THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-04-84-T

IN TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: **Judge Alphons Orie, Presiding**
Judge Frank Höpfel
Judge Ole Bjørn Støle

Registrar: **Mr. Hans Holthuis**

Date Filed: **7 November 2007**

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* EXHIBIT LIST

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A. Overview

1. The Prosecution seeks to tender a number of documents on its Rule 65 *ter* exhibit list. The documents fall into five categories: (i) statements of the Accused; (ii) maps; (iii) KLA documents; (iv) VJ documents; and (v) ICRC missing person reports. Each of the documents has sufficient relevance and probative value to be admitted into evidence.

2. The parties have yet to finalize their agreement on forensic facts. Should agreement not be reached as anticipated, the Prosecution may seek to tender certain forensic material contained in the following Rule 65 *ter* numbers: 910, 911, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 953, 955, and 987. This material relates to the matter of bullets found in or near the bodies of victims in the indictment.

B. Discussion

3. A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value. "The threshold standard for the admission of evidence … should not be set excessively high."[1]

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[1] *Haradinaj et al.*, Decision on Admission into Evidence of Documents Tendered During Testimony of Bislim Zyrapi, 15 October 2007, para. 8 (citing several Trial Chambers that have approved this pronouncement by the *Čelibiči* Trial Chamber). The Prosecution relies on its discussion of this

4. Parties may tender exhibits from the bar table as long as the twin requirements of relevance and probative value in Rule 89(c) are met.[2] The same general standard applies to statements made by an accused.[3] As set forth in the description of the documents below, each of the documents the Prosecution seeks to tender meets this standard.

i. Statements by the Accused

A Narrative About War and Freedom (Dialogue with the Commander Ramush Haradinaj)

5. This document is an extended interview of the Accused Ramush Haradinaj by Bardh Hamzaj published in 1999. Rule 65 *ter* number 146 is the English version of this book, and Rule 65 *ter* number 283 is the Albanian version. The English version is attached as Annex A.

6. Haradinaj has acknowledged the authenticity of this book and its admissibility in these proceedings. Annex B is a letter dated 9 January 2007 from the Haradinaj Defence to the Prosecution relating to agreed facts proposed by the Prosecution. In it, the Haradinaj Defence acknowledged that the book was compiled from interviews of Haradinaj by Bardh Hamzaj, and stated that "there is no dispute as to the authenticity or admissibility of the book in its entirety."

7. The book contains many statements by Haradinaj relevant to live issues in this case such as the level of organization of the KLA during the indictment period, Haradinaj's *de facto* control of the Dukagjin area KLA in early 1998, Haradinaj's involvement in arming the KLA, and Haradinaj's efforts to organize the KLA in the Dukagjin area and unify it under his command. Examples of matters of relevance include the following:

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standard in this case contained in the Prosecution Submissions in Relation to Admission into Evidence of KLA Documents, 10 May 2007, paras. 5-18.

[2] *Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski*, IT-04-82-T, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Admission of Exhibits from the Bar Table with Confidential Annexes A to E, 14 May 2007, para. 9; *Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al.*, IT-05-87-T, Decision on Prosecution's Third Request for Admission of Documents from the Bar Table, 23 March 2007, paras. 3-5.

[3] *Prosecutor v. Halilović*, IT-01-48-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Admission of Record of Interview of the Accused from the Bar Table, 19 August 2005, para. 14.

- When Haradinaj returned to Kosovo in February 1998, it was his mission to "make the population acknowledge the war, … to involve everyone in this war";[4]
- By early March 1998, Haradinaj was using his house in Gllogjan to store weapons and was distributing weapons where they were needed. By mid-March he had created his "network" in the Dukagjin area;[5]
- By the end of February 1998, Haradinaj had created a KLA base in Smolica;[6]
- After 24 March 1998, KLA forces in Gllogjan expanded their operations to surrounding villages such as Irzniq, Baballoq, Gramocelj, and Shaptej;[7]
- Idriz Balaj ("the Lieutenant") led the Black Eagles special unit. He operated in Gllogjan training young fighters in the period following 24 March 1998.[8]
- On 23 May 1998, Haradinaj invited representatives of approximately 30 KLA village headquarters to a meeting in Gllogjan at which he announced that the group would constitute the KLA Staff for Dukagjin. Although this staff did not include a representative from the Jabllanica KLA headquarters, from 23 May, Haradinaj exercised authority over the operations of the Jabllanica KLA;[9] and
- When the FARK unit under Tahir Zemaj entered the Dukagjin zone, Haradinaj sent the unit to Prapaqan for training. After the unit arrived in Prapaqan, KLA soldiers from Prapaqan reported to Haradinaj that FARK soldiers were calling the KLA "Cowboy Ramush's soldiers." Haradinaj immediately went to the Prapaqan, and gave the FARK half an hour to leave the premises.[10]

Transcript of 5 September 2001 Interview of Ramush Haradinaj by Marlene Schneiper

8. The recording of this interview, conducted in French, as well as an English translation of the interview, is Rule 65 *ter* number 220. The English translation is attached as Annex C. Annex D is the seizure record of this interview indicating that the recording was received by the OTP from Ms. Schneiper in November

[4] p.50.
[5] p.52.
[6] p.49.
[7] pp.66-67.
[8] p.66 and pp.104-105.
[9] pp.71-72.
[10] pp.87-90.

2004. Because the interview was audio recorded, it is a particularly reliable record of Haradinaj's words.

9. The interview contains several statements relevant to the intensity of the armed conflict during the indictment period, and Haradinaj's command and control in the Dukagjin area. Particularly relevant are the following:

- According to Haradinaj, the attack on the Haradinaj family compound on 24 March 1998 was "how open warfare began where we lived;"[11]
- Haradinaj organized and commanded successful operations against the Serb forces;[12]
- During the war, Haradinaj's base was "Peć, Decane, Đakovica, up until the region of Klina." Haradinaj stated that "I was there the whole time. From March '98 to June '99, 15 months of open warfare."[13]

Notebook Seized from the Home of Idriz Balaj

10. Rule 65 *ter* number 40 is a notebook seized from Idriz Balaj's house by UNMIK Police. The original Albanian and the English translation are attached as Annex E. Attached as Annex F are search and seizure records from UNMIK police indicating that this notebook was seized from Idriz Balaj's bedroom (along with other items including Balaj's KLA identity card) during a search of his house by UNMIK police on 18 June 2002. Idriz Balaj's name, birth date and place of birth are written in the first pages of the notebook.

11. The notebook contains a retrospective of events of 1998 written from the perspective of Balaj as the first person. The retrospective contains evidence relevant to Haradinaj's command of Balaj and the KLA in the Dukagjin Zone, Balaj's command of the Black Eagles unit, and Haradinaj's participation in the creation of the Black Eagles. Relevant material in this notebook includes the following:

[11] p.9
[12] pp.9-10
[13] p.10.

- Balaj entered Kosovo at the beginning of April in a large convoy of soldiers and mules laden with weapons;[14]
- The group arrived at Brahimaj's house in Jabllanica where they met "Commander Ramush Haradinaj" who had been wounded;[15]
- Balaj began training soldiers in Jabllanica until they moved to Gllgojan where Balaj continued training soldiers;[16] and
- The Black Eagles special unit was created by Balaj with the help of Haradinaj on 14 April 1998 in the village of Gllogjan. In each village, Balaj assembled young men and trained them for the Black Eagles with Haradinaj's assistance.[17]

12. In addition to the fact that the diary is written in the first person, that it contains Balaj's name and personal details in the first few pages, and that it was seized from Idriz Balaj's bedroom, the 1998 retrospective is consistent with evidence the Trial Chamber has heard from other sources.

13. For example, Peter Shala testified that, while he served as a KLA officer in Jabllanica, Balaj was in Jabllanica training young solders. When Gllogjan was attacked, Balaj went to Gllogjan, and was later based in Irzniq.[18] This evidence is consistent with the above extracts from the notebook. Peter Shala also testified that after four or five weeks in Jabllanica, Shala went to Gllogjan.[19] Balaj's notebook states that, after some time training soldiers in Jabllanica, he went to Gllogjan with some of the "best lads there" including a person by the name of "Pjeter." Shala also testified that Gjelal Hajda was a commander at Jabllanica,[20] and one of the copies of Shala's KLA Military Police rules was signed by Gjelal Hajda, a.k.a. "Toni."[21] Balaj's notebook states that, while at Jabllanica, Balaj was the deputy commander of Toni (Xhelal Hajda).[22]

[14] U008-3560-U008-3561.
[15] U008-3561
[16] U008-3561-U008-3563.
[17] U008-3564-U008-3565.
[18] P.Shala:T.9969-9970.
[19] P.Shala:T.9945.
[20] P.Shala:T.9946-9947.
[21] P1167; P.Shala:T.9962.
[22] U008-3461.

14. For these reasons, whether or not the retrospective in the notebook was written in Balaj's own hand or not, it constitutes an authentic and reliable record of Idriz Balaj's activities in 1998.

ii. Maps

15. The Prosecution seeks to tender from the bar table the following maps from the Prosecution's map book distributed to the Trial Chamber and the Defence at the beginning of trial:

- Map 3: Municipalities in Kosovo (65 *ter* # 1003)
- Map 5: Kosovo Physical and Municipalities - Albanian 1997 (65 *ter* # 1005)
- Map 8: Dakovica (65 *ter* # 1008)
- Map 9: Dakovica - topographic (65 *ter* # 1009)
- Map 10: Decan (65 *ter* # 1010)
- Map 11: Decan - topographic (65 *ter* # 1011)
- Map 12: Pec (65 *ter* # 1012)
- Map 13: Pec - topographic (65 *ter* # 1013)
- Map 14: Klina (65 *ter* # 1014)
- Map 15: Klina - topographic (65 *ter* # 1015)

16. These maps provide neutral and reliable evidence of geographical features such as villages, rivers, and altitudes that are relevant to the case. Some maps have been admitted into evidence,[23] but the admission of these exhibits will ensure that the parties and the Trial Chamber have a comprehensive set of maps forming part of the trial record that can be relied on when referring to geographical features.

iii. KLA Documents

17. The Prosecution seeks to tender the 16 KLA documents in Annex H. The relevance and reliability of each of these documents is discussed in the chart attached as Annex G. As indicated in Annex G, the provenance of all but one of these documents (Rule 65 *ter* number 310) has been established by the 6 November 2007 declaration of Harjit Sandhu, the 7 November 2007 declaration of Barney

[23] For example, Map 6, Crime Base Locations, and Map 7, Lake Radonjić Area, have been admitted as D32 and P10 respectively.

Kelly, or the 5 November 2007 declaration of Deyan Mihov, all of which have been filed by the Prosecution.[24]

(iv) VJ Documents

18. The Prosecution seeks to tender three VJ documents contained in Annex J. These documents contain the headings, numberings, signatures and stamps typical of VJ documents that are sufficient to establish their authenticity.

19. Rule 65 *ter* number 434 is an official note dated 24 May 1998 by the Military Police Staff at Prizren. It relates to the arrest of five armed men in KLA uniforms on 23 May 1998 in the Popovac village sector by the VJ. This arrest is referred to in the Rule 92 *ter* statement of Dragan Živanović[25] and exhibit P1049 MFI. Rule 65 *ter* 434 adds to this existing evidence by showing that the arrested individuals were in KLA uniforms and were armed with automatic weapons and ammunition. These factors are relevant to the organization of the KLA, and the existence of an armed conflict at that time.

20. Rule 65 *ter* number 437 is a Priština Corps report, dated 27 May 1998, issued by Colonel Vladimir Lazarević. The report states that, on 27 May 1998, a large group of terrorist forces was present on the northern slopes of Radonjićka Suka. This document is relevant to show that any Serbian presence at, or control of, the Radonjićka Suka feature at this time was of a limited nature.

21. Rule 65 *ter* number 450 is a Priština Corps Forward Command Post report dated 6 June 1998, issued by Major General Nebojša Pavković. The report contains information relating to the arming of Jasić village obtained from fifteen people of Roma ethnicity who had fled from Jasić village. This corroborates the evidence of Witness 38 and Gen. Dragan Živanović that Witness 38 and her family fled from the KLA and was eventually given assistance and protection by VJ forces near

[24] *Haradinaj et al.*, Declaration of Deyan Mihov on Provenance and Chain of Custody of Certain KLA Documents, 6 November 2007; *Haradinaj et al.*, Prosecution's Submission of Chain of Custody Information for Exhibits Tendered Through Bislim Zyrapi, 7 November 2007.
[25] P1017, para.81.

Batuša; and that Witness 38 had been detained in Jasić and provided information about KLA arming in that village to the VJ.[26]

(v) ICRC Missing Person Reports

22. Annex K contains ICRC missing person reports for Nenad Remištar, Ivan Zarić, Agron Berisha, Kujtim Imeraj, Xhevat Berisha, and Tush Frrokaj downloaded from the ICRC website. These reports are contained in Rule 65 *ter* numbers 888 and 890.

23. The date and place of the last news of the victims on these reports provides corroboration of the evidence of Prosecution witnesses on these matters. For example, the missing person reports for Ivan Zarić and Agron Berisha state that the date and place of last news is 19 May 2005. This corroborates evidence that the Trial Chamber has heard from a protected witness about the disappearance of Ivan Zarić, Agron Berisha, and Burim Bejta.

C. Conclusion

24. For these reasons, the Prosecution requests the Trial Chamber to admit into evidence each of the Rule 65 *ter* list documents described in this motion and contained in Annexes A, C, E, H, J, and K, or the Prosecution's map book.

Word Count: 2322 words

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7 November 2007
The Hague
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[26] P1017, paras.49-59; Witness 38:T.741-743 and 747.

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ANNEX A
RULE 65 *TER* 146: DIALOGUE OF WAR AND FREEDOM

II-04-84-1 24957

Bardh HAMZAJ

U0090722

A NARRATIVE ABOUT WAR AND FREEDOM

(Dialog with the commander Ramush Haradinaj)

[redacted]

U0090723

U0090724

ZËRI

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Bardh Hamzaj

A NARRATIVE ABOUT WAR AND FREEDOM

(Dialog with the commander Ramush Haradinaj)

Translated from Albanian by Engjëllushë Morina

Prishtina
2000

ZERI

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THE SOLDIER OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVA

Hardly anyone had heard of Ramush Haradinaj in Kosova until the spring of 1998. He was one of the hundred thousand young Albanians who were forced to leave Kosova. As a child he suffered from the arrest of many members of his family. Later on he witnessed the peaceful demonstrations in Kosova, when he concluded that use of force would be necessary for the liberation of Kosova.

To that end Ramush Haradinaj spent years in exile. He would return to Kosova whenever there was a need to promote the process for an armed struggle. From the beginning he took charge of the war effort in Dukagjini area. He had put everything at the service of this cause: his personal wealth, that of his family, even his life.

After the heroic death of the Jasharaj family in Prekaz, an event that he considers as the end of the mayhem and the beginning of the Albanian renewal, he was put as the person in command of the war in Dukagjini.

He did not start the war to die. He started the war to win. Knowing that he could be killed and that the war will be left without the winner, he decided to find the one that could not be killed. He came to a conclusion that that was only one: NATION. Therefore, he says "I came with a mission, to give the war to the nation". Not that he has solved this problem, for himself, he says, that he is nothing more and nothing less than "The soldier of the independence of Kosova, for which I will fight until I get it".

During the war he went through the situations that were unbearable. He lost two younger brothers, lost many co-fighters, lost

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battles from the biggest force in the Balkans, he faced the break up of a large number of his army, he was insulted from his co-fighters...At one point he was left with 50 soldiers only when he raised the Albanian flag opposite an army that was considered to have tens of thousands of troops in Kosova and hundreds of others in reserve.

-I fought with my hands tight-says he-because the opponent would take all his anger for his losses out on the unprotected civilian population.

Even though, he never lost faith that one day he will win the war.

When it was time to fight he did not speak, although he had a lot to say. Now he has opened his mouth and his heart. He speaks with the same decisiveness like he fought, about the war, his friends, about speculators and about the enemy. He praises and accuses without any hesitation. He speaks openly, just like his war that was open.

The pages of this book will offer you the story of the Commander that is a living legend.

The legend is not complete. It is only a part of it...

The author

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I

INTERROGATIONS, ARRESTS, THE DEPARTURE FROM KOSOVA

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I NEVER THOUGHT THAT THE WAR SHOULD SPREAD THROUGH OUT ALL ALBANIAN INHABITED TERRITORIES

- **How should Ramush Haradinaj introduce himself to the readers of this book?**

HARADINAJ: I was born on 3 of July 1968 in the village of Gllogjan, Deqan municipality. I finished primary school and the first two years of secondary school in "Vëllezërit Frashëri" school in Irzniq with excellent results. The first part of the third year of secondary school I continued in Deqan, and the second part of the third year I moved to Gjakova where I finished secondary school in "Hysni Zajmi" school. I studied Atomic Physics with the intention of studying Astronomy at University which was expected to be a new discipline at the Faculty of Science in the University of Prishtina.

- **Why did you move from Deqan to Gjakova?**

HARADINAJ: I had a surname that was unpopular with the regime of those days, especially because of a close cousin that was arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison in 1981. I was warned that I would have difficulties; therefore, I decided to move and go where my surname was little known.

- **Is this when your education in Kosova finished?**

HARADINAJ: After I finished Secondary School, I had all kinds of difficulties in preparing the necessary documentation for enrolment in the University, because a political suitability and various other checks were required. Even so, I managed to

complete the necessary paperwork and enroll at the university for the 1987/1988 academic year. Before I started studying I volunteered for military service, which I started in Pirot near Nish. After three months of service in the then Yugoslav National Army, I was promoted to the rank of corporal, and I carried out other duties such as; the detection of poisonous chemicals, I specialized in radio communications, I served in air defense, and in the last three months I was responsible for a military warehouse called 'Izvor' near Dimitrovgrad on the border with Bulgaria.

- **And then you continued your studies?**

HARADINAJ: I was determined to continue higher education, but the political situation in Kosova was becoming graver and the possibility of acting was decreasing. At that time different Albanian citizens in Kosova were organizing many demonstrations. My decision then was that; nothing concrete and valuable could be achieved through these demonstrations. I began to discuss my future, that was very closely linked with the economic situation of my family (I was the oldest son), outside Kosova. As an economic émigré I went to Switzerland where my uncles were living at that time, who helped me to find a job.

- **When did this happen?**

HARADINAJ: In early 1989. I had different seasonal jobs, usually in a joinery. During the winter, when there was not enough work, I would come back to Kosova and in the spring I went back to Switzerland.

- **All this to and fro Switzerland was legal.**

HARADINAJ: Yes, I had the proper documentation. The first open conflict I had with the regime of those days was in

1991, but before I start talking about this let me tell you first that after I finished military service I was called for the so-called 'informative conversations' (questioning /cross-examination /interrogations) a few times by the Yugoslav security service.

- **What was the reason for these interviews?**

PRESSURE BY THE POLICE AND OFFERS OF CO-OPERATION

HARADINAJ: They called them 'informative conversations'. But in essence they were requests for my co-operation. They had been given reports from the military command where I served about my well developed individual skills. These conversations usually took place in Peja and they were actually asking my help in those areas that they had learned that I mastered extremely well. I think that the Yugoslav security service saw in me either a danger or a potential asset.

- **Do you remember any details from these 'conversations'?**

HARADINAJ: Yes. 'Conversations' were different. I was asked why I refused to became a member of the Communist League of Yugoslavia (Lidhja Komuniste e Jugoslavis-LKJ) while I was doing my military service, why didn't I join now, why I did not accept to go and study in Belgrade where they were offering to send me, why did I not accept the actual duties that they were offering, why did I think that Kosova should become a Republic or an Independent state, and why the Albanians could not coexist with the other nationalities of Yugoslavia, why did I think that the demonstrations of 1981 were useful and why I supported those demonstrations, they were asking me whether I knew that these demonstrations were counterrevolutionary, etcetera. These 'conversations' with me were developed in this context more or less. I was also summoned for further

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'conversations' during my return to Kosova from Switzerland. The Yugoslav Security Services were informed about my whereabouts. In 1990 I was involved in activities that took part outside Kosova, I was especially connected with the LPK (Lidhja Populore e Kosovës/National League of Kosova) and its activities and the most nationalist Albanian émigré group in Switzerland. In March 1991, in Deqan, I was arrested by the Serbian security forces together with some other citizens. It was at a time when in Kosova were a lot of violent demonstrations, when there was a lot of stoning, breaking and burning of cars...They kept us in prison for two days and nights, after which they took us to the court. The judge was from Pozhari, I can't remember his name, and he was the son of Pozhari Imam who decided that we were innocent. There were some witnesses who were Serbian police, one of them was a policeman called Vula, infamous for all the dreadful things that he did to Albanians. As far as I am concerned, the accusation that I had participated in these demonstrations was without foundation, because I was not an actual participant, I was only a passer-by.

- **So you were not a participant or an organizer of those demonstrations?**

HARADINAJ: No. Neither a participant nor an organiser I was more of an observer of those demonstrations. That is when I saw how the Serbian police would use the breaking of windows, the burning of cars, the puncturing of car tires etcetera, for their own purposes.

- **When did you last leave Kosova believing that you could not came back legally?**

HARADINAJ: After the court case in Deçan, they Serbian security services were serious. New accusations were issued in Peja; I was accused of the burning of cars, which meant that I had endangered the life of the policemen. So one day I got a

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summons from the court of Deçan, I was asked to appear in court where a file about me had already been prepared. I could sense that they would arrest me, so immediately that day I left for Lubjana taking just my identity card.

- **Do you remember when this happened?**

DEPARTURE FROM KOSOVA

HARADINAJ: In March 1991. I did not travel from Peja or Deqan like I usually did, but I traveled from Gjakova, I got on the bus in Gjakova for Lublana, which went through Prizren, Ferizaj and so on. I gave my passport and other documents to a distant cousin who would take them to Lublana and deliver them to me in Lublana. This is how I organised my trip to Lublana where I took all my documents and went to Switzerland. I worked as a laborer; I was involved in many sports activities, including long distance running in mountainous terrain such as the famous "Eagle", "Aile", "Aile Ezen" race which is up to 22 kilometers long. I had quite a good time in these competitions in which world class runners usually competed. I trained for this type of event regularly and then I applied for the original competition; a 33 kilometer run, with climes of 2 kilometers and 200 meters altitude. I immediately got involved in the Vietnamese martial art "Vjet Vudat, Kung Fu". I trained intensively for long hours and during the weekends, and on my own as well. I built up my muscles and improved my physical condition through every day training. In other words I aimed to master this martial art. At the end of this year (1991), I went to Tirana where I stayed for some time and where I also met my cousin Naim who had left Kosova 11 years previously and emigrated to Sweden. Naimi was friends with the then Albanian ambassador to Sweden Mr. Petrit Bushati who had been, prior to that, an ambassador to Austria. At Mr. Bushatis' family we also met his father Mr. Seit Bushati who was an amazing man and I can say that meeting with Mr. Seit Bushati

helped me a lot in preparing me physiologically and in other ways for what I was going to do later on.

- **Where you at this time particularly occupied organising an armed resistance in Kosova?**

HARADINAJ: Ever since I was a secondary school student, I saw the Serbian forces as the enemy and my vision was quite clear. Perhaps the fate of my extended family and the imprisonment of many family members were decisive factors in drawing me to these conclusion. As early as 1981, when I was quite young, I knew that the use of force would be the only solution for resolving the problem of Kosova. This was my personal belief that strengthened continuously, and it was not influenced by anyone. This was why I committed myself to different sports and other similar activities. And this was also the reason for my trips to Albania, to specifically explore the possibilities of benefiting from the Albanian State mechanisms in order to help the armed resistance in Kosova. This is why I met up with my cousin Naim who together with his father and other members of his family were the founders of earlier movements; and knowing that they worked in this field, I insisted and requested that we meet up and combine forces, and reasons and work for a common purpose. I was aware of other activities that took place as early as 1991 but I was never directly linked to any of these groups. So different movements existed as early as 1991, that resulted in the creation of the Front (Frontit; alb), but as I said, I was never a direct member of any of these movements. From the earliest experience I had; the arrests of 1981-1990, I was convinced that actions should be prudent and that the work should be done with people who had been trained professionally and not only with people who had strong patriotic feelings. This is the reason why I stayed slightly detached when it came to co-operation, I was very careful in choosing my partners, I never worked with people that I did not know very well. As early as 1991 I started buying the first military equipment in Albania,

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such as: hand grenades, small bombs, and pistols all intended for use in Kosova.

- **What conclusion did you reach about using Albania's state institutions to help organise armed resistance in Kosova?**

HARADINAJ: Albania was an unknown place for me, and my first job was to get to know and study closely the institutions of the country, such as; the army, the police, and other services. I was trying to get in touch with people in these other services, who could help me at the appropriate time. I was aware of other preparations that were taking place at that time from other people, such as Mentor Kaqi, and later on the Ministry of Defence's efforts together with the Union of ex-policemen. I never wanted to undertake any operations that would include all these institutions, but I tried to find a distinctive way that would be my way of functioning. This is how I started my first operations, which involved getting to know a number of people in the Albanian police force and a number of former policemen. I also got to know a particular number of Albanian military people who were active at that time. I contacted a number of people in the government as well, whom I studied to see how we could use them later to help the war. The phase when the operations actually started was in 1996, when we employed former and serving officers of the Albanian Army in order to train the soldiers and also to help us find routes for moving military equipment.

- **Did you ever count on any institutional support from the Albanian state?**

HARADINAJ: To tell you the truth I could see that the Albanian government had huge problems. In other words there was a real war on who was going to run the country. Sali Berisha was in dispute with other people in the government, he was also

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in a battle with other people in the government using undemocratic means, so it was not that easy to think that Albania's institutions would be able to get involved fully in helping the war in Kosova. It was easier to find individuals, or if I can say juridical people of this mechanisms who would help in different way, not through the Parliament, but who would support our war by different means. We also believed that moral support, in the form of propaganda, would come simultaneously – we are one nation and our concern is understandable.

- **To be more accurate, did you ever consider the possibility that Albania with its organised institutions would get involved directly in the war for the liberation of Kosova?**

THE COUNTRY OF ALBANIA BEING WEAK WAS A HANDICAP FOR KOSOVA

HARADINAJ: I continuously thought that our war should not challenge other Albanian inhabited territories. I thought this for practical reasons, because war in which you do not have a large rear area in which you get organized is difficult to win. A lot of our preparatory work took place in Albania. My opinion was that the war should take place in Kosova and that Albania should never get involved. I always considered recruiting volunteers from Albania, but the reality did not turn out as I expected. There was a lack of organization from our side in Albania as well; we could have had better arrangements especially towards the end of the war we could have aimed at placing complete regular units into Kosova. What made this impossible, was the self-destruction of Albania that was helped by its neighbors, since then UCK has remained without sufficiently important support mechanism like the Albanian army was. I have seen the eagerness that some Albanian military people had, that is to return all the 'debts' from the past to Serbia.

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- **Was Albania, in this state, a handicap for the war in Kosova?**

HARADINAJ: Unfortunately yes, it was a handicap. A damaged Albania both in military terms and in other aspects damaged Kosova's cause. If we go back to September 1998, when there were efforts to end the war and when international troops were ready to enter Kosova, the role of Albania was missing. Albania was never near being able to play an important role in the process. The infrastructure of Albania and the level of the development of Albanian society, in general, were not compatible with a macro-action that would mean the entering of 50 thousand troops in Kosova; a large number of these troops entering from Albania.

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II

THE UNIFICATION OF ARMED GROUPS AND THE FIRST UÇK ACTIONS IN DUKAGJINI AREA

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WHO PROPOSED THE NAME FOR UÇK?

- **In which other countries, apart from Albania, have you stayed during this time?**

HARADINAJ: Apart from Albania, where I have spent a lot of time, I spent some time in different parts of Italy, I spent a long time in France as well. I have visited other countries like Finland, Sweden, etc. But the longest time I have spent abroad was in Switzerland and France.

- **Until when can you say that this period of staying abroad lasted?**

HARADINAJ: Until the beginning of 1998.

- **What more can you tell us about this period. Who did you contact and worked with. Describe the activities towards achieving your aspiration. What was the armed movement in Kosova?**

HARADINAJ: I don't think that it is embarrassing to admit that through out all my time in Western Europe, I was completely convinced as to where my duty lay. I wanted to explain this to other people, or recruit other people who were ready to accept their duty for their country, for the fatherland, the duty to win independence, or call it how you like. In order to achieve this, I worked continuously through identifying groups and individuals who were prepared or ready to sacrifice for the fatherland. For this reason I approached the National Movement of Kosova (Lidhja Popullore e Kosoves-LPK) in 1994 when I became a member of this organization, but let me explain that I never

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agreed with the political line that this party followed, but I was part of the working groups that existed within this organization; groups that worked endlessly to gather military knowledge and different intelligence; and in recruiting people for military operations in Kosova. I can say that since 1994 I belonged to the Kosova Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves-UÇK). I was kept closely informed about where the idea for the name came from (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës), about the idea for the emblem. So basically I was informed how these working groups operated. In 1994 some illegal groups that operated in Kosova got unified, and I can say that I contributed towards this unification by helping in unifying, I will call it the Dukagjini group, that was quite small in numbers but technically very well prepared.

- **You said that you know about the origin of the name UÇK. Can you tell us who named the KLA - Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, and who worked on the emblem.**

HARADINAJ: I think that this was done in the General Council of the National Movement of Kosova (LPK), from a particular working group, where Ali Ahmeti and Emrush Xhemajli gave a good contribution. I am not underlining only these two people; there were others who worked on the emblem and the name of KLA. I can say that it was the result of many suggestions.

- **When was the name UÇK used for the first time?**

HARADINAJ: I think that this dates from 1994. I don't know exactly when the UÇK appeared in public for the first time with this name, but I can guess that it happened a year latter, sometime at the end of 1995.

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ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS AND THEIR LEADERS

- **Can you tell us who were members of the Dukagjini Group?**

HARADINAJ: There were some people in the first Dukagjini Group who are in prison now so I prefer not to mention their names. Among them were Lahi Ibrahimaj who was one of the coordinators and who contributed military equipment like; long barreled weapons, Swiss automatic guns, pistols and other types of guns from Switzerland from 1994. Other members were Xhevat Zeneli, Sali Zeneli, Hajdar Ahmeti from Jabllanica from where Lahi originate, Luan and Shkëlzen Haradinaj from Gllogjan and myself.

- **Did other groups exist in Kosova then, and was there any degree of coordination between these groups?**

HARADINAJ: Yes there was another group in the Dukagjini area that acted in parallel from Radavc, Nabërgjan etc. Qerim Kelmendi, who is the brother of Ibrahim Kelmendi, and Ardian Kelmendi and numerous other young men were in this group. Among other groups that were active, I can mention the Llapi group that was lead by Zahir Pajaziti, Edmond Hoxha was also in this group. Edmond possibly joined the group later on and not in that year. Otherwise this group existed a long time ago, probably as early as 1991. It is interesting to mention that the Dukagjini group consisted of many young men who came together on a voluntary basis with some sort of a personal independence, unlike the Llapi group and other groups that originated from other illegal groups that had existed previously. While we in Dukagjini were a new generation after all those arrests made by the regime years before. The Prekazi group led by Adem Jashari was quite powerful and it dated back to 1991. The Drenica group that had "number 10" in the group, Rexhep Selimi, who is the Minister of Order at the present, Hashim Thaqi, who was also a

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coordinator and always on the move, and then Sokol Bashota etc. This group was spread throughout Drenica and had connections, not double connections, but parallel with Xhavit Haliti who represented this group abroad and helped them financially. Azem Syla was in this group and he worked on distribution. The Drenica group, with the influence of Sokol Bashota and in close cooperation with the members of National Movement of Kosova (LPK) like; Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla and Hashim Thaqi itself started winning a lot of authority and gradually the KLA was being identified and/or represented by this group.

- **While you were talking about the existence of these groups, you mentioned the Prekazi group and Adem Jashari. Have you ever met Adem Jashari?**

I DID NOT BELONG TO 'THE FOREIGN LEGION'

HARADINAJ: In 1997 I had a meeting with Abedin Rexha – 'Sandokani', but I did not meet Adem. It was arranged that from there we were go to Adems' house, but due to the fact that we had very little time left, because we had to return before dawn; we only traveled at night the reason being that the Serbs would not operate at night or operated very little, I had to go back. I also met Rexhep Selimi – 'number ten', on this occasion, with whom I went to Sokol Bashota or 'number eleven' like he was called in the military organization. This was actually the only time that I operated in this part of Kosova during this period, so no I did not met Adem.

- **Can you tell us when the idea of acquiring military skills occurred to you? Could you identify the timing of this idea?**

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HARADINAJ: During the years of 1991, 1992, 1993 I was quite good friends with some military people in Switzerland, friendly rapports more than anything else.

- **Military people from Switzerland?**

HARADINAJ: Yes people that served in the Swiss army. I learned a lot from the literature and philosophy of their army. Although Switzerland is a small country and although the Swiss did not have to fight a war on their territory for quite some time, they still have a very organized and a very respected army, their military doctrine is very valuable and it should not be underestimated. Switzerland has a very advanced military industry that produces valuable equipment that meets many needs. These products are quite expensive though.

- **During the war a lot was said and written about your military capabilities. How would you describe the military training and experience that you have gone through?**

HARADINAJ: I would like to go back to the time I served in the Yugoslav National Army (APJ-së). During those 12 months I obtained a good base in military skills. I made an effort to keep this up while I was in Switzerland, not through direct training, but in other indirect ways. I worked towards professional lifting and I also trained partially or periodically in France, and this does not mean that I was involved in 'The Foreign Legion' like many people have thought so.

- **That was one of the inevitable issues that preoccupied me during my preparation for this interview, as well as your eventual involvement in other wars in the world?**

HARADINAJ: Yes I know that there has been a lot has been a lot of speculation about this issue, here and in the world press.

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The truth is that I have followed the history of the French 'Foreign Legion' very closely, but I worked in the defense from close distances that is usually a civil defense work, I would say. This means defense of important facilities and people, ensuring the circulation of money and various types of wealth, ensuring that there are anti-terrorist demonstrations and actions or security actions under extraordinary conditions. I did this work in various forms with various people, in Switzerland and France. This work was legal, but not in state institutions. Usually, I worked with associations that had carried out this work for business, security, and other purposes.

- **And about your involvement in another war?**

THE WAR IN KOSOVA WAS MY ONLY WAR

HARADINAJ: My first war was the war in Kosova. I never participated in another war. There is not a single military activity that I carried out outside Kosova, not even shooting with a pistol. All my military activity was concentrated only in Kosova.

- **Could you tell which moment you considered as your first contact with UÇK?**

HARADINAJ: In 1994 I came to Kosova from Switzerland in order to check upon the situation. On this occasion I entered Kosova via Albania; it was the 28-th of November. I was armed and I felt I was a member of UÇK. I took this trip after three months of training with members of the Albanian army, which had more of a physiological and theoretical nature rather then physical one that I commanded quite well by then. The first night I stayed with my family and next day I went to Jabllanica where we spent five days conducting equipment and weapons check. On this occasion I assigned the first duties to those members that I had accepted in the UÇK. These people were Lahi Ibrahimi

'Magjupi', Shkëlzen and Luan Haradinaj. Afterwards I went back to Albania and invited Luan as well. The aim was to start operations, in other words to break the ice. The preparations were done earlier on, as early as 1992 and 1993, when I had entered Kosova from Albania all the way to the mountains of Junik, to Mulliq, but not further in. The point of these entries was to study the border; I have to say that in this I was helped a lot by Albanian citizens. During this time I brought a lot of arms into Kosova, I can even say that during those years there were two-three month periods where I would maybe be in the border everyday, especially in Tropoja and Babinë area where I had some people helping me.

- **During this time, Jabllanica of Dushkaja was a village where the Serbian police could not enter?**

HARADINAJ: No, the equipment for which we are talking about was still under my control, still undistributed. The military equipment in Jabllanica was secured by the villagers on their own initiative, especially after a conflict that the village had with the police earlier on, the population itself started gathering guns, maybe one gun or two, a hunting gun and a few pistols. Basically very little. Nevertheless, this seemed to us to represent an awakening of the population so we tried to benefit from the situation and engage the population directly. To have a better understanding of this group, I think it better to talk about the actual group that acted with the support of National Movement of Kosova (LPK) in which Ali Ahmeti from Zajazi of Kërqova, who is now know under the nickname of 'Abazi' or ' Xhuka'. I had worked from early on with Ali Ahmeti, as we both worked as members of UÇK. But my first collaborator was Njazi Ibrahimaj, who would come to Kosova regularly sending financial aid, and who also worked as a courier passing on suggestions on operations and organizational aspects. And of course there were many other young men around, and the aim of my trips to Kosova then was to see the actual situation and the possibilities

for action. Like I said I was not trying to meet everyone, but only with Lahi, for security reasons. I can say that these moments were the first roots of our regular activities, or coordinated UÇK actions in Dukagjini area. At that time in Jabllanica, they only had an old Italian gun, a hunting gun, some pistols some of which had only three bullets. These, of course, had been obtained by the villagers after the problems they had had with the police. When we realized what the situation was like, we came to the conclusion that you cannot work without weapons, and so in cooperation with Ali Ahmeti, we decided to supply weapons to the villagers, and by the end of that year we had distributed a 'Pezho-305' car filled with weapons to Jabllanica. After this the group was more or less complete.

- **Which was the first UÇK action in Dukagjini area?**

HARADINAJ: There were a lot of efforts and mini-actions. But Luan Haradinaj undertook the first action in the police post block in Irzniq. It was Luan, who went to the window first, he broke the window with stone and then he threw two hand grenades inside the room and managed to escape. The Serb police admitted that there were 4 dead and 6 injured policemen. Otherwise that night Serb police raided the house of the Mushkolaj family in Irzniq and told them that someone had attacked them. On his withdrawal, Luan heard the policemen screaming in the room where he had thrown the hand grenade. Luan carried out other activities as well in Irzniq and other places together with other people.

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III

THE KILLING OF LUAN HARADINAJ AND ARDIAN KRASNIQI

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A KNOCK ON THE CARRIERS OF WAR

- **Luan was later killed in the Kosova-Albania border. At that time it was not possible to talk about the circumstance of Luan's death. Could you tell us now about how it happened?**

HARADINAJ: We continuously had huge problems with the lack of weapons. This was the reason why many of our planned operations were not carried out at all. I was in Albania, I was in contact with the appropriate people who could apply military equipment abroad and from Albania, I also knew the ground really well on the border, so what I needed was a reliable collaborator to bring the weaponry into Kosova. Luan transported weaponry into Kosova many times. I helped him to load the equipment and take it to the border, and then Luan would take the equipment into Kosova and distribute it in different parts, sometimes all the way to Llap and Drenica. The explosives, with which the munitions depot in Podujeva in 1996 was blown up, was brought into Kosova by Luan and myself. At one time we were the only supply line that functioned. There were problems in gathering together the material, as it was not always secured in an organized way. And while we always tried to work in keeping the equipment all in one place, we tried to take it immediately into Kosova and then distribute it where it was most needed.

- **Which are the regions where you had to send most of the military equipment?**

HARADINAJ: The most active regions were Drenica and Llapi, and that is where most of the weapons were sent.

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- **Can we go back to the circumstances of Luan's death?**

HARADINAJ: The UCK experienced a huge knock after the killings of Zahir Pajaziti, Edmond and Akif, and the arrests of many of our young men who fought the war. This situation caused some panic among us, and so a number of us that were directly involved in organizing the movement of weapons, decided to go into Kosova. I was one of those people who wanted to go into Kosova at that time. Luan was in Albania then, he also wanted to go into Kosova, because as far as we were concerned things weren't going well. Our plan was not to go into Kosova individually, but to get as many people as possible to help the war and at the same time to bring as much equipment in as we possibly could, at this stage the equipment was needed very badly. A good number of people who were very patriotic, were interested in going into Kosova. They included; Fehmi Lladrovci, Xhevë Lladrovci (the wife of Fehmi), Ramiz Lladrovci (the brother of Fehmi), Selim Krasniqi (the brother of Xheva), Abedin Rexha – 'Sandokani', Ilaz Kodra, Rafet Rama and Gani Rama. This was a very well prepared team that was ready to enter Kosova and help. Following the killings of Zahir, Edmond and Akifi, we wanted revenge, and we thought of attacking through a large-scale operation, to make Serbia realize that we were able to fight back. Luan and I had been preparing the equipment since March 1997. We had planned to enter Kosova through Junik mountains and then attack the police post block in Junik to take revenge for Edmond who came from the same area as we did. But because there were requests from other people who were from Drenica to enter Kosova, we then decided to carry out two operations, one in Junik and another on further into Kosova, which would have meant taking revenge on two sides. So we decided on this plan and this is how I managed to stop Luan from going into Kosova before hand, even though he was ready and wanted to go as early as march 1997. During this time there were a lot of problems in Albania, it was a time of much turbulences in Albania, and this situation created good conditions for us in terms

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of supplies. For the first time we managed to get mortar wings that we never had before. Feeling content that we had enough weapons this time, we set off on the 3-rd or 4-th of May from Tirana. All those people whom I mentioned above were with us plus Emrush Xhemajli – 'Kompjuteri' who is now here with us, and Ali Ahmeti, who prepared the group. I have to mention that this time I was helped financially by the National Movement of Kosova (LPK); this was the first time I got financial help, before I used money from my own pocket; the money I had saved from my work as an émigré. In the last years I did get some help from various people. An enormous sum was offered to us by the Haxhia family, more specifically speaking, from Ibrahim Haxhia from Korenica who was a member of the Front at the time of Mentor Kaqi, and persecuted by the regime, and Zeqir Haxhia – 'Kanuni'. These people also helped me financially during the war.

WHAT DID LUAN ASK ME BEFORE WE DECIDED TO CROSS THE BORDER?

While we were preparing to go into Kosova, we came across many obstacles, because not all those people who wanted to go into Kosova, like Fehmiu, Abedin Rexha etc., were prepared physically. They were very determined, but physically and maybe physiologically they were not properly prepared, so we could not continue the journey as planned; when we approached the border some of us were very tired and we had to stop for the night. And so next day we had to wait all day near the border. In normal circumstances this was not that easy, because the Serbs were guarding the border so logically it was better to go back. Because of the enormous desire and will that we had, especially myself and Luan, we wanted to go back and start working under any circumstances, so we decided to give it a try anyway. I remember the conversation I had with Luan. We would never address each other with our names; we would address each other

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with the expression 'mashkull', other people who were with us were not aware that we were brothers.

I told him: "hey 'mashkull', I think that we failed!"

-I want you to tell me one thing – he said.

Go on – I said.

-These people that have joined us, have they come as tourists to go to Kosova for two weeks, visit their families and as soon as it goes 'bum' will they go back or will they stay in Kosova?

I told him that these people were our leaders and that they will never leave Kosova before liberating it.

He turned around, very determined, and said; in that case I will go in (enter Kosova) even if I get killed.

So, we decided to go ahead with our plan, quite aware that the risks were high.

- **This happened at the beginning of May 1997?**

HARADINAJ: Yes. Between 5 and 6 of May we stayed near the border, and on the 6 of May just before dawn, I had never taken this route before, Luan knew it well, and because of the difficult circumstances, we were late and maybe we had been spotted by the Serbs. I asked Luan if we could possibly go ahead a bit and clear the ground once more. We went to a place called 'Qafa e Mullarit' just above Larë village. This place would take us down in the direction of Kushnini village of Has region. I could see that there was a basin and so my opinion was that it would be dangerous to pass through this area, because one could easily be taken prison. When we came back I suggested to Luan that we should not go through the 'basin' but to cut through it and end up in the dominant angle. I presumed that there would be no ambush in this angle. And that is what we decided.

Luan set off first, about 50 meters in front; the rest of us started crossing the border keeping 20 meters distance. I was separated from the unit, I was something like 50 meters further down from everyone else, to keep an eye on things. In order to react quickly I was armed with just one Scorpion. The others

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were armed with Albanian automatic guns 'twenty-th', with hand grenades, and all of them had 'Scorpions'. And this is how they crossed the border, which I was observing. Luan was the first to reach the height that we had agreed on the opposite side and by giving appropriate signs told us that he had gotten there without a problem. Luan was something like 500 meters into Kosova and the last one was approximately 200 inside Kosova. I was about 300 meters inside, and I happened to be in the broken territory. It turned out to be just as we had predicted: there was a triple ambush, but on one side only. We were fortunate that there was no ambush on the other side. So basically the Serbs had opened one side but they didn't close it. Along ambush sides they had put infantry_weapons, starting from automatic weapons, automatic guns, infantry machine guns and Yugoslav snipers. There were no heavy weapons, but what they had was enough for the distance involved.

WOUNDING OF RAFET RAMA AND THE KILLING OF LUAN

They opened fire at the same time as they issued their warnings. I did not shoot at them but I started screaming at the others: "take cover, fire and move back!" I realized that an ambush was prepared, and so it was impossible to go further forward, we were not well prepared physically and I did not have room for maneuver. Luan saw me and asked me whether he should go down, meaning go further into Kosova like we always did. I told him: "No, we have to pull out, there is no other way". Without firing and in a zigzag run, I went to see if everyone was positioned. I realized that they were all positioned in his or her right places. I went to where Gani, the uncle of Rafet Rama from Prekaz who was injured that day, was. I took his gun and told him to pull out, because he had the possibility of doing that. I told them to: "Fire one by one and to be careful not to shoot each-other and to pull out crawling towards the border line". The Serbs

were firing continuously. Luan withdrew first and took up a position on the borderline. Because I was nearer to the ambush of the enemy, my withdrawal was a bit more difficult, and so while I was firing I changed positions in order to see how the others were doing. The majority of them pulled out really quickly with the exception of Rafet who was wounded earlier on and screamed: "Oh, I am shot!" I went to him and I realized that he was shot in the leg. While I was approaching him he got another bullet in the leg, this is where we nearly lost all hope that he was going to survive. The bag that he was carrying was very heavy and it was stopping him from changing positions. I took the bag off him and I helped him take up a new position. Even though I did not have much hope that he was going to survive I told him: "Don't give up, I will pull you out, we are quite close". It was getting dark and so it was easier to pull him out. I told him: "use one bullet at a time", because we did not have enough ammunition. At the time we would go in by carrying only forty bullets. Because I was something like five meters away from Rafet, I fired and kept an eye in the direction of the enemy, I was worried that the Serbs might come and take Rafet who was becoming weaker and weaker. I also looked back to where the others had pulled out, and I saw that Luan was standing upright. Luan realized that I was behind and that I was not going towards him, he also knew that Rafet was wounded. He got up and started walking towards us. I screamed at him: "stay where you are, I will come to you!" but because of the shooting he couldn't hear me. I was unable to go to where he was. I want to stress that; after the first shooting I was able to localize the enemy positions; they were not very well protected, because they probably did not expect that we would return such a strong fire. I fired in the direction of the gap in between the fire and the helmet that I could see and I am convinced that I killed two soldiers. While I was helping Rafet I had to shoot again in the direction of the Serbs, and I think that again they suffered more losses. As I was helping Rafet for the last time before I pulled out, I heard Ramiz Ladrovci, the brother of Fehmi, shouting, "Ardiani is wounded!"

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'Ardian' was Luan's nickname. When I learned that Luan was injured and knowing that he was not in cover, I told Rafet that I was going to go away for a while, and that I would not be long and that he should have faith in me. Rafet's reply was: "Give me one bullet, because I had it". I told him: "Don't make that mistake!" I was worried that he was going to kill himself, "there is nothing wrong with you, you are only wounded in the leg, I will pull you out of here". When I approached Luan I saw that he was lying on his stomach; he had fallen as he was shooting. Because I never experienced someone close to me being killed, I thought that he was only wounded, I said to him: "Come on 'mashkull' get up, don't dishonor our clan, it's still not over. Lets go and get Rafet because he is down there wounded!" There was no reply. He was shot. He was shot with a bullet in his mouth. He was shot by an automatic or maybe by a Yugoslav sniper from a close distance, approximately 200 meters. I realized that Luan was dead. Serb forces, in the meantime, due to the lack of our fire and maybe because of the losses that they could have suffered, started shooting continuously. At this stage I started getting worried that they might surround us, and I did not want to leave Luan's body there, because it was in Kosova. I lifted him up as if he was still alive without thinking twice. I had problems carrying him. Not even his clothes would stay on him, and also the ground was very difficult as there were a lot of thistles and thorns. By dragging him by his arm and sometime his leg, I managed to pull him away from that place where we were continuously in danger from bullets; I took him to a slightly safer place. I came back to collect his things, I have to say I was a bit lost, I collected his gun and some other equipment, my pistol that was given to me by Brahim Haxhia in 1997, he had this pistol since 1991. I came back to where Luan was and the others were, and I told them: "Please go and get Rafet because his is left on his own". But when they realized that Luan was dead, and everyone knew him as a hero and as very strong, that affected our moral quite a bit. That is why no one was strong enough to go and get Rafet. But, by that time it was getting dark, and so Rafet took advantage of

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the situation, got up and with the help of his gun which he used it as a walking stick, coming back slowly, shooting every now and then to let us know that he was coming, he was absolutely shattered.

We had to carry Luan's body and carry Rafet as well who was unable to walk, so we had to create a type of stretcher, and most of our people there did not have any training in these kind of things. So I took Luan's knife, Luan had this big army knife, we had to cut two tree branches, and then I asked for two jackets, Selim Krasniqi gave me one jacket and Abedin Rexha gave me the other, they were good strong working jackets, we put the branches of the trees in the sleeves of the jackets and we put Rafet on this improvised bed and made him secure with a belt. I gave the order to everyone to start walking down, and we still had to be very careful, although we were in Albanian territory, it was still dangerous because the Serbs were still firing. During this withdrawal, we were not in a position to search for a better route, because we had to be quick, and we also had the problem that our moral had suffered from the set back that we had experienced. I realized that we were moving too slow, and so I turned around and screamed and also threatened the others by saying, "What is wrong people? Just pick up Rafet because we have to move on". And then Rafet turned around to me and said: "Smajl (Ramush Haradinaj's nickname at that time) I am at your mercy, please don't let me die. Help me!" I have put Luan on my back, I took his weapons, my weapons, and I ordered the others to pick up Rafet and start walking. On our way back some of my co fighters would drop their bags, because they were too heavy and we were unable to carry everything. So we decided to stop and hide some of our bags somewhere in the wood, we only kept our weapons-'Scorpions' and some hand grenades, because it was a time of unrest in Albania and we had to be careful. During the whole way I carried Luan without anyone's help because the others had to carry Rafet. We walked for four hours until we arrived in the village of Vlanë. It was a difficult journey for all of us, we had to save Rafet, and this was not an easy thing for my co

fighters who had to carry him. When we arrived in Vlanë we asked for help and we got outstanding help that can never be forgotten. Avdi Sokoli and his two sons, Ylli and Iliri, and the other villagers of Vlana who helped us bury Luan. Since that moment this great friendship has been created between us, the villagers of Vlana helped us until the liberation of Kosova. The villagers of Vlana have shown truly typical Albanian characteristics, by showing that we are one nation and that we understand each other's difficulties.

- **When did you definitely come back to Kosova?**

AFTER THE KILLING OF LUAN, THE MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS INTO KOSOVA WAS DONE BY ARDIAN AND ILIR

HARADINAJ: After the killing of Luan I wanted to come back to Kosova, but I think it's interesting to explain why; I did not allow any publicity about Luan's death as a member of UÇK, because all of us as a family were engaged in the resistance, and it was risky that all of us, my father Hilmiu, my brothers Shkëlzeni and Dauti who were in Kosova, would have been exposed. I got prepared to go into Kosova once more, but because of the risk of discovery, I accepted suggestions that maybe for a period of time I should stay away that the organisation should hide me. The fact that at that time I was cohabiting with a foreign women, from Finland, with whom I am still living, helped me, I did not organize any death ceremony for my brother Luan where I stayed (an Albanian tradition, when a member of a family dies, the family opens their door to the people who want to came a pay their respect). In the meantime I helped the organization in other ways, by being in constant touch with people who were involved in supplying Kosova with military equipment, people like Ardian Krasniqi, Ilir Konushevci, Qerimi, Dilaveri, Ganiu and other young men that joined the

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organization during that period. During this time I went to Albania few times. In august of 1997 I went into Kosova. This time I entered Kosova together with Ardian Krasniqi, Qerim Kelmendi and Ilir. We went and visited other groups and we brought equipment that was going to be used for the general action that took place in September of the same year; on this occasion we used arm mortars which marked a step forward in our activities. During my stay in Kosova this time, I tried to prepare the ground so that order that when I next went back it would be for good. In December 1997 I came back to Kosova again. This time I brought with me an amount of equipment that had never been brought into Kosova before. It was approximately 120 machine guns, mortars, automatic guns 'one-hundred'-type machine guns, as we called them at that time, 7.9 caliber machine guns, like infantry weapons but more powerful, various snipers, and other weapons, which constituted a new element in supplying activities. This time I stayed until January 1998.

- **Do you know the circumstances of Ardian Krasniqi death? Was he on his own or was he accompanied by someone else during the attack that he carried out on the Serb police station in Kliçinë?**

HOW WAS ARDIAN KRASNIQI KILLED?

HARADINAJ: I have mentioned on several occasions that Ardian Krasniqi brought military equipment into Kosova many times, and every time he entered Kosova he made an effort to conduct an operation. I remember one occasion when we entered Kosova together he told me: "Smajl, we are going to take some things there, but we are not going back without a bang!" During the very little time we had, we waited in ambush in the evening in Ozdrim village, we waited all night at the bridge, we planned to attack the change of Serb forces that never happened. Which means that our attack was never carried out. On our way back

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when we crossed the border we were exhausted and so we stopped for some rest and he said: "I don't feel like going back to Tirana, we didn't do anything!" When we arrived in Tirana his fiancé Merita asked us: "Hmm I see you are back, and I was expecting to hear your guns!" The reason I am telling this is that just taking equipment into Kosova never satisfied Ardian, at the same time he always wanted to carry out an action.

On an other occasion, when Qerim Kelmendi, Ilir Konushevci, and Ardian went into Kosova, they did not want to come back to Albania without having attacked the police station in Kliçinë. They were in Drenica at that time, where they had gone to distribute equipment. Muje Krasniqi was there at the time. He told them that; if they were going to leave from Drenica, which was Muja's Place, to carry out this action then he would accompany them. Kliçina had been attacked many times before and this time they would attack from the rear. I remember Mujë Krasniqi telling me how Ardian was killed. Muja said that when they arrived at the top of a small hill just above the police station, approximately 100-150 meters away from the actual building, he suggested to the others to stop there because that was from where they attacked the previous time. Ardian looked at the place and it seemed to him that it was not near enough. Ardian and Muja were carrying 150-th mortars Qerimi and Iliri were carrying automatic weapons. Qerimi and Ilir were positioned on the flanks in order to protect the other two, while Ardian and Muja had gone quite close. In fact Muja said that he stopped and got into position but he couldn't start shooting because Ardian was still approaching. The moment Ardian stopped and got down on his knees to shoot from his mortar, he turned around to look at Muja, who gave him the signal "lets go" and started shooting first. Ardian started shooting at this car that he had spotted, with people in it. The police had taken this car from some Albanians. He started shooting again for the second time, and as Muja turned around to see what he was doing he noticed that he preformed a movement as if he was going to pick up something, and then he fell flat on the ground. So basically a bullet hit him in the

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shoulder, shot by a policeman who happened to be in another building at that time. And then Serbs started hail of firing from all sides. Muja at this time continued firing and tried to go to Ardian, but it was impossible so he had to take up a new position. At one moment he met up with Qerim and Ilir and told them that Ardian had been wounded. Muja says that he was told by Qerim that; if Ardian was alive he knew the area and would pull out, and that the rest of them should start withdrawing otherwise they would all get killed. Muja told me that he informed them that Ardian was wounded and that they should do something to pull him out. Muja said that he even thought of going to get Ardian himself, but he did not get any support and while they were pulling out he says that Qerim kept saying that Ardian would have crossed the road by now and that very soon they would meet him somewhere. And of course later on it turned out that Ardian had been killed on the spot.

- **Illir Konushevci, later on during the war was killed in Albania. Do you know the motives and the circumstances of Ilir's killing?**

ILIR KONUSHEVCI WAS KILLED BY SERBIA, MAYBE THROUGH AN ALBANIAN HAND

HARADINAJ: To tell you the truth during the war, I was more frightened and worried in Albania then in Kosova. After the collapse of the Albanian State organized mechanisms, other foreign services were quite active in Albania, and not only from neighboring countries but other countries as well. Serbia tried to block our resupply operations and to disrupt us in Kosova through the Albanian compatriots. Ilir Konushevci was one of those people who made an extraordinary contribution towards the unification of UÇK. He also worked in coordinating activities within existing groups in different regions of Kosova, in close cooperation with the Llapi group and other groups, he also helped

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to develop the logistics chain in Albania. By being educated and unassuming, Ilir never created conflict. He managed to create great trust and to win a lot of support from the native population in Tropoja and in Bajram Curri, in Tirana as well as the support of the people in Llap. The killing of Ilir Konushevci was an unbelievable act, very well prepared and executed by Serbia, I cannot exclude the incrimination of our people in the execution of this act, and I can trace it to the people that were involved in our organization. I will say it once more that; Serbia was behind this act. A person of Ilir Konushevcis' competence was of course a menace to Serbia.

I have tried to find out the details of this case. And as far as I can gather, it was not a very well organized ambush, which was specifically focused against the life of Ilir Konushevci and not against the equipment and the other people that were with Ilir. It happened in Albania, I don't know the place exactly, Ilir was together with some other people from Albania, one of them was doctor Haziri who had helped us a lot. During the attack, people were separated first from the equipment. And then the attacker started shooting, and so 'Mërgimi', Ilir's nickname, opened fire and killed one of the attackers and he himself was wounded. Haziri tried to drag Ilir away, but the attackers opened fire again and killed both of them. The people that took part in this crime have been identified roughly, but I can't say that this has been done properly. The Albanian police service and UÇK service are working to shed light on the identification of the attackers and on explaining the motive to this crime. Otherwise the killing of Ilir Konushevci was a massive loss for all of us.

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IV

RETURN TO KOSOVA AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

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MY MISSION WAS: TO MAKE THE POPULATION TAKE UP ARMS

- **Where were you on the 28 November when the UÇK first appeared in public in Drenica, at the funeral of Halit Geci, the teacher, killed by Serb forces?**

HARADINAJ: I was not in Kosova. Dauti participated in the first UÇK official appearance (the brother of Ramush).

- **How was it that UÇK should appear publicly: was it spontaneous, or had the decision been taken already but you needed to wait for the right moment?**

FEHMI LADROVCI SAID: NOT EVERYONE IS WORKING 'WHOLEHEARTEDLY' FOR THE WAR, SOME PEOPLE WANT TO MAKE A CAREER OUT OF THIS...

HARADINAJ: Throughout the war, there were two thoughts in the army: First was that; the war should turn into a national uprising, and second was that; the resistance should develop into an organized guerrilla war. A good number of those people, who wanted to have a national uprising, were very hard working and very dedicated people. They took so many risks during their work. And of course the latter group succeeded. I belonged to this group as well. Throughout the war I wanted the war to be a national uprising, because you can't have a war with a small group of people. The decision for the UÇK to make a public appearance was taken right there and then by the people who were on site. These people found out that they could benefit by

getting the message across to the population, because there was a lot of propaganda going on, a real propaganda war against the army by different organisations. So in order to tell the people of Kosova that the army consisted of their sons, and also for the population to have a better rapport with its army, this decision was taken right there and then, I don't know by whom. I considered this a very powerful and very useful decision and I supported it wholeheartedly.

- **And during the time of the massacre of Albanian civilian population in Qirez and in Likoshan, and later the resistance of Adem Jashari and his family in Prekaz, where were you? And how did you experience those events?**

HARADINAJ: At the end of February 1998 I crossed the border into Kosova. Before I did this I stayed in Switzerland for three weeks. I had to take time to think, because after the killing of Luan and other events, I felt some dissatisfaction and uncertainty about our organization. Fehmi Ladrovci himself had some very important objections.

- **Can you tell us about what kind of objections you are talking about?**

HARADINAJ: Yes. Fehmi thought that not everyone was working, as he would say 'wholeheartedly'. That some people were looking to create a career. Not everyone had embraced the war sincerely; we could not keep going on by making statements only....

- **This debate was held under the backing of the National Movement of Kosova, right?**

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HARADINAJ: Yes, with the backing of National Movement of Kosova, and especially with the backing of those working groups that were directly linked with the support of the army. Fehmis' request was that we should enter Kosova in vast numbers, and was suggesting that we use all the resources we had for the army. Fehmi did not belong to the group of people who thought that the aid should be given in percentages. Not three percent, not even thirty percent. We wanted this war, we made a lot of propaganda about the war – he would say – we have to use all our assets and all go to Kosova. I had similar objectives, similar concerns. So I went to see what I could expect once I had entered Kosova. Would I get any financial support any physical support or moral or material support. In other words I wanted to know where I stood. I stayed in Switzerland approximately one month, in connection with this, basically January-February 1998, and when I came back, I was convinced that enormous support should go to the forces on the ground. Basically I realized that I could not count that much on the support from the Diaspora. The level of sacrifice did not extend beyond helping with the propaganda, helping moral to an extent and material support, but no more then that. So physical support was not taken into an account then. A large number of people there did not agree to come into Kosova, and so at the end of February I entered Kosova on my own. I have to say that by now I had created Smolice, which I consider to be a precious piece of work. The Smolica fighters were the most extraordinary fighters that Kosova had, and their work was a unique contribution in Kosova. I have to mention Agron Rama especially, the commander of 34 Brigade, now dead. His house was a base for the army and his mother Shakja was the mother to all those young men who passed that way. She was ready all the time to open the door of her house, to help us, to clean our clothes, to bake for us and feed us and in the end to give us her blessing.

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I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE WAR SHOULD TURN INTO A NATIONAL UPRISING

So I came to Kosova knowing that the war was definitely turning into a national uprising. I had given myself the mission to come back to Kosova, to make the population acknowledge the war, to unify people for the war and of course to give everyone the opportunity to fight. In other words I wanted to involve everyone in this war, because I had seen the danger to those who had been identified by Serbia as fighters. It was very risky for them. Serbia carried out an attack on the Jashari, killed Zahiri, arrested many many others, without going into details about those who were arrested. In this situation being, I fully recognized the threat posed by Serbia.

- **We did not mention the war in Prekaz and the resistance of Jasharaj family....**

HARADINAJ: I am very sorry that all of them were killed. This as a principal, I would call it a professional principle. It would have been good if on of them at least would have survived the roundup. But, I think, also; that for the state of consciousness that our people in Kosova had at that time, the sacrifice was necessary. .

- **Are we talking here about a conscious sacrifice...?**

HARADINAJ: I want to say that not only it was a conscious act but also a heroic act. This act was maybe the determination zenith of which direction the population of Kosova was going to take; will it continue being in that confused state or will it wake up and realize that Serbia is our enemy and there is a risk that we will disappear if we don't retaliate. And of course the solution was to retaliate. I would like to say it again that if any of the fighters that were in Prekaz that day were still alive I am

absolutely certain that it would have helped us a lot. I never agreed with this but circumstances were like that.

- **Approximately a month after the war in Prekaz, on the 24 of March Serb forces attacked Glogjan. That day Daut Haradinaj killed one policeman and wounded another one. And in this battle the first martyrs; Agron and Gëzim Mehmetaj and Himë Haradinaj were killed. Is this the day when the war started in Dukagjini area?**

WHY WAS GLLOGJANI ATTACKED AND NOT JABLLANICA?

HARADINAJ: Dukagjini did not stay still after what happened in Prekaz, Likoshan and Qirez. There were continuous attacks on Serb forces. Every day and every night in every place. Without hiding at all. And so Serbia saw and grasped that the war is spreading and that, most importantly, the war is approaching the border. At the same time we had started more concrete preparations for our activities. Basically direct activities, direct attacks, open war. My opinion was that the Serb forces knew that the war starting point is Jabllanica.

- **Exactly. Publicly through Serb media the possibilities of an attack on Jabllanica were proclaimed at that time...**

HARADINAJ: Yes. Forces in Jabllanica were larger in numbers, but slightly less dangerous for Serbia, because during the last period, for which we are talking about, they weren't that active outside the village. Gllogjan forces had shown risk for the days that were coming because they were very active. They acted continuously, every day, every night everywhere, especially in Qirez, in Likoshan and Prekaz like you said. There was never a day off. There were ambushes in waiting for the Serb forces in the post blocks everyday. Serb policemen were killed everyday,

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even the ones that were known for their terrible things that they have done to people like Prashqeviqi, etc. During these activities, so until March, we were helped a lot by Mujë Krasniqi – 'Kapuçi' who stayed with us during that time. We were very much supported by a lot of other people, but we have special respect for Muja, who in the most difficult moments stayed as a guard for our family, because it was expect the same thing to happen in Glogjan as it happened in Prekaz. Until the 24 of March we were helped by other our co villagers as well, I like to mention especially, now martyr, Gazmend Mehmetaj – 'Rrudhani', like we have called him, and Isufi and Miftar Dervishaj. They would ussualy sneak out as soon as it got dark through the fields to come to our house where we kept all the weapons, and they would stay there until the morning in order to help us in case we got surrounded. And then Musë Fetahaj, a friend from Skivjan etc. **I stayed in hiding until 16-17 of March**. I worked on the duties I had in the organization, like supplying and distributing weapons where it was most needed, but I did not go out and meet people in the open. Since that time I have distributed weapons in Smolicë, where I had created the first base for help. **We had a base in Jabllanica**, and of course we had recruited people in Gërgoc and in Vraniq at Leshi family house, and at Gega who have lost two of their family members on duty. I had connections with other men in the area, I can say that by now I **have created my network in Dukagjini area. I was** in close cooperation with 'David' as we have called Daut then (Haradinaj), with Shkëlzen (Haradinaj) **and 'Magjupi'** (Lahi Ibrahimaj) **in Jabllanica**. So basically I have used what the above-mentioned people had built up by now, by making it more powerful using the connections I had. By now we had built up a force. We would not go to the demonstrations that were being organized then. Knowing that Serbia had prepared something for us, we started building quite a high wall around the house, which we planed to finish before the end of the war, but we never managed to do so. Few days before the 24-th of March I went out in a village, this is after 8 years that I saw the village in the

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daytime. The aim was to see the houses, to see the walls, roads and any changes, in order to know how to act in case of an attack that I knew it was going to happen very soon. And so I walked for a while not talking to anyone in the village and I came back to my house having a clear view of how I was going to act in case of on attack. On the 24-th of March, Daut went out in the village for some house work, on his way back he was followed by Serb forces who had planned to kill him without making to much noise. It has to be explained that this is not the only isolated act that happened that day, since 5 am Serb forces were preparing by benefiting a lot from our Montenegrin neighbor, where a lot of Serb policemen slept a night before and in the morning they spread out in western side of our house. As off seven in the morning we had also seen a lot of Serb forces approaching the village from the Irzniq direction and they were positioned in the hills around and in the direction of the Farm, where they had put the first wide circle. In some cases this circle would include up to 3 kilometers on a straight line, from our house where the center of the fighting was. According to my analysis; the attack was a bit late, and this was because, I think, Daut was not in the house, and they thought that if they come and kill us all in the house, Daut would survive. So they waited until Daut came back to the house and so they would finish the job in one go. Serb forces came prepared to execute the same scenario like in Prekaz. Other words, in order to frighten the others, and in this case Jabllanica, they were going to come and kill everyone at the same time. They wanted to complete the plan; we finished Jashari family in Prekaz, we will finish these ones here in Dukagjin, and you the others be careful. This was their (Serb forces) aim, and they were very well prepared. The obstacle was that Daut had left the house very early that morning, and so they followed him and attacked him near the house, they did not do this in any other place, because in that case they would have not been able to localize the war, the war would have spread out and the Serb forces would have lost.

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- **You think that Serb forces had prepared the similar scenario like in Prekaz?**

THE AIM WAS;
TO FIGHT, TO DAMAGE THEM AND SURVIVE

HARADINAJ: No, not similar but identical with the Prekaz scenario. The difference was that here in Dukagjini they were dealing with a slightly different mentality that consisted of the fact that we wanted to survive. Basically, our aim was to fight and to survive not to get killed in the house. The conflict started when the police car stopped, they opened their doors and in the distance of 20 meters they fired at Daut. Daut was not on his own, his was with a friend from our village called Rasim Selmanaj, who happened to be on his way to see his cousins who live near our house. Daut told Rasim that there is a police car following them and asked him whether he wanted to go with him, Daut told him that he was armed and that they will be fine. Rasim said No, you do whatever you like I have nothing to do with them. When Daut realized that the police car is approaching him, he started running and the police started firing at him. Daut kneeled down and started returning the fire with a pistol that I have given him as a present. As a result of this an infamous (bad sense of the world) policeman called Otovici was killed and another policeman was wounded. When I heard the first shootings I knew that the job has started. I quickly went inside the house, looking for my automatic gun that I could not find because my friends son had taken the gun a night before without asking, so I took my brothers automatic gun and I fired five bullets in the front yard in order to alarm the others which were building the wall of the house. I did not have time to answer my fathers question to 'what happened', I went out and saw that Daut had fallen down, in fact he was changing pistols cartridge that was empty. For a minute I thought that he was wounded, so I hurried up to return the fire to make it possible for him to

withdraw. And then my friend Musaja and my brothers Enver and Shkelzeni and the others joined us. In the meantime the number of Serb forces was becoming larger, they were coming from all sides in their 'Niva' cars and other armored vehicles, the road from Dubrava to Gllogjan was full with policemen. I went up to the second floor of our house and took another gun and fired up to 100 7.9 caliber bullets in the direction of the Serb forces. Afterwards I came out of the house onto the streets where I saw my father (Hilmiun) who was carrying a bag with about 1000 bullets in it, he has been saving them for quite a long time, and we would always joke with him about these bullets. He told me 'Congratulation, I don't know how is this going to finish, but I think you will need them', referring to the joke that we always teased him about. He asked me where he should position himself, I showed him the place and told him to fire every now and then and to look after the other members of the family whom I have ordered to leave the house even though they were against leaving the house, they would rather stay and fight than go somewhere else. I decided to stay in the house with Daut only, and I asked Shkelzen to go to our relatives house, Rasimi, to tell them that the game has started, and to bring all the weapons and the ammunition that we have hidden there, and to wait in the village and that we were going to meet them there. Our cousin Rasim together with his two sons, Bujari and Himë, were armed, there were others that were armed too and we were counting on their help.

- **Apart from people, did you have others means of communication?**

HARADINAJ: We had two types of radio connections. We had one channel radio connection to communicate within ourselves. Daut, Shkelzen and I had three radios, Rasim had one, and Isuf Dervishaj and Gazmend Mehmetaj had one each. We had another multi channel radio connection, and with that we would listen to the Serb forces. Using the same radio we would

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communicate with people in Drenica and elsewhere, but we had to speak really quickly in case the line would get cut off.

- **Was it possible for the Serb forces to listen to you conversation using the multi channel radio connections?**

HARADINAJ: Yes it was possible, and they would cut us off sometime, and this is why we had to speak really quickly. We had a code, and the code was 607. it was 'David's' (Daut's) code. As soon as the attack started I informed other people through this radio connection. I remember I said, "Attack at the 607-th. We are surrounded. We are talking about a big job".

- **So people in Drenica knew what is happening in Glogjan?**

HARADINAJ: Yes. Mujë Krasniqi – 'Kapuçi' carried an attack in Kijevë immediately, and at the same time four other groups carried attacks in other parts of Kosova. Our aim was to make Serbia think that they will be attacked powerfully from all sides so they will not send all their forces in Gllogjan but spread them out in other parts as well. We knew that the battle was going to last and if we attack them in four other places at the same time the police would not be able to bring more forces in Gllogjan, especially at night that was getting close. Otherwise Serb forces were very angry, they spoke openly to each other without using any codes. Serb forces had surrounded in three circle villages around Gllogjan from Gramaqel, Dubrava, Baballoq, and Irzniq and all the way to Rastavica. They have left just one corridor open from the school in our village to Radoniqi Lake. It was quite clear that they were ordered not to fire on civilians, so that their action will not be internationally condemned.

- **It was the period when Robert Gellbard had put the photos taken in Prekaz on Milloshević's desk, and it was**

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said that since then the US envoy for the Balkan has asked for the NATO intervention against Serb forces. Instead of the intervention, the competencies were taken from Gellbard to continue working in Kosova. Did you think that 'RFJ' was being given silent blessing for what it was doing in Kosova?

WHAT WAS THE CONVERSATION OF THE LEADER OF THE OPERATION ON SITE AND HIS LEADER IN THE OFFICE

HARADINAJ: I think that the International Community has tolerated Yugoslav actions that were crime against humanity, in Kosova, because they respect Yugoslavia as a state. Maybe the International Community though that Serbia is fighting against terrorism, but the state of Serbia never acted in an effective way, especially when it came to dealing with me, they called me a terrorist. They were not professionally able to prepare a trap to eliminate me, let's say another five people and myself, but they used the method of the 'burned land'. In fact this was unfortunate for the state of Yugoslavia, because it got revealed very quickly in front of the International Community.

- **Earlier one you started talking about the behaviors of the leaders of the Serb forces...**

HARADINAJ: I can say that at the beginning they have underestimated us a lot. The leader of the operation on the ground in Gllogjan informed his senior at the headquarters that everything is fine by telling him that 'they are ten, they are armed, but I don't think we will have problems. This will finish in ten minutes and the ground will be clear'. The leader in the headquarters told him to act according to the plan and also warned him: 'Sorted all out'. I realized that they are prepared very well and that they have concentrated a large number of their

forces on us. I dropped the gun and I picked up the hand grenades, I gave one to Daut, we picked up our bags and we started returning the fire with hand grenades. Our advantage was that the Serb forces were gathered in one place, but we did not have too much time to spend in targeting, also we had to fire lying down on the stomach, and at the same time it was very noisy from the helicopters that were flying around, even though they were not flying that low. I think that the helicopters were observing the movements of the civilians and also trying to discover the movements of armed people. I am sure that one of my shootings and one of Dauts' shootings towards this particular house where the Serb forces were concentrated was quite successful. We shot few more times but they were not targeted but they had physiological effects only. Some of the weapons we had and that we had never tried before had faults in them, so we had to brake them all. So basically they did not find a lot of arsenal in Gllogjan like they have said so. All arsenal that the Serb forces had found in Gllogjan was; one broken Russian gun, a broken machine gun, several empty rounds of ammunition and two UÇK uniforms. Special Serb unit had entered our front yard, and I had run out of hand grenades, I asked Daut who was not that close to me at that moment, to give me one and I through it in the front yard. I heard them screaming and I had to reposition without any control. I have to say that from on of the hand bombs our housedog got blinded. In the meantime I managed to listen to a new conversation between the leader on site and the one at the headquarters. The person one on site was saying: 'Four of my people are lying down on the ground. The situation is very bad. They are approximately 70 and they are very quick. I need more people'.

After this I got some more hope and I could see that we could fight with them. We pulled out from the house through the meadows and we went in the direction of the village. We entered some of the houses that were empty because the population has already left. We decided to position ourselves in the house of uncle Ismail that was uninhabited at that time, this house was

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built with a very strong stone material and so we estimated that this house is quite appropriate for the war. In this house we met up with Shkelzen, Rasimi and our nephew Kujtim Zeneli who never separated from us. They were firing at the Serb forces from the flanks and had terrified them. When I realized later on in what position the Serb forces had, I was quite sure that they had been damaged a lot from the fire of Shkelzen and Rasim and Kujtim. We continued firing from a new position and I went to the house of Rasim three times to get ammunition. I went three times to get ammunition at his house and I searched the whole house and I could not find anything. I think that is interesting to say that latter on the Serb forces had entered the same house, but when they saw all the furniture and other things on the floor they did not burn the house, thinking that one of them had been in there previously. The helicopters that had arrived earlier started firing using double explosive ammunition at an empty house because they had not followed carefully our withdrawal. Or maybe they were given wrong calculations from the ground.

THE VILLAGERS THAT WERE TAKEN HOSTAGE WERE BEING USED AS A PROTECTION

We spread out in different rooms and in different floors in the house of Ismail Haradinaj, and the war continued for another hour. At this time the Serb forces started realizing more clearly where we were. When I realised that this was happening I though that not all of us are going to survive. I told my father: "Old man take these two and go somewhere else, don't fight anymore, only if they come very near you, and when it gets dark use the situation to go another place". I suggested that he should go to a tower nearby. My father refused and said that he was going to stay with us. And then I asked my sister and my brother to go as well, but they refused too, maybe because they were frightened and felt safer with us. When I realized that they were not going to leave us I decided to separate them into groups. I asked Daut to

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go and find Isuf Dervishajn and Gazmend Mehmetajn, they both had amunition and weapons, and I told Daut that if he does not find them he should stay in Islam Mustafaj tower, (alb. *kulla).* I asked Shkelzen, my father and the others to go to two different houses nearby (Xhafer Sadrias' house and Zeqe Mustafaj house), and so I decide to take a position opposite them in the house of Shaqe Qerimajt. From these buildings we carried on the fighting and we stayed there all day. When we separated into these houses we took a short break, changed our clothes that by this time was soaking wet, and we eat whatever we could find. At the same time the Serb forces were repositioning themselves. They thought that we were in the house of Ismail Haruadinaj and so they surrounded the house. Serbs started attacking that house and we started firing too, especially Bujar and myself because we were closer, but other people were firing from other houses too. After this attack I listened to their conversations coming from their radio connections when the leader of the whole operation said that "now they are all together" and he left the impression that he though that we were more in numbers that we actually were. We fired continuously with grenades and small bombs in the direction of their infantry troops and their vehicles. The Serbs stopped their movements because they were being attacked continuously from us, and they started taking the villagers as hostages, who then were made to walk with their hands up on their heads, down the road where they could have been shot from us.

- **They were probably used as a protection?**

HARADINAJ: Yes. There are some elements of that that explains their behavior. I am sure that they have listened our radio connections. Daut told me via the radio that they have taken villagers as hostages and that they are bringing them down the road and he asked me what to do. So I said "don't fire in our people or in the Serbs, you fire only if they come to the door of the house where you are". – If they try to come in to where you

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are with the hostages, then try to withdraw, and if you can't withdraw then, - I said, - you fire irrespective of who it is. I knew it that in that case our people will be dead, and a soldier should not die without firing his weapon. The Serbs were aware of these conversations and so this type of a game went on for a while. All the positions that Serbs took around us were taken by using the villagers as hostages. I remember when they brought down the hostages from the 'Bregu" area: Shaban Zeqiraj, Besim Haradinaj, Mehmet Bajramaj and us after we had targeted the policemen we were forced not to fire because of the hostages.

TWO INJURIES FROM THE CARELESSNESS

My sister and my father functioned very badly, this is because they did not open fire often, and so the policemen thought that there is no one in the house where they were. So they got through in the middle of us, they had surrounded the house where my father was and they had gone inside the house on the second floor. There was a lot of smoke and we could not see properly what was going on. At one point I got out in the window and in the house where my father was I saw a silhouette in the window and I thought that was my father and I said, "hey go in before they shoot you". That in fact was not my father, he was a policeman who fired at me using 'dum-dum' bullets; I got injured on my hand. I got out of the window again and said "hey don't shot it is me". He fired ones more and I was hit for the second time. I was fortunate because I had a bunch of keys of my uncle's house in my pocket. The bullet had hit me in the area between the bottom of the stomach and the top of the leg in the pocket where the bunch of keys was, so the bullet did not have the full effect, but it caused me 12 different holes of different perimeters where the pieces of metal had gone. I was seriously injured in the arm and the leg especially. All this happened around 13:00 hours. I laid down took the 150 grenade that was already full, prepared it, got out of the window that was opposite

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the other house and I fired. I hit the policeman who was positioned in there and also caused a lot of damage inside the room. I could hear screams coming out of the house and I am sure that they were hit pretty badly. These policemen were special units, with shaved heads with or without scarves and they all came in four wheal drives which was quite unusual for the police. They all started swearing by saying: "There is no point of us being here", they wanted to pull out and they were asking for help because a lot of them have been injured. Every time they asked for help we would discover where they are and we would go and 'visit' them with a hand grenade. Especially me, I took care of them in a precise way, from a close distance. In those moments I had to give myself the first aid, so I took a piece of cheese that I found in that house and I put it on my leg to stop the bleeding. The fighting continued all day, and it was really difficult because they fired a lot and we did answer as much as we could, but by the end of the day we started running out of ammunition.

Around dawn, I asked everyone via the radio, to meet up in the front of Xhafer Sadrias house in the dark. That is where I gave the order to pull out. Although I was injured I pulled out without anyone's help. I have to say that then we did not know the story of the war in the other parts of the village, because we could not communicate with Gazmend, Agron (Mehmetaj) and with Hime (Haradinaj), who had manage to get together and knowing that we would go towards Jaballanica direction, they set off that way. The unfortunate thing was that those three have used the same way few times during the day. Serb forces left the way out of the village towards Jabllanica 'open' only temporarily, because during the day they were stationed in the school of the village and they knew that in the case of our withdrawal our only hope would be Jabllanica. That is where Gazmend and Agron Mehmetaj were killed on the spot, and Hime was injured and died on the route. Our group managed to get together with Jabllanica group nearby the Radoniqi Lake.

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- **UÇK came out publicly in Gllogjan only a week after. What were your estimations and your conclusions after the battle of the 24 March?**

HARADINAJ: Because I got injured during the battle, at this stage I could not function. Shqipe Nimoni from Gergoci looked after me during this time, she was helped by Hysen Brahimaj to come and visit me illegally everyday. Kadri Veseli brought another doctor to me from Drenica. During this time Daut (Haradinaj) has shown a lot of organizational skills and also has shown to be very brave, he was quite authoritative as well within the young group of people and also old group of people. He voluntarily went back to the village the next day without even consulting me, he got a lot of support especially from the young people of the village, who by this time were going out publicly, carrying weapons and KLA uniforms. Daut asked if he could participate in the funeral of Gazmend and Agron, but my answer was the he should not, because I was worried that the Serb forces would carry out a massacre on the population. And in this way these young men had proved that UÇK was the winner in Gllogjan and not Serbia.

- **It is interesting that after the battle the police withdrew from Gllogjan and did not show up again. How would you explain this?**

HARADINAJ: To be able to explain this I have to go back to the development of the war. During the fighting's of that day we have used the tactic: "We are everywhere and we are nowhere". Serb forces would think that they have localized us, but we would not be there. And often we would change our places rapidly. And this is how they would loose the control. I have noticed that the leader of the operation was very surprised. I remember this particular detail when I fired from this house that was on their side. They were positioned on another house as well and they weren't expecting an attack from the sides. From a close

distance of 200 meters I fired with an automatic gun and I hit four policemen immediately. Later on the Serb forces burned this particular house from where I shot and torture the owner of the family Ymer Sylaj. I suppose that on that day the Serb forces lost about 40 people and I am not counting the injured people here. They assumed that they have work only for one day they did not count on the war and they certainly did not count on shift changes. They could keep the third circle of the round up and they could bring reinforcement up to there but not in the village. I am sure that in order to rework the plan, counting in military way; one would need preparations for at least a month. A large scale action, which is what the Serb forces were convinced they needed in Gllogjan, acquires study of the ground, recording of the site, the preparation of the troops, preparation of the techniques and of course the study of the possibilities that the enemy has. I knew it that their first step would be localizing us. And this was done in order to study us and to make it difficult for us to show up everywhere in order to isolate us and later on to destroy us. But by this time a new phase of war was beginning.

- **In this way Gllogjan was turning into a resistance center. Can you tell us about the expansion of UÇK and what was people's mood, and their dilemmas?**

DURING THE EXPANSION OF THE WAR I WAS MOSTLY HELPED BY THE TECHNICAL SUPPLY CONNECTIONS I HAD

HARADINAJ: People of Kosova were convinced that Serbia was a state that would not respect not only the national values, but not even the human rights and at the same time people realized that peaceful resistance was taking us nowhere. Maybe people did not expect the armed resistance exactly but every one of them expected some sort of a new form of resistance in order to have the aim realized. So I can say that we as UÇK benefited

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from this mood. I was also aware that the people of Kosova would not accept the war easily. Yugoslavia had a type of authority and people of Kosova did not believe that they could get out of Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia was there for decades. So I had shown to be very careful in propagandizing the war. I have tried to present the war as a necessity, as merit and as an honor of ours, at the same time I tried not to present the war as a difficult activity. I tried not to offer division a chance, but to leave space for everyone to join in. In achieving this I was helped by everyone, or to be more precise I was helped by everyone I was in contact with. But I was mostly helped by my contact supply I had in Albania; I was able to reply to all the requests for weapons in a very short period of time. Apart from the will that people had, they also started seeing the possibilities of the war. Or to say it differently, the people that dreamt to posses a gun managed to get a 7.9 automatic gun. I would like to mention the immense help of **Maxhun Cekaj, who was the commander of Irzniq, and also the help of my father.** Both were known in the area as authoritative people, the first one as an intellectual, they were known as balanced people that you would trust. So these were the circumstances that helped the expansion of the war. And at one time the expansion of the war reached the kind of the level that it was difficult to control.

- **By this time thousands of volunteers came to Gllogjan. The village was becoming the main recruiting center for the future fighters. How did this happen?**

HARADINAJ: As I said earlier one, this has a lot to do with the war propaganda. And as far as the development of the war is concerned, Gllogjan was not only the main center for Dukagjini, but it was also the epicenter for Shala, for Llap, Drenica, Pashtrik, Nerodime, basically all regions. We have used the connection that we had in Gllogjan and everything that had any connections with the war would pass through Gllogjan. During the time that we had to wait to go for the weapons we would

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exercise. When we came back with the supplies and we had to wait to go to the other zones we would again use this time for exercise. We gave military education to everyone that had a chance to come to Gllogjan. The number of people that came to Gllogjan at the same time sometime would pass 2000. Large contribution towards achieving all this was given by Bedri Shala, killed in Junik. The 134 Brigade is named after Bedri Shala, otherwise Bedri was the Brother of Shaban Shala who is now a deputy commander for Drenica region. Large amount of work was also done by Captain Driton Zeneli, also killed, who was then a commander of the second battalion of "Myrte Zeneli" Brigade, and all other young men like Maliq Ndreca, the commander of the Brigade, and **Idriz Bala – "Togeri"**, ect, who prepared all the young fighters for the battle.

- **During this time the front of the war was created in Baballoq, in Suka e Hereqit, in Gramaqel, in Suka e Biteshit, in Irzniq, in Prejlep, in Carrabreg, etc, that actually created a type of defense for Gllogjan. And also UÇK HQ were being set up in all these villages, but also in other villages of the region. How would you describe this new phase of the expansion of the war in Dukagjini area?**

THE CREATION OF THE REAR GUARD

HARADINAJ: I knew that after the creation of Gllogjan undoubtedly something else would follow. The 24 of March happened without being prepared properly, and when we started, it was quite clear that no one was going to give up from their aims: Either work, or you would be eliminated. My first aim was not to let Gllogjan became the front line, but to have the front line at least one village further away, in order to have a background. For the reinforcement of the war it is necessary to have a background that would be used as a space for the preparation of different activities, as a space for the soldiers, etc.

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And this is why we acted energetically in order to send the technical supplies as quickly as possible to the villages like: Irzniq, Baballoq, Gramaqel, and Shaptej. And after this we expanded the front line all the way to **Rastavica** village. By realizing that we were expanding, Serbia acted energetically as well, but not with the intention of destroying us, but with the intention of taking up position as closer as possible to us, in order to keep an eye on us and not let us get developed until they decide to attack us.

- **Maybe because they saw a risk of not being able to use the main Peje-Deçan-Gjakova road?**

HARADINAJ: Not because of this only, but first of all not to allow us to develop. Serbia could have protected the road from Suka e Baballoqit, and we did not have enough technical supplies then to make the road dangerous for them. The aim was to get as closer as possible to us, like for example in Gramaqel, to get closer in a distance of 200 meters, and in that case we would have not been able to get out. By being aware of all this we were able to send good amount of technical supplies in Baballoq and Gramaqel, so that we would have the possibilities of creating a background in Gllogjan. This was a great victory for us and one of the first victories, and I have always mentioned this, it was the first time that we had an open front with Serbia. During these days a large amount of work was done by volunteers that came from abroad together with Xhelal Hajda – "Tonin", who was an excellent soldier and a great man at the same time, whose later death is an immense loss for all of us. In Xhelal's unit was also Maliqi who is now here, Bedri Shala, and many more young man. A lot of help then was also given by Nasim Haradinaj, Mustaf Bajramaj, "Qorri" in supplying, Naser Shatri, Edmond Guri, and many many more that helped us keep the front line. This is where a fighter called Fazli, whose surname I can't remember, was injured and who was then cured with a lot of difficulties. Ajet Potera whose is now commander of the Guard

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Battalion in Llap was also injured, Ramizi from Baballoq was killed, and Shkelzen Haradinaj was injured pretty badly. Ali Avdiaj from Gramaqel was and excellent fighter. But above all is worth mentioning the support of the population in general, starting from the Imam of Baballoq, all those ex-policemen etc. So, I can say that more or less everyone was involved in the war.

THE FIRST SUPPORTERS

Tirana, November 1992: Seit Bushati, Ramush Haradinaj, and Hamit Boriqi (left to right)

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FOREWARNING OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION

Drenica, Summer 1996: Rexhep Selimi, "the Thenth", and Adem Jashari (seated, left to right); Mujë Krasniqi, "Kapuçi", and Xheladin Gashi, "Plaku", (standing, left to right)

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MILITARY ORCHESTRA

Drenica, Summer 1996: Mujë Krasniqi, Rexhep Selimi, Adem Jashari, Xheladin Gashi (standing, left to right); Hamze Jashari (seated)

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THE FIRST ACTIONS OF THE KLA IN DUKAGJIN
Switzerland, 1995: Luan Haradinaj

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SMILE OF FREEDOM
Tirana, 1995: Luan Haradinaj (center), with two friends

TRIBUTE TO THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS

Vlana in Albania, 1998: Before going into Kosova the KLA soldiers pay tribute at the grave of Luan Haradinaj

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ROAD TO FREEDOM

The Kosova-Albanian border, 1998: Dukagjin freedom fighters bring combat equipment into Kosova

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UNITING THE GUNS

Acareva in Drenica, 1997: Daut Haradinaj, "David", Rexhep Selimi, "the Thenth", and Mujë Krasniqi, "Kapuçi". (from left to right)

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CREATION OF DUKAGJINI UÇK HEADQUARTERS, PROBLEMS WITH ELECTING COMMANDER, HOLBROOK IN JUNIK

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WHAT WAS THE MEANING OF THE NUMERICAL PSEUDONYMS IN THE UÇK?

- **Did the Dukagjin KLA headquarters exist at that time?**

HARADINAJ: No. At that time, the headquarters for Jabllanica, Gllogjan, and Smolica existed. The Gllogjan headquarters appeared later than Jabllanica and earlier than Smolica. A characteristic of the Gllogjan headquarters is that it was in constant development, because it always aimed at advancing, to be at the forefront. I was the initiator of this and I tried to enlist the will of the people, to make them unite around the war.

- **When do you think that the Dukagjin headquarters started?**

NAIM MALOKU ENTERED KOSOVA UNDER THE PSEUDONYM "THE FAITHFUL"

HARADINAJ: On 23 May 1998, I invited two representatives from the headquarters from each village in Gllogjan. The meeting took place in Hysen Mehmetaj's home. I had also invited military officers who had served in the Yugoslav army and at that time were living here, in order to create a joint institution that would conduct the war. Among the officers were Adem Ukehaxhaj, who was later killed in Carrabreg, Rrustem Tetaj, Shemsedin Cekaj, Skender Rexhahmetaj, and many others who were from the village headquarters and who were involved in bringing weapons from Albania and carrying on the war at the same time.

I do not have exact information, but I know that representatives of about 30 villages were present at the meeting and, without consulting anybody, I called it the UÇK headquarters for Dukagjin. This did not include the Jabllanica representatives who had their own headquarters and had only observer's status at this meeting. After the meeting, the Gllogjan headquarters became stronger and surpassed all. The war strategy was accepted as advertised, and we agreed that, later one members from each of these village headquarters would become a member of the main Dukagjini headquarter and, as such, would meet once a month. From that moment on, I started to oversee, in an authoritative manner, the activity of the Jabllanica headquarters, so as to balance it and to create direct connections between Jabllanica and Gllogjan. With this aim in view, I sent people with whom I had very good relations and for whom I had very good respect to Reka e Keqe and Smolica.

- **Naim Maloku, whose return to Kosova was remarkable, was also in Smolica. What were your contacts with Naim and what is your opinion of his activity in Smolica?**

HARADINAJ: Naim came back to Kosova in May 1998, i.e. at the time we are talking about. He returned with the pseudonym "Besniku" ("the faithful"). It is important to say that during a meeting that I had with Naim Maloku in Tirana, I was a bit rude to him.

- **At what time did the meeting take place and in what context were you 'rude'?**

HARADINAJ: This happened at the beginning of April 1998. I went to Albania with 370 people to get weapons. We left Gllogjan on 15 tractors and five trucks, going up to Smolica. Although I was wounded, I guided them crossing the border. This was the first time that some many people transported weapons. When we arrived in Albania I had difficulty in bringing all the

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weapons together, so I had to go to Tirana to 'shake up' those people a little bit so that they would help with the weapons. I had 400 strong young men who slept in the open; it was cold and wet; and for three days they had eaten only bread and a little cheese now and then. In Tirana, Xhavit Haliti and Qerim Kelmendi suggested that we meet with several officers who wanted to come to Kosova. I did not know any of them. When I entered the room, the atmosphere was relaxed. They had mobile phones and good conditions. I had two wounds, I was tired. They started to teach me how to use a 62-mm mortar from Tirana, and I felt insulted. I thought they were a bunch of chatterboxes and I said to them: "We will see each other in Kosova if you want to come, if you don't, don't stay here because it will be very difficult for you, so get lost." I also threatened them.

When I went out, Bislim Zyrapi, whom I did not know, followed me. I heard him call me by the pseudonym "Smajl". He asked me to go back and talk, but I had already walked out. Naim was the first one of the officers to come to Kosova; Bislim was the second. Naim found a nucleus in Smolica which had already been started, but not grown yet. Naim's presence there was big help, especially since Smolica was part of the border area where Serbia tried to impose its own doctrine using all means. His wisdom and seriousness helped with the rapid expansion of the war in Junik. Naim assisted in establishing unity in Reka e Keqe. After Sali Veseli came to Kosova, about a month after Naim, he was my connection with Reka. Sali helped me in other directions especially with military advice. Thus, I continued to coordinate work with all the leaders of the headquarters, as far as Krushec and Loxha.

PROBLEMS IN SELECTING THE COMMANDER FOR THE DUKAGJIN OPERATIONAL ZONE

Nevertheless, there were problems in completely unifying the Dukagjin headquarters and in selecting the headquarter

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commander, because Lahi Ibrahimaj, as the person responsible for a great part of the activity, wanted to become the commander. But he was not up to the organizational level that had been achieved so far. I must explain: Lahi is my uncle. I was sure that I was the one who could do most of the work, but I felt bad because I though if I asked for that responsibility it would sound as if I were an opportunist. All who worked with me were sure that the responsibility should be given to Ramush, but there was an inclination on the part of the present Minister of Order of the Provisional Government of Kosova and the former "The Tenth," Rexhep Selimi, not to give the responsibility to Ramush but to Lahi.

- **Why?**

HARADINAJ: I think that Lahi was more submissive while I was one of those who defined, for myself, the war criteria and the modus operandi.

- **So, the UÇK general Staff did not exist at the time?**

HARADINAJ: The UÇK General Staff did exist. The ties between Dukagjin and the General Staff were maintained through "Maxhup" (Lahi Ibrahimaj) who, at that time, was a member of the General Staff. They were afraid of my stubbornness, which sometimes I had manifested openly, because I had defined the criteria myself and I had acted according to my logic, the logic of the terrain, and not according to the advice or orders of others.

- **You are talking about relations that were full of disagreements. During that time, did you have any communication with the UÇK General Staff?**

HARADINAJ: All the time. I am talking about organizational issues. In two meetings, we could not resolve the

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questions I talked about earlier. In second half of June 1998, a third meeting took place in Jabllanica, in which the decision was made to establish the Dukagjin headquarters. I was appointed commander and Lahi Ibrahimaj, deputy commander. Sali Veseli, Rrustem Tetaj, Shemsedin Çekaj, Skender Rexhahmetaj, Gani Xhukla, Driton Zeneli, Mustaf Bajramaj, Nazmi Ibrahimaj, Lahi Ibrahimaj, and Rexhep Selimi, and a bodyguard were also present at this meeting. Duties were assigned to the officers. Sali Veseli was appointed chief of staff as he was more learned in military matters. In these meeting, the command positions were given to the officers while all the military who were distinguished for their bravery were released from their command duties. I told them: "For the sake of unity in war, we must act in the right way; the gun is valuable to you; do not ask for responsible positions."

I was, as they say, a "work horse", and I abided by strict military rules, demanding that everybody render accounts for whatever they did. I ran into difficulties with Lahi who left the area without permission. He went for a time to the Central Headquarters in Drenica and I took disciplinary measures against him, dismissing him from his position as deputy commander. I told him openly that we could not work like this and that he behaved like a tourist and tourists cannot stay with me. To avoid trouble or unnecessary scandal, I recommended that his brother Nazmi, who is a man of principle, take over the position. Otherwise, Lahi was a good fighter, an ardent supporter of the war, but it was the time when the war was assuming a mass character and much arduous work was necessary to explain to people why we were waging the war. Naim Maloku, who was a commander there, Sali Veseli, and Agron Rama were appointed members of the KLA Dukagjin Headquarters from Reka e Keqe.

- **Who was the representative for Dukagjin in the General Staff?**

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UÇK GENERAL STAFF WAS IN A PERIOD OF CRISIS

HARADINAJ: For a time, Lahi was the representative for Dukagjin at the General Staff. This was the period of crisis in the organization of the General Staff. This went on until Bislim Zyrapi became chief of the General Staff. Together with the others who were there, he deserved extraordinary credit for organizing the General Staff, especially in military matters. Bislim managed to involve the zone commanders in the work of the General Staff. This happened much later, around the time that the international observes came to Kosova. Before that, the General Staff was more enigmatic, more secretive, and not so professional in composition.

- **What do you mean by the expression " a period of crisis, enigmatic, and not very professional in composition" in regard to the UÇK General Staff?**

HARADINAJ: I consider it a period of crisis for the General Staff because let us say, the highest ranking military officers in the UÇK, such as the zone commander, was not a member of the General Staff. This manner of organizing the headquarters of an army fighting for freedom such as the UÇK could not be justified. I consider it, therefore, as a period of crisis. No zone commander was a member of the UÇK General Staff. When the staff was called to meet, the ones who got together were the political department, the spokesmen, and the services. They held discussions and made decisions. Why do I think that it had an enigmatic content? Because the zone commanders did not know the responsibilities of those people whom meet at the General Staff. There were people who until yesterday were only a name somewhere and, at a certain moment, became deputy commander of the army, spokesmen, representative here or representative there, etc. I do not criticize anybody for not having graduated from the military academy, but the presence of soldiers who are

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trained professionally and capable of doing work was small. What was worse, even the zone commanders were not members of the Staff.

- **It is interesting to explain the numerical organization of the UÇK. For example, who was "number Ten", "number Eleven" and so on. No one knows whom "number one", "number two" and others were. More precisely, did you belong to this organization?**

THE NUMERICAL PSEUDONYMS DID NOT INDICATE THE UÇK HIERARCHY

HARADINAJ: The First, the Second, and up to number nine did exist. It started with "number ten". Do you understand this? There was no First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and so on. There was the "number ten", "number eleventh", " number fifteen." There was the 607th. "Number ten" was Rexhep Selimi, "number eleven" was Sokol Bashota, and "number fifteen" was Lahi Ibrahimaj, while the 607th was Daut Haradinaj. These were numbers for identification and communication and radio transmissions. I think that this naming system was used spontaneously. We said, "I talked to number eleven" and not "I talked to Sokol Bashota", or "We were at the Tenth's place" and not we were at Rexhep Selimi's. Do you understand? I do not know who proposed and developed this form of action. At that time, I was outside Kosova. I think that these numbers date as far back as 1996. There were other numbers that were used later.

- **Why do I ask this question? During the war, the people in Prishtina thought that the number actually represented the hierarchy, the ranking of the most important people in the UÇK. For example, it was thought that the "First" was Adem Jashari, and so on.**

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HARADINAJ: No, this was not the meaning of those numbers. There was no ranking. There was only an idea about communication. For example, if Daut Haradinaj was the 607th, where were the 606 others who were as great at that time?

- **In June 1998, an important event for the UÇK took place. At that time, Richard Holbrooke met with local UÇK commander in Junik. Many consider this meeting the first moment of international recognition of UÇK. Did you think the same at that time?**

HARADINAJ: On the basis of my knowledge about the logic existing in international opinion, I knew that international opinion would be convinced very soon that the people of Kosova were on the correct course. I personally have used every possible means to achieve this, starting with contacts with various personalities, by means of presentations in the media, which I have not utilized simply as propaganda but as possibilities for explanations that we do not carry out terrorist activities, but defensive actions, and that the attacker that is putting us in danger is no state, but a barbarian, etc. I was informed about Holbrooke's visit but, at that time, the army was not skilled enough to successfully handle a meeting with him.

- **We know that the Holbrooke team was interested in visiting Gllogjan. Were you interested in meeting with Holbrooke at that time?**

HARADINAJ: I can say concretely that we were not prepared on that level, we were not even well informed or organized. We could not present ourselves as an army, but as armed people.

- **So you were not interested, at that time, in meeting with Holbrooke?**

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HARADINAJ: I was interested and always ready to support our war, but I was not capable of and prepared for such a meeting. Do you see what I am trying to say?

- **Holbrooke wanted the UÇK and Demaci to unblock the road to Llapushnik and to Kijeva on the Prishtina-Peja highway. Was it thought that, if this demand were met, the UÇK would take the United States "hostage" and thus get it more concretely involved in the war? What do you think these demands?**

HARADINAJ: Irrespective of any concessions we would have made at that time, international opinion, American opinion, and the USA did not have the necessary readiness to act concretely against Serbia. To convince international opinion of the necessity for actions against Serbia, the usurpation or taking hostage of Kijeva and other continuing actions such as in Decan, Prejlep, etc. were necessary. I think that a gesture of good will toward Holbrooke and the US was necessary for political effect, though we were aware that we had not achieved any victory. I think that concessions were necessary because of the personality of our friend Holbrooke and the US, and for nothing else or anybody else.

- **At the beginning of the war, the army saluted with raised fists. This has been talked about a lot, placing it in the context of the past. Demaci also dealt with this question and he publicly announced that the salute had to be changed...,**

WHY DID WE SALUTE WITH RAISED FISTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR?

HARADINAJ: This is clear. I'll explain why. The Kosova Liberation Army was not set up according to some initial rules

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and regulations. Suppose the Prime Minister of Kosova, as the highest-ranking military officer, would have ordered me to prepare this mechanism. I would have made the preparations, that is, the documents, orders, decrees, rules and regulations, and concrete military actions. So that the soldier could carry them out in practice, the army of Kosova was set up at the initiative of the boys of Kosova. They had the right to define the norms of action at that time. I'm going back earlier, before Zahi, before Adrian. It was their right to set the norms because they set up the mechanism. Demaci did not come at that time to tell me how to salute, nor did the Prime Minister, the former minister, or the generals. None came to tell me that it would be good for the army that you are setting up to salute with hand on chest, or with open hand, or with the fist. Thus, the salute with the fist was the first initiative or the first salute. It symbolized unification, strength. The first reason that made us abandon the hand salute was the fact that the Yugoslav army saluted in this way. When I was a soldier in Yugoslavia, I had saluted with the hand. Pavkovic saluted with the hand. We wanted to identify ourselves with something Albanian. I know that they saluted with fist in China, but China is too far. Yugoslavia is closer. We were at war with Yugoslavia. I wanted to set up an army against that army and we could not have the same salute. The use of a Yugoslav gun against Yugoslavia was more reasonable than the use of the same salute.

The fist salute was a special Albanian salute which dates back much earlier than merely to the period of cooperation with the "fraternal Chinese people" or with Russia. If you have seen the movies about Skenderbeg, the fist is raised as a salute symbolizing strength. I think that the fist salute has never put as to shame in war. It was only part of the propaganda, of Serbia's special warfare, to try to find fault even with our salute, ranking us with red, the yellow, the black, etc. It was not a salute inherited from the socialist Albania of Enver Hoxha, when the army saluted with the fist. It is an Albanian salute borrowed from the special characteristics that we have as Albanians. With the

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fist, I am stronger and when I want to scare you, I do not show you my hand or finger, but my fist. When I raised my fist, I did not do it because Enver Hoxha did it, but to show that I want us to be united and strong.

- **Was the change of saluting a big problem?**

HARADINAJ: The first set of rules of the Kosova Liberation Army says clearly that the official salute is with the outstretched hand touching the front of the hat, and the person looks straight ahead, etc., while it says that the salute with the fist is being maintained among people. I think that this clarifies everything. Our people need to be united; they need an attack force against the enemy. Our army needs discipline, education, and this can be achieved much easier in peace. All have agreed to observe the salute with the outstretched hand.

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VI

DISAGREEMENTS WITH OFFICERS AND TAHIR ZEMAJ

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TO WIN THE WAR WE PLANNED A TOTAL UPHEAVAL IN KOSOVA

- **At that time, the media wrote about the problematic relations between the KLA in Gllogjan, led by you, and a kind of KLA in Prapacan, led by Tahir Zemaj. How was this situation created?**

HARADINAJ: All along, I had known that Serbia would work against this war. Our people were deprived of their own media, deprived of a mechanism, I apologize for criticizing the print media, but without TV and radio, which would clarify what was happening every day. There was danger of a special war waged by means of propaganda. It was often said that Ramush is a young man, militarily untrained, crazy, or who knows what his interests are. There were many rumors about me. Those who had the chance to meet me and with whom I created a good impression said that Ramush is good, but those surrounding him re not good. The enemy has always tried to divide us, creating situations such as between Izetbegovic and Silajdjic in Bosnia, possibly to provoke us into worst forms of civil war. Serbia was interested in keeping Kosova, but it panned that at the moment it could not do so to instigate a civil war. That is, not right away, but later. This was good luck. I think that some of us, willingly or unwillingly, fell victim to this propaganda or special warfare.

- **With the expansion of the war, it became necessary for the Albanian officers in the West to join the war in Kosova. Some of them such as Naim Maloku, Bislim Zyrapi, and others were already leading the war in various parts of Kosova. How did the group of officers led by Tahir Zemaj came to Dukagjin?**

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THE OFFICERS AND TAHIR ZEMAJ WERE LOOKIN FOR A BATHROOM

HARADINAJ: The organized arrival of a number of officers, nearly 20 of them and 112 soldiers, was problematic and alarming for the KLA, because it was a matter of an organized mechanism which wanted to act outside the existing command. Our forces in Jasiq blocked the officers and soldiers, thinking that they were forces sent from Serbia. There were demands that they be physically eliminated. They wanted me to go up there, to Jasiq, for a working meeting. I think Lum Haxhiu escorted me there. We had two meeting. I had the first meeting with everybody present, Tahir Zemaj and other officers. From the start, I saw that they were not sincere. They were more interested in taking on responsibilities and powers rather than helping with the war. After a rather short discussion, I stood up and said: "Whoever comes to Kosova to help is welcome. As a soldier, as officer, all are indispensable. I am pleading with you brothers, don't drive us to ruin". I allowed them to enter and told the boys not to fire a single bullet against them. I was very stern with this order. That day, in the evening, through a representative, they asked for another meeting in Junik.

- **What were the demands? Was there any special demand?**

HARADINAJ: Their demands were: to have a place for themselves where they could wash; to act as a separate mechanism, just as they were. The problem was they did not want the officers to be scattered through the region. For instance, four would go to Reka, four would come with me, four would go to Jabllanice, etc. There was no problem if, let us say, ten of them stayed in Strellc, Isniq, or Prapacan. The problem was that they wanted 20 officers to command 100 soldiers. In the meantime, I had 6,000 soldiers and only three of them were officers. In other words, they had come as a staff, to settle somewhere in Dukagjin, also as a staff, and to operate as a staff.

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As the headquarters already existed at that time, it was not allowed to set up another one, especially since no one was prevented from participating in the existing headquarters. During the conversation, I had the impression that they were not convinced that the war with Serbia could be won. I clearly saw their inclination to become an autonomous army, a part of the Serb army, or I don't know what. This inclination was more prominent in their leader Tahir Zemaj and some of his friends. That nigh I stayed there at the invitation of the people in Junik. Gani Shehu, former LDK activist who led the war, Nimon Tofaj, Sali Veseli, and some others were there. After dinner, as I mentioned earlier, through e representative, the group of officers presented a written request for two of their representatives to participate in the talks, which I accepted the next day.

- **Who were those two?**

HARADINAJ: Tahir Zemaj and Kemal Shaqiri. Kemal is from Drenice. We had a long conversation, about two hours.

- **It was only you three?**

WHO MET WITH WHOM IN DENMARK AND WHAT DECISION WAS MADE THERE?

HARADINAJ: No, Sali Veseli and Naim Maloku were also present. Naim was present at all talks with the officers. Naim was worried that something might go wrong, he was also obsessed with the danger of division. He tried to play the role of a mediator, bridge. He was very close to my stand. Seeing that I was trying to leave some space for him, he assumed a correct stand and, in the end, he distanced himself from them completely. I am sure that I was very tolerant. I allowed them to express their opinions at great length, listening to them attentively. Later on, Tahir Zemaj told me that this was an organization achieved by

agreement with the General Headquarters. It was revealed that a joint meeting was organized in Denmark among Adem Demaci, Shaban Muja, Xhavit Haliti, and Bujar Bukoshi. Allegedly, they decided to join forces. Upon learning this, I asked them to give me some time to see what this was all about. I think that Xhavit Haliti was the one who was most in contact with them or with one of them.

I said: "You are welcome in Kosova. We are brothers and I would like that all the wealth you bring to Kosova, including the officers and equipment, to be handed to me for use". In cooperation with Rrustem Tetaj, Shemsedin Cekaj, Sali Veseli, Skender Rexhahmetaj, and Gani Xhuka, we had already prepared a center for the training of cadets in Prapacan. Barracks had been built there and the rooms were furnished with beds, a kitchen, etc. Funding came from army sources and Rrustem Tetaj made an outstanding contribution. A scam was discovered. A group of officers had expressed the desire to be stationed in this center, not with the aim of using it for the cadets, but as a place where they could set up their headquarters. We had just brought the other headquarters together and had already set up the Dukagjin headquarters, and now they wanted a new headquarters. Our talks came to an end, no hard words, and no threats. I told them that they did not have my approval for this: You can fight against Serbia, I will fight against Serbia; as long as we do not clash, "good luck in your work:" if we come to disagreements, god help us, we are all Albanians. This is how we parted.

- **So you parted without reaching an agreement?**

HARADINAJ: We did not agree on anything. I told my soldiers not to fire on them. The mortars were already directed against them. Tahir Zemaj especially irritated them, because of his past. It was known that until recently he had worked for the Yugoslav armed counterintelligence forces, and later he allegedly was involved in drug trafficking.... In other words, he had a very bad record. We did not allow fratricide. They passed through

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Gllogjan and went to Prapacan. Their going into Prapacan building conflicted with the purpose of the building. But Rrustem Tetaj told me that they would unite with us in combat. We had 200-300 young men, the generation of Gjakova soldiers, including Permet Vula and Elton Zherka, that is, the elite of the young men. We sent them to Prapacan and asked that they be trained. The group of officers began to behave carefully, because they realized my power in the. They were all very well dressed, well fed. They had good sleeping quarter and did not participate in combat. This made the other soldiers jealous. To some extent, this was understandable, because the frontline had to be kept up in Baballoq, Garamacel, Prejlep, and Carrabreg. Other new frontlines had been opened up. Our soldiers were not respected. They were insulted... They were scared lest we attack them, lest we take concrete actions.

- **Was there any time when some serious incident might have occurred?**

THEY WERE TOLD: "YOU ARE THE SOLDIERS OF 'COWBOY RAMUSH'"

HARADINAJ: This could have happened when a great number of soldiers in the barracks came to Gllogjan and told me that they would no longer stay in the barracks, because "they are calling us rebels, they are treating us badly, they are saying that we are soldiers of 'cowboy Ramush'". I went to the premises immediately, I insulted them, I fired in the courtyard, and I gave them half an hour to leave the premises and evicted them. Then I explained to 300-400 soldiers why all this happened and most of them looked at me with admiration. One of the soldiers asked, "what did I do to get into this predicament?" I told him that his fault was that he belonged to people among whom there were men (Tahir Zemaj – author's note) who wanted to mistreat him, me, and all the people out of evil intentions. I returned the

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soldiers to the premises. I told them to continue working, and said: "Kosova is your". Fearing fratricide, that night I had a meeting in Lluke, where we reached a compromise. Some of the officers were to be given to me so I could send them where there were many soldiers, such as Gllogjan, Jabllanica, and Smolica. The day after this compromise, I allowed the officers to return to the premises.

- **Were the officers the only ones to participate in the meeting or were others present?**

HARADINAJ: Taking part in this meeting were the members of Dukagjin headquarters and the representatives of, what we called then, the officers of the government headed by Tahir Zemaj. That night I asked for help of soldiers and officers in Loxha. Although the war had not yet started there, the situation was very tense. Two officers went to Jabllanica and one came to Gllogjan but they did not stay longer than one day. When the first grenade was fired, the one who came to Gllogjan asked me to release him. This was at a time when Gllogjan was filled with civilians and provided volunteers every day to support the frontlines up to Voksh and Poberxha. The people in those villages had left immediately, which enabled Serbia to defeat me in Prejlep.

From then on, they continued their parallel activity, which resulted in the initiative to take over the command in the Dukagjin area, under the justification that it belonged to the professionals. At the same time, they contacted the Serb representatives and international representatives, implying that they were ready for compromise. All this ended with their departure in September 1998, in collaboration with the Serb forces. Without an agreement with the Serb forces, it was impossible to pass along the Peje-Decan road, where our army had passed. I am sure that this was some kind of an agreement.

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- **Did you prove later whether the meeting in Denmark really took place and did you learn what was said there?**

HARADINAJ: I would like to stress that for a time, at the beginning, there was professional cooperation with the officers in Prapacan. Regular work meetings were held at which Tahir Zemaj spoke as the Commander of the First Brigade in Prapacan; Nazif Rambaja, as deputy commander of the Third Brigade; and Shemsedin Ceku, from the Second Brigade in Bardhaniq. This cooperation went on until the moment when our relations were aggravated because of the attempts on the part of the officers and their chief to make him the commander of the zone.

As for your question, I have tried to find out what happened. I have come to the conclusion that something like this must have happened. Why? The fact that Xhavit Haliti, several times, according to documents, accepted money Bujar Bukoshi, we are not talking small amounts of money, proves that there was collaboration.

- **Can you tell us how much money?**

HOW MUCH MONEY WAS RECEIVED FROM BUKOSHI IN THE NAME OF KLA?

HARADINAJ: Yes. The first time, they received 1.7 million DM, the second time, 2.5 million DM, and the third time three million DM. This money was given prior to March 1999. It is a question of about eight million DM that Xhavit Haliti received from Bukoshi, in the name of the army, the General Staff or logistics. I'd like to clarify that the most recent amount of three millions DM was received by Dervishi, i.e the cooperator of Sokol Bashota. It was withdrawn in the West Europe, allegedly on the order of the General Staff.

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- **Dervishi, is it a pseudonym or the true name of some person?**

HARADINAJ: I know him, I know where he comes from, but I have not had frequent contacts with him. I know the person in question but I do not know his full name.

- **Do you know exactly what agreements were reached in Denmark?**

HARADINAJ: Some people acted without consultations. In my opinion, probably Xhavit Haliti, Shaban Muja, and Adem Demaci, and others who might have been present at that meeting, because I do not know exactly who was there, they might have had talks with Ahmet Krasniqi or Bujar Bukoshi, about cooperation. By not dispatching the details of the meeting to us in the grassroots, so that we could know what to do in the future, I think that this act was a very big mistake.

- **Do you consider it a mistake that you were not informed about the possible agreement?**

HARADINAJ: When I was informed about an activity that took place somewhere, or the will of fellow workers, or fellow fighters, or suppliers, or even Shaban Muja and Xhavit Haliti, not that I had great respect for them, but it was easier to face my officers in the terrain, explaining to them that that was a coordinated activity with our people and our army.

- **It is interesting that the intensity of the fighting in Decan municipality in the direction of Gjakova, was more severe than in direction of Peja. How would you explain this?**

HARADINAJ: In my opinion, there are two explanations. A great number of people live in Isniq, and many of them are

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young. Having frontlines in Decan, Carrabreg, Prejlep, etc., Serbia did not consider it convenient to open up new fronts. The people in Isniq did not consider it convenient to start an open confrontation, because there were also many people who had come from other villages. We must not forget that there was a line of fire in Isniq and that the Serb forces were not allowed to cross that line. At the same time, in Isniq they did not take actions to block the roads as in Carrabreg, Prejlep, etc. It is true that some thought that Kosova could be liberated without the smell of scorched earth. Let's attempt an analysis now. If they had supported my request to block the movement of the Serb forces on the Peja-Decan road and from Dujaka to Gjakova, by other means – not like Prejlep where the road was blocked with barricades – a huge triangle toward the border would have been opened from that time on.

- **Do you think it was possible to maintain this triangle?**

THE PRAPACAN MEETING DEMANDED AN ACCOUNTING FROM ME

HARADINAJ: If we had done this, NATO forces would have entered Kosova in September 1998. At that time, Serbia was not prepared to do what it did recently. In the meantime, Serbia trained and recruited reservists, paramilitaries, Russian mercenaries, etc. If that corridor had been opened, it would have been sufficient for an invasion by the Albanian forces or other forces that might possibly have been interested. I want to make something clear: I had about 10,000 rifles in Dukagjin, about 1,000 75-mm cannon shells, 1,000 82-mm and 62-mm shells, and many hand grenades. What a pity for Drenica or some others to hear these figures. The people had an indescribable will to fight Serbia. People went to the frontlines with pistols, hunting riffles, and whatever else they had. If all those rifles had been fired at the same time, as it is done at the New Years eve, Serbia would have

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been alarmed. This happened to a certain degree, because in Dukagjin a huge free territory was created. The great number of weapons and the people's organization made this possible. We were divided, and, unfortunately, those plans became impossible. That is why I accuse those forces and do not forgive them even now, because they did something very bad. They insulted us in front of the enemy. People started to ask: "Are you with Ramush or the government?" I did not fight against the government or against Bukoshi; on the contrary, I fought for the government, for the state that has a government. I fought against Serbia.

- **At this time, public opinion was being made manipulated. The Information Ministry of the government in exile, with headquarters in Geneva, had released a report based on a letter sent from Dukagjin, according to which you were no longer the UÇK commander for the region, but Tahir Zemaj was. How did this happen?**

HARADINAJ: This was part of the special war. Wherever there is military action, the intensity of the special war goes down. Serbia is concerned about intensifying this kind of war prior to every offensive. I do not think that the offensive of the summer of 1998 would have started if they could have not sowed division. They did not attack us earlier because we were united. They did not attack us from Isniq, but from where the bearers of the war were at that time. Our strength weakened because of the split. I have seen this directly on the frontline. The group of officers led by Tahir Zemaj worked for the division. They insulted the values of the war, its outstanding people who were dying every day in the battle field and they lauded to the skies values at that time were not values at all, such as the right command and the left command, etc. We need these very much now, but, at that time we did not need them so much.

The first Serb offensive that summer was used for this purpose and it was described as Ramush's defeat. A meeting was called in Prapacan. Prapacan was not yet torched. I had to go

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after a two-week war, after many people killed in the battle, as a loser. Serbia had defeated me, but so did the other part of my army. Instead of recognizing the sacrifice and the Great War we waged, the losses we caused to the enemy – we also had losses but not that huge – they made me render account as if I were the culprit. Representatives of the villages, not the army, were invited to this meeting. They asked me to call this meeting and analyze the situation. I told them that I was also interested in hearing the opinion of the people. During the meeting, the scenario for disputing my commanding and organizational capabilities came out clearly. When I sensed this tendency, I told those present: "I will be pleased if someone assumes the responsibility of leading us in war. I will help him and serve him as a good soldier. If you think that someone here or elsewhere can take this responsibility, you tell me and I will follow him. Keep it well in mind, though, that I will forgive no one if he does not work for the liberation of Kosova and I, the soldier, will punish him."

Rrustem Teta asked what would I think if he would propose Tahir Zemaj as commander, because he said, he had become a matter of concern. I told him that if the Dukagjin headquarters has the same opinion, I agree and wish us good luck. At that time, the UÇK General Staff had been organized to some extend. I was led more by Hashim Thaqi, Rexhep Selimi, and others. Bislim Zyrapi was chief of the Operations Directorate. In Prapacan, it was decided that the proposal for changing the commander should be sent to the General Staff for approval. Soon after this approval, someone reported this to the information minister. I do not know whom. The proposal I had approved was interpreted as a decision. After the General Staff received the proposal, representatives came twice to discuss this question in work meeting.

- **Who came on behalf of the KLA General Staff?**

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UÇK GENERAL STAFF OPPOSED PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE IN THE DUKAGJIN COMMANDER

HARADINAJ: Bislim Zyrapi, Hashim Thaqi, and Rexhep Selimi. Jakup Krasniqi and Rame Buja were also present sometimes. In these meetings, it was said that I was to remain the commander. Bislim communicated this decision in the meeting in Bardhaniq. On this occasion, Tahir and his men were very angry. They said that they recognize Ramush as the commander of the zone but they had their reservations with regards to me, and also thought that the General Staff was incomplete professionally.

- **Earlier you mentioned that you were defeated in Prejlep. How did it happen?**

HARADINAJ: There were people who considered our blocking of the Prejlep road a mistake, but we must make it clear that the worse the war is, the faster it comes to an end.

- **The diplomatic representatives of the Western countries who were in Prishtina or who came to Prishtina at that time were astonished by the blocking of the Decan-Gjakova road and considered it very problematic!**

HARADINAJ: The diplomatic circles were not alarmed about the evacuation of all the residents of Pobergje and the torching of the entire village. Nobody said a word. They did not react to the burning of Decan. You must keep it mind that this was the war that had already began. There were people in the diplomatic circles that were interested in the not presenting this war as a war. Our aim was to engage all the people Kosova in the war, to win the war. Before the verifiers came, we had a plan for an uprising, which meant cutting electric lines, blocking roads, shutting off water supplies, in a word, making it difficult for Serbia to act in Kosova. This cannot be achieved by just staying in the mountains.

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VII

THE LARGE SERBIAN OFFENSIVES OF THE SUMMER OF 1998

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WE NEVER PULLED OUT BECAUSE OF THE POWER OF THE ENEMY'S FIRE BUT BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF POWER OF OUR ATTACK

- **The battle of Rahovec was seen as the first UÇK effort to [redacted] control. The Serb forces entered the town after few days of the war and a large number of the Albanian civilian victims were caused. Even today there are people that think that that was an accident. How did you see this war then?**

HARADINAJ: I have said it previously that we did not carry out two wars and now we are on our third war. Our war was developed on the basis of the initiative, ideas of the moment, of strategy that was worked out time after time, and it was usually carried out of euphoria, from the developments on the ground from the level of the power that we had, so basically from the contest that we happen to in be then. Similar to Rahovec case is the Deçani case. We undertook a lot of preparations to go into Deçan, but Serbs took actions earlier than us, they burned the whole of Deçan, expelled all the population and created a very strong front line there. I think that it should be known that the first idea of the war was to create a free space and then the liberation of Kosova by us. This idea, to take everything from Serbia and to get Serbia out of here, was strong in every soldier, in every captain and in every commander. I was aware of how the war was developed in Kosova, there were some of our soldiers that fought there, Alush Agushi-Mala went there together with his unit and we helped him with the technical supplies. I know that Selaudin Mullaabazi – Mici and Musa Jahshari came to us and we gave them a lot of heavy equipment for the war. I do not want to go into detailed analysis of whether the Rahoveci war was planed or it was an incident. Rahoveci was part of the

development of the war. All our war was an incident if we look at it like that, the war was a product of the momentarily circumstances, the product of the will, of the desire to liberate Kosova. As far as the victims are concerned, we have seen how much other towns suffered until Kosova was fully liberated. My opinion was that Kosova should have been turned upside down, the Kosovar Albanians should have kept on going as much as they could and that the Serb forces should have collapsed. So I have thought of a total destabilization, similar to what NATO did later on by hitting the Serb forces in every place in every object.

- **Did you think that that could have been possible without the involvement of the international community?**

HARADINAJ: Yes, but after a longer period, and after many difficulties and after we had paid an expensive price. It was clear to us that without risking the enemy's background and if we do not make it impossible for them to have a normal life in particular areas, there is very little we can do. If, for example, Serbia was able to always hold press conferences in Prishtina, had enough electricity, was able to move freely with a lot of young people on the streets, able to keep shops open, they would have never admitted that they are loosing Kosova and that they should pull out of here. We have thought of disconnecting the power and the water supplies in all towns of Kosova, because we thought that the Albanians would be able to live without water and electricity and the Serbs would not be able to stay here without water and electricity.

- **Approximately during this time the battle of Loxha took place. It is said that in Loxha all armed Albanian forces that were in Dukagjin fought together and that they caused Serbian forces great damage in people and in equipment?**

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IN LOXHA IT WAS PROVED THAT UNITED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DESTROY SERBIA

HARADINAJ: The population of Loxha that were organized in a unit fought there, a large number of fighters from Lugu i Baranit, soldiers from Dushkaja and Jabllanica, and a considerable number of soldiers prepared from Tahir Zemaj itself. A very powerful war took place in Loxha, successful war, and a lot of damage was caused to Serbian forces. In this battle a special contribution was given by officers, two of which were killed there, Rrustem Bruci and another one that was an anti aircraft protection expert, but I can't remember his name. The battle of Loxha was a proof that united we could have destroyed the enemy. The hope of a unification of a professional knowledge with the powerful will of the young men, has pushed me to become tolerant, knowing that if we achieve that we would really be strong. And this was achieved in Loxhë.

- **In June and July of 1998 in Prishtina a lot of efforts were made by the then American ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, to form an executive body that could have been called Government of Kosova, and the KLA would have been part of this government. It is known that meetings were held between Ambassador Hill and UÇK representatives in connection with this project. It was thought that the formation of the government would have stopped the war with concrete results for that time. As it is known, the idea failed. How did you see these efforts then?**

HARADINAJ: I had knowledge of these meeting, but not a complete knowledge of what was said during the meetings. I would like to say that we started from zero. I am talking about the Albanian position. The international community, not entirely, but primarily USA, United Kingdom, and other countries that were interested not to let Kosova go throughout the Bosnia

experience, tried continuously to find a way out. They tried to find the solution to the Kosova problem step by step, by disabling the obstacles coming from the states like China, Russia and etc., into achieving what was planned. To tell you the truth I do not think that we could have achieved then as much as we have achieved now. If the Albanians were better organised politically and earlier, we would have not come to the situations where the politics were being influenced by us "the mountain people" as we were being called. This was a fatal mistake. The intelligence and the political class of our nation have proved to be unable and have failed the test. I like to mention here that I have quite liked the saying "Intelligent is he who has a high level of sacrifice for his own nation". In other words, intelligent is he who at one moment is ready to sacrifice as much as it is necessary for his nation. We have been damaged continuously by a political incapacity. Maybe it is a petty that I am speaking like this, conscious that I am damaging the political representation of the KLA headquarters, but the political leadership has been the heaviest wound and has been an obstacle in the unity, has been a barrier in our vision, because we did not know what we wanted, by asking for the national unity, by asking for this and than that. The political factor was an impediment in our line of ideas as well, by saying that someone is white and someone else is red and the other is black. If our political leadership would have been able to sustain Kosova in every aspect, be it militarily, or politically, or in other moral forms, then the international community would have see in us a partner with whom it would have been possible to communicate in a straight line. With the contact forms that have been used with us – come and talk to us in Prishtina, come and talk to us in Drenica, in Dukagjin etc, was impossible. Other words, it was unfortunate for us. The answers to why it happened like this is best know by political leaders.

- **In this state Kosova had to face up the large Serbian offensives of the summer of 1998. How did these fightings developed in Dukagjin?**

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HARADINAJ: Before I start talking about this let me mention first that the most important thing for our war was to be able to keep the corridor with Albania open, so that we would be able to bring in the technical equipment. The military equipment was carried out up to 100 horses and 1200 people at the same time. This sort of movement acquired a lot of security. We all know that a lot of young men that were involved in the military organization were damaged a lot by the Serb ambushes. All the technical equipment that Shala, Llapi and Drenica had, not only until September but also until November of 1998, came into Kosova via Dukagjini. The main points through which the military equipment had passed through were Smolica, Gllogjan, Jabllanica and further one.

By having this kind of a situation, it was necessary to create free zones into which the Serb forces could not carry out different activities and could create ambushes. The expulsion of the population from the border villages like Pobergja, Vokshi etc. was done on purpose, in order to create the tampon zones and cut off our supply routes. We have managed to keep the village of Vokshi until quite late, to be more precise until the fall of Junik. We did not need Vokshi that much as a village, we needed it as a front line to protect the corridor. There was one position in Voksh and another one was near Korenica in Smolica, and this part was free for us, apart from this particular building that Serbia had near the border, but they were not strong enough to react here although they could see a lot of young men passing by carrying military equipment. As an exception I would mention here some ambushes done by paramilitaries in cooperation with the sold people of our nation, but these ambushes could not damage us a lot.

HOW DID GLLOGJAN FELL FOR THE FIRST TIME?

In connection to this we should not blame Smolica. Smolica faced an offensive from the firts day and until it fell. Every day

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thousands of grenades were thrown in Smolica. There were fighting's in Voksh, in Carrabreg, in Prejlep, in Rastavica, in Baballoq, in Dujaka, in Gramaqel, in Shaptej, in Qeskove, in Bokshiq, etc, every day. So the offensive was permanent and daily, which meant that we had to fight every day, and we did cause a lot of damage to the enemy and we thought that after this the Serbs would go away.

The summer offensive that you are mentioning was very well prepared and has caught us divided. The offensive started as off 13 of May, and Serbia thought that they could push our positions all the way to Irzniq and Baballoq to put us in a circle of three kilometers. But they were quite surprised, because they found our first positions in Krushec, near Kroi i Gervalles, in a place called Kodra e Vranocit up to where we had expanded our front line. In these fighting's everyone took part by creating the front line through Krushec, Prapaqan, partially in Isniq, Lluke e Eperme, Carrabreg and so on. During this time Adem Ukhaxhaj was killed in direct fighting's with Serbs.

The peak of the offensive was done on purpose in order to get through to us and destroy the 'stubborn army' and leave the moderated army like it was in Prapaqan and elsewhere, to turn it into, as it was being discussed, a local police or to make them leave for Albania. This was the scenario. A large number of people and large military power took part in this offensive; two directly involved brigades in the fighting's, that means 2000 to 3000 people; two motorized battalions with up to 1000 war equipment; in the whole of Dukagjin I can say that there were about 20 000 Serb troops involved in the war. Serb forces tried to get through via Carranreg, via Beleg, Rasotvica, Baballoq and Gramaqel. The most powerful attack that came from the Serb forces came from Suka e Biteshit in the direction of Shaptej. During these fighting's that lasted for 5 days, Serb forces did not advance at all not even a meter. So basically all the front lines were kept, the only front line that was broken was that of Gramaqel. By this time we were forced to act differently and at the same time we were running out of ammunition especially

antitank ammunition. This was a very powerful war, irrespective of the fact that the battle was lost, by this time Gllogjan fell, it was the first time that the war strategy prepared by us was applied. During the penetration of Serb forces from the Bitesh side and in the Gramaqeli hill, we dug up hidden trenches during the night, and we would let the enemy go through in large numbers and than we would hit them from the sides by using a 75-th cannon, and after this "Black Eagles or Shqiponjat e Zeza-alb" led by 'Togeri' would operate. On the third day of fighting's we have damaged a whole convoy of Serb forces and we forced them to withdraw. This is where my brother Enver was injured heavily while he was attacking the Serb positions. The Serb forces could only get through and take control of the territory but only partially after we had run out of the ammunition, and we pulled out in the last moment. We never pull out from our positions because of the power of enemy's fire but because of the lack of power of our attack. During this time we have spent about 500 hand grenades, about 100 mortar shells, 12 boxes of 12.7 ammunition. In the usage of 12.7 motorized automatic the infamous Arben Lami who was trained by Ajet Potera was excellent. On the first day of this battle Gllogjan was taken. We withdrew and we took all the documentation, the wounded people and we created a new front line near Radoniqi Lake, Ratishi i Ulet, Ratishi i Eperm, Pozhar and Lluke, in order to protect the population that had passed completely on the other side of the Bistrica river.

- **And then the forced accumulation of the almost entire population of Dukagjini in Isniq followed up...**

I NEVER BELIEVED THAT AN ORGANISED DEPARTURE OF AN ENTIRE ARMY CAN HAPPEN

HARADINAJ: This happened slightly later on. We went back to our previous positions and carried out our activities

wherever it was possible. Serbia started another offensive in September of 1998 that was even stronger and we were even more divided. After the first break up of Gllogjan, I like to talk about my emotions for a bit; people started seeing me as unreliable. So it was difficult to have the moral uplifting. The special war was intensified with the conclusion that Serbia was unbreakable. I heard people say that 'you can't win a war with an automatic and other bits and pieces'. So our values were fading. During the second time of the attack we were attacked from two sides, from Jabllanica and from Carrabregu. Irrespective of our great resistance, this time we were damaged easily. My idea was that we would give in step by step up to a limit that it would mean the creation of a free zone for the population and where we would be unbreakable. I thought that this zone should be in the mountainous areas that would include the villages of Ratish, Dashinoc, Maznik, Jabllanice, Bardhaniq, Gergoc etc. We created a new front line, a protection front line at the Radoniqi Lake all the way to Isniq this time, in order not to let the further penetration of the enemy, or if the worst comes to the worst we could pull out the population that was in Isniq in the mountain villages where we were thinking of staying. Let me explain that we never thought of mixing the population with the war, so we would always evacuate the population first. There were few options, and I am talking about extreme situations here, of evacuating the population and not allowing under any circumstances the population to became a war hostage. We thought that the sheltering of people should be made in the region of Turjaka, in Lugu i Leshanit, and also the option of evacuating people through the mountains was considered, but we never never thought the we should leave the ground at the same time as the population together with all our equipment. In these circumstances the last background line of the war was near Pozhar through the road that takes you to Lumbardh, through Lumbardh, through Dashinoc and all the way to Ratishi i Ulet. The ground had approximately the shape of letter "L". The lack of ammunition and people made it impossible for us to keep a

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straight front line. On the third day we set up position in Pozhar, in the entrance of which was Sefedin Shehu as a guard, a group of young men and I decided to go to a house in Lumbardh a get some rest. At the same time Jabllanica fell as well, where apart from all the fighters, a group of soldiers from Drenoc, Klina municipality led by Alush Agushi – 'Mala' took part. All these fighters had managed together with the population to pull out all the way to Isniq and Broliq and by now they wanted to see me. After I had created the line of fire, and after three days of no sleep, an old man from Lumbardh, whose name I can't remember, has invited us to his house, fed us with whatever happened to be in the house, and made beds for us to sleep and get some rest. Thinking that the lines of fire are functioning as before, we decided to take some rest. After half an hour of sleep, Alush Agushi and Lahi Ibrahimaj came to the house where I was and asked to see me. I refused to get up because I was very tired. They stormed into the room and started screaming at me by saying; "Hey do you know what has happened. We have been betrayed. The whole army has left. And we are surrounded"! When I realized that something unusual had happened, I got up and the two of them explained to me that the whole army of approximately 2000-3000 people had left a day before via the mountains of Strellc, and that the Serb forces had entered all the way to Isniq and all the way to Krushec and that they had come as far as Lumbardh from the upper side, and this is the village where I was. So it turned out that we were surrounded in Lumbardh. We were unable to keep the line of fire and we had this great curiosity to find out what had happened, we decided to move from Lumbardh to Broliq. We have set up another line of fire there along Bistrica river, assuming that our forces that were in Prapaqan, Isniq, Dubovik, Krushec, Lug i Baranit, etc, were still there. I did think that a soldier every now and then can abandon us, but I could never believe that an organized departure like this one would happen. This was a great shock and a powerful knock that I have suffered really badly spiritually as well.

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A PLAN FOR ME TO BE COUGHT ALIVE HAS EXISTED

We had a lot of injured soldiers in the Krushec hospital, where Yll Morina was, who was latter killed by Serbs in the hospital of Novi Sad, Arber Spahia – Cukla, who is here with us, my brother Enver who is an invalid now, and the medical personnel as well like: Iliriana, Ryva, Tima, Hilmi and Haki Shehu, Rrustem Berisha and others. So in other words with the departure of the whole army, our background line was left unprotected. And of course our families were somewhere there. I did not know anything about my father that I have sent after my wounded brother. I asked one of our old coofighters, Isuf Dervishajn, to go to Vranoc and see if he could find out anything about our families, and then go to Isniq and see what is going on. In Vranoc he did not find anyone, everyone had been evacuated; he did not even see the Serb forces. And when he arrived in Isniq he saw that people of Isniq were discussing about handing in their weapons, and that is where he found out that the army had left the barracks of Prapaqan. Only the Isniqi HQ was left and it consisted of the villagers. That is where Isuf meet one of my coofighters, Naser Ahmetxhekaj, who asked him to pass a message on to me, and the message was; "Tell Ramush that the army has gone they are on the road, there is only you and those left with you, go before you are captured alive". Isuf came back alarmed and told me what he had learned. I asked Isuf to go back to Isniq again, to find my father and to ask him to come to where we were 'because his place was where the men were', and also to ask my family not to stay together but to spread out in the population. My father came that night and we all stayed in Broliq, in the front line, not wanting to believe in what had happened. The next day Serb forces had localized us in a distance of 500 meters straight line. The war developed in a distance of 100 meters, and we were very few in numbers.

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- **How many fighters did you have with you?**

HARADINAJ: In Broliq I still had about 100 fighters. By realizing the present situation, a number of soldiers came to individual conclusions, so some left. I could see that the situation was very bleak, Serbia could see us but they could not hit us, they were waiting for the population to evacuate and they thought that we would mix within the population. We were being attacked from the sides in order to force us to pull out in the direction of the population, so that some of us would have been arrested, some of us captured alive and the others would have been killed. Serb forces had already told the gathered groups of people in Isniq that within two hours they are going to hang Ramush on the electricity pillar. During the day I have lined up the remained soldiers four times, trying to boost their moral, I told them that we will confront this situation as well, by not telling them how definitely. I have continuously mentioned mountains as a withdrawal possibility, but my mind was in Gllogjan and Jabllanica really. I have separated everyone in four little groups along Bistrica river, as if to keep the front line, but in fact later on that day I informed the leaders of the groups who were very trustworthy people, in which direction they should go. We have managed to go through Bistrica river towards Jabllanica: we pulled out through the water that was up to the waist and sometimes higher. The round up was very powerful. The distance between them and us during our withdrawal was 50 to 100 meters.

I WAS LEFT WITH FIFTY OTHER SOLDIERS ONLY

Sokol Dobruna and his brother Musli, Deli Haxhosaj and my father were with us who were slightly older, Shaban Lajqi, young men of 13 and 14 years of age, some women fighters and few wounded fighters. All of us managed to get to Jabllanica, of course without any military activity. When I lined up everyone in

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Jabllanica we were 75 all in total. Fifty of them could have been considered as soldiers, the rest were escorts. We put a flag up in Jabllanica the next day immediately and we carried on with the usual military activities, which means continuos state of readiness. We did not have anywhere to sleep; in fact we slept for days and days in our positions.

- **Jabllanica was all burned right?**

HARADINAJ: Yes, it was all destroyed, on the day when we got there we were not sure whether we would find Serb forces or not. As they were pulling out we got to the village, and in fact on that day we were in one side of the village and they were on the other side of the village. During the next day they withdrew from the village completely.

- **So Serb forces did not notice your arrival in the village?**

HARADINAJ: Maybe they did notice.

- **Was it not logical, do you think, to have expected the last attack on the group of what was left of you?**

HARADINAJ: We were in a position of a total self defense, and so they knew that in order to eliminate a group of professionals like they have assessed me, they would need a special unit that would agree to die if necessary. That kind of a war would have been developed as we would called it: "AK-47 for AK-47". So they did not have the special unit troops, and they were forced in a way to be tolerant towards us and let us get reorganized and get developed. Basically our further existence was not a total secret. The Serb forces were stationed in Suka e Cermjanit, and from there they could see our flag. I remember Bujar Roka who was later killed in Gjakova, telling me: "Commander can we bring the flag down a bit so it will not be

seen from the Suka". The flag was 6 meters high. We were very few and the position of the guard was 200 meters away from the headquarters, we could not keep the front line, we were on alert with our bags loaded, ready to act like guerillas, in case we would get attacked. We had peppers and cabbages to eat and whatever we could find on the ground where we were, ones we had cut a cow that we found in the village, without getting a permission from anyone, because there was no one there to give us permission. So I told Bujar that our flag belongs here, and it is to be seen, and that flag there that you see in Suka is illegal and has to go. After a while the flag that was in Suka went and our flag stayed where it was. We stayed in Jabllanica until the April 1999 offensive. When the 1199 Security Council Resolution of United Nation was approved, resolution that has obliged Serbia for a cease-fire, but Serbia never respected the resolution. By knowing that we are not many, we were continuously attacked in Jabllanica from the directions of Kralan, Gllogjan, Maznik, Ratish and Gergoc. Serb forces tried to benefit from the situation and completely destroy us.

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VIII

HOLLBROOK, VERIFIERS, DEMAÇI

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THE ARRIVAL OF OSCE VERIFICATORS IN KOSOVA MADE THE RENEWAL OF KLA POSSIBLE

- **In September of 1998 the International community responded vigorously against the crimes committed by Serb forces and they were especially concerned about the humanitarian catastrophe that with the arrival of the winter was threatening to take unexpected dimensions. And that is when the Hollbrook-Milloshevic agreement took place on the bases that 2000 OSCE unarmed verifiers would come to Kosova. What did you think about this agreement?**

THE ACHIEVED AGREEMENT BY HOLLBROOK SAVED THE KLA

HARADINAJ: You have to understand that due to the difficult situation that we were in, we were interested to be able to breath so to speak for a period of time. Actually, the agreement was life saving for the KLA. As far as the Dukagjini region is concerned the agreement had an important significance, and has helped us a lot for the renewal of the army.

- **You had meeting with the OSCE verifiers that came to Kosova. What was your experience with them?**

HARADINAJ: By being aware of the general thinking about Kosova, I knew that not knowing the truth about Kosova was a real handicap or an obstacle if you like. Essentially it was imperative that the International Community gets to know the truth about Kosova, not only through newspapers, or through emissary's that would come and spend a week and during that

week Serbia would hide the truth by masking their own actions. I was very glad when I learnt that the International verifiers would come to Kosova and I was convinced that this is a victory for us. The International Community would see for themselves the barbarities that Serbia was executing in Kosova and they would understand the necessity that Albanians should be released from this regime.

- **What would you consider as special about the meetings with the OSCE verifiers, and would you highlight any of these meeting?**

HARADINAJ: These meeting were usually quite long, and sometimes we went further on then the actual topics. We even discussed about our ideas, the ways of how we think of achieving our aim; we talked about the importance of KLA cooperation with other factors. The longer conversations were those with the military observers of different armies, especially British, American, French and Canadian, etc. They were studying our aim, our thinking, our ideas, and our determination and I would also study their determination, their interests and eventually the ways of what the further actions will be. It was a preparation in itself of NATO air strikes that would follow later on.

- **It was noticed quite early on that the mission of unarmed verifiers has its own limits. At this time you were, as you said, preoccupied with the renewal of the army, and how did you think the work with verifier would go?**

HARADINAJ: Once again I have to stress that the arrival of verifiers was really something extraordinary. To be honest to the end, I will explain two things. After the September's offensive, our population lost faith in the army, they started to think that we will not be able to finish our duty, because after every fall we did not rise stronger as it is supposed to, but naturally we faced harder situations of organizations and transportation of technical

equipment. In the meantime, Serbia sent big forces in the border strip, enforcing ammunition in big amounts, except in small groups, which could bring ammunition only to keep war alive, but not to make it stronger. So the acceptance or affirmation of KLA from international verifiers helped in acceptance of army from internal factor. For example, conversations held by international diplomats, American and others with KLA leaders in Dragobil and in other places were a big power for us. Also a specific effect had verifiers' contacts with zone commanders, because our population, being always under Yugoslavia and having no force of its own to get free from it, always saw the hope for survival in international community, for that ten years of peaceful resistance were developed that prayed to the international to take us from where we were. When it was seen that the international is appreciating, accepting and respecting KLA, then also, our population did the same. So, this was the first issue that consists in verifiers' contribution to turn back faith at our population.

The second thing is the fact that monitoring of our activities from verifiers forced us to develop, to improve ourselves, to make some improvements, in what we did not bother that much in war circumstances. The improving had to do with greater returning in regular army, well-organized, well-commanded and capable to act. Thus, the observers' arrival was a victory for the people of Kosova.

- **You said you had only 50 soldiers left and that the presence of the OSCE verifiers in Kosova provided you with an opportunity to put yourself in order. How was the KLA revitalized?**

REVITALIZATION OF THE ARMY

HARADINAJ: Besides those who were with me, there were other soldiers in Dukagjin, who were isolated in separate areas,

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armed, but disorganized momentarily. After the activation of the Dukagjini Operational Command in Jabllanica, after the fighting in that area and the resistance put up against the new Serb offensive, which started in November and went on relentlessly until 17 January 1999, the people of Dukagjin realized that they could still count on us and that we could stand and continue fighting. Realizing they could not act illegally, they joined us. Our numbers in Jabllanica increased gradually, and we expanded as far as Gllogjan again, activating new nuclei in Lug i Tërstenikut, Lug i Baranit, Lig i Reshanit, and Reka. We advanced to where we could set up the nuclei of eight brigades. I am including here the brigade that developed independent of my supervision under the leadership of the commander, Rrustem Berisha. After September 1998, in Dukagjin, eight closely connected operations units were set up. Within five months, we numbered 4000 strong.

- **Serbs attacked Gllogjan again in November, after the assassination of six youths of Serbian nationality in a cafeteria in Peja. The Serb regime accused KLA members operating in Gllogjan as being behind this, did they not?**

HARADINAJ: This was the first time that they attacked Gllogjan. The Serb regime realized that it had lost the war in Kosova. They were in trouble because of the domestic opinion. In order for the war to end, the Milosevic regime should end, too. It depended on keeping Kosova under occupation. This is clear to us now. For this, they manufactured or improvised "facts". They made use of some of our mistakes. I cannot say that we were perfect during all the war. We did not have the experience of three wars to wage the fourth one; we were novices. We were human; they attacked our families and all our values. It is understandable that regular KLA members also made mistakes. This was not stated; there were no signs of this; this incident does not belong to us; it is not an ordered incident, commended and perpetrated by the regular KLA forces.

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We are not ruling out the possibilities of isolated individual acts, for revenge. They accused us of perpetrating acts so they could justify their actions to domestic public opinion, because these actions caused difficulties for Belgrade and the Serbs. That had to activate a great number of reservists, military, and paramilitary, which made life in Serbia even harder. In presence of international verifiers, they attacked Gllogjan for a second time. We did not lose anything in this battle. We had not returned to Gllogjan for strategic purposes, but because of the will of the soldier to carry out their activity from that village. The terrain in Gllogjan is flat and hard to protect. We won that battle, inflicting heavy losses on Serb forces. Two young recruits from Gjakova were killed. They were 16-years-old and were waiting for their parents to come and get them. We were attacked, and they tried to leave on their own initiative without being organized. This was fatal for them. The Serb forces' aim was to separate Gllogjan from the other part connected to Ratish, to isolate and then eliminate physically most of the soldiers.

Events moved very quickly and the "Myrte Zeneli" brigade came to Gllogjan's rescue. I took part in the fighting. Their plan to separate Gllogjan failed because, in the hills in the direction of Ratish, we caught the Serb forces between our two firing lines. According to estimates, they suffered 30 casualties and eight armored vehicles were damaged. We used 75-calibre guns. Burim Mustafa and Shpend Malaj, who were killed; Fatmir Hasim; Flurim; Luan, who was also killed; as well as Zhuja, Lec, and other young men from Gllogjan; and the rest of us took them by surprise with our heavy firing. We also used antiaircraft gun, which the boys brought immediately, as well as 62- and 32-caliber grenade launchers, 12.5 snipers that we used for the first time in combat, because we did not have a firing line in Gllogjan. Our organization did not suffer and I can say that this was a kind of tactical training for us.

- **The KLA was trying to get organized on the political level as well. It had political representatives in Kosova and the**

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West. Adem Demaçi was the general representative and he opened an office in Prishtina. What did the relationship with Demaçi bring to the KLA?

I LEARNED ABOUT DEMAÇI'S APPOINTMENT AS KLA GENERAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MEDIA

HARADINAJ: I want to return to the situation within the KLA. The September offensive inflicted heavy loses on us. We were disorganized. We based our organization mostly on logic, rather than instruction or coordination, because we were isolated; circulation and communication were very difficult. We were not cut off but communication was difficult. Therefore, information about our activities was very scarce or very limited. So I was not informed of Adem Demaçi's appointment as the KLA general political representative. I learned about it through the media, or rather through people who had heard the news. I never disagreed with that. I have extraordinary respect for Adem Demaçi, for his merits as an Albanian. He probably symbolizes our people's past, the period of persecutions. I have respect for his sacrifices, for the many years that he spent in prison. Therefore, I don't think his appointment was a mistake. To estimate to what degree his appointment helped the war, we must analyze all his public declarations, his activity, the ties he developed with the KLA, etc. I have respect for him, not as a politician, not for his position, but for him as an Albanian.

- **Did you meet with Demaçi then?**

HARADINAJ: I met Adem Demaçi only once and it was during the conference in Rambouillet. We met in the Berisha Mountains, at the headquarters of the KLA General Staff. We were at a working meeting. I did not even have a chance to greet him. I saw him coming out of the meeting in a very nervous state.

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- **Did you know why Demaçi was so nervous?**

HARADINAJ: I did not consider Demaçi's departure from his position a good thing. I

thought it illogical that Adem Demaçi, as a personality, in the name of KLA, would speak against, shout at, and threaten national and international personalities and then resign as if nothing had happened. I had nothing against his appointment, to which I did not contribute, nor did I think it would become a calamity someday. But, I did not like the fact that, one day, this man who identified himself with us, was not around anymore. I did not understand why these things were happening. The zone commanders asked to meet with him. I wanted to meet with Adem Demaçi and see what he thought about what was going on. This meant that I would ask about his appointment and why was he being removed. The Llap commander, Rrustem Mustafa, "Remi", had closer ties with Demaçi. I talked to him about Demaçi's activity and position. I asked "Remi" to invite uncle Adem to a meeting with the zone commanders and to discuss his stand on Rambouillet and other current problems. When I arrived at the meeting, Demaçi was walking out.

I asked Commander "Remi" why Demaçi left in that way.

He exchanged words with Jakup Krasniqi, got very nervous and left," he told me. Demaçi had exchanged words with some others there. I do not know exactly with whom. I know that Hashim Thaqi had not come back yet. Later "Remi" told me that Demaçi was criticized for his work practices and for several proposals that he had made - I think – why he had consulted Mahmut Bakalli, or why he had proposed him in a group he wanted to set up. He was also criticized for not setting up a mechanism he had promised to set up, like the National Assembly. Demaçi became irritated and left the meeting demonstratively.

- **The regions were the war took place were not connected with one another through free territories. How did you, the zone commanders, maintain your contacts, how did you coordinate the war, what atmosphere prevailed in the General Staff?**

HARADINAJ: Being on the same footing during the war, we, the zone commanders, as fighters and military representatives, worked according to a similar logic. We maintained connections through cellular phones, and this is how we coordinated our activity. We had mutual assistance with neighboring zones, such as Drenica and Pashtrik. After the signing of the armistice agreement, during November offensive, we had aid coming from Drenica, such as the units of Muje Krasniqi, "Kapuçi", together with his brother Ali Krasniqi. We cooperated with the units of Xhelal Hajde, "Toni", that helped us even before, then with commander Drini in Pashtrik who helped us with men, material, and ammunition. We assisted the other zones with equipment and ammunition supplies. Cooperation with the General Staff was difficult. We reached the best cooperation during the presence of the international observers. That is, before, during, and after Rambouillet. During that period we had regular contacts. Before that period, cooperation developed during the visits of the members of the General Staff in the zones. Hashim Thaqi, Rexhep Selimi, Bislim Zyrapi, Jakup Krasniqi, and sometimes Ramë Buja came out to our zone and so did Sokol Dobruna, after he became a member of the General Staff.

- **You mentioned Mujë Krasniqi, "Kapuçi', at the beginning of this book. On 24 March 1998, when open war started in Dukagjin, he attacked the Serb forces in Kijeva. Mujë was killed at the Kosova-Albanian border...**

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FEW COMRADES ARE LIKE MUJË KRASNIQI, "KAPUÇI"

HARADINAJ: Yes, but I want to explain why I respect Mujë. Mujë never caused any trouble to the organization. He did not have the tendency to impose things. He was very productive and fought ceaselessly against the Serb forces. He was very brave and effective. He was an inspiration for all of us, including me. His behavior demanded maximum respect. There were very few comrades like Mujë in the KLA. Someone with all Mujë's characteristics is rare. He was injured several times. He had to cope with many difficult situations. There were no supplies and military technology in Drenica. There were many organizational deficiencies. He accepted the invitation to go to Albania to convalesce, but he had another intention. He intended to collect weapons and ship them to Kosova, because people went to fetch weapons and come back with very old rifles. For example, the 40-mm gun, which was not difficult to find, came very late from Albania. Lately, we smuggled in a few from Serbia and Montenegro. We lacked "Zola" and 90-mm rocket launchers, which were indispensable for our war. The 12.5-mm snipers, a large caliber weapon, but one which is mobile and light, came very late. We were very irritated and indignant over logistics shortcomings from Albania.

I tried to persuade Mujë to convalesce in Albania, and other comrades asked me to do so. When he went to Albania, his brother Ali, who had come with his fighters in Dukagjin, and I called him several times. During those conversations, Mujë said to me "Ramush, I will not stay to convalesce in Albania because I cannot convalesce here. I want to come to Kosova but I am sorry I cannot carry anything because I am sick. Therefore, if possible, please dispatch my two units, staying with you, to Albania to carry weapons. I want to return with them. I cannot continue like this any longer". I talked with Mujë's soldiers who were in Zhebel, maintaining the firing line in the direction of Gregoc, with others in Maznik and some who were with Shkëlzen

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(Haradinaj). I have great respect for those young men, because they fought under very bad conditions, when we did not have sufficient food, let alone other things. I told Mujë that I was going to send his 30 men there, while he collected the technology, which consisted of one mobile rocket launcher, two 12.5-mm snipers and handguns. It was a miracle that a group would have this equipment that could be brought to Kosova.

To the satisfaction of both of us, we kept constant contact and I could hardly wait to send his boys there. This was difficult because we were using the line that passed through the enemy territory, through Bistrazhin and Goden. Only one of my groups, consisting of Gegë Leshi from Vraniq and the brothers Tom, Nik, and Meme, who were later joined by Pren, knew this pathway. Pren and Meme are now considered lost in battle. They had other partners such as Sokol Morina, Sahit Krasniqi from Ratkoc, who was later killed in Rugove in Has, as well as Agron Rama and others. Therefore, I could not send Mujë his boys all at once and I told him that I would send them after a week. The Drenica boys were bored in Dukagjin. They knew there were no weapons there. They knew that their families were suffering and asked me to escort them to Drenica. I told them that Mujë Krasniqi had ordered them to go to Albania and that I had to obey his orders. One afternoon, these two units left for Drenica and I did not stop them, though I could have done it. Only five remained: Ali, Mujë's brother, and Naser with three soldiers. I sent these five at the right time to Albania. I had promised Mujë that I would train 30 young men in Albania and then escort them and Mujë into Kosova from Dukagjin, together with armaments. Even when I sent Gega, I asked Mustaf Selmanaj, who directed logistics in Albania, and who had done extraordinary work in this direction, to train up to 20 young men to carry the equipment. I called Mustafa and told him that, this time, we would not send our men as usual, but we would send back only "Kapuçi". This is what we agreed to do.

Then, in Vlana in Has, in Cahan, where our forces were concentrated, I heard that "Kapuçi" had decided to travel from

another direction, from the direction of Has, specifically from Kushnin, I do not know why. We had used this pathway before, somewhere in the area of where Luan was killed. This was a shorter line to penetrate into Drenica from Pagarusha. The decision to come through this line, in large numbers, with 100 people, was a fatal mistake. It was illogical to act in this way, when it was known that, at that time, Serbia operated better in Albania, along the border area, than in Kosova; when it became known who Mujë Krasniqi was and how the elimination of Mujë and his groups would help Kosova. I think that these were organizational mistakes that cost us very dearly. His announced departure, with the group, was an unprecedented blunder. They fell into an ambush, indicating that the trip was not arranged by the young men who were supposed to do this and who would know how to act in danger and take the necessary precautions to avoid enemy attack. A great number of fighters were killed, and the greatest loss was the killing of Mujë Krasniqi and some of the other boys.

- **You mention another fighter with whom you worked before the war, Abedin Rexha, "Sandokani", who was killed in Drenica, under circumstances that were not well explained to the public. Contradictory reports were issued in the name of the KLA Headquarters for Drenica.**

HARADINAJ: Abedin Rexha was one of the first KLA commanders to fight against Serbia. He managed to create a free zone, a connecting point with Dukagjin and as far as Llap. The free zone of Llaush and Vojnik is directly connected to Abedin Rexha. His name was one of the first remarkable KLA names and very promising for the future. If he were not killed, he would have been the commander of the Drenica zone. Whoever perpetrated this evil deed served only Serbia. Abedin was killed at the time when Drenica and Kosova needed him most. If he had lived, Drenica would have paid a smaller price for the war. I do not deny the skills of other Drenica commanders, but I do not

doubt his great ability to carry the war forward. Every Albanian who killed his own brother during the war, perpetrated an evil deed, which cannot be considered an accident, but must be denounced.

- **This killing was explained as an accident, as a premeditated act or as assassination perpetrated by another soldier who is though to belong to a family closely linked politically with the LDK. Considering all these things, do you think the incident has taken on tragic, fratricidal proportions?**

HARADINAJ: The conflict with the LDK during the war never reached the level of a fratricidal war. This did not happen in Kosova and I do not think it happened anywhere else in Drenica. The catastrophe happened because, after Abedin's killing, the whole area suffered, I would even say fell, because none could play Abedin's role as a commander, leader, and organizer. I cannot forgive the assassination of an army leader because he has offended me or insulted me. Serbia offended us thousands of times and we were not able to pay it back but, instead, we bowed our heads. I think that Abide Rex should have been forgiven for the mistakes he made – if he had made one – in regard to another Albanian.

- **It was said and written that there was a KLA general commander, but for practical reasons, his name was not published. Is this true?**

THERE WAS NO KLA GENERAL COMMANDER

HARADINAJ: I can say that, in its early stages, the KLA had a commander but, as far as I know, later there was no one with these powers. Therefore, his name was not published. I don't think such a man existed. I think that the army that was fighting

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under such circumstances would have acted unreasonably and unjustly if it had declared a commander. Therefore, I cannot say that he existed and was not announced. It would be reasonable that not all the details would be announced.

- **Before Sylejman Selimi was selected to be KLA general commander, during the time that the Kosova peace conference was being held at Rambouillet, it was said that Azem Syla was the general commander. This was never published, but the information circulated in circles that were not uninformed about the trends in KLA.**

HARADINAJ: Special circles inside the army instigated and assisted the attempt to identify the war with special individuals. The one who had the money, the one who had the means, the one who supplied you with equipment in Albania, was more than an officer. He was like God. What is the commander in the army? The commander is the person who sleeps among the soldiers. We cannot say that there was an army commander whom the zone commander has never seen. How can an army commander exist if the zone commanders have never seen him in Kosova? This theory is untenable. He could have been a commander or chief of an illegal group in Drenica, but he never met the chiefs in Drenica, Dukagjin, or the chiefs of other zones. From the beginning of the open war, he has never been at a meeting with the zone commanders. How can a commander exist like this? No army commander lives on the moon, in Tirana, or Switzerland, strolling freely, at a time when war is raging in Kosova.

The thesis that the KLA had a commander does not hold water either theoretically or practically. There were people claiming to be the commander, but we did not have a personality within the army who would deserve to be called the commander. I can say it again, on the basis of the power that they had in the military organization at that time, Hashim Thaçi or Rexhep Selimi could have been the commander at that time. They were in the terrain and were in constant contact with the zone

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commanders. On the basis of the comment that we had, Hashim or Rexhep could have assumed the post of the KLA commander. Bislim Zyrapi could also have been trained for this. But it would not have been possible for Azem Syla to be the KLA commander, even theoretically. I am not talking about the time of the clandestine activity, when anybody might have called himself number one, but, after the organization of the army, there was no general commander.

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THE MOUNTAINS OF KOSOVA
The Muhaxher Oak in Dukagjin, April 1998: (from left to right) Shaban Lajçi, "Mixha", and Sami Krasniqi (seated) Ismet Maliqi, Veli Baci, and Ramush Haradinaj (standing)

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A FRIENDSHIP BORN OUTSIDE KOSOVA
Switzerland, 1995: Joanna Carlsonn and Ramush Haradinaj

A FRIENSHIP CONTINUED IN KOSOVA

Jabllanica in Dushkaja, December 1998: Joanna Carlsson and Ramush Haradinaj

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SONGS OF FREEDOM

Jabllanica in Dushkaja, 1996: Lahi Ibrahimaj, "Magjupi", Rexhep Selimi, "the Thenth", and Daut Haradinaj, "David" (from left to right)

THREE COMMANDERS

Kosova 1997: Sylejman Selimi, "Sulltani", Daut Haradinaj, "David", and Rexhep Selimi, "the Thenth" (from left to right)

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MARTYRS IN THE DEFENSE OF CIVILIANS IN DUBOÇAK IN DUSHKAJA

Gllogjan in Deçan, 1998: Shkëlzen Haradinaj (in the center) with his brother Daut (on the left) and his cousin Bujar (on the right)

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FREEDOM FOR HOSTAGES

Gjakova, September 1999: Ramush Haradinaj at a protest for the release of Albanians imprisoned in Serbia

PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO

Kosova, August 1999: General Agim Çeku, an American soldier, and Ramush Haradinaj (from left to right)

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IX

FARK AND LOGISTICS

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CONTROLLERS OF THE WAR

- **When the fighting was raging and the international verifiers were present in Kosova, polemics on the purpose of the existence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova, the FARK, became more intense. What was the dispute about?**

WHOEVER ACTED OUTSIDE KOSOVA WAS DISAPPROVED OF

HARADINAJ: The Albanian soldiers who served in the Yugoslav army and all others who came from other walks of life such as doctors, former police, judges, lawyers, etc. had been trained to work in the framework of a highly sophisticated mechanism. They worked less intensely under less organized circumstances. They found it difficult to adapt to the war situation in Kosova. In those circumstances, I was never clear about the situation in the FARK, as we call it, or the situation among the members of the FARK. I never knew where the political struggle, or the power struggle, started and where it was going. Knowing how to better win the trust of the people and the international support, they used the founding of the army more as a kind of electoral program or as propaganda for power. Some people were neither capable of spending nor ready to spend their financial or professional wealth, to give it away to Kosova, but they wanted to organize things in such a way that both Kosova and they would profit. Later, we realized that it related more to personal gain and to destroying others, not the Serb forces, but hard-working Albanians.

Taking Hostage officers, who were indispensable, damaged the KLA, the war, and Kosova. A considerable number of

officers, not having a clear idea about the KLA, not knowing the national and international importance of the cause, thought that Bukoshi's government, as a mechanism, enjoyed the right, or had the legal right, to the organization of Kosova's defense mechanism. They trusted it completely. Therefore, they were put lock and key and taken hostage. Even in this situation, some of them could succeed in penetrating and helping the war and the army. On the contrary, the other part remained hostage to this activity, to this day. In my opinion this was the wrong move, the inability of certain individuals to accept that, this time, the initiative of the people was far more advanced than the initiative of their leadership. They lacked the courage to serve this initiative, to make use of its fruits as every leading structure does. This organization was fraught with dangers and we went into civil war in Dukagjin. People must assess these situations correctly and distinguish between those who want to help Kosova and gain profit for themselves and give Kosova what's left.

- **In the circumstances you are speaking about, the defense minister in Bukoshi's government was assassinated. What did you think of this and did Krasniqi's assassination represent the greatest danger to the outbreak of the civil war that you just mentioned?**

DURING THE WAR I NEVER ACCEPTED ANY MISSION FROM OUTSIDE

HARADINAJ: I would like to bring up something else here. In my opinion, anyone who did not operate within Kosova was disapproved of – whether it was Ahmet Krasniqi or a KLA General Staff member. During the war, nobody from outside dared call on me, even in the name of the General Staff. I never accepted any obligation or mission from outside Kosova. I accepted obligations and showed allegiance to whoever was in Kosova. I considered those who were outside Kosova to be

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tourists, spies, profiteers, and evildoers, all at the expense of the people of Kosova. The rules of the game were different for those who were abroad. In Kosova other rules operated; people were sincere and they had an obligation to act logically. The political games that took place abroad were played at the expense of those inside Kosova. In this regard, I put them all, without exception, in the same boat.

Ahmet Krasniqi's assassination was shocking to me. During the war I was not worried much, because many of my friends died in the war. I prayed that our people would not fall prey to these acts but would survive in the circumstances they are facing. Many noble young men were killed in the war, so we must save everybody, not just individuals. We should administer justice not for the sake of an individual, but for the sake of the people of Kosova who were under oppression.

- **During the war, finding resources was a problem. The KLA General Staff had many criticisms of Bukoshi's government that collected the three-percent from our emigrants and yet did not contribute to the war. What were the consequences of freezing those funds?**

HARADINAJ: A popular saying goes "Money destroys men". This is true under any circumstances. Nevertheless, it is true that the financial aspect was, many times, decisive for our war. Especially at the beginning of the war, when the greatest part of the national wealth were in the hands of Bukoshi's government, while the KLA operated with revenues from some special individuals, from those who gave everything for the war. Therefore, our strength was not enough. We did not advance at the required pace. We could not meet the required commitment, could note make contacts to buy equipment, which would enable the war to take another course, one which would be more favorable for us. And, of course, we could not find the life of the army within the country. Holding the national wealth hostage at that time was a gross mistake, because today we can find

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resources. Many can help us with the construction and advancement of Kosova. The money is not of a great value today. But during the war, if that money were given to those who did not care about money but about the war and Kosova's future, it would have been a great help to the war and today we would have another situation. There would be another situation today. So, holding the wealth hostage was a crime against the people of Kosova.

- **You speak about the continuing difficulties in obtaining equipment for the war. Who was in charge of the logistics efforts in Albania?**

OUR LOGISTICS IN ALBANIA WAS IN REAL CHAOS

HARADINAJ: The problem was that nobody was in charge. That is, there was no real leadership. There was constant friction regarding logistics in Albania. As logistics is closely connected to money, I can say that, from the start of the war, material goods and war equipment were weak points. First, certain people dealing with logistics had basis of family ties or other connections or obligations. On the other hand, the people dealing with logistics often aspired to command the war in Kosova. They claimed the leadership of the war in Kosova, the General Staff, and command of the army. They tried to gain this position on the basis of the logic: "If you do not obey, I will not give you equipment".

- **Where there concrete instances?**

HARADINAJ: Not only were there concrete instances, but this is how they always acted. The obedient, the flatter received the equipment, others, nothing. Therefore, every zone had a logistics staff in Albania. Dukagjin had four or five. "Qorri" (the

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Blind Man), Xhabir Haliti, had one. Nasim Haradinaj had one. Gani Luma had one. There was one fro the government in Papaj – I do not know who headed this. All over Albania, there were depots, garages, army barracks, but there was no coordination of operations.

- **So basically, we cannot say that an organized mechanism existed which might have been in charge of logistics there?**

HARADINAJ: After a long meeting with members of KLA General Staff – Hashim Thaçi, Rexhep Selimi, Jakup Krasniqi, and Bislim Zyrapi – and after their insistence that the existing staffs can be combined into a unified management for logistics, I agreed that we should merge a single mechanism for managing logistics. However, when I agreed, I set two conditions. The first condition was that Raif Çela or Gashi, I do not know his exact last name, we called him by the name Raif, who had shown that he was successful and sincere, should remain in action. The second condition was to ensure the transparency of the logistics operation for the zone commanders. We agreed to combine the headquarters, because the existence of many headquarters created large and unnecessary expenses. It also created confusion. Afterwards, I was not able to see how the unification was carried out.

Yet, I know that Rexhep Selimi, Bislim Zyrapi, and someone else went there and had a meeting with Azem Syla who later became defense minister in the provisional Government of Kosova, along with Dervishi, - I do not know his real name but he worked with Sokol Bashota – and also Xhavit Haliti and Raif. I do not know whether this pressure was the result of his being considered "Ramushi's man" or for any other reason. Raif remained logistics man number one on paper. I say on paper because no one asked him for permission to act. Xhavit Haliti and Azem Syla had a dominant role in logistics while Xheladin Gashi, "Plaku" (the Old Man), who was responsible for the base

in Cahan, had a dominant role out in the terrain. The base in Bajram Curri was eliminated gradually because, penetration into Kosova in that direction became very difficult, so we sent equipment we had there to Cahan, gradually. Friction continued especially among Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla, Rai? Gashi, and those others. The cause was the equipment's destination – why was it sent there and not somewhere else, how it went, etc. There was no council or body to receive the request and then give orders for their distribution.

Very often, requests from Kosova were taken into consideration. When I needed equipment and when I tried to smuggle it here, I sent my people there and got the equipment, not asking anyone. This is how almost everybody damaged this mechanism of logistics. As far as I am concerned, I had to act. I always realized the ineffectiveness of this mechanism, and I lost confidence that it would help me to obtain the necessary equipment. Therefore, I set up a parallel mechanism of logistics, and I placed Mustafë Selmanaj at the head of it. He was a very capable man, very active and helpful, who had never been in Albania before, but when there to escort the injured. Mustafa told me that there was chaos there, anarchy, that there were donors ready to help, young men who wanted to come into Kosova, but that little was done in this direction. "I could have helped you from Albania," he told me. I agreed then and there, because I knew I needed this. I covered the legal part for him. I wrote an authorization so that he could organize the logistics there, which meant collecting equipment and money and recruiting young men who wanted to come to Kosova. Our mechanism extended as far as the United States.

- **You said that the people who managed the logistics effort wanted to control and lead the war in Kosova. Can you make any concrete identification?**

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XHAVIT HALITI AND AZEM SYLA SET OBEDIENCE TO THEM AS A CONDITION FOR RECEIVING WEAPONS

HARADINAJ: More precisely, Xhavit Haliti and Azem Syla were such. They though that everything in Kosova should develop according to their own minds. Many a time, they set obedience to them as a condition for receiving weapons.

- **What does obedience consist of?**

HARADINAJ: It consisted of the fact that the actions and statements were to take place only in the form they considered reasonable and that we would not cause any trouble in the organization of the General Staff, and we would leave their satellites there. That is, we had to be obedient to the serfs Azem and Xhavit had in the terrain and accept the existence of a General Headquarters, which actually did not exist and was not staffed. They wanted us to act according to the orders of "comrades". Nobody knew who they were. They told us: "The comrades have said, the comrades have said". Which comrades? By "comrades", they were alluding to the General Staff. In fact, this was a way to keep the military mechanism under control by means of the "shadow", the "underground", the mysterious.

- **Did these demands go to the extend that they were able to signify a change in the character of war?**

HARADINAJ: Their demands were well defined and they had strong support. I say well defined because they knew well what they wanted for themselves. I think they wished to identify the war with themselves. So the war could go on but it had to be identified with them – this was the concrete side. According to this logic, in the terrain, ties with some member of the General Staff were considered more important than ties with the zone commanders. I am saying this not because I am on of them, but

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the zone commanders waged the war in Kosova. The political division did not wage it. I must be clear on this. The political division could act even from the Moon. The position of the political divisions in Kosova was identified with the release of communiqués on behalf of the KLA General Staff, which I do not consider of exceptional value. I must point out that Jakup Krasniqi did a laudable job in this direction. He released communiqués and, in this way, he presented the KLA political line. Jakup was trusted with the responsibility of presenting the war and, personally, I still have great respect for him. He became a politician during the war and I trusted his strength as a man, as an Albanian.

Those who wanted to have the war under their control did not want to create the climate of trusting the zone commanders, but have reservations about them. Azem and Xhavit were the source of all that. I shall give example. After the September 1998 offensive, when many soldiers and officers left Dukagjini and very few remained there, the situation was against me and everybody insulted me. Many co-fighters insulted me. They insulted the war.

- **This mood existed only in Prapaçan barracks?**

FOR A TIME I WAS INSULTED MORE BY MY FELLOW FIGHTERS IN ALBANIA AND SWITZERLAND THAN BY ANYONE ELSE

HARADINAJ: No. Many people were involved in this. During this time, I fought more and was insulted more in Switzerland, Albania, by these and by other fellow fighters who did not make the slightest effort to get me out of the situation. This happened for a certain period, until they understood what was in question. Nevertheless, this behavior was not unsupported. All these things had a source somewhere.

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- **Where?**

HARADINAJ: In those who wanted to keep the war under control, so that the war could not gain new strength, new shape, and new representation.

- **Who created this situation in Switzerland?**

HARADINAJ: Members of the National Movement of Kosova (LPK) who, most of the time, were not productive for the war, or those whose jealousy against certain individuals or commanders went so far that they lost control by crossing over to the negative side of the war.

- **Besides the "Homeland Calls" Fund, what were the other financial resources for the war?**

HARADINAJ: The regular or official way of funding the army was through the "Homeland Calls" Fund. Funds went directly to the zones or the General Staff and then they were distributed where necessary. The people themselves were another source. For example, Gjakova supplied us with various products. The League of Peja Businessmen, coordinated at that time by Ethem Çeku, and greatly assisted by Ekrem Lluka, helped us on continual basis. I must not forget to mention the extraordinary contribution made by Hasan Meta who coordinated the aid of the businessmen. The Emergency Council, with headquarters in Prishtina, also gave considerable assistance. For a time, they sent us specific sums of money, sometimes as much as 200, 000 DM, for shipmen. This is true government founded some officers, soldiers, or certain segments of the operations unit, through salaries or other forms, but I do not know exactly how it went.

- **Did funds sent by the Bukoshi government come to Dukagjin?**

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HARADINAJ: No money ever came to the KLA Dukagjin zone command. The officers with Tahir Zemaj testified that the Bukoshi government funded them, because we did not fund them. Probably some other officer was founded in the same way. The Bukoshi government did not fund the army.

- **Where there donors outside Kosova?**

HARADINAJ: Yes. I would like to thank an Albanian immigrant in Italy, Gjergj Marani, an Arbëresh, who made an extraordinary contribution especially in treating our injured. This aid can be calculated as up to one million DM, which came through various associations or even money from Marani himself. There was a group of donors from Turkey, Turkish citizens or citizens of Albanian origin. Among them were Hamza and Haxhi Rafeti, who have helped on a continuing basis. Here, we can mention our immigrants in Europe and the United States. I can say that all helped us.

- **Has there been a state mechanism or a mechanism close to the government of some other country that expresses interest in helping the war in Kosova?**

HARADINAJ: State mechanisms or those close to other countries did not assist the war in Kosova directly, but their assistance was expressed indirectly, such as recognition of our right to wage war, moral support, etc.

- **There was no direct assistance?**

HARADINAJ: No.

- **Were there non-Albanian soldiers that participated in the war?**

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HARADINAJ: Yes, not in big numbers. I do not know how many were all over Kosova but in Dukagjin I can say that there were about twenty. The volunteers were from Sweden, Netherlands, France, Germany, Algeria, Italy and some other country. There were martyrs from those volunteers and they were buried in Koshare.

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X

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KOSOVA AT RAMBOUILLET

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AMERICA CAME WITH A MISSION TO KOSOVA: TO BRING JUSTICE

- **After the limitations of the OSCE Verification Mission became clear, it was expected that there would be total war in Kosova in the spring of 1999. The truth is that there was war during the winter, but of another intensity. Do you think the picture of a one-year-old and his mother killed by the Serb forces in Abri in Drenica and the Reçak massacre were the levers for putting the international mechanisms into motion leading to the international conference on Kosova in Rambouillet?**

HARADINAJ: I think that these two cases sensitized international opinion tremendously. They did not sensitize the decision-making factors to the extent the failure of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement did. Why do I say this? Because after the agreement was signed, the Serb forces continued with arrests and killings. They waged ceaseless, declared or undeclared war, insulting the mission of the international verifiers by their inhuman behavior. Barbarism continued and it was referred to or reported on a daily basis at the discussion tables of the world decision-making factors, especially the NATO military alliance. This was an unprecedented insult to the international community and to certain persons who had a decisive influence on today's world trends. It was a kind of cynicism and disregard that disappointed the international community tremendously. I agree with you that the international opinion supported the decision making mechanisms because of Reçak and Abri, Rakovina – where five civilians were killed, including two children, one 11 and the other 9-years-old – many other crimes committed by the Serb forces must not be forgotten.

- **Can we talk about the historic role of William Walker, head of the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosova? It was not easy for him to evaluate the Reçak massacre, because, among other things, his deputy, the former French ambassador to Belgrade, Gabriel Keller, also opposed him. In other words, do you think that the United States' role was decisive in all that happened in Kosova later?**

HARADINAJ: I am completely convinced that the United States came on Kosova's side without many prejudices. The United States came to Kosova, as was seen later, with the mission of serving justice, regardless of whose side it was on, even Serbia. William Walker, as a citizen of the world, seeing such a massacre, could not restrain from declaring what he did. Otherwise, only the criminal would be denounced. Walker's reaction is human. It is the reaction of the man who saw more than 50 massacred bodies and immediately, with no hesitation, gave the true pronouncement: "This is a crime". After this reaction, the diplomatic atmosphere became so charged that the decision-making mechanisms moved toward the correct solution of the problem of Kosova. The Albanian people cannot but have extraordinary esteem and admiration for William Walker or Luise Arbour, who asked to come and investigate. She came to Kosova's border, but the Serb regime turned her back. There is great regard for the United States and for its role in the solution of the Kosova question.

- **What do you think of the international conference on Kosova Rambouillet?**

HARADINAJ: As something useful.

- **How do you consider Demaçi's position that neither he nor the Albanian delegation should go to Rambouillet?**

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SELECTION OF THE KLA COMMANDER WAS NOT A "COUP"

HARADINAJ: I want to say something. People in Kosova were in a very difficult situation, in crisis, so it was very difficult to make particular decisions. I do not think Demaçi refused to go to Rambouillet. Demaçi, the General staff, all of us had to live under some specific circumstances. They led to his refusal to go to Rambouillet. I do not want to say that it was an agreement or disagreement, an obstacle or something else, but I want to say that it was not clear to us all. More precisely, part of us did not know what Rambouillet was, what would come out of this conference about Kosova. It must be admitted that we were all afraid of what would come out of Rambouillet.

- **Back to Demaçi. It was made public that Demaçi tried to restrain movement within the castle at Rambouillet. At the same time, something happened in Kosova that became the talk of the day. During the Rambouillet conference, Mr. Sylejman Selimi was appointed KLA general commander. At the time when many members of the representatives, led the Albanian delegation there, did you think that the appointment of the commander would be done in a different way? Let us say, was this move considered as a "coup" against those who were not here?**

HARADINAJ: No, this is not the case. I personally am one of the live wires of this activity, without Demaçi's permission or restrain. The international community and internal opinion have come to some incorrect conclusions concerning Demaçi. It is not true that Demaçi restrained anything. Demaçi's sphere of influence over the zone commanders was not decisive, thought I cannot say that it was completely worthless, it was not decisive. The zone commanders acted on their own, on their logic as soldiers, as fighters, and as Kosova citizens. Always. Something else should be borne in mind: Jakup Krasniqi, the spokesperson

for the KLA General Staff; Hashim Thaçi, head of KLA Political Directorate; Rame Buja; Azem Syla; and Xhavit Haliti were present at Rambouillet. All of them are the political side of KLA. On the other hand, the army, the army cannot function without a hierarchy. The army is not an association where everybody has equal rights with everybody else. In the army, one person speaks and the others listen.

In other words, command is essential. We have suffered a lot because we did not have one head, and the Albanians in Kosova still do not have a head to listen to. Therefore, we have tried to find a head, in the professional aspect of the word, who would help us to increase unity, boost morale, and keep fighting, not in the political and diplomatic aspects, because it has nothing to do with this. We were not afraid that this appointment would sound like a coup, because we have changed nothing. We have only tried to improve our organization, which we thought was our right, and, naturally, we have not asked anybody's permission for this.

- **What did you think of Rambouillet conclusion?**

NATIONAL UNITY ACHIEVED AT RAMBOUILLET WAS A GREAT VICTORY

HARADINAJ: When we took up arms, we jeopardized everything: our lives, families, Kosova, the nation. Being the live wires of a very dangerous initiative, such as the war that cost Kosova very dearly, we tried to be very cautious, at least as much as we could be. As soldiers, fighters, or officers, we are worthy of saying; no sooner said than done. We could not speak out about signing or not signing the Rambouillet Agreement, because they did not tell us about it. It is meaningless to ask a zone commander who is fighting to sign a document whose contents he does not know, regardless of whether somebody liked it. If you want to share the responsibility with me, you must inform

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me. We did not know the contents of the agreement. We tried to get hold of it through faxes. Had we gotten it, we would have expressed our opinion immediately, but we could not get hold of it. In these conditions, we could not give our consent. Jakup Krasniqi and Hashim Thaçi made a great contribution in signing the Rambouillet agreement. They persuaded us to sign the agreement. Ramë Buja and Sokol Dobruna also made their contribution. Even when they signed it, we had some reservations, because we did not know the contents of the agreement and the promises and commitments of the International Community for the period after the Rambouillet.

- **Can you tell us how a consensus on signing the agreement was reached, since that the Albanian delegation at Rambouillet has taken on the obligation of ensuring its signing within three weeks?**

HARADINAJ: Not that the zone commanders were less educated, but I can say that the statements and the papers were less important than the unity achieved there, which we considered a great national victory. We all hailed the unity, especially the consensus to endorse the agreement. We were ready to back and to support our diplomatic team there; even legitimize it as a valuable institution, probably as the Government of Kosova or something else. The political unity forged there helped us to better prepare for the ensuing Serb offensive.

- **What do you think of the opinions that the three-week period between Rambouillet and Paris gave Millosevic the opportunity to send numerous fresh troops to Kosova?**

HARADINAJ: We must be realistic. From day one, Serbia was prepared for war. It was an organized state; it had an organized army, not very well organized, but still organized. The Serb people were indoctrinated with frenzied nationalism and

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chauvinism against the Albanians. Therefore, if you consider these things, you cannot say that these three weeks were so decisive, as some politicians and analysts sound the alarm. I do not think that the problem of Kosova would have been solved without this three-week period of NATO bombing. We had to go through these stages. We had to sacrifice; no people and no nation have been freed without sacrifice. We are lucky and honored, because the need to sacrifice lasts for years or is even endless.

- **How did you anticipate the course of events after the signing of the Rambouillet agreement by our delegation in Paris?**

HARADINAJ: Our war became well known not because of its powerful organization or its big striking capacity. Our war had harassing or defensive character. This was not enough to convince Milosevic to give up Kosova. Therefore, the commitment of the international community was very useful in defining the winner. We could not take the decisive step. We advanced, Serbia attacked us, and we retreated to the initial positions. We did not give ground, but the Kosova people were paying the debt. The signing of the Rambouillet document was a political and diplomatic victory, while those of us in the terrain remained in the same positions. As I said earlier, we suffered because of the political leadership; the victory at Rambouillet helped us to reach this day sooner. It was an example of what we can achieve if united. From that moment on, we were more at peace, because we finally saw that we had support, that the interests of the Albanians do not run counter to the interests of the International Community.

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XI

NATO AIR CAMPAIGN

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NATO's INTERVENTION DETERMINED THE WINNER OF THE WAR IN KOSOVA

- **Did you have any special feeling during the NATO operations? I am interested in your emotional experiences.**

HARADINAJ: When planes were flying over, we hoped that not everything had ended. The situation was very difficult; it was a life and death struggle. Either you fought and died like a hero, or you would end up with your throat cut. Sacrifices brought us to this day. The NATO air strikes on Kralan and Gregoc are indescribable, at the time when fighting was going on to defend the only free territory in Kosova, which was our rear packed with civilians. During the fighting, when we were at the point of defeat, NATO aircraft attacked the Serb forces in Ratish and Lumebardh. I would mention the use of B-52 bombers two days before the signing of the agreements between the Serb forces and NATO, which were decisive for us.

- **Can you say something about how the KLA and NATO worked together during the bombing campaign?**

HARADINAJ: We must be realistic. During that time, from the military aspect, Kosova was a joint workshop of NATO and the KLA. These forces were allies, but I cannot say they were equal. There were common interests, closely linked with one another and mutual benefits. I benefited from the air raids, while NATO pilots benefited from our firing line, which forced the Serb forces to be exposed. This was our cooperation.

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- **During the NATO operations, two NATO attacks were conducted, one on the KLA forces along the border with Albania and the other on the column of Albanian refugees. Casualties resulted on both occasions. Do you have any other explanation of the two incidents, besides the ones that are known?**

IMPORTANCE OF PENETRATING THE BORDER IN KOSHARE

HARADINAJ: Once the air strikes began, the Serb forces lost the war. Their morale and their value as an army deteriorated. Their army was no longer an army. There were groups of disorganized people, who acted according to the logic of the moment. Many of their actions were not those of an army, such as taking civilians hostage, their use as human shields, keeping heavy military equipment in the same houses with civilians, forcing the civilians to move about on military tanks and trucks. By these actions, Milosevic wanted to bring an end to the support of the NATO bombing by International public opinion. The only hope that remained was to cut off this support, which he tried to do with the use of the alleged victims of these air raids. Serbia invested a lot in this direction and did everything to achieve it. To this day, I am not convinced that the air strikes were the cause of casualties in either Korisha or Bistrazhin. They were the results of the improvisations of the Serb forces.

As for the attacks on the KLA positions in Koshare, I think that part of the blame falls on our cooperation with NATO, which should have been more concrete, because the misunderstanding in the terrain should have been eliminated. This was a technical mistake, which was fatal for us in places where our people were killed.

- **In addition to the fierce fighting within Kosova, a corridor from Albania was also opened at this time. How**

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difficult was the opening of this corridor and what was its value for the war?

HARADINAJ: This corridor was valuable not only for its use as a territory, but also since it compelled the Serb forces to put up a wall to counter this attack. Our forces' attack to open the corridor had an all-round effect, because many Serb forces that were forced to fight against the attempts to open this corridor were taken hostage. This enabled us in the terrain to breathe more easily. I would single out the commander of the brigade, Rrustem Berisha, Agim Ramadani who was killed, the hero whose name the brigade now bears, as well as other fighters, dead or alive to the last one. They made an extraordinary contribution to the war in Dukagjin and the war in Kosova in general. The corridor enabled the movement of small groups that kept the war going. Therefore, the penetration of the border in Koshare and the air strikes forced Serbia into signing the withdrawal from Kosova.

- **During the NATO operations, the Provisional Government of Kosova was set up according to the agreement between the KLA, LDK, and LBD, reached in Rambouillet. The LDK did not participate in the government. What did you think about the formation of the government and the nonparticipation of LDK in it?**

HARADINAJ: Until then, there was the conflict between the KLA and Bukoshi's government. Therefore, having in mind the consensus reached in Rambouillet, we, the army, thought that we would avoid the extension of this conflict with the creation of a government in which all would participate: the KLA, the previous government, and the independents that were accepted at Rambouillet. As an army, we supported the founding of the government on this basis and we proposed Hashim Thaçi for the mandate. We were not asked about the other appointments, because we could not deal with this problem. We appointed Thaçi because he was the head of the Albanian delegation at

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Rambouillet and we thought that the government elected would be similar to the delegation there, or that there might be some improvement. The founding of the Provisional Government was not a mistake then, it could have had other names, but we thought that the people and the international factor should support and take advantage of the legacy from Rambouillet.

THE FAILURE OF THE LDK TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT WAS A GRAVE MISTAKE. OUR POLITICIANS AND INTELLECTUALS MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THEY BELONG TO THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVA, AT THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE REACHED, WHILE IMPROVING AND DEVELOPING THE MECHANISMS OF THEIR LEADERSHIP. I THINK THAT THE BOYCOTT DOES NOT SERVE KOSOVA AND DOES NOT PAVE THE WAY FOR ITS FUTURE

- **After the beginning of the NATO operations, almost all the population of Kosova was deported along with all the parties, politics, and other segments of organized life. What did you think of all this turmoil?**

HARADINAJ: Knowing that they were the decisive moments of the war, we expected this to happen. It was not something out of the blue. It was difficult for Serbia to justify to its people the inability of its forces to cope with the NATO air strikes and all the hatred fell on the Albanian people. Their logic was: we failed in war; we have to take revenge against the civilians. Our people were the victims; all the values of the Albanians were fought against to the maximum. I am not talking about the physical or national values, but values such as religious, cultural, political, freedom of speech, etc. I want to make it identified with the army. In Dukagjin, the KLA had journalists, politicians, doctors, intellectuals, hodjas, and priests. I want to say that everything was preserved only in the framework

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of the KLA, while other mechanisms were not envisaged, or were not prepared to cope with the extraordinary situation created at that time.

- **Because of lack of information from Kosova, you appeared several times on the major electronic media of the world during this time. Besides providing information on what happened, did you have any other reason for these appearances?**

I WAS AFRAID THAT INTERNATIONAL OPINION MIGHT TURN AGAINST THE NATO OPERATIONS

HARADINAJ: My appearance on the media were not in accord with my principles because it was not my intention to behave like that during the war and even earlier and I can say that not only me but all the zone had some reservations concerning the media. Not to conceal any possible shortcomings, but to protect the nature of our work and sacrifices and not to create an atmosphere of testimonies, appearances, and parades, just for show, in the media. Nevertheless, seeing that Serbia wanted to create a complete blackout of information in Kosova. For its own benefit, and let the people suffer the consequences, we tried to make use of our possibilities. First, we tried to help ourselves as soldiers, then our families, our people, and international public opinion to maintain a correct stand and not fell prey to the propaganda war of the Serb media and Serb officials. First of all, I am referring to the Serbian ambassador to the UN, the Yugoslav minister of information, other representatives in London and elsewhere.

Through the media, such as the very popular BBC television, they made cynical statements and complained so much, that I thought that the International opinion would say "Stop!" to NATO attacks. If you have noticed, my statements appeared after the statements of the Serb officials. I did not make the statements

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at the request of the BBC, but on the basis of my own requests to make known what was going on in Kosova. Thought I was identified with the KLA, because of my earlier acquaintances in the International Community, they believed that what I was saying was true. I would like to thank the Voice of America for its openness to my statements. I have always been prudent. I have never exaggerated anything, but I emphasize that what I said is true. I tried to be consistent, to protect the population, and to continue the war for Kosova.

- **What battles would you single out during the NATO bombing?**

HARADINAJ: The "Adrian Krasniqi" brigade that operated in the vicinity of Istog and Peja, at the foot of the hills, was a victory for us. This brigade served as our rear guard all the time. It helped us with the equipment and other supplies and, of course, with military actions. This kept the Serb forces from being able to operate safely in a valuable rearguard area. The firing line from Lubizhda to Banja in Peja was important. Fierce fighting took place along that line from 8 to 10 April, when more than 30 KLA soldiers were killed. Intensive fighting also took place along the entire firing line from Shaptej, Gllogjan, Irzniq, Kodralia, Pozhar, Lumbardh, Dashinoc, Rashiq, Vranoc, Qollopek, Bucan, Kusuriq, Llugagjia, Gllogjan in Nepola, Kepuz, Kralan, Gregoc, and Rakovina. The enemy could not penetrate even 500 or 1000 meters along this line. Very fierce fighting went on almost every day along that line. Every unit waged a life and death struggle.

- **You lost your brother during the NATO bombing, in the fighting with the Serb forces. Under which circumstances was Shkelzen killed?**

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SHKELZEN DIED DEFENDING THE PEOPLE IN DUBOCAK

HARADINAJ: During a period in April 1999, we thought we had better stay in hiding and not undertake overt military actions until we consolidated our ranks. However, we faced great difficulties with the civilian population in the valleys. There is a valley called Dubocak, above the new Zhebel in the vicinity of Jabllanica. There were about 2,000 civilians in that valley, mainly from the villages of Dushkaja, who lived on army supplies. The army sent them flour and other supplies and they took responsibility for their protection. It was very difficult for us because we did not have enough troops to guard that terrain and we did not have enough ammunition. For these reasons, we worked under cover. One day, the Serb forces discovered this population. On 16 April, our advance guard, Hasim Halilaj, Fatmir Nimonaj, and another soldier encountered the Serb troops. They put up the first resistance and halted the penetration of those forces.

As I said earlier on, it was not easy to send in reinforcement because we were in difficult organizational circumstances. I remember Shpend Malaj, who was killed later, coming and saying that we had to act immediately because the people in Dubocak were attacked and also saying that it appeared that Hashim and others might have been killed. He wanted help. Shkelzen Haradinaj, Luan Nimonaj, Shpend Malaj, Luan Qerimaj, who was also killed later, and some others went to their rescue. Shkelzen, Shpend and Luan, were the advance guard. They entered into combat against the Serb forces. They fought with hand grenades and knives and prevented them from taking combat positions because, after that, they would penetrate the civilian population. A great heroic battle took place there. Much ammunition was used and, before Shkelzen was killed, witnesses say that he killed many Serbs. The Serb forces could not take our positions, they had to retreat to retreat to the previous positions and, from that day on, that position was not attacked any more.

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Indeed, they withdrew later, taking their troops, in ambulances in the direction of Gregoc and Gllogjan in Peja. Shkelzen was killed on 6 of April, between 1400 and 1500 hours.

- **Were you wounded at any other times besides those two incidents on the 24 of March 1998 in Gllogjan?**

HARADINAJ: I was wounded for the first time, not too seriously, on 6 of May 1997.

- **At the same time that Luan was killed?**

HOW WAS I WOUNDED FOR THE THIRD TIME

HARADINAJ: Yes, at Qafa Mullar in Vlana. The second time, as I said, I received two serious wounds in Gllogjan. The third time I was wounded was in the summer of 1998 in Carrabreg. I was escorting the guard in the territory where our firing line had been broken several times. At that time, Serbia had built up a huge striking force and we had to retreat for tactical reasons, little by little. When the circumstances were favorable, we created the new firing line as close to them as possible. This line changed every day. Sometimes we advanced, and other times the Serbs did. With me were Fatmir Nimonaj, who is now dead, Hysen Smajli and a number of volunteers from Gjakova. When we reached our position, in one of the houses, I told the soldiers to move slowly because the area was problematic. We wanted to go into the house, but we were not sure of the presence of Serb forces in the surrounding houses.

I started to advance. I reached a barbed wire barrier, which had two wires, not four. It was a clear night and the moon was shinning so I had a clear view, like dusk or early dawn. There was a felled log there on the level of the wires. I beckoned to the boys to advance slowly. Trying to climb over the barrier, I put one leg over the wires, I had my gun ready. When I tried to put

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the other leg over the wires, snipers opened fired from close by, about 50 m. I was lucky that the shots did not come from an automatic rifle, but came on by one. The first bullet hit the finger of my right hand, with which I was holding the trigger, and went through the gun, which fell on the ground. Thinking that I was wounded in the stomach, the first thing I did was to lie on the ground. Then I felt my stomach, but I made a mistake because I did it with my wounded hand. I withdrew my hand covered in blood and I thought I was wounded. Then I started searching for my gun, found it, and took a position. At this time, my soldiers responded to the fire. My soldiers made a mistake. They did not accurately determine the place where I was lying and their bullets came so near I did not dare move. I remained there, lying down. After the firing stopped, I started to talk, thinking that some of my soldiers were nearby.

I said: "Who are you? I am so and so." No one answered. I repeated my question, saying, at the same time, that we would attack if we did not get a response. Then we started our attack. I started to crawl in the same position thinking that I was wounded in the stomach. While retreating, I saw that everything was functioning normally. I then touched my stomach with my other hand and realized that I was not wounded. I joined the boy and we intensified the attack against the houses from where they had fired. The commander Maliq Ndreca also helped us. Later we attacked the house with hand grenades but the people that had shot at us had already left and no one was there.

- **How did the KLA receive the withdrawal of the Serb forces and NATO's arrival in Kosova?**

SERB FORCES HAD TO CAPITULATE, NOT WITHDRAW

HARADINAJ: The Serb forces are greatly indebted to Kosova. They caused great damage to the people of Kosova. We wanted them to capitulate, and not withdraw. I think that the fact

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that they had the opportunity to withdraw was for those forces. It was our request and the desire that the NATO attacks continue for another week or ten days, which would bring about the capitulation of the Serb forces. This would be a great victory over the destructive forces in the Balkans, which are identified with Milosevic and which will cause his demise. Although this was not achieved, the withdrawal of the Serb forces from Kosova means to us that the war for Kosova has been won.

- **To what extend was the Serb war machine damaged? Or as NATO officials say, do you think that this damage has incapacitated it to the extend that this warmongering army cannot pose a threat to its neighbors in the future?**

HARADINAJ: On the basis of my difficult military experience, I think that motive or morale is the main weapon of an army. An organized state that manages to motivate its troops for war, even if it does not have any powerful military technology, poses a threat for its neighbors. I think that Serbia's military attack force, in the technical aspect, was damaged by 30 to 40 percent. I am not referring only to tanks or other types of equipment that have been destroyed, but also to the fact that the continued use of war machine has greatly reduced its technical precision. The breakup of the units during the war reduced their organizational and moral capacity, making them incapable of action on the level they used to have in Kosova. The total break up of this machinery will occur with the breakup of the regime which is still succeeding in recruiting, motivating, and forcing its citizens to respond to a military doctrine that is erroneous and aggressive toward others.

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XII

LIBERATION OF KOSOVA

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KOSOVA DOES NOT NEED A REBEL ARMY OR ILLEGAL ARMY, BUT A REGULAR ARMY

- **We talked about this earlier, but can it be said that Kosova is really liberated?**

AT LAST, KOSOVA IS LIBERATED

HARADINAJ: Finally, Kosova is liberated. I know that we all desired the triumphant liberation of Kosova by the Kosova Liberation Army. We wanted to mark liberation day and, at the same time, Independence Day with a government of the state of Kosova and a democratic society of Kosova. This day has not come. Considering the pace of our progress, we will have to wait three, five, or who knows how many years for this day, and I do not know under what circumstances and with what kind of sacrifices we will arrive at that point. Nevertheless, with help of NATO, dominated by the US and Great Britain, Kosova saw the withdrawal of Serbian forces and entry of the international forces. We have no reason to believe that the interests of the international community and those of the people of Kosova are in any way in opposition. The international community's criteria for building societies are not in conflict with the free declaration of people. In this context, the will of the Albanians of Kosova, who make up 95 percent of its population, is known. In other words, the international community does not have a mechanism of force to compel people to live under a system driven by violence. It is for this reason that I think that the liberation of Kosova has been achieved.

We must create the internal circumstances, I would call them the human and political circumstances, to prove that we are able to agree to live with the minorities who live in Kosova, because

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there is no ethnically pure state anywhere. We must be able to protect the values of the minorities, both religious and actual values, including material ownership, because these values do not endanger us in circumstances in which Albanian culture and other Albanian values are developing freely. In addition, we have members of our population who live in other states, such as those in Italy, who have been there for centuries, or others, all over the world, and those states should be thanked for protecting the values of the Albanians. This can become a reality only with the internal democratization of the people of Kosova and the fostering of their awareness of the road that must be followed to achieve this.

We must turn to another matter. Kosova is not in Europe, nor it is in America. It is in the Balkans. Today, in the Balkans, there are hegemonistic ideas, large or small nationalistic states. The people of Kosova, therefore, need the army of Kosova, above all, to make the state of Kosova a reality. We did not say that the Albanian nation, but the people of Kosova, therefore it is the army of all the citizens of Kosova. I am speaking about an army that will be created with the assistance of the international community, just as the international community is helping to create other institutions which are just as important, such as the Kosova police and the civil government with UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosova). I think that it is the International community's moral obligation and duty to respond to the martyred people of Kosova by giving it the right to create the army of Kosova. This would be a depoliticized army, by the means of which, the people of Kosova would, so to speak, manipulate, not for various clandestine purposes, but for the purposes that are transparent to the international community. This army will be constructed on the basis of the criteria of Western armies and, of course, under the supervision of the international community. I think that the Albanian people are more valuable to the international factor as a partner than as an unskilled, unorganized, and undeveloped people. As such, we would be an Achilles heel for the international factor in the Balkans.

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- **At the time of transformation of KLA, an agreement was signed between the prime minister of the QPK (Provisional Government of Kosova), Hashim Thaqi, and General Jackson. Can it be expected that from the KLA up to the present we will have, in the future, the army of Kosova, as you call it, or national guard, as it is referred to in American style, as well as police of Kosova? (The material for this book was recorded in the first part of July 1999)**

AGREEMENT ON DEMILITARIZATION IS AN INITIATIVE OF KLA

HARADINAJ: Some things are clear. First of all, the international community, such as it is, is not united. Various factors or states have seen our goal and are convinced by our values as a people and also by the values of the army. Another part of the international community, which opposed NATO's air campaign, has continually had unclear positions and, I would say, has continued to prevent the development of the future state of Kosova. In these circumstances, the agreement signed by Thaqi and Jackson signifies an agreement signed between the military mechanism of the international community and Kosova. This is a result of the KLA initiative for demilitarization. Therefore, we are stating clearly that this is our initiative, but the international community sets the rules.

The agreement obliges the KLA: on basis of the K-7, to withdraw from residential areas and main roads and to stop taking war positions, combat actions, military training, etc., in other words, to remove the state of war; on the basis of the K-30, to deposit its heavy weapons and 30 percent of the personal weapons in known places under joint supervision with KFOR; the K-60 calls for the handing over of 30 percent of the personal weapons; while the K-90 calls for the elimination of the KLA,

which would mean the loss of the right to wear the uniform, the right to appeal, and the existence of the KLA as a mechanism. The zone commanders, the General Staff, and the army support such as an agreement in the hope that something will result from it. In one of the paragraphs of this agreement, it says that the international community will take into consideration the assistance given by the KLA at the time of the crisis in Kosova. Indirectly, we understand this to mean that help will be given to candidates from the KLA who want to be incorporated in the police service in Kosova and in the civil government.

The agreement also says that it will take into consideration – words that lend themselves to discussion – the creation of a future army along the lines of the US National Guard. That is, it is not a matter of a guard and an army but of an army in the form of a guard. Thus, we have only two options for the creation of security mechanisms: police and National Guard. We believe that, on the basis of activity up to now and of our involvement so far, the international community has the moral obligation to recognize the rights of the people of Kosova and of the mechanism called the KLA and to provide opportunity for the creation of a security mechanism that is more serious than a national guard or police force. This mechanism would be more valuable and more useful for the international factor and, even more, for the Albanians of Kosova.

The KLA has supported demilitarization, realizing that we cannot remain in a liberation situation all the time and we do not have any reason to keep explosive materials or destructive weapons, artillery weapons, anti-tank weapons, etc. in our homes. This would be dangerous for us as a people. As I said earlier, for this reason, the idea of demilitarization is our idea, so that we can free ourselves from a war situation. The war is over. We don't want to fight against KFOR. We don't want to fight against the international community. But we want, without conflicting with Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, to find corridors, to find openings, to achieve our aims, by democratic means, I believe. We are not afraid nor do we hesitate to ask the

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international community to recognize our rights to create the future army of Kosova. We will do this as an organized mechanism, little by little or come what may. I am convinced that we will do this. Let me say once again that we don't want conflict with the international community. We also do not believe that the international community wants conflict with the people of Kosova, for the very reason that the people want to be a mechanism of security and protection, without any capacity for attack and without the technology needed for a striking force.

- **How is this being achieved? We have the impression that you hope that the international community will be obliged to do something that might not be included in the agreement on demilitarization.**

ARMY OF KOSOVA IS BEING CREATED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

HARADINAJ: There remains one opening, one in addition to the personal aspect, I must say. I think that the courts of the people of Kosova must demand that the international community create a security mechanism, as a regular army of Kosova. This will not be an active or an executive mechanism on the day of the proclamation of the juridical act on its establishment. It will be an army on paper and in juridical law. Lengthy preparatory activities will then follow, and it might take three years to reach the desired level. If this is achieved in cooperation with the international community, we will free ourselves, I might say, from the bad features that have been inherited from the war. Therefore, I want the army to be created under the direct supervision of the international community, similar to the way in which a police force is being created. I am more than convinced that only the legal formalities need to be completed to achieve this, because I

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believe in the justice of the international community and in our right to request this.

- **Have you discussed this idea with any of the international factors?**

HARADINAJ: So far, (This conversation took place in the first part of July 1999 – Author's Note), I have talked with the chief of the General Staff, who has some reservations about the extent of the willingness of the international factor, and also with the zone commanders, with the prime minister, and with Defense Ministry personnel. To tell you the truth, I think that the problem is the inability of our representatives to make a legitimate case for this request, as a right of the people of Kosova. An army built on the basis of criteria set up by the states that created KFOR should frighten no one. In various forms, the Western political and military factor that is in Kosova and the diplomatic decision-making centers in the world are aware of this request, which we have never concealed.

In all the meetings that I have had with representatives of the Western States, some of which have been at high level, I have said that I am a fighter for the independence of Kosova, for which I will fight until I achieve it. I have said that I respect the rules of the game. Therefore, during the war, I fought and was successful; now the war is over and new circumstances which I understand have been created and I will choose the forms of activity in accordance with the new circumstances until the army of Kosova is created. I am so convinced of this that I am congratulating the people of Kosova on the army of Kosova. Since I am so convinced of this, I have supported the agreement on demilitarization and we are an outstanding zone for the fulfillment of our commitments. Our whole internal organism, in Dukagjin, no longer has the character of a wartime army but the real character of a peacetime army, one with humanitarian activities.

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- **How do you see the future of the soldiers of the KLA?**

HARADINAJ: All the citizens of Kosova joined the KLA, regardless of age, religion, ideology, profession, and level of education. Naturally, after the war, a certain number of them will return to where they came from or where they have been. A number of them will belong to the new mechanism of the state of Kosova, such as the police and the military, while others will return to the professions which they had earlier in Kosova, which were interrupted.

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XIII

VIEW TOWARDS THE FUTURE

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THE CREATION OF A REGULAR ARMY MARKS THE CROWNING MOMENT OF OUR VICTORY

- **It seems to us that we are coming to the end of this conversation on the war. At the beginning of the conversation, you said that you were a member of the LPK (National Movement of Kosova).**

HARADINAJ: Yes, I was.

- **Are you a member of any party now?**

WHY I JOINED THE LPK AND WHY I LEFT

HARADINAJ: My sympathy for or my membership in the LPK was not because of its name or its ideas. The reason for my membership was the fact that the LPK was the closest to the idea of the liberation of Kosova at that time, having included the idea of armed resistance in its program. I joined it to benefit directly from the personal contacts, to take advantage of the budget, the resources, and the people, for the purpose of organizing the struggle. Even before I joined the LPK, I was a soldier of Kosova, maybe since 1986. Therefore, I considered myself more a soldier than a political activist. My LPK membership was fruitful. I contributed very much, by ensuring that everything that the LPK had placed in the service of the war. My departure from the LPK coincided with my departure, once and for all, from Switzerland in January 1998. From that moment on, I have belonged to any political party, but a national organization, of course, with a specific political nature.

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- **Will you join any political organization in the future?**

HARADINAJ: Political developments before the war and during the war led me to believe that our people's maturity is not up to the proper level, and I am including here personalities with the main responsibility in Kosova. This is a useful criticism. We were not competent in the war. Since I have been given the right, I am saying what I think. During the war, we suffered very much from the lack of organization and technology. I think that the future generation of politicians or diplomats must be diplomatic, because Europe is in Kosova now. If this generation knows how to work, it will be very fortunate for the people of Kosova, who have the will and desire to achieve something valuable, to compensate themselves this time for their sufferings and sacrifice.

As for me, since up to now I have exercised the profession of the soldier, and I think I have mastered it quite well, and since I have been a factor in the military organisation, I would like to continue my activity in the army until the day that the army is handed over to the people of Kosova and the state of Kosova – as a regular army such as every people who have a state has. After this moment, which would be historic, the moment of our crowning victory, I think that many things will be able to be done by other groups. At that time, conditions would be created for a political and national equilibrium – and I cannot say that this has not yet been done. At that time, I would like to help achieve a unity, I might say a national unity, but it would be one with the values of a respected or a genuine pluralism. It would not be a pluralism, like, I would say, the present situation, when everything is calculated on the basis of the struggle for power, when many things are denied, when the people of Kosova are not helped in this very difficult situation.

I would like to become part of a policy of resistance that will engage the majority of the people so that they will go forward. I do not know when this will happen and I do not even know if it will happen at all. But, if I were to get involved, I would not go

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into any position offered by today's politics. Let me say again that, if this happens, I will not try to create a party, but a coalition of all those who have something from the Kosova electorate. I am not a person who waits to take responsibility when he thinks that it is to the people's advantage, because I have done much for them. Two of my brothers were killed in the war, many family members have been wounded many times, and many comrades have been killed. However, I have saved my family and, as a leader in the war, I contributed to saving the population of Dukagjin.

KOSOVA NEEDS A REXHEP MEIDANI

I don't think that Rexhep Meidani has complete control in Albania, but I think that a Meidani is needed in Kosova. We see exacerbation in the relations among the political forces in Albania, but Meidani remains above them. This is lacking in Kosova.

- **What kind of experience do you have from contacts with our politicians?**

HARADINAJ: I have had frequent contacts with the politicians who created the KLA or who came from the KLA. I am talking about those on the national level. I have contacts with politicians of the Parliamentary Party (PPK), who has approached me during the war, with the Democratic Movement of Kosova (LBD), with Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), not at the national level but with the regional officials. We have found a common language with all those with whom we have met up to now. Concretely, although we have built a front in Dukagjini, perhaps there is still criticism, ambiguity, and dissatisfaction, but I would like to say that, today, there is a political and military balance in Dukagjin and there is a common work front. The structure of the people elected to head the mechanisms is

evidence of this. Right now, there are more technicians than politicians.

Perhaps I am deviating from the topic of discussion, but, if we look at the situation in the terrain, we have Mazllum Kumnova, the mayor of Gjakova commune who is an LDK activist; his assistant, Adrian Gjini, from the NDSH (Albanian National Democratic Party); and the mayor of Decan commune; Ibrahim Selmanaj, is also an LDK activist. Then, the mayor of Peja commune, is Ethem Ceku of the PPK. Jonuz Jonuzi in Istog had also been in the PPK. Ramadan Krasniqi of the LDK is in Klina. The coordinator in the Dukagjini region, Hasan Meta, used to be in the PPK, but he is a rightist, so he has the ideas of Balli Kombetar (the National Front). Gafurr Elshani was 'a red' (Haradinaj laughs – Author's note) in the LPK, etc. Therefore we have a mix of ideas that I would call political and ideological and they are all combined into something which is expressed in what the citizens of Kosova feel and have accepted – the obligation to serve the state of Kosova.

- **You said earlier that Kosova needs e Meidani. What do you think about Thaqi, Rugova, Qosja and Surroi? Could any one of them be the Meidani of Kosova or do you think that this personality will came later?**

HARADINAJ: With regards to Thaqi, I will begin with the time of war. I have respect for him as a soldier and as an officer of the KLA. I have not been satisfied with his work in the political domain. I have some criticism that deals with his ability to unify, that is, in regard to the political factors related to the power of a political organization. We though that, with his appointment, what was inherited from Rambouillet would continue and we do not have a mechanism. We wanted a limit, perhaps like we spoke about earlier and we though about Meidani. But, we do not like his current position because this is a crisis situation, even today, and whether we like it or not, there are parallel actions and we are being disgraced before the

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international community. I don't want to talk about his successes so far as a politician. As a young man, he developed the KLA by means of political participation and he created some new circumstances in the KLA and in regard to the KLA, but we are not completely satisfied with the results.

- **Rugova?**

HARADINAJ: I believe that a political analyst could speak with more competence with regards to Rugova because I know his activity only through the media. I think that he belonged to an earlier period that is all over. In other words, he belonged to the period of peaceful resistance. Since we are in a year of victory, I do not want to express the bitterness and criticism that we had had for him. I am not accusing him, but I would say that I am confronting Rugova with the fact that he did not support us during the war, that he did not help us, and perhaps at times he hurt us with his statements. I cannot hide this as a citizen of Kosova, as a soldier and an officer, but I do not want to take revenge over this. I would like to give him the opportunity to help us in this period, by unity, by a symbolic gesture or act, which will ease the sufferings or the situation of the people of Kosova, which would give honor to a part of the electorate that trusts in Rugova, so that he will be united with all the others and, in this way, we will function as a nation.

- **And how about Surroi as a member of the younger generation?**

HARADINAJ: his skills in communication, presentation, and confrontation command respect. I am not so well informed about his political or diplomatic activity. But let me explain that my evaluation of him as a politician is based on his readiness to make sacrifices for the people because he, himself, belong to those who make sacrifices. I value those who make sacrifices more than others who are very capable, very intelligent, or very

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alert. Contrary to my convictions I believe that Surroi is a treasure of our people and, along with the others, he will be useful in the future.

- **How about the governments? Do you think that Kosova can allow itself the luxury of being led by the two governments?**

HARADINAJ: No, this possibility is utopian. For this very reason, we have our criticism of Hashim Thaqi. I do not think that it is his entire fault, but we did not ask for an incomplete Provisional Government. We asked for a complete government and, although we had criticism, our desire was that all should join in so that national unity would be created. Even the richest countries, with hundreds of years of democracy, do not allow parallel operations. I think that Kosova, too, does not desire to tolerate and allow parallel operations, at whatever level they might be. Naturally, a political pluralism that must be helped can be created but pluralism of operations on the government level is harmful.

- **Even now, when Kosova has won its freedom, we are witnesses to savage behavior, not only in politics but also in many other fields, and to degenerative behavior manifested in frenzy for plundering. Is there danger that Kosova will be confronted with self-destructive chaos, similar to that which took place in Albania in spring of 1997?**

IF WE ALLOW THE CREATION OF MAFIAS, THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE WILL SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES FOR CENTURIES

HARADINAJ: I belong to the terrain, and usually, warnings from offices haven't concerned me very much. But, in fact, these

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warnings come from the terrain itself. I have a great respect for the work of KFOR. Their work is exhausting. But, such warnings come at a time when we are awaiting the installation of police and international administration. With the denial of KLA's right to help with Kosova's security, the juridical damage caused by the agreement on demilitarization – we say juridical damage because we did not have legal power to act; we are no longer based on laws, norms, and mechanisms – has created a standstill, confusion, and an unclear situation in the terrain. This has raised the hopes of specific individuals and different elements that they will be able to engage in criminal activity, robbery, corruption, and other acts. This would not have happened if these people did not have very high-level contacts or if they did not have hopes of existence. If these actions were to be carried out, without a mechanism to oppose them, at a specific moment, the level of Mafia organization that exists in other countries will be achieved, along with organized corruption and organized crime, which will burden the society of Kosova, not just for years but for centuries. We warned the international community about this.

The creation of political unity, of a so-called technical government, and of legal acts that condemn all activities in opposition to human standards would be a great help in avoiding this. I want to explain to our people and to international opinion that the KLA is not responsible for these initiatives and does not approve of these actions. The KLA has sacrificed so many young lives that it wants to combat these initiatives in any from. However, the KLA is in an impossible position, with half the demilitarization phase completed; with the families of martyrs – about 500 in Dukagjin – homeless, without material resources, and in difficult legal circumstances; and with the problem of the wounded, the disabled. Therefore, we are not able to combat these actions in the terrain. The continuation of the fierce competition, the use of inhuman norms to achieve aims, the tendency to use everything for political gains, including the military, the health sector, or other vital mechanisms, is a bad tendency and is very dangerous for the people of Kosova. For

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this reason, we are insisting on the army of Kosova, not as a gendarme for the population, but as a proof that there can be serious mechanisms that are able to maintain the correct position that they had during the war and who are capable of confronting the epidemics that could endanger our nation.

Therefore, I am appealing to the people of Kosova to support the creation of the army of Kosova, to support the construction of a democratic society that will be built on the values of humanity because the Albanians are people who have the same values as other nations, a society in which the integrity of the individual, the family, the property, religion, communities, etc., will be respected. Everything that is contrary to this logic is detrimental to us. Also, the international community, since it has taken responsibility for everything in Kosova, must give an accounting to the people of Kosova for the delays, the ineffective actions, the toleration of those activities in the terrain, and the delay in giving people of Kosova the right to create an army. The people of Kosova must be allowed to make their contribution to establishing security, because it is utopian to expect that the international mechanism alone should keep order in the postwar period. Especially when it is known that, after the war, desires for rapid profit, as well as the appetites of clans, groups, and Mafia have become rampant.

- **You said earlier that there were about 500 martyrs in Dukagjin. And there are hundreds of other martyrs from the various regions in Kosova. How will the memory of the martyrs be perpetuated?**

ARDIAN KRASNIQI SAID TO ME: "I WILL GIVE MY ONLY PEOPERTY, MY HOUSE TO THE ARMY"

HARADINAJ: Without going into other cases, let me take one example: Ardian Krasniqi. His father died young; he was a teacher. Ardian was devoted to the war. I remember one time

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when we left his fiancé, Merita, in Tirana and he said to me: "I want to go to Peja to see the only property that I have that I will give to the army." There was talk about selling the house in Peja because we did not have anything to work with. That is, these young men, not to mention any other cases, did not want any remuneration and sacrificed everything. They were not ideologues of the state but had the burning desire that the people of Kosova should enjoy Kosova, as a state in which human values were respected. I kept mentioning human values because all the citizens must feel that they are free in Kosova. They must be free to express themselves. This will be achieved when Adrian's mother or brother is ready to say: "Thanks to Adrian, there is a state of Kosova." The realization of their desire is the creation of the state of Kosova, the creation of a democratic society in Kosova on the values of humanity. Wealth, power, dictatorship, etc. are not values of humanity. Mutual respect, legal competition in all regards, progress, etc. are the values of humanity. I am working for this so that we can go with heads up before their graves, before their memory, before their families, and before their children.

- **After all that we said, what are the most difficult moments that you have experienced during this time?**

HARADINAJ: I will explain it for myself, for my comrades-in-arms, and for the people Kosova. The most difficult moments for me are associated with the wounded. Why? During one day of fighting we had as many as 30 wounded and we were not sure that we would be able to treat them. Their evacuation was extraordinaryrily difficult. It was done with improvised carriers, with the involvement of the population and the soldiers. The fate of the wounded tormented me during the war, was very costly to me, and held me back. This feeling is still following me even after the war. Two officers were killed while carrying the wounded: the technician Rexhep from Bec and Luan Qerimaj. Other soldiers, civilians, and wounded soldiers were killed during

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the transfer to Bogiq. The first time, in April 1999 offensive, in the evacuation of the wounded, three operations units with more than 600 people had to be used to withdraw about 40 wounded soldiers from Zhebel and Ratish in the direction of Vrella, from Vrella to Rugova, from Rugova to Albania. This evacuation was a success. All the wounded were treated and they returned to the war. This was not a war; it became a massacre for us because we did not have our hands free to fight. We easily compensated for the lack of equipment. But because of the families that we had in our area and the wounded, we did not dare to fire or to move the line of fire so it was a massacre for us.

If this war had been carried on in another territory, where we did not have to think of the civilian population first of all, I believe that the war would have had another nature. Many people have criticized us because we made frontal attacks, attacking positions. Fine, but what else could we do considering that we had those families who knew that they would be killed if they fell into their hands. They killed women and children; this is how 30- and 40-years-olds operated. During the NATO operations, there were thousands of men from Kosova, who had come there. What should we do with all of them? I am not often faced with a dilemma as to strategy of military activity, but I was literally taken prisoner by the impossibility of taking action. I am asking for pardon from my comrades-in-arms, because I have been obliged many times to demand from them the execution of tasks that cannot be executed. But there was no other solution.

- **But what about the good moments, the happy moments?**

HARADINAJ: The good moments for me have been every passing day, every military or political act that brings us closer to freedom. If I have to specify, they came mainly after difficult moments. For example, when things were very bad for us, a pleasant surprise occurred. One of these surprises was the arrival of Xhelal Hajda and his group with equipment from Albania, to help us after the offensive of the summer of 1998. It seemed to

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me that he brought wings for flying. It is impossible not to remember the beginning of the NATO air strikes. We all looked, with admiration, at the first missiles and aircraft. Those are unforgettable moments.

The End

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REVIEWS

A STORY THAT KEEPS ALIVE THE MEMORY OF THE EPOCH

By Zenun Çelaj

Not every war can be transformed into an epoch. The most recent one, in Kosova, reached these dimensions. It was an unequal war in which the desire of the victim to win freedom from an executioner triumphed; this was an executioner who was many times more powerful and also barbarous. Therefore, the memoirs of those who created this period are interesting not only because they satisfy the curiosity of the people to learn about its heroes but also because they renew the memory of the tragic drama through which the Albanians passed at the end of this century. The memoirs of Ramush Haradinaj, one of the principal heroes of this period, address these two interests. The style of the memoirs, the way in which they are written, is also interesting.

The book *Rrëfimi për Luftën dhe Lirinë,* intertwines human sincerity, courage, and truth, in the words of the Commander Haradinaj, and the skillfulness of the author of this dialog, which cannot lead today's and tomorrow's scholars astray, as a literature for the events of the end of this century in this Balkan land, which jolted mankind.

It is a book to be read with spirit, a true drama, on that does not relax its hold on you.

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It is a special story, not so well known in our literature. The dialogue is so natural that the reader forgets that he is following questions and answers. It seems as if the person asking the question and the person answering the question have traveled together and fought together and have been together during the entire drama, sacrifices, and heroism that characterized the struggle of the Albanians in the Dukagjini plain. And, as if it were done with a scenario by a master of dramatic films, they set in motion the passages of terror and resistance, bravery and treachery, wisdom and farsightedness, and of purpose, in the presence of which every obstacle is destroyed.

Here, Commander Ramush shows that he is a master not only of the art of war but also of the art of memoir writing. He is raised to the level of a hero while being modest and sparing in relating his own heroic deeds. He becomes great by extolling the heroism of his comrades-in-arms, both living and dead.

He is also distinguished by the heroism of his confrontation with his own mistakes and those people, which he does not hide, but as a result of which he constantly becomes more knowledgeable and stronger.

Gllogjani, Jabllanica, Baballoqi, Gramaçeli, Irzniq, Prapaqan – each one of these residential areas are localities in which an alarming human drama has been played out, and Commander Haradinaj speaks the truth about the victories and failures, without concealing anything.

This is a book that will keep us alive for us the memory of this epoch and which will be of value today and tomorrow.

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PROOF THAT KOSOVA DESERVED FREEDOM

By Blerim Shala

Serbia will never give up Kosova. The West will never intervene militarily in Kosova. Kosova will never become free and independent.

These were the political positions that were tied like millstone around the neck of every Albanian in the 1999's.

The idea of independence, which was made of official in 1990-1991, by the decision of the Assembly of Kosova and by the vote of the citizens in a referendum, became, in the 1990's, a slogan, a leitmotif, a shield to preserve the monopoly of an illusory authority that was being built on a verbal pronouncement in favor of the state of Kosova. Each one of us was afraid that those of us were living would not live a single day or a single moment in freedom. Slavery seemed to be our eternal misfortune.

On this stage of fate and politics, everything collapsed with the appearance of a few dozen people who had that age-old Albanian conviction that there can be no freedom. Although, in the beginning, they did not know what war was, whose throat they were actually grabbing, or what could result from all this confusion, they knew well, very well, that all the illusion had gone, that the time for humiliating words had passed, and that dying for freedom was of much more value than life under Serbia. Serbia was standing between

Kosova and freedom. In Kosova, there was no room for both the Albanians and for Serbia. Heroes and martyrs were needed to get Serbia out of Kosova. Thousands of martyrs were dispersed throughout the land of Cassava and its mountains were filled with thousands of heroes, so that the west would understand that it must intervene militarily for the sake of Cassava, because Cassava's freedom is not only a just aim of the Albanians and their capacity for making political agreements and the criminal nature of the Serb regime are placed between the West and its willingness to carry out military intervention in Kosova.

Thus, by the war, the West forced Serbia to leave Kosova and, starting in June 1999, the Albanians began to learn what freedom is, with the rises and falls of a child who is learning how to walk.

I would never believe that the war for Kosova could be described so completely in only one book of memoirs. As you know, this is the age of photographs and films, and the epoch of the television screen. However, you have before you, in this extraordinary book, memoirs that have all the colors of such a difficult war for Kosova.

These memoirs prove that Kosova deserved freedom.

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Proof that Kosova deserved freedom 189

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...Here, Commander Ramush shows that he is a master not only of the art of war but also of the art of memoir writing. He is raised to the level of a hero while being modest and sparing in relating his own heroic deeds. He becomes great by extolling the heroism of his comrades-in-arms, both living and dead.

Zenun ÇELAJ

...I would never believe that the war for Kosova could be described so completely in only one book of memoirs. As you know, this is the age of photographs and films, and the epoch of the television screen. However, you have before you, in this extraordinary book, memoirs that have all the colors of such a difficult war for Kosova.

Blerim SHALA

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX B
LETTER FROM THE HARADINAJ DEFENCE DATED 9 JANUARY 2007

To: David Re
Senior Trial Attorney
OTP

From: Ben Emmerson
Rodney Dixon
Defence Counsel for Mr. Ramush Haradinaj

9 January 2007

Agreed facts

Pursuant to the Trial Chamber's order of 5 December 2006, we enclose herewith the responses of the Defence for Mr. Haradinaj to the agreed facts proposed by the OTP. These responses are divided into the following nine batches of proposed admissions as served by the OTP:

1. Nos. 1-88 (armed conflict)

The Defence for Mr. Haradinaj does not admit any of the proposed facts on armed conflict. The proposed facts are based largely on recordings in the White Book. As the OTP is aware from discussions, we do not accept the reliability of the allegations as stated in this document, nor do we accept the admissibility of the White Book itself. We have not, therefore, attached any admissions in respect of this batch.

However, as the OTP is aware from our discussions, in the interests of narrowing the issues in dispute and shortening the length of the trial, we have put forward a proposal for consideration whereby the defence of Mr. Haradinaj would not challenge the jurisdiction of the court for offences alleged to have occurred after 1 June 1998, providing that offences alleged to have occurred before this date were withdrawn from the Indictment. This date is drawn from the finding of the Trial Chamber in the *Limaj* case that an armed conflict existed in Kosovo by the end of May 1998. We understand that the co-accused take a similar position on this issue.

In making this proposal, the Defence does not make any concession as to the date on which a state of internal armed conflict came into existence. The proposal has been put forward in an endeavour to reach a practical agreement between the parties as to the scope of the indictment and in order to reduce the generic and background evidence that would otherwise have to be led at trial.

If the OTP were to accept this proposal, and to reduce the scope of the indictment accordingly, it would not amount to an admission on the part of the OTP that a state

of armed conflict had not come into existence until the beginning of June 1998. It would, however, reduce the length of the indictment, eliminating the need for the calling of generic and background evidence as to the state of military engagements between Serbian forces and the KLA, thereby enabling the trial to focus on the central allegations in the indictment.

In the event that this start date for the Indictment cannot be agreed between the parties, it will be necessary for the Trial Chamber to determine the date upon which a state of armed conflict came into existence. Generic and background evidence would then have to be led at trial as to the nature and extent of military engagements throughout the indictment period.

2. Nos. 89-143 (Mr. Haradinaj's book)

It is admitted by the Defence for Ramush Haradinaj that the book entitled "Story of War and Freedom" was compiled from a series of interviews with Mr. Haradinaj by Bardh Hamzaj. There is no dispute as to the authenticity or admissibility of the book in its entirety.

It is thus unnecessary to request the Defence to admit selected extracts from the book, in the manner suggested in the OTP's proposed admissions 89-143. We have not therefore attached any admissions from this batch.

The Defence proposes to prepare a set of suggested admissions on the background to the military situation for the period covered by the Indictment. The aim is to agree between the parties a basic set of military and other facts about which no evidence need be led at trial so as to assist the Trial Chamber to clarify the key underlying facts and to reduce the length of the trial proceedings.

Many of these proposed facts will be drawn from the *Limaj* Judgement, some of which the OTP have already requested the Defence to accept as adjudicated facts in its letter of 19 December 2006. We will serve these proposals for consideration as soon as possible.

3. Nos. 144-259 (Forensic matters)

We have attached our admissions in respect of this batch of proposed forensic facts on a provisional basis, subject to the final assessment of our forensic DNA expert which is due shortly.

We are unable to agree any proposed facts concerning Serb activities in the canal area in September 1998. As we have explained in our discussions, the integrity of the alleged crime scene is disputed. Further, as you are aware, the Defence for Mr. Haradinaj will contend that remains recovered from the canal and Economic Farm area include remains of persons who were killed by Serb forces.

In light of the decision to remove the Economic Farm bodies from the indictment, we have invited the OTP to consider abandoning those counts on the indictment which relate to remains allegedly found in and around the canal that are either (a) unidentified or (b) where there is no evidence as to the circumstances in which the victim met his or her death. We await your final position in response to this suggestion.

We expect to be in a position to agree the identities of all remains for which positive DNA results have been obtained. We are awaiting confirmation from our forensic DNA expert before finalising any admissions in this regard. In order to progress matters in the interim we have indicated which identities are likely to be accepted on a provisional basis. We will revert with our final position as soon as our expert's final assessment is to hand.

To the extent that these identities are admitted, there will be no need for the OTP to present any evidence about the identification or DNA processes. Accordingly, we have not addressed the proposed admissions concerning the exhumations which were carried out in order to obtain samples for DNA testing (see immediately below), or those proposed admissions in the batches that proceed body by body which concern the various processes undertaken to identify the bodies. We have confined ourselves to a simple admission as to the undisputed conclusion of the identification process. This should eliminate the necessity for calling any evidence as to the series of steps which led to that identification.

4. Nos. 260-351 (Forensics - 2001 exhumations)

As noted above, given that the identities which have been confirmed by DNA are likely to be admitted (subject to our DNA expert's final review) there is no need to address admissions that concern the background processes to the final result. We have thus not attached any responses to this batch of proposed admissions.

5. Nos. 352-479 (Military orders)

We have attached our admissions to the military orders.

6. Nos. 480-651 (Forensics - body by body, part 1)

As noted above, we have in the attached document indicated on a provisional basis which identities are admitted. We have not addressed any admissions concerning the background processes to these identifications. In addition, as stated above, no admissions are made as regards Serb activities, except those set out in our response to batch 3 above (144-259).

7. Nos. 652-729 (Military meetings and documents)

These proposed admissions were only served on us on 22 December 2006. As a result, we are still taking instructions in respect of them and will endeavour to respond to them as soon as possible.

8. Nos. 730-846 (Forensics - body by body, part 2)

As above, in respect of part 1 of the body by body proposed admissions.

9. Nos. 847-855 (Military meetings and documents)

These proposed admissions were only served on us on 2 January 2007. As a result, we are still taking instructions in respect of them and will endeavour to respond to them as soon as possible.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX C
RULE 65 TER 220: TRANSCRIPT OF 5 SEPTEMBER 2001 INTERVIEW OF RAMUSH HARADINAJ BY MARLENE SCHNEIPER

/SIDE A/

Marlene SCHNEIPER: I would like to first find out a little bit of biographical information, when were you born and where and how did you find your way to Switzerland, can you tell me?
Ramush HARADINAJ: I was born on 3 July '68.
M.S.: Yes?
R.H.: In a village called Glođani.
M.S.: Glođani?
R.H.: Glođani.
M.S.: And?
R.H.: Which is in the Dečani municipality, in the western region, near Albania, twenty kilometres from the border.
M.S.: Yes. It's between Peć and Đakovica?
R.H.: And Đakovica. I attended primary school in a neighbouring village - eight grades of primary school - which at the time was called Irznić. Now this village is called Rezar.
M.S.: Resa?
R.H.: Rezar. Rezar. And after I also attended two years of gymnasium also in Irznić and two years of gymnasium in a school...how do we call that...also gymnasium, in the subject of physics in Đakovica. In the school in /unintelligible/, which is how it was called at the time.
M.S.: /?And this physics school, what is that/? You did some sort of sports training?
R.H.: No, that...that was in science, physics, so applied physics and everything that falls under that. It was preparatory because I wanted to study astronomy and this was preparation, because from there on...it was a precondition for studying astronomy later and so I went into physics. It was in the domain of science, there was mathematics, physics and other subjects like biology, medicine and I decided on physics. I studied this for two years. I applied to study here in Priština. I was registered.
M.S.: When was this?
R.H.: '87.
M.S.: '87.
R.H.: But before this, between '86-'87, in the summer, in the summer of '86, sorry, before finishing gymnasium, I went to Switzerland for three weeks /unintelligible/ the Vaud Canton I believe, in Valée /unintelligible/. It was hard to find work at that time and to study in a foreign country. I was able to organise this trip because my mother's two brothers, who had already emigrated to Switzerland for financial reasons and lived there...
M.S.: In that village?
R.H.: One in Villeneuve and the other in Lausanne.
M.S.: They worked in?
R.H.: Carpentry. The two were carpenters. Carpenters in the /unintelligible/ in Lausanne.
M.S.: Why did you choose to go to a foreign country at that time, was it because...
R.H.: There were two reasons. The first reason was financial.
M.S.: Yes?
R.H.: Because our financial situation wasn't good. And the second reason is because my family was in a difficult position with regards to the government, which is why I

couldn't continue my studies here in Kosovo, because my political situation wasn't good as I was part of a family whose members had served prison time and had trouble with the government and I did not receive permission to study.
M.S.: And your family was a family of…you had a farm /?or something/?
R.H.: /unintelligible/ firstly, our /unintelligible/ a family of villagers who took care of /unintelligible/ we had cows, sheep and everything else that village families have. After a while, /?about 20 years ago/ my father had a store in a neighbouring village. Even though the store was state owned, my father was still the owner and he worked there on his own, and occasionally with us too and other family members, like one of his uncles who helped him out during a period of time. However, my father had to close the business down.
M.S.: It was a store for what?
R.H.: A grocery store. He had everything in there, even /unintelligible/ it was one of the biggest stores in the region at the time, but they were all the same, there was no difference. But I remember that I would go there often during summer vacation and in the afternoons, sometimes in the mornings, to work a bit and earn some pocket money.
M.S.: Are your brothers still in Switzerland?
R.H.: No, I am the only family member in Switzerland, I didn't bring anyone else with me later. I was the first to live here. It was my mother's brothers, these are my uncles, who were there. There were two of them and one came back with me and is now in Kosovo. He had family here in Switzerland, his wife too, but now they have returned to Kosovo.
M.S.: And you, at that time, you had the opportunity to go to Switzerland obviously?
R.H.: I came for the first time in 1986. 1987-88, after finishing gymnasium, I joined the army, the Yugoslav Army, as a volunteer, a volunteer you know, because this was also a condition. Before completing the army, the government /unintelligible/ that I have a passport before serving in the army. In any case, I received the passport thanks to a student competition. A competition…a championship of mathematicians and physicist was to be held in Bulgaria, it was the socialist Balkan countries that were organising this championship, and I was chosen as one of the participants, which helped me to obtain a passport because it was…it's a bit strange because in principle, I could not obtain a Yugoslav passport. Afterwards, I /unintelligible/ that, but since I had not served compulsory military service, there was always a chance that they would come across me and say you cannot exit or enter because you did not serve compulsory military service. I planned on serving my military service first, quickly before things in Kosovo changed. After completing my compulsory military service, I was not able to attend university in Priština as a regular student due to my family's participation. From there on, in 1988, I again planned to go to a foreign country, Switzerland, but I was only able to go in 1989, in the spring, because there was no work during the /?winter/ in Switzerland, so I went there in 1989.

M.S.: So did you come here as a seasonal worker or…
R.H.: I came because I was a student registered here, I had…it was more the case of a student coming to Switzerland with the purpose of working and studying. And here, it was easier to find work for three months or four if you had the status of a student. It was not a direct permit, but as a student, they gave you work /unintelligible/ there was an agreement with the municipality, they paid you less /unintelligible/ the others who worked in the summer. And me, I started out like this, but with /unintelligible/ I could

not afford to pay for school. So during 12 months, I was also looking at the possibility of France, but it was also expensive. Italy was less expensive but more complicated so I applied for a work permit and got it, at the time I believe it was /unintelligible/ four months – three months as a student and then the first seasonal permit, /?which was valid for four months/, because as a student I only had the right for three months of work I think. Afterwards, I did another four months, so that makes seven months of work in one year in /?household/ carpentry, which is not a small sum.

M.S.: Did you always change the type of work you did?

R.H.: No, not really. I did not really want to change but the /unintelligible/ where I worked for a while was sold and it became a /unintelligible/, so it had gone bankrupt. /unintelligible/ unfortunately and afterwards I did /unintelligible/ because from the moment we started working, our company was able to /unintelligible/ and work with other companies. For example, we dealt with the woodwork while the other company dealt with water and heating and the rest. So I directly crossed over into another company also in Lausanne, which was quite close to ours and we had often worked with them on the same /?houses/ /unintelligible/ I worked on the /?roofs/, plumbing and heating. So with them we had /unintelligible/ frequently on the same /?houses/, and at the same locations where I had worked before.

M.S.: So every time you learnt err…

R.H.: Yes, yes, it was rather good /unintelligible/ for one to spend three years in /unintelligible/ and carpentry. I managed to become one of the /unintelligible/, one of the workers who could work on his own and not for a company. But I could go alone to the building site and work on my own, also on the heating and plumbing. I was not an expert, but I was good help /unintelligible/ so I could often, after the three months on my own /unintelligible/ of our company and carry out all the projects. During this time, I was involved in sports so for me it was races, running, walking, hiking; I was attracted to anything that involved sports. /?I did this/ in Switzerland, all the slopes like /unintelligible/, that's at…that's at, I think at 1,800 metres from /unintelligible/, no, it's at 2, 200 metres from /unintelligible/. I did it /unintelligible/, I went down various mountain slopes, valleys /unintelligible/ and I also, after running, I did the 100 kilometre…100 kilometre /unintelligible/ where I came in 18th, but it was a long stretch, over 10 hours. I also did the /unintelligible/ 100 kilometres and also there, my record wasn't great so I came in amongst the first 30 in two hours, but the time wasn't great. That's how it was and I was also very passionate about martial arts. I practiced /unintelligible/ karate, that was in Switzerland, I was a member of the /unintelligible/ karate federation and I also took part in the Swiss championships.

M.S.: And you are, err…you always lived in Lausanne?

R.H.: Mostly in Lausanne. So this was my…our company moved to /unintelligible/ towards the north, at the Swiss border. I stayed there about six weeks, there was a large /?building site/ there where I lived. But it was mostly Lausanne, that's the place I like most.

M.S.: And you worked at a disco also?

R.H.: Yes, before. I started off as a bouncer, maybe you remember the rock festival in Lausanne and…

M.S.: Yes, yes.

R.H.: These were rock concerts, in classic venues, and since I was athletic and also practiced martial arts, the organisers and the people who were in charge of everything began to ask me to help out /unintelligible/, /to man the cash registers/, to take care of merchandise, and things like that so that nothing would happen because of the crowds

around and everything. So I began to be called by people for parties, like there were live music nights and /?others/ in the disco in Lausanne, because Lausanne was a student town.
M.S.: Yes.
R.H.: Also, through participation in sports, I had good relations with a lot of other students from foreign schools who were there and it was…I provided security for discos in Lausanne. First it was in /unintelligible/, and then after it was Club 94. The /unintelligible/ was a long time ago, it was a /unintelligible/ discotheque.
M.S.: Oh, so they put you in front of the door with your Albanian /unintelligible/?
R.H.: I was…I did my job and… I have to say, I have to say that it was not the type of discotheque like big cities have, it was more intimate. Sometimes there was trouble, but nothing serious, and everything went well, and so…I was well liked by people who came, by the clients, and by the owners, and also by the police, who would buy me coffee in the morning because they hadn't been called for problems in the disco and had slept well. They bought me coffee because they were satisfied.
M.S.: And did you already have a Finnish girlfriend at that time?
R.H.: Yes, in /?85/, I met a girl who was a student. During the time I was in Switzerland /unintelligible/ where all the people were staying, and since Lausanne was a tourist town, there are 2,000 permanent inhabitants and there are always tourists and people who come to visit for a while. So for me as well, life after work consisted of friends in Lausanne and /?people getting together/. But I met a girl who was rather serious, from a good family and who was somewhat different from the other girls so to speak and we became a couple and lived together later on.
M.S.: Did she come to Switzerland as a student?
R.H.: Yes, she was a student at a hotelier school.
M.S.: /unintelligible/
R.H.: /?In Lausanne/. But it really helped me have a /?more defined/ identity at the time if you will.
M.S.: May I know what her name was?
R.H.: Her name? CARLSONN, Joanna is her first name and her last name is CARLSONN.
M.S.: CARLSONN?
R.H.: /unintelligible/ a book and there are also photos and things like that.
M.S.: Yes, yes, yes. And then you…she is…you got married at a certain point or she stayed…
R.H.: No, the situation was like this. We were not married, we lived together, we were good friends, sometimes we had /unintelligible/ one year, nine months, but it happened that we got back together again for good. When I returned to Kosovo in May of /?97/ I lost one of my brothers upon my return to Kosovo, at the border with Albania. I lost this brother during combat at that time. From that moment on, I often thought of my family, what would happen to my father and so on. I eventually suggested she go and live her life because it was impossible for me to live a regular life…
M.S.: And /?she/ remained in Lausanne?
R.H.: Yes, she was studying in Lausanne and continued because /unintelligible/ with semesters, and after the semesters they have internships and go and work somewhere. So there are four semesters that last more than three years.
M.S.: Yes?

R.H.: Like, like, like school…Two years and /unintelligible/ and then after some time, I came back here but she /unintelligible/. She also came back here.
M.S.: Was she there during the war?
R.H.: Yes, she came at the end of November '98 and stayed until the end of June. /?So she was there until the end of November/.
M.S.: Was she /unintelligible/
R.H.: Always with me.
M.S.: And?
R.H.: And during the war, she became pregnant and the baby was born after the war. In November '99, she needed…she felt the baby/unintelligible/, I don't exactly know in what month and since Kosovo didn't yet have a health system and all, I suggested she go to her country to see what the procedure is and all. And we never saw each other after that.
M.S.: Really?
R.H.: We spoke.
M.S.: But it was after /unintelligible/ she became pregnant?
R.H.: Yes, we had the baby err…it is a child we have together and I gave my name and accepted it was my son, I accepted paternity, that it's my son, our son, but we're not married. The son was born in March 2000 and is a year old now.
M.S.: March 2000?
R.H.: Yes. A year and four months.
M.S.: Where was he born?
R.H.: In Finland, in /unintelligible/, where she's from. But since they are a family where the /?father and the mother/ both take care of this son, it's also a /unintelligible/ so they take care of her and the child. And since I was always like this, running around, doing what I was doing…I don't know…but /?I think I'll go see him/ now at Christmas… for Christmas /unintelligible/.
M.S.: What is the son's name?
R.H.: Shkëlzen. Shkëlzen. It's…
M.S.: Shkëlzen?
R.H.: Shkëlzen, she named him after one of my brothers who was killed in the war.
Male Voice: Have you seen him?
R.H.: No, no, photos, videos but not /unintelligible/.
M.S.: So then…you did not…err…there was no direct break-up, it was more that…
R.H.: Err…it's a different lifestyle so to speak, she's more of a family girl /unintelligible/ from my family /unintelligible/ in her life while I , my life is more career-oriented, I wanted to pursue my political projects /unintelligible/ and all that …
M.S.: It's hard for her…
R.H.: Yes, what we want out of life is completely different from each other. So if I changed, became a bit more stable, maybe things would have changed, but it's not certain they would have.
M.S.: So Western women are a bit difficult to handle for Kosovars?
R.H.: For me, she will always remain a good friend. It's not that I love someone else, that I'm thinking about someone else. I think about her, she's really a friend, she's my friend. It's a different lifestyle that forced us to be like this.
M.S.: Yes, yes, yes. And so err…when you yourself, you…you later became one of the KLA commanders, it was…how did you join the KLA?
R.H.: /unintelligible/ all the time, because my family, like I told you before, was not in good relations with the state. We always had problems, there was prison

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/unintelligible/ we were always maltreated by the government. We were deprived of work, studying, benefits that /unintelligible/ given. My father was also frequently threatened at work, and had a difficult situation. For me, the government was definitely an enemy, so it was something that I abandoned just like that. In '98, there was a protest one time by the /unintelligible/ because I, like I said, I came to Kosovo and there was a protest, and I was arrested and brutally treated /?even if I was/ not taking part in this protest. But because of this protest…and from then on, we began to think of the war in Croatia, and we thought that the same thing would happen to us and we were closer to that. But /unintelligible/ once /?I/ came from Albania illegally, had to cross the Albanian border into the former Yugoslavia on foot.
M.S.: May I ask you a question, at that time in Switzerland, you were never…you did not have the status of a political refugee?
R.H.: No, no, I never asked for it.
M.S.: So at that time, you…
R.H.: I came from Kosovo as a seasonal worker. I had the /?B/ permit, which allowed me to stay there, to travel and…
M.S.: And at that time, since you crossed over illegally…
R.H.: I arrived to Albania /unintelligible/ regularly, but from there I crossed over illegally to go to the house. I hiked for 30 kilometres over mountains, and then I stayed with my father and my mother for two or three days and then I returned because /unintelligible/ the Serbs were more vicious.
M.S.: Yes. You passed through Morina?
R.H.: Yes, near…near…Qafa e…Rrasa e Zogut…it's above Morina, to the right, in Albania, to the right of the mountain.
M.S.: And then?
R.H.: We came there and…it was a feeling that had to be acknowledged…that if the police came to the house, if they arrested you, the feeling was that you had to use weapons to respond. This is how it began more or less.
M.S.: The KLA /?appeared/ in '93 or around that time?
R.H.: It was more in '94. The idea was always there, there were always armed groups in Kosovo who would not only settle for an agreement with the government. During the time of Tito, there were arrests, people who were killed. My for my family for example, that feeling was already present in '91.
M.S.: Yes.
R.H.: My family had weapons and we were not in agreement with what was going on. That's how it started. In addition, a relative of our family was also maltreated by the government and felt the same, that's how it err…the message came that we needed an armed movement.
M.S.: Yes, yes. So then you…you…you started…at that time you formed a /?political party/ in Switzerland?
R.H.: Yes, in Switzerland.
M.S.: At what time?
R.H.: I think it was in 95, 96.
M.S.: It was only after that that you…
R.H.: No, there was a people's movement in Switzerland.
M.S.: It was the LPK, right?
R.H.: Yes, the same community /unintelligible/.
M.S.: You became a member of this…

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R.H.: Yes, I became a member of the LPK. I was not politically active in Switzerland. I don't like that environment very much. But after, since I was linked to /unintelligible/ of my family, I was looking at who was more serious. In looking at the LPK, sometimes, the positions they took, they seemed to me to be the most serious. But at the moment I became a member, I didn't like it very much because most of them…they were not well raised, and me I call that /unintelligible/. There were people who were very honest, sincere. There were also people who could talk for long periods of time, drink tea, smoke cigarettes /unintelligible/ days and are…are…
M.S.: And you did not like that?
R.H.: I did not like that /unintelligible/
M.S.: There was also a type of /unintelligible/ somewhere?
R.H.: It wasn't err…before it was /?more/. But at the time when I became a member, that wasn't the reason why I…for example, they were too soft-line. They spoke of grand theories, and there was nothing on paper, it was mostly discussion, discussion and then at the end of the day everyone goes back to their homes. It seemed to me to be too utopian, the way they did this.
M.S.: And then?
R.H.: Then, because I had come home, I therefore felt closer to the needs of the armed movement in Kosovo than I did to the LPK in Switzerland. So I /?did not/ advance because they were not supportive /unintelligible/ becoming a member of the LPK presidency and all that. I held on to my ties with Kosovo and my family because I was the only one /?who returned to Kosovo/. I arrived. I was well informed, I knew the mountains and I was brave. I went to Tirana, where I spent two or three days. I had bought an apartment, a small one, 46 square metres in an old neighbourhood of Tirana. I had bought this in one of the /unintelligible/, it was one of the /?unintelligible/ of /unintelligible/ of Albania. It was one of the /unintelligible/ that was treated badly during the time of the government. There was a small apartment of 44 square metres. But after the government changed, we received the…the…the property from the state and they sold that at a very good price. It was by accident that…that I met her, it was in…in /?'88/, September and I had /unintelligible/ for three days. The fourth day, jeans and /unintelligible/, a Gortex jacket. I crossed through the mountains and arrived home in three days /unintelligible/ something /unintelligible/ happened to me. And then we all gathered to carefully discuss, like we should, how to go about creating a force to respond to the Serb police and army.

M.S.: It's you…do you consider yourself as one of the founders of the KLA?
R.H.: I am one of them, that's right.
M.S.: So you met directly with Adem JASHARI and…
R.H.: No, the KLA had three bases in Kosovo that were spontaneously created at the same time.
M.S.: Yes?
R.H.: One was in Llap, in the region of Podujevo, /unintelligible/ one was in Belince, in /?the region of/ Prekazi, the same thing, and one was from where I come from, Glodani, Dečane, Jablanica, the region of Dukagjini.
M.S.: Yes, yes, yes.
R.H. I was one of the three commanders at the time.
M.S.: So there were only three regions and three commanders, without any…
R.H.: There were three regions that were relevant for the KLA.
M.S.: Yes?

R.H.: And three armed groups that were important to the KLA. In this case, three co-ordinators, or rather commanders, who could…who were people who…who were expected to…who could not give orders but who could put things in order so to speak. For example, /unintelligible/ armed groups in Dukagjini co-operated with armed groups in Jablanica and armed groups in Llap.
M.S.: Alright, so you /?did not/ have armed groups but the will of the armed groups /unintelligible/?
R.H.: In /'91/ people in all the regions of Kosovo no longer wanted to protest.
M.S.: Yes?
R.H.: Because protests were /?over/.
M.S.: It was THAÇI at that time…
R.H.: No, no, THAÇI was one of those who came later. It was rather Fehmi JASHARI and Fehmi LLUSHTAKU /unintelligible/ who had problems later on, afterwards it was mostly that. THAÇI was more of an activist, one of the people close to the LPK. But if we want /unintelligible/ the LPK /unintelligible/ Azem SYLA, that THAÇI saw himself as /unintelligible/ to send to meet the KLA in /unintelligible/. He was not the /?leader/ of the armed groups, THAÇI, everyone here says that but he wasn't. He was one of the first that the LPK recruited, and he gave himself the right to represent the Kosovo Liberation Army. Politically speaking, if you will, it was him who began…
M.S.: When did you meet him for the first time?
R.H.: THAÇI, I think it was in May 1998, during the war.
M.S.: Only?
R.H.: Only. I had never met him before.
M.S.: But…
R.H.: Prior to meeting him…
M.S.: You told me that it was in '93 that the KLA was founded? You said in '93?
R.H.: No, '94.
M.S.: It was here?
R.H.: No, I told you that armed groups existed in '93. Some of them knew about each other, but they were not related. Sometimes there was competition between them here in Kosovo.
M.S.: It was in…
R.H.: There was an idea in '93 for these armed groups to carry names. For example, the Jusuf Gërvalla unit, the unit of another name, the Drenica unit, the Llap unit or the Dukagjini unit. And there was a discussion regarding this in '94, it was in the autumn of '94, there was an agreement /unintelligible/ Ali AHMETI was one of the people who had worked very hard, which /unintelligible/ DEÇANI, and there were others, Fazli VELIU, the LPK that was in Switzerland. It was people like that who were closer and who had suggested that these armed groups not take individual names but to be called by a collective name: the Kosovo Liberation Army.
M.S.: Yes, yes.
R.H.: It was a name that was rather…if stupid to call a group an army, but /unintelligible/ and that was it.
M.S.: But you took part in operations?
R.H.: Not no personally. But my brother Luan, who was killed in…
M.S.: Luan?

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R.H.: Luan. Luan. Luan. Like lion, in Albanian it means lion. He was one of the first. Luan and Shkëlzen, two of my brothers who were killed. He was also one of the first people who also began /?armed operations/ en '93, '94.
M.S.: And then he was killed…
R.H.: In '97, in May, in an ambush in the mountain, on the way back from Albania. I was with him at the time. And then in '99, my second brother, Shkëlzen was killed in /unintelligible/ in '99 during the bombings, while protecting civilians. Our family members were in a valley and the paramilitary forces knew that there were children and women there and wanted to go in and so there was a battle, a very difficult one because our positions weren't good. At the time I lost 12 of my soldiers, my brother was one of the most important.
M.S.: Shkëlzen?
R.H.: Shkëlzen, yes.
M.S.: So afterwards you decided to replace him?
R.H.: My brother?
M.S.: Yes.
R.H.: It was more the family /unintelligible/.
M.S.: But then you became, more or less, a professional soldier?
R.H.: I had my first education in the Yugoslav Army. I was there /unintelligible/ for a lengthy period of time /unintelligible/ and I commanded 30 persons. Afterwards I /?gained/ knowledge, I was interested in sports, security work, I worked as a security guard, a body guard and step by step also military doctrine and I was also interested in the Swiss Army – in the literature, not the training. And I was also interested in bodyguard training and other types of training, not only in Switzerland but also in France. In '97, I also worked with a military expert from the Albanian army. In '98, I was /unintelligible/.
M.S.: In '98 you came to stay here or you retuned?
R.H.: I left the moment the war started and stayed until it finished.
M.S.: Was this after the Spring of /unintelligible/ ?
R.H.: Yes.
M.S.: So then after that you came back and you stayed?
R.H.: Yes, the whole time. There was an attempt against our family as well, on 24 March '98, while I was with my family. We retaliated and in the process I lost my cousin. He was 16. It was on 24 March '98 – it was my family, in my village. I also lost another two cousins and that's how open warfare began where we lived. The difference was that we didn't retaliate like /unintelligible/ for three days. We retaliated from the house itself for two hours and then clashed with the Serbs. My mother and the children ran off in different directions and we retaliated from different directions and that's how our family was saved. It was the same scenario. You'll see from my book, which I'll give you, there's an English version, that it was the same scenario but our response to it was not the same. The Serbs were prepared to do the same thing but we were not that brave so we did /unintelligible/.
M.S.: And did you kill /unintelligible/?
R.H.: Yes.
M.S.: During the war?
R.H.: Yes. I organised operations against the Serbs forces that were successful. On many occasions I was the commander of the /unintelligible/ armed operations. I saw that the Serb forces were attacking us and we withdrew /unintelligible/ and we

organised. I personally never saw anyone that I killed, but I do know that the units I commanded were very strong against the Serb forces.
M.S.: So you're not afraid of being called a /unintelligible/?
R.H.: No, no.
M.S.: Why?
R.H.: There's no /?reason/. It was a war of liberation against armed forces /?that killed/ and materially /unintelligible/ were armed forces. These armed forces killed civilians, and we retaliated against them because these were not Serb citizens from our land that were on the frontlines, these were armed forces, paramilitary forces. This was not a civil war like elsewhere. This was a war of armed forces from one state who came to kill people and these people then retaliated and I am very proud of what I did.
M.S.: Where was your…I think you can tell me this, where was your /?base/ during the war?
R.H.: Peć, Dečane, Đakovica, up until the region of Klina. I was there the whole time. From March '98 to June '99, 15 months of open warfare, I was there face to face with the Serbs.
M.S.: So you knew…you received at that time that a sort of paper from Switzerland a permit?
R.H.: No, I sent a letter to the Swiss municipality…in '98 I sent a fax to the Lausanne municipality in which I sent my best wishes for the 1st of August and I told them that for these reasons, because they had sent a letter to my apartment saying that it was time to renew my permit and so I sent my best wishes for the 1st of August, it was a satellite fax /unintelligible/ and I said that for reasons that concern the future of my country I have decided to return to Kosovo, that I thank them and that I no longer needed papers to return to Switzerland.
M.S.: And since that time, have you visited Switzerland?
R.H.: Yes, a few times, yes.
M.S.: Yes?
R.H.: I have returned to Lausanne three times.
M.S.: But as a traveller?
R.H.: As a tourist.
M.S.: But your /?mother/, your family…some of your family, as you've said, is there still?
R.H.: Yes, still. Everyone is still there, my mother, we are still five brothers, we were seven before, I have three sisters, my father and mother are in /?my/ village.
M.S.: And do they want to stay there?
R.H.: Yes, yes. They are in Kosovo and they'll stay there.
M.S.: In Kosovo?
R.H.: Yes, yes. They are not in Switzerland. I have many Swiss friends still /unintelligible/ who like me very much.
M.S.: But contrary to THAÇI, were /?people/ aware of your role in Switzerland, at least in a small circle, because I…I…I.. see that when THAÇI /unintelligible/ no one, not even people who were close to him knew, while you /unintelligible/?
R.H.: It was very open. I represented Lausanne in races and my name was publicly known and later on I trained…I gave courses in physical education…
M.S.: Yes?
R.H.: For football clubs in Lausanne, hockey clubs in Lausanne, I had a martial arts school in Lausanne and I was someone who was well known. The first time I came back to Lausanne, people were crying when they saw me /unintelligible/. In a way,

Lausanne is my second village /unintelligible/. So Lausanne is a place I like well, Switzerland. /unintelligible/
Male Voice: For the second part, is it possible for you to /unintelligible/ because there is a problem with the /unintelligible/.
M.S.: So then, later, THAÇI accepted the disarmament of the KLA, after Rambouillet and everything that took place, I don't know if it was in September or… were you in agreement with that?
R.H.: We had already had plan for disarmament and transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army after the war. Even before Rambouillet I had a draft on how to put an end to the war. It would be /?with/ international presence and we wanted to /unintelligible/ people to help the country. Because for us, a change…for example, if the Serb forces went beyond Kosovo, especially before this /unintelligible/ after the war, for us it was already a victory if the international forces came and then we could ask them questions about security.
M.S.: If I understood well, there were different wings and THAÇI had some difficulty with the different fractions of the LPK for example?
R.H.: The only problem was that he did not know how to work with all those different people. He ignored the people and the people did not even know what was going on. For example, when I was on the terrain, I did not receive any information from Mr. THAÇI. It was someone completely different who was informing me on what happened at Rambouillet. It was the international observers who came daily and /unintelligible/ and he…he did not adequately inform the people about what was going on. So this was also the difficulty because the people did not know what he wanted or what he was doing.
M.S.: Yes, but nevertheless, there were…there were extreme fractions who were not in agreement, who already envisaged themselves as Kosovo's future army...
R.H.: We still see ourselves as the future army, but it's not a liberation army. We are not looking to liberate Kosovo again, we've already done that. But we are the foundation for a future army. So all those who wanted something, wanted that – nothing more and nothing less. But I cannot /unintelligible/ everything that was less important than that.
M.S.: Yes, but for example, if you see in Macedonia and in Switzerland, Mr. VELIU and all that, who…who…who…speaks of the KLA's legacy, we're talking about the current KLA, who presents himself as being one of the KLA founders and that the KLA will continue to fight until all the Albanians have been liberated.
R.H.: I think that the KLA in Macedonia have a political platform that it very close to what the political party in Macedonia wants. Their platform is not to join all the Albanians together. There will always be individuals who have dreams, but those are not our plans so I don't think that we are working towards those goals either here in Kosovo or in Macedonia. We /unintelligible/ people like everyone else /unintelligible/.
M.S.: And that famous /?incident/ in July 2000 with the /?MUSAJ/ brothers, were you armed at that time?
R.H.: Yes.
M.S.: /unintelligible/ 40 /unintelligible/?
R.H.: No that is people's imagination. It was my father, two drivers and I.
M.S.: Were you armed?
R.H.: Yes. And only one of them was there and the other was in the vehicle. And yes, I had a pistol.

M.S.: But were you authorised at the time to carry a weapon?
R.H.: Even today I have that authorisation and I have a bodyguard.
M.S.: Yes but you had gone directly to this farm to …
R.H.: In a country where there is no law and no police /unintelligible/
M.S.: Yes but why had you gone.
R.H.: I had gone there to tell them they were not to go and see my father anymore and ask him anything. /?He is an ordinary citizen/ and I don't have police or anyone…
M.S.: It was blood vengeance?
R.H.: They went…they went to my father's, /?for 12 years/ they were going to my father saying they lost one of their brothers and that they think my father knew what happened to him. /unintelligible/ at my father's, and he had lost two of his sons in the war /unintelligible/.
M.S.: But you father was not the one who killed them?
R.H.: No. He is a 56 year-old man /unintelligible/.

/SIDE B/
R.H.: He's someone who does not deserve to be treated that way and I told them that if they had something to come to me, to come to Priština or elsewhere, don't go to my family anymore. This family had never been treated like this and so it's their honour that is in question and no one wants something like this.
M.S.: So it was three of you?
R.H.: Yes, yes.
M.S.: So it was you that had the grenade?
R.H.: No, it was one of the others who had thrown a grenade at us, one of the brothers.
M.S.: Yes?
R.H.: We went, as it was tradition, we arrived near the house and called them and instead of an answer I got a grenade. A grenade was thrown at me.
M.S.: So you don't consider a society with blood vengeance ideal?
R.H.: No, not at all. But I also don't want a system where citizens who have ties with the mafia should be free to do what they want in a society. There are rules that should be respected and there are nevertheless /unintelligible/ that should be taken into account. At that time there was no police and imagine that someone who has made all sorts of sacrifices for this country and these people…during the war I lost two brothers and three members of my family, I was wounded four times and then people who are involved in all that is wrong in Europe, and in Switzerland – drugs, trafficking – your police was after these people and then they come here today and co-operate with the Montenegrin mafia and they come and bother my family. They can't do that, I won't let them. And me…I had no one that could help me. There was no police at the time who could help me at the time because these international policemen /unintelligible/. That was the situation. /?That's why it happens/. No one wants to live in that type of society. /Unintelligible/ because anyone that comes now who has served prison time and comes here and says here are the rules we're imposing on you. We don't want to be bothered, it's only logical.
M.S.: Did you before…three months ago or something like that, in March I believe, you founded the Alliance?
R.H.: In May.
M.S.: May, yes. It seems to me that before you had hesitated and had thought for a while to ally yourself with THAÇI or /unintelligible/ perhaps?

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R.H.: No I had never wanted that.
M.S.: Never? So you always had the idea to form your own party?
R.H.: /unintelligible/ I wanted to stay in the /?TMK/, I was the deputy of the Kosovo Protection Corps, because I saw what our politicians were doing and I said that we could not just leave things as they are. They were quarrelling amongst each other and not doing anything for the people of Kosovo.
M.S.: Yes, so your…there are three parties there I believe, right?
R.H.: Yes. /unintelligible/ Alliance, at the branch level in the municipalities, we had presidential elections and they were all elected, it's not a coalition of parties. We are very…so the /unintelligible/ but we are a political party with people who have various experience, /unintelligible/ Mr. /?BAKALLI/ the former president of Kosovo and one of the vice presidents of Yugoslavia at the time of Tito, until /unintelligible/ finished studies at 25.
M.S.: And what are the essential things for you with regards to your party, this party?
R.H.: Transparency and /?proof/…
M.S.: Transparency?
R.H.: Transparency in that sense that no one knows where we are at the moment and I don't want to see…for example, Kosovo still has no driving permits. The citizen cannot get a driving permit. We want to see a transformation in property ownership, privatization and we want to do more for our /?community/.
M.S.: Speaking in Swiss or Finnish terms, to what model would you adapt your party to?
R.H.: I want a realist and pragmatic party. A party that applies itself and that is capable, which is not into dreams but is close to reality /unintelligible/ which /unintelligible/ really. Parties have great demands: independence, liberty, everything but they don't apply themselves. We want a party that /unintelligible/ which has /unintelligible/ in the interior and which is able to apply itself to the needs of our society. So I don't have a model yet, like for example a Swiss party, but I do want a model of Swiss governance, and I would like a Kosovo where the government and the administration are efficient. I know that sometimes you also complain about your administration but when looked at from here it seems perfect. Your state functions perfectly and we want to do the same.
M.S.: And what is Switzerland for you today?
R.H.: It's a country I like very much, also a /unintelligible/ I like very much, it's a /?place/ that has done much for /unintelligible/ and for others as well. What I really like here is the work ethic – the people are hard-working, there's no time for walking about and I like that very much.
M.S.: The ensemble of minority cultures and all that?
R.H.: The way in which /unintelligible/ is organised is also interesting. It's very… I have never studied Switzerland, I was always close but I studied the area where I lived but I like the way…
M.S.: The efficiency…
R.H.: The efficiency in particular. And people work, /unintelligible/ there is a lot of energy, it's a very rational state.
M.S.: And you see…because you lived in Valée…
R.H.: The Vaud canton.
M.S.: The Vaud canton yes, did you see a similarity? Are the two parts close?
R.H.: Yes, yes, in a way. For example, tradition has always been a part of you here, in Vaud, in Valée, in other regions and here there is also tradition. There is respect, there

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is nevertheless respect where you live, towards property and all that and here there is also an education of respect towards everything /?that is in front of us/ and in that case in Kosovo /unintelligible/ work ethic. I'm not talking about everywhere, but in general it's education, respect and work ethic.
M.S.: And your…your…where is your homeland in the sense that, is it Kosovo or is it anywhere you find yourself?
R.H.: Kosovo. Kosovo.
M.S.: And the village where you live?
R.H.: Yes, my village, my family /unintelligible/
M.S.: Your family…
R.H.: I come back once a week, I'm with my mother, my family. /?Every Sunday I have breakfast there with them/, in my village.
M.S.: You're very attached…
R.H.: Yes, I'm very close to my family.
M.S.: But this model of family and the village, do you think that large families can be imported into modern society?
R.H.: It is very modern. Very modern.
M.S.: Do you really think so?
R.H.: Yes, yes. Come and visit my family once, it's a very modern model. It's like an apartment building, where everyone has their own /unintelligible/ where they live and they have a common room where they drink tea and eat and it's very…
M.S.: It's everyone for themselves.
R.H.: It's his life, his corner but due to the difficult real estate situation here and also the economic one, people live together but it's very modern. It doesn't matter if you live on the seventh or the eight floor, it's the same thing. /Unintelligible/ in the villages, but it's very…tradition is not fanaticism, we like our culture and…for example if you come from my village, our culture is not the same as that in Priština. We do our part, we do everything, it's great, so why change it, we should preserve it!
M.S.: And your mother was not shocked when you came with a foreign woman?
R.H.: No. She was pleased, she was pleased. You know how it's like, people, no matter where they go, evolve in the environment where they are but /?remain with their logic working/. For example, in my family, the logic is that this girl was a good person, she can speak Albanian, she can speak another language, but if it's a good person…this is how we treat people.
M.S.: Why do you have so much money at the moment?
R.H.: Pardon?
M.S.: Why do you have so much money at the moment? You obviously have more money than …
R.H.: I /unintelligible/. We are a party in which people work. There are a lot of people, for example, who have come from foreign countries, from Switzerland, from /unintelligible/, from Germany. We have people who donate to our party, and not only members but /unintelligible/.
M.S.: You have /?built/ a house?
R.H.: Yes, a very nice house, big too…
M.S.: To support my family and my friends. It's not a house that would cost as much as it would in Switzerland, because a part of the work was not /unintelligible/ like it would be there.
M.S.: Nevertheless…

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R.H.: Nevertheless, it's a house that costs…if I would buy a house in those parts, like people do, it would cost twice as much than building this beautiful house. So this is not such a high price. At the moment, we've surpassed the 250,000 we've invested in the house, it /unintelligible/ of my family.
M.S.: And the property?
R.H.: It's the municipality that sold it /?to me/ and I paid for it.
M.S.: How much?
R.H.: 32,000 DM but total costs so far have been 250,000 DM, which is 210,000 Swiss Marks.
M.S.: They say you are involved in cigarette trafficking in the /?West/?
R.H.: That's what those who are involved say. They need an address and even the internationals are involved in that. /unintelligible/ those who are involved in that.
M.S.: There is a book I've just read during my vacation by Mr. Zafir /unintelligible/ that came out in Switzerland /unintelligible/ about the Albanian mafia in which the central theme is that weapons trafficking, dominated by the Albanian and Italian mafia /?profited from/ the KLA /unintelligible/ the KLA, which gave itself a patriotic image?
R.H.: Yes, yes, it's possible. Everyone profited from war except for those who in the war itself /unintelligible/.
M.S.: And you are not linked with these people who offered weapons?
R.H.: I was on the terrain for 15 months, and I never left. All those people who /unintelligible/ weapons were /unintelligible/ for me and I have accepted that, but it was correct. These people worked /unintelligible/
M.S.: The people who brought you weapons were soldiers?
R.H.: Yes, they were my soldiers who went to get an Albanian /unintelligible/.
M.S.: And you never asked them from where they got their weapons?
R.H.: Always, yes. Always, always. It was a KLA /?supply/ organisation who procured all /unintelligible/ Kosovo, but I personally didn't know who was on our side because I was always on the terrain.
M.S.: Did this interest you?
R.H.: Yes, it always interested me. /unintelligible/ for example Bosniaks, Albanians, everyone, /?but they were the best people for me/. They were the best because I needed that at the time. If I see them again, I'll take them out for coffee. It's someone who saved my life and the life of my people. For me /?they are people/. If today they are involved in trafficking, or act against society and the rules and laws that our society /?imposes/, it's obvious that /unintelligible/ cigarettes /unintelligible/ prison. But at that time they were good people for me…because /unintelligible/ the RUGOVA government did not help me while the Serbs could kill thousands of people. That's how it was. We thank all the people who were close to us and who found a way to help us, and all those who profited, what can I do? These were our people. /unintelligible/ but we can't do anything about it.
M.S.: Thank you.
R.H.: My pleasure. It was a pleasure, a pleasure.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX D
SEIZURE RECORDS OF INTERVIEW OF RAMUSH HARADINAJ BY MARLENE SCHNEIPER

Surrogate Sheet

AUDIO TAPE

Evidence Reference Number: T000-2619-T000-2619

Number of tapes: 1 Duration:

Type: AUDIO Submitter: WAESPI, Stefan

SYNOPSIS/DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE:

Title:

Title: Audio-recorded interview with HARADINAJ, Ramush; by swiss journalist SCHNIEPER, Marlene; dated 5 September 2001
Source Reference: N/A
Originator: SCNIEPER, Marlene;
Addresse: UNICTY - OTP
Number of pages: N/A
Summary:Digitilized copy of audio-recorded (original in magnetic support in custody of originator), interview of HARADINAJ, Ramush; by Swiss journalist SCHNIEPPER, Marlene; dated 5 of September 2001. Interview carried out in Pristina, language of interview is French. Contents summaried as follow: personal details, eduction, schools; stay in Switzerland (1989); has a kid (born March 2000) with his Finnish girlfriend (Joanna Carlsonn);military eduction (training in Albania in 1997 and also in France); 1995, returned to Kosovo on foot via Albania; UCK: he considers himself to be one of the founders - talks about the several stages of UCK's foundation - in March 1998 he took over local command was one of 3 regional bosses of UCK - initially, UCK was based on 3 bases (North/Podujevo; centre/Drenica; West Dukagjin);weaponry supplies; concedes that he has a lot of money but denies it's from cigaratte smuggling; talks about Rambouillet, post-war Kosovo and his relation to Rugova and, in particular, Thaci ; his brother Luan killed in 1997 in ambush;has not personally killed, but was present ; States "you cannot show mercy in war".

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX E
RULE 65 TER 40: NOTEBOOK SEIZED FROM THE HOME OF IDRIZ BALAJ

/U0083555/

/printed in English:/

CAMPUS

Notebook

/U0083556/

/written sideways:/

N. /word illegible/

19 June 2002

/U0083557/

Idriz BALAJ

/U0083558/

/Written on blank printed page of Turkish address book:/

Idriz BALAJ

23 August 1971

Gllareva

Klina

Kosovo

/U0083559/

/written on blank printed page of Turkish address book:/

Teuta BALAJ

/U0083560/

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I left Croatia. I went to Naim MALOKU's in Ljubljana. I met his deputy there, and he told me that Naim had left for Albania on that same day /from/ Ljubljana. I left for Albania the next day. In Albania, I got out of the plane and some lads met me. I remember their names. I met Mr. Naim MALOKU and Bislim ZYRAPI, representatives of the General Staff. We had some brief conversations about our work. Bislim ZYRAPI said to me, up to now you have been an officer in Croatia, from now on you will be in Kosovo. We talked to Bislim and then the next day I met Ilir KONUSHEVCI and two other lads who worked on /?supplies/. In the morning Bislim set off from Tirana. Together /word illegible/ we met with Gani /word illegible. He worked /?with weapons/, and with some other comrades and Gani and /word illegible/ KELMENDI we set off for Kosovo.

/U0083561/ /U0083561 – U0083565 evidently written by a different hand/

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At the beginning of April, the large convoy of about 100 armed soldiers with mules laden with weapons set off from the village of Viçidol in Tropoja. On this march were Fadil NIMANI, Agim ZENELI, aka Çergashi, Sami NIMANI from the village of Gërgoc, Xhevdet BRAHIMAJ, Gani ZENELI from the village of Jabllanica, Mujë BERISHA, and Ethem from Çeskova /written above by different hand: Këpuz/ etc. On this day, I joined the ranks of the KLA to set off for Kosovo for the first time. Idriz BALAJ, Sabri OSMANI from Prishtina. In the course of the same night we reached the stream above the village of Popoc we were well received and given a lot of help /by/ Ramë RAMA, Agron RAMA, and Sejdi RAMA (CIA), who accompanied us as far as Smolica. We rested here until the evening, when we set off for Jabllanica. When we arrived there we were welcomed by Lahi IBRAHIMAJ and some other lads. There they gave us help.

It was night by the time I entered Lahi IBRAHIMAJ's house, where Commander Ramush HARADINAJ was. He was wounded, but I did not recognise him /sentence as written/. His father Hilmi HARADINAJ, who cleaned the KLA's weapons, was also there.

After a while, at the same time, I met with Xhelal HAJDA (Toni) with whom I had fought in Croatia. He was hardworking and admired both by Commander

/U0083461/

Ramush HARADINAJ and the people. He was a hard worker and an outstanding serviceman in Croatia.

That night, we were tired and exhausted from our journey. We rested at Lahi IBRAHIMI's house and the next day we went to Naser IBRAHIMI's house, where the military premises were. I was the deputy commander of Toni (Xhelal HAJDA) and I was given the necessary duties, i.e. supervision of the guards, patrolling the guards, and supervising the trenches together with Commander Xheladin HAJDA (Toni) in the village of Jabllanica. During this time, I met with some other soldiers, such as Naser MORINA, who had arrived from the Netherlands. Maliq NDRECAJ had arrived from Germany. He was a hard worker and helped the army a lot. After a while Commander Ramush HARADINAJ made him commander of the 132nd /Brigade/ in the Dushkaja region. There was Ajet POTERA, then a solder, and now commander of the 2nd Guard Battalion in Llap. There was Fazli, Ilir /written above: FONIQI/, Cima /written above: LOÇANI/, and Bedri SHALA, Shaban SHALA's brother, who helped us and is a major general in the sixth zone, and many other comrades.

After a time, in the village of Jabllanica, I started training these lads for the command unit in the hills and fields. I trained them for several days and the order came from the commander for some lads to go to the village of Gllogjan.

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The question then was when we would leave. Evening came. Lahi IBRAHIMAJ and Commander Toni made up the numbers with some of the best lads there, Naser, Ajet, Ilir, Fazli, Pjetër, Sadik UKA, and some other lads who were with me and Musa. Bujar HARADINAJ's uncle led the way and took us to the village of Gllogjan. When we arrived there, we met with Commander Ramush HARADINAJ and Shkëlzen.

We rested that night and the next day at the house of Smajl HARADINAJ, father Nasim HARADINAJ, in Gllogjan. /sentence as written/ The next day, Commander Ramush HARADINAJ set off for weapons and when he returned they started to make plans for the work on the agenda.

I started to train some soldiers with the help of the commander, there in Gllogjan where Maliq NDRECAJ, Bedri SHALA, Naser BALAJ, Ajet POTERA, and many others were also officers.

We started to work and to prepare ourselves for war. We went to organize the villages for war. The first battle was in the in the village of Baballoq, where I was present in charge with the help of Commander Ramush, and than the battle started in Baballoq. Faik DODA was the organiser of the village of Baballoq and then we started to work in that village, digging trenches, training lads with automatic rifles and other heavy weapons.

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When I entered that village for the first time with Daut HARADINAJ, Nesim HARADINAJ, and some other fellow-fighters, whose names I do not remember, I was welcomed by Faik DODA, the representative of the village. The weather became cloudy, with rain. It was April. We could not dig trenches on that day. The next day we went to dig trenches, but Serbia had positioned its own scouts. I went to the hill of Baballoq and climbed up with Faik DODA and a prisoner /written above: Izet/ whose name I do not remember, from Gramaçel, and also Flamur from Jasiq. We returned to the village after a few hours, positioned the soldiers among the posts and two days later the war began in this village, where there were a lot of inhabitants. We sheltered the population among other villages and started fighting against Serbia. After a time, we began to extend the territory to Irzniq, Shaptej, Gramaçel, Prilep, Rastavica, Pozhar, Lumbardh, Lluka, and the Bitesh hill. In these places too, we fought with untrained men. We had difficulty preparing them for war but we were helped by Bedri SHALA, Maliq NDRECAJ, Naser ~~BALAJ~~ MORINA, Ilir FONIQI, Fazli, and many others lads, /and/ Ajet POTERA.

During this period, I, Idriz BALAJ (Togeri), thought that the "Special Unit" could exist within the framework of the Zone, to

/U0083565/

help the country, so we could damage the enemy. With the help of Commander Ramush HARADINAJ, the opportunity existed, and the request was granted for the creation of the Special Unit known as the "Black Eagles" headed by Togeri (Idriz BALAJ). This unit was formed on 14 April 1998 in the village of Gllogjan. In each village, I assembled some lads and trained them for the "Special Unit" with the help of Commander Ramush. This special unit took part in fierce fighting against the Serbo-Slave /"Serbo-Skllav", pun on "Slav"/ occupier. This unit included somewhere between 40 and 100 soldiers. This unit undertook many operations in Baballoq, Rastavica, Prilep, the Bitesh hill, Shaptej, Voksh, Lumbardh, Sllup, Drenoc, Loxha, by the stream of Gërvalla, Dubovik, and many other places.

~~This unit did a lot of work during the period of the war~~.

/U0083566/ 27 April 2000

27 April

KZOD ZOD TMK III

Working meeting

With Head of Command

From 1000 until 1/?1/30

1. Disciplinary /?Personnel/ up to Brigade
2. Enforcing Regulations. One officer
3. Parade for raising the flag.
4. Taking part /three words illegible/
5. Military secret 1 hour for soldiers

Brigades or battalions

ES /expansion unknown/ 1 Personnel

ES 2 Enforces approval of Commander

/words illegible/ of heads of headquarters

Commander Daut 21 visit house for meeting

24-hour guard duty

Plan /word illegible/ of building

/00083567/

Staff Council Daut /?head/

Deputy commander

Military Police 1.5 /?months/

0800-1600 new working hours

Parade GHQM /expansion unknown/

/U0083568/

/blank page/

KZOD

Working meeting

With commander of Zone of Plain of Dukagjin Gj. /?General/ D.H. /?Daut

HARADINAJ/

Last week /two words illegible/

From Istog, Deçan, Gjakova

Each photograph --- 5

Wednesday

Wednesday Agim ÇEKU /word illegible 12 o'clock

29 Gathering Junik /?19/ Istog

/U0083570/

/some scribbling/

/U0083571

22 May 2000

Working meeting

Working meeting

Next week Baballoq

/U0083572/

Working meeting 22 May 2000

Request

1. Bekim BERINGJIKU was 8 has now changed number 11, before 8

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2. Logistics of Command – Request

1. Bekim BERINGJIKU /a signature/
2. Hajdar VATAJ /a signature/
3. Visar ADEMI /a signature/
4. Sadik HASANAJ /a signature/
5. Riza GJEVGJEKAJ /a signature/
6. Lulzim UKAJ /a signature/

/U0083573/

TMK

29 May 2000

Working meeting

With Commander

Daut HARADINAJ KZOD

Next week Next Monday

Peja at Rasim AGUSHI's working meeting

This week George GIBSON

Obstruction of Military Police

As practised Ponoshec

/words illegible/ necessary

U0083574 /word illegible/

Working meeting

With officers of Guard and units, platoons

1. Beqir KRASNIQI
2. Azem /?ZENA/
3. Din SADRIJA

/U0083575/ 4 August 2000

Sherif SHABAN/?I/

/U0083583/ /pages U0083576-U0083583, evidently written by another hand, are presented in reverse order/

On 2 June 1998, at 1800 in the evening, I talked to Commander Ramush and rescuing a woman and an elderly man from the village of Lloqan.

We rescued Havë KASUMAJ and an 80-year-old man, the father of Zenel ~~Binak DUKAJ~~. Havë was wounded, and we took away the paralysed 80-year-old man with six members of the "Special Unit:, Idriz BALAJ – Togeri, Blerim Sahit LOKAJ, a martyr, Rexhep DACI, Agim RAMOSAJ – Gashi, Astrit BERISHA, Musë MALOKU. We carried the old man from the village of Lloçan on a stretcher, and carried Havë on our backs as far as the village of Drenoc, and then we took them by car to Gllogjan. It was 0100 in the morning.

2. The Second Offensive of September 1998

We were attacked from two directions, from Jabllanica and Carrabreg, and on this day we of the Special Unit fought at Post Three, while at Post Two Shkëlzen HARADINAJ and his unit had arrived. The order came to withdraw from Gllogjan. Shkëlzen arrived and told me that I had to withdraw with the entire military arsenal. I gave the *Gulinov* and the /word illegible/ to Daut and he went to Irzniq while Shkëlzen and I withdrew with our weapons from the Gllogjan meadows towards the canal

/U0083582/

from Irzniq five minutes before the Serbian forces entered Gllogjan, and there we met Ramush and reconnoitred the situation in the field. We fought fiercely with them and went down towards Ratisha e Epërme, by Lumbardh, were we set up guard posts at the Pozhar crossroads, by Lumbardh, Dashinoc, and Ratisha e Poshtme. We entered a house to rest a bit with Commander Ramush and some soldiers. At this time, Jabllanica had fallen and Male AGUSHI and Lahi IBRAMAJ informed us of this and asked for Ramush. Towards 0100 after 0100, all we members of the KLA got ready and on the commander's orders set off from the village of Lumbardh and arrived at Broliq. At the village of Broliq, we rested until morning and set guards until morning. In the morning, we set off from Broliq and went /?along the/ Bistrica. We rested near the Bistrica until evening with the KLA members. Daut and Maliq reconnoitred the terrain while Hilmi HARADINAJ and I drank coffee. Ramush and a soldier from the Special Unit went to look for Nazmi while I waited there until evening. The Serbian forces were 40 metres away from us. Then, after the situation had calmed a little, we set off towards Jabllanica on the order of Commander

/U0083581/

Ramush. About half way, we divided into two groups, myself with Daut /illegible word written above/ and the Special Unit. We travelled for about nine hours as far as Jabllanica. Near Jabllanica, we rested in the woods until morning. When we entered Jabllanica, Commander Ramush and some soldiers had already arrived at the Headquarters. I also thank Deli HAGJOCEN/?I/ for helping me to carry ammunition on this journey, because I had a lot.

We started to construct a kitchen for the cooks to prepare food, a little bread and a pepper. We started to keep someone on duty in the Headquarters, to carry out patrols, to set guards, and carry out reconnaissance, and within a certain time began to return life to normal. I had seven or eight lads, and during this time I had to maintain two posts at Kralan and at Jabllanica, "the Eagle's Post" /Pika e Shqiponjës/. After things were normalised, the number of men increased to 20 and then to 100 and from that time I started to work with the men I had, because, in a special unit, it was very difficult to keep military order.

-- The Gllogjan Operation –

Time passed and the men's morale began to improve. I saw that the lads were ready for an operation. Using their determination, we decided they would attack the village of Gllogjan, where Serbian forces

/U0083576/

with an extremely large arsenal were situated.

Our lads' high morale enabled them to cleanse the village from Serbian soldiers and paramilitaries without casualties on our side. After we rested one night at the military base where we were situated at Jabllanica, we went in the early hours of the morning to the village of Zhabel and set up posts, one group in Kralan and the other above the hills of Zhabel. The enemy's attacks increased every day, and this battle required the intervention of the special unit. They woke up at four o'clock in the morning, before dawn, to be ready at 0600. Ramë UKAJ was in charge of this group, while Agim RAMOCAJ – Gashi was in charge of the second group at the hills of Zhabel.

---- II ---- II ---- II ----

It took a long time before the situation in the Dushkaja region started to stabilize. Before the situation in Dushkaja was normalized, Daut HARADINAJ, com/mander of the 131st Brigade, with Bujar, Shkëlzen, and some others went to the village of Gllogjan and took up their old positions. The number of soldiers from all over Kosovo grew every day.

/U0083579/

In the village of Zhabel, I had some men who were at all the front lines, but one squad started to alter its military appearance, because of one individual whose military and fighting morale had collapsed. This squad had left the base without orders from anybody, and went /?away/ for a long time. They came /?to/ another unit where some men had had already fallen as martyrs. As unit com/mander/, I reported this to the responsible authorities and to the military police, in order to arrest these men. However, on the other hand, these men were not to blame because the so-called colonel, Commander Tahir ZEMAJ had left for Albania through the Strellc mountains, although it also possible that he followed the asphalted road with a few soldiers and 1,200 people.

--II—II—II—

Now and then I would form a squad of 10 people. This was the third group of the Special Unit, and the deputy in this squad was "Valmir UKAJ" from Lumbardh. He was an outstanding young man, both in military and combat discipline. He had been seriously wounded at Drenoc. Time was passing, and freedom was coming closer. As unit commander, I started to make up the numbers of soldiers and officers in our ranks.

/U0083578/

On 18 November 1998, Bekim BIRINXHIU, arrived, a soldier and former officer from Drenica. He joined the Special Unit. After a week, they went on the order of the Command, after the situation stabilised in the Dushkaja area. We went from Zhabel to Gllogjan and met with the com/mander of the 131st *Jusuf Gërvalla* Brigade. With the help of Daut and Shkëlzen, we positioned ourselves at the old posts. The number of soldiers began to grow, from one squad to four other squads. Shkëlzen and Daut helped by bringing me men from their units to mine. As the days passed, our territory expanded, and we had to patrol the villages of Gramaçel, Dubrava, and the vicinities of Shaptej and Irzniq, where we confronted the Serbo-Slav enemy face to face.

Freedom was nigh, and I had to encourage the young soldiers. When I say young soldiers, I must say that I had even under-age soldiers, from 15 to 20 years old. The Serbian forces and paramilitaries, when they saw what we, the KLA, were doing,

/U0083577/

stepped up what we Albanians call their terror. It grew day by day until the offensive of December 1998 when Serbia without compunction went on the attack, to destroy us, so that there would be no army, and no freedom, but only slavery according to the plan they had devised years before. In the December offensive launched against the KLA's nest in the village of Gllogjan, they started major attacks from all sides. In Irzniq, Prekolluk, Baballoq, and other villages, the attack went on from the early hours of the morning to midday. The heavy and light artillery never stopped. Because of the difficult position regarding our ammunition, which was carried on the backs of martyrs who fell on the altar of the freedom and liberation of our country, we were forced to withdraw all our units with Com/mander/ Daut, Shkëlzen, Bujar, and other officers I have not remembered to mention. After leaving the front line, we withdrew through the hazel bushes of Gllogjan. One group continued to withdraw toward Shaptej, along the canal, where we also encountered the Serbian forces. There was some fierce fighting between the two sides. After we crossed the canal, we came out at the Radoniq reservoir. Withdrawing at a steady pace, we met

/U0083576/

with Commander Ramush, who came in reinforcement from Jabllanica. After we situated ourselves in the village of Ratisha, we set up posts on the hill and the canal, which had two posts under its responsibility, one of them 2,500 metres away. This was the post of the late Shkëlzen. At these posts, we carried out patrols three times each night from our posts as far as Post 13, which was Shkëlzen's post. After we situated ourselves in Ratisha, I saw that one group of the unit was missing. Valmir UKAJ was in these groups. He was in charge of a squad which one night he /?formed/ in among the Serbs /*Shkije* – derogatory term for Serbs/ that had entered the village. However, as an able officer, he had started to withdraw at a steady pace from the village of Gllogjan, which teemed with Serbs like worms, to the village of Ratisha. As com/mander/ of the Special Unit I had the duty to find out about my group, which /word illegible/ from the withdrawal. We took two scouts to find out about the lost groups. These were Shpend MALA, a war martyr, from Gllogjan and Ramë UKAJ from Ratisha, a war invalid. During their reconnaissance, they met up with the lost group and they came together to the village of Ratisha.

/U0083584/

Altin HASKAJ

Blerim LOKAJ

Armen KUKLECI

Visar MIFTARI

Kujtim ÇALAKU

Fadil MULAKU

Nuredin GËRVALLA

Çelë UKAJ

Naim LATAJ

Albes/ia/n MATAJ

/U0083585/

/some scribbling/

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CAMPUS

Notebook

U0083556

Nr. Oprirz Zrpul
19.06.2002

U0083557

U0083558

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9

PREJ KROACIS UNISA SHKOVA
NE LUBLJAN TE NJAIN MALOKU
UTA ~~KOPA~~ TAKOVA ZV ETI M.
THA SE NJAIM UNIS PER SHQIPRI
QA DITE NEJTA LUBLJAN
TE NSLMIT UNISA PER SHQIPRI
SHQIPRI ZPRITA NGA AKOFCIAN
DHE MPRITE DISA DJEM EMRAT E
TY NE KOSOVONEN UTAKOVA ME
ZOTRI NJAIM MALOKU BESLIM SYLAPIN
PERVASUSIT SHTAPIT PERGJISHM.
BISEDUAM BISEDIME TE SHKURTA
RETIR PUNES TAH ME NJAIM
MALOKU BESLIM ZGJATI ME THA
SE TI JE KA EFOR KCOMCI DERI
TUSH TASH NAS DO JESH KOSOVE
BISEDUM SA DISEM PASTAJ TE
NESREMIT U THAKOVA ME ~~LL~~ KIR
KOMOSHEVCI EDHE DY DJEM TOE QI
PUNUASHI VUKNIZIM, OKET METROP
UNCS ~~PER~~ PER TIRANE BAJRAM CUP
BAJRA OVE U TAKUM ME GANIN FEK
E EI PUNOJKE ARMATI ME DISA
SHOK TJEK E GANIJA DEM
KELMENDI DHE UNJEM PER KOSOVE

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U0083561

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10

NE FILLIM TE MUAJIT PRILL NGA FSHATI VIÇIDOL I TOROPOJES U NISA KARAVANI ME KRETH 100 USHTAR TE ARMATOSUR MUSHKAT TE NGARKUAR ME ARMATIM. NE KETE MARSHIM ISHTE FADIL NIMANI, AGIM ZENELI I ÇUAJTURI (CERGASHI) SAMI NIMANI NGA FSHATI GERGOVC, XHEVDET BRAHIMAJ, GANI ZENELI NGA FSHATI JABLLANIC, MUJE BERISHA, ETIHEMI ~~NA~~ NGA ÇESKOVA KRUJTA etj. KETE DITE PER TE PAREN HERE U FUTA NE RADHET E UÇK PER NE KOSOVE IDRIZ BALA, SABRI OSMANI NGA PRISHTINA. BRENDA NATES KEMI ARRITUR TE PRRONI MBI FSHATIN POPOVC KU NA KAN PRITUR DHE NA KAN NDIHMUAR SHUME. RAM ~~B~~ RAMA, AGRON RAMA SEJDI RAMA (CIA) ~~O~~ TE CILET NA KANE SHOQERUAR DERI NE SMOLICE KETU KEMI PUSHUAR DERI NE MBREMJE PREJ NGA JEMI NISUR PER NE JABLLANICE KU MB~~RRIEM~~ ATJE NA PRITI LAHI IBRAHIMAJ ME DISA DJEM TE TJERE, ~~KU HYME MBRENDA~~ KU NA KA NDIHMU.

ISHTE NATE KU HYRA MBRENDA NE SHTEPIN E LAHI IBRAHIMAJ ATI ISHTE KOMANDANTI RAMUSH HARADINAJ ISHTE I PLAGOSUR POR UNE NUK E NJISHA M ISHTE EDHE BABAI I TIJ HILMI HARADINAJ I CILI I PASTRONTE ~~NE~~ ARMATIMIN E UÇK.

MBAS PAK KOHE U TAKOVA TE NJEJTEN SHTEPI ME XHELAL HAJDA (TONI) ME TE CILIN KISHA LUFTUAR NE KROACI. AI ISHTE PUNETOR DHE I LAVDUSHEM ~~EDHE TE~~ SI TE KOMANDANTI RAMUSH HARADINAJ ASHTU EDHE TE POPULLI, NE KROACI ISHTE PUNETOR

SÜLÜN

U0083562

DATE :

AA

I MADHE DHE USHTARAK I LAV DALLUAR.

ATE NATË ISHIM TE LODHUR DHE TE RRASKAPITUR NGA KRUGA, PUSHUAM NE SHTEPIN E LAHI IBRAHIMIT TE NER NESERMEN SHKUAM TE SHTEPIA E NASER IBRAHIMIT KU ISHTE OBJEKTI USHTARAKE DHE ISHA ZAVENS KOMANDANT I TONIT (ZHELAL HAJDA) DHE MORRA FILLOVA TE MARRE DETYRAT TE CILAT ISHIN TE NEVOJSHME. D.M.TH. MBI KEQYRJEN E KOJEVE PATROLLIMIN E KOJEVE, DHE MBIKEQYRJEN E ISTIKAMEVE BASHK ME KOMANDANTIN XHELADIN HAJDEN (TONIN) NE FSHATIN JABLLANICE. MBRENDA ASAJ KOHE U TAKOVA ME DISA USHTARAKTJERE I CILI ISHTE NASER MOLLA I CILI KISHTE MBERRI NGA HOLANDA, MALIQ NORECAJ KISHTE ARDH NGA GJERMANIA. I CILI ISHTE NJE PUNETOR I MADH DHE I KA NDIHMUAR SHUME USHTRIS. MBAS PAK KOHE ISHTE KOMANDANT I 132 NE RAJONIN E DUSHKAJES NGA KOMANDANTI RAMUSH HARADINAJ. AJET POTERA I CILI ISHTE NE ATE KOHE USHTAR TASH ESHTE KOMANDANT I BATALIONIT DYTE GARDIST NE LLAPE, ISHTE FAZLIA, ILIRI, CIMA, BEORI SHALA VELLAU I SHABAN SHALES NA KA NDIHMUAR DHE ESHTE GJENERAL MAJOR NE ZONEN E GJAKOVES, E SHUME SHOKE TETJERE.

MBAS NJE KOHE NE FSHATIN JABLLANICE KETA DJEM E FILLOVA TI USHTROJ PER NJESITIN KOMANDO NEPER MALE, FUSHA, I USHTROVA DISA DITE DHE ERDHI URDHRI NGA KOMANDANTI QE DISA DJEM TE SHKOJN NE FSHATIN GLOGJANE.

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12

ATY ISHTE NE PYETJE ORA KUR DO TE NISEM Ü BË MBREMJE LAHI IBRAHIMAJ DHE KOMANDANT TONI MË KOMPLETUN DISA DJEM ME TE MIRE TE CILET ISHIN ATY, NASERI, AJETI, ILIRI, FAZLIA, PJETRI, SADIKI UKA DHE DISA DJEME TE TJERË TE CILET ISHIN ME MUA DHE RRUGES NA PRINTE MUSA ~~I CI~~ DAJA I BUJAR HARADINIT DHE NA ÇOI NË FSHATIN GLLOGJANË. KUR SHKUAM ATJE U TAKUAM ME KOMANDANTIN RAMUSH HARADINAJ, S ME SHKELZENIN ATE NATE PUSHUAM NE GLLOGJAN EDHE TE NESERMEN NE SHTEPINE E SMAJL HARADINAJ BABAI NASIM HARADINAJ. TE NESERMEN KOMANDANTI RAMUSH U NISE PER ARMATIM KUR U KTHY AI FILLUAM TI BEJNE PLANET E PUNES TE RENDIT TE DITES.

FILLOVA TI PERGADIS DISA USHTARE ME NDIHMEN E KOMANDANTIT, ATY NË GLLOGJANE KU ISHTE EPROR EDHE MALIQ NDRECAJ, BEDRI SHALA, NASER BALAJ, AJET POTERA DHE SHUMË EPROR TJERË.

FILLUAM TE PUNOJME DHE TE PERGADITEM PER LUFTË. SHKUAM TA BEJME ORGANIZIMIN E KATUNDËNE PER LUFTE. LUFTA E PARE ISHTE NE FSHATIN BABALOQ KU ISHA SI PERGJEGJES ME NDIHMEN E KOMANDANTIT RAMUSHIT PASTAJ FILLOI LUFTA NE BABALOQ SI ORGANIZATOR I FSHATIT BABALOQ ISHTE FAIK DODA PASTAJ FILLUAM TE PUNOJME NE ATE FSHATË TE QELIM ESTIKAME TI PERGATISIM DJEMT ME PUSHK AUTOMATIKE DHE ME ARME TE TJERA TE RENDA

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KUR JAM HI PËR HERE TE PARË NE ATË FSHATE JAM HI ME DAUT HARADINAJ, NESIM HARADINAJ DHE DISA A BASHKLUFTAR TJERË, TE CILEVE NUK ME KUJTOHEN EMRAT. KETU NA KA PRITUR PERFAQSUESI I KATUNDIT FAIK DODA. FILLOI KOHA E URANT ME SHI, ISHTE PRILLI ATE DITË NUK KEMI MUJT MI QEL ESTIKAMET. KUR TE NESERMEN SHKUAM TI QELIM ESTIKAMET, POR SERBIA I KISHTE HYP VERHGUST EVET.

SHKOVA NE SUKE TE BABOLLOQIT U NGJITA POR ME FAIK DODEN EDHE NJË I BURGOSUR TË CILIT NUK ME KUJTOHET EMRI I GRAMAQELIT EDHE FLAMURI I JASIQIT. U KTHYEM MBAS DISA ORËVE NE FSHAT I VENDOSEM USHTARET NËPËR PIKA MBAS DY DITE FILLOI LUFTA NE KËTE FSHATË KU ATY KISHTE SHUME POLULATE. POPULLATEN E STREHUAM NEPER FSHATKA TJERA DHE FILLUAM LUFTEN ME SERBI. MBAS NJE KOHE FILLUAM TI ZGJERONJM TERITORIN NE IRZNIC, SHAPTEJ, GRAMAQEL, PRILEP, RASTOVIC, POZHAR, LUMBARDH, LLUKE, DHE SUKE TE BITESHIT. EDHE NE KËTO VENDE LUFTUAM NE DJEM TE PA PERGADITUR POR I PERGADITEM PËR LUFTE ME VESHTERSI POR NA NDIHMOI BEDRI SHALA, MALIQ NDRECA, NASER MOLLNA ~~BALAJ~~, ILIRI FUNIQI FAZLIA E SHUME DJEM TE TJERË AJET POTERA.

UNE IDRIZ BALAJ (TOGERI) GJATE KESAJ PERIUDHE KAM MENDU ~~TAF~~ SE MUND TË EGZISTOJ „NJESIA SPECIALE" NI KUADER TE ZONES QË TI

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NDIHMOJ VENDIT PE QE TE SHKAKTOJME DAME ARMIKUT ME NDIHMEN E KOMANDANTIT RAMUSH HARADINIT KA EGZISTU MUNDESIA DHE KERKESA I PLOTESU QE TE EGZISTON „NJESIA SPECIALE" E QUAJTUR „SHQIPONJAT E ZEZA" NE KRYE ME TOGERIN (IDRIZ BALAJ). KJO NJESI U FORMUA ME 14. PRIL 1998 NË FSHATIN GLOGJAN.

NEPERMJET SOO KATUNDI I KAM MBLEDHUR MBA DISA DJEM DHE I KAM PËRGADITUR PER „NJESI SPECIALE" ME NDIHMEN E KOMANDANTIT "RAMUSH.

KJO NJESI SPECIALE KA MARR PJESË NË LUFTIME TE ASHPRA KUNDËR OKUPATORIT SERBO, SKLAV. NE KETE NJESI KANE EGZISTUAR DIKUN KA 40 DERI 100 USHTAR. KJO NJESI KA MARR AKSIONE TE SHUMTA NE BABALOQ, RASTOVIC, PRILEP, SUK BITESHIT, SHATTEJ, VOKSH, LUMBARDH, SLUP, DRENOVC, JUNIK, LOXHE TE PRONI GERVALLES DUBOVIK DHE SHUME VENDE TE TJERA.

~~KJO NJESI KA PUNUAR SHUME GJA~~ Ë ~~PERHUMES~~ TES.

SULUN

U0083566

NO 27.04.2000

DATE 27.04

KZOD ZOD TMK III

TAKIM PUNE

NE SHEFERIN E KOMANDES.

OKM 10 DERI 1620

1 KUADRI DISIPLINES DERI BRIGADA

2 SHATIMIMI REGULORE. NJI OFICER.

3 LESHTIM PER NGRE T FAMURITI.

4 MAKI PERSE ROMANTA BR SU

5 SEKRET USHTRIA I OKB PER USHTRIA.
BRIGADAKU OSE BATALIONIT

ES 1 PERSONELIT
ES 2 SHATOM MIKATIM KOMANDANTIT

TRUPTI I SHEFERI SHPAP

KOMANDANT DALI 21 VISIT SHPA PER
G TAKIM

PUNE 24 KUJDESTARI

PLANI GRD OBJEKTITI

SÜLÜN

U0083567

NO :

DATE :

KSHILI KADAOVEUI DAUPI SHEUI
2 KOMANDATI

POLICIJA USHTRIMIT 1. 5. MMJ.

8 - 16 OCH KI PUNES

RESHTIN GHQM

SÜLÜN

U0083568

NO :

DATE :

SÜLÜN

TMK

NO: U0083569

KZOD

U0083569 DATE: 15.05-2000

TAKIM PUNE

ME KOMANDANTI E ZONE RAFSHIT
OJGAQINIT, GJ D.-H.

JAVA E KALUM PAKE NJUJE
3. PED ISTOG DEGAN GJAKOV

GJO FOTOGRAFI --S

~~MELKCHUK~~
MELCUKE AGIM QEKU QUA- OLA 12

29 MANUISTIM. JUNIK B ISTOG.

SÜLÜN

U0083570

NO :

DATE :

SÜLÜN

GJAKOVE

NO :

KZOD
THKIM PUNE

U0083571

DATE : 22.05.2000

THKIM PUNE,

JAVE TJETËR BABALOÇ

SULUN

TAKIM PUNE

NO : 22.05.2000

DATE :

U0083572

KEQIKOS

1 BEKIM BEQINGJIKU 4 KAÇEN TASH, KA DRYSHU NUMRI. 11 PAKA 8.

2 LOGESTIKËN KOMANDES — LUFTE

1 BEKIM BEQINGJIKU - Bekim
2 HAJDAR VATAJ Hajdar Vataj
3 ISAK ADEMAJ
4 SADIK HASANAJ
5 RIZA GJEVRELAJ Rizaj
6 LULSIM ULAJ, Ulaj

SULUN

TMK

NO :

DATE 29 05. 2000

THKIM PUNE U0083573

NE KOMANDATIN

DAÇOT HAKADIHAJ. KZDO

JAVE TJETRE HËNE TJETR

PEJ TE KASIM AGLASHI. THKIM PUNA

KI JAGE GJOKE GILBSON.

PENGIM I POLICIE USHTAKE

SI USHTON PONJSHEUC.

NJOVTOM TI DITJETKA

SULUN

U0083574

NO

DATE :

MEDHTEX 31-07-2000

TAKIM PUNE
ME EPKORT E GJAKOES EDHE
NJISIVE TO GEVE –

1 BEQIR KRASNIQI
2 ALEM ZENA
3 DIN SHADIVA

SÜLÜN

NO 04 08 2000

U0083575

DATE :

SHERIF SHAHAN

SULUN

U0083576

ME KOMANDANT RAMUSHIN I CILI VINTE
PER PERFORCIME NGA JABLLINICA. PASI U
VENDOSEM NE FSHATIN RATISH ATY I VENDOSEM
PIKAT BREGUT KANALLIT ÇEI KISHA 2 PIKA
NE PERGJEGJESI KURSE KURSE NJE PIKE MA
LARGESI PREJ 2500.M. ISHTE PIKA E TE NDJORIT
SHKELXENIT KURSE NE KETO PIKA DENIM
3 HERE NE NATE BENIM PATROLLIME NGA PIKAT
TONA EDERI NEPIKEN 13. E CILA ISHTE PIKA
E SHKELXENIT MASI U VENDOSEM NE RATISH
PASHE QE MUNGONTE NJERA GRUP E NJESIS NE
KETO GRUPE ISHTE DHE ZV. KOMANDANT I NJESIS
VALMIR UKAJ KU ISHTE PERGJEGJES I NJE
SKUADRE KU AI NJE NATE E BERI E KISHTE
DERE NE MESIN E SHKIJEVE QE KISHIN HYRE
NE FSHAT POR SI EPROR I AFTE KISHTE
FILLUAR TE TERHIQEJ ME HAPA TE SIGURT NGA
FSHATI GLLOGJAN I CILI I ESHTE MBUSHUR ME
SHKIJE SI KRIMBAT, NE FSHATIN RATISH UNE
SI KOM. I NJESIVE SPECIALE ISHA I DETYRUAR
TE MERRJA VESH PER GRUPEN TIME QE ISHT
NDA NGA TERHEKJA MOREM DY VEZHGUES QE
TE INTERESOHEN PER GRUPEN E HUMBUR KETA
SHPEND MALA DESHMOR LUFTE NGA GLLOGJALI
RAME UKAJ NGA RATISHI INVALID LUFTE
TE CILET GJATE VEZHGIMIT ISHI TAKUAR ME
GRUPEN E HUMBUR DHE EROHEN BASHKARISHT
NE FSHATIN RATISH

DATE: .....

NO: .....

U0083577

TA SHTOYNE ZULLUMIN SIQ THOYME NE SHQIPTARET DIT ME DIT. ERDHI DHE OFENZIVA DHJETORIT 98 KUR SERBIA PA DURIM MORI OFENZIVE QE TNA SHPARTALLOI E TE MOS KET AS USHTRI E AS LIRI VETEM TE KETE RODRI SIPAS PLANIT QË KISHIN BËRË ME VITE. EDHE OFENZIVA E DHJETORIT QE E HYREN NE FOLEN E USHTRIS ÇLIRIMTARE TE KOSOVES NE FSHATIN GLOGJAN FILLUAN SULME TE MEDHA KGA ÇDO ANE, IRENIQI PROKOLLUKI, BABALOQI E DISA FSHATRA TJETË KU KY SULM ZGJATI PREJ OREVE TE HERTA TE MENGJEZIT E DERI NE MERDIT. ARTILERIA ERENDO DHE ELEHTE NEK NDALEJ NE U DETYRUAM SIPAS KUSHTEVE TE VESHTIR QË KISHIM PER MUNICIONIN QE U BARTKE MO KRAHET E DESHMOREVE QE BINIM PER ALTARIN E LIRIS E PER ÇLIRIMIN E TROJEVE TONA U DETYRUAM TE TERHIQEMI TE GJITHA NJESITET ME KOM. DAUTIN, SHKELZENIN, DUJARIN, JI DHE EPRORË TJERE QE NUK ME KUJTOHEN TI PERMEN RASI U LARGUAM NGA VIJA E FRONTIT MOREM PER HEKJEN HEPER LAJTHIJAT E GLOGJANIT KJER GRUP VAZHDOI TERHEKJEN NE DREJTIM TE SHAPREJT NEPER KANALL KU DHE ATY MBERRITEM FORCAT SERBE KU ATY PATE DHE DISA LUFTIME TE ASHPRA NE MES DY PALEVE PRAI QE E KALUAM KANALLIN DOLEM TEK DAZENI I RADONIQIT ME ME HAPA TE SIGURT NE TERHEKJE U TAKUAM

DATE : .....

NO : .....

U0083578

KURSE ME 18 NENTOR 1998 ERDH BEKIM BIRINYAMIN USHTAR DHE EPROR I PER PARSHEM NGA DRENICA I CILI U VENDOS NE NJESIN SPECIJALE KURSE PAS NJE JAVE PATEM SHKU NE URDHER TE KOMANDES PASI U STABILIZUA GJENDJA NE ANEN E DUSHKAJES SHKUAM PREJ BHEBELIT NE GLOGJAN DHE U TAKUAM ME KOM. E BRIGADES 131 JUSUF GERVALLA NE NDIHME E DAUTIT DHE SHKELXENIT E U VENDOSEM NE PIKAT E VJETRA KU ATY FILLOI TE SHTOHEJ NUMRI I USHTAROVE PRJE NJE SKUADRE DERI NE 4 SKUADRA TJERA ME NDIHMEN SHKELXENIT DHE DAUTIT PREJ NJESIVE TE VETA MI BISHIN DJEMTE NE NJESIN TIME DIT PAS DITESH FILLOI TE ZGJANOHEJ TERITORI I JON NE TE CILIN NA DUHEJ TE BENIM PATROL NE ESHATEAT GRAMAÇEL, DUBRAV, AFER SHAPTEJT, SIDHE NEA AFERSI TE IRZNIQIT KU ATY U BALLAFAQOHEM BALL PER BALL ME ARMIKUN SERBOSLLAV

-PASI QE ISHTE LIRIA AFER E DUHEJ TJU JEPYA VULLNET USHTAREVE TE RI. KUR THEM USHTARE TERI DUHET TE THEM SE KISHA USHTARE EDHE TE MITUR QE NDOA MOSHA 15 VJEÇARE E DERI TE MOSHA 20 VJEÇARE PASI QE PANE PUNEN QE BENIM NE USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVES FORCAT SERBE E PARAMILITARET RILUAN

U0083579

NGA FSHATI ZHEBEL KISHA DISA DJEM TË CILET
DHIN NE GJITHA VIZAT FRONTALE POR NJERA
T SKUADER FILLOI TA NDROI PAMJEN USHTARAKE PER
SHKAK TE NJE INDIVIDI QE I KISHTE HUMBUR MORALI
USHTARAK DHE LUFTARAK KU KJO SKUADER ISHTE
LARGUAR NGA BAZA PA URDHRAT E ASKUJT
PER SHKOI NJE NJE KOHE E GJATE DHE ATA
ERDHEN NE NJESINE TJERA KU EDHE DISA DJEM
PREJ TYRE KISHIN RENE DESHMORE. UNE SI KOM.
NJESIS, PATA LAJMRUAR ORGANET KOMPETENTE
SI DHE POLICIN USHTARAKE PER ARRESTIMIN E KETYRE
DJEMVE. POR NE NJE ANE NUK KISHIN FAJ KETA
DJEM SEPSE I ASHTE QUAJTURI KOLONEL KOMANDA
NT TAHIR ZEMA KISHTE MARRE RRUGEN PER
NE SHQIPERI NE BJESHKET E STRELLCIT POR
GJITHE E MUNDSHME QE KA SHKUAR EDHE NEPER
ASFALT ME PAK USHTARE ME 1200 VETE

— // — // — // —

KOHE PAS KOHE FORMOVA NJE SKUADER PREJ
10 VETESH KU KJO ISHTE GRUPA E TRET E
NJESIS SPECIJALE KURSE REVENDES I KESAJ-
SKUADRE ISHTE "VALMIR UKAJ" NA LUMBARDHI
KY ISHTE NJE DJAL I DALLUAR SI NE
RREGULLA USHTARAKE ASHTU DHE LUFTARAKE
KISHTE MARRE PLAGE TERENDA NE DRENOC.
KOHA ECTE DHE LIRIA PO AFROHEJ UN SI KOMANDA
NJESIE FILLOVA TE PER NBUSHI NUMRIN E USHTARVE
SI DHE EPROREVE ME RADHE

DATE : .....

NO : .....

SULUN

SERBE ME NJE ARSENAL TEPER TE MADH.
MORALI I FORT I DJEMVE E BERI FSHATIN QË
TË SPASTROHET NGA MILITARET DHE PARAMILITARET
SERBE PASI QE E KRYEM ARSIONIN PA HUMBJEN
TONË NË BAZËN USHTARAKE KU ISHIM TE VENDOSUR
NË JABLLANICË NË ORET E HERTA TË MENGJEZIT
- PASI QE BEMË NJË NATË, PUSHIM TE NESER
MEN NE MENGJER SHKUAM NE FSHATIN EMEREL
DHE I VENDOSEM PIKAT NJE GRUPE NE KRALAKI
KURSE TJETRA GRUPE MBI KODRA TE ZHEBELIT.
- GJDO DIT E ME TEPER SHTOHESHIN SULMET E ARMI-
KUT KU NE ATO BETEJA U LYPKE INTERVENIMI
I - NJESISË SPECIJALE - KU U ZGJOHESHIN
NE 4°° TE MENGJEZIT PA U ZDRITUR PER ME
ARRIT NE ORA 6 NE GJENDJE GADISHMERIE KURSE
PERGJEGJES I KSAJ GRUPE ISHTE RAME UKAJ
NGA RATISHI. KURSE PERGJEGJES I KRUPES SË
2 TE KODRAVE ZHEBELIT ISHTE - AGIM RAMOCAJ
GASHI -. —11—11—11—
- PAS NJE KOHE TE GJATE GJENDJA FILLOI TE STABILIZOHET
OHET NE RAJONIN E DUSHKAJES PA U NORMALIZUAR
GJENDJA NE DUSHKAJE KOM. BRIGADES 131 DAUT
HARADINA BASHK ME BUJARIN SI DHE SHKOLXENIN
EDHE DISA TE TJERE SHKUAN NE FSHATIN
GLLOGJAN DHE U VENDOSEN NE POZICIONET E VJETRA
ÇDO DIT E ME TEPER NUMRI I USHTAREVE
VIKE PUKE U SHTUAR NGA GJITHE KOSOVA KOSOVA

DATE .....

NO .....

SOLON
U0083581

RAMUSHIT. KA GJYSA E RRUGES U NDAM NE DY
GRUPE UNE ME HALIN PAUTIN DHE NJES AN SPECIALE
U HETUAM AFER 9 ORE DERI NE JABLLANICE
AFER JABLLANICES NE MALE KEMI PUSHUAR DERI
NE MENOJES. KUR HYM NE JABLLANICE NE SHTAB
ATY VEQ KISHTE MBERRI KOMANDANT RAMUSHI
"ME DISA USHTARE. NE KETE RRUGE E FALENDEROJ
EDHE DELI HAGJOCEN I CILI ME NDIHMOI TA BART
MUNICIONIN SEPSE KISHA SHUME.
KUZHINEN FILLUAM TA NDERTOJM QE TEMA M
RERGAPISIN BUKE, KUZHINJERIT, PAK BUKE ME NJE
SREC, FILLUAM TA MBAJM KUJDESTARIN MBRENDA
SHTABIT, TE BEJME PATROLLIME, ROJE, VEZHGIM
DHE FILLUAM TA NORMALIZOJM JETEN MBRENDA
KOHES SE CAKTUAR KURSE UNE I KISHA 7-8
DJEM KURSE BRENDA ASAJ KOHE KISHA
TI MBAJA DY PIKA NE KRALAN SI DHE
NE JABLLANIC "PIKA E SHQITONTES" PRAPA SE U
NORMALIZUA KOHA FILLOI DHE NUMRI I DJEMVE
KU ERDHI DERI NE 20 QE NGA AJO KOHE
FILLOVA TE PUNOI HEATA DJEM QE I KISHA
SEPSE SI NJESI SPECIALE ISHTE SHUME VEANTIRE
PERMBAHEJ RREGULLIT USHTARAK.
- AKSIONI GLLOGJANIT -
KOHAN ECTE EDHE MORALI I DJEMVE FILLOI TE SHTOHEJ
PASA SE DJEMT ISHIN TE GATSHEM PER NJE AKSION
NE MULLINGTIN E TYRE VENDOSEM QE TA SULMOJME
FSHATIN GLLOGJAN KU ATY NDODHESHIN FORCAT

DATE .....

ON .....

U0083582

NGA IRZNIQI 5 MINUTA PARA SE TE HYNIN FORCAT
SERBE NE GLOGJAN. DHE ATY JEMI TAKUAR ME
RAMUSHIN DHE E KEMI VEZHGU SITUATEN NE TEREN
LUFTUAM ASHPER META ZBRITET NE PREJTIM TE
RATISHIT TE TEPERIM TE LUMBARDHA ATY KEMI VENDOS
RIKAT E ROJES TE KRYQI I POZARIT TE LUMBARDHI
PASHINOVCI DHE RATISH IULET. JEMI HI NE NJE
SHTEPI PER TE SI PUSHUAR PAK ME KOMANDANT
RAMUSHIN DHE DISA USHTAR NE ATE KOHE ISHTE
RA JABLANICA DHE NA CAJMERUN DHE E KERKUAN
KERKUAN RAMUSHIN MALE AGUSHI DHE LAHI IBRAHI-
MAJ DI KA ORA 1.00 MESNATE JEMI BERE GATI
TE GJITHE PJESTARET E UÇK ME URDHER TE KOMAN-
DANTIT JEMI NISUR NGA FSHATI LUMBARDH DHE
MBERRITEM NE BERLIQ NE FSHATIN BERLIQ KEMI
PUSHUAR DERI NE ORET E MENGJESIT I VENDOSEM
ROJET DERI ~~SA JEMI ZGJUAR~~ NE ORET E MENGJESIT
NE MENGJES UNISEM PJREJ BR BERLIQIT NEPER
BISTRIC PUSHUAM ~~NE B~~ AFER BISTRICES DERI MA
MBREMJE BASHK ME PJESTARET E UÇK.
DAUTI DHE MALIQI VEZHGOJSHIN TEREN KURSE
UNE DHE ILMI AARADINAJ PNIM KATE. KOMANDANT
RAMUSHI ME NJE USHTAR TE NJESIS SPECIALE SHKOI
TA KERKONTE NAZMIN KURSE NE PRITEM ATY
DERI NE MBREMJE ~~DHE ATY~~ FORCAT SERBE
ISHIN 40 METRA AFER NESH PASTAJ PASI UA
QETESUA PAK GJENDJA U NISEM NE PREJTIM DK
J JABLANICER ME URDHERIN E KOMANDANT

DATE .....

NO .....

U0083583

ME 2 QERSHOR E 1998 NE ORA 6 NE MBREMJE M BISEDOVA ME KOMANDANT RAMUSHIN PER SHPETIMIN E NJE GRUAJE DHE PLAKU NGA ESHATI LOQANE.

E SHPETUAM HAVE KASUMAJ DHE NJE PLAK BABA 80 VJEÇAR BABAIN E BIJAK DUKAJ HAVA ISHTE E PLAGOSUR KURSE PLAKU 80 vjeçar i pa levizshem e tenhoqem me 6 PJESTAR TE „NJESIS SPECIALE" IDRIZ BALAJ – TOÇERI BLERIM SAHIT LOKAJ – DESHMOR, REXHEP DACI, AGIM RAMOSAJ – GASHI ASTRIT BERISHA, MUSE MALOKU E TERHOQEM PREJ ESHATIT DERI PLAKUN ME LESE, KURSE HAVEN NE SHPIN DERI NE ESHATIN PRENOVC PASTAJ ME KERR I KEMI QU NE GLOGJAN, ISHTE ORA 1.00 PAS MESNATE.

2. OFENZIVA E DYTE E SHTATORIT 1998

JEMI SULMU NGA DY DREJTIMET NGA JABLANICA DHE NGA CARRABREGU ATE DITE KEMI LUFTUAR ME NJESIN SPECIALE NE PIKEN TRE KA KURSE NE PIKEN DY SHKELZEN HARADINAJ ME NJESITIN E UET KA ARDHUR URDHËNA PER MU TERHEK NGA GLOGJANI.

KA ARDHUR SHKELZENI ME KA LAJMRUAR SE DUHET TE TERHEQEM ME GJITHE ARSONALIN LUFTARAK: GULINOVIN DHE GJIRIN JA RAM DHANE DAUTIT DHE AI ESHTE SHKU NE DREJTIM TE IRZNIQIT KURSE NE ME SHKELZENIN JEMI TERHEQ NGA LIVADHET E GLOGJANIT ME ARMATIM A NE DREJTIM TE KAÇANIT

DATE .....

NO .....

U0083584

NO :

DATE :

ALTIN HASKAJ
BLECIM LOKAN
ARMEN KUKLECI
VISAR MIFTARI
KUJTIM ÇAÇAKU
FADIL MALAKU
NUREDIN GEGVALA
ÇELE UKAJ
NAIM LATAJ
ALBESN MATAJ

SÜLÜN

U0083585

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX F
UNMIK POLICE SEARCH AND SEIZURE RECORDS RELATING TO THE NOTEBOOK SEIZED FROM THE HOME OF IDRIZ BALAJ

UNITED NATIONS
United Nations Interim
Administration Mission
in Kosovo

UNMIK

NATIONS UNIES
Mission d'Administration
Intérimaire des Nations Unies
au Kosovo

3 August 2005

Dear Mr. Groome,

In accordance with your request for assistance of 18 May 2005 (Ref. No. OTP/05/2005/45) in relation to the indictment against Ramush Haradinaj *et al* (ICTY Case number IT-04-84-I), I have authorized the release of the requested original search order and the requested confiscated material.

Please note that the originals of the search and seizure records were not located in the court files. However, certified copies of the search and seizure records were found in the court file. These certified copies will be provided instead of the missing originals.

The aforementioned documents and a direction for release of the requested materials will be forwarded to Mr. Lubomir Jozefciak, Investigator, ICTY Office, Pristina, through UNMIK Department of Justice, Criminal Division within the next week.

I look forward to our continued cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

Lawrence Rossin
Principal Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Mr. Dermot Groome
Senior Trial Attorney
Office of the Prosecutor
International Criminal Tribunal
For the Former Yugoslavia

UNITED NATIONS
United Nations Interim
Administration Mission
in Kosovo

UNMIK

NATIONS UNIES
Mission d'Administration
Intérimaire des Nations Unies
au Kosovo

Reference: DOJ/CD/03437/te/05
CD/25/te/89/05

04 August 2005

Dear Mr. Jozefciak,

In accordance with the request for assistance made by Mr. Dermot Groome, Senior Trial Attorney in the letter reference HaS/TmC/UMK-0039 dated 18 May 2005, please find enclosed documents requested and a direction for release of requested confiscated material.

I am informed that the originals of the search and seizure records were not located in the court files, but certified copies of the relevant documents contained therein are provided.

I look forward to our continued cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

Annunziata Ciaravolo
Deputy Director
Department of Justice

Mr. Lubomir Jozefciak
Investigator
ICTY
Pristina

Interim Administration of Kosovo
Administrata e Përkohshme e Kosoves
Privremena Adminstracija Kosova

District Public Prosecutor's Office
Peje/Pec

Police Case No.
CCIU 2000-00158

PP No. 90/02
HPQ No. 215/04 (District Court of Peje/Pec)
ICTY Ref: OTP/05/2005/45, Has/TmC/UMK-0039

Date: 20 June 2005

TO: THE SERIOUS CRIMES INVESTIGATING UNIT, UNMIK POLICE

Pursuant to Articles 46, 47 and 51 of the Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, I make this

DIRECTION FOR RELEASE OF TEMPORARILY CONFISCATED ITEMS

Whereas the verdict in the above case has become final after the dismissal of the motion made by Idriz Balaj, in AP 95/2003 dated 28 April 2005, for an extraordinary review of the final verdict of the Supreme Court of Kosovo AP No. 95/2003 dated 1 December 2003, and that Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo (PCPCK) now applies pursuant to Article 500 PCPCK, the public prosecutor has custody and control of objects that are temporarily confiscated by way of a lawful search.

As stated in the Request for Assistance, reference Has/TmC/UMK-0039 dated 18 May 2005, from the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the items listed in the "Evidence log and receipt" dated 18/6/2002 at time 0845, numbered 1 to 10 inclusive, at page 101 of the Court file in the above proceedings relating to a search conducted against an address in Deshmoret e Lirisi Street, Dakovica, are required for criminal proceedings at ICTY.

Therefore, I make this direction to the Serious Crimes Investigation Section, UNMIK Police to release items numbered 1 to 10 indicated above to the custody of Criminal Division, UNMIK Department of Justice, for handover to the ICTY Office in Pristina and

onward handover to the Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY. I note that item numbered 9 has already been released to ICTY by a previous request.

Direction made this 17th day of June 2005

Time: 18 : 10 hrs

Michael E. Hartmann
International Prosecutor
Office of the Public Prosecutor of Kosovo
For the District Public Prosecutor's Office of Peje/Pec

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UNITED NATIONS
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIK

NATIONS UNIES
Mission d'Administration Intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo

District Court Peja
Investigating Judge

HPQ 215/ 2002
17June 2002

DECISION ACT

In the criminal case against the suspects:

1. Idriz Balaj, nickname Toger, born 23 August 1971, resident of Deshimoret e Lirise Street, Dakovica, Grid 53125-91231
2. Daut Haradinaj, born 6 April 1978, Babaloce
3. Bekim Zekaj, nickname Drenica, born 28 November 1977, resident of Korriku Nr. 24 in Peja
4. Faton Mehmetaj, born 24 January 1963, resident of Babaloce
5. Ahmet Elshani, born 28 February 1963, resident of Ozrim
6. Ramush Ahmetaj, born 5 September 1974, resident of Dubovik
7. Ramush Haradinaj

further personal data so far unknown

the Investigating Judge of the District Court in Peja, acting on the request of the District Public Prosecutor in Peja, PP.Nr.: 90/2002 dated 17/06/2002 pursuant to Art. 158 Sec 1, 159, 166, 161 par 3, 206 and 207 par 1 and 3, 208 par 2, 210, 211 of LCP renders the following

Decision

Police is ordered to search the premises of the suspects Idriz Balaj and Bekim Zekaj for papers/ documents/material that may have links to the unlawful detention and torture of the victims Bashkim Balaj, Sinan Musaj, Rexhe Osaj, Rame Idrizi, nicknamed Peja and Vesel Muriqi .

Reasons

The District Public Prosecutor filed a request to conduct investigations, dated 17 June 2002, PP No. 90/2002 and charged the suspects mentioned above under 1. - 6.

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among additional charges with unlawful detention in complicity pursuant articles 63 par 1 and 4 of the CLS read with Article 22 of the CLY and in complicity causing serious bodily injury pursuant to Article 38 par 2 of the CLK read with article 22 of the CLY. Together with this request the Prosecutor filed a request to search the premises of the suspects Idriz Balaj and Bekim Zekaj in order to find documents or materials, whose contents might be relevant for the investigation and prove the suspicion that the suspects took a leading role in the torture and subsequent "disposal" of the victims Bashkim Balaj, Sinan Musaj, Rexhe Osaj, Rame Idrizi, nicknamed Peja and Vesel Muriqi .

The request is founded.
Although article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms enshrines that everyone has the right for respect of his domicile and private property it is clear that this right is not absolute, as par 2 of the aforementioned article allows inferring. The provisions provided in article 8.2 together with the abovementioned articles are fulfilled. The public authorities interference in the right in question is set out in the LCP from article 206 onwards. The search in question is a measure absolutely necessary as it is probable that clues to the crimes or other important items related to the ongoing criminal procedure will be found.
Looking at the material/ reports and testimonies gathered in the police file so far it is most likely that the search of the premises will lead to additional evidences
The search can be undertaken without prior presentation of the warrant, as it is necessary to perform the search by surprise otherwise the items expected to be found might be taken away or destroyed in order to blur traces.

If the premises to search are locked, the premises might be open by force. According to article 208 par 6 LCP the search shall be made with the utmost care and eventual damages should be kept to the most possible minimum.

Articles, which are found and might serve as evidence in these criminal proceedings shall be temporarily confiscated and a list of the possibly seized items shall be handed over to the Investigating Judge immediately so a court's decision on the seizure can be made. This includes the permit to temporarily take away computers or related items, in order to be able to make readable documents, which are possibly saved in the computer and might serve as evidence in this case as well.

Investigating Judge
Birgit Lange-Klepsch

24674

IT-04-84-T

SAKTËSINË E KOMISIONIT PËR PERSONI ZHDUKUR
TAÇHOTT
SHËRBIM

EXHIBIT CONTROL SHEET

DATE : 18/06/2002

FILE # CCIU 2000-00158

LOCATION OF SEARCH DAKOVICA - DESHMORET e LIRISË STREET

EXHIBIT CUSTODIAN:

SEARCH TEAM MEMBER JOHN HEISTKE, ANATOLIY RUCHKIN, FLORIN CIOBOTARU, MEHMET TOGAL

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] FOUND	[illegible]	[illegible]
1	RUCHKIN	LIVING ROOM	0900	SWORD - LONG	0900
2	CIOBOTARU	LIVING ROOM	0905	WEAPON CLEANING KIT RG57	0905
3	~~CERTIFICATE~~ RUCHKIN	LIVING ROOM	0910	CERTIFICATE (UCK)	0910
4	TOGAL	BEDROOM	0910	SWORD - SHORT	0910

ITEM	FOUND BY	LOCATION	TIME FOUND	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	
5	TOGAL	BEDROOM	0915	KNIFE IN SHEATH	
6	TOGAL	BEDROOM	0925	ID CARD (UCK)	
7	CIOBOTARU	BEDROOM	0925	PHOTOGRAPH HOLDING PISTOL	
8	TOGAL	BEDROOM	0935	JACKET WITH (UNIFORM) GERMAN FLAG	
9	TOGAL	BEDROOM	0950	DIARY CAMPUS NOTEBOOK	
10	CIOBOTARU	BEDROOM	1000	PROTECTIVE VEST ~~SAFARILAND~~	

SAKTËSINË E KOPJES E VËRTETON
PERSONI EVITAR I GJYKATËS,
TVËRSHËT KOPJE OVEFAKA
SHËRBIMI LIGJOR SHQIP

ITEM #	FOUND BY	LOCATION	TIME FOUND	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	

SAKTËSINË E KORJES E VËRTETON
SLUJBENO LICE SUDA

101

32-B

EVIDENCE LOG AND RECEIPT

DATE AND TIME OF SEARCH 18/06/2002 0845

SEARCH WARRANT IDENTIFIER HPQ 215/2002
(NAME, NUMBER, ETC)

LOCATION OF SEARCH (ADDRESS) DAKOVICA - DESHMORET e LIRISI STREET

ITEM	PRESIDE LOCATION FOUND (PHOTOS IF POSSIBLE)	FINDERS NAME AND #	DISPOSIT ITEM
SWORD - LONG ~~SWORD~~	LIVINGROOM ~~LIVINGROOM BEDROOM~~	RUCHKIN	1
WEAPON CLEANING KIT RG57	LIVING ROOM	CIOBOTARU 7365	2
CERTIFICATE (UCK)	LIVING ROOM	RUCHKIN	3
SWORD - SHORT	BEDROOM	TOGAL 9070	4
KNIFE IN SHEATH	BEDROOM	TOGAL 9070	5
ID CARD (UCK)	BEDROOM	TOGAL 9070	6
PHOTOGRAPH HOLDING PISTOL	BEDROOM	~~TOGAL~~ CIOBOTARU 7365	7
JACKET WITH (UNIFORM) GERMAN FLAG	BEDROOM	TOGAL 9070	8
DIARY CAMPUS NOTEBOOK	BEDROOM	TOGAL 9070	9

OFFICER ISSUING RECEIPT JOHN HELDTKE # CPO 7760

PERSON RECEIVING RECEIPT

DATE AND TIME RECEIPT ISSUED 18/06/2002

PROTECTIVE VEST SAFARILAND	BEDROOM	CIOBOTARU 7365	10

SAKTESINE E KORRUES E VERTETIT
PER ... E OFICERIT
... E SUDA

UNMIK Police

Page 5

102

32D

SEARCH WARRANT RESPONSIBLE PARTY ROSTER
(WITNESS, OWNER, ETC.)

NAME GRIGAT, FRED

DOB * 15.02.62

ADDRESS Gjakova PD

RELATIONSHIP TO LOCATION UNMIK (Team Leader of Team 5)

REASON FOR BEING AT SCENE ASSIST CCIU

NAME

DOB

ADDRESS

RELATIONSHIP TO LOCATION

REASON FOR BEING AT SCENE

NAME

DOB

ADDRESS

RELATIONSHIP TO LOCATION

REASON FOR BEING AT SCENE

THE ABOVE LISTED UNMIK POLICE OFFICER IS THE ONLY AVAILABLE AND RESPONSIBLE WITNESS TO THE SERVICE OF SEARCH WARRANT HPQ 215/2002 ON 18/06/2002 AT DAKOVICA - DESHMORET e LIRISI STREET AT/BETWEEN 08:45 AND 11:15. HE APPEARED AT THE LOCATION AT 10:45 TO SECURE THE LOCATION'S FRONT DOORS.

JOHN HEIDTKE CROTTLO

UNMIK Police

103

32-A

PRE AND POST SEARCH DAMAGE INSPECTION REPORT
(CIRCLE WHICH SEARCH IS APPLICABLE)

ROOM OR LOCATION	DAMAGE	# C
FRONT DOORS	RUPTURED DOOR STOP - LEFT SIDE, DENT ON RIGHT SIDE	

INSPECTING OFFICER JOHN HEIDTKE # CPO 7740

RESPONSIBLE PARTY OWNER STATUS _____
(OWNER, WITNESS, ETC.)

DATE 18/06/2002

WARRANT IDENTIFIER HPQ 215/2002
(NUMBER, NAME, ETC.)

KOSOVO DISTRICT COURT IN PEJA

104

	UNMIK International Police	File # CCIU 2000-00158

DIAGRAM OF LOCATION TO SEARCH

DAKOVICA - DESHMORET e LIRISI STREET

OCCUPIED

— FIRST FLOOR —



UNOCCUPIED

— SECOND FLOOR —

STORAGE
UNDER CONSTRUCTION - VACANT



NOT TO SCALE.
APPROXIMATE ONLY.
18/06/2002 0900 HRS
JOHN HEIDTKE GP07760

Location : DAKOVICA - DESHMORET e LIRISI STREET

CCIU PRISTINA
WAR CRIMES

SAKTËSIME E KOMISIONIT TË PERSONIT [illegible]
TAKIM [illegible]
SLUJBA [illegible]

105



SAKTËSISHT E KORRIGJUAR E VËRTETË
[illegible] GJYKATËS,
[illegible] GJYKATËS
[illegible] SHTERAVA
[illegible] SHLDA

104

SAKTËSINË E KOPJES E VËRTETON
PËRSONI FYTTAR I GJYKATËS,
TËRËSISHT KOPJE OVERAVA
GJUKSENI LICE SUDA

GJYKATA E QARKUT NË PEJË * DISTRICT COURT IN PEJË * QARKU I GJYKATËS SË PEJË
KOSOVË
KOSOVO

107

SAKTËSINË E KOPJES E VËRTETON
PERSONI ZYRTAR I GJYKATËS,
TAČNOST KOPIJE OVERAVA
SLUŽBENO LICE SUDA

GJYKATA E QARKUT NË PEJË • DISTRICT COURT IN PEJA • KOSOVO
KOSOVË UNMIK KOSOVO

108

SAKTË KOPJE E VËRTETË
NGA ORIGJINALI
KOSOVË

Mvc-002f (1280x960x16M jpeg)

109



KORJES E VËRTETON
PËRPUTHET ME GJYKATËS,
VËRTETUESI I GJUHËS
GJYKATA E DISTRIKTIT NË PEJË
KOSOVË
UNMIK
KOSOVO

110


UÇK
UÇK
UÇK

Mvc-004f (1280x960x16M jpeg)



SAKTËSINË E KOPJES E VËRTETON
NGA ORIGINALI GJYKATËS,
SHËRBIMI I PËRKTHYESVE DHE SHËRBIMI I GJUHËVE GJYKATA
KOSOVË
KOSOVO

Mvc-003f (1280x960x15M jpeg)

112





THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX G
CHART OF KLA DOCUMENTS

Reliability and Relevance of KLA Documents

Binder Tab	65 ter /Exh.	Date	ERN	Indicia of Reliability	Matters of Relevance
1	208	9 Feb 1998 (digit "8" erroneously translated as "3")	U002-0355	KLA identification card bearing "UCK" stamp, letterhead and signature "Ramush Haradinaj". This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows that "Dukagjini Operational Zone Command" issued identification cards, signed by Ramush Haradniaj, in February 1998. Probative of organization of KLA and role of Haradinaj. Also probative that Jabllanica was within the jurisdiction of the "Dukagjini Operational Zone Command" at that time.
2	209	June 1998	U002-0354	KLA identification card bearing "UCK" stamp, letterhead and signature "Ramush Haradinaj". This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows that "Dukagjini Operational Zone Command" issued identification cards, signed by Ramush Haradniaj, in June 1998. Probative of organization of KLA and role of Haradinaj. Also probative that Qallapek was within the jurisdiction of the "Dukagjini Operational Zone Command".
3	276	5 July 1998	U001-7011	KLA membership certificate bearing "UCK" logo, and has the same form as a document bearing Ramush Haradinaj's signature, as recognized by Bislim Zyrapi and attached to one of his statements which is Exhibit P118. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows that membership certificates were systematically issued to recruits, and that this recruit was issued with an automatic rifle. Probative of level of KLA organization and level of armament.
4	310	24 June 1998	U004-4445 – U004-4447	One of the signatures on these minutes appears to be that of Ramush Haradinaj. This same signature was identified by Bislim Zyrapi as the "long and short versions" of the signature of Haradinaj.	Shows Ramush Haradinaj as "commander" of the Dukagjin Operative Staff; participation of Lahi Brahimaj in the staff; and agenda of meeting probative of activities and level of organization of the KLA at this time.
5	333	2 July 1998	U001-5559 – U001-5560	This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows six KLA recruits from Gjakova, who are apparently waiting "in the facility in Tropoje [Albania", appealing to Ramush Haradinaj to supply them with weapons. Probative of KLA infrastructure in Albania and role of Haradinaj as leader of the organization.

Reliability and Relevance of KLA Documents

6	338	4 July 1998	U001-7004	KLA membership certificate bearing "UCK" logo, with the long and short version of Ramush Haradinaj's signature. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows that membership certificates were systematically issued to recruits, and that this recruit was issued with "2 bombs". Probative of level of KLA organization, level of armament, and command role of Ramush Haradinaj.
7	359	19 June 1998	U001-6995	KLA membership certificate bearing "UCK" logo, with the long version of Ramush Haradinaj's signature. This document is identical in form to a document recognized by Bislim Zyrapi and attached to one of his statements which is Exhibit P118. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows that membership certificates were systematically issued to recruits, and that this recruit was issued with "a semi-automatic rifle and 100 bullets". Probative of level of KLA organization, level of armament, and command role of Ramush Haradinaj.
8	360	15 May 1998	U001-6993	KLA membership certificate bearing "UCK" logo, with the long version of Ramush Haradinaj's signature. This document is identical in form to a document recognized by Bislim Zyrapi and attached to one of his statements which is Exhibit P118. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows that membership certificates were systematically issued to recruits in mid-May 1998, and that this recruit was issued with "a rifle". Probative of level of KLA organization, level of armament, and command role of Ramush Haradinaj.
9	361	7 July 1998	U001-6986	KLA membership certificate bearing "UCK" logo, with the long and short versions of Ramush Haradinaj's signature. This document is identical in form to a document recognized by Bislim Zyrapi and attached to one of his statements which is Exhibit P118. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows that membership certificates were systematically issued to recruits in mid-May 1998, and that this recruit was issued with "an automatic rifle". Probative of level of KLA organization, level of armament, and command role of Ramush Haradinaj.
10	534		U001-5695 – U001-5774	This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Shows number of individuals involved in the "Black Eagles", the dates on which they joined the KLA, and armament of the Black Eagles. Probative of the level of organization of the KLA and the Black Eagles, which is relevant both to the issue of the existence of an armed conflict and the means by which JCE was perpetrated.

Reliability and Relevance of KLA Documents

11	535	30 April 1998	U001-5855 – U001-5869	Daily reports written dated 30 April to 25 May, most of which bear a signature over the name "Xhevdeti". These documents were seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Reports show systematic patrolling and record-keeping for the period 30 April – 22 May 1998. Also demonstrate the inter-relationship of KLA village staffs in the Dukagjin Operational Zone.
12	567	28 June 1998	U001-5593 – U001-5594	The signature "Sali Veseli" appears at the bottom of this note, addressed to the Commander of the Dukagjin Operational Zone. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	Describes the first meeting between the KLA and the FARK forces, in Jasiq, on which both Witness 17 and Witness 29 gave testimony. Relevant to credibility of those witnesses' accounts. Also relevant to organization of the KLA, as the author urges Ramush Haradinaj to consult with the General Staff.
13	570	30 June 1998	U000-4036	This document is, in form, identical to other documents admitted as KLA documents, including Exhibits P157 and P158. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	The document suggests that Junik was under the command of the DukagjinOperative Staff at this time.
14	614	24 July 1998	U002-2649 - U002-2650	This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Harjit Sandhu.	The content of this document demonstrates that soldiers from Gllogjan were seconded to the village staff of Grgoc. Demonstrates the level of military integration within the KLA in the Dukagjin Operational Zone.
15	749	25 Aug 1998	U008-5619	This document bears the signature of Sadri Selca, and appears consistent with the signature of Sadri Selca on P897, admitted through Witness 17. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Barney Kelly.	This document corroborates the testimony of Witness 62 concerning the abduction of two individuals, one of whom was suspected to be a collaborator.
16	1000	20 July 1998	U009-1692	This "Appeal" is printed on KLA letterhead and bears the long-version of Ramush Haradinah's signature. This document was seized in accordance with the declaration of Deyan Mihov.	This document shows Ramush Haradinaj's directing control over the "Operative Staff of the Dukagjini Plane," including his purported control over "the KLA brigades". Also reflects the organization, goals and ideology of the KLA, which are probative of the existence of an armed conflict.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

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Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX H
KLA DOCUMENTS

Draft translation

KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY Dukagjini Operational Zone Command	
Sadri Azem ZENELI	(stamp)
d.o.b. **06/09/1951 Jabllanica**	
09/02/1993, Jabllanica Date and place of admission in KLA	
0350 No.	**07/01/2000** Date of expiry
	Commander Ramush Haradinaj /signed/

U0020355



USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS
Komanda e Zonës Operative të Dukagjinit

SADRI AZEM ZENEL
Emri Emri i babës

06.09.1951 JABLLANICË
Datëlindja Vendlindja

09.02.1993, JABLLANICE
Data dhe vendi i paraqitjes i UÇK

Gradi

LETËRNJOFTIM I USHTARIT

Nr. Rend. - 0350 -

Data e lëshimit 07.01.2000

Nënshkrimi

Komandanti

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS
ZONË OPERATIVE E DUKAGJINIT
UÇK

Draft translation

KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY Dukagjini Operational Zone Command	
AFRIM Hajdin SMAKIQI	
d.o.b. **10/08/1970, Jabllanica** /illegible/	Stamp
June, Çallapek Date and place of admission in KLA	Brigade
0926 No.	**19 March 2000** Date of expiry
	Commander Ramush Haradinaj /signed/

U0J20354

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS
Komanda e Zonës Operative te Dukagjinit

AFRIM HAJDIN SMAKUL

10.08.'70, DABELANICË E ÇESHI

QERSHOR 1998 GALLAPEK

— 0926 —

19.5.2000

Romeo Hasanaj

LETERNJOFTIM I USHTARIT

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS
ZONA OPERATIVE E DUKAGJINIT

KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY
Operative Zone No. _____
Operative Subzone _____

GENERAL INFORMATION ON

Ervin Shukri MEKIQI

(First name, name of father, last name)

Date of Birth:	*3 March 1977*
Place of Birth:	*Peja*
Place of Residence:	*Dardania*
Profession:	*Bicycle repairman*
Education:	*secondary school*
Physical Condition:	*average*
Marital Status:	*no*
Joined the KLA on:	*5 July 1998*
Equipped with:	*automatic rifle*

The above-mentioned data have been registered in the main register under number

Signature
/signature/

The Commander

/handwritten note/

Reinforcement in Loxha /Lodja/ - 20 July 1998. Ramush Haradinaj

U0017011

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS

ZONA OPERATIVE NR. _____

Nënzona operative _____

TË DHËNA GJENERALE PËR _____

EDVIN SHUKRI MEKIQI
(EMRI, EMRI I BABAIT DHE MBIEMRI)

DATA E LINDJES 03-3-1977

VENDI I LINDJES "REÇE"

VENDBANIMI DARDANIA

PROFESIONI BIKLIKALIST

PËRGATITJA SHKOLLORE SHKOLLA E MESME

PËRGATITJA FIZIKE I MESEM

GJENDJA FAMILJARE TO

DATA E ANGAZHIMIT NË UÇK 05-7-1998

I PAISUR ME ME AUTOMATIK

TË DHËNAT E LARTËSHËNUARA JANË REGJISTRUAR NË LIBRIN KRYESOR NËN NUMRIN RENDOR .....

NËNSHKRIMI

KOMANDANTI

U0017012

- Paraqitur në Gjykatë — 20-07-98 Ramush Haxhiu

16/18 /handwritten/

24 June 1998

Constituent meeting of the Dukagjin Operative Staff

Agenda:
1. Tasks of the command and organs of the command during wartime,
2. Organization of the formation and structure of the units in the zone of responsibility of the operation staff,
3. Teaching, training at the individual and collective levels, according to specialities,
4. Involvement of the command in the planning, coordination and range of action of integral units,
5. Planning of related documentation and progress in plans,
6. Material and funds for the accomplishment of military duties,
7. various matters.

1. Commander Ramush HARADINAJ /initialled/
2. Lahi BRAHIMAJ /signature/
3. Chief of Staff /signature: ?Salih Veseli/
4. Rrustem TETA /signature/
5. Operative No. 2 /signature/
6. Skënder REXHAHMETAJ /signature/
   Chief of armoured and anti-armoured forces

16/18

Me 24.06.1998.

Mëdhje konstituive e Shtabit operativ
të Dukadinit.

Rendi i ditës:

1. Detyrat e komandës dhe organeve
të komandës në luftë
2. Organizimi formacioni dhe shtabim
e njësive në zonën e përgjegjësisë
së Shtabit operativ.
3. Mësimi, shërbimet e nivelve
individuale, kolektive dhe
specialistike.
4. – Angazhimi i komandës në planë-
filim, koordinim dhe bashkëveprim
të njësive organike.

5.- Planifikimi i dokumenta rreth perkatës dhe përpunimi i plakës.
6.- Njetet materiale-financiare për krymrin e detyrave luftë
7.- Të mbrëthënë

1. Komandant Ramush Haradinaj
2. Lahi Brahimaj
3. Nexhat Daci
4. Rustem Teta, Sadri Ferati, Zavendës i Krysetarit Shtabit.
5. Operativ N=2
6. Skender Perezhiti, Krysetar i forcave ushtarake dhe kundër ushtarake

145

24.08.98.год.

Конститутивни састанак оперативног штаба „Метохије„

Дневни ред

1.Задаци команде и органа команде у борби
2. Формациона организација и структура у зони одговорности опертивног штаба
3. Настава колективне индивидуалне вежбе по својим специјалностима
4. Ангажовање команде као и координирање са осталим представницима
5.Планирање и документација и обраде планова.
6. Материјално финансијска средства за извршавање борбених задатака.

7. Разно

1. Командант Рамуш Харединај
2. Љахија Бердунај
3.....
4. Рустем Тетај,
5. Оперативац Н+2
6. Скендер Рађахметај, начелник специјалних снага за брзе интервенције.

Date of departure from Gllogjan 02 July 1998	Date of arrival at Tropoja 04 July 1998

Request

16/26

Commander (Ramush), we six individuals (of your staff) are men of Gjakova. We are not armed. We have been left alone in the facility in Tropoja for ages now.

We ask you to do something, either by telephone or by some other means, to provide us with arms.

We thank you for your understanding

1. Arsim GREZDA, leader
2. Fisnik UKMATA
3. Lirik BEJTULLAHU
4. Fatos HANA
5. Berat /…/XHIHA
6. Adonis BECI

written on 16 July 1998

U0015559

DATA E NISJES NGA GJEOGJANI 02.07.98.

DATA E ARRIJES NË TROPOJË 04.07.98

LUTJE

16/26

KOTRI KOMANDANT (RAMUSH) JEMI G. VETA TË (SHTABIT JONË) "GJAKOVARËT" DUK JEMI GJASHTË NË OBJEKT TË QEKOMES NË TROPOJË

JU LUSIM TË NDËRMERRNI VIÇKA ME LINJE TELEFONIKE OSE ME NDONJË MUNDËSI TJETËR, PËR ARMATIMIN TONË.

"JU FALEMINDERIT PËR MIRËKUPTIM"

1 ABSIM – LREZDA NDHILEGES
2 FISNIK – VEMATA
3 HIRIK – BEJTULLAHU
4 FATOS – HANA
5 BERAT – XHIHA
6 ADONIS BECI

DATA E SHKRIMIT 16.07.98

Jukmoto

7.62 普（鉄）

56式

30发

00155C0

Draft translation

KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY

OPERATIONAL ZONE Kosova no.1

Dukagjini operational sub zone 14/05

GENERAL DATA ON KLA

SHEFKI MEHMETI
(Name, Father's name and Last Name)

BIRTHDAY	5 April 1973
BIRTH PLACE	Prishtina
RESIDENCE	Çaçakut /Čačakut/
PROFESSION	Businessman
EDUCATION	
PHYSICAL TRAINING	
MARITAL STATUS	Average /as printed/
DATE OF JOINING KLA	4 July 1998
ISSUED WITH	Two bombs

THE ABOVE MENTIONED DATA ARE REGISTERED IN

THE MAIN BOOK UNDER THE ORDINAL NUMBER _ _ _

SIGNATURE	COMMANDER
Jeton Mehmeti	Ramush Haradinaj
/Signed/	/signed/

U0017004

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS

ZONA OPERATIVE NR. _____

Nënzona operative _____

TË DHËNA GJENERALE PËR UÇK

SHEFKI MEHMETI
(EMRI, EMRI I BABAIT DHE MBIEMRI)

DATA E LINDJES 05-04-~~1998~~ 1973

VENDI I LINDJES PRISHTINË

VENDBANIMI GAÇAKUT AG

PROFESIONI TREGTAR

PËRGATITJA SHKOLLORE

PËRGATITJA FIZIKE

GJENDJA FAMILJARE E MESME

DATA E ANGAZHIMIT NË UÇK 04-KORIK 1998

I PAISUR ME 2 BOMBE

- TË DHENAT E LARTËSHËNUARA JANË REGJISTRUAR NË LIBRIN KRYESOR NËN NUMRIN RENDOR .....

NËNSHKRIMI

KOMANDANTI

U001-6995-U001-6996-ET/Translation

KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY
Operative Zone No. I
Operative Subzone of Dukagjin 14/05

GENERAL DATA ON _____

SAMI META

(first name, father's name, and family name)

Date of birth	19 March 1967
Place of birth	Zagreb
Place of residence	M. Pijade 22/6, Peja
Profession	hydraulic engineer
Schooling	middle school – programming
Physical condition	average
Marital status	bachelor
Date of beginning of KLA service	19 June 1998
Equipped with	a semi-automatic rifle and 100 bullets. No. 68183

The above-mentioned data are registered in the main register under the file number .....

Signature
/signed/
Sami Meta

The Commander
/signed/
Ramush Haradinaj

U0016995/RE

/handwritten note/

19 July 1998 volunteer, semi-automatic rifle

U0016995

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS

ZONA OPERATIVE NR. 1

Nënzona operative E DURAGJIMIT 14/05

TË DHËNA GJENERALE PËR _____

SAMI META

(EMRI, EMRI I BABAIT DHE MBIEMRI)

DATA E LINDJES 19. III. 1967

VENDI I LINDJES ZAGREB

VENDBANIMI Y. FIJADE 22/6 PEJË

PROFESIONI HIDRAULIK

PËRGATITJA SHKOLLORE SHKOLLË E MESME - FAKRAMEX

PËRGATITJA FIZIKE MESATARE

GJENDJA FAMILJARE I PAMARTUAR

DATA E ANGAZHIMIT NË UÇK 19. VI. 1998

I PAISUR ME PUSHKË GJUSEM AUTOMATIKE

E 100 FISHEK Nr - 68183

- TË DHËNAT E LARTËSHËNUARA JANË REGJISTRUAR NË LIBRIN KRYESOR NËN NUMRIN RENDOR .....

NËNSHKRIMI

KOMANDANTI

U0016996

19-07-98 – Logje vullnetor Publiki qj sen auto-

Draft translation

KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY

OPERATIONAL ZONE NO. _____

Operational sub zone _____

GENERAL DATA ON

REMZI ZEKA, GAZMEND ZEKA
(Name, Father's name and Last Name)

BIRTHDAY	8 April 1976
BIRTH PLACE	Peja
RESIDENCE	Peja
PROFESSION	Barber
EDUCATION	Primary School
PHYSICAL TRAINING	Average
MARITAL STATUS	Good /as printed/
DATE OF JOINING KLA	15 May 1998
ISSUED WITH	Rifle. 10. /as printed/

THE ABOVE MENTIONED DATA ARE REGISTERED IN

THE MAIN BOOK UNDER THE ORDINAL NUMBER _ _ _

/a signature/

COMMANDER

Ramush Haradinaj

/signed/

Handwritten: reinforcement in Logja 21 July 1998

U0016993

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS

ZONA OPERATIVE NR. _____

Nënzona operative _____

TË DHËNA GJENERALE PËR _____

RAMI ZEKI GAZIMIRUZIMI

(EMRI, EMRI I BABAIT DHE MBIEMRI)

DATA E LINDJES 5.4.1975

VENDI I LINDJES [illegible]

VENDBANIMI [illegible]

PROFESIONI PUNËTOR

PËRGATITJA SHKOLLORE [illegible]

PËRGATITJA FIZIKE [illegible]

GJENDJA FAMILJARE [illegible]

DATA E ANGAZHIMIT NË UÇK 15.5.1998

I PAISUR ME PUSHK. 10.

- TË DHËNAT E LARTËSHËNUARA JANË REGJISTRUAR NË LIBRIN KRYESOR NËN NUMRIN RENDOR .....

NËNSHKRIMI

KOMANDANTI

U0016994

– Pri Jovicu ne Zogg – 21-07-98

Draft translation

KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY

OPERATIONAL ZONE __1

Dukagjini operational sub zone 14/05

GENERAL DATA ON _____

ARTAN Salih MANI
(Name, Father's name and Last Name)

BIRTHDAY	31 March 1972
BIRTH PLACE	Koplik
RESIDENCE	Koplik Mountain Range
PROFESSION	Construction technician
EDUCATION	Secondary School
PHYSICAL TRAINING	Average
MARITAL STATUS	Married
DATE OF JOINING KLA	7 July 1998
ISSUED WITH	Automatic rifle no. 018868

THE ABOVE MENTIONED DATA ARE REGISTERED IN

THE MAIN BOOK UNDER THE ORDINAL NUMBER _ _ _

SIGNATURE	COMMANDER
Artan MANI	Ramush HARADINAJ
/signed/	/signed/

U0016986

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS

ZONA OPERATIVE NR. 1

Nënzona operative Dukagjin 14/OC

TË DHËNA GJENERALE PËR _____

ARTAN SALIH MANI
(EMRI, EMRI I BABAIT DHE MBIEMRI)

DATA E LINDJES 31.3.1972

VENDI I LINDJES KOPLIK MALSI E MADHE

VENDBANIMI KOPLIK

PROFESIONI I MITERRAIS I NDERTIMIT

PËRGATITJA SHKOLLORE SHKOLLË BESME

PËRGATITJA FIZIKE I NESERMI

GJENDJA FAMILJARE I MARTUAR

DATA E ANGAZHIMIT NË UÇK 1.7.98

I PAISUR ME PUSH AUTOMATIKE ME NR. 018868

TË DHËNAT E LARTËSHËNUARA JANË REGJISTRUAR NË LIBRIN KRYESOR NËN NUMRIN RENDOR .....

NËNSHKRIMI
Artan Mani

KOMANDANTI
Ramush Haradinaj

Perforcom no thoplp 13-07-98

U0016987

ET U001-5695- U001-5774

/hand-written/ 407

/hand-written/ KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY

A notebook for the needs of the special unit

Mahir LAJQI	M 10 March 1981
Agim RAMOSAJ	March 26. 03 /?26 March/
RanëUKAJ	
Hajdar VATAJ	1 February 1976
Jusuf OSMONI	M 23 October 1979
Sabit KASTRATI	M /?13/ June 1977
Xhevdet KELMENDI	M 11 February 1979
Bekim ZEKAJ	M 28 November 1977
Naim LATAJ	M 21 January 1977
Bajrash ADEMAJ	M 6 December 1974
QeëUKAJ	M 9 November 1980
Arben BEKAJ	M 18 August 1975

Agim RAMOSAJ	(joined the KLA)	
Mahir LAJQI	Donji Ratiš, 26 March 1973	10 12 48
RanëUKAJ	Dašinovac, 1 February 1976	11057317
Hajdar VATAJ	Djakovica, 23 October 1979	5617087910
Jusuf OSMONI	Dobri Dol 13 June 1977	049 819
Sabit KASTRATI	Zahać, 11 February 1979	02824
Xhevdet KELMENDI	Peć, 28 November 1977	4212411
Bekim ZEKAJ	Solica, 21 January 1977	14192238
Naim LATAJ	Donji Ratiš, 6 December 1974	
Bajrush ADEMAJ	Ljumbarde, 9 November 1980	02539
QeëUKAJ	Peć, 18 August 1975	11112021
Arben BEKAJ		

Ammunition
400
ammunition, machinegun /as printed/
700, 7.62 mm
ammunition
220

ammunition - mortar
150, two shells

ammunition, shells
257, mortar 150 2 /as printed/

ammunition mortar 150 /as printed/
250, with /?1/ shell
ammunition
120 - *Zolja* hand-held rocket launcher
ammunition - machinegun 7.9 /as printed/
120 350

Name and Last name: Mahir LAJQI
Parent's name: Haxhi
Date of birth: 10 March 1981
Place, municipality and republic: Rogovo, Peć, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: trade
Education: secondary school
Weight: 81 kg
Height: 185 cm
Marital state: not married
Equipped with: automatic rifle no. 17085489/?/
Joined the KLA on: 18 May 1998
Remark:

Name and Last name: Agim RAMOSAJ
Parent's name: Zeqir
Date of birth: 23 May 1978
Place, municipality and republic: Carabreg, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: lathe worker
Education: technical gymnasium
Weight: 75 kg
Height: 180 cm
Marital state: not married
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on: 14 May 1998
Remark:

Name and Last name: Beg RIZAJ
Parent's name: Miftar
Date of birth: 25 December 1977
Place, municipality and republic: Prekoluka, Dečane, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: machinery technician
Education: secondary school
Weight: 87 kg
Height: 179 cm
Marital state: not married
Equipped with: automatic rifle no. 92821
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

Name and Last name: Astrit BERISHA
Parent's name: Jahë
Date of birth: 20 September 1976
Place, municipality and republic: Požare, Dečane, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: machinery technician
Education: technician
Weight: 77 kg
Height: 178 cm

Marital state: not married
Equipped with: automatic rifle no. 14161996
Joined the KLA on: 14 May 1998
Remark:

Name and Last name: Shkumbim LAJQI
Parent's name: Ali
Date of birth: 21 January 1982
Place, municipality and republic: Peć, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: science gymnasium
Weight: 58 kg
Height: 180 cm
Marital state: not married
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on: 13 October 1998
Remark:

Name and Last name:
Parent's name:
Date of birth:
Place, municipality and republic: R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital state:
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

Name and Last name:
Parent's name:
Date of birth:
Place, municipality and republic: R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital state:
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

Name and Last name:
Parent's name:

Date of birth:
Place, municipality and republic: R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital state:
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

Name and Last name:
Parent's name:
Date of birth:
Place, municipality and republic: R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital state:
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

Name and Last name:
Parent's name:
Date of birth:
Place, municipality and republic: R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital state:
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

Name and Last name:
Parent's name:
Date of birth:
Place, municipality and republic: R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital state:
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

ET U001-5695- U001-5774

Name and Last name:
Parent's name:
Date of birth:
Place, municipality and republic: R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital state:
Equipped with: automatic rifle
Joined the KLA on:
Remark:

Duty Hours

Day of the week	Name and Last name	Date	Work schedule	Remarks
Friday	Bekim BERINXHIKU	3 December 1998	from 7 to 7	
Saturday	Enver GJOCAJ	4 December 1998	7 - 7	
Sunday	RamëUKAJ			
Monday	Adem ISLAMAJ			
Tuesday	Valmir UKAJ			
Wednesday	Hajdar VATA			
Thursday				

***The Black Eagle* Special Unit**

Commander of the unit: *Toger*

Notes on the registration of the soldiers of the Unit

Commander of the Unit

Ramë UKAJ

Name and Last Name:
Parent's name:
Date of Birth:
Place, municipality and republic:
Nationality:
Profession:
Education:

Name and Last Name: Valmir UKAJ
Parent's name: Sokol
Date of Birth: 25 January 1978
Place, municipality and republic: Ljumbarde, Dečane, Republic of Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: Student
Education: Secondary school
Weight: 68 kg
Height: 168 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 14 April 1998
Equipped with: automatic rifle and a hand-held rocket launcher

---

Name and Last Name: RamëUKAJ
Parent's name:
Date of Birth:
Place, municipality and republic: Ratiš, Dečane, Republic of Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education:
Weight:
Height:
Marital status:
Joined the KLA on: 14 May 1997
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Bekim BIRINXHIKU
Parent's name: Ramadan
Date of Birth: 28 March 1975
Place, municipality and republic: Ćubrić, Srbica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: Car mechanic
Education: secondary school
Weight: 78 kg
Height: 175 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: /illegible/ April 1998
Equipped with: automatic rifle

Name and Last Name: Adem ISLAMAJ
Parent's name: Osman
Date of Birth: 27 June 1975
Place, municipality and republic: Rašić, Peć, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: primary school
Weight: 82 kg
Height: 182 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 15 August 1998
Equipped with: automatic rifle

Name and Last Name: Petrit MAZREKAJ
Parent's name: Haxhi
Date of Birth: 26 March 1967
Place, municipality and republic: Prilep, Dečane, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: Construction technician
Education: secondary school
Weight: 70 kg
Height: 175 cm
Marital status: married
Joined the KLA on: 2 April 1998
Equipped with: automatic rifle

Name and Last Name: Visar MIFTARI
Parent's name: Idriz
Date of Birth: 19 March 1980
Place, municipality and republic: Bajram Curri Street number 92, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: primary school
Weight: 70 kg
Height: 185 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 18 August 1998
Equipped with: automatic rifle

Name and Last Name: Albesian MATI
Parent's name: Sali
Date of Birth: 3 March 1982
Place, municipality and republic: Car Dušan Street number 51, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: Economist
Education: secondary school
Weight: 65 kg
Height: 170 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on:
Equipped with: automatic rifle

Name and Last Name: Lis KURTISHI
Parent's name: Agim
Date of Birth: 8 March 1983
Place, municipality and republic: Remzi PULA street number 34, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: secondary school
Weight: 70 kg
Height: 170 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 5 December 1998
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Luan DINA
Parent's name: Sami
Date of Birth: 22 December 1981
Place, municipality and republic: Migjeni Street number 34, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: gymnasium
Weight: 73 kg
Height: 178 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 8 December 1998
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Granit HALILOSMANI
Parent's name: Xhafer
Date of Birth: 6 April 1982
Place, municipality and republic: TefikÇanga Street number 44, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: gymnasium
Weight: 70 kg
Height: 170 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 11 November 1998
Equipped with: automatic rifle

ET U001-5695- U001-5774

Name and Last Name: Mimoza SHALA
Parent's name: Shëlzen
Date of Birth: 29 December 1981
Place, municipality and republic: Dërgut Vokshi Street number 7/1, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: gymnasium
Weight: 55 kg
Height: 162 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 17 November 1998
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Valentina LOTA
Parent's name: Muhamet
Date of Birth: 25 August 1982
Place, municipality and republic: Isa Grezda Street number 31, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: gymnasium
Weight: 50 kg
Height: 160 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 17 November 1998
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Saranda ARLLATI
Parent's name: Gani
Date of Birth: 27 May 1984
Place, municipality and republic: Skenderbeu Street number 55, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: primary school
Weight: 60 kg
Height: 160 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on:
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Albin GJOCI
Parent's name: Sylejman
Date of Birth: 21 July 1980
Place, municipality and republic: F. Ramadani Street number 21, Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: singer
Education: mechanic
Weight: 70 kg
Height: 170 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 8 December 1998
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Izet BRAHIMAJ
Parent's name: Bekë
Date of Birth: 6 July1978
Place, municipality and republic: Kašice, Istok, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: farmer
Education: primary school
Weight: 77 kg
Height: 177 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 31 December 1998
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Visar BRAHIMAJ
Parent's name: Brahim
Date of Birth: 13 October 1978
Place, municipality and republic: Kašice, Istok, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: student
Education: secondary school
Weight: 74 kg
Height: 174 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 9 September 1998
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Sabit KASTRATI
Parent's name: Haxhi
Date of Birth: 13 June 1977
Place, municipality and republic: Dobri Dol, Peć, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: trader
Education: secondary school
Weight: 75 kg
Height: 175 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 8 January 1999
Equipped with: automatic rifle

Name and Last Name: Ilir GASHI
Parent's name: Ahmet
Date of Birth: 15 March 1980
Place, municipality and republic: Kruševac, Peć, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: economist
Education: secondary school
Weight: 75 kg
Height: 185 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 15 April 1998
Equipped with: Automatic rifle no. 108209-90- /as printed

The *Black Eagles* Special Unit

Information on the registration of soldiers and the profession of their parents

Commander: *Toger*

Name and Last Name:
Parent's name:
Where does the father work?
Where does the mother work?

Name and Last Name: Ranë UKAJ
Father's name: Dervish
Mother's name: Havë
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Valmir UKAJ
Father's name: Sokol
Mother's name: Hyrije
Did your father work and is he still working? - He used to work in the vehicle spare-part factory in Peć but was removed from his job.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Bekim BIRINXHIKU
Father's name: Ramadan
Mother's name: Raze
Did your father work and is he still working? - He worked and still works in the education field.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Adem ISLAMAJ
Father's name: Osman
Mother's name: Hajrie
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Albin GJOCI
Father's name: Sylejman
Mother's name: Valbone
Did your father work and is he still working? - He works as a transporter in the *Ereniku* Enterprise.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Visar MIFTARI
Father's name: Idriz
Mother's name: /?Sose/
Did your father work and is he still working? - He used to work in the textile factory, but not anymore.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She works as a cook in the hospital.

Name and Last Name: Izet BRAHIMAJ
Father's name: Bekë
Mother's name: Raze
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was a farmer. He died recently.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Visar BRAHIMAJ
Father's name: Brahim
Mother's name: Sadie
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was employed in a road construction company but he was removed from his job.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Sabit KASTRATI
Father's name: Haxhi
Mother's name: Havë
Did your father work and is he still working? - He used to be a farmer. He died a long time ago.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Ilir GASHI
Father's name: Ahmet
Mother's name: Nurije
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Xhevdet MAKSUTAJ
Parent's name: Zekë
Date of Birth: 25 January 1976
Place, municipality and republic: Orobrdo, Istok, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: primary school /as printed/
Education: primary school
Weight: 80 kg
Height: 175 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: /illegible/ January 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Avni ELEZI
Parent's name: Smail
Date of Birth: 2 August 1981
Place, municipality and republic: Jablanica, Peć, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: primary school /as printed/
Education: primary school
Weight: 65 kg
Height: 175 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: /illegible/ January 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Sabedin MAVRAJ
Parent's name: Tahir
Date of Birth: 16 November 1980
Place, municipality and republic: /?Starodvorane/, Istok, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: primary school /as printed/
Education: primary school
Weight: 78 kg
Height: 185 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: /illegible/ January 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Xhevdet MAKSUTAJ
Father's name: Zekë
Mother's name: /?Cym/
Did your father work and is he still working? - He is a repairman.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Avni ELEZI
Father's name: Smail
Mother's name: Halime
Did your father work and is he still working? - He used to work as a painter in Peć. Now, he is not working.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She never worked. She is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Sabedin MAVRAJ
Father's name: Tahir
Mother's name: /?Sheri/
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: /illegible/
Parent's name: Misin
Date of Birth: 26 June 1981
Place, municipality and republic: Maznik, Dečane, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: karate
Education: primary school
Weight: 75 kg
Height: 175 cm
Marital status: not married
Joined the KLA on: 1 October 1998
Equipped with: Light machinegun

Name and Last Name: Arian QELA
Father's name: Misin
Mother's name: Kumrie
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Arben SHALA
Parent's name: Halil
Date of Birth: 5 August 1981
Place, municipality and republic: Dubovik, Dečane, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: football/as printed/
Education: secondary school, science
Weight: 70 kg
Height: 180 cm
Joined the KLA on: 15 February 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Arben SHALA
Father's name: Halil
Mother's name: Sabrie
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: /?Ramush/ SHALA
Parent's name: Sahit
Date of Birth: 17 May 1971
Place, municipality and republic: Dubovik, Dečane, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession:
Education: football /as printed/
Weight: 62 kg
Height: 175 cm
Joined the KLA on: 15 February 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: /illegible/ SHALA
Father's name: Sahit
Mother's name: /? Sam/
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: /?Ardian/ /?CANA/
Parent's name: Imer
Date of Birth: 4 August 1982
Place, municipality and republic: Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: football /as printed/
Education: primary school /as printed/
Weight: 64 kg
Height: 175 cm
Joined the KLA on: 15 February 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: /?Ardian/ /?CANA/
Father's name: Imer
Mother's name: /Qefsere/
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was a director. He is unemployed now.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She was and still is a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Muhamet /?MADANI/
Parent's name: Mustafa
Date of Birth: 22 November 1974
Place, municipality and republic: Starodvorane, Istok, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: mechanic
Education: primary school
Weight: 80 kg
Height: 175 cm
Joined the KLA on: 16 February 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Shaban /?MADANI/
Parent's name: Adem
Date of Birth: 5 September 1976
Place, municipality and republic: Starodvorane, Istok, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: barber
Education: primary school
Weight: 80 kg
Height: 175 cm
Joined the KLA on: 16 February 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Ranë MIFTARI
Parent's name: Shaban
Date of Birth: /?13/ October 1974
Place, municipality and republic: Starodvorane, Istok, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: footballer
Education: primary school
Weight: 75 kg
Height:
Joined the KLA on: 16 February 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Valon GUNGA
Parent's name: Emin
Date of Birth: /?12/ July 1982
Place, municipality and republic: Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: mechanic
Education: primary school
Weight: 65 kg
Height: 170 cm
Joined the KLA on: 16 February 1999
Equipped with:

Name and Last Name: Muhamet MADANI
Father's name: Mustafë
Mother's name: Duška
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She's always been a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Shaban MADANI
Father's name: Adem
Mother's name: Zojë
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was and still is a farmer.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She's always been a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Ramë MIFTARI
Father's name: Shaban
Mother's name: Miradi
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was an officer in the former Yugoslavia. He is dead now.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She's always been a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Valon GUNGA
Father's name: Emin
Mother's name: Verë
Did your father work and is he still working? - He worked as a driver. He is unemployed now.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She's always been a housewife.

Name and Last Name: Yll SALIHU
Parent's name: Hajdar
Date of Birth: 4 January 1979
Place, municipality and republic: Djakovica, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: football /as printed/
Education: secondary school
Weight: 62 kg
Height: 170 cm
Joined the KLA on: 17 February 1999
Equipped with:
Marital status: not married

Name and Last Name: Shëlqim SHABANI
Parent's name: Metë
Date of Birth: 20 February 1979
Place, municipality and republic: Dobrić, R. Kosovo
Nationality: Albanian
Profession: football /as printed/
Education: secondary school
Weight: 74 kg
Height: 182 cm
Joined the KLA on: 17 February 1999
Equipped with:
Marital status: not married

Name and Last Name: Yll SALIHU
Father's name: Hajdar
Mother's name: Sanije
Did your father work and is he still working? - He had an MA degree. He died.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She's always been a housewife.

ET U001-5695- U001-5774

Name and Last Name: Shkëlqim SHABANI
Father's name: Metë
Mother's name: Kumrije
Did your father work and is he still working? - He was a farmer. He /illegible/ twice.
Did your mother work and is she still working? - She's always been a housewife.

The special unit has the following weapons:

- four mortars: 150, two 500 with mortar shells and ten pieces of 150 /as printed/
- nine pieces of 500 /as printed/
- five automatic rifles
- two *10* rifles
- two machineguns
- one *Swiss* rifle

The special unit has the following weapons:

1) RanëUKAJ - a rifle, a 500 mm mortar and a full bandoleer.
2) Valmir UKAJ - an automatic rifle, a 150 mm mortar and a full ammunition belt.
3) Bekim BIRINXHIKU - an automatic rifle, a 150 mm mortar and a full ammunition belt.
4) Adem ISLAMAJ - one *Petica* (in Albanian - *Pesëshe*) machinegun (J) /?Yugoslav manufacture/ and a full ammunition belt.
5) Petrit MAZREKAJ - an automatic rifle, a full ammunition belt and a 500 mm mortar.
6) Visar MIFTARI - one *Petica* machinegun and a 150 mm mortar.
7) Albesian MATI - one *Desetka* (in Albanian - *Dhjetëshe)* rifle and /illegible/.
8) Albin GJOCI - one *Desetka* rifle.

/illegible/

Albin GJOCI
Avni ELEZI

~~Enver GJOCAJ - released from the special unit due to~~ /as printed/

Valmir UKAJ: "I am satisfied with the special unit and the officers". /a signature/
Adem ISLAMAJ: "I am satisfied with the special unit and the officers". /a signature/
Izet BRAHIMAJ: "I am satisfied with the special unit and the officers". /a signature/
Visar MIFTARI: "I am satisfied with the special unit and the officers". /a signature/

Commanders:

1. /?Toger/ - commander of the units
2. Valmir UKAJ - deputy commander of the units
3. RanëUKAJ - commander of a unit
4. Adem ISLAMI - commander of a unit and escort to the commander of the units.

ET U001-5695- U001-5774

RanëUKAJ	Remark:
Valmir UKAJ	Remark:
Enver GJOCAJ	Remark:
Adem ISLAMI	Remark:
Bekim BERINXHIKU	Remark:
Hajdar VATA	Remark:

For an identification card:

Albesian MATI
Albin GJOCI
Bekim BERINXHIKU
Visar MIFTARI
Izet BRAHIMAJ
Visar BRAHIMAJ
Sabit KASTRATI

407

U0015695

24607

IT-04-84-T

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE
E KOSOVS

11001569 6

BLLOK PER NEVOJA TE
NJESIS SPECIALE

24606

IT-04-84-T

MAHIR LAJQI	M 10.03 1981
AGIM RAMOSAJ	U0015697
RAM UKAJ	MARS 26.03
HAJDAR VATAJ	SHKURT 1. 02 1976
JUSUF OSMONI	M 23.10 1979
SABIT KASTRATI	M 13.06 1977
XHEVDET KELMENDI	M 11.02 1979
BEKIM ZEKAJ	M 28.11 1977
NAIM LATAJ	M 21.01 1977
BAJRUSH ADEMAJ	M 06.12 1974
QELË UKAJ	M 09.11 1980
ARBEN BEKAJ	M 18.08 1975

24605

IT-04-84-T

SAGIN RAMOSAJ	I.Kyqur në U,QIK RUGOV M 10.03.1981	1	U0015698	
MAHIR LAJQI	IRATISHIT I ULT M 26.03.1973	10 12 48	MUNICION 400	
RAM UKAJ	DASHINOC M 1.02.1976	11 05 73 17	MUNICION MITROLOZ 700 7.62	
HAJDAR VATAJ	GJAKOVË M 23.10.1979	5617087910	MUNICION 220	
JUSUF OSMONI	DOBERDOL M 13.06.1977	049 819	MUNICION MURTAJ 150 150 M 2 BREDHA	
SABIT KASTRATI	ZAHAQ M 11.02.1979	02 824	MUNICION 257 MURTAJ 150 2 PREDH	
HXEUDET KELMENDI	PEJË M 28.11.1977	4212411	MUNICION MURTAJ 150 250 ME 1 PREDH	
BEKIM ZEKAJ	SMOLIC M 21.01.1977	14 192238	MUNICION 120 ZOLL	
NAIM LATAJ	RATISH I ULT M 06.12.1974			
BAJRUSH ADEMAJ	LUMAR DHE M 09.11.1980	02539	MUNICION MITROLOZ 7.9 120 350	
QELË UKAJ	PEJË M 18.08.1975	11112021		
ARBEN BEKAJ				

24604

IT-04-84-T

EMRI -TE MBIEMRI: MAHIR ZAJAZI

EMRI I PRINDIT: HAXHI U0015699

DATA MUAJI DHE VITI LINDJES: 10. III. 1981

VENDI KUMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA: RUGOVE PEJË

R. E KOSOVES

KOMBSIA: SHQIPETAR

PROFESIONI: TREGTI

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE: SHKOLLA E MESME

PESHA 81 kg

GJATESIA: 185 cm

GENDJA FAMILJARE I PA MARTUAR

I PAISUR ME: PUSHK AUTOMATIKE 17085489

I KYÇUR NE UÇK: 18. V. 1998

VREJTJE:

24603

IT-04-84-T

EMRI D... MB EMRI: AGIM RAMUSAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT: ZEQIR U0015700

DATA MUAJI DHE VITI I LINDJES: 23. V 1978

VENDI KOMUNA REPUBLIKA: CARABREG

R. E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA SHQIPTAR

PROFSIONI: TORNITOR

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE: GJIMNAZI TEKNIK

PESHA 75 kg

GATSIA 180 cm

GJENDJA I PA MARTUM

I PAISUR ME PUSHK AUTOMATIKE

I KYÇUR NË UÇK: 14. V 1998

VREJTJE:

24602

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI: BEG RIZAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT: MIFTAR U0015701

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES.: 25.12.1977

VENDI KOMUNA RREPUBLIKA: PROKOLLUK DEÇAN

R.E KOSOVËS.:

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR.:

PROFESJONI TEKNIK I MAQENERIS

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE: SHKOLLA EMESME

PESHA 87 kg

GJATSIJA 1.79 cm

GJENDJA FAMILJARE. I PA MARTUAR

I PAISUR ME PUSHK ATOMATIKE. 92 821

I KYÇUR NË UÇ K.:

VREJTJE:

24601

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI: ASTRIT BERISHA

U0015702

EMRI I PRINDIT: JAHE

DATA MUAJI DHE VITI I LINDJES: 20.09.1976

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA POZHAR DEHM

R. E KOSOVES

KOMBSIA SHQIPETAR

PROFESIONI: TEKNIK I MAKINERIS

PERGADITJE SHKOLLORE TEKNIKE

PESHA: 77 kg

GJATSESIA: 1.78 cm

GJENDJA FAMILJARE: I PA MARTUM

I PAJSUR ME: PUSHK AUTOMATIKE 14.1.1996

I KYÇUR NË UÇK 14.V 1998

[redacted] VRETJE:

24600

IT-04-84-T

EMRI MBIEMRI: SHKUMBIM LAJQI

EMRI I PRINDRIT: ALI U0015703

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES: 21.01 1982

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA: PEJË

R. E KOSOVËS:

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR:

PROFESJONI: NXENS

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE: GJIMNAZ SHKENCOR

PESHA: 58 kg

GJATSIJA: 1.80 cm

GJENDJA FAMILJARE: I PA MARTUAR

I PAISUR ME PUSHK ATOMATIKE:

I KYÇUR NE UÇK: 13.10 1998

VREJTJE.

24599

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE ATBIEMRI

EMRI I PRINDRIT U0015704

DATA MUAJI DHE VITI I LINDJES

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA.

R.E KOSOVËS.

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR

PROFESJONI

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE.

PESHA

GJATSIJA

GJENDJA FAMILJARE

I PAISUR ME PUSHKË AUTOMATIKE

I KYÇUR NË UÇK

VREJTJE.

24598

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI

EMRI I PRINDRIT

U0015705

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES.

VENDI KUMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA

R. E. KOSOVËS

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR.

PROFESJONI

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE

PESHA

GJATSIJA

GJENDJA FAMILJARE

I PAISUR ME PUSHK AUTOMATIKE.

I KYÇUR NË UÇK.

VREJTJE.

24597

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE ,,BIEMRI

EMRI I PRINDRIT

U0015706

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES.

VENDI KUMUNA DHE REPOBLIKA

R.E KOSOVËS

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR.

PROFESJONI

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE

PESHA:

GJATSIJA:

GJENDJA FAMILJARE

I PAISUR ME PUSHK ATOMATIKE

I KYÇUR NË UÇK:

VREJTJE:

24596

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI

EMRI I PRINDIT

U0015707

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES.

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA

RE. E KOSOVËS

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR

PROFESJONI

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE

PESHA

GJATSIJA

GJENDJA FAMILJARE

I PAISUR ME PUSHK ATOMATIKE

I KYÇUR NË UÇK

VREJTJE

24595

IT-04-84-T

U0015708

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI

EMRI I PRINDRIT

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA

RE. E KOSOVËS

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR

PROFESJONI

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE

PESHA

GJATSIJA

GJENDJA FAMILJARE

I PAISUR MEPUSHK AUTOMATIKE

I KUÇUR NË UÇK.

VREJTJE.

24594

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI

EMRI I PRINDRIT U0015709

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES.

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA

RE.E KOSOVËS.

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR.

PROFESJONI

FËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE

PESHA

GJATSIJA

GJENDJA FAMILJARE.

I PAISUR ME PUSHK AUTOMATIKE

I KËSUR NË USK

VREJTJE.

24593

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI U0015710

EMRI I PRINDRIT

DATA MUAJ DHE VITI I LINDJES

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA

RE-E KOSOVES.

KOMBESIJA SHQIPTAR.

PROFESJONI

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE

PESHA:

GJATSIJA:

GJENDJA FAMILJARE

I PAISUR ME PUSHK ATOMATIKE.

I KYÇUR NE UÇK:

VREJTJE:

U0015711

ORË KUJDESTARIE

D.E. JAVES	EMRI MBIEMRI	DATA	ORARI I PUNES		VREJTJ
1.E PREMTE	Bekim Berimxhiku	3.12.98	7 deri 7		
2.E SHTUNE	Enver Gjocaj	4.12.98	7 — 7		
3.E DJELL	Ramë Ukaj				
4.E HONE	Ademë Islamaj				
5.E MARTE	Valmir Ukaj				
6.E MERKURE	MAJVAR VATA				
E EJTE					

24591

IT-04-84-T

„U.Ç.K."

Njesia Speciale

U0015712

„Shqiponjat e Zeza"

- Komandant i Njesive -

„Togeri"

Shenime mbi rexhistrimin e ushtareve te njesis komandant njesie

Çamë Unij

24590

IT-04-84-T

U0015713

EMRI dhe mbiemri -
EMRI i Prindit -
DT. Muji dhe viti i Lind-
vendi komuna dhe republika-
Kombesia -
Profesioni -
Rrethanat shkollore -

24589

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - VALMIR UKAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT - SOKOL U0015714

DATA MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 25-I-1979

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - LUMBARDH - DEÇAN - REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI - STUDENT

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - SHKOLLEN EMESME

PESHA - 68 KG

GJATESIA - 1,68 cm.

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - I PA MARTUAR

I KYÇUR NE UÇK - 14-04-1998

I PAISUR ME - P. AUTOMATIKE + MURATAJ DORE

24588

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI- RAM UKAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT- U0015715

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES-

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA- RATISHE

DEÇAN- REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA- SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI-

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE-

PESHA-

GJATESIA-

GJENDJA FAMILJARE

I KYÇUR NE UÇK- 14-05-1997

I POSUR me-

24587

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - BEKIM BIRINGIKU

EMRI I PEINDIT - RAMADAN 00015716

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 28.03.1975

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - ÇUBRA
SKENDERAJ R. E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTARE

PROFESIONI - AUTO MEKANIK

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - SH. MESME

PESHA - 78.

GJATESIA - 1.75 -

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - I PA MmartuAR

KUÇUR NE UÇK - 08.04.1998

PUNUAR NE - P. Automatike

24586

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI – Adem Jashmaj

EMRI I PRINDIT – Osmon

U0015717

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES – 27-06-1975

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA – RASHIÇ

I PAI – REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA – SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI – NXENES

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE – DH. FILLORE

PESHA – 82

GJATESIA – 1.82.

GJENDJA FAMILJARE – I PA martuar

I KYÇUR NE UÇK – 15.05. 1998

I PAISUR me – Pushk Automatike

24585

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - PETRIT MARKAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT - HAXHI

U0015718

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 26-03-1967

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - PRILEP DEÇAN, REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI - KONSTRUKTOTEKNIK

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - SH. MESME

PESHA - 70 KG

GJATESIA - 1.75 cm.

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - I MARTUAR

I LJÇUR NE UÇK - 02.04.1998

I PAISUR ME - P. AUTOMATIKË.

24584

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI- VISAR MIFTARI

EMRI I PRINDIT- IDRIZ U0015719

DATA MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES- 19.03.1980

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA- RR. B. CURR NR.92. GJAKOVE- REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA- SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI- NXENES

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE- Sh. FILLORE

PESHA- 70

GJATESIA- 1.85

GJENDJA FAMILJARE- I PA martuar

I KYÇUR NE UÇK- 18.08.1998

I POISUR ME- Pushk AUTOMATIKE.

24583

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - ALBESIAN MATI

EMRI I PËRNDIT - SALI

U0015720

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 03-08.1982

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - C. DUSHANI NR. 51, GJAKOVË, REPUBLIKA E KOSOVËS

KOMBËSIA - SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI - EKONOMIST

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE - Sh. MESME

PESHA - 65 KG.

GJATËSIA - 1.70 m.

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - i pa martuar

I ÇVÇUR NE UÇK -

I PËRSUR IMË - P. AUTOMATIKE

24582

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI – LIS KURTISHI

EMRI I PRINDIT – AGIM U0015721

DT. MUJI DHE VITI LINDJES – 08-03-1983

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA – RR. REMZI PULA – NR. 34, GJAKOVE, R. KOSOVES

KOMBESIA – SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI – NJOHES

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE – SH. MESME

PESHA – 70 KG

GJATESIA – 1.70 m

GJENDJA FAMILJARE – i pa martuar

I KNÇUR NE UÇK – 05-12-1998

I POISUR ME –

24581

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - LUAN DINA

EMRI I PRINDIT - SAMI U0015722

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 22.12.1984

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA -

MIGJENI NE SH. GJAKOVE REP. KOSOVES

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI - NXENES

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - GJIMNAZIST

PESHA - 73 KG

GJATESIA - 1,78 CM

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - I PA MARTUAR

I KYÇUR NE UÇK - 08.12.1998

I PAISUR ME -

24580

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI – GRANIT HALILOSMANI

EMRI I PRINDIT – GJAFER U0015723

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES – 06-04-1982

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA –

TEFIK ÇANGA NR. 44. GJAKOVË. REP. KOSOVË

KOMBESIA – SHQIPTAR.

PROFESIONI – NXENES

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE – Gjimnazist

PESHA – 70 kg

GJATESIA – 170 cm

GJENDJA FAMILJARE – i pa martuar

I KYÇUR NE UÇK – 11.11.1998

I PAISUR me – P. Automatike

24579

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI – MIMOZA SHALA

EMRI I PRINDIT – DHKELZEN

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES – 29.12.81

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA –
RR. DËRGUT VORSHI 7/1 – GJAKOVË R.E KOSOVËS

KOMBËSIA – SHQIPTARE U0015724

PROFESIONI – HXENËSE

PËRGADITJA SHKOLLORE – GJIMNAZ

PESHA – 55

GJATËSIA – 1.62 cm.

GJENDJA FAMILJARE – e pa martuar

I KYÇUR NË UÇK – 17.11.1998

I PAISUR ME –

24578

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - VALENTINA LOTA -

EMRI I PRINDIT - MUHAMET U0015725

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 25.08.1982

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA -
RR. ISA GREZDA NR. 31. GJAKOVË R. E KOSOVËS

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTARE

PROFESIONI - HYGJENISTE

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - GJIMNAZ

PESHA - 50 KG

GJATESIA - 1.60 cm

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - Pa martuar

I KYÇUR NE UÇK - 17.11.98 -

E PAISUR ME -

24577

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - SARANDA ARLATI

EMRI I PRINDIT - GANI U0015726

DATA MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 27.05.1984

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA -
RR. SKENDERBEU NR. 55. GJAKOVE
K. KOSOVES.

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTARE -

PROFESIONI - NXENESE

PERGADITJA BIKOLLORE - FILLORE

PESHA 60 kg

GJATESIA - 160

GENDJA FAMILJARE - e Po martuar

I KYÇUR NE UÇK -

I PAISUR NE -

24576

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - ALBIN GJOCI

U0015727

EMRI I PRINDIT - SULEJMAN

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 21.07.1980

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - RR.F.RAMADAN NR. 21, GJAKOVË R. E KOSOVËS

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI - KENGETAR.

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - AUTOMEKANIK

PESHA - 70 KG.

GJATESIA - 170 cm

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - I PA MARTUAR

I KYÇUR NE UÇK - 08.12.1998

I PAISUR ME -

24575

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - IZET BRAHIMAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT - BEKË

U0015728

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 06-07-1978

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - KASHICE

K. ISTOG - REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI - BUJK

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - SH. FILLORE

PESHA - 77 kg.

GJATESIA - 1.77 cm

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - I PA MARTUAR

I KYÇUR NG„UÇK" - 31. 12. 1998

I PRISUE ME.

24574

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI – VISAR BRAHIMAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT – BRAHIM U0015729

D.T. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES – 13-10-1978

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA – KASHICE

JUGOS. REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA – SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI – GJIMNAZIST

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE – SH. E MESME

PESHA – 74 KG –

GJATESIA – 1.74 CM.

GJENDJA FAMILJARE – I PA MARTUAR

I KYÇUR NE UÇK – 09-09-1998

PAISUR ME –

24573

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - SABIT KASTRATI

EMRI I PRINDIT - HAXHI

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 13.06.1977

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - DOBERDOL

PEJË - REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI - TREGTAR

PERGADITJA SHKOLLORE - SH. E MESME

PESHA - 75 KG

GJATESIA - 1,75 CM

GJENDJA FAMILJARE - I PA martuar

I KËQUR NE UÇK - 08-01-1999

I PAJISUR ME - Pushk Automatike.

U0015730

24572

IT-04-84-T

Emri dhe mbiemri- Ilir Gashi

Emri i prindit- AHMET U0015731

Vt. Hyji dhe viti i lindjes- 15-03-1980

Vendi komuna dhe republika- Kryshec

Komuna- Peje- Rep. e Kosovës

Kombësia- Shqiptar.

Profesioni- EKONOMIKIST

Përgatitja shkollore- Sh. e mesme

Pesha- ~~[illegible]~~ 75 kg.

Gjatësia- 1,85 cm.

Gjendja familjare- i pa martuar

i kyçur me uçk- 15-04-1998

i pajisur me - P.A. nr. 108209-90-

24571

IT-04-84-T

U0015732

Njesia Speciale

„SHQIPONJAT E ZEZA"

Shenime mbi Lexhisteimin e ushtareve si Dhe Profesionin e Prindeve –

Komandant – „Togeri"

24570

IT-04-84-T

EMRI Uhe MBIEMRI-

EMRI i Prindit

KU PUNON BABAI

KU PUNON NENA-

U0015733

24569

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - LAMË URAJ

EMRI I BABES - DERVISH

U0015734

EMRI I NËNES - HAVË

1. A KA PUNUAR DIKU BABA - KA QËNE DHE KA MBETUR BUJK

2. A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA

KA QENE DHE KA MBETUR AMVISE

24568

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - VALMIR UKAJ

EMRI I BABES - SOKOL.

EMRI I NENES - HYRIJE U0015735

1. A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABAJ

BABAJ KA PUNUAR NE FABRIKEN E AUTOPJESEVE

NEPËR JANI ESHTE I LARGUAR NGA PUNA

2. A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA

NËNA KA QËNE DHE KA MBETUR AMVISE

24567

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - Bekim Biringjiku

EMRI I BABES - RAMADAN

U0015736

EMRI I NENES - RAZE

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA-
KA PUNUAR DHE PUNON NE ARBIN

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA-
KAQËNE DHE KA MBETUR AMVISE

24566

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - ADEM JSLAMAJ

EMRI I BABES - OSMON

EMRI I NENES - HAJRIE

U0015737

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA.

KA QENE DHE KA MBETUR BUJK

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NENA.

KA QENE DHE KA MBETUR AMVISE

24565

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI- ALBIN GJOCI

EMRI I BABES- SULEJMON

EMRI I NENES- VALBONE

U0015738

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA-
BABAJ PUNON SI TRANSPORTUS NE NDERMARRJE
EN „ERENIKU"

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA-

KA QEN DHE KAMBETUR AMVISE

24564

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - VISAR MIFTARI

EMRI I BABES - IDRIZ

EMRI I NENES - SOSE U0015739

A. KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA

KA PUNUAR NE FABRIKEN E TEKSTILIT

POR ME NUK PUNON

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA

PUNON NE SPITAL SI KUZHINIERE

24563

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - IZET BRAHIMAJ

EMRI I BABES - BEKË

EMRI I NËNES - RAZE

U0015740

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA

BABA KA ÇEN BUJK DHE TANI KA KOHE ÇEKA VDEKUR -

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA

KA ÇEHE DHE KA MBETUR AMVISE

24562

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - VISAR BRAHIMAJ

EMRI I BABAIT - BRAHIM

U0015741

EMRI I NENES - SADIE

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA-

BABAJ KA PUNUA NE NDERTIMIN E KRUGEVE

TANI eshte i LARGUAR NGA PUNA -

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA-

KA QËNE DHE KA MBETUR AMVISE -

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI – SABIT KASTRATI

EMRI I BABES – HAXHI

EMRI I NENES – HAVE

U0015742

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA.

KA QENË BUJK DHE KA VDEKUR QE MOTI

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA

KA QENE DHE KA NDETUR AMVISE.

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI- ILIR GASHI

EMRI I BABAIT- AHMET

U0015743

EMRI I NENES- Nurije

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA-KA ÇËNE DHE KA MBETUR BUJK-

A KA PUNUAR DIKU DHE A PUNON NËNA KA ÇËNE DHE KA MBETUR AMVISE-

24559

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI - XHEVDET MAKSUTAJ

EMRI I PRINDIT - ZEK

U0015744

DT. MUJI DHE VITI I LINDJES - 25-1-1976

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - ORODERD ISTOG

REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES - ISTOG

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTAR +

PROFESJONI - FILLOREN

PREGADITJA SHKOLLORE - FILLOREN

PESHA - 80

GJATSIA - 1,75

GJENDJA - I PA MARTUR

I KYQUR NË UÇK - QIT. 1999

I PAIGUR -

24558

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI – AVNI ELEZI

EMRI I PRINDIT – SMAIL

U0015745

DT. MUJ DHE VITI I LINDJES – 2.8.1981

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA – JABLLANIC. I PEJËS

REPUBLIKA E KOSOVËS – PEJË

KOMBESIA shqiptare +

PROFESJONI – FILLORE

PREGATITJA shkollore – FILLORE

PESHA – 65

GJATËSIA – 1,75

GJENDJA – I PA MARTUAR

I KYQUR NË UÇK – 01.7.1999

I PAKYÇUR –

24557

IT-04-84-T

EMRI I MIEMRI - SABEDIN MAVRRI

00015746

EMRI I PRINDIT - TAHIR

DT. MUJ DHE VITI LINDJES - 16.11.1980

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA - STARADORAN

REPUBLIKA E KOSOVES ISTOG

KOMBESIA shqiptare +

PROFESIONI - FILLOREN

PREGADITJA SHKOLLORE - FILLORER

PESHA - 1,78

GJATESIA - 1,85

GJENDJA - I PA MARTUR

I KALUAR NË UQK - 0,1,1999

I PA ISUK -

24556

IT-04-84-T

EMRI D. N. EMRI - Xhevdet MAKSUTAJ

EMRI BABES - ZEK

U0015747

EMRI NENES-CYM

A KA PUNUR DIKU DHE A PUNON BADAJ
BABAJ PUNON MESHTRI

AKA PUNUR DIKU DHE A PUNON NENA
NENA SKA PUNUR NENA asht AMVISTE

24555

IT-04-84-T

EMRI I E BIEMRI - AVNI ELEZI

EMRI I BABES - SMAIL

EMRI I NENES - HALIME

U0015748

KA PUNUR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA
BABAI PERPARA KA PUNUR NULER NE PE/
NDRESA TASH NUK PUNON FARE
KA PUNUR DIKU DHE A PUNON NENA
NENA SKA PUNUR AS PUNON ESHT AMVISE

24554

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE i BIEMRI - SABEDIN MAVRAJ

MRI i BABES - TAHIR

MRI i NENES - SHERI

U0015749

KA PUNUE DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA
ABA/ BUJK KA QEN BUJK osht

KA PUNUE DIKU DHE A PUNON ~~BABA~~ NENA
NENA AMVISHE KA QEN AMVISHE osht

EMRI: PRENDIT, MOSIN U0015750

DT. MUJ DHE VITI LINDJES - 20.6.1981

VENDI: KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA, MAZNIK

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES, DEGAN

KOMBESIA: SHQIPTARE

PROFESIONI: FILLORENI

PREGATITJA: KARATE

PESHA: 75

HATSIA: 1,75

EMRI I PA MARTUAR

VDQUAR NE UQK 1.10.1998

DAISUR NE MILICOTE ILET IDORO

RI I E BIGMRI, AKIAN GCTA

RI BABES MUIN U0015751

RI NANES KUMRIE

A PUNUR DIKU DHE A PUNON BABA
BRI KA QEN BUJK DHE CSHT BUJK

A PUNUR DIKU DHE A PUNON NENA
ENA AMVISHE KA QEN AMVISHE CSHT

24551

IT-04-84-T

EMRI, DHE ATEMRI ARDERSHALA

EMRI I PRINDIT HALIL U0015752

DT MUJ VITI LINDJES 5.8.1981

VENDI KOMUNA DIK REPUBLIKA DUBOVIK

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES DOGANI

KOMBESIA, SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI KRESITER SHKOLLOR

PREGADITJA, FAQE 11

PESHA, 70

GJATESIA, 1,80

DOKUMENTI MBI LËSHIMIN, 15-2-1999

I PAFUNDËSHËM

EMRI J.E DIEMI MEDEN SHALA

EMRI BABES, HALIL

EMRI NANES, SABRI

U0015753

AKA PUNUK DHE MUNGON BABA DIKU
BABAJ KA DER BUK DHE GOLT BUK

AKA PUNUK DHE AFUPUT NENA DIKU
NENA AMUSTE KAQEN DHE AMUSTE
DE GOLT

24549

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE I. DIEMRI FHUSUR SHALA

EMRI PRINDIT SAHIT U0015754

DIT MUJ DHE VITI LINDJES 17.5 1971

VENDI KËMBËNA DHE REPUBLIKA DUBROVNIK

REPUBLIKA KOSOVËS DEGRAN

KOMBËSIA, SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI

PREGADITMA FUNDISORE

PESHA 162

GJATËSIA 175

I KYQUR NË HQK 15-2-1999

I PAISUR

EMRI DA[illegible] MBEMRI [illegible]

EMRI BABES DANI[illegible]

EMRI KOMES ISAM

U0015755

AKAR PUNUE DIKU BABAM DHE A PUNON
BABAI BUIK KAQEN SHE ISHT BUIK
AKA PUNUE DIKU NENA DHE A PUNON
NENA A MUSHTE KA QEN DHE A MUSHTE ISHT

24547

IT-04-84-T

EMRI [illegible]

EMRI PRINDIT INER U0015756

DT. MUJ. DHJETOR VITI LINDJES 4.8.1982

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA XHAKOV

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES XHAKOV

KOMBESIA, SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI FILLORE

PRANIMI I FUNKSIONIT

FAKTA 64

XHATSIA 1,75

LYQUR 15.2.1999

PAISUR

[illegible] HEDIHT KAMA

EMRI BABES IMER

U0015757

EMRI MENES QETSERE

BKA PUNUK DIKU DHE A PUNON BABAI
BABAI KA QEN DREJTUR DHE ISH SPUNUR NE

BKA PUNUR DIKU DHE A PUNON MENA
NENA KA QEN AMVISTE DHE AMVISTE ISHT

24545

IT-04-84-T

EMRI I E BIEMRI MUHAMET MADANI

EMRI PRINDI MUSTAFA

00015758

DT MUJI DHE VITI LINDJES 22.11.1974

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA STARRDRAM

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES ISTOG

KOMBESIA SHQIPTAR

PROFESIONI FIKLOREN

PREGATITJA MEKANIK

PESHA 80 kg

LARTESIA 1,75

KOQUR 16.2.1999

PAISUR

EMRI - ME I SIENRI SHABAN RADANI

EMRI PRINDIT ADEM U0015759

DT. MUJ DHE VITI LINDJES 5.9.1966

VENDI: KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA STARADORAN

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES ISTOG

KOMBESIA: SHQIPTARE

PROFESIONI: FILLORER

PREGADITJA: BERBER

PESHA: 80 Kg

GJATESIA: 1,75

IKYRUE: 16.2.1999

I PALISUR

24543

IT-04-84-T

EMRI, B.E. AI KAM MITRAKI

U0015760

EMR PRINDIT SHABAN

DT. MV DHE VITI LINDJES 13.10.1974

VEND KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA SHKRUARAN

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES VIOG

KOMBESIA SHQIPTARE

PROFESIONI FILLORENI

PREGATITJA FAKSHME

PESHA 75 kg

XHAMIA

I KUQUR 16.2.1999

I PAISUR

24542

IT-04-84-T

EMRI I ATI EMRI VALON GUNGA

EMRI PRINDIT EMIN

U0015761

DT NU DHE VITI LINDJES 12 7, 1982

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA VHAKOV

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES VHAKOV

KOMBESIA SHQIPTARE

PROFESIONI FIZIKANT

PREGATITJA MEKANIK

PESHA 65 kg

XHATSIA 1,70

SHKYRJE 16.12.1999

SHPAIJOR

EMRI . BIE AI MUHAMET MADANI

EMRI BABES MUSTAF

U0015762

EMRI NANES DUSHKA

AKA PUNUR DHE A PUNON BABA DIK
DHA KA QER BUJK EDHE BUJK esht

AKA PUNUR DHE A PUNON NANA DIKU
EDHA AMUSTIC KA QER AMUSTIC esht

EMRI TË TRI SHËNJAT MADHA

EMRI BABES ADAM

EMRI MANES ZOJ

U0015763

AKA PUNUE DHE A PATËN BABA DIKË
BABAI BUJK KA QENË BUJK ESHT

AKA PUNUE DHE A PATËN NENA DIKË
NENA AMERISË KA QENË AMERISË ESHT

EMRI MD. MRI RAM KITTAR

EMRI BABES SHABAN

U0015764

EMRI NAMES MIRADI

AKA PUNUR DHE A PUNON BABA DIKA
BABA/ ~~Bajk~~ KAQEN OFICIR MI ISH JIC
DHE KA KDEK
AKA PUNUR DHE A PUNON NENA DIKU
KENA AMVISTE KA QEN AMVISTE ESHT

EMRI HE ZBIEMRI VALON GUNGA

EMRI BABOS EMIN

U0015765

EMRI MAMES VGR

AKA PUNUE DHE A PUNON BABA DIKU
BABA, KA PUNUR SHUFER POR FMSH SPUN
ON DOT
AKA PUNUE DHE A PUNON KENA DIKU
KENA AMUSTE KH QER DHE AMUSTE
SHT

24537

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DHE MBIEMRI YLL SHQIPH

EMRI I PRINDIT HAJDAR 110015766

DT. MUJ DHE VITI LINDJES 4.1 1979

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA XHAKOV

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES XHAKOV

KOMBESIA – shqiptare

PROFESIONI SHKOLLTON emesme

PREGADITJA FUTBOLL

PESHA – 62 kg

XHATSIA 1,70

I KYQUR 17.2.1999

I PA ISUR

I MARRUR JO

24536

IT-04-84-T

EMRI DH MBIEMRI SHKELQIM SHABANI

EMRI PRINDIT MEF

U0015767

DT. MUJ DHE VITI LINDJES 20.2.1979

VENDI KOMUNA DHE REPUBLIKA DOBRITHË

REPUBLIKA KOSOVES DOBRITHË

KOMBESIA - SHQIPTARE

PROFESIONI AKTUAL

PREGADITJA - FUSHAOLL

RESHA - 74

KHATSIA 1,82

I KUQUR NE 17.2.1999

I PAISUR

I MARTUAR JO

emri i fabrikës gjl shëlitë

emri babës hajdar

emri nënës shanie

U0015768

Atë punë dhe a punon para dikujt
barbaj ka një ministër dhe ku
jetoi

Atë punë dhe a punon para dikujt
nëna ka një ministër dhe cilët
janë.

EMRI I AI MBIEMRI SHKOLLOR SHKOLLA

EMRI BABES MEM

U0015769

EMRI NANES KUNIVE

A KA PUNUAR DHE A PUNON DHJA DIKU
BABAI KA QEN BUJK OSHT PLAGUR E
HERE
BEKA PUNUAR DHE A PUNON NENA DIK
NENA AMVISHE KA QEN AMVISHE
OSHT.

24533

IT-04-84-T

U0015770

Ne njësi speciale i kem
keto arme
4 murtaja 150 2 500 me
Bre oka 10 copa 150.
9 copa 500
5 p. automatike
2 dhetshe
2 mitraleza
1 pushke zvicrane

24532

IT-04-84-T

Njesija specjale posedonë
me kto armë

1/ RAMe ukaj - pushke + murtaje 500 + gjuksore kompleT

2/ VALMIRë ukaj - P. ATOMATIKë + murtaj 150 me gjuksore kompleT

3/ Bekim Biriqikiu P. ATOMATIKë + murtaje 150. gjuksore kompleT

4/ ADe me Islamaj MITROLezi M(j) petice + P. ATOMATIKë me gjuksore kompleT

5/ PETRIT MAZREKAJë P. ATOMATIKë me gjuksore kompletë + murtajen 500

6/ VISAR MITARë MITROLezë pecme + murtajë 150

7/ ALBESJANC MATI PUSHKë OHETSHë

8/ ALBINC GJOCI Pë OHETSHë

~~Visar P. Chakdvn~~

Aldin Khoci

Avni Elezi

0015771

~~ENVER GJOCAJ LIROHET PREJ~~
~~NJIAN SPECIALE PERSHKRUE~~

VALMIR UKAJ JAM I KNAÇUN
ME NJIRIN SPECIALE PO
DHE EPROC JAM KNAÇUN

U0015772

ADEM ISLAMAJ JAM I KNAÇUN
ME NJISIN SPECIALE DHE EPROR.

IZET BOHUMAJ
JAM I KNAÇUN ME NJISIN SPECIALE
DHE EPROCIN JAM I KNAÇUNI

VISAR MIFTARI
JAM I KNUÇN ME NJISIN SPECIALE
DHE EPLORT JAM KNAÇUN

VISARI
VISAR

24530

IT-04-84-T

KOMANDUZTE

1 TOGLI KOMANDANT I NJISIVE

2 VALMIR UKAJ ZV. KOMANDANTI I NJISIVE

3 ZAM UKAJ KOMANDAT I NJIS

4 ADEM ISLAMI KOMANDAT I NJISIS
PCIS ~~PER~~
PERCBCC
I KOMANDATI
TE NJISIVE

00015773

24529

IT-04-84-T

U0015774

RAM	UKMJ	~~VRETJ~~ VREJTE
VALMIR	UKMJ	VREJTE
ENVER	GJOCMJ	VREJTE
ADEM	ISLAMI	VREJTE
BEKIM	BERINXHIKU	VREJTE
HAJDAR	VATA	VREJTE

PER	LETERNJOVTIM
ALBESMAN	MATI
ALBIN	GJOGI
BEKIM	BERINXHIKU
VISAR	HIFTARI
FZET	BRAHIMAJ
VISAR	BRAHIMAJ
SADIT	KASTRATI

ET U001-5855- U001-5869

/hand-written/ T-21 198

No. 1
30 April 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

I am writing this report from the time when I was entrusted with the task of designating guards and their patrol. On 30 April 1998, the main points and the guards on these points were designated. During the night patrol, I noticed many irregularities, for example, the /?disregard of sleeping hours/, failure to carry out ? /as printed/, but I also noticed that the lack of experience in this time /as printed/.

During Ilir and Xhevdet's patrol, we were forced to fire our weapons in order to calm their nerves during duty hours.

/a signature/

No. 2
1 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

The second day of the patrol: The situation on the points were we fired our weapons somehow has changed. They seemed more in order and on certain main points ? /as printed/. However, we were forced to fire our weapons on those points as well, in order to calm their nerves /as printed/.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

ET U001-5855- U001-5869

No. 3
2 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

On this date, I was forced to make a change in point number seven and to bring /?them/ to point number two. There were certain objections but I brought them there. During this night, Ilir and myself, Xhevdet, were on patrol. There was an attack during the day and the lack of physical readiness was obvious because during the night they had felt tired /as printed/.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

No. 4
3 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

It was a brief experience. There were some problems which were solved without any need for urgent intervention.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti

No. 5
4 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

Two other changes were carried out today with regard to the points. Point number two is now on the other side of the river, in a house, and it is called point number two /as printed/.
Point number six has been cancelled and moved to an apple garden. It is now called point number three.

/a signature/

---

4 May 1998

When Faik was dismissed, his uniform and weapon were taken from him.
Faik's weapon was given to private Arben MATAJ. Faik's uniform has been taken and is now folded until the designated moment.
Faik has been temporarily dismissed from military duty and is working in the kitchen.

Sami GJOCI

Faik had his uniform and weapon returned. He is back on duty under the condition that he does not consume alcohol.

/a signature/

No. 6
5 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

, Ilir and Xhevdet were on patrol this night. Everything was stable and in order.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

No. 7
6 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

Sami and Xhevdet patrolled all the points last night. They are a good example for the rest because it is evident now that the situation with guard duty has stabilised and the earlier fear is gone.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

No. 8
7 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the terrain patro, Xhevdet and Ilir noticed that the level of guard duty was satisfactory at all points. Our remark would be to improve guards' observation skills.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

ET U001-5855- U001-5869

No. 9
8 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

We had no problems during our patrol. Everything is going on well and without problems.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

No. 10
9 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During our patrol we didn't have any problems. The level of guard duty is satisfactory and we don't have remarks.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

No. 11
10 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the patrol, we moved one of the points a bit forward and it turned out to be a very successful move. During the patrol, Xhevdet and Ilir did not have any remarks.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

These soldiers are on duty only during the day
Three /?soldiers/ from Prilep

1. Petrit MAZREKAJ
2. Sami LOKAJ
3. Shpend LOKAJ

Three /?soldiers/ from Glodjane village

4. Burim MEHMETAJ
5. Zhuj HAMZA
6. Burim MUSTAFA

/?11/ May 1998

Today's shift is carried out by five volunteers from Gramačelj village. One of them is from Babaloč village.

1. Beqir AGAJ
2. Isa DOBRA
3. Blerim CUFAJ
4. /?Xhemshit/ KUQI
5. Metë ALIA
6. Naser HUMAJ from Babaloč

/?/ May 1998

Today's shift is from Glodjane

1. Lan ISUFAJ
2. Faton MALAJ
3. Agron HAMZAJ
4. Burim MUSTAFAJ
5. Zhuj HAMZAJ
6. Ardian MALAJ

---

8 May 1998

During the control conducted on 8 May 1998 by Sami GJOCI and Xhevdet SHALA, the level of military discipline is satisfactory on all points. We concluded that the number of soldiers on point number one must increase. Everything is in a good order on the points controlled by *Maliqi.*

9 May 1998

We have no remarks. It is important to mention that on 9 May 1998, there were more attacks compared to other days, nevertheless there was no lack of mobilisation from our side.

10 May 1998

As usual, all guard duty points were checked and we are satisfied with the vigilance.
Yet, there are remarks. Soldiers lack physical preparation and adequate measures should be taken for the above.
We met with *Maliq* and Ilir and we consulted them on the future work.

11 May 1998

During our patrol, we decided that we observe the terrain with the competent persons before we establish a new point.
On *Maliq*'s point, the terrain was observed by him and the co-ordination of guards was carried out perfectly well.

ET U001-5855- U001-5869

12 May 1998

The guard duty points controlled by Sami and Xhevdet were in a good and satisfactory level.

/signed/

No. 12
/?11/ May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the earlier patrol, we observed that a new point be established in a designated place. During the patrol, Ilir and Xhevdet had no remarks.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

No. 13
12 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

Sami and Xhevdet had no problems during the patrol. There were no complaints and the guards performed well.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

No. 14
13 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the night patrol, Xhevdet, Fazli and Florim checked all the points and had small problems which were easily overcome. There is a remark. Namely, in point number 10, only one of the guards should go for the shift-change, not both of them, because they leave the position unmanned by doing so.

Reporting officer
Xhevdeti
/a signature/

ET U001-5855- U001-5869

No. 15
14 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the patrol, Xhevdet and Ahmet noticed that there were no problems at any of the points, except for point number nine where the two guards designated for guard duty had abandoned their post.

/a signature/

---

13 May 1998

During this time, we eliminated a dangerous phenomenon. During guard duty, only on of the guards shell leave the post, not both of them. The patrol this night was carried out by Xhevdet, Fazli and Florim.

14 May 1998

While patrolling the points which had been recently moved, we observed that the guards were not fulfilling their duty in a satisfactory manner, for example, points number two, three, five and six. We consulted again *Maliqi* with regard to future work.

15 May 1998

During the check on point two, three and four which had been moved, we concluded with *Maliq* that the moving was reasonable and that the number of guards should increase for the purpose of military readiness.
Maliq's remark was that the plan for guard duty on point number three was in order but nut carried out by two persons. Namely, Mal ZEQIRAJ and Sylejman ZEQIRAJ, who were designated for guard duty on point number three, violated the orders by not coming out on the above location to /?greet the officers/. What is worse, the above persons abandoned guard positions on the front and left the village which is situated on the frontline with the enemy. They went to their homes. I specifically request that you ask the persons who you sent on guard duty on the front whether they are willing to stand guard duty and to advise them pursuant to the military regulations.

With respect,
Maliqi /a signature/

/?13/ May 1998

Today's shift is from Glodjane village.

1. Mustafë MALAJ
2. Bekë DERVISHAJ
3. Ramë BAJRAMAJ
4. Halit MEHMETAJ
5. Afrim MEHMETAJ

15 May 1998

Today's shift comes from Šaptelj village, with the exception of one person who comes from Dubrava village.

1. Dervish LUSHAJ
2. Fadil HAJDARAJ
3. Petrit SOKOLI
4. Sylë LUSHAJ
5. Isni LUSHAJ
6. Rexhep LLOQANI from Dubrava village

18 May 1998

Today's shift comes from Glodjane.

1. Arben QERIMAJ
2. Florim MUSTAFAJ
3. Hasim HALILAJ
4. Driton MUSTAFAJ
5. Agron MUSTAFAJ
6. Behlul QERIMAJ
7. Agim SELMANAJ

Volunteers who stand guard duty until their friends return from the journey:

Behlul QERIMAJ
Agim SELMANAJ

/hand-written/ Xhevdeti

No. 16
15 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the patrol, Xhevdet and Ahmet had no remarks. While checking point number two, three and four which had been moved, we concluded with *Maliq* that the moving was reasonable and that the number of guards should increase for the purpose of military readiness.

Patrol carried out by:
1. /hand-written/ Xhevdet /a signature/
2. /hand-written/ Ahmet /a signature/

Zone leader
Maliqi
/a signature/

No. 17
16 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*

DAILY REPORT

At 0030 hours, a fierce attack began, first with fireworks /as printed/ and machineguns and proceeded later with heavy shelling, particularly on point number one. During the shelling, the following persons were wounded: Fazli, the person in charge of the point, who was replacing Ilir when the attack took place; Ramiz and Dervish, both standing guard duty on this point. We requested help from *Maliq* via radio and we took the first two who were wounded to the designated location. *Maliq* came back shortly after and having consulted him, we carried out the orders and mobilised.
The next day, after having consulted *Maliq* again and having observed the terrain, the location of the point was changed.
During this meeting, we requested from the staff a substitute for Fazli.
We did not patrol this night due to security reasons since the enemy continued to attack with rifle grenades.

Zone leader
Maliqi
/a signature/

/hand-written/ 15 May 1998, Babaloč village

According to the plan for guard duty, everything was in order at point number three, but this plan (or this order) has not been respected by two persons. Mal ZEQIRAJ and Sylejman ZEQIRAJ who were designated for guard duty on point number three violated the orders by not coming out on the above location to fulfil military orders. What is worse, the above persons abandoned guard position on the front and left the village which is situated on the frontline with the enemy. They went to their homes. I specifically request that you ask the persons you sent on guard duty on the front

whether they are willing to stand guard duty and to advise them pursuant to the military regulations.

With respect,
Maliqi

/?15? May 1998

reporting officers: *Xhevdet* and *Maliq*

DAILY REPORT

During the check on point two, three and four which had been moved, we concluded with *Maliq* that the moving was reasonable and that the number of guards should increase for the purpose of military readiness.
Maliq's remark was that the plan for guard duty on point number three was in order but nut carried out by two persons. Namely, Mal ZEQIRAJ and Sylejman ZEQIRAJ, who were designated for guard duty on point number three, violated the orders by not coming out on the above location and by failing to adhere to the military rules. What is worse, the above persons abandoned guard position on the front and left the village which is situated on the frontline with the enemy. They went to their homes. I specifically request that you ask the persons you sent on guard duty on the front whether they are willing to stand guard duty and to advise them pursuant to the military regulations.

With respect,
Maliqi

No. 18
17 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the terrain patrol, everything was in order and there were no complaints from the guards.

Zone leader:
Maliqi
/a signature/

No. 19
18 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During tonight's patrol there were no problems and no remarks. The guard duty was stable.

Zone leader:
Maliqi
/a signature//

No. 20
19 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the check on guards carried out by Sami, Avdi and myself, we concluded that the level of guard duty was satisfactory, with the exception of point three. We went up to the trench. We also checked on the house where the guards go for a rest but we did not see the guards on the point /as printed/. I request that adequate measures be taken for the above. We did not patrol of the points that has been removed, point number seven respectively.

1. Sami /a signature/
2. Avdi /signature/

Zone leader:
Maliqi
/a signature//

No. 21
20 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During today's control, everything was in a good order and we had no remarks. A young man from point number eight escaped from the place used by the guards for a rest. His name is Adriatik SELMANAJ from Babaloč. He was sent to the designated location at point number eight.

Zone leader:
Maliqi
/a signature//

---

20 May 1998

The shift in Glodjane was carried out by the following soldiers:

1. Besim SELMANAJ
2. Shkëlzen BEZERAJ
3. Nexhat GASHI
4. *Muhameti*
5. *Cima*
6. Haxhi BAJRAMAJ
7. Behlul QERIMAJ
8. Agim SELMANAJ

22 May 1998

Today's shift is from Glodjane.

1. Afrim ZEQIRAJ
2. Esat MEHMETAJ
3. Astrit MEHMETAJ
4. Arben NEZIRAJ
5. Naim QERIMAJ
6. Jeton HALILAJ

24 May 1998

Today's shist is from Glodjane.

1. Rasim SEJFIJA
2. Beqë HAMZAJ
3. Mustafë MALAJ
4. Enver HALILAJ
5. Nazmi MALAJ
6. Miftar HALILAJ

No. 22
21 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

Pursuant to the patrol regulations drafted by *Maliq,* Adem and myself, we have only one remark, and that is, at point number one, the guards were grouped together and the observation was not at a satisfactory level. The rest of the points were in a good order.

1. *Maliqi*
2. Adem

Zone leader:
Maliqi
/a signature//

No. 23
22 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the patrol carried out by Faik, Milazim and myself, there were no remarks. Everyone was on the designated positions and everything was in order.

1. Milazim
2. Faik

Zone leader:
Maliqi
/a signature//

ET U001-5855- U001-5869

No. 24
/?23/ May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the control carried out by Sami, Luli and myself, we concluded that the guards were carrying out their military duties regularly and that the number of soldiers on the points was sufficient.
When asked if they observed any movement of enemy forces towards our positions, the guards responded negatively.

1. Sami /a signature/
2. Luli /a signature/

Zone leader:
Maliqi
/a signature//

No. 25
25 May 1998

Reporting officer: *Xhevdeti*
/a signature/

DAILY REPORT

During the patrol, myself and Avdi noticed that the guard duty was at a satisfactory level. The guards had no remarks. Today there wasn't a heave shelling, but at night time there is firing from rifle grenades.

Nr I T-21 198 U0015855

30.04.98 RAPORTI DITOR Raportues XHEVDETI

KETO RAPORTE DOTE SHKRUAJ PREJ KESAJ KOHE KUR ME BESOHET DETYRA PER PERCAKTIMIN E ROJEVE DHE PATROLLIMIN E TYRE-.

ME 30-04.98 ESHTE PERCAKTUAR PIKAT KRYSORE DHE ROJET NE KETO PIKA.

GJAT NATES SE PATROLLIMIT TE PIKAVE KAM VREJT SHUM PA RREGULLSI P.SH.- MOS KUJDESI NE FJETJE DHE MOS ZBATIMI ?. POR KAM VREJTUR SE DHE MOS PROVOJA NE KETO KOHE

DUKE PATROLLUAR ILIRI DHE EHEVDETI JEMI DETYRUAR NE DISA PIKA TE SHTIM EHEEHE NE ME ARME VETEM E VETEM TJUA HEKIM TREMEN QE KISHIN GJAT DETYRES

00015856

Nr.2

01.05.98 RAPORT DITOR RAPORTUS XHEVDETI

DITA E DYT E PATROLLIMIT DISI GJENDJA KISHTE NRYSHUAR NE ATO PIKA KU KISHIM SHTIE ME ARME DISI MA TE RREGULLT DHE PERSERI KISHTE PROBLEME ME DISA PIKA KRYSORE ? POR JEMIDETYRUAR TE SHTIM EDHE NE ATO PIKA TJUA HEKIM TREMEN

RAPORTON XHEVDETI

Nr.3 RAPORT DITOR
02.05.98

ME KET DATE JAM DETYRUAR TE BEJ NJE NDRYSHIM TE PIKESXXX VII DHE TE SJELLI NE PIKEN II KAM PASUR DISA KUNDERSHTIME POR I SJELLA ATY GJAT KESAJ NATE KEMI PATROLLUAR ILIRI DHE XHEVDETI POR GJAT DITES KISHTE QEN NJE SULM DHE U VREJ SE MOS PERGADITJA FIZIKE ESHTE NE PYTJE SEPSE GJAT ROJES SE NATES KISHIN NDIELODHJE

RAPORTON XHEVDETI

Nr.4 RAPORT DITOR
03.05.98

ISHTE NJE PROVOJ E SHKURT POR KISHTE DISA PROBLEME TE CILAT U EVITUAN PA NDERHYRJE URGJENTE

RAPORTUS XHEVDETI

Nr.5 RAPORT DITOR
04.05.98

SOT JAN BER EDHE DY NRYSHIME TE PIKAVE PIKA DYEKH ESHTE PERTEJ LUMIT NE NJE SHTEPI DHE TASH QUHET PIKA II
DHE ESHT TERHEK PIKA VI DHE ESHT VENDOS NE NJE BAHSHQE ME MOLLA DHE QUHET PIKA III

U0015857

04.05.98

NE DITEN SHKRAKIMT TE FAIKUT JU KAN MARR ARMJA DHE UNIFORMA.

ARMJA E FAIKUT JUKA DHEN USH, ARBEN MATAJ UNIFORMA E FAIKUT ESHTE E MARRUR DHE GJENDET E PALUAR DERI NE MOMENTINTET E CAKTUAR FAIKU LIROHET PERKOSESHT NGA DETYRA USHTARAKE DHE KRYEN PUN NE KUZHIN

SAMI GJOCI

FAIKUT JU KA KTHYE UNIFORMA DHE ARMJA DHE ESHTE KTHYER NE DETYR MEKUSHT ME QELLIM QE MOS TA PERDOR ALKOOLIN.

U0015858

Nr,6

RAPORT DITOR

RAPORTON XHEVDETI

05.05.98

[redacted] [redacted]

NE KET NAT KEMI PATROLLUAR ILIRI DHE XHEVDETI XHITHČKA E STABILIZUAR DHE NE RREGULL N

Nr.7

RAPORTI DITOR

RAPORTON XHEVDETI

06.05.98

MBREM KAM PATROLLUAR ME SAMIUN DHE XHEVDETI NEPER TE GJITHA PIKAT DHE TEJAN NE SHEMBULLTYR DHE SHIFET SE ESHTE STABILIZUA GJENDJA NE ROJE DHE HEQJA FRIKES SE MEPARSHME .

Nr.8

RAPORTI DITOR

RAPORTON XHEVDETI

07.05.98

NE BAZ TE PUNES NE TEREN GJAT PATROLLIMIT UNE XHEVDETI DHE SAMI GJOCI PAM SE ROJET NEPER TE GJITHA PIKAT ISHIN NE NIVELDUHUR ME VRETJE QE TE NGRITET AFTSIA VREJTUSE E ROJEVE

Nr.9

08.05.98

RAPORTI DITOR

RAPORTON XHEVDETI

GJAT PUNES NE PATROLLIMIT NE TEREN NUK KEMI PASUR KURFAR PROBLEMI DHE PUNET PO SHKOIN SI MAS MIRI PA PROBLEME.

Nr.10

09.05.98

RAPORTI DITOR

RAPORTON XHEVDETI

NEKOHEN PATROLLIMIT GJAT KESAJ KOHE NUK KEM PAS KURRFAR PROBLEMI NIVELI I ROJEVE ESHTE I DUHUR VRETJE NUK KA

Nr.11

10.05.98

RAPORTI DITOR

RAPORTON

NE KOHEN E PATROLLI MIT KUR KEMI N DRUAR NJE PIK TE CILEN E KAM LEVIZ MA PERPARA DHE KA SHUM SUKSES TE MADH GJAT PATROLLIMIT XHEVDETI DHE SAMIU NUK PAT KURFAR VREJTJE-.

U0015859

08.05.98 [redacted] [redacted]

NDRIMI I KETYRE USHTARVE BEHET VETEM DITEN

TRE USHTARAK NGA FSHATI PRILEP

1. PETRIT MAZREKAJ
2. SAMI LOKAJ
3. SHPEND LOKAJ

TRE USHTARAK NGA FSHATI GLLOGJAN

4. BURIM MEHMETAJ
5. ZHUJ HOMZA
6. BURIM MUSTAFA

11.05.98

NDRIMI I SOTEM BEHET NGA FSHATI GRAMOQEL VETEM ME PES VULLNETAR. NJE ESHTE NGA BABALLOQI.

1. BEQIR AGAJ
2. ISA DOBRA
3. BLERIM CEFAJ
4. XHEMRET KUQI
5. MET ALIA
6. NASER HUMAJ NGA BABALLOQI

13.05.98

NDRIMI I SOTEM BEHET NGA GLLOGJANI

1. LAN ISUFAJ
2. FATON MALAJ
3. AGRON HOMZAJ
4. BURIM MUSTAFAJ
5. ZHUJ HOMZAJ
6. ARDIAN MALAJ

Hemeto/C

U0015860

Me.8maj.98

I

GJATEKON KONTROLLESE SE BER NGA SAMI GJOCI DHE XHEVDET SHALA ME 8.05.98 NETE GJITHA PIKAT DICIPLINA USHTARAKE ESHTE NE NIVEL; KONSTATUAM SE NE PIKEN Nr-1 DUHET TE SHTOHET NUMRI I ROJEVE . NE PIKAT QE KONTROLLON MALIQI GJITHQKA ESHTE NE NIVEL TE DUHUR.

Me.9maj.98

NUK KEMI NDONJE VRETJE PER TE SHENUAR ESHTE KARAKTERISTIKE SE ME 9maj KA PASUR MES SHUM SULME SE DIDVE TJRA MIRPO AS GJENDJA JON MOBILIZUESE NUK KA MUNGUAR.

Me.10maj.98

II

JAN KONTROLLUAR SI ZAKONISHT PIKAT E ROJEVE DHE JEMI TE KENAQUR ME VIGJILENCEN.

VREJTJE KA SE USHTARAKVE JU MUNGON PERGADITJA FIZIKE E DUHUR PERQKA DUHET NDERMARR MASA ADEKUATE .

KEMIPAS TAKIME ME MALIQIN DHE ILIRIN ME TE CILET JEMI KONSULLTUAR PER PUNEN E METUTJESHME.

Me.11 maj.98

GJAT PATROLLIMIT KEMI VENDOSUR QE ME NJERZIT KOPETENT TE VEZHGOJM TERENIN PRTE VENDOSUR NJE PIK TE RE.

NE PIKEN E MALIQIT ESTE BER VEZHGIMI I TERENIT NGA ANA TIJ DHE ESHTE BER KORDINIMI I ROJEVE NE MENYR TE SHKELQYSHME.

Me12 maj.98

NEPER PIKAT E ROJEVE TE CILAT I KONTROLLUAN SAMIU DHE XHEVDET QDO GJE ISHTE NE RREGULL DHE NIVEL TE DUHUR.

U0015861

Nr.I2

RAPORTI DITOR RAPORTON

II.05.98 [redacted] [redacted] XHEVDETI

NE KOHEN E PATROLLIMIT EXAT TE ME PARSHEM KEMI VEZHGUAR SE DUHET VEBBSUAR EDHE NJE PIK TE RE E CILA ESHTE VENDOSUR NE VEND TE CAKTUAR GJAT PATROLLIMIT ILIRI DHE EJEVDETI NUK KA PASUR KURRFAR VREJTJE

Nr.I3 RAPORTI DITOR RAPORTON

I2.05.98 XHEVDETI

GJAT KOHES SE PATROLLIMIT XHEVDETI DHE SAMIU NUK PATEN KURRFAR BROBLEMI DHE TE GJITH ROJET KAN QEN NIVELIN E DUHUR DHE PA KURFAR ANKIMI VREJTJE NUK KA

Nr.I4 RAPORTON

I3.05.98 RAPORTI DITOR XHEVDETI

NE KOHEN EPATROLLIMIT GJAT NATES XHEVDETI, FAZLIU, DHE FLORIMI KEMI KALUAR NE PER TE GJITHA PIKAT DHE KEMI PASUR VETEM DISA ANKTHE TE VOGLATE TE CILA KALOHEN PA VESHTERSI VREJTJE KA TE CILAT NE PIKEN IORE ROJET PER TE NRUAR DUHET TE SHKOI NJENI ROJE E JO DY ROJET TE KERKOIN NDRIMIN DHE PER TE LESHUAR POZICIONIN N

Nr.I5. RAPORTON

I4.05.98 raporti ditor XHEVDETI

NE KOHEN E PATROLLIMIT UNE XHEVDETI DHE AHMETI NUK KA PAS PROBLEME NE PIKAT E TJERA VETEM NE PIKEN 9 DY ROJE TE CILET ISHIN PERCAKTUAR PER PIK ISHIN IKUR NGA VENDI I TYRE

III Me. I3maj.98 U0015862

GJAT KESAJ KOHE KEMI KEMI ELIMINUAR NJE DEKURI TE DEMSHME GJAT KOHES SE NRIMIT DUHET TE SHKOI VETEM NJERI NGA ROJET E JO TE DYT .DHE TE LESHOHET POZICIONIN, PATROLLIMI GJAT KESAJ NATE E KAN BER XHEVDETI, FAZLIU,DHE FLORIMIR

Me.I4maj.98

GJAT PATROLLIMIT NEPER PIKAT TE CILAT JAN LEVIZUR NGA KOPETENT-ET NE DITET E KALUARA KISHIN VREJTJET TE ROJET TE CILET NUK ISHIN NE NIVELIN E DETYRES P.SH PIKA X,2,3,5,6
ESHTE BER EDHE NJE KONSULLTIM ME MALIQIN PER PUNEN E METUTJSHME

I5
Me maj.98

GJAT KONTROLLES SE BER NE PIKAT 2,3,4, TE CILAT JAN LEVIZUR KEMI KONSTATUAR SE BASHKU ME MALIQIN SE LEVIZJA E TYRE ESHTE E ARSYSHME DHE DUHET TE SHTOHET NUMRI I ROJEVE PER ARSYE TE GADISHMERIS USHTARAKE.
NGA MALIQI NA VIE VREJTJA SE: SIPAS PLANIFIKIMIT E PLANIT TE ROJES NE PIKEN III ISHIN NE RREGULL; POR KY PLAN (OSE KY URDHER) NUK U ZBATUA NGA DY PERSONA POR EDHE SHKELJE TE URDHRAVE NGA DY PERSONA TE QUAJTUR MAL ZEQIRAJ DHE SYLEJMON ZEQIRAJ QE ISHIN TE CAKTUAR PER ROJE NE PIKEN III JO QE NUK KAN DALUR NE VENDIN E LART PERMENDUR PERTI RRESPEKTUAR USHTARAKET POR QKA ESHTE MA E KEQJA SE KETA DY PERSONA E KAN LESHUAR VENDIN E ROJES NE FRONT DHE JAN LARGUAR KOMPLET NGA KY FSHAT QE GJENDET NE FRONT ME ARMIKUN DHE KAN Shkuar NEPER SHTEPIT E TYRE NE DHE UNE POSAQARISHT KERKOI NGA JU QE NJERZIT TE CILET I DERGONI PER NDRIMIN E ROJEVE NE FRONT TI PYSNI PER VULLNETIN E TYRE DHE TI KISHELLONI SIPAS URDHRAVE USHTARAK.

ME RRESPEKT
MALIQI

U0015863

I[illegible].05.98 [redacted] [redacted]

NDRIMI I SOTEM BEHET NGA GLLOGJANI

1.MUSTAF MALAJ

2.BEK DERVISHAJ

3.RAM BAJRAMAJ

4.HALIT MEHMETAJ

5.AFRIM MEHMETAJ

MeI5.0598

NDRIMI I SOTEM BEHET NGA FSHATI SHAPTEJ DHE NJE NGA DUBRAVA

I.DERVISH LUSHAJ

2.FADIL HAJDARAJ

3.PETRIT SOKOLI

4.SYL LUSHAJ

5.ISNI LUSHAJ

6.REXHEP LLOQANI NGA DUBRAVA

I8.05.98

NDRIMI I SOTEM BEHET NGA GLLOGJANI

I.ARBEN QERIMAJ

2.FLORIM MUSTAFAJ

3.HASIM HALILAJ

4.DRITON MUSTAFAJ

5.AGRON MUSTAFAJ

6.BEHLUL QERIMAJ

7.AGIM SELMONAJ

SI VULLNETAR TE CILET RRIN PA NDRIM DERI SA TJU KTHEHEN SHOKET NGA UDHTIMI ATA JAN

BEHLUL QERIMAJ

AGIM SELMANAJ

Kheveldi

U0015864

Nr.16

RAPORTI DITOR RAPORTON

15.05.98 [redacted] [redacted] XHEVDETI

GJAT KOHES PATROLLIMIT XXHEVDETI DHE AHMETI NUK KISHIN KURRFAR VREJTJE DUKE BER KONTROLLIN NE PIKAT 2,3,4 TE CILAT JAN LEVIZUR KEMI KONSTATUAR SE BASHKU ME MALIQIN SE LEVIZJA E TYRE ESHTE E ARSYESHME DHE DUHET TE SHTOHET NUMRI I ROJEV PER ARSYE TE GADISHMERIS USHTARAKE .

PATROLLUESIT UDHHEQES I ZONES

1. Xhevdeti
2. Ahmeti [redacted]

MALIQI

Nr 17

RAPORTI DITOR RAPORTON

16.05.98 XHEVDETI

NEOREN 24.30 KA FILLUAR NJE SULEM I RRUFESHEM SE PARI ME FISHEK ZJARR E MITRALEZA E PASTAJ ME GRANATIME TE RRUFESHME TE ME THEKS TE VEQANT ESHTE GRANATUAR PIKA I NE TE CILEN NGA GRANATIMI JAN PLAGOSUR : FAZLIU? SI PERGJEGJES PIKE I CILI KISHTE ZEVENDESUAR ILIRIN DHE RAMIZI? DERVISHI ROJE NE KET PIK. NE RADIO KEMI KERKUAR NDIHM NGA MALIQI DHE DY TE PLAGOSURIT E PAR I KEMI DERGUAR ME NJE HER NE VENDIN E CAKTUAR MALIQI ESHTE KTHYER BRENDA NJE KOHE TE SHKURTER DHE NGA KONSULLTIMET EH SHPEJTA URDHERAT I KEMI ZBATUAR DHE TE MOBILIZUAR NE MENYR TE PERGJITHSHME.

GJITH ASHTU TE NESERMEN NE KONSULLTIM ME MALIQIN DHE VEZHGIMIN E TERENIT ESHTE BER NDRIMI I PIKES.

GJAT KETI TAKIMI KEMI KERKUAR QE SHTABI KEMI KERKUAR NJE ZEVENDESIM TE FAZLIUT.

NE KET NAT NUK KA PAS PATROLLIM TE PIKAVE PER SHKAK TE MOS SIGURI SE ARMIKU GJUANTE EDHE TRUBLON NDRIQUS.

U
UDHHEQES I ZONES

MALIQI

U0015865

15 - 05 1998 Bobollë

Sipas planifikimit e planit të Rajës me pikën 3 ishte më Rregul, por kur plani (ose kur vendin) ata e ditë Respektuan ata dy personat jo Respektuan por edhe shkelën të vendin nga këto 2 persona të njohur. Ata jah zgjidhj edhe Sulejmanin zgjidhj si dhim të caktu. ar për Rajë me pikën 3 jo si duke bam dolun me vendim e landegermenderi per ti Respektuar vendimet ultimatube por ata ëdhë me e bëjë se bëto dy persona e bamë ledhuar vendimin e Rajës me front edhe jamë larguar komplet nga ky fshat si jemi. Ndërsa me front me Armikun edhe bamë dhunë nga ditëpërë e dyne, Na edhë unë pozicioni bëshkuj nga ju si Njerëzit të cilët janë dërguar për Ndërmjetësi e Rajës me front të njohur për vullnetin e dyne edhe ti bëshkuar sipas vendimeve vullnetarisë.

Me Respekt

Mehmeti

U0015866

I8.o598 [redacted] XXXXX RAPOR RAPORT [redacted] RAPORTON XHEVDETI DHE MALIQI

SIPAS PLANIFIKIMIT E PLANIT TE ROJES NE PIKEN 3 ISHIN NE RREGULL, POR KY PLAN(OSE KY URDHER) NUK ESHTE RRESPEKTUAR NGA DY PERSONA POR EDHE SHKELJE TE URDHRAV E NGA KETA DY PERSONA TE QUJTUR MAL ZEQIRAJ DHE SYLEJMON ZEQIRAJ QE ISHIN TE CAKTUAR PER ROJE NE PIKEN 3 JO QE NUK KAN DALUR NE VENDIN E LART PERMENDUR PER TI RESPEKTUAR URDHERAT USHTARAKE POR QKA ESHTE NA E KEQJA SE KETA DY PERSONA E KAN LESHUAR VENDIN E ROJES NE FRONT DHE JAN LARGUAR KOMPLET NGA KY FSHAT QEGJINDET NE FRONT ME ARMIKUN DHE KAN SHKUAR NEPER SHTEPIT E TYRE NE DHE UNE POSAQARISHT KERKOJ NGA JU QE NJERZIT TE CILET I DERGONI PER NDRIMIN E ROJEVE NE FRONT TË PYESNI PER VULLNETIN E TYRE DHE TI KISHELLONI SIPAS URDHRAVE USHTARAKE

ME RRESPEKT

MALIQI

U0015867

NrI8

RAPORTI DITOR

RAPORTON

I7.•5.98

DATYM

XHEVDETI

GJAT PATROLLIMIT TE TERENIT X NE TE CILEN NUK PATI PA RREGULLSI POR TE GJITH GJENDJE E ZAKONSHME VRETJE NUK KA AS ANKIME TE ROJEVE NUK PATI.

I. XHEVDETI

2. SAMIU

UDHHEQES I ZONES

MALIQI

Nr I9

RAPORTI DITOR

RAPORTON

XHEVDETI

I8.•5.98

GJAT PATRLLIMIT TE KESAJ NATE NUK PATI KURRFAR PROBLEMI AS VRETJENUK PATI VETEM ROJE TE STABILIZUAR.

I. XHEVDETI

2, FLORIMI

UDHHEQES I ZONES

MALIQI

Nr2•

raporti diter

RAPORTON

XHEVDETI

I9.•5.98

GJAT KONTROLLES SE ROJES QE BEM UNE SAMIU DHE AVDIU KONSTATUAM SE ROJET ISHIN NE NIVEL TE DUHUR PERPOS NE PIKEN 3ISHIM DERI TE ROVI PO ASHTU E KONTROLLUMAM DHE RRETH SHTEPI KU PUSHONIN ROJET POR ROJET NUK I TAKUAM NE PIK KERKOJ QE PER KETE TE MERREN MASAT ADEKUATE NJE PREJ PIKAVE QE ESHTE TERHEQUR PIKA 7 NUK ESHT PATROLLU NGA NE TE DY.

I.SAMIU

2.AVDIU

UDHHEQES I ZONES

MALIQI

RAPORTON

XHEVDETI

2I

RAPORTI DITOR

2•.•5.98

GJAT KONTROLLES SOTME NUK KEMI PAS KURRFAR VRETJE DHE KEMI PASUR NJE RREGULLSIR TE MIR

POR NE PIKEN8 KA IKUR NEE I RI NGA VENDI KU PUSHONIN ROJET AI ESHTE ADRIATIK SELMANAJ BABALLOQI I CILI ESHTE DERGU PERSERI NE VENDIN E CAKTUAR NE PIKEN 8

20.05.98 ДАТУМ ОПИС. U0015868

NDRIMI NGA GLOGJANI ESHTE BER ME KETA USHTARAK

I.BESIM SELMANAJ

2.SHKELZEN BEZERAJ

3.NEGJAT GASHI

4. Muhameti

5. Cima

6. Haxhi Bajramaj

7. Behlul Qerimaj

8. Agim Selmanaj

22.05.98

Kym ndrim i setem behet nga glogjani

1.Afrim Zeqiraj

2.Esat mehmetaj

3.Astrit Mehmetaj

4.Arben Neziraj

5.Naim Qerimaj

6.Jetem Halilaj

24.

24.05.98

Ndrimi i setem u beh nga Gllogjani

1.Rasim Sejfija

2. Beqe Hemzaj

3. Mustaf Malaj

4.Enver Halilaj

5.Nazmi Malaj

6.Miftar Halilaj

22
Nr.22 RAPORTI DITOR U0015869

21.o5.98 RAPORTON
XHEVDETI

Ne baze te ligjit te patrollimit qe kemi ber une Maliqi dhe Ademi kemi vetem nje vretje ne piken nje rojet qe ishin ne ate pikë ishin te grumbulluar dhe vezhgimi i tyre nuk ishte ne nivel te duhur te gjitha pikat tjera ishin ne - rregull.

1. Maliqi
2. Ademi

Udhheqes i zones
Maliqi

Nr.23 RAPORTI DITOR
22.o5.98

RAPORTON
XHEVDETI

Gjat patrollimit te rojeve qe kishin ber une Faiku dhe Milazimi nuk kishte vretje te gjith ishin ne vend te duhur dje ishte ne rregull.

1. Faiku
2. Milazimi

Udhheqes i zones
Maliqi

Nr.24.98 RAPORTI DITOR
24.o5.98

RAPORTON
XHEVDETI

Gjat kontrolles qe bem une Samiu dhe Luli me te gjitha pikat e rojeve konstatuam se rojet i kryan detyrat e tyre ushtarake si duhet , numri i ushtarve neper pika eshte i mjaftushem.

Pytjet qe i bem rojeve se a vreni ndonje levizje te armikut drejt pikave tona , pergjigjia ishte nuk ka .

1. Samiu
2. Luli

Udhheqes i zones
Maliqi

Nr.25 RAPORTI DITOR
25.o5.98

RAPORTON
XHEVDETI

Gjat patrollimit une Xhevdeti dhe Avdiu me sa pam se rojet ishin ne nivel te duhur, dhe vrejtje nuk ka nga ana e rojeve.

Gjat dites se sotme nuk pati as shum granatime por gjat nates ka gjetje të trupave ndërluftuese.

/handwritten document/

REKA /Juničko Polje/ /?STAFF/
Junik
28 June 1998

Note on the Security
Situation in the Reka combat zone
- to: Dukagjin Operational Staff

With regard to the arrival of units of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, 112 soldiers and 21 officers, I hereby report that following your visit I have taken combat security measures.
1.- Security has been stepped up and political measures to clarify their arrival and their aims have been taken.
2.- We have contacted them in talks and they were given time to leave the liberated territory (Jasiq /Jasić/).
3. - The officers are being manipulated by the so-called Minister Ahmet KRASNIQI who said he had daily contact with the KLA /Kosovo Liberation Army/ spokesman Jakup KRASNIQI.
/?text missing/
who /illegible/
4.- We have explained once again to all the officers, without the presence of Tahir ZEMAJ, everything about them joining the ranks of the Operational Staff of Dukagjin. It appears that the officers are being manipulated, but they want to clarify matters with those that dispatched them.
5.- I believe, Commander, that you need to consult with the General Staff and if possible, inform me about procedure.

28 June 1998

Commander
Sali VESELI

0015593

STABI i KEKOS
Junik
28.06.1998.

Shkresë rreth gjendjes
të sigurisë në zonën
luftarake të Rekas
– i de dikuhet

Komandatit Operativ
të Dukagjinit

Me rastin e ardhjes së njësive të
ashtuquajtura të Republikës së Kosovës
112 oficer dhe 21 oficer. Ju lajmëroj
se pas shkurtjes së Juaj nuk mund
masa të sigurisë lufta rake:

1. – Ekipi ngritë sigurisë dhe janë marë
masa politike për sqarimin e
ardhjes së tyre si dhe qëllimet e
tyre.

2. – Kemi monitoruar në një bazë dhe
u është dhënë koha për largimin
nga territori i qlirë (Jasi 21).

3. Epiroi janë të manipuluar nga
ashtuquajturi ministër Ahmet Krasniqi
i cili shkon se kam monitoruar nga
kërë në dyt me zëvëndës i UÇK
Jakup Krasniqi

0015594

I cili sipas e ka [illegible]

I – E sjetra për kryejen e tyre ne-
radhët e Shtabit operativ të Dukagjin-
ës sqarime i kemi bërë edhe më herët
prezen Tahir Zemaj. Shtabi se eporet
janë të manipulua por ata dëshirojnë
mësë.

I – Mendojë se është e nevojshme që Ju
Zot komandant të merreni vetë me
Shtabin e Perqipshërim dhe nese kemi
mundësi të ne njoftoni për veprim.

Me 28.06.1998

Komandant
Sali Veseli

ET U000-4036 -U000-4036

Kosovo Liberation Army
The REKA HQ
30 June 1998
Reka

Military Secret
ev.op.10.36/06-98

Pursuant to Order No. 1 of the Reka HQ, since Junik is in a state of war and in order to have knowledge of the material goods for the needs of the soldiers, I hereby

ORDER

- to form Evidencing Commissions for each neighbourhood of Junik separately;
- The commissions to register all types of vehicles and other means of transport as well as oil derivatives throughout Junik.
- The commission to appoint one warehouse where food and all the above-items would be collected and handed over to the Commander of the logistic platoon, Mr. Kadri SHALA.

This order enters into force immediately.

To:
Archives
Dukagjini Operative Staff
Junik HQ
Commander of the Logistic Platoon

Commander
"VETIMA" (the Lightning)
/signed/

U0004036

65

USHTRIA ÇLIRIMTARE E KOSOVES
Shtabi i Rekës
30. 06. 1998
Rekë

Sekret Ushtarak
ev.op.10, 36/06-98

Duke u nisur nga Urdhëresa nr. 1 e Shtabit të Rekës, për shkak se Junikut është në gjendje lufte dhe me qëllim që të dihen të mirat materiale për nevojat e luftëtarëve,

URDHËROJ

1. - Të formohen Komisione i Evidentimit për çdo lagje të veçantë të Junikut.

2. - Komisioni të bëjë regjistrimin në tërë Junikun të të gjitha të mirave materiale dhe të llojeve të ushqimit, si drithëra, miell, fasule, patate, sheqer, vaj, kafe, detergjent etj.

3. - Komisioni të bëjë regjistrimin në tërë Junikun i të gjitha llojeve të autoveturave dhe mjeteve të tjera të transportit, si dhe derivatet e naftës.

4. Komisioni të caktojë një depo për të bërë grumbullimin e artikujve ushqimorë dhe të gjithë artikujt e lartpërmendur t'i dorëzohen Komandantit të Togut të Logjistikës, zotit Kadri Shala

Kjo urdhëresë bëhet e plotfuqishme menjëherë.

Arkivës:
Shtabit Operativ të Dukagjinit
Shtabit te Junikut
Komandantit të Togut të Logjistikës

Komandant
Vetima
Vetima

/handwritten/

WEEKLY REPORT

24 July 1998
Gërgoc /Grgoc/

Last week, our local staff carried out its normal activities: guard duties at the three main posts by 22 soldiers in 24 hour periods, helping feed the Myrte Zeneli Brigade, and it began repairing the road leading to post Zero (Suka e Madhe) and the one between Gërgoc and Cermjan. But this work has subsided somewhat this week. Because the KLA /?retaliation unit for Dushkaja/, most of our staff were busy with the surprise attacks it carried out in Rakovina during the change of shifts at the police post on 22 July 1997 /as printed/. The unit consisted of one soldier from Jabllanica, 2 from Xhungla /Jungle/ Staff and 5 from the our village, carried the action out with success at 11:45 hours on 22 July 1998. The enemy suffered considerable damage in men and arms. Explosives and hand-helm grenade launchers were used during this attack. Those charged with the attack withdrew without injury and Cermjan expressed its indignation for the attack.
I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to convey my greetings to the deputy commander, Nazi Ibishi for the assistance he provided to us with military and radio equipment for this action.

The soldiers seconded from Gllogjan prefer Post Zero, but food is a problem because there is quite a distance between our village and this post.

The unarmed soldiers of our village have returned for a second time from their journey to Albania, one time via Junik and most recently from Gllogjan, without having been able to get to Albania.

24 July 1998
Gërgoc

prepared by
Artan NIMANI

RAPORT JAVORE

Më 24.07.98
Gergoc

U0022649

Gjatë javës që shkoi shtabi ynë lokalë ka krye punë të rendomta si: kundërstaria më 3 pikat kufesore nga 22 ushtarë mbrendë 24orësh, ndërmerra në ndihmë për Brigadën "Myrtë Zenel", si dhe ka filluar mëgëlimin i muajës që mbyje në pikën Zero (Sukë Mëd) dhe atë Gergoc – Cerujan. Mbrëpë puna në këtë drejtim është bërë pakësa. Këtë javë sepse Njësiti Ndërshkues i UÇK për ndihmën ~~shtë~~ shumica nga Shtabi ynë ishin të angazhuar në sulmin befasinës që ndërmorëm në Rakovinë gjatë ndërrimit në punktin policorë më 22 korrik 1997.

Njësiti i kombinuar më 1 ushtarë nga Jabllonica 2 nga Shtabi Kmunglë dhe 5 nga Shtabi ynë, kryen aksionin me sukses më 22.07.98 në orën 11⁴⁵ kur armiku ju shkaktua dëm i konsiderueshëm në njerëz dhe teknikë luftë, gjatë sulmit u perdorën lëndë eksplozive dhe minoherdhes krokët, personat e angazhuar në sulm u terhoqëm pa fëndime, ndërsa Cerujani ka shkrehur mbrëmjë për këtë sulm.

Shpytës mësh që të penërendes Z/komandant Nazi Ibroi, për ndihmën ~~e na dha~~ për pasje luftëra si radiokë për këtë aksion.

Pika Zero është perforcuar nga ushtarë e dërguar nga Gllogjani por ushtrimi është problem gjë po vërehet sepse bëjnë dëm me pikë nga Shtabi ynë është bukur e mirë.

00022650

Vëllezërit e paarritur të fshatit tonë për herë të parë u bëllyen nga ~~nga~~ mësuesi dë masën për Shqipri, por ëër nga Jugoslavia dërgohen fundi nga Gjermanët pa pasur asnjë të drejtë kalojnë në Shqipëri.

Më 24.07.98
Gërgoc

pëngadër raport
Anton Mirash

/handwritten file number and date/

REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO
KLA /Kosovo Liberation Army/ 3RD BRIGADE
BARAN 25 August 1998 TO THE COMMANDER

OFFICIAL NOTE

Compiled on the premises of the 3rd Brigade in Baran, regarding the abduction of Istref Imer KRASNIQI and his wife from the village of Turjak.

I have been informed by an informant that Istref Imer KRASNIQI and his wife have been abducted from Turjak village by Rrustem TETAJ of Lluka, Deçan municipality, and their fate is so far unknown, and that Rrustem was accompanied by two other persons with a Landrover (jeep) vehicle.

The same couple's son has also been killed but the person who carried out the killing has not been identified.

An official note will be sent regarding a subsequent investigation.

Baran, 25 August 1998

Compiled by
Sadri SELCA
/signed/

N.R.B.K. 46 – 11/11/2004

U0085619

REPUPLIKA E KOSOVES
UQK-BRIGADA E III
BARAN 25.08.1998

K O M A N D A N T I T

S H [illegible] Z Y R T [illegible] R

I perpiluar ne lokalet e brigades [illegible] III [illegible] Baran e ne lidhje me me marrjen e Istref Imer Krasniqit [illegible] fshati Turjak se bashku me bas shksherten etij.

Siq jam i nformuar nga nji lidhje operative se Istref Imer Krasniqin dhe bashksherten e tij i ka marre ne fshatin Turjak Rrustem Te[illegible] Muka KK Deqan, dhe deri me sot nuk dihet per fatin e tyre, se [illegible] Krustemin [illegible]ane qene edhe dy persona te tjer me automjetin Landro[illegible] p[illegible].

Gjthashtu po te njeteve bashshert i eshte vrare edhe [illegible] dihet perseni i cili e ka kryar aktin e vrasjes.

Shenimi zyrtar dergohet per shqyrtim te matutjeshem.

Baran, 25.08.1998

Perpiluesi
Sadri Selca
Selca

Unrevised Translation
U009-1692-U009-1692

The Kosovo Liberation Army

Operative Staff of the Dukagjini Plane

Dukagjin 20.07.98 Ev.op.L1 – 47/20/7/98

APPEAL

To the Albanian brothers and sisters that are in the Dukagjini Plane. Knowing the needs of the war conducted for the liberation of these land from the Serb yoke; in order for us to be saved from the occupation once and for all, we call on you to be up to the levels required to meet the military obligations and that you all join the KLA, specifically the KLA brigades that operate in our sub-zone; to be united as one and to mobilize in order to win the war!

-To be vigilant in guarding the liberated territories.

- To hit the occupying Serb forces everywhere and at all times in order to liberate the entire sub-zone and to go and help other zones of the Fatherland that have not yet been liberated.

- To build the fortifications needed in order to be able to resist any attempts by the enemy to retake the territory that has been covered in the blood of our best sons.

- To fight the divisive propaganda of the enemy that functions through the organisation of parallel societies and police unions which aim to obstruct and sabotage the work of the KLA and its Military Police.

- To fight all the attempts of the enemy at infecting the army with the diseases of political pluralism and the politicisation of the military. The Operative Staff of the Dukagjini Plane is going to undertake measures against all officers and soldiers who /?do not respect the obligations that flow from the military and national education/ /as printed/ or that abandon their military duties and get involved in politics.

- We invite the emigrants from the Dukagjini Plane, as well as all the Albanians that live outside the boundaries of the Albanian territories to return to Kosovo with weapon in hand and join in the fight for the liberation of the country. Those who obstruct the coming of the young men to the battlefield are doing the work of the Serb occupiers and are participants in crime.

Unrevised Translation
U009-1692-U009-1692

- The KLA speaks only in its own name. Its only aim is liberation. Those who try to deviate from the sacred aim of liberating the country are enemies of the nation. The KLA is not going to attempt to remove anyone from power or to place someone in power.

Nation – Fatherland – Flag – KLA – that is what our people are hailing today!

- Glory to the nation's martyrs! The shame will weigh heavily on our shoulders as long as a single enemy soldier violates our land.

Commander Ramush HARADINAJ /signed/

U0091692

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Tribunal Pénal International pour l'ex-Yugoslavie
CERTIFIED COPY OF A DOCUMENT
I, Zijke Dzhangy, TA, hereby certify that I have compared the original with the copy and affirme avoir comparé l'original avec cette copie et certifie par ci-présente que celle-ci est une reproduction exacte et fidèle de l'original.
Signature: Date: 22/11/05

USHTRIA CLIRIMTARE E KOSOVËS
SHTABI OPERATIV I RRAFSHIT TË DUKAGJINIT

Dukagjin
20.07.98

Ev. op.L1-47/20/7/98

THIRRJE

Vëllezër e motra shqiptarë që gjendeni në Rrafshin e Dukagjinit, duke pasur parasyshë nevojat e luftës për çlirimin e këtyre anëve nga zgjedha serbe, për të shpëtuar një herë e përgjithmonë nga pushtimi, u bëjmë thirrje që të jemi në nivelin e detyrës luftarake, të jemi të rreshtuar të gjithë në Ushtrinë Clirimtare të Kosovës, përkatësisht në Brigadat e UCK-së në nënzonën tonë, të jemi të bashkuar, unik dhe të mobilizuar për të fituar luftën e nisur.

- Të qëndrojmë vigjilent në roje për mbrojtjen e territoreve të çliruara.
- Tu jepet goditje forcave pushtuese serbe çdo kund dhe në çdo kohë për çlirimit e gjithë nënzonës dhe për kalimin në nihmë zonave tjera ende të paçliruara të Atdheut.
- Të ngriten fortifikime të nevojshme për të përballuar çdo tentativë të armikut për të rimarrë trojet tona të vaditura me gjakun e bijve më të mirë.
- Të luftohet propaganda përçarëse e armikut e cila shfaqet në formën e organizimeve paralele të shoqatave e sindikatave policore për të bllokuar dhe sabotuar punën e UCK-së dhe Policisë Ushtarake të saj.
- Të luftohen të gjitha përpjekjet e armikut që sëmundjet e pluralizmit politik t'i fus edhe në ushtri dhe politizimit të ushtrisë. Shtabi Operativ i Rrafshit të Dukagjinit do të marrë masa kundër të gjithë ushtarakëve dhe ushtarëve që nuk kryejnë detyrat e edukimit ushtarak e kombëtar apo që lënë detyrat luftarake dhe merren me politikë.
- Ftohen kurbetçarët e Rafshit të Dukagjinit, por edhe gjithë shqiptarët që gjinden jashtë tokave shqitpare që të vijnë në Kosovë dhe me armë në dorë të luftojmë bashkë për çlirimin e vendit. Ata që pengojnë ardhjen e djemve në fushbetejë kryejnë direkt punën e pushtuesve serb dhe janë pjesmarrës në krime.
- Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosovës flet me vet emrin që ka. Të vetmin qëllim e ka çlirimin. Janë armiq të kombit ata që përpiqen që të devijojnë rrugën e shenjt të çlirimit të vendit. UCK nuk do të angazhohet as ta heq dikend nga pushteti dhe as ta vëjë dikend në të. Komb - Atdhe - Flamur - Ushtri Clirimtre e Kosovës - Brohorit sot nga qenja gjithë populli ynë!
- Lavdia u takon dëshmorëve të kombit! Turpi rëndon mbi shpatullat tona derisa edhe një ushtar i vetëm armik dhunon tokën tonë!

Komandant
Ramush Haradinaj
Ramush Haradinaj

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX J
VJ DOCUMENTS

Translation

/handwritten: **28/**

Authorised Official /OSL/ of the Military Police /VP/
of Military Post 4445/4 Prizren
24 May 1998
KU – number 32/98

OFFICIAL NOTE

Compiled on 24 May 1998 in the premises of the SD /expansion unknown/ of the Prizren VP by VP OSL Staff Sergeant Mirko MILEKIĆ concerning: the arrest /detention/ of five armed men wearing uniforms of the so-called KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) on 23 May 1998 in the sector of Popovac village (Babaj Boks), Đakovica municipality /SO/.

On 23 May 1998, in the sector of Popovac village (Babaj Boks), Đakovica SO, organs of the Yugoslav Army /VJ/ arrested (detained) five armed men wearing uniforms of the so-called KLA, as follows:

+1. Imeri GAZMENDI – carrying automatic rifle number - 836-95.
+2. Nedždet /Nexdet/ ZUMBERAJ – carrying a 7.65 mm pistol number – 119252.
+3. Ahmeti AVNI – carrying automatic rifle number – TU 3565P.
+4. Sulejman SADRIJA – carrying automatic rifle number – 0110957-91.
+5. Sulja /Sula/ AGRON – carrying automatic rifle number – 56200926/2.

End at number five.

In addition to the weapons, the following items were found in the possession of the above men:
+1. 7.62 mm automatic rifle bullets ---------- 276
+2. automatic rifle clip ---------- 10
3. Personal identification card /LK/ (Nedždet ZUMBERAJ) and wallet with money:
- German marks /DM/ ---------- 160 DM.
- New dinars ---------- 135 dinars.

A search of the terrain (the sector where the above men were arrested) turned up the following:
+1. Automatic rifle ---------- 073371-89.
+2. Automatic rifle ---------- 14185300.
+3. Automatic rifle ---------- 3103561.
+4. Sniper rifle (foreign made) ---------- 44455.

NOTE: Paraffin tests were conducted on the men, the findings of which together with the weapons will be forwarded for expert opinion. The confiscated weapons are being kept at the SD of the Prizren VP.

COMMAND
549th MOTORISED BRIGADE /mtbr/
Confidential No. 1264-1
14 October 2002

/illegible VJ stamp/

This is a true copy of the original.
Certified by:
/a signature/

28.

ТАВ 34

Овлашћено службено лице војне полиције
Војне поште 4445/4 Призрен
Дана 24.05.1998. године.
КУ- број 32/98

С Л У Ж Б Е Н А З А Б Е Л Е Ш К А

Сачињена дана 24.05.1998. године, у просторијама СД Војне полиције Призрен, од стра Овлашћеног службеног лица Војне полиције, старијег водника Мирка Милекића, а у ве са : *Халшењем (лишењем слободе), 5 (пет) наоружаних и униформисаних лица такозване ОВК (ослободилачке војске Косова), дана 23.05.1998. године, у реону с.Поповац (Бабај Бокс), општина Ђаковица.*

Дана 23.05.1998. године, у реону с.Поповац (Бабај Бокс), општина Ђаковица, од стране органа Војске Југославије, ухапшена су (лишена слободе), 5 (пет) наоружаних и униформисаних лица такозване ОВК (ослободилачке војске Косова) и то :

1. ГАЗМЕНДИ ИМЕРИ – са собом носио Аутоматску пушку број –836-95.
2. ЗУМБЕРАЈ НЕЏДЕТ - са собом носио Пиштољ 7,65 мм број – 119252.
3. АБНИ АХМЕТИ - са собом носио Аутоматску пушку број – ТУ 3565П.
4. СУЛЕЈМАН САДРИЈА – са собом носио Аутоматску пушку број – 0110957-91.
5. АГРОН СУЉА - са собом носио Аутоматску пушку број – 56200926/2.

Закључно са редним бројем 5 (пет).

Код наведених лица са наоружањем пронађено је :
1. метак 7,62мм. за Аутоматску пушку ---------- 276 комада.
2. оквир за Аутоматску пушку ---------- 10 комада.
3 Лична карта (ЗУМБЕРАЈ НЕЏДЕТ) и новчаник са новцем :
- немачка марка ---------- 160 ДМ.
- нових динара ---------- 135 динара.

Приликом претреса терена (реона где су наведена лица ухапшена) пронађено је :
1. Аутоматска пушка ---------- 073371 – 89.
2. Аутоматска пушка ---------- 14185300.
3. Аутоматска пушка ---------- 3103561.
4. Снајперска пушка (страног порекла) ---------- 44455.

НАПОМЕНА : наведеним лицима је скинута парафинска рукавица, која ће са наведени наоружањем бити предата на вештачење, а одузето наоружање налази се у просторијам СД Војне полиције Призрен.

КОМАНДА
ВАС. МОТОРИЗОВАНЕ БРИГАДЕ
ВБ Бр.

Да је фотокопија верна
Оригиналу
ЧУВАЊЕ И ОБРАДА

/handwritten: 27 May/

/handwritten and encircled: 222/

PrK /Priština Corps/ Command

Strictly confidential number 873 - 296

27 May 1998

VERY URGENT

To the command of the PrK and the 3rd Army (to the commander or chief of staff)

DRAFT TRANSLATION

1. THE ENEMY

1.1. OUTSIDE FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ TERRITORY:

Armed forces of the ARM /Army of the Republic of Macedonia/ and RA /Republic of Albania/ continue to be at a high level of b/g /combat readiness/.

There is continued observation of our territory from observation checkpoints and seized border posts in Albania, and UNPREDEP observation checkpoints and border posts in the Republic of Macedonia.

On 26 May 1998, between 1540 and 1550 hours, one or two Albanian policemen were observing our border post *Ćafa e Prušit* (53rd Gb /border battalion/ and our territory from gk /border stone/ C – 14.

On 26 May 1998, at 1800 hours, a detonation was heard from the direction of the Albanian village of Mahala e Eperme (*Deva* border post sector of the 53rd Gb).

1.2. ON THE TERRITORY OF KiM /Kosovo and Metohija/

1.2.1. AGAINST THE SERBIA MUP /Ministry of the Interior/

In the course of the day there were no attacks against members of the Serbia MUP.

1.2.2. AGAINST PrK UNITS

During the day today there were no attacks by *Šiptar* /Albanian/ terrorists at PrK units.

Šiptar terrorists launched a salvo from the direction of Radonjićka Suka against a *Gama* helicopter (flying on the Radonjić Lake - Dečani relation) transporting VON /forward air control officers/.

SITUATION IN THE UNITS:

During 27 May 1998, the chief of communications, officers from the communications platoon and security soldiers performed reconstruction of the SVZL /expansion unknown/ at the *Mitar Vojinović* border post.

DRAFT TRANSLATION

We also have information that there is a large concentration of terrorist forces at the northern slopes of Radonjićka Suka. In the course of the day there were no further operations by MUP units directed at clearing up the Đakovica – Dečani – Peć road.

REQUESTS:

As in the previous combat reports.

CHIEF OF STAFF /stamp illegible/

Colonel

Vladimir LAZAREVIĆ

27.05.

U0155000

(222)

KOMANDA PRK-A
STR.POV.BR. 873-296
27.05.1998. GODINE

VRLO HITNO

KOMANDI PRK -A I 3.A. (NA LICNOST K-DANTA ILI NS)

1.- NEPRIJATELJ

1.1.- VAN TERITORIJE SRJ
ORUZANE SNAGE ARM I RA I DALJE SU U STANJU POVISENE B/G.
I DALJE SE VRSI OSMATRANJE NASE TERITORIJE S A OSP I POSEBNIH KARAULA ALBANIJE , OSP UNPREDEP-A I GRAICNIH KARAULA R.MAKEDONIJE.
DANA 26.05.1998. GODINE U VREMENU OD 15,40 DO 15,50 JEDAN VOJNIK I DVA ALBANSKA POLICAJCA OSMATRALI SU SA GK C-14 NASU KARULU CAFA PRUSIT (53.GB) I NASU TERITORIJU.
DANA 26.05.1998. GODINE U 18.00 CASOVA IZ PRAVCA ALBANSKOG SELA MAHALA EPER CULA SE JEDNA DETONACIJA (REJON KARULE DEVA -53.GB).

1.2.- NA TERITORIJI KIM
1.2.1.- PREMA MUP-U SRBIJE
U TOKU DANA NISU ISPOLJIVANE TERORISTICKE AKCIJE PREMA PRIPADNICIMA MUP-A SRBIJE.

1.2.2.- PREMA JEDINICAMA PRK-A
PREMA JEDINICAMA PRK-A U TOKU DANASNJEG DANA NISU ISPOLJENE AKTIVNOSTI SIPTARSKIH TERORISTA .
NA HELIKOPTER "GAMA "(KOJI JE LETEO NA PRAVCU RADONJICKO JEZERO -DECANI) SA RADONJICKE SUKE OTVORENA JE PALJBA PLOTUNOM OD STRANE SIPTARSKIH TERORISTA .HELIKOPTER JE VRSIO PREVOZENJE VON.

2.- STANJE U JEDINICAMA

U TOKU 27.05.1998. GODINE NACELNIK VEZE SA STARESINAMA LINIJSKOG VOD A I VOJNICIMA ZA OBEZBEDJENJE SA 3 M/V RADILI SU NA REKONSTRUKCIJI SVZL NA KARAULI MITAR VOJINOVIC.

00000
ABGCD

2

V0155001

TAKODJE RASPOLAZEMO INFORMACIJOM O JAKOJ KONCENTRACIJI TERORISTICKIH SNAGA NA SEVERNIM PADINAMA RADONJICKE SUKE. U TOKU DAN A NISU VRSENE DALJE AKCIJE JEDINICA MUP-A NARASCI SCAVANJU KOMUNIKACIJA DJAKOVICA-DECANI -PEC.

.- ZAHTAVI :

- PO PRETHODNIM BORBENIM IZVESTAJIMA .

NACELNIK STABA
PUKOVNIK
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIC

JOO

PRK /Priština Corps/ COMMAND - IKM /forward command post/
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL NUMBER 873-378/2
6 JUNE 1998

VERY URGENT

TO THE COMMANDS OF THE 3RD ARMY AND PRK
/TO THE COMMANDER IN PERSON/

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES FROM THE NEIGHBOURING ALBANIA DIRECTED AGAINST THE FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/

FRY TERRITORY CONTINUES TO BE MONITORED FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA, WITH THE EMPHASIS ON THE AREAS OF THE BORDER POSTS OF ĆAFA PRUŠIT, MORINA AND KOŠARE UNDER THE 53RD GB /Border Battalion/.

2. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES:

2.1. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST VJ /Yugoslav Army/

AT 0330 HOURS IN THE SECTOR OF THE BROD BORDER POST (55TH GB), AN ARMED TWO-STRONG IP /reconnaissance patrol/ WAS LIQUIDATED, THEY ARE MUHEDIN KHAFIZ PASAJ, BORN ON 1 JANUARY 1944 AT KUKËS AND AN UNIDENTIFIED 15 YEAR OLD YOUTH. THE TWO LIQUIDATED PERSONS WERE FOUND TO BE HOLDING TWO 7.62 MM PAP /semiautomatic rifles/, 4 ROB /hand grenades/, TEN 7.62 MM BULLETS. THE IP BODIES WERE HANDED OVER TO THE MUP /Ministry of the Interior/.

2.2. IN THE TERRITORY:

AGAINST THE MUP SERBIA:

THE MUP SERBIA HAVE BEEN REGROUPING AND BRINGING IN REINFORCEMENTS FOR FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE VILLAGES OF VOKSA AND GLOĐANE. AT 0500 HOURS, A MUP UNIT WAS ATTACKED OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE OF PRILEP. TWO ARMED ŠIPTARS /derogatory for Albanian/ WERE CAPTURED IN THE PROCESS.

3. CORPS UNITS' STATUS REPORT

DURING THE DAY, ALL THE CORPS UNITS CARRIED OUT THE TASKS AS REQUIRED UNDER THE EARLIER DECISION. THE UNITS WERE PRIMARILY USED FOR SECURING THE DG /state border/ AND ENSURING THAT THE ROAD ALONG THE DJAKOVICA-PONOŠEVAC-MORINA BORDER POST IS PASSABLE.

THE SECURITY OF THE STATE BORDER WAS INSPECTED AND THE TROOPS WERE BRIEFED AT THE MORINA BORDER POST. AN INSPECTION WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE CORPS COMMANDER.

A TEAM FROM THE CORPS COMMAND INSPECTED ALL THE UNITS (BG-2 AND BG-4).

THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE MORALE AMONG THE CORPS UNITS ARE POSITIVE AND MAKE THE EXECUTION OF THE TASK POSSIBLE.

4. SITUATION IN THE TERRITORY

- THE VILLAGERS FROM ZULFAJ VILLAGE MOVED OUT.
- TERRORISTS ARRIVING FROM THE DRENICA AREA HAVE BEEN GROUPING UP AT DOBRODELJANE VILLAGE (SUVA REKA MUNICIPALITY). THEY HAVE BEEN CHECKING ALL THE CIVILIANS AND PASSERS-BY.

- THE ŠIPTARS HAVE BEEN PLANNING TO TRANSFER REFUGEES TO THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA THROUGH THREE CORRIDORS, NAMELY:
    - DEČANE - BUZAN;
    - ĐAKOVICA - ZOGAJ;
    - PRIZREN - KUKËS.
- THERE ARE SOME 300 TERRORISTS AT ĐOČAJ VILLAGE. THE HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED IN THE HOMES OF ASLAN DJOČAJ AND RIZO ĐUČAJ /as printed/. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT 19 HORSES CARRYING WEAPONS HAD ARRIVED FROM THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA ON 29 MAY 1998.
- FROM INTERVIEWS WITH 15 PERSONS OF THE ROMA ETHNICITY WHO FLED FROM JASIĆ VILLAGE IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT EVERYONE IN JASIĆ WAS ARMED AND THAT THEY HAD TWO 60 MM MORTARS AND FOUR MACHINE-GUNS.
- DURING THE NIGHT AT THE VILLAGES OF DOUSAJ /stricken/, /handwritten and stricken: DOBROŠ, LOŠAJ/, RAMOC, RACAJ, PACAJ AND ŠERETES /stricken and handwritten: ŠEREMET/, OVK /Kosovo Liberation Army/ MEMBERS MOBILISED ALL THE PERSONS WHO HAD WEAPONS AND TOOK THEM ALONG IN THE DIRECTION OF THE DOBROSKO FOREST AND THE FOREST OUTSIDE ŠEREMET VILLAGE.
- TERRORIST ENGINEERING TROOPS HAVE ARRANGED THEIR POSITIONS AT CRNI POTOK NEAR RACAJ VILLAGE. THERE ARE AROUND 2000 ARMED MEN ALONG THE RACAJ-PLJANČOR-EREČ-DOBROŠ-NIVOKAZ AREA. A CERTAIN NUMBER OF UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS ARRIVED IN THE AREA FROM GLOĐANE AND OTHER VILLAGES IN ORDER TO PREVENT WHAT HAPPENED WITH BATUŠA VILLAGE.

THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF PERSONS HAVE SO FAR RETURNED TO THEIR VILLAGES: BATUŠA VILLAGE 60 /crossed out and handwritten: 58 families, illegible/, SOPOT VILLAGE 35 AND BROVINA 3. /handwritten: illegible/. /illegible/ I HAVE DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

- TO MAINTAIN HEIGHTENED SECURITY OF THE STATE BORDER TO THE REPUBLICS OF ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA AND TO PREVENT ANY INCURSIONS BY DTG /sabotage and terrorist groups/, AS WELL AS TO PREVENT ANY SUPPLIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FROM ENTERING THE TERRITORY OF KIM /Kosovo and Metohija/.
- AT THE SAME TIME, TO ENSURE THAT THE FOLLOWING ROADS ARE FULLY PASSABLE: ĐAKOVICA-PONOŠEVAC VILLAGE-BATUŠA VILLAGE, PONOŠEVAC-MORINA BORDER POST AND BATUŠA VILLAGE-KOŠARE BORDER POST; TO BE PREPARED TO LIFT THE BLOCKADE ALONG THE BATUŠA-JUNIK ROAD AND TO PROTECT THE RIGHT FLANK FROM POSSIBLE ACTION FLOODING OF DTS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE VILLAGES OF SMONICA, BERJAH, NIVOKAZ AND JUNIK.
- TO PREVENT, IN COOPERATION WITH THE MUP ORGANS, MASS-SCALE DEPARTURE BY MEMBERS OF THE ALBANIAN ETHNIC MINORITY FROM KIM TERRITORY INTO THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA.

/handwritten: eighty 7.62 mm rounds were fired./

6. REQUESTS:

- TROOPS IN THE AREA ARE TO BE SUPPLIED WITH CIGARETTES;
- TROOPS IN THE AREA ARE TO BE SUPPLIED WITH FRUIT.

COMMANDER
MAJOR GENERAL
NEBOJŠA PAVKOVIĆ

RECEIVED:		6 June 199/illegible/	1735 hrs	/signed/
		(day and month)	(hour and minute)	(s i g n a t u r e)
927		P	31	
(code name)	(telegram no.) (group no.)	(urgency)	(processing method)	(communications station no.)
PROCESSED:			1805 hrs	/signed/
		(day and month)	(hour and minute)	(s i g n a t u r e)
DELIVERED:				
		(day and month)	(hour and minute)	(s i g n a t u r e)

/illegible handwritten text/

06.06.

K0356656

KOMANDA PRK-IKM
STR.POV.BR.873-378/2
06.06.1998.GODINE

VRLO HITNO

KOMANDI 3.ARMIJE I PRK
(NA LICNOST KOMANDANTA)

-AKTIVNOSTI NEPRIJATELJA IZ SUSEDNE ALBANIJE PREMA SRJ
I DALJE SE VRSI OSMATRANJE TERITORIJE SRJ SA TERITORIJE
R.ALBANIJE SA TEZISTEM NA REJONIMA KARAULA CAFA PRUSIT,MORINA,
KOSARE IZ 53.GB.
2.-AKTIVNOSTI TERORISTA:
2.1.- AKTIVNOSTI TERORISTA PREMA VJ
U 03,30 U REONU K.BROD(55.GB)LIKVIDIRANA SU 2 NAORUZANA IP I
TO MUHEDIN KHAFIZ)PASAJ,RODJEN 01.01.1944.GODINE U KUKSU I DRUGI NN
STAR OKO 15 GODINA.KOD LIKVIDIRANIH IP PRONADJENO JE 2 PAP
7,62 MM,4 ROB, 10 METAKA 7,62 MM.LESEVI IP SU PREDATI MUP-U.
2.2.-NA TERITORIJI:
PREMA MUP-U SRBIJE:
MUP SRBIJE VRSI PREGRUPISAVANJE I DOVODJENJE SNAGA ZA DALJE AKCIJE
PREMA S.VOKSA,S.GLODJANE.U 05.00 NAPADNUTA JEEDINICA MUP-A KOD S.P
PRILEP.TOM PRILIKOM ZAROBLJENA SU 2 NAORUZANA SIPTARA.
3.-STANJE U JEDINICAMA KORPUSA
U TOKU DANA SVE JEDINICE KORPUSA IZVRSAVALE SU ZADATKE PO
PRETHODNOJ ODLUCI.TEZISTE U ANGAZOVANJU JEDINICA BILO JE NA
OREZBEDJENJU DG I PROHODNOSTI KOMUNIKACIJA DJAKOVICA-PONOSEVAC-
, AULA MORINA.
IZVRSENA JE KONTROLA OBEZBEDJENJA DG I INFORMISANJE LJUDSTVA
NA KARAULI MORINA.KONTROLU JE IZVRSIO KOMANDANT KORPUSA.
EKIPAK-DE KORPUSA IZVRSILA JE KONTROLU SVIH JEDINICA(BG-2 I
BG-4).
STANJE BEZBEDNOSTI I MORALA U JEDINICAMA KORPUSA JE POVOLJNO
I OMOGUCUJE IZVRSENJE ZADATKA.
4.-STANJE NA TERITORIJI
-SELJACI IZ S.ZULFAJ SE ISELILI
-U S.DOBRODELJANE(SO SUVA REKA)GRUPISU SE TERORISTI,KOJI
DOLAZE IZ DRENICNOG KRAJA.KONTROLISU SVE CIVILE I PROLAZNIKE.
-SIPTARI PLANIRAJU DA PREKO TRI KORIDORA PREBACUJU IZBEGLICE U
R.ALBANIJU I TO:
- DECANE-BUZAN
- DJAKOVICA-ZOGAJ
- PRIZREN-KUKS
-U S.DJOCAJ IMACKO 300 TERORISTA,STAB JE SMESTEN U KUCI ASLANA
DJOCAJA I RIZA DJUCAJA.POTVRDJEN JE PODATAK DA JE 29.05.98.
GODINE STIGLO 19 KONJA SA NAORUZANJEM IZ R.ALBANIJE.
-U RAZGOVORU SA 15 LICA ROMSKE NACIONALNOSTI,KOJA SU IZBEGLA
Z S.JASIC DOBIJENI SU PODACI DA SU U JASICU SVI NAORUZANI TE
DA IMAJU 2 MB-60 MM I 4 MITRALJEZA.

K0356657

DOBROŠ
LOŠKI

-IZ SELA ~~DOUSAJ,~~RAMOC,RACAJ,PACAJ I SERET~~ES~~ NET U TOKU NOCI PRIPADNICI OVK SU MOBILISALI SVA LICA KOJA IMAJU ORUZJE I POVELI IH UPRAVCU DOBROSKIH SUMA I SUMA KOD S.SEREMET.
-TERORISTI SVRSE INZINJERISKO UREDJENJE POLOZAJA KOD CRNOG POTOKA KOD S.RACAJ.NA PROSTORU RACAJ-PLJANCOR-EREC-DOBROSNIVOKAZ IMA OKO 2000 NAORUZANIH LICA.NA TAJ PROSTOR DOSAO JE JEDAN BROJ NN TERORISTA IZ S.GLODJANA I DRUGIH SELA DA BI SPRECILI SCENARIO IZ S.BATUSE.
DO SADA U SELIMA VRATILO SE SLEDECI BROJ LICA:S.BATUSA-~~60.~~ 58 porodica
S.SOPOT-35 I BROVINA-3.
-A ODLUCIO SAM:
NASTAVITI SA POJACANIM OBEZBEDJENJEM DG PREMA R.ALBANIJI I R.MAKEDONIJI I SPRECITI UPAD DTG I UNOSENJE NORUZANJA I MUNICIJE NA TEROITORIJU KIM.
ISTOVREMENO OBEZBEDITI POTPUNU PROHODNOST KOMUNIKACIJE DJKOVICA-S.PONOSEVAC-S.BATUSA I PONOSEVAC-KARAULA MORINA I S.BATUSA-KARAULA KOSARE I BITI U GOCTOVOXSTI ZA DEBLOKADU KOMUNIKACIJA S.BATUSA-JUNIK I ZASTITITI DESNI BOK OD DEJSTVA PRELIVANJA DTS NA SIREM REJONU S.SMONICA,S.BERJAH,S.NIVOKAZ I JUNIK.
U SARADNJI SA ORGANIMA MUP-A SPRECITI MASOVNO NAPUSTANJE TEIRITORIJE KIM-A OD STRANE GRADJANA ALABANSKE NACIONALENE MANJINE I ODLAZAK U R.ALBANIJU.

Утрошено 80 метака 7,62 mm.

6.-ZAHTEVI:
-OBEZBEDITI CIGARETE VOJNICIMA U PROSTORU
-OBEZBEDITI VOCE JEDINICAMA U PROSTORU

KOMANDANT
GENERAL - MAJOR
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC

PRIMLJENO:		17 35		
	(dan i mesec)	(čas i minut)		(potpis)
927				
(tajni naziv)	(br. telegrama)	(br. grupa)	(hitnost)	(br. pt. veze)
OBRADENO:		18 05		
	(dan i mesec)	(čas i minut)		(potpis)
OTPRAVLJENO:				
	(dan i mesec)	(čas i minut)		(potpis)

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Ramush HARADINAJ
Idriz BALAJ
Lahi BRAHIMAJ

PUBLIC

PROSECUTION'S MOTION TO TENDER DOCUMENTS ON ITS RULE 65 *TER* LIST

ANNEX K
ICRC MISSING PERSON REPORTS

U0154141

HOME

ICRC

Persons unaccounted for in connection with the conflict on the territory of Kosovo

If you are the person being sought, or if you have any precise information on the fate of this person, please contact the ICRC Central Tracing Agency by mail: Do not forget to give us all information on the person sought as well as all information to recontact you.

CONTACT ICRC

ICRC ID No	**YUK-050025-01**
Full Name	**REMISTAR NENAD**
Sex	**M**
Date & Place of Birth	**04.02.1969 , BICA/BIQ / KLINA/KLINE**
Father's Name	**REMISTAR ALEKSANDAR**
Date & Place of Last news	**15.06.1998 in JABLANICA/JABLLANICE / PEC/PEJE**
Is sought by	**RELATIVE**

Last update : **29.05.2006**

HOME

U0154143

ICRC

Persons unaccounted for in connection with the conflict on the territory of Kosovo

If you are the person being sought, or if you have any precise information on the fate of this person, please contact the ICRC Central Tracing Agency by mail: Do not forget to give us all information on the person sought as well as all information to recontact you.

CONTACT ICRC

ICRC ID No	**YUK-050078-01**
Full Name	**ZARIC IVAN**
Sex	**M**
Date & Place of Birth	**11.12.1974 , DOLAC/DOLLC / KLINA/KLINE**
Father's Name	**ZARIC TRAJKO**
Date & Place of Last news	**19.05.1998 in GRABANICA/GRABANICE / KLINA/KLINE**
Is sought by	**RELATIVE**

Last update : **29.05.2006**

U0154144

HOME

ICRC

Persons unaccounted for in connection with the conflict on the territory of Kosovo

If you are the person being sought, or if you have any precise information on the fate of this person, please contact the ICRC Central Tracing Agency by mail: Do not forget to give us all information on the person sought as well as all information to recontact you.

CONTACT ICRC

ICRC ID No	**YUK-050056-01**
Full Name	**BERISHA AGRON**
Sex	**M**
Date & Place of Birth	**19.06.1982 , SVRKE/SVERKE / PEC/PEJE**
Father's Name	**BERISHA BAJRAM**
Date & Place of Last news	**19.05.1998 in GRABANICA/GRABANICE / KLINA/KLINE**
Is sought by	**RELATIVE**

Last update : **29.05.2006**

U0156717

HOME

ICRC

Persons unaccounted for in connection with the conflict on the territory of Kosovo

If you are the person being sought, or if you have any precise information on the fate of this person, please contact the ICRC Central Tracing Agency by mail: Do not forget to give us all information on the person sought as well as all information to recontact you.

CONTACT ICRC

ICRC ID No	BLG-803492-01
Full Name	IMERAJ KUJTIM
Sex	M
Date & Place of Birth	08.03.1980 , PALJABARDA/PALABARDHE / DJAKOVICA/GJAKOVE
Father's Name	IMERAJ BINAK
Date & Place of Last news	04.07.1998 in NOVO SELO/NOVOSELLE / DJAKOVICA/GJAKOVE
Is sought by	RELATIVE

Last update : **22.11.2006**

HOME

U0156718

ICRC

Persons unaccounted for in connection with the conflict on the territory of Kosovo

If you are the person being sought, or if you have any precise information on the fate of this person, please contact the ICRC Central Tracing Agency by mail: Do not forget to give us all information on the person sought as well as all information to recontact you.

CONTACT ICRC

ICRC ID No	BLG-803740-02
Full Name	BERISHAJ XHEVAT
Sex	M
Date & Place of Birth	--.--.1986 , BROLIC/BROLIQ / PEC/PEJE
Father's Name	BERISHAJ MISIN
Date & Place of Last news	--.07.1998 in JABLANICA/JABLLANICE / DJAKOVICA/GJAKOVE
Is sought by	RELATIVE

Last update : **22.11.2006**

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ICRC

Persons unaccounted for in connection with the conflict on the territory of Kosovo

If you are the person being sought, or if you have any precise information on the fate of this person, please contact the ICRC Central Tracing Agency by mail: Do not forget to give us all information on the person sought as well as all information to recontact you.

CONTACT ICRC

ICRC ID No	**BLG-804800-01**
Full Name	**FROKAJ TUSH**
Sex	**M**
Date & Place of Birth	**29.08.1961 , PLJANCOR/PLANCOR / DJAKOVICA/GJAKOVE**
Father's Name	**FROKAJ TUNE**
Date & Place of Last news	**26.08.1998 in PLJANCOR/PLANCOR / DJAKOVICA/GJAKOVE**
Is sought by	**RELATIVE**

Last update : **22.11.2006**