja. Šime Šegarić was killed in Knin by unidentified perpetrators after having been put by paramilitary soldiers in a JNA APC in Škabrnja.
298	P331	At 0500 hours in the morning of 19 November 1991, the Croatian forces withdrew from Škabrnja. Around 0700 hours, the JNA convoy left Škabrnja and advanced along the road towards Nadin, which was subsequently shelled. The convoy passed through Nadin around 1400 hours after which it withdrew to the Benkovac barracks. During the night of 19 September 1991, "everything was burning" in Nadin.
299	P332	Killings occurred from 18 November 1991 until 11 March 1992.
300	P333	On 20 November 1991, the JNA Naval Military District in Split, on the request of the European Community Monitoring Mission, asked the JNA 9th Corps command to provide a report by the following day on the killings in Škabrnja and Nadin on 18 and 19 November 1991. An on-site investigation was carried out in cooperation with the Benkovac Public Security Station. The 180th Motorised Brigade conducted interviews, although not pursuant to superior orders. Following the interviews, reports were sent to the JNA 9th Corps command.
301	P335	After the attack on Škabrnja and until February 1992, soldiers under the command of the Benkovac TO, Serb paramilitary forces and local Serbs looted and burnt houses in Škabrnja.

302	P336	Bruška is located about 15 kilometres east of Benkovac. In 1991, about 400 people lived there, and the village was predominantly Croat.
303	P337	89.54% of the inhabitants were Croats, and 10.46% were Serbs.
304	P338	Marinovići is a hamlet in Bruška comprising eight houses, which in 1991 was inhabited by Croats.
305	P339	From the spring of 1991, there was a Croatian reserve police force in Bruška, however, they did not have regular shifts, uniforms or weapons. The "Militia Krajina, Martić's police" set up barricades which cut off the bus line between Zadar and Benkovac. Armed men identifying themselves as "Martić's men" or "Martić's Militia" came to Bruška almost every day to scare the inhabitants. The armed men called the villagers Ustašas and said that Bruška would be a part of a Greater Serbia and that the people of Bruška should leave. However, as of December 1991 almost all of the inhabitants of Bruška were still living there.
306	P340	On the evening of 21 December 1991, Ante Marinović was at home playing cards with his brother Dušan Marinović, his father Roko Marinović, his uncle Petar Marinović and Sveto Drača. Ante Marinović's grandfather and Ljilja Marinović, the wife of Dušan Marinović, were upstairs with two children of theirs, Jure and Donja, and with the children of Sveto Drača and Soka Drača. The men were not armed and were dressed in civilian clothes, except Sveto Drača who was a Serb member of the JNA, and who was wearing an olive-drab uniform. Although Ante Marinović was a reserve police officer at the time, he was not on active duty that night.
307	P341	At around 2000 or 2030 hours, three members of the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> barged into the house, took the men outside, lined them up against a wall and started shooting. Dušan Marinović and Roko Marinović were killed and Ante Marinović was wounded. Sveto Drača and Petar Marinović ran away but were chased and killed near the gate.
308	P342	Ante Marinović was shot seven times: twice in the left thigh, or above the left thigh, twice in the arm, twice above the right hip, [...].
309	P343	The same evening Jasna Denona was in her family home, which was close to Roko Marinović's house, with her mother and her neighbours, Soka and Dragan Marinović. Jasna Denona, her mother and Dragan Marinović were Croats, and Soka was a Serb. At about the same time as the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> came to Roko Marinović's house, men identifying themselves as the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> and as "Martić's men" came to the door. Dragan Marinović went to answer the door.
310	P344	The women fled out into the garden and across a wall. As they were running Jasna Denona heard one of the men shout "they got away", after which the men started shooting at them and Jasna Denona was hit. Her mother came back and helped her move behind a wall in the vineyard, where they hid together with Jeka and Soka for about two hours. Jeka then went to check what was happening in the house closest to them, which was the house of Roko Marinović. They followed her and saw that at the gate of the yard she had found the dead body of her husband, Petar Marinović, and of her neighbour, Sveto Drača. In the front yard she had found the dead bodies of Roko Marinović and his son, Dušan Marinović.

311	P345	Joso Marinović came to the house and told them that both his son, Dragan Marinović, and his wife, Ika Marinović, had been killed. Later that night Dušan Drača, the father of Sveto Drača, came and told them that there were four more dead bodies in Marinovići. The following morning they discovered that the dead bodies belonged to Krsto Marinović, Draginja Marinović, his wife Stana Marinović, and her mother-in-law, Manda Marinović. Jasna Denona's mother and neighbour Kata saw their bodies and told her that they had been shot and that their bodies were "bullet riddled".
312	P346	Krsto Marinović, Draginja Marinović, Stana Marinović, and Manda Marinović were killed by gunshot. All the four victims wore civilian clothes.
313	P347	Today Jasna Denona has 50% disability, with her right arm being much weaker than her left arm as well as being disfigured.
314	P349	There were investigations into the killings in Bruska.
315	S10-Krajina	There was a very limited SVK presence of approximately 50 to 150 SVK and police personnel within the town of Knin at the start of Operation Storm on 4 August 1995. The SVK also had transport vehicles and mobile communication equipment in the town at this time. The SVK personnel at the SVK headquarters included 15 soldiers, as well as part of the Main Staff. A number of SVK officers were at the Pensioner's Hall. Further, there were no more than 30 SVK members at the Northern barracks and that the RSK Special Police were located outside of Knin on the front lines.
316	S11-Krajina	A significant number of men from Knin had been mobilized and stationed at the front lines in Knin in early August 1995. Further, there were at least 15,000 civilians in Knin on 4 August 1995. The vast majority of these civilians were women, children, and elderly men.
317	S12-Krajina	Most of the villagers left Buković in Benkovac municipality on 4 August 1995 or in the night between 4 and 5 August 1995. An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Buković on this day, were Krajina Serbs.
318	S13-Krajina	Almost all of the villagers in Civljane left on 4 August 1995. A vast majority of those leaving were Krajina Serbs.
319	S14-Krajina	Shells were fired at Gračac town from approximately 5 a.m. on 4 August 1995 and there was a civilian population in Gračac when the shelling began on 4 August 1995, many of whom had left by 2 p.m. on 5 August 1995. The overwhelming majority of people who left Gračac town between 4 and 5 August 1995 were Krajina Serbs.
320	S15-Krajina	Between 25 and 27 July 1995, some of the villagers, including Dušan Torbica's children, left Torbica hamlet in Kistanje village. [...] An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Torbica hamlet in Kistanje village on these days were Krajina Serbs.
321	S16-Krajina	All but around ten of the villagers left Kakanj on 4 and 5 August 1995. An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Kakanj village on these days, were Krajina Serbs.
322	S17-Krajina	The majority of the inhabitants of Kistanje had left the town by at least 13 August 1995. An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Kistanje town were Krajina Serbs.

323	S18-Krajina	Approximately 1,000-2,500 people left Knin in late July and early August 1995, a number of who left for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia in the days prior to Operation Storm. Among the reasons they gave for doing so was that they believed a Croatian military operation was imminent. There were at least 15,000 civilians in Knin on 4 August 1995. The reasons given for leaving Knin before 4 August 1995 included rumours of the HV taking over Bosanko Grahovo, rumours of possible military activity in Knin, as well as food shortages, and a lack of electricity.
324	S19-Krajina	Approximately 14,000 civilians left Knin on 4 and 5 August 1995. A vast majority of the persons who left Knin on these days were Krajina Serbs.
325	S20-Krajina	The columns of people leaving Knin on 4 and 5 August 1995 headed west towards Gračac municipality and north to Donji Srb, and on to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, while a relatively small minority of people left Knin for the UN compound and surrounding villages near Knin.
326	S21-Krajina	On 4 August 1995, Polača in Knin municipality was shelled. Most of the inhabitants of Polača left on 4 August 1995. An overwhelming majority, if not all, of the persons who left Polača on this day were Krajina Serbs.
327	S22-Krajina	On 4 August 1995 a number of inhabitants of Žagrović in Knin municipality left the village. An overwhelming majority, if not all, of the persons who left Žagrović on 4 August 1995, were Krajina Serbs.
328	S23-Krajina	On 4 and 5 August 1995 a large portion of the population left Plavno. The overwhelming majority, if not all, of the persons who left on these days were Krajina Serbs.
329	S24-Krajina	On 4 August 1995, Promina Hill near Uzdolje was shelled. On 4 or 5 August 1995, the majority of inhabitants left Uzdolje.
330	S25-Krajina	An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Uzdolje on 4 and 5 August 1995 were Krajina Serbs.
331	S26-Krajina	Between 4 and 7 August 1995 columns of people travelled through Donji Lapac municipality and crossed the border to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Approximately 50,000-70,000 persons travelled in these columns through Donji Lapac municipality and to Bosnia-Herzegovina. These persons came from several municipalities, including Knin and Gračac, as well as Korenica.
332	S27-Krajina	There were at least 15,000 civilians in Knin on 4 August 1995, the vast majority of whom were women, children, and elderly men, and approximately 14,000 of whom left on 4 and 5 August 1995. Similarly, there was a civilian presence and only a minimal SVK presence in the towns of Benkovac, Gračac, and Obrovac on 4 August 1995. The vast majority, if not all, of the persons who left Benkovac, Gračac, Knin, and Obrovac on 4 and 5 August 1995 were civilians or at least persons placed <i>hors de combat</i> at the time.
2.2. SAO SBWS		
333	P350	The district of Vukovar is located in Eastern Slavonia, current day Croatia, on the western bank of the Danube River. The river marks the border between Croatia and Serbia.
334	P351	Vukovar municipality is large in geographical terms. The municipality ranges from Ilok, southeast of the city of Vukovar, on the Danube, to Osijek, northwest of Vukovar. The distance between Osijek and Ilok is about 50 kilometres. The municipality also encompasses Trpinja and Bobota to the west.

335	P352	The population of some towns or villages in the municipality, such as Borovo Selo and Trpinje, was exclusively Serb, but overall the area was mixed.
336	P353	The Vukovar area was among the richest areas in Yugoslavia both in terms of the land and general infrastructure.
337	P355	Members of these [paramilitary] groups began encouraging the local Serb population to put up barricades and seek to defend themselves from the "Ustashas" who "were coming to kill them".
338	P356	On 2 May 1991 the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs ("MUP") carried out an operation in the largest Serbian village in Vukovar municipality, Borovo Selo, in response to the arrest of two Croatian policemen the previous night."
339	P357	This incident was followed by a series of acts directed against Serbs or pro-Serb interests.
340	P359	In August 1991 local Serb communities made a declaration of their autonomy and purported to create the second of the new Serb-ruled "mini-states" in Croatia, viz, the Serb Autonomous District ("SAO"; Srpska Autonomna Oblast) of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. A "government" of the SAO was formed in September 1991. At the time, in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar entities were formed by local Serbs and local Croats.
341	P360	JNA forces sporadically shelled parts of Vukovar in June, July and August 1991. Houses in the centre of Vukovar as well as the Vukovar hospital were hit and damaged and civilians were wounded. The first significant shelling occurred on 4 July 1991. The predominantly Croat Borovo Naselje was targeted from the direction of the predominately Serb Borovo Selo.
342	P361	In June and July 1991, shelling would take place once a day or every two days in Vukovar. The intensity grew on a daily basis.
343	P362	Other villages in the municipality of Vukovar as well as towns in the larger area of Eastern Slavonia were also subjected to military operations by the JNA during the summer and autumn of 1991. To the north and northwest of Vukovar, the town of Osijek came under heavy artillery attack in July 1991, the villages of Erdut and Dalj were shelled in early August 1991 and Borovo Naselje was shelled during the spring/summer of 1991. To the east, the village of Ilok was shelled and experienced daily shooting in August 1991.
344	P363	As part of its autumn operation, the JNA started an incursion in Eastern Slavonia with the intention of capturing the towns of Vukovar, Vinkovci and Osijek. At the same time military operations by the JNA were occurring elsewhere in Croatia.
345	P364	During September and early October, the JNA attacks on villages in Eastern Baranja intensified, causing extensive material damage to those villages and civilians to flee.
346	P365	By August 1991 people were already leaving Erdut, after the village was shelled with mortars.
347	P366	On 25 and 26 August 1991 the JNA and other Serb forces overran the entire district of Baranja. This area had a proportionally small Serb population, of between 20 and 25%.
348	P367	On 23 August 1991, Borovo Naselje came under heavy shelling. Croatian forces in Borovo Naselje brought down two JNA aircrafts with hand-held rocket launchers.
349	P368	On 24 and 25 August 1991, all other parts of Vukovar were subjected to a heavy aerial attack by the JNA [...] Extensive damage was caused to the city of Vukovar and many civilians were killed.
350	P369	After this attack, on 25 August 1991 the siege of Vukovar commenced. By the late summer or early autumn of 1991 the city of Vukovar was effectively surrounded and besieged by JNA and other Serb forces.

351	P370	A large number of JNA, Territorial Defence Units ("TO") and paramilitary units, including Serb volunteers took part in the battle for Vukovar on the Serb side. Initially, their number was limited. By the end of September 1991 the number of JNA troops had increased considerably.
352	P371	On the Croatian side there were the locally based Territorial Defence and members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ("MUP"), the National Guard ("ZNG") and a small number of a newly created Croatian defence force. After the attack in late August, the local Croatian defence mobilised. Some reinforcements and volunteers came from other parts of Croatia.
353	P372	There were dramatic differences between the military capabilities of the opposing forces. The JNA was an extensively equipped and trained military force and was in far superior numbers.
354	P373	The Serb TO, paramilitary and other volunteer elements were all equipped and armed.
355	P374	Available to the Serb forces in large numbers was a full range of military weaponry, including automatic infantry rifles, other automatic weapons including machine-guns, rockets (including hand-held and multi-launchers), heavy and light mortars, artillery and land mines. They had armoured vehicles including armoured personnel carriers (nearly all mounted with heavy machine-guns), tanks both old (T-33) and new (M-84). They also had anti-aircraft batteries and an air force armed with a range of ground attack weapons including bombs of up to 250kg, all of which were used in the attack on Vukovar. Naval forces on the Danube were also used.
356	P375	The population of Ilok increased from 6,300 to 15,000 due to an influx of people from the surrounding villages. 65.5% of that population was Croatian. On 17 October 1991 around 8,000 of these people, mainly Croats, left Ilok.
357	P376	From 2 October until 18 November 1991 the JNA was constantly engaged in attack operations in and around the city of Vukovar. Combat operations were conducted more or less on a daily basis. These often involved attacks by JNA aircraft, artillery, tanks and rockets. While cease-fire agreements were reached from time to time, they were violated by both sides.
358	P377	Under the might of the attack the destruction of Vukovar progressed and, slowly but certainly, the siege of the city by the JNA was tightened until the Croat forces finally capitulated on 18 November 1991.
359	P378	The fighting in the Vukovar area from late August 1991 until 18 November 1991 had devastating consequences for the city and its surroundings. Many towns around Vukovar were destroyed. Luzac, Opatovac, Stompajvci, Tolonik, Trpinja, Bršadin, Petrovci, Negoslavci and Borovo Naselje were destroyed. In others houses had been heavily shelled.
360	P379	On 20 November 1991, a meeting of the self-described "government of SAO" [...] Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem was held at Velepromet. This "government" had been formed in September 1991 by a secret organisation calling itself the Serbian National Council of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem. The Council did not accept the separation of the region from the State of Yugoslavia. Among the participants at the session in Velepromet, there were members of this "government", including its prime minister, Goran Hadžić and Slavko Dokmanović, minister of agriculture and ousted mayor of Vukovar, as well as two senior officers of the JNA, Colonel Vujić, from the Security Administration were also present at the meeting. LtCol Panić, Chief of Staff of OG South and Gmtbr [Guards Motorised Brigade], attended the meeting as the representative of Mile Mrksić. Captain Jaksić of the Vukovar TO was present. Željko Raznjatović, aka Arkan, a renowned paramilitary leader whose troops had fought in Vukovar, also attended the meeting.
2.3. Republic of Serbian Krajina		

361	P381 / S2-Krajina	On 19 December 1991, the RSK was proclaimed by the Assembly of the SAO Krajina with Milan Babić as its President, and the RSK Constitution was passed. The TO constituted the armed forces of the RSK. On 16 February 1992, the government fell as Milan Babić was removed from the office of President of the RSK by the RSK Assembly due to his opposition to Slobodan Milošević in respect of the Vance Plan. Milan Martić, who had previously opposed the Vance Plan, now publicly supported the adoption of the Vance Plan. After Milan Babić was removed from office, the Vance plan was adopted by the Assembly of the RSK.
362	S7-Krajina	On 19 February 1992, Milan Martić ordered the disbandment of an RSK MUP Special Purpose unit commanded by Predrag Baklajić due to information that this unit had been involved in criminal activities, including several murders, and incidents of robbery, theft and destruction. This disbandment was ultimately not carried through and the unit continued with criminal activities in 1992. On 1 April 1993, Milan Martić requested the MUP of Serbia to provide 20-30 inspectors to deal with homicides and property offences which were "rapidly increasing recently in the RSK". On 7 September 1993, Milan Martić ordered the arrest of members of certain paramilitary groups, who were suspected of committing organised crimes.
363	P382	On 26 February 1992, the SAO Western Slavonia and the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Šrem joined the RSK. In the new RSK government, Zdravko Zečević became Prime Minister, Goran Hadžić was elected President, and Milan Martić was re-elected Minister of the Interior.
364	P383	As Minister of the Interior, Milan Martić was kept informed concerning the activities of the SJBs and maintained "excellent communication" with the units subordinated to the MUP. Moreover, information regarding crimes committed in the SAO Krajina and the RSK was regularly reported to Milan Martić. In particular, police inspectors, who carried out investigations into crimes on the ground, reported to the MUP and Milan Martić during the time period of 1991 to 1995 pursuant to reporting regulations.
365	P384	[T]here were numerous contacts between UNPROFOR and the RSK government, including the Public Security Stations, regarding crimes committed on the ground by members of the [RSK] MUP.
366	S3-Krajina (P385)	The RSK was not demilitarised in its entirety in accordance with the Vance Plan. On 28 April 1992, Special Police ("PJM") Brigades and a PJM Administration were established within the RSK Ministry of Defence by the SSNO [Federal Secretariat of National Defence of the JNA] of Serbia. General Borislav Đukic, a JNA officer, was appointed chief of the PJM Administration. The PJM Brigades were connected both to the Ministry of Defence and to the MUP of the RSK. The members of PJM units wore blue uniforms and used the side arms and the equipment of the TO. On 18 May 1992, the SVK was established. In peacetime, the SVK was to consist of TO units, however in the event of imminent threat of war and during wartime the PJM units would join the SVK.
367	P390	The RSK authorities cooperated with the authorities in Bosanski Novi, BiH, regarding the displacement of the non-Serb population from that municipality. ŠTČhe RSK MUP was to be involved in providing security for an organised "safe departure" of Muslims and other non-Serbs in the direction of Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, and Germany in July 1992.
368	P391	The RSK's armed forces known as the Serbian Army of Krajina ("SVK"), was established on 18 May 1992, and existed, save for its 11th Corps that outlived the RSK, until 8 August 1995 when the RSK fell.

369	P392	The President of the RSK, as Supreme Commander, led the SVK in peacetime and wartime in accordance with the Constitution and decisions adopted by the RSK Supreme Defence Council, and presided over the RSK Supreme Defence Council.
370	P393	The Law on the SVK was adopted on 22 April 1993 and provided that the SVK operated under the principle of unity or singleness of command and defined its objective as "defending sovereignty, territory, independence of Republic of Serbian Krajina".
371	P394	On 26 October 1992, Milan Novaković was appointed to the post of Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK by the President of the RSK, Goran Hadžić. He was replaced on 22 February 1994 by Milan Čeleketić who was appointed by Milan Martić.
372	S5-Krajina	On 20 April 1993, the RSK Supreme Defence council was established, which was composed of the President of the RSK, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, and the commander of the SVK. The President of the RSK "[led] the [SVK] in times of peace and war, in accordance with the [RSK] constitution and decisions adopted by the Supreme Defence council, and [presided] over the Supreme Defence council". The Supreme Defence council was mandated to "adopt decisions on the readiness, mobilisation and deployment of the [SVK] and on other matters in accordance with the constitution and the law."
373	P395	On 18 May 1995, the resignation of Milan Čeleketić was approved by the Assembly and Mile Mrksić took up the post of Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK.
374	P396	Directly subordinated to the Commander of the Main Staff of the SVK were departments of security, intelligence affairs, morale, religious and legal affairs, department of mobilisation and personnel affairs, rear services, development and finance and anti-aircraft and air defence.
375	P397	In May 1994, Dušan Smiljanić was appointed to the post of Assistant Commander for the Security and Intelligence Sector of the SVK. On 3 July 1994, Rade Orlić became Chief of the Intelligence Department of the SVK. On 19 December 1994, Rade Rašeta became the Chief of the Security Department of the SVK Main Staff.
376	P398	In 1994, Borislav Đukić was the Chief of the Main Staff of the SVK. As of May 1995, this post was held by Dušan Lončar.
377	P399	The SVK was composed of six Corps, namely the 7th, 11th, 15th, 18th, 21st and 39th Corps.
378	P400	The 7th Corps was headquartered in Knin, had approximately 13,000 soldiers and its area of responsibility covered the area of North Dalmatia.
379	P401	The zone of responsibility of the 11th Corps covered Eastern Slavonija, Western Srem and Baranja. The 11th Corps had between 17,500 and 25,000 troops
380	P402	The 15th Corps had 10,000 soldiers and covered the area of Titova Korenica.
381	P403	The 18th Corps numbered 9,000 troops and covered the area of Okunčani.
382	P404	The 21st Corps was responsible for the area around Vojnić and had around 11,000 troops.
383	P405	The 39th Corps covered the area of Glina and had about 12,000 troops.

384	S4-Krajina	The RSK leadership was against the demilitarisation of the RSK, asserting it would be unable to defend itself in the event of Croatian attacks. Thus, the Vance Plan was interpreted by the RSK authorities to mean that UNPROFOR was to protect the population in the areas of deployment. In this context, Croatian forces carried out several armed incursions into the UNPAs between 1992 and 1995, including on the Miljevac plateau on 21 June 1992, Maslenica on 22 January 1993, Medak pocket on 9 and 12 September 1993, and Operation Flash from 1 May 1995.
2.4. Detentions		
385	P413	In early 1991, a detention facility was established on the premises of the old hospital in the centre of Knin. This facility was sometimes referred to as “Martić’s prison” and the “District Prison”. A section of the hospital was used as a dormitory by “Captain Dragan’s men and members of the JNA reserve force”. From the summer of 1991, the Ministry of Justice of the SAO Krajina took over control of the old hospital from the TO and hired professional guards. On 28 September 1992, the Assembly of the RSK formally established the District Prison in Knin.
386	P414	From mid-1991 to mid-1992 between 120 and 300 persons were detained in the old hospital in Knin. Among the detainees were both Croats and other non-Serb civilians and members of Croatian armed forces and formations.
387	P415	On 2 October 1991, Stanko Erstić was arrested in Medviđa near Bruška by the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> and brought to the old hospital in Knin. He was detained with another 120 prisoners, all non-Serbs from Croat or mixed villages in the Krajina region. Except for 20 members of the ZNG who had been captured during the fighting in Kijevo, all detainees were Croat civilians. He was detained in a room with approximately 12 people.
388	P416	On 2 November, Stanko Erstić and approximately 100 non-Serb prisoners were exchanged for approximately 60 Serb prisoners. Twenty Croats from Lika remained in the prison. Members of “Special Military Police Unit”, dressed in JNA uniforms, took them to the JNA barracks in Knin, where they were loaded onto buses. Afterwards they were driven to Pakovo Selo where buses from the Croatian side picked them up.
389	P417	On 19 November 1991, Luka Brkić, Ante “Neno” Gurlica and Marin Gurlica were brought by truck to the JNA barracks in Knin by men wearing JNA uniforms. While they were taken to the barracks, they were beaten and verbally abused.
390	P418	Luka Brkić was detained at various locations at the JNA barracks with between 8 and 17 people, ranging from 30 to 80 years old. The detainees were severely beaten for at least twenty days. The detainees did not receive medical treatment, there was insufficient food and water, and there were no sanitary facilities.
391	P419	Luka Brkić was also detained at the sports hall of the barracks with between 75 and 200 people, mostly Croats. The detainees were occasionally severely beaten. There were limited sanitary facilities and a 200-litre barrel next to the door that was used to urinate in. Ratko Mladić, the then-Commander of the 9th Corps, twice visited the detainees at the sports hall. Ratko Mladić taunted them, saying “if you don’t do what you are told [...] your fate will be the same as the fate of the inhabitants from Škabrnja.” The detainees were “displayed as Ustashas” and made to “take an oath for the King and the fatherland, the Serbian fatherland”.
392	P420	While being detained in the JNA barracks, in addition to JNA soldiers, Luka Brkić saw soldiers wearing SAO Krajina insignia and the White Eagles (“Beli Orlovi”) insignia.

393	P421	Luka Brkić was brought to the old hospital from the JNA barracks in Knin. (...) Luka Brkić was detained in a small room together with nine people. After approximately 12 days, he was transferred to the ground floor of another wing of the old hospital, which was under the control of the JNA. There, he joined the people who had initially been detained with him at the JNA 9th Corps barracks.
394	P422	The detainees were threatened and beaten every day for long periods, often by several guards at a time using rifle butts, truncheons, and wooden staves. The detainees were interrogated and also beaten by shift commanders. The detainees also had cocked revolvers pressed against their temples, were beaten on their kidneys until they were swollen, and were denied the use of toilet facilities. They were forced to drink urine and to clean toilets with their bare hands. They had their heads forced into toilets. They also had their personal belongings stolen. Some detainees were sexually abused and detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation. There was insufficient food. The detainees were verbally abused by the guards, who said things like “the Croatian nation has to be destroyed”, “all Croats have to be killed; Split and Zadar are burning, Šibenik will burn as well”. On one occasion, Vojislav Šešelj visited the old hospital and insulted the detainees, asking them “how many Serbian children they slaughtered, how many mothers”.
395	P423	“Martić’s police”, wearing blue uniforms, carried out beatings together with people in camouflage uniforms. Ivan Atelj, who was also detained and beaten at the old hospital, stated that while Stevo Plejo and Jovica Novaković were in charge of the old hospital prison, they “allowed beatings of prisoners by civilians, Serbian prisoners, ‘Martić’s Special Forces members’ and all others who wanted to beat them.”
396	P424	From his mistreatment in detention, Luka Brkić sustained permanent injuries to his stomach and contracted Hepatitis B. He is still receiving medical treatment. Stanko Erstić sustained two broken ribs and one cracked rib, while Ivan Atelj sustained three broken ribs and injuries to his spine.
397	P425	In October 1991, Milan Martić was seen in the prison in Knin wearing a camouflage uniform with the insignia of the <i>Milicija Krajine</i> .
2.5. Forcible Transfer		
398	P426	Beginning in 1990, Croat businesses and properties were blown up in Knin and there was constant pressure on the local Croat population. From around April 1991, Croat houses in the Knin area were searched for weapons. Following the fighting in the Hrvatska Kostajnica, Knin and Glina areas in August 1991, Croat civilians began to leave their homes to go to Zagreb, Sisak and other places.
399	P427	Due to the situation prevailing in the Knin area, the Croat population began to fear for their safety and began requesting authorisation from the RSK authorities to leave the RSK territory. The insecurity of the Croats was also aggravated by speeches of Milan Martić on the radio that he could not guarantee their safety, particularly in the area of Knin. As a result, in the period between 1992 and 1993 the RSK police directed the Croat population towards Croat settlements near Knin, such as Vrpolje and Kninsko Polje.

400	P428	A decision on the conditions upon which Croats and other nationalities could return to the RSK was adopted by the RSK government on 21 April 1992. However, in September 1992, UNPROFOR reported that "it might be unrealistic to carry out any return [of displaced persons] in the forthcoming future" due to the likelihood of hostile acts being carried out against returning Croats.
401	P429	Displacement of the Croat population as a result of harassment and intimidation occurred elsewhere in the SAO Krajina, and subsequently RSK, territory and continued until the end of 1994. Harassment and intimidation of the Croat population was carried out on a large scale by the police and by local Serbs in the territory.
402	P431	During 1992 on the territory of the RSK, there was a continuation of incidents of killings, harassment, robbery, beatings, burning of houses, theft, and destruction of churches carried out against the non-Serb population.
403	P432	Throughout 1993, there were further reports of killings, intimidation, and theft. By 1995, several Croat villages had been attacked and destroyed, including Rakovica, Poljanak, Kuselj, Saborsko, Korana, Rastovaca, Celiste, Smoljanac, Dreznik, Rakovac, Lipovaca, Vaganac, Hrvatska Dubica and Medvida.
404	P433	On 18 November 1991 over 4000 civilians took steps to leave Vukovar. The civilians consisted of men, women, children and the elderly. Their evacuation was assisted by the JNA. [T]he civilians assembled at a collection point in the Mitnica area which appears to be the same as the surrender point for the Croatian forces from Mitnica. Veselin Sljivančanin, assisted by Major Vukasinović and unidentified Vukovar TOs, who had local knowledge and knew many of the local population, interviewed civilians who had gathered at the collection point. [I]n effect they were seeking to ensure that no members of the Croat forces were seeking to be evacuated as civilians.
405	P434	From the collection point in Mitnica some civilians were transported to Velepomet while others were transported initially to Ovčara. The civilians arrived at Ovčara on buses or in their private cars at approximately 2200 or 2300 hours. They were continuously transported by bus to Croatia or to Serbia. This process started late in the evening of the 18 November 1991 and continued throughout the night and into the following morning. Their private cars remained at Ovčara. JNA personnel were present throughout the transportation of the civilians
406	P435	Convoys of civilians were leaving Vukovar throughout 18, 19 and 20 November 1991. At least one convoy consisting of 16 buses with civilians was turned back by Croatian authorities on 18 November 1991 and had to return to the area of responsibility of Operational Group South.
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina		
3.1. Developments in 1990-1991		
407	P436	For centuries the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, more so than any other republic of the former Yugoslavia, has been multi-ethnic.
408	P437	A census in April 1991 recorded that 43.7 percent of the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina were ethnic Muslims, 32.4 percent were Serbs and 17.3 percent were Croats.
409	P438	The third ethnic population living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also sizeable, are the Croats, living principally in the south-west adjacent to Croatia's Dalmatian coast.

410	P439	The large Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina owes its religion and culture to the long Turkish occupation, during which time many Slavs adopted the Islamic faith.
411	P440	For Serbs the heroic but unsuccessful resistance of the Serb nation to Turkish invasion, culminating in their defeat in the battle of Kosovo, remains an emotional event, symbolic of Serb courage.
412	P441	During the Second World War, Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by the German and Italian armies.
413	P442	Three distinct Yugoslav forces fought one another. Whereas the strongly nationalist Ustasha forces of the Croatian state supported the occupying powers, the Chetniks, Serb nationalist forces, and the partisans, a largely Communist and Serb group, both opposed the German and Italian forces.
414	P443	Muslims were found in the ranks of both the Ustasha and the Partisans. Bosnia-Herzegovina was particularly affected by serious crimes committed against the civilian population.
415	P444	The former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into territorial units of self-management which were possessed of a certain level of autonomy. Each of these municipalities (<i>opština</i>) were governed by a Municipal Assembly, consisting of members directly elected by the local population, which in turn elected an Executive Council from its own members. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there were 109 such municipalities.
416	P445	In February 1990 a law passed in Bosnia-Herzegovina allowing the formation of non-Communist parties. Parties established pursuant to this law included: the (predominantly Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), established on 26 May 1990; the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), established on 12 July 1990; and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), established on 18 August 1990.
417	P446	Radovan Karadžić, Aleksandar Buha, Velibor Ostojić, Rajko Dukić, and Aleksandar Divčić were some of the persons involved in the establishment of the SDS.
418	P447	From the moment of its creation, the SDS political platform included an emphasis on the protection of the Serb nation, which was said to be disadvantaged by the purported lower birth rate of Serbs and by the way Bosnia-Herzegovina had been divided into municipalities, effectively making Serbs an ethnic minority in areas where they might otherwise have dominated. The SDS advocated the maintenance of a federal Yugoslavia, respect for the rule of law, and an equal distribution of power between the three main national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
419	P448	In 1990 and 1991 the SDS was funded by voluntary contributions and enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs.
420	P449	The main organs of the SDS included the party Assembly, formally the supreme body; the SDS Main Board, the highest party organ at times when the Assembly was not in session; the SDS Executive Board, the executive arm of the Main Board; the president of the party, who was also the president of the Main Board; and several advisory bodies, such as the SDS Political and Economic Councils and the Commission for Personnel and Organization.
421	P450	The party was a hierarchical structure, organized into municipal assemblies and boards resembling the republican organs.
422	P451	Speaking in early November 1990, SDS president Radovan Karadžić said that SDS boards in the municipalities had the responsibility to maintain contact with "10 to 20 Serbian households, so that information from the most remote village reaches the Main Board in two hours at most."

423	P452	In the following months, the close relationship between SDS municipal organs and the apex of the party was enhanced: by July 1991, for example, members of the Main Board and of the Executive Board were instructed to be involved in the work of local boards in the areas they represented.
424	P453	Local officials frequently addressed the central leadership in order to solve local problems.
425	P454	On 18 November 1990 the first multi-party elections were held in Bosnia- Herzegovina at the municipal and republican levels.
426	P456	In the Republic's Assembly, composed of the House of Citizens and the House of Municipalities, voters gave the SDA 86 seats, the SDS 72 seats, and the HDZ 44 seats, out of a total of 240.
427	P457	Following the November 1990 elections, the SDA, SDS, and HDZ reached an agreement among themselves on a formula for the distribution of power.
428	P458	A coalition government was thus formed headed by a seven member State Presidency, with the leader of the SDA, Alija Izetbegović, as the first President.
429	P459	The outcome of the elections was, in effect, little more than a reflection of an ethnic census of the population with each ethnic group voting for its own nationalist party.
430	P460	It was agreed that, at the most senior level, the Prime Minister would be from the HDZ, the President of the Assembly from the SDS, and the President of the Presidency from the SDA (the persons appointed were Jure Pelivan, Momčilo Krajisnik, and Alija Izetbegović, respectively).
431	P461	Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević were appointed to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina as SDS representatives.
432	P462	Positions in all Government organs and public institutions with government appointees were distributed in accordance with party quotas. This meant that, for practical purposes, personnel were chosen on the basis of nationality and allegiance to the views of the three coalition parties.
433	P463	This arrangement stamped out opposition by smaller parties and sowed the seeds for the establishment of parallel ethnic structures. The SDS, for example, received a vice-presidential position, two Ministers without portfolio, and five out of thirteen departmental portfolios in the Government, as well as eight out of thirty chairmanships of Assembly committees and commissions.
434	P464	The three parties divided among themselves top positions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), which controlled the police. Alija Delimustafić (SDA) became MUP Minister, Vitomir Žepinić (SDS) became the deputy Minister, Avdo Hebib (SDA) became assistant Minister for police affairs, and Momčilo Mandić (SDS) became assistant Minister for the prevention and detection of crime. The regional organization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP was based on nine Security Services Centres (CSBs), located in Bihac, Banja Luka, Dobož, Tuzla, Livno, Mostar, Zenica, Sarajevo, and Goražde. Chief positions in three of these were assigned to the SDS.
435	P465	At the local level, a similar division of posts was made, reflecting the percentages gained by each party in the elections. These percentages corresponded to the ethnic composition of each municipality.
436	P466	The municipal assembly was by law the highest organ of municipal authority.
437	P467	It was headed by the assembly president and one or more vice-presidents, who were elected by the assembly from its members for a four-year term. It consisted of a single chamber with quotas for its ethnic composition.

438	P468	The law provided that assembly delegates were to be chosen by secret ballot in popular elections for a four-year term.
439	P469	The municipal assembly was accorded a wide range of powers. In particular, the assembly was to issue the municipal statute, the defence plan, the municipal budget, and could call a municipal referendum.
440	P470	The assembly could also determine the organization and functioning of the executive board and other local government authorities.
441	P471	The assembly president was to convene assembly sessions, initiate debate, and sign assembly decisions, which were to be reached by majority vote.
442	P472	An executive organ (a board or a committee), together with a number of administrative organs or departments, was to be in charge of the implementation of assembly decisions.
443	P473	In the Republican Assembly, co-operation between the Muslim and Serbian political parties proved increasingly difficult as time went by.
444	P474	What was initially a coalition government of the Republic broke down in October 1991 and failed completely in January 1992.
445	P475	The disintegration of multi-ethnic federal Yugoslavia was thus swiftly followed by the disintegration of multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the prospect of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina increased.
446	P476	The conflict between Serbia and Croatia, following the declaration of independence by Croatia in June 1991, served greatly to exacerbate the tension between Bosnia and Herzegovina's three ethnic groups.
447	P477	Further, the Bosnian Serbs retained vivid memories, albeit now some 50 years old, of their suffering at the hands of the Croats during the Second World War.
448	P478	[From the autumn of 1991], while the SDA and the HDZ promoted the secession of the SRBH from the SFRY, the SDS strongly advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia as a state, in order to ensure that the Serbs would continue to live together in a single state, and would not become a minority in an independent Bosnian state.
449	S4-BiH	By October 1991, the three-party coalition was crumbling. The SDA and HDZ pressed the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly to discuss a declaration of sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would pave the way for the republic to assert its independence from Yugoslavia. The SDS protested that such a declaration would be unconstitutional as it would infringe on the rights of one nationality recognized by the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution, namely the Serbs, and it had not been vetted by the council for Ethnic Equality.
450	S5-BiH	In the course of the debate on whether to vote on such a declaration of sovereignty, during the night of 14 and 15 October 1991, Radovan Karadžić expressed strong opposition and warned that the SDS would make use of constitutional mechanisms to prevent a vote. When the other parties decided to proceed with the vote, Krajišnik, as President of the Assembly, adjourned the session to the next morning. The SDS deputies, as well as most Serb deputies not in the SDS, left the hall. However, the vice president of the Assembly then reconvened the session and the declaration was adopted. Without intervening, Krajišnik followed events on television from his office with some other deputies.
451	P481	On 15 October 1991, after the Republican Assembly of the SRBH had adjourned for the day and the SDS delegation had departed, HDZ and SDA delegates reconvened without them and passed a "Declaration of Sovereignty", a measure that moved the SRBH a step closer to independence.

452	S6-BiH	On 15 October 1991 the SDS Political council met to assess the situation. Addressing the meeting, Krajišnik suggested that, since the decision to adopt the declaration was illegal and unconstitutional, the SDS had to find a method of denouncing it. During this and other meetings, the idea emerged that the SDS should form its own institutions, which would function in parallel to those of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 16 October the SDS's "Announcement to the Serbian people" stated that the SDA and HDZ had breached the constitutional order. It reiterated the SDS's support for federal institutions, including the JNA. At the SDS Deputies' club meeting of 18 October the SDS leadership decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of secession from Yugoslavia.
453	P482	The SDS and the SDA failed to reconcile their differences and started moving in opposite directions.
454	P483	The Bosnian Serb deputies of the BiH parliament proclaimed a separate Assembly of the Serb Nation on 24 October 1991.
455	P484	In November 1991 the SDS sponsored, organised and conducted a plebiscite primarily for the Bosnian Serb population. Voters were given different ballots depending upon whether they were Serb or non-Serb. The Serb voters were asked to vote on the question: "Are you in favour of the decision reached by the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 24 October 1991 whereby the Serbian people shall remain in the common State of Yugoslavia which would include Serbia, Montenegro, Serb Autonomous Region Krajina, Serb Autonomous Region Slavonija, Baranja, Western Srem along with all others willing to remain in such a State?"
456	S8-BiH	The Serb plebiscite was held on 9 and 10 November 1991. Although all ethnicities were allowed to vote in the plebiscite, ballots were of different colours depending on the ethnicity of the voter. Few non-Serbs participated. The figures reported at the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 21 November were: 99.9 per cent of the 1,162,032 Serbs who voted and 99.1 per cent of the 49,342 non-Serbs who voted, voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia.
457	S9-BiH	On 21 November 1991 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly proclaimed as part of the territory of federal Yugoslavia all those municipalities, communes, and settlements where a majority of registered citizens of Serb nationality had voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia. If the majority in one municipality had voted to remain within Yugoslavia, the whole of that municipality would remain. In municipalities where the majority of people had not participated in the plebiscite [...], the SDS proposed to look at single communes or settlements: if local communities had voted to remain, then only that community would be considered part of Yugoslavia, while the rest of the territory of the municipality would be allowed to join an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.
458	S10-BiH	During the same session of 21 November 1991, Krajišnik declared that "these are crucial times for the survival of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I would dare to say – even more broadly – when it comes to the Serbian people as such." He cautioned that "All proposed solutions must be based on the constitution and the laws, reflecting the interests of the Serbian people, but not at the expense of other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina".
459	P485	In a speech given on the occasion of the "Plebiscite of the Serb People" in Sarajevo in November 1991, Radovan Karadžić instructed SDS members representing the municipalities to impose complete Bosnian Serb authority in their respective municipalities, regions and local communities.
460	P486	On 11 December 1991, the SerBiH Assembly voted to recommend the establishment of separate Serbian municipalities. The declared aim of this decision was "to break up the existing municipalities where Serbs are not in a majority".

461	P487	The outcome of the plebiscite purported to be 100 percent in favour. The plebiscite was cited as justification for subsequent moves such as the ultimate walk-out of the SDS representatives from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly, the various negotiations conducted at the federal and international levels and the proclamation, on 9 January 1992, of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
462	P488	Also on the basis of the plebiscite, the SDS and military forces in each region including the JNA, paramilitary organizations, local TO units, and special police units, began to establish physical and political control over certain municipalities where it had not already gained control by virtue of the elections.
463	P489	In these regions the SDS representatives in public office in some cases established parallel municipal governments and separate police forces.
464	P490	Physical control was asserted by positioning military units, tanks and heavy artillery around the municipalities and setting up checkpoints to control the movement of non-Serbs.
465	P491	Prior to the outbreak of the armed conflict, the SDS started waging a propaganda war which had a disastrous impact on the people of all ethnicities, creating mutual fear and hatred and particularly inciting the Bosnian Serb population against the other ethnicities.
466	P492	Within a short period of time, citizens who had previously lived together peacefully became enemies and many of them, in the present case mainly Bosnian Serbs, became killers, influenced by a media, which by that time, was already under the control of the Bosnian Serb leadership.
467	P493	As far as the Bosnian Krajina in particular is concerned, in August 1991, a paramilitary group, known as the 'Wolves of Vujcak' and supported by the SDS, took over the TV transmitter on Mount Kozara. The frequencies were redirected and, consequently, most municipalities in the Bosnian Krajina could no longer receive TV and radio programmes from Sarajevo, but only programmes from Belgrade and occasionally from Croatia and, from March 1992 onwards also from Banja Luka.
468	P494	Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat employees of TV and radio stations as well as of most newspapers were dismissed and replaced by Bosnian Serbs.
469	P495	Beginning from that period, the tenor of the message spread by the SDS through the media was that the Bosnian Serbs were threatened with persecution and genocide by the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and that they had to protect themselves in order to avoid the repetition of crimes committed against the Serbs during the Second World War.
470	S19-BiH	Around 20 December 1991, SDS members Nikola Koljević and Biljana Plavšić voiced their opposition to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency's decision to apply to the Badinter commission – established by the European community to issue advisory opinions on legal matters relating to the Yugoslav crisis – for recognition as an independent state.
3.2. The Bosnian-Serb Political Framework		
471	P496	On 23 October 1991, the Yugoslav presidency invited Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Nikola Koljević, and Biljana Plavšić, among others, to a meeting. The main object was to calculate the percentage of the population from the territories of the former Yugoslavia who were supporting Yugoslavia, the concept of Federation, the policy promoted by Slobodan Milošević.

472	P497	On 24 October 1991 the SDS deputies convened separately and established the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnian-Serb Assembly). Momčilo Krajišnik was elected President of this Assembly. Nikola Koljević, Biljana Plavšić, Radovan Karadžić, Milutin Najdanović, and Miodrag Simović were “authorised to represent and protect the interests of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” It was resolved that, for the time being, Serb representatives in republican bodies would not relinquish their offices and would carry out their duties “in accordance with the law”.
473	P498	In practice, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly began as a gathering of the SDS Deputies’ Club, joined by a few Serb non-SDS deputies from the Bosnia- Herzegovina Assembly.
474	P499	At that founding session, Bosnian-Serb deputies passed a resolution that “the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall stay in the joint state of Yugoslavia together with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja, Western Sirmium [Zapadni Srem], and others who may declare that they wished to stay,” subject to confirmation by a plebiscite.
475	P500	Assembly sessions were often attended by the President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, other members of the Presidency, Ministers of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, members of the SDS Main Board, presidents of municipalities, and representatives of the Orthodox clergy.
476	P501	Chaired by a President (Speaker) and two vice-presidents, [the Bosnian Serb Assembly] could adopt laws and determine the budget and territorial organization of the Republic.
477	P502	Regardless of who initiated the legislation, the body officially proposing it would always be the Government.
478	P503	The Assembly President had the power to propose the agenda of Assembly sessions and to convene the Assembly at his initiative, or upon demand of the Bosnian-Serb Government or one-third of the deputies of the Assembly.
479	P504	Following the establishment of the VRS on 12 May 1992, Generals Ratko Mladić, Milan Gvero, and Momir Talić, as well as Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, would also often attend. They, together with other military officials, would address the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on the strategic situation and proposed plans of action. The deputies were regularly informed about the political and military situation by Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and [Momcilo Krajišnik].
480	P505	In its early days, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly was composed of 82 deputies. All but seven were SDS members. Other parties represented in the Bosnian-Serb Assembly were the Reformist Party, the former Communist League, and the Serb Renewal Movement.
481	P506	[T]he activities of the Assembly were supported financially by the SDS.
482	P507	The Assembly’s composition and operating methods thus ensured that the decision making process was heavily influenced by SDS policy. [Momčilo Krajišnik], both as President of the Assembly and as a prominent member of the SDS, played an important role in effecting the SDS’s influence over the Bosnian-Serb Assembly.
483	P508	Twenty-three sessions of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly were held between October 1991 and December 1992. The evidence shows that all were chaired by Momčilo Krajišnik, except for the 15th session (held on 6 and 7 April 1992), when at least part of the session was chaired by Milovan Milanović. Deputies attending these sessions came from the following municipalities: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Brčko, Čajniče, Čelinac, Doboј, Donji Vakuf, Foča, Gacko, Sarajevo, Ključ, Kalinovik, Kotor Varoš, Nevesinje, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Teslić, and Zvornik.

484	P509	The SDS leadership resolved to start requesting loyal officials in republican organs to report along party lines. In September and October 1991, SDS officials and top-ranking personnel of republican (Bosnia-Herzegovina) organs met to exchange information and establish coordination and cooperation between SDS members in various organs. They adopted a resolution to set up a duty system in order to monitor activities, implementation of tasks in state organs, day-to-day problem management in different fields and serve as a liaison with the SDS."
485	P510	Already on 18 October 1991 Radovan Karadžić, as president of SDS, had declared a state of emergency in the SDS and ordered the organization of daily meetings of the SDS municipal boards and round-the-clock duty watches, indicating that instructions would follow on a daily basis.
486	P511	On 21 November 1991, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly adopted a resolution declaring full support for the JNA in defence of the common state of Yugoslavia and in conducting mobilization of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to reinforce military units. The resolution added: "Serbian people and other people who wish to preserve Yugoslavia are called upon to respond to military call-ups".
487	P512	On 21 November 1991, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly certified the proclamation of the SAOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Autonomous Region of Krajina had its seat in Banja Luka and comprised the following municipalities: Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Čelinac, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, "as well as parts of other municipalities from this region with a majority Serbian population".
488	P513	It soon became clear to the Bosnian-Serb leadership that the creation of a parallel Assembly and the calls for support of federal institutions (primarily the JNA) would most likely not result in Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining in Yugoslavia.
489	P514	Between November and December 1991, therefore, the SDS leadership began practical preparations for a separate state, should Bosnia-Herzegovina secede.
490	P515	A letter signed by Momčilo Krajišnik as President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 19 December 1991, addressed to the government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (on the territory of Croatia), reflected not only the shared goal that all Serbs live in one state, but also the idea that Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were, even as minorities, on territory which historically belonged to them.
491	P516	On 2 December 1991 Herbert Okun and Cyrus Vance met with Radovan Karadžić in Belgrade. Karadžić expressed his concern that Bosnia-Herzegovina would become independent. He strongly advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia as a federal state, in order to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs would not become a minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
492	P517	At the third session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, held on 11 December 1991, a recommendation was passed that separate (Serb) municipal assemblies should be formed in areas where Serbs were in the minority.
493	P518	In early 1992, while international negotiations to resolve the question of the status of BiH were ongoing, the Bosnian Serb leadership enforced its plan to separate the territories claimed by them from the existing structures of the SRBiH and to create a separate Bosnian Serb State.
494	P519	On 9 January 1992, the SerBiH Assembly proclaimed the SerBiH, which on 12 August 1992 was renamed Republika Srpska ("RS"). It was composed of so-called Serbian autonomous regions and districts, which included the ARK.

495	P521	In March 1992, the Assembly of Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina promulgated the Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and proclaimed itself a distinct republic.
496	P522	The March 1992 Assembly session was transmitted live on television.
497	P523	On 19 December 1991, the Main Board of the SDS issued a document entitled “Instructions for the Organisation and Activity of Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances” (“Variant A and B Instructions”). These instructions provided for the conduct of specified activities in all municipalities in which Serbs lived, and essentially mapped out the takeover of power by Bosnian Serbs in municipalities where they constituted a majority of the population (“Variant A”) and where they were in a minority (“Variant B”).
498	P524	The instructions contemplated two levels of preparation for Serb takeovers according to whether the municipality fell within Variant A or Variant B. Within Variant A, at the first level, the SDS municipal boards were to form Crisis Staffs and establish Serb municipal assemblies and begin preparations for taking over the security organs. The second level called for the mobilisation of Serb police and their subordination into the JNA, the mobilisation of TO and JNA reserve forces, and the takeover of the security and municipal organs. The second level of Variant B instructed the election of Serb officials to posts within the local Serb Assemblies, same mobilisation of Serb police and their cooperation with the JNA, and the same mobilisation of the JNA reserves and TOs “through competent organs”.
499	P525	The stated purpose of the Variant A and B Instructions was “to carry out the results of the plebiscite at which the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to live in a single state” and to “increase mobility and readiness for the defence of the interests of the Serbian people”.
500	P527	The Variant A and B Instructions included, amongst others, the directive that the SDS Municipal Boards should form Crisis Staffs of the Serbian people in their respective municipalities. The “tasks, measures and other activities” referred to in the Variant A and B Instructions were to be carried out exclusively at the order of the President of the SDS.
501	P528	[T]he existence of ‘Serbian municipalities’ was declared even in municipalities where the SDS did not have overall control (“Variant B municipalities”).
502	S11-BiH	The “first stage” of Variant A, applicable in municipalities with Serbs in the majority, includes the following instructions: The SDS municipal board shall immediately form a crisis staff of the Serbian people in the municipality, to be composed of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - all members of the secretariat of the SDS municipal board; - municipal officials who are also SDS nominees in the following organs: president of the municipal assembly or president of the municipal executive committee; chief of the public security station or commander of the police; commander or chief of the municipal territorial defence staff; secretary of the municipal national defence secretariat or another SDS-nominated official from the secretariat; - assemblymen in the Assembly of the Serbian people of BH; members of the Main Board of the SDS of BH from the municipality in question.

503	S12-BiH	The Instructions set out a number of other actions to be taken at the municipal level: convene and proclaim an assembly of the Serbian people in the municipality ... carry out preparations for the setting up of state organs in the municipality (executive committee, administrative organs, magistrates' court, public security station, etc.) and propose individuals for posts and duties in these organs. Prepare the take-over of staff, facilities and equipment of security services centres and their incorporation into the newly established internal affairs organ ... Upgrade the protection and security of vital buildings and facilities in the municipality ... Make an estimate of the necessary size of active and reserve police forces, TO units, and civil Defence units; on the basis of the estimate, these structures shall be reinforced and other necessary measures shall be taken for their activation, as may be required by further developments. The order to activate these units shall be issued by the crisis staff in each municipality ... carry out preparations (create organisational means and other conditions) for: ... reinforcing combat units as classified by the JNA with manpower as well as inventoried materiel and livestock, according to federal regulations, based on the Serbian principles of fairness and humanity, with SDS officials, other leaders and distinguished Serbs serving as personal examples; the protection of material resources important for defence and resistance, as well as for the survival and activities of the population.
504	S13-BiH	The main actions of the second stage include the establishment of state organs in the municipality; the mobilization of all Serb members of the police forces in cooperation with "JNA commands and staffs"; the implementation of orders to mobilize reserve JNA forces and TO units; the assumption of control over public finances; and the take-over of the staff, premises, and equipment of the security services.
505	S14-BiH	The second stage of Variant A also includes the following instruction: "In the implementation of all these measures, ensure respect for the national and other rights of members of all peoples and, subsequently, ensure their involvement in the administrative authorities to be set up by the assembly of the Serbian people in the municipality."
506	S15-BiH	The instructions forming part of the first stage of Variant B, relating to municipalities where Serbs did not constitute a majority, are substantially the same as those relating to Variant A, including the membership in the crisis staffs. The only significant difference in the first stage of Variant B is the instruction qualifying the actions for setting up state organs in the municipality, which states: "Ensure proportionate representation in government organs of members of other nations and nationalities who have expressed their loyalty to federal Yugoslavia."
507	S16-BiH	The instructions forming part of the first stage of Variant B, relating to municipalities where Serbs did not constitute a majority, are substantially the same as those relating to Variant A, including the membership in the crisis staffs. The only significant difference in the first stage of Variant B is the instruction qualifying the actions for setting up state organs in the municipality, which states: "Ensure proportionate representation in government organs of members of other nations and nationalities who have expressed their loyalty to federal Yugoslavia."
508	S17-BiH	The Instructions have a general section on their mode of implementation. This requires the crisis staff to "obtain and respect expressions of loyalty (in written form, if possible) to the constitutional order and judicial system of the federal state of Yugoslavia by citizens of other nationalities." Implementation of the Instructions was to be "in accordance with the federal constitution, federal laws and other federal regulations, as well as regulations issued by the Republic, when these do not conflict with federal regulations."

509	P529	The composition of the municipal Crisis Staffs in 1992 was designed to ensure that they not only had authority in the eyes of the general public, but also that they were able to ensure implementation of their decisions.
510	P530	Members of municipal Crisis Staffs included the respective President of the Municipal Assembly or the President of the Municipal Executive Committee (Variant A) or the President of the SDS Municipal Board (Variant B), the commander of the Municipal TO staff, and the Chief of the police.
511	P531	[T]he [Variant A and B] Instructions were received and implemented, fully or partially, in several municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
512	P532	Karadžić also referred to their implementation in the weeks following 20 December 1991.
513	P533	Preparations for take-over in municipalities started immediately after the Instructions were announced. On 21 December 1991 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly appointed a coordinator of the work of governments and executive bodies of the SAOs, Jovan Čizmović, who was tasked with, among other things, the implementation of the 19 December Instructions.
514	S36-BiH	Calls to take over territories and create a Serb-dominated state in Bosnia-Herzegovina became strong and distinct in the Bosnian-Serb Assembly beginning in January 1992. At the Assembly session of 26 January 1992, a member of the Ministerial council, Jovan Čizmović, addressed Krajišnik as Assembly President: "Taking the constitutional and legal status of the peoples as a starting point, it is both politically and legally correct to allow all peoples to create their own sovereign and independent states on the basis of the right of each people to self-determination and an absolute respect of the will of all other peoples, and not on the basis of a unilateral act and by the use of force. To solve this problem, I propose that we begin with an urgent operationalization and a declaration on the establishment and promulgation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tasks set out in the instructions of 19 December 1991 should be carried out."
515	P534	On 21 December 1991 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly adopted a statement pointing out that the decisions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency in favour of independence were taken unconstitutionally and contrary to the equality of the three ethnicities. It also decided "to commence preparations for the establishment of the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal unit within Yugoslavia", despite the fact that, by that time, [Slobodan] Milošević had informed Radovan Karadžić and [Momčilo Krajišnik] that the international community intended to foster an independent, federal, Bosnia-Herzegovina and that Yugoslavia would only consist of Serbia and Montenegro.
516	P535	The deputies proceeded to establish a Ministerial Council, which was to act under the Assembly. Vitomir Žepinić and Mićo Stanišić, high-level officials in the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP, were named to the Council, the former as Minister of Internal Affairs and the latter as Minister without portfolio. The proclamation of a Bosnian-Serb Republic was set for 14 January 1992. Radovan Karadžić suggested that a solution to the crisis might lie in the creation of three entities, each with ties to different states.
517	P536	On 9 January 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously proclaimed "the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina". [...] The implementation of the proclamation was conditional upon the recognition of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the international community. Nevertheless, the SDS-backed arming of the Serb population during this period shows that the Bosnian-Serb leadership was also simultaneously preparing for another course of action.

518	P537	On 11 January 1992 Radovan Karadžić and [Momčilo Krajišnik] attended the first meeting of the Bosnian-Serb Ministerial Council, where they participated in a discussion on “execution of tasks resulting from the Declaration ... of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina” which had been adopted two days earlier. The list of priorities identified at the meeting included definition of Bosnian-Serb ethnic territory and the establishment of government organs in that territory. Following this meeting, Bosnian-Serb authorities moved ahead with the organization of a separate Serb MUP. This meeting shows the officialization of the SAOs within the structure of the nascent Serb state: SAO presidents were made ex officio members of the Ministerial Council.
519	P538	During [January 1992], the SDS started contemplating military conflict as a likelihood, and no longer as a mere possibility. Thus, arming and mobilization of the population in cooperation with the JNA increased.
520	S20-BiH	A confidential document, contextually dated January or early February 1992, from the “organs of the Republic of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina” to the JNA chief of the Main Staff in Belgrade and the commanders of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts (covering Bosnia-Herzegovina and small areas of Croatia), noted that the Bosnian-Serb Assembly had decided to “institutionalize” a situation, in which the “Serbian territories” of Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain in federal Yugoslavia. The document stated that this was to be done through peaceful means, but went on to note that the organs of the Bosnian-Serb Republic were soon to establish full control over these Serb territories, and requested various forms of assistance from the JNA in this respect. First, the “organs” requested the JNA to assign officers to assist municipal TOs, SJBs, and CSBs, and to supply materiel, including weapons, ammunition, vehicles, helicopters, communications equipment, and uniforms, all of which was required by 20 February 1992 at the latest. Second, the “organs” asked the JNA to support them in taking over “Serbian territories in [Bosnia-Herzegovina] that remain part of Yugoslavia”. The requested support included deploying JNA units to positions, from which they could protect the borders of Serb territories and preparations for providing rapid assistance in establishing control of territory by securing important areas. The “deadline” for completion of tasks in relation to the second request was 25 February. In their turn, the “organs” undertook to enlist volunteers through municipal organs, and to designate persons (municipal presidents and TO commanders) to coordinate cooperation and joint operations with the JNA – a list with the phone numbers of these persons was to be provided to JNA Military District commands.
521	P539	On 13 February 1992 [Momčilo] Mandić directed the Security Services Centre chiefs in Banja Luka, Doboj, and Goražde, the Public Security Station heads in Nevesinje, Sokolac, and Bijeljina, and the chief of the SUP in Sarajevo to prepare for the Serb MUP. Part of the preparation for separation included the arming of Serb police officers and Serb police stations. The Security Services Centres and Public Security Stations reassigned stockpiled weapons belonging to the reserve police force to the new Serb MUP.
522	P540	On or about 12 February 1992 a meeting of representatives of three SAOs was held in Doboj, which [Radovan] Karadžić, [Momčilo Krajišnik], and Maksimović attended. During the meeting, an exchange of population was discussed to achieve territorial continuity between Croatian and Bosnian Krajina, on the one side, and Semberija and Serbia proper, on the other.

523	S21-BiH	By 23 February 1992, representatives of the SDS (among them Karadžić and Krajišnik) and of the other two national groups had agreed on a statement of principles for a new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to this statement, the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would keep its external borders. It would become an independent state made up of three constituent units which would group municipalities according to the nationality principle based on the last three censuses (1971, 1981, and 1991). Freedom of movement would be allowed only within each unit, while resettlement from one unit to another would be subject to a "special permit".
524	P541	On [28 February 1992], the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously adopted the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with a Government Act, a Law on Defence, and a Law on Internal Affairs. The Constitution defined the Bosnian-Serb Republic as part of federal Yugoslavia, and not of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
525	S22-BiH	After the republican referendum that took place on 29 February and 1 March 1992, and due to the fact that the Yugoslav leadership had by then clearly expressed its position to SDS leaders that a Bosnian-Serb entity would not be allowed to be part of the new Yugoslavia in the near future, negotiations persisted, but mainly turned on the nature of what an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina would be like (unitary or federal) and what the division of power among the entities would be.
526	S23-BiH	For example, on 11 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly decided to continue international negotiations on a confederative arrangement for the three national groups, albeit on its own terms. Krajišnik, Karadžić, Koljević, Plavšić, Buha, and Maksimović remained members of the negotiating delegation. In response to an invitation from José Cutileiro, international mediator, to continue the multi-party negotiations, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously rejected a draft of constitutional arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During that session, Krajišnik tabled a proposal that the Bosnian-Serb delegates would continue the negotiations, subject to the restriction that the negotiators, at a minimum, seek to preserve Yugoslavia or pursue "three sovereign national states which may be linked up on the confederal principle." Both the proposal and the restriction were adopted by the Assembly.
527	S37-BiH	In early 1992, respect for the interests of other peoples was still being expressed by Karadžić, as separation and homogenization were not yet the declared aim of the nascent leadership. In a 1994 speech to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, Karadžić remarked upon the benefits that had accrued to the Bosnian Serbs from the early establishment of a de facto overall Bosnian-Serb authority: "we won the battle for our Republic on 18 March [1992] ... thanks to Mr. Krajišnik's skills. We were talking all the time. ... The international community made a huge mistake by sending Cutileiro and Carrington to see us before the war and by accepting us as a party in the conflict. If they had ignored us, kept silent and acknowledged Bosnia and then said afterwards that some rebels were overthrowing their own state, we would have faced difficult problems; nobody would have talked to us."
528	S38-BiH	As Karadžić recalled in his 1994 speech, the battle for the Republic began on 18 March 1992, the day on which the Bosnian-Serb leadership, specifically Krajišnik, made known to the Assembly deputies its wish to pre-emptively take over territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while separating the Bosnian Serbs from the other two ethnic groups.

529	S24-BiH	On 24 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly elected Branko Đerić as Prime Minister, and he was sworn in on the same day. The Bosnian-Serb Assembly proceeded to instruct the new Government to prepare, by 27 March, an operational plan for assuming power, that is, for establishing power in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular in the field of internal affairs, national defence and money transactions ... in all municipalities where Serbian authorities already existed, and in those municipalities where only recently established Serbian municipalities existed.
530	S25-BiH	On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly also issued a decision verifying the proclamation of various Serb municipalities. From April 1992, Bosnian Serbs implemented the take-over of municipalities. [...] [B]y this time, the Bosnian-Serb leadership was increasingly losing its confidence in diplomatic efforts, into which Krajišnik and the other negotiators had invested so much of their political capital.
531	P542	On 6 April 1992 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by the European Community. The next day, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, chaired by Milovan Milanović, declared the independence of the Bosnian-Serb Republic (on 12 August 1992, the name of the republic was changed to “Republika Srpska”). Plavšić and Koljević resigned from their positions in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 17 April Radovan Karadžić called upon all employees of Serb ethnicity, appointed by the SDS to serve in institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to withdraw from their positions and to be reappointed in the corresponding Bosnian-Serb institutions.
532	P543	In the first days of April 1992, following international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state and the beginning of the conflict, the Bosnian-Serb leadership relocated to Pale, about 20 kilometers from Sarajevo.
533	P544	The Kikinda Hotel [in Pale] functioned as the seat of the Bosnian-Serb institutions (Assembly, Presidency, Government) until June 1992.
534	P545	[T]he Government moved to the Bistrica Hotel on Mount Jahorina. [Momčilo Krajišnik] remained in the Kikinda Hotel, as did Koljević, Plavšić, and Karadžić. By the end of July 1992, Biljana Plavšić moved to Mount Jahorina.
535	P546	[M]ilitary telecommunication lines were used to share information and transmit orders between Pale and local authorities.
536	P547	In April 1992, Nikola Koljević proposed to JNA colonel Bogdan Subotić that he set up a Bosnian-Serb Ministry of Defence. Branko Đerić and the Assembly were aware of this approach. Subotić accepted the assignment, moved to Pale, and with the assistance of the SFRY Ministry of Defence, started organizing the Ministry and preparing drafts of the Law on Defence and Law on the Army. These drafts were eventually adopted by the Government and submitted to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. The Ministry’s central office was located at the Bistrica Hotel and consisted of approximately 30 staff members. Branches of the Ministry existed in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and Sarajevo. Since communication was often disrupted in the first months, local military detachments were asked to dispatch messages through deputies traveling to Pale for Assembly sessions.
537	P548	A collective presidency was to be formed in time of war or imminent threat of war to replace a municipal assembly, and was to remain in existence until the assembly was able to reconvene.
538	P549	This war presidency, consisting of the municipal assembly leadership and some additional members, was accorded extraordinary powers in dealing with situations of war or imminent threat of war.
539	P550	The 1984 Law on All-People’s Defence provided for “operational and policy” committees. These committees were to consist of municipal leaders, the JNA, the TO, and the secretariats of national defence and internal affairs.

540	P551	The main function of a committee of this kind was to lead resistance in case of foreign occupation and act within the competence of government organs that were not able to function at the time.
541	P552	The crisis staffs that came into being in the Bosnian-Serb Republic in late 1991 and early 1992 were created without reference to [the 1974 Constitution and the 1984 Law on All-People's Defence]. Instead, they started out as SDS organs and were only later transformed into organs of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.
542	P553	The SDS crisis staffs in the Bosnian-Serb Republic were all fully set up and operational by April or May 1992
543	P554	Once [the SDS crisis staffs] became municipal organs they functioned as the municipal authority when municipal assemblies could not operate due to the state of emergency, replacing both the municipal assembly and the executive committee.
544	P555	As the leading governing body in the municipality, the crisis staffs exercised control over civilian, military, and paramilitary affairs.
545	P556	In addition, throughout the period of their existence, the crisis staffs functioned as the coordinating body between municipal authorities, the SDS, and the central republican level (both state and SDS) on the one side, and the military, the police, and other forces on the ground in the municipalities, on the other.
546	P557	On 24 February 1992, the SDS Executive Board assigned "coordinators" for the ARK and the different SAOs. Among other tasks, these coordinators were to ensure the implementation of decisions of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly and the Bosnian-Serb Government and to take part in the work of the regional crisis staffs.
547	P558	The crisis staffs were transformed from SDS organs to republican organs with the public announcement of 4 April 1992, in which the SNB ordered their activation and instructed that the TO and reserve police be put in readiness.
548	P559	On 26 April 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Government issued a plan concerning the functioning of crisis staffs in the municipalities: "In the conditions of war, the Crisis Staff shall take over all the prerogatives and functions of municipal assemblies when they are not able to convene ... The Crisis Staffs shall collect information on the situation in the field and notify and consult competent authorities of the Serbian BiH, that is commissioners of the Government who shall be appointed especially for the communities and areas threatened by the war ... The Crisis Staffs shall ... prepare weekly reports which shall be submitted to the regional and state organs of the Serbian BiH."
549	P560	Members of the SDS Main Board but, in particular, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly deputies "were the link from the republic level to the municipal".
550	P561	Their role was to transfer authority from the central to the municipal level, and also to convey information between those two levels.
551	P562	The central republican level ensured that the members of the crisis staffs would include at least one Assembly deputy. By prescribing the membership of crisis staffs in this way, the central republican bodies and the Bosnian-Serb leadership exercised a substantial amount of control over them and were able to exert central influence on the municipal level.
552	P563	The Bosnian Serb leadership saw the crisis staffs as an extension of the leadership's authority in the municipalities. For example, the Bosnian Serb leadership, through the party or the republican organs, issued direct orders or instructions both to crisis staffs in general and to individual crisis staffs, and these were received and acted upon. The crisis staffs themselves would cite orders and decisions from regional and central organs as the basis for their actions.

553	P564	On 15 April 1992, in pursuance of this goal of subordination and centralization of power, the Bosnian-Serb Government and the SNB concluded that the political leaderships of all the SAOs should be notified that cooperation and all contacts between them were to be conducted through the central organs of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.
554	P565	Other examples of attempts at centralization exist. The central authorities would support the crisis staffs materially, in the form of loans, direct funding, and material, including weapons and ammunition. Such support was often requested by the crisis staffs.
555	P566	The crisis staffs would report on their activities to the Bosnian-Serb leadership, although not necessarily formally or in written form.
556	P567	Reflecting the conflation of state and party organs, such reporting was sometimes done via the SDS Main Board, sometimes via the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, sometimes via individual leaders such as Karadžić or [Momčilo Krajišnik], and sometimes directly to the Bosnian-Serb Presidency.
557	P568	In June 1992, in order to further centralize the power and streamline its authority, the Bosnian-Serb leadership pursued efforts to transform the municipal crisis staffs first into war presidencies and then, later, into war commissions. The three were, however, essentially the same body.
558	P569	One distinction between them was that while the crisis staffs were meant to be replacing the municipal assemblies only, the war presidencies and war commissions were to replace both the assembly and the executive committee. There might not have been any practical difference, however, since the crisis staffs already acted as executive organs.
559	P570	On 31 May 1992, war presidencies were formed in the municipalities. The war presidencies were to consist of the president of the municipal assembly or another prominent figure in the municipality and "a representative of the Republic".
560	P571	This representative was in fact the commissioner mentioned in the Bosnian-Serb Government instructions.
561	P572	One representative could cover several municipalities "in conformity with the organization of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
562	P573	This was essentially an exercise in renaming municipal crisis staffs and changing their name to "war presidencies", without altering their membership.
563	P574	On 1 June 1992, the Constitution of the Bosnian-Serb Republic was amended by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency to allow war presidencies at both the republican and municipal levels.
564	P575	It was clear from this amendment that the power to form the municipal war presidencies, as well as "the manner, composition and competence" of these, was a prerogative of the Bosnian-Serb Presidency.
565	P576	The decision to establish war presidencies was acted upon in some municipalities.
566	P577	In order to further tighten the central grip over the municipalities, the Bosnian-Serb Presidency decided to replace municipal war presidencies with war commissions.
567	P578	[O]n 10 June 1992, [the Bosnian-Serb Presidency] issued an official decision establishing war commissions. The war commissions were to consist of "four members from the ranks of the most influential citizens within the crisis staff, the economy and the ruling party" and a "state commissioner", appointed by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency. The state commissioner was responsible for appointing municipal war commissions and providing them with his expertise and other assistance.

568	P579	A list of commissioners was drawn up on the same day and included Dragan Đokanović, Nikola Poplašen, Milimir Mučibabić, Miroslav Radovanović, Jovan Tintor, and Danilo Veselinović. Soon thereafter, Dragan Đokanović was appointed state commissioner for Zvornik, Vlasenica, Skelani, Bratunac, Šekovići, and Novo Sarajevo.
569	P580	Once a state commissioner was appointed he or she would appoint the remaining members of the war commission, which would then have to be confirmed by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency.
570	P581	The exact setting up and transformation from crisis staff, to war presidency, to war commission varied from municipality to municipality. Some of the factors determining this variation were location, time, and personalities. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the fact that many state commissioners were appointed by the Presidency, and sometimes even [Momčilo Krajišnik] himself, the main role of the war commissions was to keep the Presidency and the Bosnian-Serb Assembly informed about the situation on the ground.
571	P582	The relationship between crisis staffs and the various military forces present in the municipalities (JNA units, the TO, paramilitary units, and the VRS), differed from municipality to municipality. At a minimum, however, the relationship involved a coordinating and supporting role for the crisis staffs. In at least one municipality, Zvornik, the local JNA commander was listed as member of the crisis staff.
572	P583	Generally there was a progression from SDS-formed military units to infantry units under the command of the crisis staffs, to full VRS control of military units by mid-June 1992.
573	P584	Thus, the crisis staffs filled the gap between the withdrawal, disintegration, or general failure of command structures within the JNA, and the establishment of a VRS with effective control of the armed forces on the ground.
574	P585	At the time when the SDS crisis staffs were being formed, the JNA was the dominant military structure in the municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
575	P586	The Zvornik SDS municipal board elected a crisis staff for the municipality, consisting of leading SDS persons from Zvornik, as well as the municipal command staff of the JNA.
576	P587	In a formal sense no other relationship existed, however, in practice, the military presence in the crisis staffs ensured a high degree of commonality of purpose.
577	P588	At the Bosnian-Serb Assembly session of 27 March 1992, Karadžić recommended that TO units formed by the crisis staffs should, where possible, be placed under the command of the JNA. Some of these units were integrated into the JNA, while other existing Bosnian-Serb forces were integrated into the TO.
578	P589	As the municipal defence force, the TO came to have close links with the crisis staffs. Many crisis staffs appointed and dismissed municipal TO commanders and received reports from TO units.
579	P590	In some cases, crisis staffs issued orders to the TO on military matters. On a few occasions crisis staffs or their members assumed a very direct military role and got involved in military activities.
580	P591	Crisis staffs also provided various forms of general assistance to the TO, calling for mobilization within their municipalities and providing financial assistance.

581	P592	Once the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina they all became part of the VRS. Thus, even though the local TOs had certain autonomy prior to the establishment of the VRS, soon after they were subordinated to the Presidency. Nevertheless, the local crisis staffs were often responsible for logistical support to the TO.
582	P593	The contacts between municipal crisis staffs and paramilitary units varied from municipality to municipality.
583	P594	The crisis staff of Ilijaš municipality invited Arkan's men to come to its assistance. The crisis staff in the municipality of Ilidža also had extensive dealings with various paramilitary groups, including Arkan's men, and Nedjeljko Prstojević, the president of the Ilidža crisis staff, was visited by Vojislav Šešelj several times.
584	P595	In some cases the municipal authorities extended financial and logistical support to paramilitary groups operating in the municipality. Other examples show that paramilitary units on certain occasions worked together with the TO, under the command or supervision of the municipal crisis staffs, on specific military tasks. There are however also examples of municipal authorities attempting to ban paramilitary groups from acting in the municipality.
585	P596/P597	With the establishment of the VRS, the central role envisioned for the crisis staffs when it came to defence became less pertinent, as the aim was then to place all armed forces under the unified command of the Main Staff of the VRS. Coordination and contacts between crisis staffs and the armed forces continued, however.
586	P598	The relationship between the crisis staffs and the police was much closer than the relationship between the crisis staffs and the army. Some crisis staffs were active in setting-up Serb police forces in the municipality, including appointing and dismissing police officers.
587	P599	Crisis Staffs were formed in the Serb Autonomous Regions to assume government functions and carry out general municipal management.
588	P600	Members of the Crisis Staffs included SDS leaders, the JNA Commander for the area, Serb police officials, and the Serb TO Commander.
589	P601	Lieutenant-General Momir Talić, Commander of the 5th Corps (which became the 1st Krajina Corps), was a member of the Crisis Staff in Banja Luka ("ARK Crisis Staff"). The ARK Crisis Staff, which had jurisdiction over opština Prijedor, was established in April or May 1992 as an organ of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.
590	P602	The statute of the Autonomous Region of Krajina provided for the creation of Crisis Staffs in the case of war or immediate danger of war.
591	P603	Municipal Crisis Staff meetings were regularly attended by representatives of the army.
592	P604	The municipal Crisis Staffs resembled SDS shadow governments, as they included SDS members for most leading positions in the municipalities.
593	P605	Between the end of December 1991 and April 1992, the SDS increased its preparations to take over political power at the municipal level in areas earmarked for incorporation into the new Bosnian Serb state.
594	P606	On 11 December 1992, the SerBiH Assembly adopted the recommendations on the establishment of municipal assemblies of the Serbian people in BiH in those municipalities where Bosnian Serbs were in a minority.

595	P607	In early May, after the official decision on its establishment was taken by the Executive Council of Krajina, the ARK Crisis Staff took over all powers of the government and other agencies. It was the highest-level decisionmaker in the Autonomous Region of Krajina and its decisions had to be implemented throughout the Autonomous Region of Krajina by means of municipal Crisis Staffs.
596	P608	The municipal Crisis Staffs had to report to the ARK Crisis Staff daily regarding the steps taken to implement the decisions of the Main Board located in Banja Luka
597	P609	On 27 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly established the National Security Council. Radovan Karadžić performed the role of the president of the National Security Council between 27 March and early May 1992, even though he was not the President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic at the time.
598	P610	Ex officio members of the SNB also included the President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly ([Momčilo Krajišnik]) and the Bosnian-Serb Republic's Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Defence and Interior.
599	P611	By early April 1992, the SNB developed into an executive organ issuing instructions to, and receiving reports from, municipal crisis staffs and TOs. [T]he SNB would meet in joint sessions with the Bosnian-Serb Government for the purpose of taking decisions on military, political, and administrative matters.
600	P614	Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, as elected Serb members of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Presidency, became <i>ipso facto</i> members of this collective body, [the SNB].
601	P615	The SBosnian SerbĆ Government sat for the first time as an independent executive body, distinct from the SNB, at its 13th session on 23 May 1992.
602	P616	In the course of 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Government held around 90 sessions. Nedeljko Lakić, secretary of the Government from 27 April 1992 onwards, would see Prime Minister Đerić about twice a week and would liaise with him and other Ministers to organize the sessions. After each session, Lakić would write the minutes of the meetings, and show them to Đerić. Legislative proposals were forwarded to the Assembly, while decisions within the competence of the Government were published in the Official Gazette.
603	P619	By early May 1992, the Government had at its disposal in Pale a Republican Information Centre which connected with regional communication centres in the Bosnian-Serb territory. It operated 24 hours per day and had five employees. By June 1992, written reports, as well as dozens of telegrams, were received daily by the Centre and sent on to the intended recipients. Most of those were addressed to the Presidency, the Government, "units and institutions in Pale", and "units in Sokolac". Some of the delivered documents were long and confidential.
604	P620	On 8 May 1992, the [Bosnian Serb] Government established a Central Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War and Arrested Persons.
605	P621	As part of that role the Commission was to differentiate between civilians and prisoners of war, with a view to releasing the former and preventing crisis staffs or paramilitary formations from committing crimes against the latter. In practice, however, exchanges of prisoners were left to the authority of the individual exchange commissions in each region.
606	P622	In accordance with the Bosnian-Serb Constitution, the President of the Republic would represent the Bosnian-Serb Republic.

607	P623	The President was the commander-in-chief of the Army, with authority to define the Army's organization, establish the system of Army command, prepare the Army for war, and issue basic regulations related to combat.
608	P624	In contrast to the situation in peace time, when the President could merely propose laws, in a state of war or immediate threat of war, the President, on his or her own initiative, could enact laws on questions falling within the jurisdiction of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, subject to confirmation by the Assembly as soon as it was able to reconvene.
609	P625	On 12 May 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly passed a constitutional law instituting a three-member Presidency until a President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic could be elected by the people. Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, and Biljana Plavšić were appointed to the Presidency on that same day.
610	P626	[O]n 12 May [1992], the Presidency held its first session, and Karadžić was elected President of the Presidency, thus becoming the President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. The President was bestowed with the authority to appoint, promote, and discharge military officers, military judges, and military prosecutors.
611	P627	Following the establishment of the Presidency, the last reported meeting of the SNB took place on 15 May 1992. The SNB was effectively replaced by the Presidency.
612	P628	The sessions of the Presidency were regularly attended by five persons, namely, Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Branko Đerić, and [Momčilo Krajišnik]. The three members of the Presidency envisaged by the Constitution, that is, Karadžić, Koljević, and Plavšić, never once met alone. [Momčilo Krajišnik] was present at all recorded official sessions in 1992, except possibly for one.
613	P629	The sessions were informal and were usually chaired by Karadzic or, in his absence, [Momčilo Krajišnik]. Members of the Bosnian-Serb Government, such as Minister of Defence Subotić, participated when a particular topic within their field of competence was discussed. Occasionally, people from municipal authorities also attended, as did lawyers, experts, and military officials.
614	P631	[T]he Presidency was well informed about the overall situation in the Republic. Indeed, it was generally the members of the Presidency, often Karadžić, who reported to the Assembly on the military and strategic situation in the Bosnian-Serb Republic.
615	P632	[W]hile legislative power normally rested with the Assembly, in the state of imminent threat of war, declared on 15 April 1992 during a joint session of the SNB and the Government, it was the President of the Republic who wielded legislative power. In the period between April and August 1992, the Presidency often invoked a provision of the Constitution allowing it to pass laws
616	P633	On 1 June 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Presidency amended the Constitution pursuant to its emergency powers in time of war or imminent threat of war. The amendment provided that "during a state of war" the three-member Presidency was to be expanded by two members, thus becoming an Expanded Presidency. The two additional members were to be the President of the Assembly and the Prime Minister.
617	P634	A 'Declaration of the Ending of the War' was issued by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, and signed by Momčilo Krajišnik as its President, on 17 December 1992. However, a state of war had not been officially declared by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency prior to this date.

618	P635/636	The Presidency appears to have decided not to declare a state of war. This means that the formal condition for the establishment of the Expanded Presidency was not met at any time in 1992. The Bosnian-Serb Presidency nonetheless operated in fact with five members from its inception on 12 May 1992.
619	P637	This Presidency acted as the commander-in-chief of the Bosnian-Serb Republic until 17 December 1992 when the Bosnian-Serb Assembly elected Karadžić as President of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, with Koljević and Plavšić as vice-presidents.
620	P639	The Presidency was composed entirely of SDS members, and the Assembly almost exclusively. This meant that, when the Bosnian-Serb institutions started operating, control over the SDS meant control over the policies of the Bosnian-Serb state-to-be.
621	P640	The Bosnian-Serb Government, and by extension, the Bosnian-Serb Republic, was nothing more than an agency implementing policies dictated by the leadership of the SDS under the watchful eyes and strong hands of Karadžić and [Momčilo Krajišnik].
622	P641	There were three principal governmental or quasi-governmental entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1993: the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina based in Sarajevo, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna based in Mostar and the Republika Srpska based in Pale.
623	P642	Corresponding to these governmental or quasi-governmental divisions, there were various armed forces, Military Police, civilian police, paramilitary formations and village guards operating in central Bosnia in 1992-1993 [...].
624	P643	In early 1992, the SDS disassociated itself from the legislature and government of the independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and formed the independent Serb government of Republika Srpska.
625	S31-BiH (P644)	The Bosnian-Serb Law on Internal Affairs was enacted by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 28 February 1992, on the same day that the Assembly adopted the Constitution. The law was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 1992. Article 81 of the Constitution provided for the police to be commanded by the Presidency where an imminent threat of war had been declared.
626	P645	The Law on Internal Affairs defined the internal affairs to include tasks related to public and national security and tasks related to identity cards, citizenship, and various registers. It further included provisions on public security service and national security services (previously known as the SDB).
627	P646	The new Law on Internal Affairs was based to an overwhelming extent on the 17 April 1990 Bosnia-Herzegovina Law on Internal Affairs.
628	P647	One of the differences was that the 1992 law referred to “national security” whereas the 1990 law referred to “state security”. Another difference was that the new law made reference to the MUP’s ethnic composition and invited “employees of Serbian nationality and other employees who so desire” to take employment in the MUP.
629	S32-BiH (P648)	The Bosnian-Serb MUP was to handle security affairs on behalf of the Government. In accordance with the [new Law on Internal Affairs], two divisions within the MUP executed the Ministry’s security functions: the National Security Service and the Public Security Service. The function of the former was mainly to collect intelligence and make security assessments. Its performance was to be evaluated by the President of the Republic, who would report on the agency’s work to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. The Public Security Service, on the other hand, was responsible for administrative and technical affairs related to protection from threats to state security, crime prevention, and detection and confiscation of illicit weapons; in other words, regular policing tasks.

630	P649	The 1992 law provided for five Security Services Centres (CSBs) in the Bosnian-Serb Republic: Banja Luka for the territory of the ARK; Trebinje for the SAO of Herzegovina; Doboj for the SAO of Northern Bosnia; Sarajevo for the SAO of Romanija-Birač; and Bijeljina for the SAO of Semberija.
631	P650	The [Banja Luka] CSB was divided into two principal departments, the State Security Department and the Public Security Department. The State Security Department was occupied with intelligence work. Within the Public Security Department there were several sub-sections dealing, for example, with crime, traffic, personnel, passports, and aliens.
632	P651	Each of the five CSBs was in charge of a number of Public Security Stations (SJBs) found in municipalities covered by that particular CSB.
633	P652	In this structure the SJBs would continue to play the role of the main organ of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the municipal level.
634	P653	The new law stipulated that CSBs and SJBs were to cease cooperating with the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP.
635	P654	The 1992 law extended the maximum period of allowable detention on the premises of CSBs and SJBs to three days (from the maximum of 24 hours permitted by the 1990 law).
636	P655	In addition, persons of unknown identity suspected of serious criminal offences could be detained indefinitely under the 1992 law.
637	P656	According to internal regulations, the MUP's head office was to coordinate the work of CSBs, and, in circumstances that jeopardized the security of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, to activate reserve police forces and supply police units with arms.
638	P657	In addition to tasks assigned to them by the MUP's head office, the CSBs and SJBs were to implement the regulations of municipal assemblies in connection with the maintenance of law and order.
639	P658	The Law on Internal Affairs authorized the MUP Minister to form additional police units to carry out specific tasks, if needed to preserve peace and public order
640	P659	The Minister could also limit public movement and assembly if the security of the Republic, the work of republican organs, or the freedom and rights of the citizens of the Republic were threatened, although before doing so the Minister was obliged to consult the Assembly – or, if the circumstances made it impossible to consult the Assembly, the Republic's President.
641	S33-BiH	The new law tasked all MUP personnel to “preserve the lives of people and human dignity” in the course of carrying out their duties. Moreover, it provided that “Authorized officials shall execute orders issued by the Minister, or by their immediate supervisor, given in order to carry out matters and tasks of national and public security, except when such orders are contrary to the constitution of the law.”
642	P660	Fixed and movable assets of the CSBs and SJBs in districts, parts of which had become part of SAOs, were to be transferred to the Bosnian-Serb Republic in proportion to the size of the parts separated from the districts.
643	P661	[T]he Bosnian-Serb MUP was one of the first institutions of the nascent Republic to start functioning effectively. At its session of 11 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously called for the implementation of the new Law on Internal Affairs by the Ministerial Council.

644	P662	At the next session, one week later, Radovan Karadžić predicted the imminent withdrawal of Bosnian Serbs from the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP and Miroslav Vještica, an SDS delegate from Bosanska Krupa, described the establishment of a Bosnian-Serb MUP as a precondition for Bosnian Serbs to seize control of “their territories”.
645	P663	The Law on Internal Affairs, published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 1992 was to enter into force on 31 March 1992. From that date, all CSBs and SJBs of Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout the territory of the Bosnian-Serb Republic were to stop functioning.
646	P664	On 24 March 1992, Mićo Stanišić was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs [of the RS] by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly.
647	P665	During the time that Mićo Stanišić was Minister, there were two Assistant Ministers (also referred to as Under-Secretaries) within the RS MUP: the chief of the National Security Service, Slobodan Škipina, from early April 1992 to 3 July 1992 when he was replaced by Dragan Kijac; and Čedo Kljajić, the Chief of the Public Security Administration. The Assistant Ministers in turn relied on chiefs of administration and primarily on chiefs of operative administration.
648	P666	Pursuant to Article 33 of the Law on Internal Affairs, the Ministry was to carry out the following tasks, among others: (a) directly conduct national security related activities; (b) monitor, direct, and co-ordinate the activities of the CSBs and SJBs; (c) directly participate in the protection of citizens' lives and personal security; (d) activate the reserve police upon orders from the President of the Republic; (e) supply both active and reserve police members with weapons; and (f) organise and maintain a single communications system.
649	P667	The Minister of the Interior mainly issued orders addressed to administrations, centres, stations, and units, but generally not to individuals. Although the Minister of Internal Affairs was not prohibited from ordering the SJB directly, he ordinarily would have to issue the instruction through the regional CSB.
650	P668	The RS MUP was responsible for reporting its activities to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. Mićo Stanišić was in the first place answerable to Branko Đerić, the Prime Minister at the time, and should have been accountable as a member of the RS Government to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. However, at the session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly held on 23 and 24 November 1992, Branko Đerić resigned and stated that the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice did not attend Government meetings and instead met with the President of the RS, Radovan Karadžić, and the President of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, Momčilo Krajišnik.
651	P669	On 24 March, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly instructed the Ministerial Council to prepare an operational plan for “assuming power, that is for establishing power and rendering operational the authorities in the territory of the [the Bosnian-Serb Republic] and in particular in the field of internal affairs” and to submit it to the Assembly on 27 March.
652	P670	Under Articles 14 through 16 of the Law on Internal Affairs, the Public Security Service was established to deal with all questions of public security. An Assistant Minister (Under-Secretary) of the MUP directed the division and was accountable for its operation to the Minister.

653	P671	The competencies of the Public Security Service included the immediate protection of the constitutional order, life and personal security of citizens, prevention and detection of criminal acts, tracking down and apprehension of perpetrators, maintenance of law and order, protection of certain individuals and buildings, traffic safety and specified safety activities in other fields of communication, state border controls, monitoring of temporary residences and movement of foreigners, passport control, control of weapons and ammunition, fire protection, transportation and storage of dangerous materials, and assistance in cases of natural disasters and epidemics.
654	P672	At the "pinnacle" of the RS police forces stood the MUP Special Police Detachment ("SBP"), a unit commanded by Milenko Karišik. The SBP was divided into five detachments with one detachment at each of the five CSBs in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Doboj, Sarajevo, and Trebinje, respectively.
655	S41-BiH	Elements of a Bosnian-Serb police force were already in place by 18 March 1992. [...] The Assembly promptly set up the Bosnian-Serb MUP, passing a Law on Internal Affairs on 27 March 1992, and handing the ministerial post to Mićo Stanišić. He, on 31 March 1992, distributed a press release announcing the formation of five CSBs, one for each of the self-proclaimed and territorially vaguely defined Bosnian-Serb SAOs (Krajina, Herzegovina, Northern Bosnia, Romanija-Birač, and Semberija), and ordered the affected police officers to sever their ties with the old republic and swear an oath of allegiance to the new state.
656	P673	[O]n 30 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb MUP was set up in SAO Romanija.
657	P674	On 31 March 1992, Momčilo Mandić sent a dispatch to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Minister of Interior, as well as to all SJBs, CSBs, and to the Secretary of the Bosnia-Herzegovina SUP in Sarajevo.
658	P675	On 6 April 1992, Momčilo Mandić organized the take-over of the Vraca police academy, which became the first headquarters of the new MUP and the CSB Sarajevo.
659	P676	The MUP headquarters was later moved to two locations in Pale. At the beginning of July 1992, CSB Sarajevo was moved to Lukavica.
660	P678	Reports prepared by the (Yugoslav) Federal State Security Services in March 1992 confirm formal cooperation between the Federal SUP in Belgrade and the Bosnian-Serb police in the take-over of power and maintenance of power in the territories claimed by the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
661	P681	By September 1992, the Bosnian-Serb MUP numbered 11,240 employees, which was more than the 10,195 employees in all of the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP in January 1990.
662	P682	Already in April 1992 the Bosnian-Serb MUP started establishing special police units armed with weaponry up to and including 120 mm mortars. The commander of the first Bosnian-Serb MUP special unit was Milenko Karišik.
663	P683	By 29 April, Stojan Župljanin, head of the Banja Luka CSB, had at his disposal armed combat vehicles, anti-aircraft artillery, and helicopters.
664	P684	By early May, Župljanin had established a "counter-sabotage and counter-terrorist" police unit equipped for combat and numbering 150 men who had had combat experience in Croatia.

665	P685	At the end of June 1992, the MUP noted the presence of special police units at Sokolac and Pale. By September 1992 the Special Brigade of the police had five detachments, one based at each of the five CSBs. Some SJBs, such as those in Ilidža and Novo Sarajevo, also had their own special police units.
666	P686	[O]n 16 April 1992, the Minister of Defence, Bogdan Subotić, declared that a state of imminent threat of war existed in the Bosnian-Serb Republic, and ordered full mobilization. Subotić's order allowed the authorities to take "all necessary measures appropriate to the situation."
667	P687	The measures decreed by the ARK on 4 May pursuant to Subotić's order included a general mobilization, introduction of a curfew, and a deadline of 11 May for the surrender of illegal weapons.
668	P688	These orders were disseminated to all SJBs within CSB Banja Luka.
669	P689	The MUP was responsible to the Minister of Interior which in turn was responsible, first and foremost, to the Presidency and then to the Government
670	P690	At a joint meeting of the SNB and the Bosnian-Serb Government on 22 April 1992, the MUP was directed to report daily on the situation in the territory of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.
671	P691	In a report on the work of the MUP produced at the end of June 1992, the MUP noted that the Prime Minister had received almost 60 "Bulletins of Daily Events".
672	P692	The MUP also cooperated closely with the VRS. On 15 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić ordered that all employees of the MUP organize into "war units".
673	P693	This order formalized the cooperation by explaining how MUP units should cooperate with the VRS. Mićo Stanišić authorized the CSB heads to implement these arrangements.
674	P694	Thus, in addition to the TO units and the VRS, the MUP personnel played a major role in the armed conflict of 1992, both as combatants and as the responsible organs of security in the daily lives of the population.
675	P695	There is also evidence of both cooperation at first, and then discord later, between the Bosnian-Serb MUP and paramilitary formations. The problems between the two usually started at the moment when the paramilitaries began committing crimes against Bosnian Serbs and when the MUP could not control them anymore.
676	P696	In the course of 1992, the Bosnian-Serb MUP also became heavily involved in the operation of detention centres.
677	P697	On 20 July 1992 Stojan Župljanin, head of the Banja Luka CSB and a member of the ARK war staff, explained this aspect of MUP operations to Mićo Stanišić. Župljanin noted that the processing of detainees had resulted in a three-fold categorization.
678	P698	The first comprised of persons suspected of the commission of criminal acts. The second comprised of persons suspected of aiding and abetting those in the first category. The third category comprised of "adult males concerning whom the Service has not to date gathered any security-relevant data on the basis of which these persons may be treated as hostages."
679	P699	MUP's first annual report, covering the period April to December 1992, stated that participation in combat activities stood at "1,451 police officers, on average, every day."
680	P700	The Ministry had put 6,167 police officers at the disposal of the VRS, most of them from the reserve.
681	P701	In July 1992 Radovan Karadžić issued "Guidelines on tasks, modes of action and functioning of defence forces, state organs, and all economic and social subjects of the Bosnian-Serb Republic in the state of war".

682	P702	Pursuant to the guidelines, the MUP Minister was to pass an act adjusting the internal structure of the Ministry to wartime conditions, and to issue instructions on how members of the MUP were to perform tasks and duties.
683	P703	Active and reserve police, as well as special units which would not form part of the MUP's wartime structure, were to be transferred to the Army or used for other wartime tasks.
684	P704	Minister [Mićo] Stanišić stated in several orders that his subordinates would be held responsible for not carrying out his orders, and also expressed an awareness that MUP employees had been involved in the commission of illegal acts such as theft and plunder, but no disciplinary committees or courts were ever established.
685	P705	The MUP Ministry and the Bosnian-Serb leadership would only go so far as placing those who misbehaved under the auspices of the VRS.
686	P706	MUP forces were involved in criminal activities in [Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Bratunac, Brčko, Cajniče, Čelinac, Doboj, Donji Vakuf, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Ključ, Kalinovik, Kotor Varoš, Nevesinje, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Teslić, Trnovo, Višegrad, Vlasenica, Vogošća and Zvornik]. These activities ranged from mere war profiteering to the running of detention centres where Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to ill-treatment.
687	P707	Units also participated in forcing non-Serbs to leave municipalities that ought to become "Serb" territory. Although there were some investigations, they were mostly aimed at stopping looting and the disruption of order.
688	P710	On 27 March 1992, the SerBiH Assembly established the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs ("MUP"). The legislation on the MUP came into effect on 31 March 1992, when a Minister was appointed who answered to the SerBiH Assembly.
689	S32-BiH	A Bosnian-Serb MUP was established by the end of March 1992.
690	P711	On 31 March 1992, Momčilo Mandić, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs in BiH, sent a telex to all security centres and all the public security stations around the SerBiH, informing them of the establishment of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), decision taken at a meeting of the SerBiH Assembly, held on 27 March 1992, at which the Constitution of the SerBiH was ceremonially promulgated.
691	P712	On 16 April 1992, the Ministry of National Defence of the SerBiH issued a decision on the establishment of the Territorial Defence ("TO") as an army of the SerBiH, putting the command and control of the TO with municipal, district and regional staffs, as well as the staff of the SerBiH TO. In the same decision the Ministry of National Defence of the SerBiH declared an imminent threat of war and ordered public mobilisation of the TO in the entire territory of the SerBiH. Moreover, the formation of TO staffs in the newly established Bosnian Serb municipalities was ordered.
692	P713	Cooperative links between the military and civilian authorities were also established at the regional level. These links were concentrated in the ARK Crisis Staff, of which General Major Momir Talić, Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Sajić and Major Zoran Jokić were all members. At one point or another, all three attended ARK Crisis Staff meetings. In addition, on 13 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff authorised two of its members, Vojo Kuprešanin and Predrag Radić, "to deal with all military and political issues in the territory of the ARK".
693	P714	During the spring and summer of 1992, most non-Serbs were dismissed from the police force. In doing so, the police was transformed into a Bosnian Serb force.

694	P715	The civilian police of the Republika Srpska was organised under the Ministry of Interior ("MUP"). In July 1995, Tomislav Kovač was the acting Minister of Interior. The civilian police was organised in two sections: the regular police force and the special police brigade.
695	P716	On 4 March 1992, the ARK Assembly during its 15th session adopted a decision to form the Security Services Centre of the ARK ("CSB") with its seat in Banja Luka. Stojan Župljanin was appointed Chief of the CSB.
696	P717	On 27 April 1992, the ARK Assembly issued a decision to establish a "Special Purpose Police Detachment" within the CSB.
697	P718	Public Security Centres ("CJBs") co-ordinated the activities of local Public Security Stations ("SJBs"), i.e. police stations, within their region [at least as of July 1995].
698	P719	In addition to ordinary police duties relating to law and order, some members of the regular police force also had duties within special police forces or PJP companies. PJP companies were trained for combat operations and were set up when needed. Members of the PJP Companies generally wore blue camouflage uniforms and were issued standard military weapons [at least as of July 1995].
699	P720	In accordance with the law in effect in the RS, MUP units could be resubordinated to the VRS for various purposes, including to reinforce the VRS during combat activities. When resubordinated, the MUP forces followed orders issued by the VRS [at least as of July 1995].
700	P721	[At least as of July 1995,] the commander of the VRS unit to which the MUP unit was re-subordinated and the commander of the MUP unit coordinated their work in carrying out the tasks assigned by the VRS.
701	P722	[At least as of July 1995,] MUP forces were engaged in combat operations for a specific time to carry out a precisely described task. During their resubordination, MUP forces retained their formation and could not be disintegrated or separated
702	P723	The chain of command in the security services was as follows: the service was headed on a ministerial level by the Minister of the Interior. Next in the chain of command were the regional authorities, the most relevant in this case being the Banja Luka Security Services Centre (CSB).
703	P724	In the spring of 1992, all employees in local Public Security Services ("SJBs") and other public services were required to sign an oath of loyalty to the Bosnian Serbian authorities. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who refused to sign the declaration of loyalty were dismissed. Those who accepted to sign could remain within the service.
704	P725	However, by June 1992, the policy changed. To start, all non-Serbs holding managerial positions were fired and replaced by Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were dismissed from the judiciary, local enterprises, the media, hospitals, the police forces and the army.
705	P726	By the end of 1992, almost the entire Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat community had been dismissed from their jobs. Many people who showed up for work during this period were turned back and denied access to their workplace. Generally speaking, people were sent home, told not to come back, and then fired soon thereafter.
706	P728	On 16 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić issued an order to the CSBs in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Doboje, Sarajevo, and Trebinje. In this order, Mićo Stanišić gave detailed instructions for the collection of information and documentation on crimes, including those relating to war crimes. However, Stanišić's instructions only related to "crimes against the Serbian population" and "war crimes against Serbs".

707	P729	RS MUP units participated frequently in combat operations in the period from April to December 1992. Until the establishment of the VRS on 12 May 1992, the forces within RS MUP were the only armed forces exclusively and directly controlled by the RS leadership.
708	P730	At the outset, RS MUP relied on armaments from police stations they controlled and on supplies of weapons by the JNA, the TO, and by the Federal SUP.
709	P731	Throughout the war in BiH, the MUP was considered part of the armed forces of the RS.
3.3. Creation of SAOs and Districts		
710	P733	During the first months of 1991 the SDS began to organize Serb-majority municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina into communities of municipalities, in some cases severing ties with pre-existing communities of municipalities.
711	P734	This led to the creation of the Community of Municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina on 7 April 1991, followed by the associations of Romanija, and Eastern and Old Herzegovina, both formed in May 1991.
712	P735	SDS party leaders justified the associations in terms of economic necessity. However, among the functions of the SDS assigned to the Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities was the organization of its defence in time of war or imminent threat of war. When considered together with the arming and mobilization of the Serbian population, this policy shows that the SDS was prepared to oppose even by force the possibility that Bosnia-Herzegovina would become an independent unitary state.
713	P736	The SDS party leadership, in agreement with the political establishment in Serbia, began considering options for a break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines and a realignment of component parts with neighbouring states.
714	P737	On 14 February 1991 Slobodan Milošević briefed Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and [Momčilo Krajišnik] on the stance of each of the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics with respect to maintaining a federal Yugoslavia. A few days after this meeting, Karadžić gave an interview in which he stated that, should Croatia and Slovenia secede, the “core Yugoslavia” that remained would have to adjust its borders by applying “the ethnic principle”: to the extent possible, Serb villages would remain in Yugoslavia, and Croatian villages would become part of the new Croatian state.
715	P738	By June 1991 the SDS leadership ordered SDS organs in the municipalities to prepare maps of the municipalities showing as precisely as possible, in colour, the ethnic composition of each territory.
716	P739	On 25 June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from SFRY.
717	P740	The armed conflict in Croatia commenced in the summer of 1991 and the fighting continued into the autumn. In September 1991, as part of a wider JNA operation in Croatia, the JNA 5th Corps (based in Bosnia-Herzegovina during peacetime) was mobilized and deployed in Croatia.
718	P742	The armed conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia increased animosity between the SDS, on the one hand, and the SDA and HDZ, on the other. In late August 1991 the SDS leadership began to consider the creation of a separate Serb territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a view to enabling Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia should the other national communities proceed with the creation of an independent republic. This plan envisaged the institution of separate Serb political, police, and military structures in order to institute, at a later stage, separate governmental functions uniting the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

719	P743	In July 1991 Karadžić expressed the view that the SDS, if needed, was able to create parallel state structures in a very short time.
720	P748	By autumn 1991, two political options for the settlement of the “Bosnian question” openly competed in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
721	P749	One option, espoused by the SDA and the HDZ as well as the majority of opposition parties, envisaged sovereign and internationally recognized statehood for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
722	P750	The other option, preferred by the SDS and some of the smaller parties, was that Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain within Yugoslavia.
723	P751	Each side radically opposed the other’s option, and the SDS was ready to have “Serb” territories secede from an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina if that was the only way for Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia.
724	P752	On 7 September 1991, at a meeting in Pale, the SDS issued a “Decision on promulgation of autonomous regions as unquestionable parts of the federal state of Yugoslavia and as constituent parts of the federal unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on separation of settlements of one municipality and their integration into another municipality”. During the same month the SDS implemented a policy of “regionalization”. This consisted in the creation of “regions” in which Serbs were the relative majority. On 16 September the SDS Executive Board approved the appointment of a regionalization staff.
725	P754	The SDS established Bosnian Serb controlled areas by linking Bosnian Serb populated municipalities together and by establishing parallel government bodies, with a view to removing that territory from the effective control of the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
726	P755	In September 1991, it was announced that several Serb Autonomous Regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been proclaimed, including Krajina, Romanjija and Stara Herzegovina.
727	P756	Bosanski Krajina, as the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina was initially called, consisted of the Banja Luka region and surrounding municipalities where the Serbs constituted a clear majority.
728	S7-BiH	On 26 October 1991 all SDS presidents of the municipalities in the ARK as well as ARK government met with Radovan Karadžić. During this meeting an order was presented and “fully accepted” by those present. [...] The order consisted of fourteen points and called for, among other things, a “town command” amounting to a military administration; intensified mobilization of the TO; formation of military units; subordination of the TO to the JNA; disbanding of paramilitary units and their reassignment to the TO; take-over of public enterprises, the post office, banks, judiciary, media, and the SDK (Social Accounting Service); coordination with local directors and with the SDS in Sarajevo to ensure supplies for the population; and imposition of war taxes. The order was sent by telex on 29 October 1991 to presidents of all municipalities in the ARK by Radoslav Brđanin, in his capacity as “coordinator for implementing decisions”.
729	P759	In 1992 Radoslav Brđanin, President of the Crisis Staff of the Serb Autonomous Region of the Banja Luka area, indicated repeatedly that only a small percentage of non-Serbs would be allowed to stay in the new Bosnian Serb state. According to him, the tiny number that remained would be used for menial work and to perform physical labour generally.

730	P760	Radoslav Brđanin advocated three stages of ridding the area of non-Serbs: (1) creating impossible conditions that would have the effect of encouraging them to leave of their own accord, involving pressure and terror tactics; (2) deportation and banishment; and (3) liquidating those remaining who would not fit into his concept for the region
731	P761	By the spring of 1992 only Serb-controlled television channels and programmes were available in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was achieved by the take-over of television transmitters throughout the Serb-controlled areas, including the transmitter on Kozara Mountain which was taken over by the Wolves, a paramilitary unit.
732	P762	In consequence, by the spring of 1992 residents in Prijedor and elsewhere in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina were no longer able to receive television from Sarajevo or from Zagreb but only from Belgrade or Novi Sad in Serbia, and Pale or Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of which broadcast anti-Muslim and anti-Croat propaganda.
733	S51-BiH	At a Vogošća municipal assembly meeting, on 14 November 1992, where Krajišnik was a guest of honour, he joked: "There are no Muslims around so one should look for an Albanian in order to prevent that Serbs quarrel with each other." In an interview from late November 1992, he took credit for rescuing his people from slaughter and genocide. On another occasion around this time he sounded wistful about the Bosnian Serbs' slow progress in achieving control over Sarajevo: "Sarajevo is a separate problem. At the moment ... the area of [the] city proper is marked as Muslim territory, but we shall plead for demilitarisation and division between the two national communities."
734	S35-BiH	At the end of 1992, the Bosnian-Serbs had, for the most part, achieved dominance over historical Serb lands – in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3.4. Arming and Mobilizing the Population, the Armed Forces, and Paramilitaries		
735	P763	Following the 1990 elections, mistrust grew among the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
736	P764	During the period between the multiparty elections and early 1991, the SDS relied on the JNA and the MUP to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, which were the SDS's main political objectives at the time. This meant that most Serbs felt protected by federal and republican institutions despite some preparations for self-defence known to the SDS leadership.
737	P765	At the same time, with an eye on the developments in Slovenia and Croatia, which were both moving towards independence, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims started storing weapons and even organized their own armed groups. This process intensified throughout 1991 and the first months of 1992
738	P767	The JNA was actively involved in preparations for the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina by participating in the distribution of weapons to citizens of Serb ethnicity.
739	P768	In a 1992 nomination for commendation by the Ilidža SJB, Tomislav Kovač was commended for having organized "illegal" meetings in 1991 in his capacity as commander of the SJB. According to the text of the nomination, "At those meetings which were held in Dobrinja, Ilidža and Blažuj, in addition to the obligations of gathering Serbs and their preparations for war, it was agreed to work intensively on the arming of citizens of Serbian nationality.

740	P769	The supplying of weapons was carried out from Ravna Romanija, Pale, Sokolac, Kalinovik, Nedavići village, Trnovo, Tosici village, Hadzici, Jusuf Dzonlagic Barracks, Lukavica and Nedarici." Kovač organized and was in charge of "the illegal work and arming of Serbian people." The "illegal" meetings organized in Ilidža were held in cooperation with local SDS representatives and pursuant to SDS directives.
741	P770	Serbs armed themselves in 31 municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Banja Luka, Bilića, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Bratunac, Brčko, Čelinac, Doboj, Donji Vakuf, Drvar, Foča, Gacko, Hadžići, Ilidža, Kalinovik, Kladanj, Ključ, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, Šekovići, Trnovo, Višegrad, Vlasenica, and Vogošća.
742	P771	Bosnian Serbs were often provided with training by JNA and police officers, and were in some cases organized into paramilitary groups.
743	P772	A report on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992 by General Milutin Kukanjac, commander of the JNA 2nd Military District (covering Bosnia-Herzegovina and small areas of Croatia) stated that "the leadership of Serbian people and all Serbs are ready for the war, in the case that the confederation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not accepted", and indicated that the SDS had distributed 17,298 weapons to "volunteer units" in the 2nd Military District.
744	P773	On 31 August 1992 the 1st Krajina Corps reported to the VRS Main Staff that weapons and other military equipment were being issued, since 1991, to the TOs and other "structures outside the armed forces", that is paramilitary units and the Serb population in general.
745	S40-BiH	By the time General Mladić detailed his ideas about a new Bosnian-Serb army before the Assembly on 12 May 1992, the utility of an armed population had already been proven: "We are not starting from scratch. That is very important. Our starting point are the armed Serbian people in the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who have, in the course of the war so far, responded, insofar as they did, to the call to put a stop ... to the fascist and phantom Ustasha dragon. And so far, we have saved this people from being totally wiped out." In 1995 Karadžić said: "Distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA. What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in the Serbian areas, but it was the SDS which organised the people and created the army."
746	P774	There was fear among Bosnian Serbs that Muslims and Croats would engage in extreme violence against them.
747	P775	Several factors were seen to support this belief. First, some Bosnian Serbs had memories of crimes committed against Serbs during the Second World War, and of injustices suffered during, and immediately after, World War I. Second, some Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats expressed extreme and aggressive messages, even hinting at the physical annihilation of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Third, armed gangs perpetrated crimes against Serbs or federal institutions – often viewed as "Serb-dominated" – based on ethnic motives. This type of action fuelled fear and mutual distrust.
748	P776	Moreover, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, supported by their leaders, often did not respond to mobilization for the conflict in Croatia, and this deepened the rift between the national parties.
749	P777	The SDS leadership did not discourage such fears, but rather shared them and made them public, thus exacerbating the mutual distrust among the ethnicities.

750	P778	In the face of a growing divide between the SDA and the HDZ, on the one side, and the SDS, on the other, Bosnian Serbs experienced instances of “outvoting” by the other two main parties both at the central and the local levels.
751	P780	The fear that the Bosnian Serbs could be left as a minority in someone else’s state was a paramount consideration in the minds of the SDS leadership. This theme was presented as justification for their claims to the territories where Serbs had been a majority before the genocide of the Second World War.
752	P781	The question of the “national and physical survival of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who in recent history have been exposed to one of the worst genocides and policies of forced resettlement in Europe” was highlighted in a document signed by [Momčilo Krajišnik] and issued by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 19 December 1991.
753	P782	The JNA remained in substantial force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the secession of that Republic.
754	P783	In September 1990, the JNA had ordered that weapons be removed from the depots under control of local TO units and moved to its own armouries. Therefore, when the tension between the ethnic groups increased, local communities throughout BiH did not have a significant number of weapons at their disposal. However, in late 1991 and early 1992, all three national parties began arming themselves.
755	P784	The SDS received substantial support from the JNA. The JNA systematically supplied light arms to local SDS committees in Bosnian Serb claimed municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina as well as to Serbian paramilitary groups.
756	P785	Distribution of light arms to Bosnian Serb civilians was carried out by the local communes and was supervised by the SDS, with the support of the JNA and the local police.
757	P786	The arming of Bosnian Serb villages was well-organised and involved the use of trucks and occasionally even helicopters.
758	P787	The JNA also engaged in redistributing weapons to Serbian TO units in predominantly Bosnian Serb populated areas.
759	P788	In the second half of 1991, TO units in predominantly Muslim and Croat areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina were [...] largely disbanded by the JNA.
760	P789	In BiH, the JNA gradually changed from being the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army and representing all ethnic groups and nationalities in the SRFY to becoming a <i>de facto</i> Serbian army.
761	P790	The Muslim-dominated government of Bosnia and Herzegovina instructed the Bosnian population not to comply with the JNA’s mobilisation order.
762	P791	Already by early 1991, some ninety per cent of high ranking officers of the JNA were Serbs and Montenegrins and not a single general was of Muslim ethnicity.
763	P792	When on 12 May 1992, the JNA was transformed into the VRS, non-Serbs were first dismissed from positions of command and soon after almost all non-Serb officers serving in the army were laid off.
764	P793	By early 1992 there were some 100,000 JNA troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina with over 700 tanks, 1,000 armoured personnel carriers, much heavy weaponry, 100 planes and a substantial number of helicopters, all under the command of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade.

765	P794	With its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992, open conflict erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the units of the JNA already present in the territory were actively involved in the fighting that took place. Reports of combat include an attack on Bosanski Brod on 27 March 1992 and the occupation of Derventa, as well as incidents in Bijeljina, Foča and Kupreš in early April.
766	P795	After Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence was recognised by the European Community on 6 April 1992, these attacks increased and intensified, especially in Sarajevo, Zvornik, Višegrad, Bosanski Šamac, Vlasenica, Prijedor and Brčko.
767	P796	The JNA strengthened its presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the latter half of 1991 and into 1992 and, consequently, significant numbers of its troops were on the ground when the government declared the State's independence on 6 March 1992.
768	P799	As President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević made arrangements to ensure that Bosnian Serb forces could retain personnel and arms by ordering, on 5 December 1991, that soldiers who were native of BiH be transferred to BiH and that those in BiH who were native of other republics be moved out.
769	P800	On 25 December 1991, a JNA commander reported to Milošević that these transfers were 90% complete.
770	P801	Milošević anticipated that several Yugoslav republics would soon be recognised as independent States, and the Serbian President wanted to be sure that the JNA in BiH could qualify as an indigenous Bosnian fighting force.
771	P803	By the time of Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence, the JNA was dominated largely by Serbia and staffed mainly by Serb officers. In addition, the JNA had been providing arms and equipment to the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991, who had, in turn, been organising themselves into various units and militia in preparation for combat.
772	P804	The Bosnian Croat population had been receiving arms and equipment from the Government of Croatia and its armed forces.
773	P806	Excluding the Rear Service Base troops, the 1st Krajina Corps numbered some 100,000 troops, expanded from its JNA peacetime strength of 4,500. These forces included or were supplemented by various paramilitary forces.
774	P807	Prior to May 1992 the JNA had played a significant role in the training and equipping of Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces.
775	P808	Some Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb paramilitary forces were even given training in the compounds of the 5th JNA Corps in Banja Luka. The reliance placed on such forces by the JNA reflected a general manpower shortage. Whilst the JNA was prepared to use its artillery in operations, it relied on paramilitary groups to go into built up areas and to act as a substituted infantry. Air support was given to such paramilitary forces which continued into 1992.
776	P809	Moreover, between March and May 1992, there were several attacks and take-overs by the JNA of areas that constituted main entry points into Bosnia or were situated on major logistics or communications lines such as those in Bosanski Brod, Derventa and Bijeljina, Kupres, Foča and Avornik, Višegrad, Bosanski Šamac, Vlasenica, Brčko and Prijedor.
777	P810	The first attack by the JNA was in Bosanski Brod on 27 March 1992. At the same time, there were clashes at Derventa. On 2 April 1992 there was an incident at Bijeljina and around this time also at Kupres. These were immediately prior to the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence on 7 April 1992 by the European Community, with a retroactive date of 6 March 1992.
778	P811	In Bosanski Šamac, the 4th Detachment of the JNA entered the town, cut off telephones and fired shots in the town. There was some non-Serb resistance quickly squelched by the arrival of JNA tanks and armoured cars.

779	P812	On 22 April 1992 conflict began in Vlasencia with a police vehicle driving through the streets announcing through a loudspeaker that all armaments were to be surrendered. All vital functions of the town were taken over by JNA forces, including the town hall, bank, post office, police and courthouse, and there were present very many uniformed men as well as some local Serbs with arms.
780	P813	On 29 April 1992 there was a bloodless take-over of the town of Prijedor, as noted elsewhere, and on 30 April 1992 two bridges were blown up by Serb forces in Brčko.
781	P814	In general, the military take-overs involved shelling, sniping and the rounding up of non-Serbs in the area. These tactics often resulted in civilian deaths and the flight of non-Serbs. Remaining non-Serbs were then forced to meet in assembly areas in towns for expulsion from the area. Large numbers of non-Serbs were imprisoned, beaten and forced to sing Chetnik songs and their valuables seized. This was accompanied by widespread destruction of personal and real property.
782	P815	On 1 June 1992, the Law on the Army proclaimed the Army of the Bosnian-Serb Republic (VRS), which was charged with defending the Republic's sovereignty, territory, and independence.
783	P816	The Bosnian-Serb President was commander-in-chief and had authority to define the VRS organization, establish the system of command, establish a plan for deployment, and make decisions on deployment, define the demarcation of military territory, and issue regulations related to combat.
784	S56-BiH	The VRS adopted and applied, with modification, the rules, regulations, and doctrines of the JNA, such as the criminal law code incorporating the laws of armed conflict set out in the Geneva conventions, as well as the rules concerning service in the security and the intelligence organs, the Military Police ("MP"), and command and control. VRS members received training on the international laws of war and the Geneva conventions.
785	S49-BiH	The VRS had a plan of action broadly formulated by the political leadership. Neither Karadžić nor Krajišnik found it necessary to become involved in the affairs of the VRS on a daily basis. This was done by their trusted commander Ratko Mladić, whom Karadžić and Krajišnik had selected for the job. General Mladić was guided by the strategic goals articulated by Karadžić and Krajišnik at the Bosnian-Serb Assembly session of 12 May 1992. [...]
786	P817	On 27 March 1992, at a Bosnian-Serb Assembly session, Karadžić ordered the deputies to place the Serb TO, which was essentially a municipal defence force, under JNA command, where possible.
787	P818	On 15 April 1992, at a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Government, a JNA colonel was appointed commander of the Serb TO and tasked with supervising and controlling local TOs.
788	P819	On 16 April 1992, the Ministry of Defence of the Bosnian-Serb Republic publicly affirmed the state of imminent threat of war declared the day before by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency pursuant to its emergency powers, and informed the ARK, other SAO governments, and all Serb municipalities of the decision made the previous day by the Bosnian-Serb Presidency that the Serb TO would become "an armed force" of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.
789	P820	The Ministry also ordered mobilization and called for coordination of TOs with the JNA, where possible, under unified command.

790	P821	On 15 May 1992 the Security Council, by resolution 752, demanded that all interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately and that those units either be withdrawn, be subject to the authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed.
791	P822	The remainder of the former JNA was to become the army of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), known as the VJ.
792	P824	On 19 May 1992 the withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced.
793	P825	As President of the Republika Srpska ("RS"), Radovan Karadžić was the commander-in-chief of the Army of the Republika Srpska.
794	P826	In times of an imminent threat of war or state of war, the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska included both the VRS and the MUP.
795	P827	Command and control within the VRS was based on the principle of "unity of command."
796	P828	The Main Staff was the supreme military command organ of the VRS. [...] The Main Staff's headquarters were in Han Pijesak and the forward command post ("IKM") was in Bijeljina.
797	P829	Subordinated to the Main Staff were six regional Corps: the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, the Herzegovina Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and the Drina Corps. In addition, two independent units were directly subordinated to the Main Staff: the 65th Protective Regiment, and the 10th Sabotage Detachment.
798	P830	The former Commander of the 2nd Military District of the JNA, based in Sarajevo, General Ratko Mladić, became the Commander of the VRS following the announced withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
799	P831	The Banja Luka Corps, the 5th Corps of the old JNA, became part of the VRS in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was named the 1st Krajina Corps, but retained the same Commander, Lieutenant-General Talić.
800	P832	Excluding the Rear Base troops, the Banja Luka Corps numbered some 100,000 men, expanded from a peacetime strength of 4,500 men.
801	P833	Units of the Banja Luka Corps took part in the attack on the town of Kozarac near Prijedor on 24 May 1992.
802	P834	Despite the change of name from JNA to Army of the SerBiH after 19 May 1992, and subsequently to VRS, no consequential material changes actually occurred. While the change in name did not point to any alteration of military objectives and strategies, the equipment, the officers in command, the infrastructures and the sources of supply also remained the same.
803	P835	The weapons and equipment with which the new VRS was armed were those that the units had had when part of the JNA.
804	P836	Although these officers and non-commissioned officers had become formally members of the VRS rather than of the former JNA, they continued to receive their salaries from the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
805	P837	The pensions of those VRS officers and non-commissioned officers who in due course retired were paid by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
806	P838	The JNA military operations under the command of Belgrade that had already commenced by 19 May 1992 did not cease immediately and the same elements of the VJ continued to be directly involved in them.

807	P839	Active elements of what had been the JNA remained in BiH after the purported 19 May 1992 withdrawal.
808	P840	The Army of the Bosnian Serbian Republic (VRS) was a product of the dissolution of the old JNA and the withdrawal of its non-Bosnian elements into Serbia.
809	P845	The VRS inherited both officers and men from the JNA and also substantial arms and equipment, including over 300 tanks, 800 armoured personnel carriers and over 800 pieces of heavy artillery.
810	P846	On 15 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić mobilized the TO pursuant to a decision of Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević.
811	P847	Despite the creation of the VRS, TO units were not disbanded completely and the role of the TO remained significant.
812	P848	In addition, in the months that followed, and despite some delay, many Serb TO units were renamed "light brigades" of the VRS.
813	P849	In June 1992 the VRS comprised 177,341 personnel divided into five Corps, as well as some units not attached to any specific Corps, all under the command of an Army Main Staff headed by Ratko Mladić.
814	S26-BiH	The VRS had control over several weapons-production plants in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They manufactured air-jet engines, radar and telecommunications systems, artillery and non-guided rocket munitions, armoured vehicles, optical electronics, and engines for military vehicles. The Pretis artillery and rocket-manufacturing plant in Vogošća municipality was the only plant to manufacture ammunition.
815	P850	The five Corps were the 1st Krajina Corps (formerly the JNA 5th Corps, headed by Momir Talić from 17 March 1992); the 2nd Krajina Corps (formerly the JNA 10th Corps); the East Bosnia Corps (formerly the JNA 17th Corps); the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (formerly the JNA 4th Corps); and the Herzegovina Corps (formerly part of the JNA 9th Corps).
816	P851	In November 1992 the Drina Corps was created on territory previously under the authority of the East Bosnia Corps and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
817	P854	The supreme military commander of the VRS was the President of the Republic, Radovan Karadžić.
818	P855	Directly below him was Mladić, who was the Commander of the VRS Main Staff.
819	S58-BiH	In accordance with Article 13 of the "Law on Ministries during an Imminent Threat of War or a State of War" ("Law on Ministries"), police units were to participate in combat operations pursuant to orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Karadžić, and the Minister of the Interior, the latter of whom "shall give orders to police units through the Ministry Police Forces command Staff". Article 14 of the Law on Ministries further provided, inter alia, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces assigned police units to combat operations and that the units operated under the MUP commander in whose zone of responsibility they were performing their tasks while they were re-subordinated to the VRS. consistent with that law the police could only be used for combat operations that were "established in advance by the commander-in-chief or the Minister of the Interior." Upon an order by Karadžić on 22 April 1995 the VRS defined "more precisely and concretely" the engagement and employment of RS MUP units in combat activities as part of the VRS troops.
820	P856	[F]rom May to November 1992, General Mladić would consult the Bosnian- Serb leadership regularly.
821	P857	The chain of command and the resulting close relationship between the members of the Presidency and the Main Staff also meant that the former were well briefed on the military situation throughout the Bosnian-Serb Republic by the latter.

822	S57-BiH	As the Chief of the Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs of the VRS Main Staff, [Tolimir] directed, coordinated, and supervised the work of the Security Administration and the Intelligence Administration, as well as subordinate security and intelligence organs, including the Military Police (“MP”). The Administrations and the subordinate security and intelligence organs were duty-bound to exchange relevant information with each other. To avoid duplication and the crossing of competencies, [Tolimir] was the one to “decide who will get what information, what will be referred to whom”. Furthermore, the principle of command and control excluded the possibility of an officer (e.g., Milovanović) issuing direct orders to subordinates two levels down (Beara or Salapura); the officer would contact these subordinates' direct superior (Tolimir). [Tolimir] would then decide whether he would assign a special task to the respective Heads of the Security or Intelligence Administration. If a subordinate officer received an order from a superior officer two or more levels above him, the subordinate was obligated to report that order to his direct supervisor.
823	S62-BiH	As Chief of the Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs, [Tolimir] was responsible for control and management of the entire sector. Through his position, [Tolimir] controlled the appointment of security and intelligence officers; as such, the appointment of Beara, Salapura, Radoslav Janković, Keserović, Popović, Momir Nikolić, Drago Nikolić, and Trbić, fell “directly and squarely” within his competence. [Tolimir] was the immediate superior of the Chief of Security, Beara, and the Chief of Intelligence, Salapura. As an Assistant Commander, [Tolimir] was directly subordinated to the commander of the VRS Main Staff, Mladić.
824	S63-BiH	VRS Main Staff Chief of Staff Milovanović described [Tolimir] as Mladić’s “eyes and ears”. [Tolimir]’s function was to prevent leaks of highly classified information from the enemy or “anyone else who wasn’t supposed to [k]now”, and to “cover up the intentions of the VRS”. To this end, [Tolimir] received daily written reports from each administration and detailed oral reports from his subordinates. Further, [Tolimir] was kept apprised of any assignments that went directly from Mladić to [Tolimir]’s subordinate intelligence and security officers. Mihajlo Mitrović testified that available information was always presented to [Tolimir]; there were no secrets kept from him. According to Milovanović, Tolimir “always knew more” than his immediate subordinates, Salapura and Beara.
825	S64-BiH	[Tolimir] was responsible for implementing and monitoring all security- and intelligence-related orders from Mladić and Milovanović. As put by Petar Škrbić, assistant commanders to Mladić were “experts for the implementation of the commander’s order[s] and decision[s] in the best possible way”. For example, [Tolimir] would receive assignments or tasks for the MP from Mladić and, as the MPs were professionally controlled by the security organs, [Tolimir] would be duty-bound to see to it that they would be carried out. [Tolimir] could issue direct orders down the chain of command with regard to training and equipping units of the MP; in all other instances, [Tolimir] could issue orders for the MP only with Mladić’s approval. In 1995, [Tolimir] was involved with the MPs in dealing with POWs, and was kept informed on the work and engagement of the MP units of the various corps.
826	S65-BiH	As an assistant commander in the VRS Main Staff, [Tolimir] took part in daily collegium meetings, gave briefings on the security situation in the RS, provided intelligence information, and made proposals for counter-actions. Further, [Tolimir] would chair the meetings if neither Mladić nor Milovanović could be present and when the focus was primarily security-related. Additionally, [Tolimir] took part in the collegium’s decision-making process.

827	P858	By the spring of 1992, a number of Serb paramilitary groups had been formed in BiH or had arrived from Serbia. Some of these paramilitary groups were trained and equipped by the JNA and were closely associated with it or with the SDS.
828	S44-BiH	In a letter dated 24 April 1992, General Kukanjac informed his superiors in Belgrade that the Bosnian-Serb MUP had presented him with a long list of military equipment (including a request for six helicopters) needed by the special-purposes police detachment at the Banja Luka CSB. The requested equipment was issued. On 27 April the Bosnian-Serb Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotić wrote to the command of the JNA's 2nd Military District requesting the assignment of active-duty military personnel to the ranks of the Bosnian-Serb TO. Already on 15 April 1992, a JNA colonel had been appointed commander of the Bosnian-Serb TO, to supervise and control local TOs. That such cooperation between the JNA and the Bosnian-Serb leadership was on-going was not a closely guarded secret.
829	P859	Prior to May 1992, the JNA had played a role in the training and equipping of Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb paramilitary forces. In 1991 and into 1992 these forces cooperated with and acted under the command and within the framework of the JNA. These forces included Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard and various forces styling themselves as Chetniks, a name which is of significance from the fighting in the Second World War against the German, Italian and Croat forces in Yugoslavia. Some were even given training in the compounds of the 5th JNA Corps in Banja Luka. The reliance placed on such forces by the JNA reflected a general manpower shortage.
830	P860	At first, their existence and training was kept secret.
831	P861	The paramilitaries created an atmosphere of fear and terror amongst the non-Serb inhabitants of the Bosnian Krajina by committing crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and their property including rape, murder, plunder and the destruction of property. They engaged in war profiteering and looting.
832	P862	When the armed conflict broke out in BiH, the scale of crimes committed against the non-Serb civilian population in the Bosnian Krajina escalated.
833	P866	The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) recruited volunteers from within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
834	P867	Many paramilitary units were seen operating independently at first. Often, paramilitary units were later incorporated within the TO structures and eventually ended up being either disbanded or integrated within the VRS structures.
835	P868	A VRS Main Staff intelligence report on paramilitary formations dated 28 July 1992 was sent to the five VRS Corps, the President of the Presidency, the Prime Minister, and the commander of the Main Staff.
836	P869	According to the report, paramilitaries did not express an affiliation with the SDS, but rather with parties in Serbia.
837	P870	The Serbian Defence Forces (SOS) paramilitary group under Nenad Stevandić, a member of the ARK crisis staff, was operative in Banja Luka in spring and summer 1992. It included convicted criminals and had links to SJB and CSB officials. Members of the SOS even acted as escorts for SDS leaders such as Radoslav Brdanin.
838	P871	The SOS paramilitary groups were also active in Sanski Most, where the local crisis staff decided to transform them into a TO unit on 22 April 1992. Although the ARK assembly formally placed the SOS under the control of the Banja Luka CSB on or about 29 April 1992, the group retained a certain degree of autonomy.
839	P872	In Zvornik, in the period April to May 1992, the Yellow Wasps, a paramilitary unit consisting of around 100 heavily armed men, cooperated closely with the TO and was even issued arms by the TO's logistics staff.

840	P873	Once the VRS was established and the Zvornik Brigade formed towards the end of May, the Yellow Wasps were subordinated to it. This paramilitary unit had direct contact with the Pale leadership.
841	S27-BiH	In Prnjavor, the "Wolves of Vučjak" were a paramilitary group, consisting of approximately 150 men. They were headed by Veljko Milanković, a convicted criminal, trained in Knin (Croatia) in the summer of 1991. The Wolves were transferred from the Prnjavor TO to the command of the 327th Motorized Brigade on 5 June 1992, by General Talić, commander of the 1st Krajina corps. General Talić commended the Wolves on several occasions. This despite the fact that they meddled in civilian affairs in Prnjavor town and committed crimes. The civilian police in Prnjavor, numbering at the time about 50 active members, was unable to stop this behaviour and requested the military police, the Autonomous Region of Krajina crisis staff, and Radovan Karadžić to intervene. However, in September 1992, General Talić ordered that the military police would no longer operate in the town, but only at the front lines, and that police matters were to be taken care of by the civilian police only.
842	P874	Local SDS boards, crisis staffs, and regional (SAO) governments often invited and assisted paramilitary groups.
843	S28-BiH	On 28 July 1992, and as a result of the VRS Main Staff Intelligence report mentioned earlier, Mladić issued an order regarding the disarmament of paramilitary formations. The order noted that paramilitaries engaged in looting were operating in all territories under the VRS. It ordered all paramilitary formations with "honourable" intentions to place themselves under the command of the VRS. No individual or group responsible for crimes was to be incorporated into the army, and any member of a paramilitary unit who refused to submit to the unified command of the VRS was to be disarmed and arrested.
844	S29-BiH	The report, while aimed at bringing law back to areas now under Bosnian-Serb control, also shows that the VRS was more concerned with looting and the breakdown of order than with the widespread crimes committed by the paramilitaries. The report also does not account for the fact that incorporation of paramilitaries had already been the rule even before July 1992 and that crimes were committed, and were continuing to be committed, by the paramilitaries under the auspices of the Bosnian-Serb armed forces.
845	S30-BiH	For example, the Prijedor paramilitary units named in the report took part in the attacks on Kozarac, Hambarine, and other areas in Prijedor as part of the VRS in May 1992. The group led by Veljko Milanković, active in Prnjavor, was integrated into the 1st Krajina corps in 1992 and was subsequently involved in military operations in June 1992.
846	P876	On 1 June 1992, General Momir Talić of the 1st Krajina Corps ordered his officer Osman Selak to distribute weapons to paramilitary formations that had been trained at Manjača (Banja Luka). On 9 June a report of the 1st Krajina Corps command complained about the slow pace of disarmament of paramilitary formations by civilian authorities. On 18 June, Talić issued an order according to which all paramilitary formations in the Corps' area of responsibility were to be disarmed. This was decided at a meeting of the ARK crisis staff attended by Talić.
847	P877	Instead of disarming the paramilitaries, the VRS incorporated them into regular forces.
848	P878	In the period May to August 1992, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps also incorporated a paramilitary group into its ranks.
849	P879	In addition, and despite General Mladić's order of 28 July, some paramilitaries remained active in relative independence from the VRS.

850	P880	[I]nstead of suppressing these groups, the leadership and the VRS attempted, on several occasions to incorporate them into the regular VRS units.
851	P881	Some groups, “invited” by SDS local boards, crisis staffs, and regional government, were accepted as fighters for the “Serbian cause” despite their record of lawlessness and ruthless efficiency.
852	P882	Others were tolerated as long as they did not pose too much of a problem for Bosnian-Serb “legitimate” authorities.
853	P883	In April 1992, Radovan Karadžić and Nikola Koljević showed a map of the future BiH, according to which seventy per cent of the territory of BiH would be covered by the SerBiH. A few months later this map was a reality, as the Bosnian Serb forces controlled exactly those areas which according to the map would constitute the territory of the SerBiH.
854	P884	During the 16th session of the SerBiH Assembly that took place on 12 May 1992, at a time when the armed conflict had already begun, Radovan Karadžić articulated the six strategic goals of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
855	P885	The first and most fateful of the six strategic goals was the “separation from the other two national communities – separation of states”.
856	P887	The other strategic goals concerned the establishment of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina; the establishment of a corridor in the Drina Valley; the establishment of a border on the Una and Neretva rivers; the division of the city of Sarajevo into Serb and Muslim sectors; and, finally, securing access to the sea for the SerBiH.
857	P889	On 12 May 1992, Momčilo Krajišnik the President of the National Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed the “Decision on Strategic Objectives of the Serbian People”.
858	P891	Dragan Kalinić, a delegate from Sarajevo and later SerBiH Health Minister, made the following comment at the 16th session of the SerBiH Assembly: “Have we chosen the option of war or the option of negotiation? I say this with a reason, and I must add that, knowing who our enemies are, how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed, which of course implies eliminating and liquidating their key people”.
859	P892	The 16th session of the SerBiH Assembly represents the culmination of a political process. At this session, not only were the strategic goals of the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina articulated, but the SerBiH Assembly also took a fundamental step towards the implementation of these goals: the establishment of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“VRS”), which was put under the supreme command of the Presidency of the SerBiH.
860	P893	The Army of the Serbian Republic of BiH, later renamed VRS, was formally established on 19 May 1992.
861	P895	General Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladić and his immediate subordinates transformed these political strategic goals into operational imperatives for the VRS.
862	P896	On 12 May 1992, in a long speech to the Assembly, General Ratko Mladić explained his “vision” that the Serbs could prevail in the territories they considered theirs without completely destroying the Muslims: “we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that the Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. ... I do not know how Mr. Krajišnik and Mr. Karadžić would explain this to the world. ... that would be genocide.”

863	P897	Mladić advised the Bosnian-Serb leadership on how to achieve controversial military objectives quietly, cynically, ruthlessly, while staying below the radar of international attention: "We should not say: we will destroy Sarajevo, we need Sarajevo. We are not going to say that we are going to destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no, because that would get America out of its seat, but ... one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo. What it is we do not know ... And the same with the electrical power ... we have to wisely tell the world, it was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were shooting at the power supply facilities ... that is what diplomacy is".
864	S46-BiH	The Bosnian-Serb leadership vacillated in its relationship with paramilitary groups, including "volunteers" from Serbia, using them opportunistically to terrorize Muslims and Croats, or at other times complaining about them when their actions threatened the new order of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. From July 1992 onwards, when most of the territories had already been seized, the Bosnian-Serb leadership generally regarded paramilitaries as a nuisance.
865	S47-BiH	In April 1992, Serbian volunteers, including Arkan's men, helped seize Bijeljina and Bratunac. At this time, their services were certainly appreciated; and the positive relationship continued into the next month, as the following telephone conversation from 13 May 1992 illustrates: Unković: "We have some Arkan's men here." Mladić: "Yes?" Unković: "Are they under our command?" Mladić: "All are. All under arms are under my command, if they want to stay alive." Unković: "Excellent! Excellent!" Mladić: "So, all shall be under our command. No one shall do things on their own".
866	P898	In an order dated 19 November 1992, [General Mladić] wrote: "The Drina Corps: From its present positions, its main forces shall persistently defend Višegrad (the dam), Zvornik and the corridor, while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him and force him to leave the Birač, Žepa and Goražde areas together with the Muslim population." This language (including the requirement that the Muslim population be expelled following the enemy's surrender) was reproduced in the orders of officers down the line of command.
867	P899	The Main Staff was the highest command in the VRS. It consisted of twelve people: four generals, Ratko Mladić, Milan Gvero, Đorđe Đukić, and Manojlo Milovanović; six colonels and lieutenant-colonels; and two lowerranking officers, Captain Miodrag Pećanac, the chief of security for the commander of the Main Staff, and Dušan Todić, chief of security for the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff of the VRS was Manojlo Milovanović.
868	P900	As of July 1992, there were approximately 60 paramilitary groups, totalling between four and five thousand men, which had been formed in BiH or had come to BiH from Serbia.
869	P902	Members of paramilitary groups were seen wearing the green camouflage uniforms worn by the former JNA, civilian clothes or a combination of both.

870	P903	In some cases, members of paramilitary groups could be distinguished by the insignia they wore. For example, members of Arkan's Men wore an insignia with the head of a tiger and a small RS flag on the sleeve, Yellow Wasps wore a white-green insignia with the police seal worn by the police of the RS, and White Eagles wore an insignia with a cockade and a two-headed eagle. Members of the SOS were described as wearing either civilian clothes or uniforms with insignia saying "SOS".
871	P904	Serb paramilitary forces also participated in combat operations of the 1st KK of the VRS throughout the ARK.
872	P906	Members of the JNA and other Serb Forces permitted members of paramilitary groups access to detainees that allowed them to mistreat prisoners in Zvornik.
3.5. Pattern of Takeovers		
873	P908	During the spring of 1992, the road which went through the so-called Posavina Corridor, a predominantly Bosnian Croat strip of land in northeastern BiH, had been blocked in the region of Doboj by Croatian forces in alliance with the forces of BiH. The area was of strategic importance as it linked the Croatian and Bosnian Krajina regions with Serbia. In two phases, during the summer and late autumn of 1992, a military operation known as "Koridor 92" was carried out in the Posavina Corridor.
874	P909	As part of the [Koridor 92] operation, the whole of the Posavina area was devastated; many houses were torched and many civilians, including Croats, were killed [in the Posavina area].
875	P910	Milan Martić and Borislav Dukić commanded a[n] RSK police detachment during the second phase of operation Koridor 92.
876	P911	JNA and VRS forces also engaged in large-scale formal military operations directed by the Main Staff. These operations were designed to achieve specific strategic objectives or secure important pieces of terrain. For example, the 1st KK participated in "Operation Corridor 92", beginning on 24 June 1992 and lasting for approximately three weeks, to establish a corridor link between the Bosanska Krajina and Serbia.
877	P912	The municipality of Brčko is located in north-eastern BiH on the Sava River, which separates BiH from Croatia. In 1991, the ethnic composition of the municipality of Brčko was approximately 31,186 (42.8%) Muslims, 19,064 (26.1%) Croats, 15,528 (21.3%) Serbs, and 7,148 (9.8%) persons of other or unknown ethnicity. In 1997, it was estimated that Brčko was comprised of 31.4% Muslims, 7.9% Croats, 54.1% Serbs, and 6.6% persons of other or unknown ethnicity.
878	P913	Already in February 1992, the JNA began preparations for military operations in Brčko. In February or March, the JNA distributed weapons to Serb villagers and erected checkpoints on major roads around Brčko town.
879	P914	Brčko was considered of strategic importance because it was necessary to link Bosanska Krajina to other Serb-held territory and the town had a developed infrastructure and the largest river port in BiH.
880	P918	On 1 May [1992], a total of 1,000 Serb forces, which included Serb units of the JNA from Bosnia and Serbia, White Eagles, Arkan's men, and others, launched an attack on Brčko town using heavy weapons, tanks and artillery. Areas of the town that were predominantly Muslim were shelled for several days.
881	P919	Large paramilitary groups came from other areas of SAO Semberija-Majeveca, of which Brčko municipality was a part, to participate in operations in Brčko town. The first group was the Serb (National) Guard, established by SAO Semberija-Majeveca and comprised of 600 men under Mauzer's command. Another group was the Serbian Radicals under the command of Mirko Blagojević.

882	P920	Other formations present in Brčko at the time of the attack included a TO battalion from Bijeljina sent by the presidency of the SAO Semberija-Majevisa.
883	P921	The attack on Brčko was initially met with armed resistance from groups using light infantry weapons. Serb forces, however, quickly took control of the town.
884	P922	Following the takeover of Brčko on 1 May 1992, members of the Brčko police, members of Serb paramilitary organisations, and members of the JNA and VRS arrested and detained Muslim and Croat individuals at Luka Camp, Brčko SJB building, Laser Bus Company, and Brčko Partizan Sports Hall. Detainees were given no reason for their arrest.
885	P923	On 2 May 1992, the TO from neighbouring Bijeljina took control of the Brčko SJB. The war presidency appointed Dragan Veselić as chief of police and began re-staffing the SJB with Serb members of the pre-war police force.
886	P924	On 4 May 1992, a group of soldiers led by Mauzer arrived at Brčko hospital, where 40 to 50 Muslim civilians had sought refuge. Mauzer told those present that Brčko town was now under his occupation.
887	P925	Over 41 Muslims were killed by Serb forces in Brčko municipality in May-June 1992.
888	P926	Serb forces mainly consisting of paramilitary groups quickly took control of Brčko town in early May 1992. They specifically targeted Muslim parts of the town and destroyed several mosques in the municipality.
889	P927	From 3 May onwards, Serbs systematically detained mostly Muslim and Croat civilians in fourteen locations in Brčko municipality in harsh conditions.
890	P928	A large number of Muslim and Croat women, children, and elderly persons were transferred out of Brčko municipality to the neighbouring municipality of Lopare.
891	P929	The Bijela mosque, Sava mosque, Hadži mosque, Dizdaruša mosque, Rijeka mosque, Omerbegova mosque, Brčko Catholic church, and Catholic church in Gorice were heavily damaged or destroyed by Serb Forces.
892	P930	The municipality of Banja Luka is located in the northern part of BiH. It is bordered to the north by the municipalities of Prijedor and Bosanska Gradiška; to the east by the municipalities of Laktaši, Čelinac, and Skender Vakuf; to the south by the municipality of Mrkonjić Grad; and to the west by the municipalities of Ključ and Sanski Most.
893	P931	According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition in the Banja Luka municipality was 106,826 (55 per cent) Serbs, 29,026 (15 per cent) Croats, 28,558 (15 per cent) Muslims, 23,656 Yugoslavs, and 7,626 of other ethnicity.
894	P932	In 1997, the percentage of both Muslims and Croats had decreased to approximately 2%. Approximately 20,900 individuals of Muslim ethnicity and 19,000 of Croatian ethnicity who resided in the municipality of Banja Luka in 1991 were internally displaced persons in 1997.
895	P933	The eruption of the war in Croatia in summer 1991 impacted on the security situation in Banja Luka. In December 1991, a great number of Croatian refugees of Serb ethnicity arrived to Banja Luka from Western Slavonia and, also due to the mobilisation call, a very large number of people owned weapons.
896	P934	At the same time, ethnic tensions started arising in the municipality. Serb soldiers and paramilitaries coming back from the Croatian front started roaming the streets. They were often drunk and were shooting at houses and shops and at mosques as they passed through Muslim areas.

897	P935	In 1991 and 1992, the SDS, the political party in power in Banja Luka at that time, broadcast through its media that Croats and Muslims were posing a significant threat to the Serbian nation.
898	P936	The SOS paramilitary group under Nenad Stevandić, a member of the ARK crisis staff, operated in Banja Luka municipality in spring and summer of 1992. It included many criminals and had links to SJB and CSB officials.
899	P937	Another paramilitary formation, led by Nikodin Cavić from the Serbian Radical Party, was also active in Banja Luka in the summer of 1992.
900	P938	Upon the establishment of a municipal Serb crisis staff in the beginning of April 1992, Predrag Radić, president of the crisis staff and a member of the SDS Main Board, announced several measures, including: the CSB employees had to pledge loyalty to the Bosnian-Serb Republic or lose their jobs; the presidency of the SFRY would be requested to reinforce the JNA's Banja Luka Corps and dismiss or transfer JNA officers who had not voted "for Yugoslavia"; and the directors of several public enterprises who pursued "an anti-Serbian policy" would be dismissed.
901	P939	From March to October 1992, civilians were killed and frequent attacks carried out against businesses and private property owned by Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka municipality. Many of these crimes were committed by members of the special police detachment of the Banja Luka CSB, VRS soldiers and Serb paramilitaries.
902	P940	Between May 1992 and February 1993, many Muslim and Croat civilians were leaving Banja Luka each month, out of fear and because they had lost their jobs and apartments.
903	P941	In the period between March to October 1992, in total, over 31 Muslims and Croats were killed by Serb forces in Banja Luka municipality. Frequent attacks were carried out against businesses and private property owned by Muslims and Croats.
904	P942	From April or May 1992 onwards, Serb forces arrested thousands of Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka municipality and brought many of them to Manjača camp. Detainees at Manjača camp were severely mistreated, and some were beaten to death. The conditions in Manjača camp were very harsh and only improved after visits by national and international delegations.
905	P943	From May 1992, many Muslims and Croats left Banja Luka out of fear and due to unbearable circumstances.
906	P946	According to the 1991 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic composition of Teslić municipality was 32,962 Serbs (56.7%), 12,802 Muslims (25.8%) 9,525 Croats (9.9%), and 1,100 persons of unknown ethnicity. By 1997, the number of Muslims living in Teslić had fallen to 3,726 (2.2%) and the number of Croats to 347 (0.9%)
907	P947	In April 1992, Teslić town was barricaded and road signs appeared in Cyrillic. The Teslić SJB, which had been part of the Doboj CSB under the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP, became part of the Banja Luka CSB. The SDS appointed president of the municipality fired all non-Serb police officers.
908	P949	The Teslić public prosecutor and the investigating judge initiated proceedings against persons who allegedly committed serious crimes against people and property in Teslić municipality. The accused were subsequently arrested and remanded in custody, but due to pressure and threats from the command of the Doboj operational group, a paramilitary formation called Mića's, were soon after released from Banja Luka prison.
909	P950	Between 200 and 300 detainees, including some local politicians and other prominent figures from Teslić municipality, were being held in a detention centre in the TO building and in a hanger near the TO building.

910	P952	In August 1995, before the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, Radovan Karadžić praised the achievements of the struggle which began in 1992: "We absolutely cannot let ourselves get any ideas about them taking our traditional territories from us. To tell the truth, there are towns that we've grabbed for ourselves, and there were only 30% of us. I can name as many of those as you want, but we cannot give up the towns where we made up 70% [...] Don't let this get around, but remember how many of us there were in Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Višegrad, how many in Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, etc. Due to strategic importance they had to become ours, and no one is practically questioning it any more."
911	P953	[T]he Municipalities of Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, Bosanski Šamac, Brčko, Doboј, Donji Vakuf, Gacko, Ilijaš, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Pale, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Teslić, Vlasenica, Višegrad, Vogošća, and Zvornik were taken over in the months of April and June 1992, in accordance with the Variant A and B Instructions through the joint action of the RS MUP and other Serb forces, sometimes by advance hostile occupation of the main features in town by police forces
912	P954	In early April 1992, Muslim police officers in Bratunac municipality were forced to turn over their firearms, and on 9 April Serbs established their own police force displaying the insignia of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.
913	P955	On 16 April, the TO in Bratunac was mobilized and in the following days, Arkan's and Šešelј's paramilitary units, and a JNA unit under the command of Captain Reljić, arrived in the municipality.
914	P956	While the JNA and TO began disarming Muslim villagers throughout the municipality, including the majority-Muslim villages Podčauš and Suha, the paramilitaries harassed locals.
915	P957	Most of the Muslim leadership left Bratunac municipality for Srebrenica after receiving threats from these Serb paramilitary units. This effectively surrendered Bratunac to Serb control.
916	P959	On 17 May 1992, police chief Vidoje Radović demanded that all Muslims in the village of Vitkovići hand in their weapons. Armed local Serbs dressed in camouflage uniform surrounded the village.
917	P960	[On 18 May 1992] soldiers from the Novi Sad Corps entered [Vitkovići] and told the Muslims to gather in the streets at noon with their belongings, to be taken to Tuzla. Around noon, two buses arrived escorted by armed paramilitary units. Villagers were taken to the Bratunac football field. They were later placed on buses and sent to Vlasenica municipality, where they were detained under the guard of additional armed Serb paramilitaries, including members of Arkan's men and the White Eagles.
918	P961	On 17 May 1992, Serbs shelled the Muslim settlement of Koljević Polje, near Hrnčici, and attacked it on 27 May.
919	P962	Four Muslim monuments in Bratunac municipality were heavily damaged or completely destroyed between April and June 1992, including the mosque in Bratunac town and the mosque in Glogova, which was demolished with explosives during the 9 May attack.
920	P963	Serb forces killed, in total, over 134 Muslims in Bratunac municipality in May 1992.
921	P964	Muslim civilians were detained in five detention centres in the municipality, over 500 in the Vuk Karadžić school, and over 5,000 on the Bratunac football field in May 1992. Some detainees were killed by local Serbs and members of Serb paramilitary units.
922	P965	In March and April 1992, Serbs and Muslims both erected checkpoints in and around Trnovo.
923	P966	Also, around March or early April 1992, Serb police officers formed their own police force, based at the local culture centre, and hoisted a Serb flag on the building.

924	P967	At the session of the SDS municipal board on 26 April 1992, Drašković, a member of the board, called for a division of the municipal administration along ethnic lines.
925	P968	Soldiers wearing Serb insignia and tanks appeared in Trnovo and dug trenches in town around 25 May 1992.
926	P969	Around 29 or 30 May 1992, Serb residents started leaving Trnovo expecting an imminent attack. The following day, Serb forces under the command of Ratko Bundalo [of the VRS] shelled Trnovo for several hours. Houses owned by Muslims were the main target of the shelling.
927	P970	A Serb unit set Muslim houses in town on fire and destroyed the town mosque.
928	P972	About 2,500 Muslims left Trnovo as a result of this attack. Those who remained - mainly women, children, and the elderly - were taken for questioning before the crisis staff.
929	P973	On 11 June 1992, Colonel Ratko Bundalo of the VRS declared the Kalinovik and Trnovo municipalities to be war zones. The movement of the Muslim population was further restricted. Muslims were detained in two weekend cottages and, in early July 1992, exchanged or released to Muslim-held territories.
3.6. Bijeljina		
930	P997	The municipality of Bijeljina is located in the north-east of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Approximately two-thirds of its municipal boundaries form part of the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Bijeljina is the closest municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Belgrade. One of the roads connecting Sarajevo and Belgrade crosses the municipality.
931	P998	Bijeljina was the first municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be taken over by the Bosnian Serbs in 1992. This seizure of power established a pattern which was later repeated in other municipalities in north-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.
932	P999	First, paramilitary groups, or so-called "volunteer units", from Serbia arrived, and started intimidating and terrorizing local Muslims, as well as Serbs they considered "disloyal". Many Muslims were killed. As a result, many of the remaining Muslims would eventually leave the territory.
933	P1000	Actual fighting started in Bijeljina town on 31 March 1992. Members of Željko (Arkan) Ražnatović's paramilitary group came to Bijeljina and, in cooperation with a local paramilitary group under the command of Mirko Blagojević, took control of important town structures.
934	P1001	On 1 or 2 April 1992, armed JNA reservists surrounded the town and columns of JNA tanks and other vehicles were seen in the area.
935	P1002	Despite some resistance, Serb forces quickly took control of Bijeljina, and by 4 April, Serb flags had been hoisted on the two mosques in the town.
936	S48-BiH	Biljana Plavšić met with Arkan in Bijeljina on 4 April 1992. She met with him again on 20 April. (At this meeting she referred to Bijeljina and Zvornik as "liberated" towns.) She also tried to contact Arkan by telephone on 23 April 1992.
937	P1003	Arkan's men were installed in the local SDS building and, for several days, accompanied all regular police patrols and were involved in arresting members of Bijeljina's SDA presidency. At this time, members of the White Eagles and the local TO were also present in Bijeljina town.
938	P1004	At least 48 civilians, most of whom were non-Serbs, had been killed by Serb paramilitaries during the Serb take-over of Bijeljina.

939	P1005	Around 3 April 1992, a police officer was sent by his commander to protect a hearse collecting dead bodies in Bijeljina town.
940	P1006	A total of 48 bodies, including those of women and children, were collected from the town's streets and houses, 45 of these victims were non-Serbs and none wore uniforms. Most of the dead had been shot in the chest, mouth, temple, or back of the head, some at close range.
941	P1007	The removal of bodies from the streets of Bijeljina was ordered by Serb forces in anticipation of a visit on 4 April 1992 of a delegation of high-ranking Bosnia-Herzegovina officials, including Biljana Plavšić, Fikret Abdić, Minister of Defence Jerko Doko (a Croat), and chief-of-staff of the JNA 2nd Military District General Prašević.
942	P1008	At the time of the visit, the roads to Bijeljina town were blocked by checkpoints attended by Serb soldiers in olive-green uniform. Journalists and European monitors were prevented from entering the town with the delegation.
943	P1009	On arrival in Bijeljina, the delegation visited the crisis staff to inform itself about the situation, as well as the military barracks a few kilometres from the town centre. At the military barracks, a large number of displaced persons of different ethnicities were surrounded by ten to fifteen JNA soldiers. At the time, General Janković, commander of the 17th Corps of the JNA, claimed he was providing shelter to 309 Muslims and Serbs at the barracks, and that another 1,500 Muslims were at the Patkovača barracks. However, his official report placed the total number of displaced persons at 3,000.
944	P1010	At one stage during the official visit, Arkan took the delegation on a tour of the town.
945	P1011	A Serb journalist who had slipped into town by avoiding the checkpoints approached the group and told Arkan: "You'll never be forgiven for what you have done to the Muslims in Bijeljina. History will judge you".
946	P1012	Arkan and the SDS appeared to be in control of the town.
947	P1013	When, in the course of the visit, Plavšić asked Arkan to hand over control of Bijeljina to the JNA, he replied that he had not yet finished his "business" there, and that he would settle the situation in Bosanski Brod next. Plavšić did not persist with her request, and repeatedly praised the good job Arkan had done in saving the local Serb population from the threat of the Muslims.
948	P1014	When the group returned to the municipality building, Plavšić publicly thanked and kissed Arkan. This scene was met by shouts of approval from the local SDS members present.
949	P1015	At a dinner with UNPROFOR representative Cedric Thornberry on 20 April 1992, Plavšić described Bijeljina as a "liberated" town.
950	P1016	Arkan's men remained in Bijeljina until at least May 1992.
951	S43-BiH	Around May 1992, Mićo Stanišić told Milorad Davidović, a Serb from Bijeljina who worked for the Federal SUP, that Arkan's forces in Bijeljina and Zvornik had his approval to be there and were helping to "liberate" territory that the Bosnian Serbs believed should be part of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. Stanišić also spoke of an agreement that Arkan's forces could do as they wished with any property in the "liberated" territories.
952	P1017	In the months following the takeover of Bijeljina, paramilitary groups such as Arkan's Men, the White Eagles, and members of the Serb National Guard, together with members of the local MUP, engaged in criminal activities on a massive scale. Muslim residents of Bijeljina, as well as some Serbs who were considered "disloyal", were terrorised by these groups.

953	P1018	From at least June 1992 Serbs detained Muslims and Croats in the Batković camp in Bijeljina municipality. The detainees originated from a large number of different municipalities, including Brčko, Ključ, Lopare, Rogatica, Sokolac, Ugljevik, Vlasenica, and Zvornik. Many had been transferred from other detention facilities, particularly Sušica camp in Vlasenica and Manjača camp in Banja Luka.
954	P1019	The guards and other officials at Batković camp were of Serb ethnicity and wore military or military reserve uniforms.
955	P1020	In August 1992, the commander at the camp was Velibor Stojanović. At that time, around 1,280 Muslim men were detained in a single warehouse. There were also some women, children, and elderly persons detained in a separate area.
956	P1021	Upon arrival at Batković camp, detainees were beaten and their hair was shaved off. They were kept in the sunshine in the camp, which was closed off with five or six rows of barbed wired fences, sentry boxes, and observation points with machine guns.
957	P1022	Sanitary conditions at Batković were poor and detainees were given little food or water. The detainees were beaten by Serb guards. Three detainees were beaten to death while one detainee was shot dead. Ten detainees were singled out for especially harsh treatment. They were beaten three times a day, forced to beat each other, and repeatedly forced to engage in degrading sexual acts with each other in the presence of other detainees. Detainees at Batković were forced to perform manual labour daily, including digging trenches and carrying munitions at the front line, burying bodies, working in fields and factories, and assisting in the construction of an airport near Bijeljina.
958	P1023	Members of the civilian police from Bijeljina, as well as members of Mauzer's Panther unit, including Mauzer himself, came to the camp and took out prisoners for labour duty.
959	P1024	In late August or September 1992, when representatives of the ICRC visited Batković, the youngest and oldest prisoners, together with the most badly beaten detainees, were temporarily removed from the camp.
960	P1025	In addition to the Batković camp, Serb authorities detained mostly Croat and Muslim civilians in six detention centres in Bijeljina municipality, namely the Bijeljina agricultural school, KP Dom Bijeljina, the Bijeljina SUP, the Bijeljina sugar factory, a fortified castle, and the "4th of July" public utilities building.
961	P1026	During the summer of 1992, two mosques in Bijeljina municipality were damaged or destroyed.
962	P1027	Both Muslims and Serbs were leaving Bijeljina as a result of the pressure and terrorization.
963	P1028	Ljubiša Savić, a.k.a. "Mauzer", was a leading SDS figure in Bijeljina and commander of the Serb National Guard paramilitary group, which was an SDS unit also known as the "Panthers", numbering approximately 1,000 men trained by Arkan and Vojkan Đurković.
964	P1029	In June 1992 Mauzer became the president of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff. According to Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, the Serb National Guard was formed by the Bijeljina municipal assembly to be the "army" of Bijeljina and operated on behalf of the Bijeljina Crisis Staff.
965	P1030	Whereas the Bijeljina municipal assembly prohibited the movement of unauthorised armed formations by 11 June 1992, Mauzer's unit continued to operate within the municipality with the backing of Colonel Denčić, who had appointed Mauzer to the position of Assistant Chief of Security Intelligence Affairs within the Eastern Bosnian Corps.

966	P1031	On 15 June 1992, Ljubisa (Mauzer) Savić stated that the presidency of SAO Semberija-Majevisa had decided to replace Muslims in managerial positions in Bijeljina, and should “the genocide against the Serbian people” in Bosnia-Herzegovina continue, all Muslims would be fired from their jobs and expelled from the territory.
967	P1032	Mauzer also stated that the 2,500 Muslims aged between 18 and 35 who had fled Bijeljina in the aftermath of the Serb take-over would lose their jobs, and their apartments would be seized and sealed, and he advised them not to return.
968	P1033	The Bijeljina SDS compiled a list of names of wealthy Muslims.
969	P1034	Aided by Mauzer’s men, Vojkan Đurković of the Bijeljina SDS paid visits to those on the list in order to extort property from them. Some of these Muslims initially paid to be able to stay in Bijeljina. Others were detained immediately, stripped of their valuables, and transferred to “no-man’s land” between the warring factions, where they remained, sometimes for days, before being able to cross into Muslim-controlled territory.
970	P1035	The Bijeljina SDS was determined to rid the municipality of its remaining Muslims.
971	P1036	At least 52 persons of mainly Muslim ethnicity were killed by Serb forces in Bijeljina municipality in April-September 1992.
972	P1037	After the takeover of Bijeljina in early April, paramilitary groups, in particular Arkan’s men, terrorized mainly Muslims.
973	P1038	From at least July 1992, many Muslims were transferred out of the municipality [of Bijeljina] and from there fled to Muslim-controlled territory.
3.7. Zvornik		
974	P1039	The municipality of Zvornik is located in the north-eastern part of BiH, bordering the Republic of Serbia to the east; the municipalities of Bijeljina, Ugljevik, and Lopare to the north, the municipalities of Tuzla, Kalesija, and Šekovići to the west; and the municipalities of Vlasenica and Bratunac to the south.
975	P1040	Branko Grujić, an SDS member, was commander of the Crisis Staff in Zvornik as well as president of the interim government of the municipality of Zvornik
976	P1041	The Zvornik police chief in April 1992 was Milenko Mijić until he was replaced by Milos Pantelić on 21 April 1992.
977	P1042	The police commander in April 1992 was Dragan Spasojević, a member of the SDS and of the Crisis Staff. He was replaced by Marinko Vasilić on 9 June 1992.
978	P1043	The commander of the TO was Major Marko Pavlović.
979	P1044	Branko Studen was a military police lieutenant at the Zvornik garrison unit in Karakaj.
980	P1045	Around 7 or 8 March 1992, the Muslims in the village of Divič set up a local guard, composed of 23 men, to protect their families from the paramilitaries. Members of the guard wore civilian clothes.
981	P1046	Mirsad Halilović was appointed to negotiate with Arkan and the Serb soldiers in relation to the situation in Divič. During the course of these negotiations, Major Marko Pavlović informed Halilović that the Serbs would not enter Divič if the villagers surrendered all weapons and signed an agreement of loyalty to the Serbs.
982	P1047	Beginning in March 1992 and continuing in April 1992, Serb TO, Zvornik police, and paramilitaries including men lead by a certain Milorad Gojić, set up and manned checkpoints in the municipality. While the curfew applied to everyone, Muslims stopped at the checkpoints were subjected to a “greater degree of control”.

983	P1048	From 29 April 1992, Serb Forces at checkpoints organized, beat, and insulted the villagers of Drinjača and prevented them from reaching Karakaj to work, turning them back towards their village.
984	P1049	On 3 April 1992, despite ongoing discussions between representatives of the SDA, SDS, and JNA about defence measures to be taken in case of an attack, a long convoy of Serbs left Zvornik town.
985	P1051	The Yellow Wasps formed their headquarters in a building next to the SUP.
986	P1052	On 5 and 6 April 1992, Serb police and paramilitary forces – mainly Arkan’s men – erected barricades throughout the municipality, the police was divided along ethnic lines pursuant to a dispatch of Momčilo Mandić, and Serb members of the Zvornik SJB relocated to Karakaj, where the Serb crisis staff was located.
987	P1053	On 6 April 1992, the Crisis Staff declared a state of war. In the same decision, the Crisis Staff tasked the TO and the reserve police with taking over defence operations.
988	P1054	On 7 or 8 April 1992 political representative of the Serb and Muslim sides met in Mali Zvornik in Serbia. It was attended by Branko Grujić, the Zvornik police chief Mile Mijić, and the paramilitary leader Arkan, as well as by the Muslim president of the municipality of Zvornik, Abdulah Pašić, and the commander of the Muslim TO, Alija Kapidžić. The discussion focused on how to divide the municipality between the Muslims and the Serbs and on running joint patrols until there was an agreement on the division. At a certain point in the meeting, Arkan said that there would be no agreement. Later that day, it was announced that Arkan’s unit would enter Zvornik to secure certain facilities.
989	P1055	During the night of the 7 April 1992, the SDA also erected barricades, on the bridge linking Zvornik to Serbia.
990	P1056	On 8 April 1992 a combination of Serb forces – the police, the TO, the JNA, and Arkan’s men – launched an attack against Zvornik town, which originated, at least partially, from inside Serbia. Many civilians were killed during the attack and Zvornik town was taken over by the Serb forces within a day.
991	P1057	After the fall of Zvornik on 8 April 1992, Pavlović, the TO Commander, arrested a number of Muslim men in the village of Đulići and took them to the technical school in Karakaj.
992	P1058	The Serbian flag was hoisted on top of the main town mosque by Serb forces.
993	P1059	On 10 April [1992], Arkan’s men piled dozens of dead bodies – including the bodies of women, children and elderly persons – onto trucks.
994	P1060	More dead bodies lay in the streets and outside houses.
995	P1062	As a result of the take-over, many Muslims withdrew to the nearby deserted village of Kula Grad, which was also attacked and taken over by paramilitaries and local police on 26 April [1992].
996	P1063	After the attack against Zvornik, Serb paramilitary groups set up barricades in nearby villages and isolated Kozluk, a village located north of Zvornik, along the border with Serbia.
997	P1064	On 10 April 1992, the provisional government of Zvornik instructed all persons with tenancy rights in socially owned apartments, as well as all owners of immovable property including private houses and businesses, to return and lay claim to those properties before 15 May, or face loss of title to the municipality.
998	P1065	On 5 May, the provisional government established a “real estate exchange agency” authorized to execute exchanges of real estate between residents of Zvornik municipality and other municipalities.

999	P1066	By late April 1992, Serb authorities had taken control of the Muslim village of Đulići in Zvornik municipality, and the villagers surrendered their weapons to Serb forces.
1000	P1067	In order to remain employed, Muslims had to sign a pledge of loyalty to the Serb authorities.
1001	P1068	The town of Divič is located 2 km south of the town of Zvornik and approximately 200 metres across the river from Mali Zvornik in Serbia.
1002	P1069	Even after the fall of Zvornik, the people of Divič wished to remain in their village despite an open route that would have allowed them to flee to Tuzla.
1003	P1070	The citizens of Divič were constantly told to surrender their weapons and to leave the village. A loudspeaker issued threats from the Serb command post across the river Drina in Mali Zvornik.
1004	P1071	In late April or early May, Serb forces demanded the surrender of the Muslim village of Divič. However, before the deadline for surrender had expired, Divič was attacked by Serb forces consisting of Arkan's men, White Eagles, and reserve police officers.
1005	P1072	About 1,000 Muslims fled towards the nearby village of Jošanica. When some of them attempted to return later in May, they were turned away by Serb forces.
1006	P1073	Around 28 May, between 400 and 500 Muslims from Divič village, including women, children, and elderly persons, were forced onto buses by members of the Yellow Wasps and told that they would be taken to Muslim territory. They were brought to Crni Vrh.
1007	P1074	The same day, Major Svetozar Andrić, commander of the VRS 1 st Birač Brigade, ordered the Zvornik TO to organize and coordinate the moving out of the Muslim population with municipalities through which they would pass.
1008	P1075	Only women and children would be moved out, while men fit for military service were to be placed in camps for exchange.
1009	P1076	In early June, Serbs were seen moving into the villages in Zvornik municipality where Muslims had been evicted. Some of them had been ordered to do so by the provisional government of the Serb municipality of Zvornik.
1010	P1077	By the end of May 1992, a large number of Muslim villagers gathered in the Muslim-majority village of Kozluk fearing paramilitaries and Serb forces who harassed them with demands to surrender arms. After the take-over of Zvornik town, paramilitary groups and local Serbs had set up barricades in nearby villages and isolated Kozluk.
1011	P1078	On the night of 20 June, the Serb TO under the command of Marko Pavlović attacked Kozluk.
1012	P1079	On 26 June, a large number of Serb soldiers, TO, and paramilitary units entered Kozluk in tanks and other military vehicles. Among the group were Branko Grujić, president of the Zvornik SDS and crisis staff, Pavlović, and Jovan Mijatović, a member of the Zvornik crisis staff and a deputy to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. They informed the Muslims that they had one hour to leave, or they would be killed. They also told them that they could not take any personal belongings with them, and forced them to sign statements surrendering their property.
1013	P1080	On [26 June 1992], a convoy of vehicles organized by the Serbs who had attacked and taken over Kozluk transported approximately 1,800 persons out of the municipality to Serbia.
1014	P1081	Most of the nineteen Muslim monuments in Zvornik municipality had been damaged or completely destroyed through shelling or explosives during the attacks on Muslim villages in April and May 1992.

1015	P1082	According to the Zvornik SJB's own reports, during the same period [April and May 1992] the Serb police engaged in house searches and interrogations of Muslims on a massive scale, accusing the Muslims of having "prepared the liquidation of Serbs".
1016	P1083	Many Muslims were detained in various locations in the municipality. For example, the Serb police, Arkan's men, and the White Eagles detained Muslims in the Alhos factory in the Karakaj area of Zvornik town, where the Muslims were extensively mistreated.
1017	P1084	On 9 April 1992, [an individual] was interrogated and beaten by Branko Grujić, and approximately eighteen other Muslim detainees were killed by Arkan's men that same day or soon thereafter.
1018	P1085	Around the end of April 1992, several Muslim men were detained at the Standard factory in Karakaj, guarded by local Serbs. Around 10 May, they were moved by the Serb police to the Ekonomija factory, also in Karakaj, where a lot of Muslim men were already detained. Some time later, they were moved again, to the Novi Izvor factory, guarded by the reserve police. This detention centre received another 186 Muslim detainees from Divič village on 27 May 1992. Armed groups, including members of paramilitaries from Serbia, frequently visited those three detention centres and severely mistreated the detainees. One detainee died in the Ekonomija factory.
1019	P1086	On 30 May 1992, about 150 Muslim men, women, and children from the village of Kostijerevo in Zvornik municipality were arrested by JNA soldiers. They were taken to Dom Kulture in Drinjače, where they were guarded by the JNA. Muslim detainees from other villages in the municipality were also brought there, although all women and children were soon released.
1020	P1087	Branko Studen informed these detainees that specialists would come and ask them military questions and that if they cooperated they would be exchanged.
1021	P1088	Five to fifteen minutes after Studen left, Arkan's men entered carrying metal and wooden sticks. The paramilitaries ordered the prisoners to sing "Chetnik" songs, state repeatedly that they were in Serbia, and "pray like Christians"; if the prisoners did not know how to pray, they were beaten. The JNA soldiers beat the prisoners with iron bars and wooden sticks to the point where they could not walk or lost consciousness.
1022	P1089	Soon after the arrival of the detainees, a unit of White Eagles took them out in groups of ten and shot them dead.
1023	P1090	On 30 May 1992, members of the White Eagles shot and killed approximately 85 Muslim men at the Drinjaca School, after calling them "Turkish", "Balijas", and "Muslim motherfuckers".
1024	P1091	From late May 1992 onwards, Muslims were detained in the Dom Kulture building in Čelopek village.
1025	P1092	In early June, a paramilitary group from Serbia assaulted the detainees with spiked metal bars and chains. Some detainees were forced to beat each other, and three were [killed].
1026	P1093	The Yellow Wasps, headed by the Vučković brothers, Repić and Žučo, arrived at the Dom Kulture on 11 June and killed at least five detainees. One man had his ear cut off, others had their fingers cut off, and at least two men were sexually mutilated. Repić's men forced detainees to eat the severed body parts, killing two detainees who could not bring themselves to do so.
1027	P1094	Repić forced all the prisoners to strip. Two pairs of fathers and sons [...], and two cousins were made to perform sexual acts on each other, including intercourse and penetration by a broom handle.

1028	P1095	Paramilitaries also cut off the fingers of detainees and carved crosses into their foreheads and backs using a home-made curved knife.
1029	P1096	On 27 June, Repić returned to the Dom Kulture alone and shot 20 detainees dead and wounded 22 others.
1030	P1097	In mid July, the remaining detainees were transferred with the assistance from the Serb municipal authorities of Zvornik, to Batković camp in Bijeljina municipality.
1031	S45-BiH	Milorad Davidović was requested by MUP Minister Stanišić to go to Zvornik, where an out-of control Serb gang was causing havoc, harassing Serbs as well as non-Serbs. Stanišić told Davidović that Radovan Karadžić and Krajišnik had had enough. The gang, which had taken control of the Zvornik SJB, was called the Yellow Wasps, a paramilitary unit of 100 to 300 men led by Vojin (Žučo) Vučković and his brother Dušan (Repić). Around 29 July 1992, Davidović and his men, together with military and special police units, arrested some 47 members of the Yellow Wasps, including Žučo and Repić. Davidović placed some of the men he arrested under the control of the VRS so that they might be incorporated into the armed forces.
1032	P1098	In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mostly Muslim civilians at thirteen detention centres in Zvornik municipality in 1992, namely the Orahovac CS headquarters, a prison near Novi Izvor, the Zvornik prison, the SUP, the Zvornik town police station, the Kneževići school, a clay factory in Karakaj, an administration building entrance the Hladnjača refrigeration plant, the youth village, the sports hall, the house of Paša Salihović and elementary school at Liplje, and the Vidikovac motel.
1033	P1100	In total, approximately 507 Muslim civilians were killed by Serb forces in Zvornik municipality from April to June 1992.
1034	P1101	Dozens were killed during the attack on Zvornik town on 8 April 1992 and many left the town in the direction of Tuzla.
1035	P1102	In April and May 1992, Serb forces attacked other villages in Zvornik municipality, including Divič.
1036	P1104	Serb soldiers separated a column of approximately 3,000 Muslims who had left in fear of their safety, bringing the women, children, and elderly to Muslim-controlled territory, and detaining the military-aged men in a hangar in the Karakaj technical school.
1037	P1105	[M]ainly Muslim civilians [were detained] in 25 detention facilities in Zvornik municipality, where they were severely beaten, and large groups [killed].
1038	P1106	A total of 88 detainees were [killed] in Dom Kulture on 30 May 1992.
1039	P1107	In the beginning of June 1992, about 160 detainees in Karakaj school were [killed], and another 190 detainees were transported to Gero's slaughterhouse and [killed] there.
3.8. Bosanski Šamac		
1040	P1108	The Municipality of Bosanski Šamac is located in the north eastern part of the then Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Situated on the banks of the Bosna and the Sava Rivers, on the border between Bosnia and Croatia, the town of Bosanski Šamac was an important commercial centre in an industrial region that contained ports, oil refineries and duty-free zones. The bridge over the Sava River was vital for the exchange of goods and services between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Municipality of Odžak is similarly located, immediately to the west of Bosanski Šamac, on the Sava River and on the border with Croatia.

1041	P1109	The town of Bosanski Šamac was of strategic importance for the conduct of military operations. The Municipality formed part of the so-called Posavina Corridor, a narrow strip of flat land along the Sava River connecting the Serb-controlled areas within Croatia to the Bosnian Serb territories and the Republic of Serbia. The Corridor was the easiest and shortest way to establish a ground route between the Serb-controlled areas within Croatia to the west (Republika Srpska Krajina), and Serbia to the east.
1042	P1110	The Municipalities comprising the Posavina Corridor were inhabited by a population of mixed ethnic background, the Croats and the Muslims together forming a majority of the population. According to the 1991 census, the Municipality of Bosanski Šamac was an ethnically diverse community of 32,960 people; Serb (41.3%), Croat (44.7%), Muslim (6.8%), Others (7.2%).
1043	P1111	The political situation in Bosanski Šamac in the period 1990 to 1992 was a reflection at the local level of the general political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the elections of 1990, the national parties won the majority of the 50 seats at the Municipal Assembly, the HDZ being the leading party, followed by the SDS, the SDP and the SDA. Similar to the practice at the Republican level, the parties shared power in accordance with the results from the elections.
1044	P1112	As part of the Serb referendum of November 1991, the vast majority of Serbs participated in a referendum held in Bosanski Šamac. The People's Assembly of the Serb People recommended the establishment of Serbian municipalities, following which meetings were held in all local Serb communes in the area, where residents were asked to vote on whether they supported the creation of Serbian municipalities in the Serb areas. On the basis of such voting, representatives of the local communes established the Serb Municipality of Bosanski Šamac and Pelagićevo in formation.
1045	P1113	The SDA formed a Security Safety Commission in Bosanski Šamac in late 1991, which was referred to as a Crisis Staff.
1046	P1114	The creation of the Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina at the end of 1991, and the Serbian municipality of Šamac and Pelagićevo on 29 February 1992, added to political polarisation on an ethnic basis.
1047	P1115	During the period prior to the takeover, many meetings were held to discuss the increase of tensions. Meetings between representatives of the SDA, HDZ and SDS, and of the military occurred prior to 17 April 1992. The purpose of these meetings was to resolve current issues, in particular those concerning incidents with patrols and checkpoints.
1048	P1116	Blagoje Simić was heading the SDS list in the elections of 1990. He was Vice-Chairman of the Municipal Assembly from 1991 through 17 April 1992.
1049	P1117	In 1985 Simo Zarić worked in the Security Services Centre in Dobož, at the State Security Service (SDB), as Senior Inspector. He was then appointed by the Ministry of Interior as Chief of the Department of State Security in Modriča, a Department which covered the municipalities of Modriča, Odžak and Šamac. He became Chief of the SDB in Modriča in 1986, and remained in this position until 1 September 1991, when he retired. Simo Zarić joined the Socialist Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) in October 1991, and he has been a member of the SDP of Republika Srpska since 1993.
1050	P1118	There was an escalation of tensions in Bosanski Šamac in the months prior to the takeover, starting in autumn 1991.
1051	P1119	There was an increase of shootings, grenade explosions, sabotage and violence in Bosanski Šamac. These incidents led to suspicion and blame on all sides as to the responsibility for the attacks.
1052	P1120	Tensions were exacerbated by the war underway in neighbouring Croatia. Citizens of Bosanski Šamac could hear explosions, battles and the movement of tanks, units and military vehicles in the surrounding area.

1053	P1124	The 4th Detachment was established by an order of Lt. Col. Stevan Nikolić, Commander of the 17th Tactical Group, on 5 January 1992, following the issuing of mobilisation summonses by the Secretariat for National Defence. The 4th Detachment was part of the JNA's 17th Tactical Group.
1054	P1125	There were around 450 soldiers in the 4th Detachment.
1055	P1126	The area of responsibility of the 4th Detachment was exclusively the town of Bosanski Šamac.
1056	P1127	The stated purpose of the 4th Detachment was the prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts and the spread of war from Croatia.
1057	P1131	Prior to 11 April 1992, Stevan Todorović took orders from Milos Bogdanović and Mirko Jovanović, President of the Executive Board of the Municipal Assembly in Šamac, to obtain blue berets and the insignia for the berets.
1058	P1132	Stevan Todorović visited the trainees at Ilok once, at the request of Milos Bogdanović, when he went to Belgrade to purchase the blue berets for the paramilitaries.
1059	P1133	On 11 April 1992 the paramilitaries arrived in Batkuša in JNA helicopters. Among the group of 50 men, 30 came exclusively from Serbia and the other 20 people were from Šamac Municipality who were trained in Ilok. "Crni", "Lugar" and "Debeli" were a part of this group.
1060	P1134	Maksim Simeunović, Chief of Intelligence and Security for the 17th Tactical Group, Mico Ivanović, Commander of the 1st Detachment, Major Brajković, the Chief of Staff of the 17th Tactical Group, and Stevan Todorović, were present for the arrival of the paramilitaries.
1061	P1136	The command of the 1st Detachment made some of the practical arrangements for the paramilitaries who had arrived.
1062	P1137	When a meeting was held on 12 April 1992 in Donji Žabar, Stevan Nikolić, Stevan Todorović, Mico Ivanović, Blagoje Simić, Simo Jovanović "Crni" and "Debeli" were present to discuss the arrival of the paramilitaries.
1063	P1138	Between 11 and 16 April, the paramilitaries stayed in Batkuša and Obudovac, another predominantly Serb village.
1064	P1139	The paramilitaries wore camouflage uniforms, face paint, red berets, black knitted hats or hats of various shapes and were recognisable by a grey wolf insignia. They had a five-pointed star on their caps. They spoke in the Ekavski dialect.
1065	P1141	A new TO was established in the week prior to the takeover, following a decision to revive the TO in all municipalities taken by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency after the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EU on 6 April.
1066	P1142	Prior to the forcible takeover of Bosanski Šamac, Serbian institutions, including the Serb Autonomous Region for Northern Bosnia and the Serb Autonomous Region of Semberija and Majevisa, were established for the purpose of assuming power and consolidating Serb authority over the municipality of Bosanski Šamac.
1067	P1143	Radovan Karadžić came to Bosanski Šamac in December 1991 to discuss the formation of a Serbian municipality of Bosanski Šamac. Blagoje Simić, as President of the SDS Municipal Board, attended the meeting.
1068	P1144	On 29 February 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People of the Municipality of Bosanski Šamac and Pelagićevo was established, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska.
1069	P1145	The elected President of the Assembly of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanski Šamac and Pelagićevo was Dr. Ilija Ristić, and Dušan Tanasić was the Vice-President.

1070	P1146	The leadership of the Assembly of the Serbian People of the Municipality of Bosanski Šamac and Pelagićevo consisted of the deputies of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosanski Šamac, Orašje and Odžak and of "other deputies of Serbian ethnicity". The self-proclaimed Assembly of the Serbian People of the Municipality of Bosanski Šamac and Pelagićevo concentrated power in the hands of Serbs only and non-Serbs could not participate as elected representatives although the municipality had a non-Serb majority.
1071	P1147	In a meeting in March 1992, the Serbian Municipal Assembly decided that the President and the Vice-President of the Municipality and the President of the Municipal Board of the SDS should establish a Crisis Staff in case the war broke out.
1072	P1148	During a meeting of 28 March 1992 in Obudovac, the Serb Assembly of Bosanski Šamac elected the representatives of the Executive Board of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanski Šamac, among these Stevan Todorović, who was elected chief of the public security station.
1073	P1149	During the meeting in Obudovac, the legally elected deputies of the Municipal assemblies of Šamac, Orašje, Odžak and Gradačac, asked Blagoje Simić to form the Crisis Staff, and if the need arose, to become President of the Crisis Staff.
1074	P1150	On 15 April 1992, a Crisis Staff was duly appointed in Bosanski Šamac, and Blagoje Simić, the President of the SDS Municipal Board in Bosanski Šamac, became its President.
1075	P1151	Most members enumerated in the Payroll list, including Blagoje Simić and Miroslav Tadić, were permanent members of the Crisis Staff and occasionally the Crisis Staff would employ additional staff who had expertise in specific fields.
1076	P1152	Stevan Todorović as head of the MUP and member of the Executive Board was an ex-officio member of the Crisis Staff and attended Crisis Staff meetings. Miroslav Tadić became an ex-officio member of the Crisis Staff as soon as he became Commander of the Civilian Protection Staff on 23 April 1992.
1077	P1153	The Crisis Staff took over the functions of the Municipal Assembly of Bosanski Šamac. By assuming the position of the Municipal Assembly, the Crisis Staff had full authority to govern the Municipality of Bosanski Šamac and was the highest civilian authority in the Municipality.
1078	P1154	The Crisis Staff was responsible for coordinating the administration of the Municipality with the civilian police.
1079	P1155	As a result of the decision originating from the Presidency of Republika Srpska, the Crisis Staff issued a Decision renaming the Municipal Crisis Staff to War Presidency, on 21 July 1992.
1080	P1156	The War Presidency with a Decision established the Committee for Exchange of Prisoners on 2 October 1992. The Committee was in charge of the prisoner exchanges and other exchanges.
1081	P1157	The Crisis Staff influenced the removal of Colonel Đurđević, the Commander of the 2nd Posavina Infantry Brigade, and his replacement by "Crni". The Crisis Staff and the War Presidency, had knowledge of the murders committed by "Lugar", "Crni" and the other paramilitaries.
1082	P1158	On the night of 7 May 1992 non -Serb civilians were killed by "Lugar" in Crkvina and the Crisis Staff was informed of the massacre.
1083	P1159	Blagoje Simić traveled to Ugljevik in order to discuss with the Corps Commander the replacement of Colonel Đurđević by "Crni", and in October 1992, the War Presidency requested the return of "Crni" and the paramilitaries.

1084	P1160	In the early morning of 17 April 1992, the town of Bosanski Šamac was subject to a forcible takeover by members of the paramilitaries and Serb police. During the takeover, the Serb police and the paramilitaries secured the key facilities in town, including the police station, the post office and the Radio Station.
1085	P1162	The forcible takeover on 17 April 1992 was followed by acts [...] which included the arbitrary arrests of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians and their [...] detention in various facilities in Bosanski Šamac, and in camps in Zasavica and Crkvina. Many were subjected to repeated beatings and other [...] acts.
1086	P1163	Members of the 17th Tactical Group of the JNA were present in town.
1087	P1164	The takeover of the town occurred without any significant resistance
1088	P1165	Blagoje Simić telephoned Lt. Col. Nikolić in the early morning of 17 April to inform him that the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanski Šamac had been established and that, with the assistance of the Serb paramilitaries and the police, the Crisis Staff had taken the most important facilities in town in order to take over authority in Bosanski Šamac.
1089	P1166	As a result of the telephone conversation between Blagoje Simić and Lt. Col. Nikolić, Lt. Col. Nikolić ordered the 4th Detachment at 6.00 a.m. to be in a state of combat readiness.
1090	P1167	An operation was conducted to collect weapons from the non-Serb population, in the town of Bosanski Šamac on 17 and 18 April 1992, by Serb paramilitaries and police, and the 4th Detachment, which collected weapons from the 4th District of the town. They took away weapons regardless of whether they were possessed legally or illegally.
1091	P1168	The order [of Lt. Col. Nikolić of 17 April 1992 to collect weapons] was carried out by the 4th Detachment on 17, 18 and 19 April 1992 in the 4th District. [...] paramilitaries and the police also participated in the collection of weapons in Bosanski Šamac.
1092	P1169	Miroslav Tadić and Simo Zarić were ordered by the command of the 4th Detachment on 17 April to supervise the collection of weapons.
1093	P1170	Paramilitaries and the police did use force when collecting weapons.
1094	P1171	Weapons were predominantly collected from Muslim and Croat civilians.
1095	P1172	Forces that took control of the town of Bosanski Šamac, within a few days, controlled most of the Municipality of Bosanski Šamac.
1096	P1173	The events that unfolded in Bosanski Šamac before and after the takeover bear close similarity to what was envisaged in the ["Instructions for the Organisation and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances", published on 19 December 1991 by the SDS Main Board].
1097	P1174	Immediately after the forcible takeover of Bosanski Šamac [...] [f]urniture, kitchen appliances, and personal belongings were removed from private houses and apartments. Commercial property and farm equipment belonging to civilians in Bosanski Šamac and the neighbouring villages was [taken]. Sometimes property was taken by force or by threat of use of force. Property exclusively belonging to non-Serbs was targeted.
1098	P1175	Paramilitaries, individual members of the 4th Detachment, policemen, and ordinary Serb civilians, were involved in [taking] non-Serb property.

1099	P1176	After the takeover it became clear that the Crisis Staff issued decisions and orders in accordance with decisions adopted by the Republika Srpska that included an Order prohibiting political activities on the territory of Bosanski Šamac Municipality, and implementation of Instructions for the Work of the Municipal Crisis Staffs of the Serbian People.
1100	P1177	The Crisis Staff decided that the date of the forcible takeover of Bosanski Šamac, should become a public holiday. Accordingly, Article 4 of the Statute of the Serb Municipality of Šamac provided that "The Municipal holiday shall be 17 April."
1101	P1178	On 2 October 1992, the War Presidency adopted a decision renaming the Municipality of Bosanski Šamac to Šamac. The preamble to this decision stated that its aim was "the expungement of all undesirable and imposed symbols and values."
1102	P1179	On 30 September 1993, the Šamac Municipal Assembly adopted a decision to rename the streets in the town of Šamac to represent important figures in Serb history. Most of the names of the streets listed in Article 1 of the Decision were changed into names of important figures of Serb history whereas the old names of the streets referred to people or events concerning all ethnic groups.
1103	P1180	On 30 December 1993 the Šamac Municipal Assembly issued a decision to change the coat of arms of the Šamac Municipality. The latter decision provides that the municipalities' coat-of-arms be redesigned to incorporate features illustrating the "Orthodox identity of the people populating this region" and "the struggle of the Serbian people for independence and biological survival".
1104	P1181	Political parties were not active during the period of war operations because of a Decision adopted by Republika Srpska requiring political parties to freeze their activities. As a result of the Decision of Republika Srpska, the Crisis Staff adopted the Order prohibiting political activities on the territory of Bosanski Šamac Municipality.
1105	P1182	The civilian police by means of an Order signed by Stevan Todorović, banned meetings of more than three non-Serbs in public places. The order was disseminated in radio-broadcasts and on posters placed throughout the town.
1106	P1183	Following the takeover in Bosanski Šamac Municipality on 17 April 1992, and continuing throughout 1992, large-scale arrests of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were carried out in the Municipality. Within the first week of the conflict, up to 50 persons had been arrested and detained at the SUP. From May 1992 until the end of the year, numbers of those arrested and held at the SUP varied from 50 to 100 persons. Around 200 arrested persons were detained at the TO during this period and between 300 and 500 arrested persons were brought to the secondary school in Bosanski Šamac. Large groups of persons were arrested and taken to facilities in Zasavica and Crkvina.
1107	P1184	In May 1992 almost 1000 people were detained at the Omladinski Dom in Crkvina.
1108	P1185	The first arrests were largely carried out by local Serb members of the police, and paramilitaries from Serbia. Methods of arrest included forming armed patrols and entering homes to arrest persons. The arrest of a large group of Croats in Bosanski Šamac, who were subsequently taken to Crkvina, was carried out by Serb police and military. The arrest of a large group of women, children and elderly, who were taken to Zasavica, was also carried out by Serb police and military. Some people were arrested by members of the 4th detachment.

1109	P1186	Following the escape of non-Serb men from Bosanski Šamac across the Sava River to Croatia in late June 1992, Serb police and military came and took the families of those who had escaped to Zasavica. Military trucks went from house to house rounding up Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat women, children, and elderly. These arrests continued in August and September 1992. Groups of Croat civilians, including women, children and elderly were arrested from the town of Bosanski Šamac in approximately mid-May 1992 and taken to Crkvina.
1110	P1187	While some persons were arrested who were in possession of weapons, there were non-Serb civilians arrested from their homes and brought to detention facilities in the town of Bosanski Šamac who did not possess weapons at all, those who had heeded the call to surrender their weapons before their arrest, or those who possessed legal permits for their weapons. The detention facilities were full of people who did not have weapons and who were not on lists of people who belonged to paramilitary groups. People were detained who had nothing to do with arming or armed groups.
1111	P1188	Those arrested were not told the reason for their arrest, and many were beaten at the time of their arrests. Some were told that they were wanted for questioning but were not advised of the reasons of their arrest at the time of arrest. Many civilian persons were arrested without legal basis.
1112	P1189	The SUP was used to detain many non-Serb persons taken into custody, following the takeover on 17 April 1992. Non-Serbs were detained in cells inside the SUP and in garages in the yard of the police station. They were guarded by local Serb police, and paramilitaries.
1113	P1190	During April 1992 people were continually brought into the SUP. This practice continued into May and throughout the year. Detainees in the SUP were held for varying periods of time. Some were detained there for a day before being transferred to the TO across the street, while some were detained there for months.
1114	P1191	The TO, across the road from the SUP building in Bosanski Šamac, was used to detain many non-Serbs taken into custody following the takeover on 17 April 1992. Non-Serbs continued to be brought to the TO in April and May 1992 and throughout the year.
1115	P1192	Later in the year, detainees were transferred from other detention facilities to the TO. Some were brought into the TO directly upon arrest, while others were transferred there from the SUP. Detainees were held in several rooms at the TO, one large and one small, and they were also held in a storage room there. They were guarded by Serb policemen and paramilitaries.
1116	P1193	In the middle of April 1992 there were between 40 to 50 people detained in the TO. In the summer, the number of detainees rose to approximately two hundred and fifty detainees. Detainees were held at the TO for varying periods of time, and some were held there for months at a time.
1117	P1194	Detainees were held at the primary and secondary school gymnasiums, several hundred metres away from the SUP and TO in Bosanski Šamac. The numbers of detainees rose to 50 at the primary school, and between 300 and 500 in the secondary school. The first group of detainees at the primary and secondary school were transferred there on 13 May 1992 from the JNA barracks in Bijeljina.
1118	P1195	Throughout the spring and summer of 1992, people were brought to the primary and secondary schools and detained there, including men from the Kultur Dom in Crkvina and from Zasavica. Detainees were held in the schools for months at a time.

1119	P1196	A group of Croat women and children were taken to Crkvina in mid-May 1992. They were detained in facilities in Crkvina, together with men and the elderly, in places that included the Youth Centre, a warehouse, the Omladinski Dom and the Sport Stadium. Hundreds of non-Serbs were held in these facilities in Crkvina, for periods ranging from one night to a week.
1120	P1197	Family members of some of the men detained in other facilities, including the SUP and TO in Bosanski Šamac, or who had been exchanged, were detained in Zasavica. In late June 1992, family members of men who escaped across the Sava River into Croatia, to avoid the mobilization call, were rounded up in military trucks and taken to Zasavica, and detained in camps there. Women, children and elderly were held in Zasavica, including some men. When Crkvina was evacuated, people from the neighbouring villages were detained in Zasavica. They were guarded and there were checkpoints at both entrances to the village. People did not go voluntarily to the camp in Zasavica, nor were they able to leave the village. People could not leave the area unless they wanted to be exchanged.
1121	P1198	A group of approximately 47 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees, who were held in the TO in Bosanski Šamac, were transferred to the JNA barracks in Brčko at the end of April 1992 and detained there. This group of detainees was held there until the conflict broke out in Brčko on 1 or 2 May 1992. They were then put on a bus and transferred to Bijeljina.
1122	P1201	Interrogations of those detained were conducted under coercive and forced circumstances. Interrogations were carried out by Simo Zarić, and members of the police that included Simo Božić, Miloš Savić, Vladimir Šarkanović and Savo Čancarević.
1123	P1202	Detainees were beaten as they were required to give statements, and many did not see the statements that they were forced to sign. Although some detainees were questioned about the offence of illegal possession of weapons, as charged in the "Law on Criminal Proceeding of former Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia", they were all non-Serbs, and were clearly singled out and questioned on the basis of their ethnicity.
1124	P1203	No witnesses were ever convicted for illegal possession of weapons. None of the detainees were ever advised of their procedural rights before or during their detention.
1125	P1204	In addition, members of the SDA and HDZ, Bosnian Muslim and Croat political parties were arrested and detained, while again, members of the Serb parties were not.
1126	P1205	On 17 April 1992 and in the following months, a large number of non-Serb civilians were repeatedly beaten in the detention facilities in Bosanski Šamac and in Crkvina, Brčko, and Bijeljina. Some of the victims had already been beaten upon their arrest. During their imprisonment in the detention facilities, detainees were severely beaten with various objects, such as rifles, metal bars, baseball bats, metal chains, police batons, and chair legs. The detainees were beaten on all parts of their bodies, and many of them suffered serious injuries. Some prisoners were beaten while undergoing interrogation.
1127	P1206	The beatings were applied by paramilitary forces from Serbia, local policemen, and a few members of the JNA. The beatings took place on a daily basis, day and night.
1128	P1207	Practically all detainees who were beaten were non-Serbs.
1129	P1208	On one occasion, a victim was beaten in the crotch, and his assailants told him that Muslims should not propagate. Prisoners were regularly insulted on the basis of their ethnicity.

1130	P1209	Hasan Bičić was taken to an office in the SUP with a big wooded, heavy writing desk with broken glass on it. About three men in police and JNA uniforms, including Stevan Todorović, started beating him. Then they ordered him to strip completely. He was told to lie down on his stomach, across the table with the broken glass on it, and the men continued to beat him all over his body.
1131	P1210	Among the assailants at the TO were members of the Paramilitaries from Serbia including “Lugar”, “Laki” – Predrag Lazarević, “Crni” – Dragan Đorđević -, “Debeli” – Srećko Radovanović -, a man called “Beli”, “Zuti”, “Avram” and a local person called “Cera” – Nebojsa Stanković.
1132	P1211	Other assailants were local Serb policemen from Batkusa, Slobodan Jačimovic, and Skarići – “Zvaka” Rakić, Spasoje Bogdanović, Slavko Trivunović, and “Bobo” Radulović, two villages within the municipality of Bosanski Šamac.
1133	P1212	Dragan Lukač was beaten severely by “Lugar” on 19 April 1992 with a rubber police truncheon on the back of his head.
1134	P1213	On one occasion, “Cera” made Dragan Lukač kneel on the concrete in the TO courtyard. Then, he kicked him in the head with his military boot, and he fainted. Then, “Cera” knocked out four of his teeth.
1135	P1214	Hasan Bičić described the “exemplary” beating in the TO as follows: in the beginning, the prisoners were beaten by the paramilitaries. Little by little, the local guards joined in, and “Cera” was particularly cruel and brutal to the prisoners. During the close to ten days that he spent in the warehouse of the TO, Hasan Bičić was beaten at least five times under the direction of “Cera”. On one occasion, several prisoners including Hasan Bičić were beaten with rifles, wooden truncheons, and metal bars. They were kicked with boots. Hasan Bičić was beaten by three or four persons at the same time. Each of them took turns to give him blows to the head. He fell down and tried to protect his head. As he crouched down, he received a blow to his spine from the kick of an army boot. This caused his hand to open up from covering his face, and he was then kicked in the face. After this, Hasan Bičić remained lying on the concrete in the yard, all bloody. With his boots on, “Cera” jumped up and down on Hasan Bičić’s hand and broke some of his fingers.
1136	P1216	The detainees who were imprisoned in the detention centres in Bosanski Šamac were confined under inhumane conditions. [...] The forced singing of “Chetnik” songs and the verbal abuse of being called “ustasha” or “balija” were forms of [...] abuse and humiliation of the detainees. They did not have sufficient space, food or water. They suffered from unhygienic conditions, and they did not have appropriate access to medical care.
1137	P1217	Between 22 and 29 April 1992, “Lugar” hit Anto Brandić, “Dikan”, aged about 60, with a wooden table leg. “Dikan” moaned and begged “don’t do this, you’ll kill me”. “Lugar” kept hitting him on the head, and at one point “Dikan” fell over a jerrycan for water. His body remained motionless and blood was gushing out him mouth. “Lugar” dragged him out into the courtyard of the TO, and then the prisoners heard one or two shots. Then “Lugar” said, “throw this dog into the Sava River”.
1138	P1218	On 7 May 1992, “Lugar”, “Crni” and “Debeli” came to the warehouse, beat Jozo Antunović and hit him on the back of his head, before “Lugar” shot him dead with three shots.
1139	P1219	On this occasion, nine non-Serb detainees were killed by “Lugar”, “Crni” and “Debeli”. The other detainees were lined up again and beaten. Thereafter, six men from Teslić were killed. When the three men counted everyone, they realized that someone was missing. “Crni” found him hiding behind a sack, and shot him.

1140	P1220	Civilians who had to report every day in front of the Pensioner's Home as well as civilians who were detained were forced to dig trenches, build bunkers, carry sandbags or railway sleepers for the construction of trenches, and build other fortifications on the frontline. Civilians were compelled to work under the supervision of armed guards, who beat, or fired at those who tried to escape. Civilians who were forced to dig trenches and to work on the frontline were not paid for their work.
1141	P1221	Civilians working on military assignments on the frontline were exposed to dangerous conditions and were under a high risk of being injured or killed. [...]
1142	P1223	Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats [...] were forced to loot the houses of people from their town, who sometimes they knew well and highly respected.
1143	P1224	Persons detained at the SUP, in Bijeljina, Brčko, and Zasavica were forced to wash and repair the cars of police officers, clean the premises, and do other similar assignments.
1144	P1233	There were other exchanges of non-Serb civilians to Dragalić on 19 September 1992, 7 October 1992, and 7 January 1993.
1145	P1234	On or about 20 February 1993, about 50 prisoners from Batković were exchanged in Lipovac from Batković to Croatia for 32 soldiers from Pale.
1146	P1235	There were seven exchanges from Bosanski Šamac and Batković to Croatia. The witnesses Dragan Lukač, Hasan Bičić, Muhamed Bičić, Ibrahim Salkić, Esad Dagović, Witness K, Dragan Delić, Nusret Hadžijusufović, Witness C, Jelena Kapetanović, Witness A, Witness O, and Witness Q were in detention when they were exchanged to Croatia.
3.9. Doboј		
1147	P1237	The municipality of Doboј is located in northern BiH, bordered by the municipalities of Derventa, Modriča, Gradačac, Gračanica, Maglaj, Tečanј, Teslić, and Prnjavor.
1148	P1238	There was a large JNA military garrison in Miljkovać in the municipality of Doboј.
1149	P1239	In March and April 1992, the JNA set up checkpoints in Doboј town.
1150	P1240	A large unit of the White Eagles had entered the municipality around January or February 1992. This paramilitary group consisted of approximately 500 men in olive-drab uniforms that often came to the town's JNA barracks for meals.
1151	P1241	Just prior to 3 May, this paramilitary group took over an area of Ankare, near Doboј town, and forced the residents to leave.
1152	P1242	On 3 May, Serb paramilitaries, the JNA, and the police took over Doboј town.
1153	P1243	Doboј town was taken over by Serb forces on 3 May 1992. In May and June 1992, Serb authorities in Doboј municipality detained Muslim and Croat civilians in 33 detention centres under cramped and inhumane conditions.
1154	P1244	The take-over of Doboј town and the threats and intimidation of Muslims in Doboј prompted many thousands to leave the town for Tešanј.
1155	P1245	The Serb crisis staff took control of the municipality, and all remaining Muslim police officers were arrested. Muslims and Croats were ordered to surrender their weapons.
1156	P1246	The Serb authorities issued a curfew allowing Muslims and Croats to be outside their homes for only two hours per day, prompting many Muslims and Croats to leave town.
1157	P1247	Around 10 May, Sešelј's men intimidated the remaining residents of Doboј town.

1158	P1248	As a result of the Serb take-over and of rumours of incidents occurring in Bratunac and Bijeljina, thousands of Muslims, Croats, and displaced persons left Doboj town for Tešanj, a Muslim-majority town south of Doboj in Tešanj municipality.
1159	P1249	Muslims set up a crisis staff there, and established a line of defence to the south of Doboj town to prevent Serbs from taking control over the entire municipality of Doboj.
1160	P1250	During May and June 1992, 21 Muslim and Catholic monuments in Doboj municipality, including the Trnjak mosque and one other mosque in Doboj town, the mosque in Gornja Grapska, and the Catholic Church in Doboj town were either heavily damaged or completely destroyed through shelling or explosives, or occasionally both.
1161	P1251	On 20 May 1992, Serb forces sealed off the Muslim town of Dragalovci and set up checkpoints.
1162	P1252	On 2 June, Serb police officers called the villagers to gather at the town railway station and ordered them to surrender their weapons. Armed Serbs then separated out the male villagers at gunpoint, and Serb police took 26 of these men to Spreča prison in Doboj town.
1163	P1253	In the prison, detainees were threatened and abused by soldiers wearing red berets and black shirts.
1164	P1254	Around 22 June, [...] several detainees were taken in armoured trucks to a discotheque in Usora in Doboj municipality. The Serb guards packed them tightly into the building, together with other detainees already present, and beat them. One elderly man died due to the harsh conditions.
1165	P1255	In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Serb authorities detained mainly Muslim and Croat civilians in 21 detention centres in Doboj municipality in 1992, namely the JNA (Milikovac) 4th of July barracks, Šešlija camp, a warehouse in Usora, the railway station, SRC Ozren, the high school, the tyre factory in Bare, the Stanari mine, Stanari elementary school, the handball stadium, Bosanska, the Rudanka transmission line factory, Kotorko village, Majevisa hangar PD, the Putnikovo brdo military premises, Seona, Grapska elementary school, Piperi shop, the Ševarlije military barracks, and Podnovlje.
1166	P1256	The detainees were severely mistreated, and at least one detainee died as a result. Serb authorities restricted the freedom of movement of Muslims and Croats, and Serb paramilitaries terrorized the population in Doboj town.
1167	P1257	Muslim and Croat monuments were deliberately damaged or destroyed through shelling or explosives.
3.10. Srebrenica & Trnovo		
1168	P1258	The town of Srebrenica is nestled in a valley in eastern Bosnia, about fifteen kilometres from the Serbian border.
1169	P1260	Despite Srebrenica's predominantly Muslim population, Serb paramilitaries from the area and neighbouring parts of eastern Bosnia gained control of the town for several weeks early in 1992. In May 1992, however, a group of Bosnian Muslim fighters under the leadership of Naser Orić managed to recapture Srebrenica. Over the next several months, Orić and his men pressed outward in a series of raids.
1170	P1261	By September 1992, Bosnian Muslim forces from Srebrenica had linked up with those in Žepa, a Muslim-held town to the south of Srebrenica. By January 1993, the enclave had been further expanded to include the Bosnian Muslim held enclave of Cerska located to the west of Srebrenica.
1171	P1262	By January 1993 the Srebrenica enclave reached its peak size of 900 square kilometres, although it was never linked to the main area of Bosnian-held land in the west and remained an island amid Serb-controlled territory.

1172	P1263	In January 1993, Bosnian Muslim forces attacked the Bosnian Serb village of Kravica. Over the next few months, the Bosnian Serbs responded with a counter-offensive, eventually capturing the villages of Konjevic Polje and Čerska, severing the link between Srebrenica and Žepa and reducing the size of the Srebrenica enclave to 150 square kilometres.
1173	P1264	Bosnian Muslim residents of the outlying areas converged on Srebrenica town and its population swelled to between 50,000 and 60,000 people.
1174	P1265	The Commander of the UN Protection Force "UNPROFOR", General Philippe Morillon of France, visited Srebrenica in March 1993. By then the town was overcrowded and siege conditions prevailed. The advancing Bosnian Serb forces had destroyed the town's water supplies and there was almost no running water.
1175	P1266	On 13 April 1993, the Bosnian Serbs told the UNHCR representatives that they would attack the town within two days unless the Bosnian Muslims surrendered and agreed to be evacuated.
1176	P1267	On 16 April 1993, the UN Security Council responded by passing a resolution, declaring that "all parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a "safe area" that should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act." At the same time, the Security Council created two other UN protected enclaves, Žepa and Goražde.
1177	P1268	On 18 April 1993, the first group of UNPROFOR troops arrived in Srebrenica. The peacekeepers were lightly armed and at any one time numbered no more than 600 men (a much smaller force than had been originally requested).
1178	P1269	The VRS was organised on a geographic basis and Srebrenica fell within the domain of the Drina Corps. Between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers from three Drina Corps Brigades were deployed around the enclave.
1179	P1270	These Bosnian Serb forces were equipped with tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and mortars.
1180	P1271	Despite violations of the "safe area" agreement by both sides to the conflict, a two-year period of relative stability followed the establishment of the enclave.
1181	P1272	By early 1995, fewer and fewer supply convoys were making it through to the enclave. The already meagre resources of the civilian population dwindled further and even the UN forces started running dangerously low on food, medicine, fuel and ammunition.
1182	P1273	Dutch Bat soldiers who went out of the area on leave were not allowed to return and their numbers dropped from 600 to 400 men.
1183	P1274	In March and April, the Dutch soldiers noticed a build-up of Bosnian Serb forces near two of the observation posts, OP Romeo and OP Quebec.
1184	P1278	The then-commander of the Drina Corps, General-Major Milenko Zivanović signed two orders, on 2 July 1995, laying out the plans for the attack on the enclave and ordering various units of the Drina Corps to ready themselves for combat. The operation was code-named "Krivaja 95".
1185	P1279	Just as envisaged [by Directive 7], by mid 1995, the humanitarian situation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians and military personnel in the enclave was catastrophic.
1186	P1280	The VRS offensive on Srebrenica began in earnest on 6 July 1995.

1187	P1281	By the evening of 9 July 1995, the VRS Drina Corps had pressed four kilometres deep into the enclave, halting just one kilometre short of Srebrenica town.
1188	P1282	President Karadžić was emboldened by this military success and the surprising lack of resistance from the Bosnian Muslims as well as the absence of any significant reaction from the international community.
1189	P1283	Late on 9 July 1995, President Karadžić issued a new order authorising the VRS Drina Corps to capture the town of Srebrenica.
1190	P1284	Late in the afternoon of 11 July 1995, General Mladić, accompanied by General Zivanović (then Commander of the Drina Corps), General Krstić (then Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps) and other VRS officers, took a walk through the empty streets of Srebrenica town.
1191	P1285	Faced with the reality that Srebrenica had fallen under Bosnian Serb forces control, thousands of Bosnian Muslim residents from Srebrenica fled to Potocari seeking protection within the UN compound.
1192	P1286	By the evening of 11 July 1995, approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees were gathered in Potočari. Several thousand had pressed inside the UN compound itself, while the rest were spread throughout the neighbouring factories and fields.
1193	P1287	Following the take-over of Srebrenica, in July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces devised and implemented a plan to transport all of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the enclave.
1194	P1288	On 12 and 13 July 1995, the women, children and elderly were bussed out of Potočari under the control of VRS forces, to Bosnian Muslim held territory near Kladanj.
1195	P1289	As the Bosnian Muslim refugees began boarding the buses, Bosnian Serb soldiers systematically separated out men of military age who were trying to clamour aboard. Occasionally, younger and older men were stopped as well. These men were taken to a building in Potočari referred to as the "White House".
1196	P1290	When they were taken to the White House, they were forced to leave their belongings, including their wallets and identification papers, in a large pile outside the building prior to entering.
1197	P1291	As the buses carrying the women, children and elderly headed north towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory, they were stopped along the way and again screened for men.
1198	P1292	Beginning on the afternoon of 12 July 1995 and continuing throughout 13 July 1995, men detained in the White House were placed on separate buses to the women, children and elderly and were taken out of the Potočari compound to detention sites in Bratunac.
1199	P1293	Later, after all of the Bosnian Muslim civilians had gone from Potočari the piles of personal effects, including identity cards, that had been taken from the Bosnian Muslim men and boys were set on fire.
1200	P1294	As the situation in Potočari escalated towards crisis on the evening of 11 July 1995, word spread through the Bosnian Muslim community that the able-bodied men should take to the woods, form a column together with members of the 28th Division of the ABiH and attempt a breakthrough towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory in the north.
1201	P1295	The young men were afraid they would be killed if they fell into Bosnian Serb hands in Potočari and believed that they stood a better chance of surviving by trying to escape through the woods to Tuzla.

1202	P1296	The column gathered near the villages of Jaglici and Šušnjari and began to trek north.
1203	P1298	At around midnight on 11 July 1995, the column started moving along the axis between Konjevic Polje and Bratunac.
1204	P1299	At a meeting held at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters on 16 July, part of the MUP force was deployed to search the terrain between Srebrenica and Konjevic Polje.
1205	P1300	On 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces launched an artillery attack against the column that was crossing an asphalt road between the area of Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba <i>en route</i> to Tuzla.
1206	P1301	Only about one third of the men successfully made it across the asphalt road and the column was split in two parts.
1207	P1302	Heavy shooting and shelling continued against the remainder of the column throughout the day and during the night. Men from the rear of the column who survived this ordeal described it as a "man hunt".
1208	P1303	By the afternoon of 12 July 1995, or the early evening hours at the latest, the Bosnian Serb forces were capturing large numbers of these men in the rear.
1209	P1304	A variety of techniques were used to trap prisoners. In some places, Bosnian Serb forces fired into the woods with anti-aircraft guns and other weapons or used stolen UN equipment to deceive the Bosnian Muslim men into believing that the UN or the Red Cross were present to monitor the treatment accorded to them upon capture.
1210	P1305	The largest groups of Bosnian Muslim men from the column were captured on 13 July 1995; several thousand were collected in or near the Sandići Meadow and on the Nova Kasaba football field.
1211	P1306	The Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated from the women, children and elderly in Potočari (numbering approximately 1,000) were transported to Bratunac and subsequently joined by Bosnian Muslim men captured from the column.
1212	P1307	Almost to a man, the thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners captured, following the take over of Srebrenica, were executed. Some were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers who captured them and some were killed in the places where they were temporarily detained.
1213	P1308	Most, however, were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July 1995, in the region just north of Srebrenica.
1214	P1309	Prisoners not killed on 13 July 1995 were subsequently bussed to execution sites further north of Bratunac, within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade. The large-scale executions in the north took place between 14 and 17 July 1995.
1215	P1310	Most of the mass executions followed a well-established pattern. The men were first taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being detained there for some hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks and taken to another site for execution. Usually, the execution fields were in isolated locations.
1216	P1311	The prisoners were unarmed and, in many cases, steps had been taken to minimise resistance, such as blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind their backs with ligatures or removing their shoes.
1217	P1312	Once at the killing fields, the men were taken off the trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those who survived the initial round of gunfire were individually shot with an extra round, though sometimes only after they had been left to suffer for a time.

1218	P1313	Immediately afterwards, and sometimes even during the executions, earth moving equipment arrived and the bodies were buried, either in the spot where they were killed or in another nearby location.
1219	P1314	Following the take-over of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were summarily executed and consigned to mass graves.
1220	P1315	In July 1995, following the take-over of Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb forces executed several thousand Bosnian Muslim men. The total number is likely to be within the range of 7,000-8,000 men.
1221	P1316	The Drina Corps came under the Command of the Main Staff of the VRS, along with the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, the Hercegovina Corps and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
1222	P1317	In July 1995, the Commander of the Main Staff was General Mladić. In turn, the Main Staff was subordinate to President Karadžić, the Supreme Commander of the VRS.
1223	P1318	The Drina Corps was the VRS military formation tasked with planning and carrying out operation Krivaja 95, which culminated in the capture of Srebrenica town on 11 July 1995.
1224	P1319	The plan for Krivaja 95 was aimed at reducing the "safe area" of Srebrenica to its urban core and was a step towards the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminating the enclave.
1225	P1320	The shelling of Srebrenica carried out by the Drina Corps, on 10 and 11 July 1995, by which time the original objectives of Krivaja 95 had already been achieved, was calculated to terrify the Bosnian Muslim population and to drive them out of Srebrenica town.
1226	P1321	The Drina Corps participated in the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Potočari following the take-over of Srebrenica.
1227	P1322	The Drina Corps command was well aware of the presence of the 65th Protection Regiment within its zone of responsibility following the takeover of Srebrenica and was organising cooperative action with it to block the column of Muslim men.
1228	P1324	On 14 July 1995, more prisoners from Bratunac were bussed northward to a school in the village of Pilica, north of Zvornik. As at other detention facilities, there was no food or water and several men died in the school gym from heat and dehydration. The men were held at the Pilica School for two nights.
1229	P1325	On 16 July 1995, following a now familiar pattern, the men were called out of the school and loaded onto buses with their hands tied behind their backs. They were then driven to the Branjevo Military Farm, where groups of 10 were lined up and shot.
1230	P1326	Between 1,000 and 1,200 men were killed in the course of that day at this execution site.
1231	P1329	The Main Staff did not have the resources to carry out the activities that occurred in the area of the former enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica on its own. The Main Staff was an organisational shell and was largely dependent upon the personnel and equipment of its subordinate Brigades to implement its objectives.
1232	P1330	The Drina Corps was not oblivious to the overall VRS strategy of eliminating the Srebrenica enclave. This had always been the long-term Drina Corps objective in the area.

1233	P1331	Between 14 July and 17 July 1995, the resources of subordinate Drina Corps Brigades were utilised to assist with the mass executions. The Command itself must have known of the involvement of its subordinate units in the executions as of 14 July 1995.
1234	P1332	The Scorpions Unit was based in Đeletovci in what was then called the Republic of Serb Krajina. During the summer of 1995 the [Scorpions] Unit was deployed from Đeletovci to Trnovo.
1235	P1333	At this time [during the deployment from Đeletovci to Trnovo] Slobodan Medić was the Commander of the Scorpions Unit.
1236	P1334	The Scorpions combat unit ("Scorpions") was deployed approximately 150 kilometres from Zvornik at the Trnovo/Treskavica front, within the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
1237	P1335	In July 1995, after the fall of Srebrenica, the Scorpions brought six Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica to an isolated location near two abandoned buildings in Godinjske Bare, near the town of Trnovo.
1238	S60-BiH	After the fall of Srebrenica, while the Scorpions Unit was deployed in Trnovo, Medić received an order through his chain of command to provide vehicles to go to Srebrenica and, as a result, six Bosnian Muslims who were subsequently killed were collected by bus.
1239	P1336	Medić ordered Slobodan Stojković, a member of the Scorpions Unit, to film the killing of the six Bosnian Muslims.
1240	P1337	Throughout the video the members of the Scorpions Unit, including the Commander Slobodan Medić, can be heard insulting the Bosnian Muslims.
1241	P1338	Human remains of the six Bosnian Muslim men were later discovered in and around the abandoned buildings at Godinjske Bare. The bodies were recovered by a team from the Bosnian Commission for Missing Persons, and autopsy reports concluded that each victim died from gunshot wounds.
1242	P1339	The men killed by the members of the Scorpions Unit were Safet Fejzić, Azmir Alispahić, Smajil Ibrahimović, Sidik Salkić, Juso Delić and Dino Salihović.
1243	P1340	All six killed were reported as missing or dead after the fall of Srebrenica.
1244	S61-BiH	The Chamber finds that following the fall of Srebrenica, the Scorpions Unit, which at the time was operating under the direction of Bosnian Serb Forces, summarily killed six Bosnian Muslim males from Srebrenica near the town of Trnovo.
3.11. Sanski Most		
1245	P1341	The municipality of Sanski Most is located in the north-western part of BiH. It is bordered to the north with the municipalities of Bosanski Novi and Prijedor, to the east with the municipality of Banja Luka, to the south with the municipality of Ključ, and to the west with the municipalities of Bosanski Petrovac and Bosanska Krupa.
1246	P1342	After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, the municipality of Sanski Most was split into two parts, with one part belonging to the Federation of BiH and the other to the RS.
1247	P1343	After the start of the war in Croatia towards the end of 1991, inter-ethnic tensions started emerging in Sanski Most. As a result of mutual propaganda, Serbs, Muslims and Croats began arming themselves.

1248	P1344	One of the first signals of these tensions manifested on 28 February 1992. On this date, Vlado Vrkeš [the president of the local SDS] - with the assistance of members of the Serbian Defence Forces, a paramilitary group also known as the "SOS", and of the Serb police - forcibly took over the payments service in Sanski Most, known as the "SDK", by removing its Croatian director, Ankica Dobrijević, from the premises and appointing a Serb woman in her place.
1249	P1345	The SDK was a key body, which collected tax revenues and re-distributed them to the central government. After the takeover, the payments of the SDK were redirected to Banja Luka and Belgrade, rather than to the authorities of BiH in Sarajevo.
1250	P1346	In March 1992, local SDS officials acting on the orders of regional SDS officials in Banja Luka repeatedly requested the municipal assembly to discuss the issue of Sanski Most becoming part of the Bosnian-Serb Republic.
1251	P1347	When the assembly refused, the local SDS authorities called for a division of the municipality along ethnic lines.
1252	P1348	On 25 March 1992, by proclamation signed by the president of the local SDS Vlado Vrkeš, and the president of the Sanski Most municipal assembly Nedjeljko Rašula, all Serb territories in the municipality were declared part of the Bosnian-Serb Republic as the unified Serb municipality of Sanski Most.
1253	P1349	Acting on an order of General Momir Talić given on 1 April 1992, the [JNA] 6th Krajina Brigade, led by Colonel Basara, deployed to Sanski Most between 3 and 4 April 1992. Talić had tasked the brigade with, amongst other things, the prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts. Basara also commanded three military police battalions, out of a total of 13 battalions deployed in Sanski Most. By that time, the 6th Krajina Brigade was comprised exclusively of soldiers of Serb ethnicity.
1254	P1350	At some point between May and July 1992, the 6th Krajina Brigade incorporated under its command the Sanski Most TO, headed by former JNA officer Nedeljko Aničić, and conducted joint operations with it.
1255	P1351	The staff of the TO in Sanski Most was headquartered in a building adjacent to the police station. The TO was made up of Serbs of Sanski Most who had been mobilised.
1256	P1352	As part of Colonel Basara's retirement ceremony in December 1992, Vlado Vrkeš stated that "[t]hanks to commander Basara and [the] 6th Krajina Brigade, the Serbs have been saved from the genocide in Sanski Most that was being prepared against them".
1257	P1353	The SDS, the 6th Krajina Brigade, and the SOS all took part in the distribution of weapons to the Serb population, with Colonel Aničić as one of the architects of the operation.
1258	P1354	The SOS was a paramilitary formation of about 30 to 50 men formed at the end of 1991. The group wore camouflage uniforms, a combination of hats, bandanas, and occasionally a cockade or the insignia of a tri-coloured star.
1259	P1355	In the spring of 1992, the [SOS] group was incorporated into the 6th Krajina Brigade as a special unit. Notwithstanding this subordination, the SOS continued to perform tasks for the SDS and maintained at least some degree of independence.
1260	P1356	Starting in April 1992, the SOS planted explosives and destroyed shops and other businesses owned by non-Serbs in Sanski Most.
1261	P1357	In April and May 1992, the SOS destroyed about 44 buildings.

1262	P1358	On 3 April, the Serb assembly of Sanski Most decided that the municipality would become part of the ARK. The Serb crisis staff in Sanski Most issued a statement that, as of 20 April, only the Constitution and laws of the Bosnian-Serb Republic shall be in effect in the territory of Serb Sanski Most. On the same day, the crisis staff declared the former municipal assembly illegal.
1263	P1359	On 14 April 1992, during a meeting attended by Dragan Majkić [a member of the SDS and chief of the Public Security Services until 30 April 1992], members of the SDS executive committee, three members of the SOS, and an intelligence officer of the 6th Krajina Brigade, the Crisis Staff of Sanski Most was established.
1264	P1360	The Crisis Staff counted several SDS members among its staff, in addition to a member of the SOS, the Chief of the TO, and the commander of the 6th Krajina Brigade, Branko Basara, who was subordinated to General Momir Talić, Commander of the 1st KK.
1265	P1361	After its creation, the Crisis Staff exercised authority and took key decisions in relation to Sanski Most, including decisions related to the detention of people arrested after the beginning of military operations.
1266	P1362	The crisis staff dismissed many Muslims and Croats from their jobs, including judges and directors of public companies, the local radio, and the health centre; others were put off from going to work by the treatment they received there, and were replaced with Serbs.
1267	P1363	In March and April 1992, Serb forces, including soldiers of the JNA 6th Krajina Brigade, and Serb police, erected checkpoints in the town of Sanski Most and around non-Serb villages, and the crisis staff established a curfew prohibiting movement at night. At the checkpoints, armed Serb forces checked the Muslims that went through.
1268	P1364	On 11 April 1992, [...] Agil Draganović, the Muslim president of the Sanski Most municipal court, received a threatening letter signed by members of the White Eagles stating that he and the municipal deputy prosecutor, Enver Cerić, also a Muslim, were to leave Sanski Most by 15 May 1992 or their families would be harmed.
1269	P1365	On 15 May 1992, the Muslim employees of the court were informed by the Serb police that they had to take mandatory leave. Draganović was dismissed from his post and the judiciary authority was transferred to the Serbs, upon an order of the crisis staff.
1270	P1366	In Sanski Most, the SDS took control over the municipality on 19 April 1992 through an armed attack on the municipality building conducted by the JNA's 6th Krajina Brigade, TO forces and members of a Bosnian Serb paramilitary group known as the Red Berets.
1271	P1367	On 17 April 1992, Stojan Župljanin, head of Security Services Centre Banja Luka, ordered the division of the police along ethnic lines. Police officers were ordered to demonstrate their loyalty to the Serb municipality by wearing the insignia of the Bosnian-Serb Republic and signing a declaration that they would respect its laws and regulations. Only persons of Serb ethnicity signed the declaration.
1272	P1368	Some non-Serb police officers and SDA leaders took refuge in the municipality building, where negotiations between the political parties continued.

1273	P1369	On 19 April, the crisis staff addressed an ultimatum to those inside. The building was surrounded by soldiers of the JNA 6th Krajina Brigade. Those inside the building managed to flee to surrounding villages. Nedjeljko Rašula, as head of the crisis staff, dismissed Muslim and Croat officers from the police force.
1274	P1370	On the same day, Serb forces attacked the municipality building in the town. Around that time, members of the SOS who were supported by the SDS, armed with automatic weapons and dressed in camouflage, destroyed 28 shops and restaurants belonging to Muslims and Croats in the Sanski Most area.
1275	P1371	As a result of these attacks [on the Sanski Most municipality building and on Muslim and Croat property] and other acts of intimidation during March and April 1992, many Muslim and Croat inhabitants left the municipality.
1276	P1372	On 20 April 1992, the Crisis Staff held a meeting in which it reached a number of conclusions in relation to the events that had unfolded in Sanski Most in the previous days. It instructed Rašula and Aničić to visit the ARK leadership, explain in detail the situation in Sanski Most, and try to obtain guidelines or suggestions for further action.
1277	P1373	The Serbian Crisis Staff also stated [at the meeting on 20 April 1992] that the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most did not recognise the former municipal assembly and that it only recognised the legitimacy of the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most and its organs, namely the Serbian TO, the Serbian SJB, and the JNA. In addition, it assigned Vručinić to the intelligence service at the Crisis Staff, with the task of coordinating the work of the Serbian SJB and TO. Finally, any other armed force in Sanski Most was deemed paramilitary and would be disarmed.
1278	P1374	On 29 April 1992, the Crisis Staff issued a decision replacing non-Serb officials holding key public positions with officials of Serb ethnicity. Muslims and Croats were removed from their jobs as directors of radio stations, banks, schools, companies, and other important positions.
1279	P1375	During April and May 1992, with a peak between 20 and 25 May 1992, there were about 44 explosions in Sanski Most, as well as shootings and killings. These actions were mainly carried out against Croatian and Muslim persons and property.
1280	P1376	During May 1992, various armed groups were seen in the municipality, including the SOS, the White Eagles, and local SUP and JNA Units.
1281	P1377	After 20 May 1991, upon orders of the Crisis Staff, the JNA and the TO carried out an operation to confiscate illegal weapons which only targeted citizens of Muslim and Croatian ethnicity.
1282	P1378	On 25 May 1992, calls upon Muslims to surrender their weapons to the Serb authorities were broadcast over Sanski Most radio. Serb patrols collected the weapons.
1283	P1379	The broadcasts also called on several named individuals – wealthy Muslims and Muslim intellectuals – to surrender.
1284	P1380	On the evening [of 25 May 1992], Sanski Most town was shelled by Serb forces. Serb forces also shelled the hamlet of Okreč, which was predominantly Muslim.
1285	P1381	At the end of May 1992, after calls for disarmament had been made, attacks were launched on the Bosnian Muslim neighbourhoods and villages of Mahala, Muhići, Begići, Hrustovo, Vrhpolje and some other small villages. These attacks were planned well in advance by the army and the municipal Crisis Staff, and were carried out by the army acting jointly with the SOS.

1286	P1382	The attacks followed a similar pattern. Heavy shelling from outside the targeted neighbourhoods or villages caused severe damage and people were killed. The shelling forced the inhabitants of these villages to flee. After the troops had entered the villages, a number of people who had not fled were killed. Houses were looted and people fleeing were deprived of the valuables that they were carrying with them. Upon the armed attack by Bosnian Serb soldiers on the hamlet of Begići, between 20 and 30 Bosnian Muslim men were taken towards the Vrhpolje bridge which spans the Sana River where they were ordered to jump off the bridge. Once in the water, the soldiers opened fire upon them. A total of at least 28 persons were killed in this event.
1287	P1383	In the period between end of May to August 1992, Serb forces attacked many majority-Muslim villages and settlements in the municipality.
1288	P1384	On or around 25 May, the JNA 6th Krajina Brigade and the TO also launched an artillery attack on the Muslim settlements of Mahala, Muhići, and Otoka. Serb soldiers forced Mahala residents to gather at a training ground and then shelled the village and partially destroyed houses and the local mosque.
1289	P1386	After 26 May 1992, the SOS and members of the 6th Krajina Brigade set on fire and destroyed non-Serb houses in Mahala, Bagići, and other non-Serb villages after conducting military operations against them.
1290	P1387	Starting on 26 or 27 May 1992 and continuing throughout 1992, after conducting military operations against non-Serb villages and settlements, members of the 6th Krajina Brigade, including its military police, arrested about 1,600 able-bodied Muslims and Croats. These people were detained in the remand facility attached to the Sanski Most Public Security Services, in the three garages of the Betonirka factory, and in the gym of the Hasan Kikić School, also known as the "sports hall". Members of the police, the TO, and the 6th Krajina Brigade took part in guarding these facilities.
1291	P1388	Serb Forces also detained, for short periods of time, Muslim and Croat women and children who left their homes following the attacks and before civilian authorities organised convoys to move them to Muslim-controlled territory.
1292	P1389	On 27 May 1992, between 50 to 100 Serb soldiers surrounded the majority-Muslim village of Lukavica and ordered the village be evacuated for the purpose of searching the houses for weapons.
1293	P1390	Also on 27 May, Serb forces shelled the village of Hrustovo, an almost exclusively Muslim village. On 30 May, the Muslims of the village decided to hand in their weapons, but the shelling continued.
1294	P1391	[On 31 May 1992], as people from 21 households were forced to leave Jelečevići, a Muslim hamlet in the area of Hrustovo, about 30 women and children and one man took refuge inside a garage. Eight to ten Serb soldiers in camouflage uniform came to the garage and ordered the Muslims out. A man who tried to mediate was shot and the soldiers killed sixteen women and children when they tried to run away.
1295	P1392	Between 50 and 100 Serb soldiers escorted the survivors with around 200 inhabitants of neighbouring villages to the hamlet of Kljevci, where their valuables were confiscated. Serb soldiers detained the villagers at various locations before transporting them by bus and train to Doboj, where they were ordered to find their way to Muslim-held territory.
1296	P1393	On or around 28 May 1992, the Muslim village of Vrhpolje was shelled by Serb forces. Shortly thereafter, the inhabitants were summoned to hand in their weapons. They were told that that was a condition for them to be allowed to leave their village.

1297	P1394	On 31 May or 1 June 1992, Serb soldiers led by Jadranko Palja escorted nineteen Muslim men from the hamlet of Donji Begići to Vrhpolje bridge. Four of the men were killed by the soldiers along the way. The others arriving on the bridge were surrounded by 50 Serb soldiers, forced to surrender their belongings, beaten, and ordered to jump off the bridge. From the bridge the soldiers shot at the men in the water and killed almost all of them.
1298	P1395	In late May 1992, Serb forces began to arrest Croat and Muslim leaders. Some, including the secretary of the SDA municipal board, a Muslim judge, and the municipal chief of police, were killed.
1299	P1396	The conditions at the police station were bad, with little food, insufficient space to lie down, no toilet, and no shower. Police officers, soldiers and ordinary citizens severely beat the detainees on a regular basis. The detainees were not given any medical treatment.
1300	P1397	Mirzet Karabeg, president of the executive board of the municipal assembly, was detained at the Sanski Most police station and in the Betonirka prison camp from 25 May to 28 August 1992. In the police station, he was held together with fourteen prominent Muslim and Croat civilians, and in Betonirka together with 75 persons.
1301	P1398	Approximately 30 men were detained in Betonirka prison camp by June 1992. At four or five meters, the building where the detainees were kept was so crowded that the detainees were forced to sleep sitting up. The detainees were provided with insufficient food and water. Serb police officers and outsiders who were allowed into the camp beat and mistreated the detainees.
1302	P1399	A Muslim religious leader from Vrhpolje, Emir Seferović, was mistreated more frequently than other detainees and was forced by prison guards to eat pork.
1303	P1400	In early July 1992, all Muslims from Hrustovo, Trnopolje, and Kamićak who had sought refuge in Tomina elementary school were taken to the Krings Hall in Sanski Most, where they were detained with 600 others. The hygiene conditions at this detention centre were extremely poor. Serb police officers beat the detainees with batons and rifles, and [...] one man [was] beaten to death in July 1992.
1304	P1401	The crisis staff [of Sanski Most] decided on 2 July 1992 that departure from the municipality would be granted to persons who had given a statement to the municipal authority that they were permanently leaving the municipality and who had exchanged their immovable property or surrendered it to the municipality.
1305	P1402	In the Municipality of Sanski Most, Bosnian Muslim representatives met with Bosnian Serb municipal authorities and representatives of the SDS on several occasions between June and August 1992, during which they requested that the Bosnian Serb municipal authorities organize convoys so that Bosnian Muslims could safely leave the area.
1306	P1403	They organized a convoy of approximately 2,000 Muslim men, women, children and elderly that left for Travnik at the beginning of August 1992.
1307	P1404	Bosnian Serb civilian and military police also escorted a Travnik-bound convoy of approximately 2,500 Bosnian Muslim men, women, children and elderly on 2 and 3 September 1992.
1308	P1405	Bosnian Muslim representatives met with Bosnian Serb municipal authorities on several different occasions to discuss the movement of Bosnian Muslim populations from Bosanski Novi for security reasons, including to Karlovac.

1309	P1406	On 1 August, a group of soldiers in olive-coloured uniform with a red stripe pinned to their epaulettes came to Lukavica and broke into several houses. They led away fourteen civilian men aged 22 to 60 years. The following day, the villagers found the bodies of thirteen of the men, marked with bullet holes and severe wounds.
1310	P1407	On 5 August, the Sanski Most Public Security Station reported that in the previous two months, there had been a great deal of activity by certain paramilitary groups that had 'broken free' from the command of the army and conducted their own operations, such as planting explosives, torching houses, killings, [...] and other types of crime against the Muslim and Croatian population, all aimed at acquiring material profit and putting pressure on them to move out. It further referred to 45 explosions that had been set off at Muslim houses and business premises, and two mosques destroyed. It reported that it had registered four such groups, among them the SOS group, a former paramilitary group with a strength of around 30 men, which had formally been placed under the command of the local military unit.
1311	P1408	[I]n total, more than 88 Muslim civilians were killed by Serb forces in the municipality of Sanski Most in the period end of May to August 1992.
1312	P1409	As a result of the attacks and other acts of intimidation, many Muslims and Croats left the municipality. Serb forces also detained more than 1,500 mainly Muslim and Croat civilians in eighteen detention facilities in the municipality. The detainees were mistreated on a regular basis. During September 1992, convoys of thousands of Muslims left the municipality. They were forced to surrender their property to the municipality.
1313	P1410	Serb Forces destroyed the Sanksi Most town mosque, located at the entrance of Mahala, and the mosques in Sehovići, Hrustovo-Vrhopolje, Lukaviće, Kamengrad, and Tomina.



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<input type="checkbox"/> Motion/ <i>Requête</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Judgement/ <i>Jugement/Arrêt</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Book of Authorities/ <i>Recueil de sources</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Warrant/ <i>Mandat</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Decision/ <i>Décision</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Submission from parties/ <i>Écritures déposées par des parties</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Affidavit/ <i>Déclaration sous serment</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Appeal/ <i>Acte d'appel</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Order/ <i>Ordonnance</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Submission from non-parties/ <i>Écritures déposées par des tiers</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Indictment/ <i>Acte d'accusation</i>	

II - TRANSLATION STATUS ON THE FILING DATE/ ÉTAT DE LA TRADUCTION AU JOUR DU DÉPÔT

<input type="checkbox"/> Translation not required/ <i>La traduction n'est pas requise</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Filing Party hereby submits only the original, and requests the Registry to translate/ <i>La partie déposante ne soumet que l'original et sollicite que le Greffe prenne en charge la traduction : (Word version of the document is attached/ La version Word est jointe)</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> English/ <i>Anglais</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> French/ <i>Français</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kinyarwanda <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B/C/S <input type="checkbox"/> Other/Autre(specify/préciser) :
<input type="checkbox"/> Filing Party hereby submits both the original and the translated version for filing, as follows/ <i>La partie déposante soumet l'original et la version traduite aux fins de dépôt, comme suit :</i>
Original/ Original en <input type="checkbox"/> English/ <i>Anglais</i> <input type="checkbox"/> French/ <i>Français</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kinyarwanda <input type="checkbox"/> Other/Autre (specify/préciser) :
Translation/ Traduction en <input type="checkbox"/> English/ <i>Anglais</i> <input type="checkbox"/> French/ <i>Français</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kinyarwanda <input type="checkbox"/> Other/Autre (specify/préciser) :
<input type="checkbox"/> Filing Party will be submitting the translated version(s) in due course in the following language(s)/ <i>La partie déposante soumettra la (les) version(s) traduite(s) sous peu, dans la (les) langue(s) suivante(s) :</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> English/ <i>Anglais</i> <input type="checkbox"/> French/ <i>Français</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Kinyarwanda <input type="checkbox"/> B/C/S <input type="checkbox"/> Other/Autre (specify/préciser) :