

ICTR-98-44-T
12-9-2008
(37668 - 37642)

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2008
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA

CASE No. ICTR-98-44-T

IN TRIAL CHAMBER No. 3

Before: Judge Dennis C.M. Byron, Presiding
Judge G. Gustave Kam
Judge Vagn Joensen

Registrar: Mr. Adama Dieng

Date Filed: 12 September 2008

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

JOSEPH NZIRORERA

JUDICIAL
2008 SEP 12 A 09:21
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JOSEPH NZIRORERA'S MOTION FOR REQUEST FOR COOPERATION
TO GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Don Webster
Ms. Allayne Frankson-Wallace
Mr. Iain Morley
Ms. Gerda Visser
Mr. Saidou N'Dow

Defence Counsel:

Mr. Peter Robinson
Mr. Patrick Nimy Mayidika Ngimbi

Counsel for Co-Accused:

Ms. Dior Diagne Mbaye and Mr. Felix Sow for Edouard Karemera
Ms. Chantal Hounkpatin and Mr. Frederick Weyl for Mathieu Ngirumpatse

1. Joseph Nzirorera respectfully moves, pursuant to Article 28 and Rule 54, that the Trial Chamber issue a request for cooperation to the Government of Switzerland to allow Ambassador Carla del Ponte to be interviewed by Mr. Nzirorera's lead counsel.

2. Article 28 provides:

1. States shall cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.

2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including but not limited to:

- (a) The identification and location of persons;
- (b) The taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
- (c) The service of documents;
- (d) The arrest or detention of persons;
- (e) The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for Rwanda."

3. Trial Chambers of the ICTR have held that they have the authority, pursuant to Article 28 and Rule 54, to request a State to cooperate with the Tribunal by making their officials available for interview by defence counsel.¹

4. Prior to seeking a request for cooperation under Article 28 from the Trial Chamber, the defence must demonstrate the efforts that it has undertaken to obtain the information.²

¹ *Prosecutor v Nindiyimana et al*, No. ICTR-00-56-T, *Decision on Nzuwonemeye's Ex Parte and Confidential Motion to Obtain the Cooperation of the Kingdom of Belgium* (9 November 2005) at para. 9; *Prosecutor v Bagosora et al*, No. ICTR-98-41-T, *Request to the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation* (10 July 2002); *Prosecutor v Bagosora et al*, No. ICTR-98-41-T, *Decision on the Bagosora Defence Request for Subpoena of Ambassador Mpungwe and Cooperation of the United Republic of Tanzania* (29 August 2006); *Prosecutor v Bagosora et al*, No. ICTR-98-41-T, *Request to the Republic of France for Cooperation and Assistance Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute* (22 October 2004); *Prosecutor v Nindiyimana et al*, No. ICTR-2000-56-T, *Decision on Nzuwonemeye's Motion Requesting Cooperation from the Government of Belgium Pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute* (7 June 2006)

² *Prosecutor v Simba*, No. ICTR-2001-76-T, *Decision on the Defence Request for the Cooperation of the Rwandan Government Pursuant to Article 28* (28 October 2004)

5. Mr. Nzirorera has exhausted all efforts to arrange a meeting with Ambassador Del Ponte on a voluntary basis. On 10 July 2008, he wrote to Ambassador Del Ponte directly, requesting a meeting.³ Ambassador Del Ponte replied in a letter received on 25 July 2008 that she was unable to meet counsel for Mr. Nzirorera as a result of a policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that she not comment on ICTR/ICTY matters.⁴

8. On 4 August 2008, counsel for Mr. Nzirorera wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting that they approve the meeting, and promising to take no more than one hour of Ambassador Del Ponte's time.⁵ In a reply dated 25 August 2008, the Federal Councilor in charge of the Ministry declined to authorize the meeting, stating:

As head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, I must assure that Ambassador del Ponte can exercise her new and challenging functions in Argentina fully and effectively. I have therefore instructed Ambassador del Ponte not to grant any interviews in connection with her former activities as Prosecutor to the International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

I would, of course, not stand in the way, should the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda come to the conclusion that Ambassador del Ponte has information relevant in your client's case. And indeed, the obligations under Article 28 of the Statute may then become applicable. Until such time, however, I would prefer to uphold my instructions.⁶

9. Therefore, Mr. Nzirorera has satisfied the requirement that he attempt to obtain the information he needs from the State before seeking a request for cooperation from the Trial Chamber.

10. In order to obtain a request for cooperation, a party must also demonstrate that the information he is seeking is relevant to his case.⁷

³ His letter is attached as Annex "A".

⁴ Ambassador Del Ponte's letter is attached as Annex "B".

⁵ A copy of this letter is attached as Annex "C".

⁶ A copy of this letter is attached as Annex "D".

11. The reason for seeking to interview Ambassador del Ponte is to support a Motion to Dismiss for Selective Prosecution to be filed on behalf of Mr. Nzirorera. The interview of Ambassador del Ponte will assist Mr. Nzirorera to establish the required element of a discriminatory motive on the part of the ICTR Prosecutor for prosecuting only Hutus and members of the former government.

12. In her book, *Peace and Punishment*, Florence Hartmann, the former spokesperson for the ICTY and ICTR Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, has alleged that Prosecutor Del Ponte was prepared to prosecute high level RPF members at the ICTR, but was pressured not to do so for political reasons by the United States government and the government of Rwanda.⁸

13. Ambassador del Ponte has firsthand information on the reasons why prosecution of RPF leaders, similarly situated to Mr. Nzirorera, were not prosecuted. Therefore, the meeting sought with her is relevant to establish whether there may have been a discriminatory motive in the decision not to prosecute the RPF.

14. In *Prosecutor v Delalic et al.*⁹, the ICTY Appeals Chamber recognized the discretion of the Prosecutor in bringing indictments before the Tribunal, but noted:

“The discretion of the Prosecutor at all times is circumscribed in a more general way by the nature of her position as an official vested with specific duties imposed by the Statute of the Tribunal. The Prosecutor is committed to discharge those duties with full respect for the law. In this regard, the Secretary-General’s Report stressed that the Tribunal, which encompasses all of its organs, including the Office of the Prosecutor, must abide by recognized principles of human rights.”¹⁰

⁷ *Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al*, No. ICTR-99-50-T, *Decision on Mr. Bicamumpaka’s Supplementary Request for an Order for the Cooperation of the Kingdom of Belgium* (26 September 2007)

⁸ A copy of the relevant portions of her book, translated into English, is attached as Annex “E” to this motion.

⁹ No. IT-96-21-A (21 February 2001)

¹⁰ Para 604.

15. The Appeals Chamber went on to refer to Article 21(1) of the ICTY Statute, which is the same as Article 20(1) of the ICTR Statute, stating that “All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal.” The court said:

“The provisions reflect a firmly established principle of international law of equality before the law, which encompasses the requirement that there should be no discrimination in the enforcement or application of the law based upon impermissible motives such as , *inter alia*, race, colour, religion, opinion, national or ethnic origin. The Prosecutor, in exercising her discretion under the Statute in the investigation and indictment of accused before the Tribunal, is subject to the principle of equality before the law and to this requirement of non-discrimination.”¹¹

16. Since Article 3 of the ICTR Statute prohibits discrimination on based upon “national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”, the decision not to prosecute members of a group on political grounds would constitute an impermissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion, as would a decision on ethnic grounds.

17. Mr. Nzirorera believes that the Prosecutor’s decision to prosecute him, while refusing to prosecute RPF officials, is based on discriminatory motives, including his Hutu ethnicity and his political affiliation with the MRND and Interim Government, as opposed to those of Tutsi ethnicity and members of the RPF. Information from Ambassador del Ponte may materially assist him in establishing the reasons for the ICTR’s failure to prosecute RPF members.


18. Therefore, Mr. Nzirorera has established the relevance of the proposed interview with Ambassador del Ponte.

¹¹ Para 605.

37663

19. It is therefore respectfully requested that the Trial Chamber issue a request for cooperation to the Government of Switzerland requesting that they facilitate a meeting between counsel for Mr. Nzirorera and Ambassador Carla del Ponte.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Peter Robinson", written in dark ink.

PETER ROBINSON

Lead Counsel for Joseph Nzirorera

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ANNEX "A"

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PETER ROBINSON
International Criminal Law
P.O. Box 1844
Santa Rosa, California 95402
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FAX (208) 694-6161
E-mail: peter@peterrobinson.com

10 July 2008

The Honorable Carla del Ponte
Ambassador
Embassy of Switzerland
846 Ave. Santa Fe, 12th floor
Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dear Ambassador del Ponte,

I hope this letter finds you doing well and enjoying your new position and your new continent.

I am Peter Robinson, lead counsel for Joseph Nzirorera at the ICTR, and former co-counsel for General Dragoljub Ojdanic at the ICTY.

I am writing to ask for an appointment with you in Buenos Aires to discuss some issues relating to my case at the ICTR.

Specifically, I would like to speak to you about your efforts to prosecute members of the RPF and the obstacles you faced in doing so.

If you can spare me one hour, I would be most grateful.

Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,



PETER ROBINSON
Lead Counsel for Joseph Nzirorera

ANNEX "B"



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Embajada de Suiza

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Circunscripción consular : Argentina

Horario de atención: 09h00 - 12h00

Mr. Peter Robinson
Lead Counsel for Joseph Nzirorera
International Criminal Law
P. O. Box 1844
Santa Rosa, California 95402

Su referencia:

Nuestra referencia: 051.11 DPC/MMG

Persona de contacto:

Teléfono: +54 11 4313 2516

Fax: +54 11 4313 6739

eugenia.martin@eda.admin.ch

Buenos Aires, 18.06.2008

Dear Mr. Robinson,

I thank you very much for your letter of 10th of July 2008 and your interest in an appointment with me in Buenos Aires.


Unfortunately will I not be able to meet you to discuss about the ICTR. According to the Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey's instructions, in my capacity of Swiss Ambassador to Argentina, I am not in position to make statements or comments on my former duty as Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.

Please be assured that I deeply regret not to be able to answer your request positively.

Yours sincerely,

The Swiss Ambassador

Carla Del Ponte



Av. Santa Fe 846, 10° piso
Apartado 76
Sucursal Pza San Martín
RA-C1059 ABP Buenos Aires
Teléfono: 00 54 11 4311 8491, Fax: 00 54 11 4313 2998
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ANNEX "C"

PETER ROBINSON
International Criminal Law
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Santa Rosa, California 95402
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FAX (208) 694-6161
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04 August 2008

The Honorable Micheline Calmy-Rey
Head of Department of Foreign Affairs
Parliament Building West
CH 3003--Bern
Switzerland

Dear Minister Calmy-Rey,

I am lead counsel for Joseph Nzirorera, the former President of the Rwanda National Assembly and Secretary-General of the ruling MRND political party. Mr. Nzirorera is on trial for genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

I am writing to request that your government authorize me to interview Ambassador Carla Del Ponte in connection with the defence of my client at the ICTR.

I am preparing a motion on Mr. Nzirorera's behalf based upon selective prosecution by the ICTR of Hutus from the former Rwandan government, while at the same time refusing to prosecute members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), most of whom are Tutsis, for crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994. Ambassador Del Ponte has important information concerning the political pressure exerted upon her and the United Nations, by the Rwandan government not to prosecute cases against RPF leaders. This information is necessary for the defence of my client, as I am required by the jurisprudence of the Tribunal to demonstrate the motive for the prosecutor's disparate treatment of the two political and ethnic groups.

I contacted Ambassador Del Ponte by letter in July, and she responded by saying that she was unable to speak with me about this matter upon your instructions. I am attaching copies of our correspondence.

Article 28 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda requires all member States of the United Nations to cooperate with the Tribunal including in the taking of testimony and production of evidence. The Tribunal's jurisprudence has confirmed that this includes authorizing interviews of current and former State employees.

37656

The Honorable Micheline Calmy-Rey

--page two--

I would appreciate it very much if your government would voluntarily agree to allow me to interview Ambassador Del Ponte so that application to the Trial Chamber for a binding order directing such an interview would not be necessary.

I promise not to take more than one hour of Ambassador Del Ponte's valuable time.

Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,



PETER ROBINSON

Lead Counsel for Joseph Nzirorera

37655

ANNEX "D"

37654



Submissions to the Independent Panel
Confidentiality notice
Confidentiality notice
Confidentiality notice

The Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)

Neuchâtel, 17-08-2008

CH-3000 Bern, CHA, 3000

Mr. Peter Robinson
International Criminal Law
P.O. Box 1544
Santa Rosa, CA, 95402
U.S.A.

Email: peter@westernjournal.com

Bern, 27 August 2008

Your request to interview Ambassador Carla del Ponte

Dear Mr. Robinson,

I thank you for your letter requesting me to authorize Ambassador del Ponte to speak to you in connection with the defence of your client at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

As head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, I must ensure that Ambassador del Ponte can exercise her new and challenging functions in Argentina fully and effectively. I have therefore instructed Ambassador del Ponte not to grant any interviews in connection with her former activities as Prosecutor to the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

I would, of course, not stand in the way, should the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda come to the conclusion that Ambassador del Ponte has information relevant in your client's case. And indeed, the obligations under article 28 of the Statute may then become applicable. Until such time, however, I would prefer to uphold my instructions.

Yours sincerely,

Micheline Calmy-Rey
Federal Councilor

ANNEX "E"

37652

FLORENCE HARTMANN

PEACE AND PUNISHMENT

**THE SECRET CONFLICT
BETWEEN POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE**

Flammarion

Extracts translated into English from the original French
 Numbers on the left hand side of the page refer to the original pagination in the French
 text

261

.....
 As for the ICTR, American interests were different, as was the environment. The United States wanted to ensure it had the support of its Rwandan allies for closing down the Tribunal in Arusha, even though it was far from having finished judging the high ups of the former Hutu administration, which instigated the genocide of 1994 in which nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutu perished in a hundred days. When it was made known, in November 2001, that the Tribunal would soon be closing, the Rwandan authorities protested, considering that the idea was premature. But President Paul Kagame was not difficult to convince. Carla Del Ponte, in December 1999, had opened investigations into Tutsi officers of the army of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under Kagame's command. These investigations, known as "special investigations", did not relate to the genocide of Tutsis, the primary mandate of the ICTR, but to the massacres of the genocidaires and ordinary Hutu civilians who fled Rwanda in large numbers before the advance of the RPF. By virtue of their military victory, which put an end to the genocide, the President-General reckoned that his men were not to be held accountable to the justice of an international community which had allowed the Tutsis to be massacred. Prosper promised that the closing of the ICTR would put an end to these disturbing investigations. It would make it possible, at the same time, to short circuit the inclination of Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere to have President Kagame indicted by the ICTR. Since 1998, the French judge had been in charge of the inquiry into the attack on the plane of Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana, which was shot down on

262

April 6, 1994, a few hours before the genocide began. His inquiry was initiated by the families of the three French members of the crew who perished together with the Rwandan president and his Burundian counterpart. The Judge was convinced that Paul Kagame was the instigator of this attack. However, even though his investigations had reached the conclusion that the current Rwandan Président was involved, the immunity granted in France to Heads of State in situ prevented any prosecution there. Rather he would have to ask the UN to make the ICTR, or its prosecutor, use their power to begin a prosecution¹². In November 2001, the Americans were interested in Judge Bruguiere's progress at the ICTR and questioned Del Ponte on what she knew about Kagame. But

¹² On 17 November 2006 Judge Bruguiere officially delivered the conclusions of his inquiry, which had finished in 2004. He named Paul Kagame as having presumptively ordered the attack which was the event which caused the genocide to begin. Nine international arrest warrants were issued for "complicity in assassination" against those close to the Rwandan president, among them James Kabarebe, Chief of the General Staff of the Rwandan Defence Forces and Charles Kayonga, Chief of the General Staff of the Army. Rwanda immediately broke off diplomatic relations with France, accusing it of genocide denial and of wishing to hide its role in training Rwandan soldiers implicated in the massacres. France was an ally of the Hutu regime which prepared and put into action the genocide of 1994. On 19 April 2007 Rwanda began an action against France before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing it of infringing international law in seeking to prosecute President Paul Kagame and some of those close to him.

they did not at this time make known their opposition to any proceedings against their ally in the area of the Great Lakes, or against his entourage. For the time being, the American strategy to precipitate the closure of the ICTR consisted in exerting pressures on African governments to give up the Rwandans who had fled and taken refuge on their territory. These steps were offered as proof of American support for the two International Tribunals and led to three arrests out of the twenty-two Rwandans indicted in their absence.

263

The International Tribunals were by now perceived as providing justice at too high a price, without quantifiable impact and as having a destabilising effect both in Rwanda and in ex-Yugoslavia: they were simply obstacles to the management of the post-war period. Americans and Europeans intended to allow the Tribunals to continue their case work until 2008 but instructed the prosecution to finish its investigations by the end of 2004. And, imposing their authority, they voted budgetary cuts which mainly affected the prosecution. With her back to the wall, Del Ponte had to reduce her programme of prosecutions. Standing at one hundred and fifty suspects during 2000, the list was reduced by the end of 2001 to a hundred and eight priority suspects. It would still need until 2015 to try them. At the end of 2002, the list was divided into two categories. On one side, the cases which could not be tried elsewhere than at the International Tribunals; on the other, those cases which could be given up to local jurisdictions. The teams concentrated, from this time on, on the first list. The investigations concerning around fifty of suspects on the second list were put on ice. If time allowed, they would be worked on further before being transmitted to the ex-Yugoslav prosecutors. Del Ponte did not want to give up them because, for the moment, the local courts were not able to guarantee credible justice. Through fear of deterring co-operation, she did not publicly announce the drastic cuts which she had just made. On October 30, 2002, Del Ponte endeavoured to convince the Security Council not to let the completion strategy operate to the detriment of justice. She argued that if it ordered the prosecution to narrow the focus of its prosecutions, and the judges to prepare transfers, it must at the same time equip Bosnia-Herzégovina with a jurisdiction capable of taking over. It must also exert the pressure necessary to obtain the arrest of fugitives and gain access to the files and the witnesses that Belgrade and also Zagreb refused to give. "It is imperative that the highly placed civilians in power and soldiers are arrested without delay and that a special Court is created, since without this the time limits can not be complied with... Only in these circumstances will the International Tribunal be able to plan to conclude its mission with the certainty of having rendered justice", explained Del Ponte. The Security Council had been formally requested, on October 10, by the President of the International Tribunal to intervene in the lack of co-operation by Belgrade. The Security Council refused to pass a resolution requiring Serbia to arrest the fugitives and to stop blocking the work of international justice. Meanwhile Mladic remained in Belgrade, under the protection of the army, with the complicity of the Head of the State, Kostunica. Zoran Djindjic, the Serbian Prime Minister, did not have sufficient power to be able to arrest him. A mandatory resolution of the Security Council could have helped him to convince the Serb political community. However Pierre Richard Prosper reassured Del Ponte: American financial assistance, granted each year in Belgrade, was conditional on the arrest of the

37649

fugitives: it would not be given if Mladic was not arrested before spring 2003. He did not keep his promise.

Prosper remained deaf to the recommendations of the International Tribunal. At the beginning of 2003, he made it more obvious than ever that the Americans wished to subject the court to an entirely political management of its exit strategy. At the time of a visit in Belgrade in January, he proposed to the authorities that they should arrest four of the twenty fugitives living in Serbia: Karadzic, Mladic as well as Sljivancanin and Radic, wanted in connection with the Vukovar affair. It promised them, in return, the suspension of the investigations in progress which were likely to put in the dock a good part of the Serbian government at the time of the war in Bosnia and in Kosovo, of whom certain members were still in power. The Belgrade press took note straight away of this disengagement with the International Tribunal by the American superpower. Most of the papers were delighted and believed they could see in the American move the sign of a desire not to allow the International Tribunal to govern the destiny of ex-Yugoslavia and bind the hands of the politicians. Del Ponte asked the Americans to state that this was not the case. A few weeks later Prosper complied, during a press conference at The Hague. But in fact he continued his secret negotiations with the purpose of deterring any co-operation by the local governments with the International Tribunal, who were aware that their dilatory manoeuvres had every chance of paying off.

265

The Europeans evinced indifference to this meddling which was holding up to ridicule the principle of independent justice which they had previously defended. Del Ponte had told them in mid 2003: "I have reached a standstill. There are nineteen fugitives in Serbia, among them Karadzic and Mladic, but nobody wants to hear about the International Tribunal any more. As if I should close the doors after the Milosevic case [the end of which was then envisaged by the beginning of 2005]. "But the Europeans only want to talk about one thing: the courts are expensive and "do not produce a return on investment". Some go as far as to say: "They are worth neither the time nor the money which is devoted to them." A side effect of the ICC was to drive the International Tribunal out of the Europeans' concerns; they failed to understand that this abandonment suited the American administration's crusade against international justice. The great powers from now on had no further scruples in taking the decision to close the court. Informal discussions within the Security Council for the adoption of a resolution formalizing the calendar of closure of the two International Tribunals started in spring 2003. The year 2003 was to be the high point of international justice's difficulties in maintaining its principles in the face of political powerplay. The debates on Iraq had just divided the members of the Security Council. The glasshouse was in turmoil. The International Tribunal business was sorted out, and no delay was merited on that subject. The preparation of the resolution was a simple formality. At least for France, Russia and China. Although fixated by the war in Iraq, the United States and Great Britain saw the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. In mid-May 2003, Prosper forced a meeting between the Rwandan leaders and the prosecutor of the International Tribunals Carla del Ponte. For a year relations between Kigali and Arusha had been at a low point. In the summer of 2002, the Rwandan government had, for several weeks, paralysed the genocide trials by preventing the arrival of the witness-victims in Arusha. Del Ponte

protested in July, then again in October, to the Security Council of UN, but they considered it sufficient, in December 2002, to make a simple declaration calling States
266

to give "co-operation without reserve" to international justice. Prosper further encouraged Del Ponte to benefit from her visit to Washington to reopen a dialogue with the Rwandan leaders, who happened also to be there. The prosecutor accepted readily, because Kigali's obstructionism was likely to lead to the acquittal of the genocide suspects, for lack of witnesses. Almost all the prosecution witnesses come from Rwanda. This formidable weapon available to the Rwandan capacity was a counter-attack by Kigali to prevail on Del Ponte to give up her investigations parallel to the genocide, aimed at officers of the tutsi army of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The mandate of the ICTR is not limited to the genocide organized and directed by the Hutu extremists, but extends to all the serious infringements of international humanitarian law, perpetrated in 1994. According to independent experts, some thirty thousand Hutu had been killed on Rwandan territory, at the time the army of the FPR was advancing. The Arusha prosecution had catalogued fourteen sites of massacres and was making efforts to go up the chain of command. Officially, Kagame promised his assistance, but the General-President never intended to hand over a single one of his men to the ICTR. As a result of the pressures exerted during the summer 2002 Del Ponte was forced to order her three investigators to suspend their mission in Rwanda, but she refused to suspend, even temporarily, the work. The team had to work from Arusha on the evidence already accumulated and on the identification of witnesses who were refugees from Rwanda. Unknown to Carla Del Ponte, the American Michael Johnson, who had arrived in September 2002 in Arusha to take over temporarily the duties of the deputy prosecutor, which had remained vacant for a year, ordered the suspension of the "special investigations". Del Ponte discovered this only in December. Johnson was immediately summoned to return to The Hague. The responsibility for the investigation was then entrusted to a British substitute, Marks Moore. The Rwandan authorities knew from now on that Del Ponte would not yield. They turned to their powerful American

267

and British allies. Consequently Kigali called a meeting with prosecutor, under American mediation, officially to deal with the problems of co-operation. But the outbreak of the war in Iraq pushed back the date endlessly. The arrival of Del Ponte in mid-May 2003 in Washington was the occasion for the two parties to get together. Prosper reassured the prosecutor: the United States was proposing to use their good offices and did not intend to interfere in the discussions. Del Ponte did not suspect for a moment what would occur.

On Wednesday May 14, 2003, at the end of the afternoon, in an elegant conference room at the State Department where the fate of so many countries has undoubtedly been decided, Del Ponte and her advisers took their seats around the table, opposite the Rwandan delegation¹³. At the end of table, Pierre Prosper played the master of

¹³ The Rwandan delegation was composed of Gerald Gahina, Prosecutor General of Rwanda, Martin Ngoga, Rwandan liaison officer at the ICTR, and Richard Sezibera, Rwandan ambassador to the United Nations

ceremonies. He took an active role, suggesting the broad outline of the discussions. The game was skewed from the beginning. It was played according to rules pre-established by the Americans and the Rwandans. Del Ponte complained about the Rwandan manoeuvres which had paralysed the Tribunal and about the refusal to cooperate with the special investigations. The Rwandans retorted that the prosecution was far from having achieved its mandate. As proof, they had prepared a diskette comprising three hundred and fifty names of highly placed persons supposedly responsible for the genocide against whom the Tribunal had not yet begun proceedings. The completion strategy, which they denounced, risked allowing the instigators of the genocide to escape from justice. Prosper concluded this first meeting by underlining the need for arriving at an agreement on the transfer of cases to Rwanda. On Thursday May 15 at 5pm there was a further meeting in the same room of the State Department. The discussions began immediately on the subject of the special investigations. The message was clear: The ICTR cannot legitimately conduct investigations against the Tutsi soldiers when it is far from having completed its work on the genocide. The Rwandans did not deny the crimes but took issue with anybody's, and in particular with the international community's, right

268
to prosecute members of its army. They said they wanted to deal with it themselves. At least so they claimed, in an effort to neutralize Del Ponte. Prosper intervened on several occasions to encourage the prosecutor to give up the special investigations to Rwanda. The magistrate, who had experienced the refusal to allow access to the sites of the massacres and to the military files, was disposed to allow the Rwandans to undertake, parallel to the ICTR, their own investigations, provided that the investigators of Arusha would have access to the Rwandan prosecution files. "I cannot rely solely on evidence collected outside Rwanda, among the Hutu diaspora, whose testimony is motivated by political interests opposed to yours. I must be able to check this information on the spot. I want to work properly with you, but I need your full co-operation", explained Del Ponte. The prosecutor was ready to grant the Kigali authorities a few months to show evidence of their desire to do justice "These crimes exist, they cannot be overlooked. To bring proceedings would be a contribution to reconciliation", she insisted. But she demanded control of these investigations. Prosper tried to dissuade her from this: "Rwanda would lead the inquiries and the proceedings". In principle, the ICTR would give up its primacy to the benefit of Rwanda if the investigations led to the inculcation of officers responsible for the massacres committed alongside the genocide. But in a Rwanda dominated by the Tutsi soldiers who had freed Rwanda from genocidaires, justice was under orders and the witnesses of their crimes condemned to silence. Del Ponte thus was unable to allow them to be in sole charge of the possible prosecutions nor give up her primacy in the trials which they would conduct, as Prosper insistently suggested. At the conclusion of the meeting, no agreement was reached. Some options had been considered which deserved further exploration. Prosper proposed that these should be summarized, in the next few days, in a document which could be used as a basis for future negotiations. A new series of talks with Kigali was envisaged in mid-July. Del Ponte encouraged the Rwandans to hold discussions in the interval with the judges and

269
Registrar to settle the question of the protection of the witnesses who were coming to Arusha, and the possibility of the transfer of cases after the closing of the ICTR.

Friday May 16, at 11 a.m. The Rwandans are not present. Del Ponte has gone to the State Department to discuss the ICTY. Prosper and his advisers await her in an outer office. They present a document to her entitled "Summary of the conclusions between the government of Rwanda and the ICTR" formulated like a road map. Taken by surprise, Del Ponte agrees nonetheless to look at the text. The document was a travesty of the content of the discussions of the previous day. It envisaged the abandonment of all the investigations against suspects belonging to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR) by the ICTR prosecution and their reference to Rwandan jurisdiction, without any guarantee of results. It required the Arusha prosecution to hand over its catalogue of the sites of massacres and also "to share all the evidence with the government of Rwanda", in spite of the prohibition on transmission of witness statements to another jurisdiction without their agreement. A further contentious point was that the document stipulated that "the prosecution will have the opportunity to review the investigations once they are finished and/or once prosecutions have begun". Del Ponte protested. She repeated the position she had expounded the previous day. Prosper invited her to modify the text and, rather than slamming the door on him, she tried to avoid a confrontation with the American representative. But it all needed to be changed. The State Department advisers noted the objections, and promised to make the necessary corrections. Del Ponte was in a hurry. Her plane for The Hague was leaving in less than three hours. In particular she wanted to escape from the ambush without having to announce to the Americans that she would not sign. When Prosper suggested sending the new version by fax to her at The Hague, she left with relief. The document arrived the following week at the office in The Hague. The Americans had not modified anything of substance. Under the terms of the alleged "agreement", the Rwandan government would be

270

in sole charge of the special investigations and the possible proceedings. The prosecutor of the ICTR would no longer have any control of the investigations nor over the course of possible proceedings and would have to yield all information in her possession to the Rwandan authorities. Del Ponte rejected the document out of hand and left to her advisers the task of informing Prosper of her refusal to sign up to it. For her part, she informed Kofi Annan's office: he condemned the American manoeuvre but objected to Del Ponte having exposed herself to State pressure.

Del Ponte ejected from the ICTR

Prosper did not accept defeat, the more so as his government was under obligation to Kigali having already negotiated the quid pro quo. In exchange for the guarantees of impunity against any prosecutions of tutsi soldiers before the TPIR, Kigali was soon to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States which protected American nationals from proceedings before the International Criminal Court. Since the beginning of 2003, the United States had tried to conclude, with as many States as possible who were signatories to the Treaty of Rome, bilateral agreements conferring immunity from jurisdiction, aimed at preventing American nationals from being handed over to the ICC. After signing, Kigali would have the benefit of the lifting of the embargo on weapons which the American Congress had imposed, and of substantial military aid from the United States although the war in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo was still raging, having already cost more than three million lives. Furthermore Kigali had not thus far been prevented from destabilizing the area of the Great Lakes nor had its army

been prevented from involving itself in the war in the east of Congo to exploit the mineral and natural resources in the area which are the cause of so much greed. Washington glossed over Del Ponte's refusal to sign, and Prosper let it be known that she had ratified the "agreement". Del Ponte contradicted him in vain, she laboured to convince people that Prosper was trying, in passing, to damage the reputation which she enjoyed among NGOs and the specialized journalists as the independent iron lady.

271

Reprisals were not long in coming. The Americans asked the British to take the lead. A powerful supporter of the ICC, Great Britain would be more convincing as the protagonist in this trial of strength against the International Tribunals. At the end of June, Jack Straw gave to Kofi Annan, while passing through Geneva, a letter requesting the separation of the post of prosecutor, hitherto common to the ICTR and the ICTY, and the appointment of a separate prosecutor for the Arusha Tribunal. He justified this step by concentrating on issues of efficiency and a reduction of costs. As a result of rejecting the agreement concluded between Washington and Kigali, with the support of London Del Ponte was to be removed from the ICTR. Having taken up her post on September 14, 1999, the Swiss was arriving at the end of her four year mandate in a few months. She had let it be known that she wished to continue in post. For the continuity of the completion strategy of which the first stages related to the prosecution, the renewal of the Del Ponte's mandate seemed to suit everyone, with the exception of London and Washington, who wanted to put her out of the game, and with the exception of certain members of her office, who also wished her set aside. Since the autumn 2002, her assistant Graham Blewitt had been campaigning to prevent her re-election. The Australian, who wished to replace her, travelled to London, Sydney, Pretoria and Taipei and was on the point of flying to New York in order to discredit her among the leaders of the U.N. when, informed of his manoeuvring, Carla Del Ponte prevented him. Michael Johnson, whose job in Arusha she had terminated, made a trip to Washington to disparage her to the American authorities, affirming that she would never keep her word on the completion strategy. Geoffrey Nice entered the contest at the beginning of 2003. He cherished the hope of succeeding Del Ponte, but especially of getting her out before the end of the Milosevic trial. He made many visits to the Foreign Office, sometimes accompanied by Michael Johnson, and never missed to take the opportunity presented by meetings in the legal or diplomatic world to describe his boss as inefficient, a poor manager, and being more concerned with her privileges and her media cover than running her office properly. He

272

claimed that she had only a vague idea of the concept of international law and that she never stopped endangering the Tribunal, while behaving like an elephant in a china shop. But, even more than wishing to sully the reputation of the Swiss from the outside, it was particularly her authority at the heart of the prosecution which the three lawyers sought to question. They wanted to have a free hand to arrange the prosecutions as it suited them, to direct the Milosevic case as they wished and to get rid of the genocide and any other hurdle which got in their way. The British and American authorities scoffed at these internal tensions which further weakened the prosecution at the time when it was having to face increased pressure from the States and needed to gather all its strength to complete its investigations into the top leaders implicated in the crimes in ex-Yugoslavia.

The negotiations between the members of the Security Council to divide Del Ponte's job, which combined the ICTR and the ICTY began in early July 2003. London and Washington skilfully prepared the ground with the assistance of Kigali. To mobilize diplomatic support, the Rwandan authorities, from the very start of June, together with the victims' organisations, got up a virulent campaign against the ICTR. Kigali was thus able to denounce a "part-time" prosecutor who was "insulting the victims of the genocide". Del Ponte attempted to counter this, but her powerful detractors moved immediately to the offensive. The Americans and the British claimed that she did not devote enough time to Arusha, that her travel was expensive, that she was too occupied with the Milosevic case and with the arrest of Karadzic and Mladic,

273

and that she would not be able to head up both exit strategies. The arguments appeared convincing and the majority of the members of the Security Council received the proposal favourably. Little did they suspect a manoeuvre motivated by the desire to set aside Del Ponte in order to put an end to the "special investigations". The principle of the splitting of the post of prosecutor passed without demur. Washington then tried to arrange the dismissal of Del Ponte, but the British found this initiative too risky. They preferred to prepare a separation which would cause neither resistance nor indiscreet questions. The Americans tested out the members of the Security Council by proposing to renew the mandate of Del Ponte at the ICTY for just one year. The Americans hoped that, rebuffed in this way, the prosecutor would turn on her heel and return in her native Tessin. But the idea, described as an "absurdity", did not last. Del Ponte is often perceived as dangerous and destabilising the regions where she is involved. But the States respected her courage, and did not want to disavow this symbol of the fight against impunity while the trial of the first Head of State brought before international justice was in progress.

At the beginning of July, the draft Resolutions began to circulate, initially between the five permanent members then between the ten other non-permanent members of the Security Council. The Americans and British were pulling the strings but continued to deny their involvement. They represented to their partners that the initiative came from Kofi Annan, who was anxious to encourage a greater effectiveness of the ICTR by this splitting of the post which the Rwandans were so insistent on. Del Ponte arrived in New York on July 28, to try to thwart the plans of her detractors. She had decided to ask to be heard by the Security Council before the adoption of the resolution and to explain the dangers of the splitting of her post, and the absurdity of changing the prosecutor one year before the end of the investigations at the risk of endangering the completion strategy in "its most crucial phase". She also wanted to alert the members of the Security Council to the hidden intentions of London and Washington. She was relying on the support

274

of Kofi Annan who, in May, intended to recommend her renewal in the post of prosecutor of both of the international tribunals. He knew that she had, at that time, the support of the States who perceived her as the guarantor of the maintenance of a reduced and re-centred programme, which had been secured by an international community which was concerned to see it put in place without delay. The possibility of a change of prosecutor was suspected by no-one. Carla Del Ponte, what is more, was persuaded that the Secretary-General would not be prepared to sanction a stratagem which undermined justice. But Kofi Annan was not ready for a new confrontation with the Americans. The

crisis at the Security Council about the war in Iraq had almost cost him his job. Crushed by the American machine, he dreamed of taking his revenge, but the game was not worth the candle: "That is likely to create too much instability, taking into account the tendency within the Security Council" said Del Ponte putting him to the test by asking whether she would be able to choose between the post of prosecutor in Arusha and that in the Hague. He answered: "I do not think so. You've got your hands full with Milosevic, your business is to get on with it." At the conclusion of the meeting, Del Ponte challenged him: "There will be no special investigations!" Kofi Annan answered: "Not, they will not do that. - You will see". Del Ponte retorted by handing her notes to him. "Keep them for history" Disillusioned, Iqbal Riza confided privately to Del Ponte: "Its all politics. It should not have happened like this, but everything is politicized." Del Ponte responded "It is unfair that politics undermines our work. I find it wounding to see that we have managed to ridicule the principles of international justice just because Kagame has signed a bilateral agreement [on the ICC with the United States] and that in exchange it has been decided to protect his soldiers". Kofi Annan's principal private secretary tried to make the best of it saying : "The principles are safe." Del Ponte replied: "No, because this separation means the end of the special investigations". And Iqbal Riza concluded: "Yes, I know. I recognize the strength of your arguments, I entirely concur, but do not quote me publicly".

The American and British manoeuvring caused a reaction in France which, since the crisis in Iraq, had no desire

275

to make the slightest concession. It disapproved of the interference in the work of Del Ponte, but in particular it had a score to settle with Rwanda. Because with the arrival in power of Kagame after the genocide, Paris had lost a little more of its African back yard. Rwanda, from that time on was under Anglo-Saxon influence and France was the subject of accusations in that country of having supported the Hutu genocidal regime. This reaction, although excited by France's particular interests, had the merit of supporting the interests of justice. Paris demanded that the strict planning imposed on the International Tribunals, requiring the conclusion of investigations at the end of 2004 and of the first instance cases in 2008, should be mandatory, but not final. It fought successfully for a mention of the "special investigations" in the resolution. The final text invited Rwanda "to intensify [its] co-operation with the ICTR in particular on the investigations into the Rwandan Patriotic Army".

Supported by several members of the Security Council, Paris also managed to block the original Anglo-American proposal to put an end immediately to investigations at the Hague Tribunal. The draft of August 10 suggested that "any new accusations would be incompatible with the completion strategy of the ICTY". The steps taken by Del Ponte at the end of July and her appearance, in camera, on August 8 in front of the Security Council, where she enumerated all the threats menacing the two Tribunals bore fruit. London and Washington's initiative was to be emptied of its substance, except for the ousting of Del Ponte from the ICTR. While the States all agreed that the deadlines should be respected, the majority of the fifteen members of the Security Council did not want to take responsibility for demanding a dead halt to the investigations, thus giving impunity to top leaders who were already in the prosecution's sights. They preferred to tighten the mandate of the International Tribunal a little further. According to the terms of Security

Council resolution 1503 of August 28, 2003, the Tribunal from now on, was required to concentrate its activity on "those principally responsible" for the crimes committed in ex-Yugoslavia.

276

Having been created in 1993 to prosecute the "authors of violations of the international humanitarian law", it had been invited by resolution 1329 of November 30, 2000 to concentrate more on the "top political and military leaders". From now on, it had to limit itself to the "those principally responsible" and was deprived, in favour of local jurisdictions, of all other investigations. The States of the region were required to hand over the fugitives and "in particular Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and Ante Gotovina". The Europeans and Americans did not manage to overcome the Russian veto and write this into the resolution, but gave the assurance that the Tribunal would not close its doors without Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic being handed over to it. The British and Americans were victorious over the splitting of the post of prosecutor. Carla Del Ponte was excluded from the ICTR prosecution with immediate effect. She was renewed in post for four years at the ICTY. Frustrated by a mixed result on the other points, Washington and London would work to get things right. To accelerate the process of delocalization, the Security Council determined to invite the establishment, as soon as possible, of a special Court in Bosnia-Herzégovina. For two years, the International Tribunal had been proposing the creation of structure to taking over this task, but the great powers had balked at putting their hands in their pockets. Under the aegis of the Americans, a conference was finally organized in the Hague, October 30, 2003, in order to raise funds. Seventeen million euros were collected to cover the first three years' costs of the mixed jurisdiction of Sarajevo. It would have to be able to conduct ten cases which would otherwise have taken place at The Hague and to conclude investigations into about fifty of the suspects that Del Ponte had been forced to freeze in 2002. The Trial Chamber for war crimes in Bosnia-Herzégovina saw the light of day at the beginning of 2005 after a reform of the Penal code, prompted by the Anglo-Saxons, who imposed a system of common law in a country, and an area, of Roman law. This choice would quickly appear as an obstacle to legal co-operation between.....



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Case Name:	The Prosecutor vs Joseph Nzirorera		Case Number: ICTR-98-44-T	
Dates:	Transmitted: 12 September 2008		Document's date: 12 September 2008	
No. of Pages:	27	Original Language: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> English <input type="checkbox"/> French <input type="checkbox"/> Kinyarwanda		
Title of Document:	JOSEPH NZIRORERA'S MOTION FOR REQUEST FOR COOPERATION TO GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND			
Classification Level:		TRIM Document Type:		
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