




International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda

IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER

Before: Judge Theodor MERON, Presiding
Judge Florence MUMBA
Judge Mehmet GÜNEY
Judge Wolfgang SCHOMBURG
Judge Inés Mónica WEINBERG DE ROCA

Registrar: Mr. Adama Dieng

Date: 13 December 2004



THE PROSECUTOR

v.

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LDs, LSS
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ELIZAPHAN NTAKIRUTIMANA AND GÉRARD NTAKIRUTIMANA

Cases Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A


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1. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 ("Appeals Chamber" and "Tribunal" respectively) is seised of appeals by Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana ("Appellant" individually or "Appellants" collectively, or "Accused") and by the Prosecution, against the Judgement rendered by Trial Chamber I in the case of *Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana* on 21 February 2003 ("Trial Judgement").¹

¹ For ease of reference, two annexes are appended to this Judgement: Annex A - Procedural Background and Annex B - Cited Materials/Defined Terms.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Appellants

2. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was born in 1924 in Ngoma secteur, Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture, Rwanda. He is married and has eight children, including Gérard Ntakirutimana. In the period April to July 1994, he was pastor and president of the West Rwanda Association of the Seventh Day Adventist Church based in the Mugonero Complex, Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture, Rwanda.

3. Gérard Ntakirutimana was born in 1958 in Ngoma secteur, Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture, Rwanda. From April 1993, Gérard Ntakirutimana was a medical doctor at the Seventh Day Adventist's hospital at Mugonero Complex, Gishyita commune. He is married and has three children.²

B. The Judgement and Sentence

4. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana were jointly tried on the basis of two indictments, Indictment no. ICTR-96-10-I, as amended on 27 March 2000 and on 20 October 2000, in the case of *Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gérard Ntakirutimana, and Charles Sikubwabo* ("Mugonero Indictment"); and Indictment no. ICTR-96-17-I, as amended on 7 July 1998, in the case of *Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana* ("Bisesero Indictment"). The charges against Charles Sikubwabo, who was at large at the time of the trial, were severed from the Mugonero Indictment.³ The Appeals Chamber notes that the Indictments, which form the basis of the convictions, do not charge the Appellants for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in its entirety, but for their individual criminal responsibility relating to selected incidents.

5. The Trial Chamber found Elizaphan Ntakirutimana guilty of genocide (Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment and Count 1 of Bisesero Indictment) and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment with credit for time spent in custody awaiting trial. Gérard Ntakirutimana was found guilty of genocide (Count 1A Mugonero Indictment and Count 1 Bisesero Indictment) and of murder as a crime against humanity (Count 3 of the Mugonero Indictment and Count 4 of the Bisesero Indictment). The Trial Chamber sentenced Gérard Ntakirutimana to 25 years' imprisonment with credit for time spent in custody awaiting trial.

² See Trial Judgement, paras. 34-38.

³ See *id.*, paras. 7-8.

C. The Appeals

6. The Appellants appeal from all of the factual findings against them and also allege a number of legal errors. They have indicated that they rely on each other's appeals. Accordingly, where appropriate, the Appeals Chamber has considered many of the Appellants' submissions as being relevant to the two of them.

7. Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that the Trial Chamber made errors of law invalidating the decision and errors of fact which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.⁴ His Appeal Brief divides legal errors into six general categories: (a) errors relating to the Indictments; (b) errors relating to the burden of proof; (c) errors relating to the treatment of prior inconsistent statements; (d) indicia of witness coaching; (e) errors relating to the alibi; and (f) evidence relating to motive. In addition, Gérard Ntakirutimana asserts that none of the factual findings on which his convictions rest could have been made by a reasonable tribunal.

8. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends generally that the Trial Chamber committed a number of recurring legal and factual errors in relation to the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments.⁵ He has regrouped the errors into seven broad categories, relevant to (i) the burden of proof, (ii) the treatment of prior inconsistent statements, (iii) credibility evaluation, (iv) the Indictments, (v) procedure, (vi) the treatment of the alibi, and (vii) character evaluation. Each of these categories is then sub-divided into a number of legal errors.⁶ In addition, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana presents the following grounds of appeal: (i) failure of the Prosecution to provide notice, (ii) that Defence testimony raised a reasonable doubt, (iii) that the Trial Chamber erred by failing to consider the Defence's motion to dismiss, (iv) that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Tutsi refugees at the Mugonero Complex were targeted solely on the basis of their ethnicity, and (v) that punishment cannot be imposed for aiding and abetting in genocide. Finally, the Appellants present a joint ground of appeal on the existence of a political campaign against them.

9. The Prosecution filed a consolidated response to the appeals of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana.⁷

⁴ Gérard Ntakirutimana's "Defence Appeal Brief" filed 28 July 2003 ("Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana)"), and Gérard Ntakirutimana's "Defence Reply Brief" filed 13 October 2003 ("Reply" or "Reply (G. Ntakirutimana)").

⁵ "Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Appeal Brief" filed 11 August 2003 ("Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana)"), and "Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Reply Brief" filed 13 October 2003 ("Reply" or "Reply (E. Ntakirutimana)").

⁶ See Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 29-32.

⁷ "Prosecution Response Brief", filed on 22 September 2003 ("Prosecution Response").

10. The Prosecution presents six grounds for appeal.⁸ The Prosecution asserts that the Trial Chamber erred (i) by failing to apply the “joint criminal enterprise” doctrine to determine Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’s and Gérard Ntakirutimana’s respective responsibility for the crime of genocide, (ii) in restricting Gérard Ntakirutimana’s conviction for genocide to the acts of killing or serious bodily harm that he personally inflicted on Tutsis at the Mugonero Complex and in Bisesero, and (iii) in its definition of the *mens rea* requirement for aiding and abetting genocide. The Prosecution’s fourth and fifth grounds of appeal address issues relating to crimes against humanity (extermination) and crimes against humanity (murder). As a sixth ground of appeal, the Prosecution challenges the sentences imposed by the Trial Chamber. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana filed responses to the Prosecution appeal.⁹

D. Standards for Appellate Review

11. The Appeals Chamber recalls the requisite standards for appellate review pursuant to Article 24 of the Statute. Article 24 addresses errors of law which invalidate the decision and errors of fact which occasion a miscarriage of justice. Where a party alleges that there is an error of law, that party must advance arguments in support of the submission and explain how the error invalidates the decision. However, if the appellant’s arguments do not support the contention, that party does not automatically lose its point since the Appeals Chamber may step in and, for other reasons, find in favour of the contention that there is an error of law.¹⁰

12. As regards errors of fact, as has been previously underscored by the Appeals Chamber of both this Tribunal and of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Appeals Chamber will not lightly overturn findings of fact made by a trial chamber. Where an erroneous finding of fact is alleged, the Appeals Chamber must give deference to the trial chamber that received the evidence at trial as it is best placed to assess the evidence, including the demeanour of witnesses. The Appeals Chamber will only interfere in those findings where no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same finding or where the finding is wholly

⁸ “Prosecution Appeal Brief”, filed on 23 June 2003, and “Prosecution Reply Brief” filed on 19 August 2003 (“Prosecution Reply”).

⁹ “Defence Response to the Prosecution Appeal Brief”, filed by Gérard Ntakirutimana on 4 August 2003 (“Response (G. Ntakirutimana)”); “Reply (sic) to Prosecutor’s Appeal Brief”, filed by E. Ntakirutimana on 5 August 2003 (“Response (E. Ntakirutimana)”).

¹⁰ *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 7; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 6 (citations omitted). See also, e.g., *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 20; *Musema* Appeal Judgement, para. 16.

erroneous. If the finding of fact is erroneous, it will be quashed or revised only if the error occasioned a miscarriage of justice.¹¹

13. The Appeals Chamber emphasises that on appeal, a party cannot merely repeat arguments that did not succeed at trial, in the hope that the Appeals Chamber will consider them afresh. The appeals process is not a trial *de novo* and the Appeals Chamber is not a second trier of fact. It is incumbent on the party alleging the error to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber's rejection of arguments constituted such an error as to warrant the intervention of the Appeals Chamber. Thus, arguments of a party which do not have the potential to cause the impugned decision to be reversed or revised may be immediately dismissed by the Appeals Chamber and need not be considered on the merits.¹²

14. Moreover, in its submissions, the appealing party must provide precise references to relevant transcript pages or paragraphs in the trial judgement to which the challenge is being made.¹³ Failure to do so, or if the submissions are obscure, contradictory, vague or suffer from other formal and obvious insufficiencies, makes it difficult for the Appeals Chamber to assess fully the party's arguments on appeal.¹⁴

15. Finally, it is within the inherent jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber to select those submissions which merit a reasoned opinion in writing. Arguments which are evidently unfounded may be dismissed without detailed reasoning.¹⁵

¹¹ *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 8; *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 40; *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, paras. 11-13, 39; *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 64; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 434; *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 63; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 8.

¹² See in particular *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 18.

¹³ Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, 16 September 2002, para. 4(b). See also *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 19; *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Appeal Judgement, para. 137; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 11.

¹⁴ *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, paras. 9-10; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 12. See also *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 43, 48.

¹⁵ *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 11; *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 19; *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 47-48; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 12.

II. APPEAL OF GÉRARD NTAKIRUTIMANA

A. Legal Errors

16. Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that the Trial Chamber made errors of law invalidating the decision. His Appeal Brief divides them into six general categories: (a) errors relating to the Indictments; (b) errors relating to the burden of proof; (c) errors relating to the treatment of prior inconsistent statements; (d) indicia of witness coaching; (e) errors relating to the alibi, and (f) evidence relating to motive.

1. The Indictments

17. As a general matter, the Prosecution responds that many of Gérard Ntakirutimana's arguments regarding perceived legal errors in the Indictments have been waived as they were not presented to the Trial Chamber.¹⁶ The Appeals Chamber will address the issue of waiver in the context of each separate argument.

(a) Double Jeopardy

18. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the Appellants' genocide convictions violate principles of double jeopardy because the convictions under the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments rely "on the same delicts."¹⁷ The Prosecution argues that this argument was not included in the Notice of Appeal and does not respond to it in substance.¹⁸ The Appeals Chamber notes that Gérard Ntakirutimana's Notice of Appeal does not contend that his convictions violate double jeopardy, nor is it clear that this issue was raised before the Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that Gérard Ntakirutimana has waived the right to adduce this argument on appeal.¹⁹

19. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber considers that Gérard Ntakirutimana's argument, to the extent it is developed, lacks merit. The Appeal Brief asserts that "[c]onvicting the Accused of two counts based on the same conduct is contrary to principles of double jeopardy" and that his two genocide convictions rely "on the same delicts."²⁰ This is an inaccurate description of the Judgement. The *actus reus* supporting the genocide conviction under the Mugonero Indictment was the finding that Gérard Ntakirutimana was "individually criminally responsible for the death of Charles Ukobizaba,"²¹ whereas the genocide conviction under the Bisesero Indictment was for other

¹⁶ Prosecution Response, para. 2.2 & n. 6 (citing authorities).

¹⁷ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 1.

¹⁸ Prosecution Response, para. 2.1.

¹⁹ *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 61.

²⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 1.

²¹ Trial Judgement, paras. 794-795.

acts enumerated in paragraph 832 of the Trial Judgement that do not include the killing of Ukobizaba. Counsel for Gérard Ntakirutimana acknowledged this when he argued that the Trial Chamber should refuse a Prosecution request to combine the allegations in a single indictment, a move he opposed because the Mugonero and Bisesero allegations “do not come out of the same act or ... same transaction.”²²

20. Gérard Ntakirutimana appears to take issue with the Trial Chamber’s reliance on all of the genocidal acts he was found to have committed, both in Mugonero and Bisesero, as a basis for concluding that he had the requisite *mens rea* for the two genocide convictions, namely that he intended “to destroy, in whole, the Tutsi ethnic group.”²³ However, the Appeals Chamber notes that his Appeal Brief does not elaborate any argument that double jeopardy principles are offended by two convictions with mental elements established by the same conduct but each with an *actus reus* distinguishable in time, location, and identity of victims. There is no need to decide whether such an argument could be successfully mounted; it suffices for present purposes that Gérard Ntakirutimana has failed to do so here.

(b) Failure to Plead Material Facts

21. Gérard Ntakirutimana’s principal allegation of error regarding the Indictments concerns the alleged failure of the Indictments to plead various material facts underlying his convictions.²⁴ The Appellant submits that the Indictments did not “set[] out the material facts of the Prosecution case with enough detail to inform [him] clearly of the charges against him so that he may prepare his defence,”²⁵ such as “the identity of the victim, the time and place of the events and the means by which the acts were committed.”²⁶ The Appellant has also challenged certain of the allegations concerning Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.

22. The Prosecution contends that Gérard Ntakirutimana waived this argument by failing to present it to the Trial Chamber.²⁷ It adds that, normally, the Defence must challenge the admissibility of evidence of material facts not pleaded in the indictment by interposing a specific objection at the time the evidence is introduced. The Defence may also choose to file a timely motion to strike the evidence or to seek an adjournment in order to conduct further investigations in

²² T. 2 November 2001, p. 4 (closed session).

²³ Trial Judgement, paras. 793, 834.

²⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 2-3.

²⁵ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 88.

²⁶ *Id.*, para. 89.

²⁷ Prosecution Response, para. 2.2.

order to respond to the unpleaded allegation. The Prosecution submits that the Appellant took none of these steps during trial.²⁸

23. In this case, however, the Trial Chamber's Judgement makes clear that the Appellants challenged the admission of evidence of unpleaded facts in a manner that the Trial Chamber considered adequate. The Judgement contains a detailed discussion entitled "Specificity of the Indictments"²⁹ and explicitly states that "the Chamber does not accept the Prosecution's submission that the Defence sat on its rights and did not challenge the lack of specificity in the Indictments."³⁰ In some situations, the Trial Chamber refused to make findings against the Appellants because it found that the Bisesero Indictment was defective due to its failure to plead the relevant allegation and that the defect was not subsequently cured.³¹ Given that the Trial Chamber expressly found that the vagueness challenge was properly presented, the issue may also be properly raised on appeal.

24. The law governing challenges to the vagueness of an indictment is set out in detail in the ICTY Appeals Chamber's Judgement in *Kupreškić*. As in that case, because this issue is being raised after the Accused have been tried and a verdict rendered, the complaint will be considered only in relation to the counts under which the Accused were actually convicted,³² namely the genocide counts for both Accused and the count of crimes against humanity (murder) for Gérard Ntakirutimana.

25. The *Kupreškić* Appeal Judgement stated that Article 18(4) of the ICTY Statute, read in conjunction with Articles 21(2), 4(a) and 4(b), "translates into an obligation on the part of the Prosecution to state the material facts underpinning the charges in the indictment, but not the evidence by which such material facts are to be proven."³³ Whether certain "facts" are "material" depends on the nature of the case. *Kupreškić* discussed several possible factors that could bear on the determination of materiality. For example, if the Prosecution charges personal physical commission of criminal acts, the indictment should set forth "the identity of the victim, the time and place of the events and the means by which the acts were committed."³⁴ On the other hand, such detail need not be pleaded if the "sheer scale of the alleged crimes makes it impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such matters."³⁵ Even in cases where a high degree of specificity is "impractical," however, "since the identity of the victim is information that is valuable to the

²⁸ *Id.*, paras. 2.2, 2.27.

²⁹ Trial Judgement, Chapter. II.2.

³⁰ *Id.*, para. 52.

³¹ *Id.*, paras. 565 (allegation of an attack at Gitwe Primary School), 698 (allegation of killings at Murambi Church).

³² See *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 79.

³³ *Id.*, para. 88.

³⁴ *Id.*, para. 89.

³⁵ *Id.*

preparation of the defence case, if the Prosecution is in a position to name the victims, it should do so.”³⁶

26. *Kupreškić* also envisioned the possibility in which the Prosecution was unable to plead with specificity because the material facts were not in the Prosecution’s possession. As a general matter, “the Prosecution is expected to know its case before it goes to trial” and cannot expect to “mould[] the case against the accused in the course of the trial depending on how the evidence unfolds.”³⁷ If the Defence is denied the material facts of the accused’s alleged criminal activity until the Prosecution files its pre-trial brief or until the trial itself, it will be difficult for the Defence to conduct a meaningful investigation for trial until then. A trial chamber must be mindful of whether proceeding to trial in such circumstances is fair to the accused. *Kupreškić* indicated that while there are “instances in criminal trials where the evidence turns out differently than expected,” such situations may call for measures such as an amendment of the indictment, an adjournment, or the exclusion of evidence outside the scope of the indictment.³⁸

27. If an indictment is insufficiently specific, *Kupreškić* stated that such a defect “may, in certain circumstances cause the Appeals Chamber to reverse a conviction.”³⁹ However, *Kupreškić* left open the possibility that a defective indictment could be cured “if the Prosecution provides the accused with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges against him or her.”⁴⁰ The question whether the Prosecution has cured a defect in the indictment is equivalent to the question whether the defect has caused any prejudice to the Defence or, as the *Kupreškić* Appeal Judgement put it, whether the trial was “rendered unfair” by the defect.⁴¹ *Kupreškić* considered whether notice of the material facts that were omitted from the indictment was sufficiently communicated to the Defence in the Prosecution’s pre-trial brief, during disclosure of evidence, or through proceedings at trial.⁴² In this connection, the timing of such communications, the importance of the information to the ability of the Accused to prepare its defence, and the impact of the newly-disclosed material facts on the Prosecution’s case are relevant.⁴³ As has been previously noted, “mere service of witness statements by the [P]rosecution

³⁶ *Id.*, para. 90.

³⁷ *Id.*, para. 92.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Id.*, para. 114.

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ *Id.*, para. 122.

⁴² *Id.*, paras. 117-120.

⁴³ *Id.*, paras. 119-121.

pursuant to the disclosure requirements” of the Rules does not suffice to inform the Defence of material facts that the Prosecution intends to prove at trial.⁴⁴

28. In *Kupreškić*, the omitted facts were not clearly stated in the pre-trial brief or in the Prosecution’s opening statement;⁴⁵ the underlying witness statement was not disclosed until “one to one-and-a-half weeks prior to trial and less than a month prior to [the witness’s] testimony in court”;⁴⁶ and the omitted fact was indicative of a “radical transformation” of the Prosecution’s case from one alleging “wide-ranging criminal conduct ... during a seven-month period” to a targeted prosecution for persecution because of participation “in two individual attacks.”⁴⁷ Moreover, the Appeals Chamber concluded that “whether the Trial Chamber would take into account [the unpleaded facts] as a possible basis for liability in respect of the persecution count was, until the very end of trial, not settled,”⁴⁸ and that this uncertainty “materially affected” the ability of the accused to prepare their defence.⁴⁹ These factors eliminated the possibility that the failure to plead material facts in the indictment had not prejudiced the accused in *Kupreškić*; rather, their “right to prepare their defence was seriously infringed” and their trial “rendered unfair.”⁵⁰

29. The allegations against Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana must be assessed in light of these standards. The Trial Chamber acknowledged that “some paragraphs of the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments are rather generally formulated.”⁵¹ The question, then, is whether these general formulations meet the *Kupreškić* test for sufficient pleading of the material facts on which the Trial Chamber based the convictions and, if they do not, whether the Prosecution cured the defects through post-indictment communications.

(i) Did the Mugonero Indictment Fail to Plead Material Facts?

30. The principal allegations in the Mugonero Indictment are as follows:

4.7 On or about the morning of 16 April 1994, a convoy, consisting of several vehicles followed by a large number of individuals armed with weapons went to the Mugonero Complex. Individuals in the convoy included, among others, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gerard Ntakirutimana & Charles Sikubwabo, members of the National Gendarmerie, communal police, militia and civilians.

⁴⁴ *Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin and Momir Talić*, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, 26 June 2001, para. 62.

⁴⁵ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 117-118.

⁴⁶ *Id.*, para. 120.

⁴⁷ *Id.*, para. 121.

⁴⁸ *Id.*, para. 110.

⁴⁹ *Id.*, para. 119.

⁵⁰ *Id.*, para. 122.

⁵¹ Trial Judgement, para. 43.

4.8 The individuals in the convoy, including Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gerard Ntakirutimana & Charles Sikubwabo, participated in an attack on the men, women and children in the Mugonero Complex, which continued throughout the day.

4.9 The attack resulted in hundreds of deaths and a large number of wounded among the men, women and children who had sought refuge at the Complex.

4.10 During the months that followed the attack on the Complex, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gerard Ntakirutimana & Charles Sikubwabo, searched for an [sic] attacked Tutsi survivors and others, killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm to them.⁵²

31. Under this Indictment, the Prosecution alleged and the Trial Chamber found that Gérard Ntakirutimana “procured ammunition and gendarmes for the attack on the Complex” and “killed Charles Ukobizaba by shooting him in the chest, from a short distance, in Mugonero Hospital courtyard around midday on 16 April 1994.”⁵³ These findings supported the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Gérard Ntakirutimana had the requisite intent for genocide and, in the case of the killing of Ukobizaba, the conclusion that Gérard Ntakirutimana was “individually criminally responsible” for his death and therefore was guilty of genocide.⁵⁴ The killing of Ukobizaba also grounded the conclusion that Gérard Ntakirutimana was guilty of murder as a crime against humanity.⁵⁵ Gérard Ntakirutimana was therefore found guilty of genocide at Mugonero because of acts committed by him personally, namely the killing of Ukobizaba and the procurement of ammunition and gendarmes. Similarly, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was pronounced guilty of genocide because the Trial Chamber found that he “conveyed armed attackers to the Mugonero Complex in his vehicle on the morning of 16 April 1994.”⁵⁶

32. Under *Kupreškić*, criminal acts that were physically committed by the accused personally must be set forth in the indictment specifically, including where feasible “the identity of the victim, the time and place of the events and the means by which the acts were committed.”⁵⁷ The Appeals Chamber must therefore consider whether the material facts underlying the Mugonero convictions were sufficiently pled in the Indictment and, if not, whether that failure was cured by other means.

a. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Murdered Charles Ukobizaba

33. The Mugonero Indictment does not state Ukobizaba’s name or any of the circumstances surrounding his killing that were eventually found in the Judgement. Yet nothing suggests that it was “impracticable to require a high degree of specificity” in this matter.⁵⁸ On the contrary, as the

⁵² Mugonero Indictment, paras. 4.7-4.10 (emphasis omitted).

⁵³ Trial Judgement, para. 791.

⁵⁴ *Id.*, paras. 793-795.

⁵⁵ *Id.*, paras. 806-810.

⁵⁶ *Id.*, paras. 788, 790.

⁵⁷ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 89.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

Trial Chamber pointed out, the witness statements of several Prosecution witnesses and the Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief mentioned Ukobizaba's name and alleged that Gérard Ntakirutimana personally killed him.⁵⁹ The Prosecution was therefore in a position to plead specific material facts regarding Ukobizaba's killing in the Mugonero Indictment, yet it failed to do so. This failure renders the counts of genocide and crimes against humanity (murder) against Gérard Ntakirutimana defective.

34. *Kupreškić* next requires consideration of whether the defect was cured by other Prosecution communications regarding the material facts underlying its case, and of whether such information was timely, clear and consistent enough to ensure that the Appellant suffered no undue prejudice from the Mugonero Indictment's failure to plead Ukobizaba's killing in detail. The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief and witness statements disclosed to the Accused cured the omission, and the Prosecution relies on this conclusion on appeal.⁶⁰

35. The witness statements of Witnesses GG and HH, disclosed to the Appellant no later than 10 April 2000, aver that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Ukobizaba at Mugonero on 16 April 1994, with Witness GG specifically stating that Ukobizaba was shot with a gun.⁶¹ The Prosecution also refers to a statement of Witness AA, but AA explicitly stated that he could not say whether Gérard Ntakirutimana shot anyone.⁶² Moreover, AA gave investigators a list of Mugonero victims that states that Ukobizaba "was killed with a machete," not with a gun.⁶³ The disagreement between the statements of Witnesses GG and HH, on the one hand, and the statement of Witness AA, on the other, demonstrates that disclosure of those statements alone did not offer "clear" or "consistent" information with respect to the role of Ukobizaba's killing in the Prosecution's case.

36. The Pre-Trial Brief, filed 16 July 2001, states: "Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana personally killed several Tutsi individuals including the hospital accountant, Charles Ukobizaba and one Kajongi."⁶⁴ Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief, which was filed 15 August 2001, summarized the planned testimony of Prosecution witnesses. Annex B gave notice of Witness GG's testimony that "[d]uring

⁵⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 60; *see also* Prosecution Response, para. 2.9 & note 21.

⁶⁰ Trial Judgement, paras. 60, 62-63; Prosecution Response, paras. 2.2, 2.9.

⁶¹ Statement of Witness GG dated 30 June 1996, p. 5 ("I saw Dr. Gerard NTAKIRUTIMANA walking in front of the attackers. He was armed with a gun. I saw that they were holding the accountant of the hospital. His name was Charles UKOBIZABA. I saw that they took the key of the office from UKOBIZABA by force. After that I saw that Dr. Gerard NTAKIRUTIMANA killed UKOBIZABA with a gun. It was a pistol."), disclosed 10 April 2000 (p. PN0190); Statement of Witness HH dated 2 April 1996, p. 3 ("I even saw Doctor Gerard NTAKIRUTIMANA kill the hospital accountant named UKOBIZABA Charles after having confiscated the key to his office."), disclosed 10 April 2000 (p. PN0171).

⁶² Statement of Witness AA dated 11 April 1996, p. 3 ("You ask me if I saw that RUZINDANA or Dr. Gerard NTAKIRUTIMANA actually shooting [*sic*] anybody. I can not tell you that.").

⁶³ List Attached to Statement of Witness AA dated 28 November 1995 ("UKOBIZABA Charles, Comptable (Accountant) of the Hospital MUGONERO (he was killed with a machete)"); List Attached to Statement of Witness AA dated 30 November 1995 ("Ukobizaba Charles, Accountant at the Mugonero Hospital, he was macheted.").

the attack he saw *Dr. Gérard Ntakirutimana* kill Ukobizaba, the hospital accountant, and take the keys of his office,”⁶⁵ and of Witness HH’s testimony that “[i]n the course of the attack the witness saw *Dr. Gérard Ntakirutimana* kill the hospital accountant Ukobizaba Charles after confiscating the key to his office.”⁶⁶

37. In contrast to the witness statements alone, the Pre-Trial Brief made it unequivocal that the Prosecution intended to prove that *Gérard Ntakirutimana* personally killed Ukobizaba. Annex B further indicated that the Prosecution planned to rely on the testimony of Witnesses GG and HH in this regard. Thus, the Prosecution had clearly and consistently informed the Defence by 16 July 2001 that it planned to assert that *Gérard Ntakirutimana* killed Ukobizaba at Mugonero on 16 April 1994. The Prosecution further informed the Defence on 15 August 2001 of the witnesses on whose testimony this charge was based.

38. In order to satisfy *Kupreškić*, however, the disclosure made in the Pre-Trial Brief and Annex B must also be found to be timely, such that the Defence suffered no prejudice from the failure of the Indictment to allege specifically that *Gérard Ntakirutimana* killed Ukobizaba. The Pre-Trial Brief was filed two months before the opening of trial, and Annex B was filed one month before trial, both pursuant to an oral order of the Trial Chamber on 2 April 2001 that was later reaffirmed in a written decision.⁶⁷ The proximity of these filings to trial, however, is not the only consideration. The Mugonero Indictment stated that *Gérard Ntakirutimana* was responsible for “the killings and causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Tutsi population”⁶⁸ and “the murder of civilians.”⁶⁹ In this context, allegations that *Gérard Ntakirutimana* personally killed a Tutsi individual, particularly allegations supported by two witnesses, would necessarily be of significant importance.

39. Unlike in *Kupreškić*, where the unpleaded facts represented a “drastic change in the Prosecution case” and were coupled with “ambiguity as to the pertinence” of the underlying evidence, which was only disclosed in the weeks before trial,⁷⁰ here the fact of Ukobizaba’s killing fit directly into the Prosecution’s case as pleaded in the Mugonero Indictment, was clearly supported by two previously-disclosed witness statements, and was made unambiguously known to the Appellants two months before trial.

⁶⁴ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 15.

⁶⁵ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 5.

⁶⁶ *Id.*, p. 6.

⁶⁷ See Decision on Prosecution Motion for Contempt of Court and on Two Defence Motions for Disclosure Etc., 16 July 2001, para. 11 (citing T. 2 April 2001, pp. 29-34).

⁶⁸ Mugonero Indictment, Count 1A.

⁶⁹ *Id.*, Count 3.

⁷⁰ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 121.

40. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the two witness statements cannot, on their own, remedy the Indictment alone because they were “inconsistent.”⁷¹ First of all, Gérard Ntakirutimana does not identify any inconsistencies between the two statements, but only purported inconsistencies between the trial testimony of Witnesses GG and HH,⁷² which, though relevant to their credibility at trial, are irrelevant to the question of whether their statements aided in curing an error in the Indictment. More importantly, however, the *Kupreškić* test is not directed to the clarity and consistency of the Prosecution’s *evidence* as disclosed to the accused, but rather to the clarity and consistency of the Prosecution’s announcement of the *material facts* it intends to prove. Here, the Appellants were informed by the Pre-Trial Brief and Annex B that the Prosecution would argue that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Ukobizaba and rely on the evidence of Witnesses GG and HH as support. Whether Witnesses GG and HH gave consistent testimony in their statements would affect the Prosecution’s ability to prove the charge, but it has no bearing on Gérard Ntakirutimana’s notice of that charge against him or his ability to prepare a defence against it.

41. Of course, if the only arguable notice to the Defence regarding the Prosecution’s intent to prove a particular material fact is its inclusion in conflicting or ambiguous disclosure, the chamber will be unlikely to find that the accused had “timely, clear, and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges against him or her.”⁷³ In this regard, the mere fact of disclosure of witness statements on 10 April 2000 was insufficient to cure the indictment error, because of the contradiction between the statements of Witnesses GG and AA with regard to the method of Ukobizaba’s murder. The Pre-Trial Brief and Annex B made plain that the Prosecution planned to rely on Witnesses GG’s and HH’s testimony, not AA’s – a decision that is hardly surprising given the obvious importance of an allegation of direct commission of murder to the Prosecution’s case. Thus, while Gérard Ntakirutimana is correct that the witness statements alone were not sufficient to overcome the defect in the Indictment, the explicit mention of Ukobizaba’s murder in the Pre-Trial Brief and Annex B’s identification of Witnesses GG and HH as the witnesses on which the Prosecution would rely, when combined with the previously-disclosed statements of those two witnesses, constitute the “timely, clear, and consistent information” required by *Kupreškić*.

42. Gérard Ntakirutimana lastly argues that the Pre-Trial Brief was not a reliable source of information for the Prosecution’s charges, because it included an allegation that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed “one Kajongi,”⁷⁴ an allegation that was not presented at trial. The Prosecution

⁷¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 10.b.

⁷² See Reply (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 6 (citing Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 91).

⁷³ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 114.

⁷⁴ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 15.

has the discretion to forgo presentation of material facts, even if they are specifically alleged in the indictment. In this situation, the Pre-Trial Brief put the Appellants on sufficient notice that the Prosecution would seek to prove that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Ukobizaba. The fact that the Appellants were also on notice of another charge that was later dropped does not alter this conclusion.

43. Naturally, the Prosecution cannot intentionally seek to exhaust its opponent's resources by leaving the Defence to investigate charges that it has no intent to prosecute. The Prosecution should make every effort to ensure not only that the indictment specifically pleads the material facts that the Prosecution intends to prove but also that any facts that it does not intend to prove are removed. The same applies to other communications that give specific information regarding the Prosecution's intended case, such as the Pre-Trial Brief. It would be a serious breach of ethics for the Prosecution to draw the Defence into lengthy and expensive investigations of facts that the Prosecution does not intend to prove at trial. Gérard Ntakirutimana does not claim that the Prosecution did so in this case. For present purposes, then, it suffices to state that the Pre-Trial Brief's allegation regarding Kajongi does not affect the conclusion that the Pre-Trial Brief, Annex B, and the statements of Witness GG and HH cured the Mugonero Indictment's failure to allege that Gérard Ntakirutimana murdered Charles Ukobizaba.

44. In light of all the circumstances, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Prosecution has met its burden of showing that its failure to mention Ukobizaba's killing in the Indictment did not actually prejudice Gérard Ntakirutimana's ability to defend against this charge.

b. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Procured Arms, Ammunition and

Gendarmes

45. The allegation that Gérard Ntakirutimana procured weapons, ammunition and gendarmes for the attack at Mugonero Complex does not appear in the Indictment. Like the allegation relating to the murder of Charles Ukobizaba, the Prosecution was in a position to plead specific details regarding this matter, given that it possessed the statement of Witness OO dated 12 August 1998, which contains a lengthy description of Gérard Ntakirutimana's activities at the Kibuye gendarmerie camp and was the sole evidentiary basis for the Prosecution's allegation.⁷⁵ The Prosecution's failure to include a specific pleading of this fact therefore rendered the Indictment defective.

⁷⁵ Statement of Witness OO dated 12 August 1998.

46. The Trial Chamber found, however, that the defect was cured by the fact that the allegation of procurement of weapons, ammunition and gendarmes was included in the Pre-Trial Brief.⁷⁶ The Pre-Trial Brief asserts that “[b]etween 10 and 16 April 1994 Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana frequently visited the Kibuye Gendarme camp headquarters from where he procured arms, ammunition and gendarmes, for purposes of launching an attack on Tutsi refugees gathered at the Mugonero complex.”⁷⁷ Annex B announces that Witness OO would testify that “in April 94 he saw *Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana* at the base on several occasions, sometimes with soldiers and gendarmes. On one or two such occasions the witness saw *Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana* being supplied with arms, ammunition and gendarmes for purposes of ‘mounting operations’ at the Mugonero complex.”⁷⁸ The statement of Witness OO, as noted above, contains a lengthy narrative description of events at the Kibuye gendarmerie camp, including of Gérard Ntakirutimana’s arrival at the camp on the morning of the Mugonero attack, driving a white pick-up “filled with about 10 *Interahamwe* militiamen,” who shot their guns in the air and said “we need weapons and ammunition because you have failed.”⁷⁹ Although it is not clear from the record when OO’s witness statement was first disclosed to the Defence, a confidential memorandum from the Prosecution filed with the Registry of the Tribunal states that it was disclosed on 29 August 2000.⁸⁰

47. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the Pre-Trial Brief’s statement that he visited the Kibuye camp “[b]etween 10 and 16 April 1994” did not give proper notice of what he submits is the Prosecution’s “unequivocal trial allegation of 15 April” as the date of the procurement of weapons and gendarmes; he also argues that the 15 April date “falls outside the period specified for the Mugonero allegations.”⁸¹ The Trial Chamber found that Gérard Ntakirutimana took gendarmes and ammunition with him from the Kibuye camp on 16 April, not 15 April.⁸² This finding was well within the time period specified in the Mugonero Indictment, which states that Gérard Ntakirutimana was part of a “convoy, consisting of several vehicles followed by a large number of individuals armed with weapons” that went to the Mugonero Complex “[o]n or about the morning of 16 April 1994.”⁸³ The statement in the Pre-Trial Brief that Gérard Ntakirutimana visited the Kibuye camp “[b]etween 10 and 16 April 1994” is precise enough to enable the preparation of a defence to the charge of procurement, particularly when viewed in combination with Annex B and the statement of Witness OO. Annex B makes clear that the allegation of procurement rests on the testimony of Witness OO, whose statement in turn makes clear that Gérard Ntakirutimana

⁷⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 172.

⁷⁷ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 11.

⁷⁸ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 10.

⁷⁹ Statement of Witness OO dated 12 August 1998, p. 12.

⁸⁰ Confidential Memorandum from Renifa Madenga to Koffi Afandé, 2 April 2003, p. 6.

⁸¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 10.a.

⁸² Trial Judgement, para. 186.

physically obtained arms and personnel at the Kibuye camp on the morning of the day of the attack on the hospital and the church. Based on these three documents, the Appellants were clearly informed that the Prosecution intended to prove that Gérard Ntakirutimana visited the camp between 10 and 16 April and that he obtained arms and gendarmes there on the morning of 16 April.

48. Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that the allegation of procurement was “buried among 83 statements disclosed.”⁸⁴ This argument would have great force if the allegation were insignificant in the context of the case pleaded in the Indictment and if it were never mentioned except in isolated references in a witness statement. In this situation, however, the assertion in Witness OO’s statement that Gérard Ntakirutimana procured weapons and attackers on the morning of the attack on the Mugonero Complex is obviously one of direct relevance to the pleaded allegation that Gérard Ntakirutimana “participated in an attack on the men, women and children in the Mugonero Complex.”⁸⁵ While the importance of the allegation might not have been enough to cure an Indictment defect on its own given that it was contained in a single witness statement, it must be viewed together with the unambiguous information in the Pre-Trial Brief and Annex B that the Prosecution intended to rely on Witness OO’s evidence as proof that Gérard Ntakirutimana was “supplied with arms, ammunition and gendarmes” for the purpose of an attack on Mugonero.⁸⁶ As with the killing of Ukobizaba, this information sufficed to cure the vagueness in the Indictment. Gérard Ntakirutimana failed to identify any particular prejudice to his ability to defend against the charge of procurement at trial by the fact that the Prosecution failed to communicate it specifically until the Pre-Trial Brief was filed on 15 July 2001. These circumstances compel the conclusion that the Prosecution sufficiently cured the defect in the Indictment by subsequent clear, consistent, and timely information regarding the nature of its case.

c. The Allegation That Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Conveyed Armed Attackers⁸⁷

49. The Trial Chamber also found that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana “conveyed armed attackers to the Mugonero Complex in his vehicle on the morning of 16 April 1994, and that these attackers proceeded to kill Tutsi refugees at the Complex.”⁸⁸ Although the Mugonero Indictment alleges that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was one of the “[i]ndividuals in the convoy” that went to Mugonero on 16

⁸³ Mugonero Indictment, paras. 4.7-4.8.

⁸⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 10.a.

⁸⁵ Mugonero Indictment, para. 4.8.

⁸⁶ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 10.

⁸⁷ Although the argument regarding this point was raised in the brief of Gérard Ntakirutimana, not Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the Appeals Chamber will consider it in light of the Appellant’s respective incorporation of the arguments in each other’s brief. Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 88.

⁸⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 788.

April⁸⁹ and that he “participated in an attack” on the Complex,⁹⁰ the allegation that he conveyed other attackers to the Complex is not alleged in the Indictment. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the distinction is important because Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’s genocide conviction under the Mugonero Indictment was based not on a finding of personal physical “participat[ion] in an attack,”⁹¹ as alleged in the Indictment, but rather on the finding that “in conveying armed attackers to the Complex, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana is individually criminally responsible for aiding and abetting in the killing and causing of serious bodily or mental harm to the Tutsi refugees at the Complex.”⁹²

50. As a preliminary matter, the Prosecution submits that this argument has been waived as it was not presented to the Trial Chamber. This argument has some force because, although the Trial Chamber specifically discussed and disposed of the challenge to the Indictment in its discussion of the killing of Ukobizaba⁹³ and the procurement of arms and gendarmes by Gérard Ntakirutimana,⁹⁴ it did not do so in discussing Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’s transport of armed attackers.

51. It is clear that the Prosecution could have pleaded its material allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to the Mugonero attack. Witness MM, one of several witnesses upon whom the Prosecution relied to prove this fact, had previously attested to this allegation in a statement in 1996.⁹⁵ Accordingly, the Prosecution was in a position to plead this material fact in the Indictment, and its failure to do so rendered the Indictment defective.

52. The Appellants do not appear to have objected to this error at trial when the Prosecution presented evidence that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to Mugonero.⁹⁶ The Appellant’s filings before the Appeals Chamber do not reference any specific objection, nor does it appear that they asked for more time to cross-examine the relevant witnesses or to conduct further investigations. Normally, the Defence’s silence would constitute a waiver of the argument: “a party should not be permitted to refrain from making an objection to a matter which was apparent during the course of the trial, and to raise it only in the event of an adverse finding against that party.”⁹⁷ The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that the Trial Chamber concluded that the challenges that the Appellants presented to the vagueness of the Indictments were properly presented and enabled

⁸⁹ Mugonero Indictment, para. 4.7.

⁹⁰ *Id.*, para. 4.8.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Trial Judgement, para. 790.

⁹³ *Id.*, paras. 60-63.

⁹⁴ *Id.*, para. 172.

⁹⁵ Statement of Witness MM dated 11 April 1996, p. 4 (“J’ai vu le Pasteur NTAKIRUTIMANA venir vers l’hôpital avec sa camionnette contenant 4 ou 5 des militaires à l’arrière.”).

⁹⁶ See, e.g., T. 19 September 2001, p. 84 (Witness MM); T. 20 September 2001, p. 135 (Witness GG).

⁹⁷ *Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement*, para. 91.

the Trial Chamber to evaluate the issue.⁹⁸ The Trial Chamber also cited certain portions of the Defence Closing Brief, which specifically challenges the allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported attackers, although it does so in the context of challenging the credibility of the evidence underlying the allegation and it does not specifically address the Indictment's failure to plead this fact.⁹⁹ The Trial Chamber's unequivocal statement that it believed the challenges to the vagueness of the Indictment to have been properly presented and its specific citation of a page of the Defence Closing Brief that addresses the allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to Mugonero indicate that the Appellants brought the point to the attention of the Trial Chamber in a manner that permitted the Trial Chamber to consider it to its satisfaction. The Appeals Chamber will therefore treat this argument as properly raised below.

53. In contrast to the killing of Ukobizaba and Gérard Ntakirutimana's procurement of arms and gendarmes, however, the allegation regarding Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transporting attackers to Mugonero is not clearly set out in the Pre-Trial Brief. Rather, the Pre-Trial Brief states only that "a convoy of military and civilian attackers arrived at Mugonero Complex in vehicles belonging to Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and others" and that "Pastor Elizaphan [Ntakirutimana] and Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana were present during the attack at the complex."¹⁰⁰ As the Trial Chamber pointed out, the Pre-Trial Brief "does not specifically either allege that either Accused was in the convoy."¹⁰¹ By contrast, the Pre-Trial Brief contains several passages specifically alleging that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to sites other than the Mugonero Complex. When making allegations about the Seventh Day Adventist Church at Murambi, the Pre-Trial Brief clearly states that "Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana and Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers and personally pursued the refugees at this location."¹⁰² Similarly, with regard to events in Bisesero, the Pre-Trial Brief states that "around May 1994, 'Interahamwe' who were taken there by Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, captured a witness,"¹⁰³ and that "[o]n many occasions between April, May and June 1994 Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana took armed attackers in his vehicle to the Bisesero area and pointed out hiding Tutsi for the attackers to kill."¹⁰⁴ These allegations show that, when it chose to do so, the Prosecution was able to allege specifically in its Pre-Trial Brief that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to particular sites. A similar allegation with respect to conveying attackers to Mugonero is conspicuously absent.

⁹⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 52.

⁹⁹ *Id.*, para. 48 & n. 53 (citing Defence Closing Brief, p. 78).

¹⁰⁰ Pre-Trial Brief, paras. 13, 15.

¹⁰¹ Trial Judgement, para. 60.

¹⁰² Pre-Trial Brief, para. 16.

¹⁰³ *Id.*, para. 20.

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*, para. 21.

54. The Trial Chamber concluded generally that the Appellants were “entitled to conclude that the allegations in [Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief] were the allegations it would have to meet at trial.”¹⁰⁵ The Prosecution also relies on the summaries in Annex B of the testimony of Witnesses FF, MM, and YY.¹⁰⁶ The Appeals Chamber must therefore consider whether Annex B, on its own, clearly, consistently and timely informed Elizaphan Ntakirutimana that he would be obliged to meet the allegation that he transported attackers to Mugonero.

55. With regard to Witness FF, Annex B states: “The witness will testify that around 9 a.m. on 16 April 94 armed soldiers were conveyed to the hospital in three cars belonging to *Pastor Ntakirutimana, Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana* and the hospital administration.”¹⁰⁷ Witness YY was to testify that “he saw thousands of armed civilians come to attack the refugees at the complex” and that “[t]he attackers included *Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana, pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana*, [and others].”¹⁰⁸ Although Annex B later stated that Witness YY “will testify further, that he saw *pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana* transporting attackers in his vehicle, and that on one occasion he saw *him* supervising *Interahamwe* to take off the iron sheets of Murambi Adventist Church,” this sentence immediately followed a sentence stating that “following the Mugonero attack he fled to Bisesero where he witnessed attacks on several occasion.”¹⁰⁹ Like the Pre-Trial Brief, Annex B’s summaries of the testimony of Witnesses FF and YY do not clearly state that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported attackers to Mugonero. The only witness summary cited by the Prosecution that does contain this allegation is that of Witness MM, which states that “*Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana* took soldiers to the hospital in his Hilux pick-up truck.”¹¹⁰

56. Other summaries of testimony in Annex B add to the uncertainty regarding Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’s role in the Mugonero attack. The summary of Witness GG’s testimony states only that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was among the attackers at Mugonero.¹¹¹ This is consistent with GG’s prior statements to investigators, none of which stated that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers in his vehicle.¹¹² Annex B’s summaries of the testimony of Witnesses KK and PP state that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was “[a]mong the attackers” at Mugonero, but not that he conveyed attackers there.¹¹³ Despite these summaries, these three witnesses, along with Witnesses MM and

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*, para. 62.

¹⁰⁶ Prosecution Response, para. 2.11 & n. 28.

¹⁰⁷ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*, p. 17.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Id.*, p. 9.

¹¹¹ *Id.*, p. 5.

¹¹² Statement of Witness GG dated 20 June 1996, p. 4 (stating that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Obed Ruzindana arrived at about the same time and that “there were armed civilians in the pick up of RUZINDANA,” but not stating that anyone rode with Elizaphan Ntakirutimana).

¹¹³ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, pp. 7, 11.

YY, were five of the six principal witnesses on which the Trial Chamber relied in concluding that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to Mugonero.¹¹⁴ As for the sixth, Witness HH, Annex B of the Pre-Trial Brief does not state that the witness even saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at Mugonero, let alone that he conveyed attackers there.¹¹⁵

57. In sum, there is only one sentence in Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief alleging that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to Mugonero. When viewed together with the Pre-Trial Brief itself, which failed to state the allegation even though it contained similar facts regarding Bisesero, it cannot be said that the Prosecution clearly or consistently informed the Defence that it intended to rely on the transport of attackers as the basis for the Mugonero Indictment's count of genocide against Elizaphan Ntakirutimana. Even if Annex B is considered sufficient notice that Witness MM would testify that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers, the Annex and the statements disclosed did not communicate the important role that the testimony of five other witnesses – GG, KK, PP, YY, and HH – would have in proving this allegation. In this context, the Pre-Trial Brief and Annex B thereto did not provide clear, consistent, or timely information regarding the Prosecution's case on this point.

58. The Prosecution contends that the Appellants have not shown any actual prejudice from the asserted vagueness in the Indictment because their defence was based on alibi, challenges to witness credibility, and internal inconsistencies in witness statements.¹¹⁶ Article 20(4)(a) of the Statute of the Tribunal guarantees the accused the right to "be informed promptly and in detail ... of the nature and cause of the charge against him." As such, a vague indictment, not cured by timely and sufficient notice, leads to prejudice. The defect may only be deemed harmless "through demonstrating that [the accused's] ability to prepare their defence was not materially impaired."¹¹⁷ *Kupreškić* places this burden of showing that the Defence was not materially impaired squarely on the Prosecution. The Prosecution's submission that the Appellants have not shown any actual prejudice rests on the speculative assumption that, had Elizaphan Ntakirutimana been given proper notice of the omitted allegation, he would have conducted his defence in an identical manner. The Prosecution cannot cure a vague indictment by presuming that the Appellants' defence would not have changed had proper notice of a material fact been given. A defence based on alibi and challenges to the credibility of Prosecution witnesses is still dependent on sufficient notice of the material facts the Prosecution intends to prove. The Defence's use of its investigative resources

¹¹⁴ Annex B also stated that Witness AA would testify that attackers arrived at Mugonero in Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's vehicle, but it is equivocal on the question whether Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported them himself. Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 1. Witness AA was not called at trial.

¹¹⁵ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 6.

¹¹⁶ Prosecution Response, para. 2.11.

¹¹⁷ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 122.

necessarily revolves around the particular facts proven, as do its preparation for the cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses. In this case, based on the Indictment, the Pre-Trial Brief and Annex B, counsel for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana could reasonably have prepared to favour the allegation of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's physical participation in the Mugonero attack and have given less attention to the allegation that he conveyed attackers there. Whether counsel could in fact have prepared a more effective cross-examination in this context is beside the point. Since the Prosecution had several opportunities to inform the Defence of this material fact and yet has not shown that it did so, and since the Defence adequately raised the issue, the Prosecution cannot rely on the mere assertion that the Appellant's counsel did not suffer by it.

59. The Prosecution has not shown that it cured the failure of the Mugonero Indictment to plead that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to the Mugonero Complex. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that a conviction could be based on this unpleaded material fact.

(ii) Did the Bisesero Indictment Fail to Plead Material Facts?

60. The relevant allegations in the Bisesero Indictment are as follows:

4.10. Many of those who survived the massacre at Mugonero Complex fled to the surrounding areas, one of which was the area known as Bisesero.

4.11. The area known as Bisesero spans the two communes of Gishyita and Gisovu in Kibuye Prefecture. From April through June 1994, hundreds of men, women and children sought refuge in various locations in Bisesero. These men, women and children were predominantly Tutsis and were seeking refuge from attacks on Tutsis which had occurred throughout the Prefecture of Kibuye. The majority of these men, women and children were unarmed.

4.12. From April through June 1994, convoys of a large number of individuals armed with various weapons went to the area of Bisesero. Individuals in the convoy included, among others, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard Ntakirutimana, members of the National Gendarmerie, communal police, militia and civilians.

4.13. The individuals in the convoys, including Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard Ntakirutimana, participated in the attacks on the men, women and children in the area of Bisesero which continued almost on a daily basis for several months.

4.14. The attacks resulted in hundreds of deaths and a large number of wounded among the men, women and children who had sought a refuge in Bisesero.

4.15. During the months of these attacks, individuals, including Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard Ntakirutimana, searched for and attacked Tutsi survivors and others, killing or causing serious bodily and mental harm to them.

4.16. At one point during this time period, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was in Murambi within the area of Bisesero. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana went to a church located in Murambi where many Tutsis were seeking refuge from the ongoing massacres. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana ordered the

attackers to destroy the roof of this church so that it could no longer be used as a hiding place for the Tutsis.¹¹⁸

61. In convicting Gérard Ntakirutimana of genocide under the Bisesero Indictment, the Trial Chamber relied on several findings of fact regarding the Appellant's participation in attacks on Tutsi in the Bisesero region. The Trial Chamber found that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in nine separate attacks on Tutsi refugees in Bisesero, which were identified by specific dates, locations, or acts that Gérard Ntakirutimana took,¹¹⁹ and also found that he participated in additional acts at "unspecified locations in Bisesero."¹²⁰ These findings underlay the Trial Chamber's conclusions that Gérard Ntakirutimana had committed the *actus reus* and had the requisite *mens rea* for genocide.¹²¹ The Trial Chamber also found that, in addition to ordering the removal of the roof of the church in Murambi as alleged in paragraph 4.16 of the Bisesero Indictment, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported attackers to five additional sites in the Bisesero region and assisted them in killing and causing of serious bodily harm to Tutsi refugees.¹²² These findings supported the Trial Chamber's conclusions that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana aided and abetted others in the killing or causing of serious bodily or mental harm and had the requisite *mens rea* for genocide.¹²³

62. In light of the preceding discussion regarding *Kupreškić*, it is clear that the facts enumerated by the Trial Chamber in support of its finding of genocidal acts and intent were material facts that should have been included in the Bisesero Indictment. Almost none of them were. The Appeals Chamber must therefore determine whether the Prosecution was in a position to include those facts in the Indictment and, if it was, whether the failure to do so was cured by clear, consistent, and timely information communicated to the Defence specifying that those allegations were part of the Prosecution's case.

a. The Allegations That Gérard Ntakirutimana Attacked Refugees at Murambi Hill On or About 18 April 1994 and That He Shot at Refugees at Gitwe Hill in Late April or May 1994

63. The Trial Chamber found that "on or about 18 April 1994 Gérard Ntakirutimana was with Interahamwe in Murambi Hill pursuing and attacking Tutsi refugees" and that "in the last part of

¹¹⁸ Bisesero Indictment, paras. 4.10-4.16.

¹¹⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 832(i)-(ix).

¹²⁰ *Id.*, paras. 704, 832(x).

¹²¹ *Id.*, paras. 834-835.

¹²² *Id.*, paras. 827-828(i)-(vi).

¹²³ *Id.*, paras. 830-831.

April or possibly in May, Gérard Ntakirutimana was with attackers in Gitwe Hill where he shot at refugees.”¹²⁴ Both findings rested on the testimony of Witness FF.

64. The attack at Murambi Hill was mentioned in one of Witness FF’s witness statements, which stated: “I also saw Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana many times in May and June of 1994 ... On one occasion, I saw him in Murambi driving his car. He was wearing shorts and a long coat. He parked his car and spent the whole day with the killers running after the Tutsi and shooting him [sic]. He had a long gun, which he had on his shoulder.”¹²⁵ Regarding the attack at Gitwe, Witness FF’s statement states that the witness saw Gérard Ntakirutimana “[s]ometime in June ... at Gitwe Primary School. He was on foot with a group of attackers. I was hiding in the bush near the road near a spring or water. The Tutsi refugees were on the hill opposite. They called to him, ‘How can you kill when you are the son of a pastor.’”¹²⁶ The Trial Chamber’s findings, including Gérard Ntakirutimana’s attire and the gun on his shoulder at Murambi, and the refugees’ protest at Gérard Ntakirutimana’s conduct at Gitwe, show that the statement refers to the same events as Witness FF’s trial testimony.¹²⁷ The Prosecution was therefore aware of significant details regarding this allegation prior to trial, including the particular locations (Murambi and Gitwe) and the means with which Gérard Ntakirutimana allegedly committed one of the attacks (the gun over the shoulder at Murambi). The Prosecution should have included these facts in the Bisesero Indictment. Failure to do so rendered the Indictment defective.

65. The Trial Chamber held that the failure to allege these Murambi and Gitwe attacks in the Indictment was cured. First, the Trial Chamber noted that “the Indictment alleges that attacks were carried out in the area of Bisesero, wherein Murambi and Gitwe Hills are located, thereby putting the Defence on notice of these allegations.”¹²⁸ The Trial Chamber also relied on the summary of Witness FF’s testimony provided in Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief.¹²⁹ The Prosecution relies on these same arguments on appeal.

66. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the allegation in the Bisesero Indictment that the Appellants participated in attacks “in the area of Bisesero which continued almost on a daily basis for several months” does not adequately inform them that the Prosecution intended to charge participation in specific attacks at Murambi or at Gitwe. The Bisesero Indictment states that the area “spans the two communes of Gishyita and Gisovu in Kibuye Prefecture”;¹³⁰ the Pre-Trial Brief calls

¹²⁴ *Id.*, para. 543.

¹²⁵ Statement of Witness FF dated 15 November 1999, p. 7.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Trial Judgement, paras. 538-539.

¹²⁸ *Id.*, para. 540.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Bisesero Indictment, para. 4.11.

it a "vast region with undulating hills and plains."¹³¹ Where the Prosecution has detailed information regarding the time and location of particular allegations, *Kupreškić* does not permit it to limit its allegations to a "vast region" that spans two communes. Rather, an Indictment must "delve into particulars" where possible.¹³²

67. The Appeals Chamber notes that the summary of Witness FF's evidence in Annex B gives more specific information regarding the two allegations than the Bisesero Indictment. Regarding the Gitwe attack, the summary states that "[t]he witness will further testify that she saw Gérard Ntakirutimana in the company of Ngirinshuti Mathias, head of hospital staff shooting at Tutsi at Gitwe Hill. The witness will further testify that there were also soldiers, commune policemen and Hutu civilians among the attackers."¹³³ The summary also indicates that the witness will testify to "several attacks between April and June 94 in the hills of Bisesero, including Rwamakena, Muyira, Murambi and Gitwe Hills where she saw Dr. Gérard Ntakirutimana."¹³⁴ Although no specific details are given in the summary about the attack at Murambi, the summary clearly informed the Defence that the Prosecution intended to allege, supported by Witness FF's testimony, that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in those attacks. The summary also permitted Gérard Ntakirutimana to prepare his defence by reference to Witness FF's witness statements, which contained further details regarding the allegations of attacks at Murambi and Gitwe.

68. For the Appeals Chamber, a problem arises, however, with regard to the timing of the attacks. The Annex B summary does not provide any time frame for the Gitwe attack and states only that the Murambi attack took place "between April and June 94," along with several others.¹³⁵ Witness FF's statement does not specify when the Murambi attack took place, although it immediately follows the allegation that Witness FF "saw Dr. Gerard NTAKIRUTIMANA many times in May and June 1994 while [FF] was hiding in the hills."¹³⁶ The statement avers that the Gitwe attack occurred "[s]ometime in June."¹³⁷ Moreover, the statement specifically states that Witness FF spent the day of 18 April 1994 at a colleague's home and did not leave until the evening, after which she went to her parents' home in Gisovu and then fled into the Bisesero hills where she witnessed the attacks at issue. Based on the information provided prior to trial, then, Gérard Ntakirutimana was justified in concluding that the Prosecution's case was that these two attacks occurred in May or June 1994, or at the very least after 18 April 1994.

¹³¹ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 19.

¹³² *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 98.

¹³³ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 4.

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ *Id.*

¹³⁶ Statement of Witness FF dated 15 November 1999, p. 7.

¹³⁷ *Id.*, p. 7.

69. At trial, however, Witness FF testified that the Murambi attack took place “before noon” on the “[e]ighteenth of April 1994”¹³⁸ and the Gitwe attack “the next day.”¹³⁹ The Trial Chamber found that the Murambi attack occurred “around 18 April 1994” and the Gitwe attack “[t]he following day, on 19 April 1994.”¹⁴⁰ When cross-examined with regard to the timing of the attacks, Witness FF specifically contradicted the mention in her statement that the Gitwe attack took place in June and reaffirmed that both attacks took place in April 1994.¹⁴¹

70. In *Rutaganda*, the Appeals Chamber confronted the situation in which an Indictment specifically pleaded that the accused distributed weapons “on or about 6 April 1994,” but the Trial Chamber held that distribution occurred “on 8 and 15 April 1994, and on or around 24 April 1994.”¹⁴² The Appeals Chamber held that this discrepancy did not violate the rights of the accused, stating that “in general, minor differences between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial are not such as to prevent the Trial Chamber from considering the indictment in the light of the evidence presented at trial.”¹⁴³ In that case, however, the Indictment “d[id] not show that the Prosecution necessarily envisaged only a single act of weapons distribution” and the accused had shown no prejudice due to the variation in the date of the distribution.¹⁴⁴ The posture in this case is different. The Bisesero Indictment did not mention the Murambi or Gitwe attacks at all, let alone indicate a general date for their occurrence. Moreover, the information that the Prosecution suggests remedied this defect in the Indictment – Annex B and Witness FF’s witness statements – not only reflected that the attacks occurred in different months, but actually *excluded* the dates proffered at trial by stating that the witness was elsewhere on those dates. The Defence would have been quite justified in thinking, based on Witness FF’s witness statements, that it did not need to present an alibi for a Murambi attack on 18 April 1994. Had the Appellants known of the dates that the Prosecution eventually advanced at trial, they might have challenged Witness FF’s trial testimony by seeking out witnesses who would support the testimony given in Witness FF’s statement, such as the “Hutu colleague” who welcomed Witness FF into her home for the day of 18 April, according to the statement.¹⁴⁵

71. The above discussion shows that the Prosecution did not provide clear, consistent or timely information relating to the allegation of these attacks. The Appeals Chamber finds that the

¹³⁸ T. 28 September 2001, pp. 53-54.

¹³⁹ *Id.*, pp. 55-56.

¹⁴⁰ Trial Judgement, paras. 538-539 (citing T. 28 September 2001, pp. 52-60, and T. 1 October 2001, pp. 29-30, 45-48).

¹⁴¹ T. 1 October 2001, p. 38 (“The attack which was launched against Murambi took place in April. ... As for the attack on Gitwe, it did not take place in June either. As far as I recall, it would have been closer to the month of April. It is possible that that attack took place in May, but not in June.”).

¹⁴² *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 297.

¹⁴³ *Id.*, para. 302.

¹⁴⁴ *Id.*, paras. 304-305.

¹⁴⁵ Statement of Witness FF dated 15 November 1999, p. 7.

Prosecution has therefore not met its burden of showing that the defect in the Indictment was cured and that no prejudice resulted to the Appellant. Indeed, given that the information available to the Defence in Annex B and Witness FF's witness statements was inconsistent with the case that the Prosecution presented at trial, the Defence was, in fact, prejudiced by lack of notice. The Trial Chamber therefore erred in relying on these findings in convicting Gérard Ntakirutimana of genocide under the Bisesero Indictment.

b. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Transported Attackers in Kidashya Hill and Chased and Shot Tutsi Refugees in the Hills

72. Also relying on trial testimony of Witness FF, the Trial Chamber found "that sometime between April and June 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana was in Kidashya Hill transporting armed attackers, and that he participated in chasing and shooting at Tutsi refugees in the hills."¹⁴⁶ The Trial Chamber acknowledged, and the Prosecution does not contest, that this allegation did not appear in the Bisesero Indictment and was not mentioned in the Pre-Trial Brief, Annex B thereto, or any of Witness FF's witness statements.¹⁴⁷ Rather, "[t]he precise reference to Kidashya Hill appeared in Witness FF's testimony and was not available to the Prosecution before the trial started."¹⁴⁸

73. The Trial Chamber held that the Defence "had sufficient notice of the allegation in view of the sheer scale of the killings in the hills of Bisesero."¹⁴⁹ The reference to "sheer scale" recalls the statement in *Kupreškić* that "there may be instances where the sheer scale of the alleged crimes 'makes it impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such matters as the identity of the victims and the dates for the commission of crimes.'"¹⁵⁰ The *Kupreškić* Appeal Judgement elaborated that, in situations in which the crimes charged involve hundreds of victims, such as where the accused is alleged to have participated "as a member of an execution squad" or "as a member of a military force," the nature of the case might excuse the Prosecution from "specify[ing] every single victim that has been killed or expelled."¹⁵¹ This observation allows for the fact that, in many of the cases before the two International Tribunals, the number of individual victims is so high that identifying all of them and pleading their identities is effectively impossible. The inability to identify victims is reconcilable with the right of the accused to know the material facts of the

¹⁴⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 586; *see also id.* 832(vi).

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*, para. 583.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 89 (quoting *Kvočka* Decision of 12 April 1999, para. 17).

¹⁵¹ *Id.*, para. 90.

charges against him because, in such circumstances, the accused's ability to prepare an effective defence to the charges does not depend on knowing the identity of every single alleged victim.

74. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the situation is different, however, when the Prosecution seeks to prove that the accused personally killed or harmed a particular individual. Proof of a criminal act against a named or otherwise identified individual can be a significant boost to the Prosecution's case; in addition to showing that the accused committed one crime, it can support the inference that the accused was prepared to do likewise to other unidentifiable victims and had the requisite *mens rea* to support a conviction. As a consequence, the Prosecution cannot simultaneously argue that the accused killed a named individual yet claim that the "sheer scale" of the crime made it impossible to identify that individual in the indictment. Quite the contrary: the Prosecution's obligation to provide particulars in the indictment is at its highest when it seeks to prove that the accused killed or harmed a specific individual.¹⁵²

75. *Kupreškić* did not expressly address the application of its "sheer scale" pronouncement to material facts regarding the location of crimes. There may well be situations in which the specific location of criminal activities cannot be listed, such as where the accused is charged as having effective control over several armed groups that committed crimes in numerous locations. In cases concerning physical acts of violence perpetrated by the accused personally, however, location can be very important. If nothing else, notice of the alleged location of the charged activity permits the Defence to focus its investigation on that area. When the Prosecution seeks to prove that the accused committed an act at a specified location, it cannot simultaneously claim that it is impracticable to specify that location in advance.

76. In this case, the Prosecution specifically sought to show, through the evidence of Witness FF, that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Kidashya Hill. Witness FF's identification of that location itself refutes the argument that identifying it was somehow "impracticable." The "sheer scale" discussion in *Kupreškić* therefore does not apply here.

77. Rather, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Kidashya finding falls into a different category of allegations mentioned in *Kupreškić*, namely those which were not pled in the indictment "because the necessary information [was] not in the Prosecution's possession."¹⁵³ Although the evidence at trial sometimes turns out to be different from the Prosecution's expectations, the accused are generally entitled to proceed on the basis that the material facts disclosed to them are "exhaustive in nature" unless and "until given sufficient notice that evidence will be led of

¹⁵² *Id.*, para. 89.

¹⁵³ *Id.*, para. 92.

additional incidents.”¹⁵⁴ Given that “the Prosecution is expected to know its case before it goes to trial,” the question is whether it was fair to the Appellant to be tried and convicted based on an allegation as to which neither he nor the Prosecution had actual or specific notice.¹⁵⁵ On this question, as on the question of whether communications of information sufficed to cure an indictment defect, the Prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating that the new incidents that became known at trial caused no prejudice to the Appellant.

78. The Prosecution relies on three arguments: first, that the new allegation did not change the Prosecution’s case fundamentally; second, that the Appellants did not complain of the novelty of the allegation during trial; and third, that the Appellants have failed to show any prejudice. The second and third arguments have already been dealt with: the Trial Chamber considered that the argument was properly raised and, where the error was not waived by the Appellants, the burden of showing that the error in the Indictment was harmless falls on the Prosecution. The first argument suggests that the Prosecution may obtain a conviction at trial based on evidence of acts that neither party was aware would be part of the case, as long as the acts are generally consistent with the overall theme of the Prosecution case and do not “fundamentally” change it. Such a rule would reward the pleading of broad generalities and encourage the Prosecution to avoid narrowing its case to conform to the evidence it knows it can prove, in order to leave open the possibility of benefiting from testimony of criminal acts disclosed for the first time on the stand. The Appeals Chamber holds that this procedure cannot be reconciled with an accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charge against him. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber cannot accept the Prosecution’s argument that it was not possible to particularise the exact site of each attack because they were so numerous and occurred almost daily.¹⁵⁶ In the present situation, Witness FF’s witness statements mentioned alleged participation by Gérard Ntakirutimana in the attacks in Bisesero. The Prosecution thus had ample opportunity to obtain more specific information from the witness prior to trial.

79. The Prosecution has accordingly not shown that the witness-stand revelation of an attack at Kidashya Hill was fair to the Appellants. The Trial Chamber erred in basing a conviction on that material fact.

¹⁵⁴ *Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin and Momir Talić*, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, 26 June 2001, para. 63.

¹⁵⁵ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 92.

¹⁵⁶ Prosecution Response, para. 2.6.

c. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Shot at Refugees at Mutiti Hill

80. Witness FF also testified, and the Trial Chamber found, that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Mutiti Hill, where he shot at refugees.¹⁵⁷ The Mutiti allegation is not mentioned in the Bisesero Indictment, thereby rendering the Indictment defective, and, like the allegation regarding Kidashya Hill, is not mentioned in the Pre-Trial Brief, Annex B thereto, or any statement of Witness FF.

81. The Trial Chamber found that there was “no issue of a lack of notice to the Defence” because the Bisesero Indictment generally alleged attacks in the area of Bisesero, where Mutiti Hill is located, and because Witness FF’s statements indicated that she saw Gérard Ntakirutimana participate in attacks “in the hills of Bisesero, including Rwakamena, Muyira, Murambi and Gitwe hills.”¹⁵⁸ As discussed above, the general allegation of attacks in Bisesero does not clearly inform the Appellant that the Prosecution will present evidence of an attack at a specific location such as Mutiti. The same is true of Witness FF’s witness statements, which do not mention Mutiti. For the reasons discussed above, the Trial Chamber erred in basing a conviction on the Mutiti Hill attack.

d. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Headed a Group of Armed Attackers at Muyira Hill and Shot at Tutsi Refugees in June 1994

82. Relying on testimony of Witness HH, the Trial Chamber found that “one day in June 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana headed a group of armed attackers at Muyira Hill. He carried a gun and shot at Tutsi refugees.”¹⁵⁹ The Prosecution was clearly in a position to specify this allegation in the Bisesero Indictment; it was mentioned in the Prosecution’s opening statement, which argued that “[t]he evidence will prove that Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana caused the death of Tutsis at Mugonero Complex and at numerous places in Bisesero including Muyira, Murambi, Gisoro and Gitwe hills.”¹⁶⁰ The Muyira allegation should have been pleaded in the Indictment, and failure to do so rendered the Indictment defective.

83. The Trial Chamber found, however, that Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief, when viewed in conjunction with a witness statement of Witness HH, provided sufficient notice of this allegation. Annex B states that “[i]n May 1994 [HH] fled to Bisesero where he saw that *Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana* ... formed part of the contingent of attackers who attacked them almost daily between then and June 94. He observed them from various hills and other locations in the Bisesero

¹⁵⁷ Trial Judgement, paras. 674, 832(ix).

¹⁵⁸ *Id.*, para. 674.

¹⁵⁹ *Id.*, para. 668; *see also id.*, para. 832(viii).

¹⁶⁰ T. 18 September 2001, p. 33, cited in Trial Judgement, para. 633.

area.”¹⁶¹ The Trial Chamber also observed that “Witness HH’s reconfirmation statement of 25 July 2001, which was disclosed to the Defence on 14 September 2001, specifically refers to Witness HH’s observation of Gérard Ntakirutimana ‘attacking us with a rifle’ at Muhira Hill, ‘at some stage.’”¹⁶²

84. Although the “reconfirmation statement” did provide clear and consistent information that Gérard Ntakirutimana would face allegations regarding an attack at Muyira Hill, it cannot be said that such information came in a timely fashion. The Trial Chamber’s summary states that it was not disclosed to the Appellants until 14 September 2001, four days before the beginning of trial and eleven days before Witness HH began testifying. There is no explanation for the delay in disclosing this statement, particularly given that it was signed over seven weeks earlier on 25 July 2001. The Prosecution cannot wait until four days before trial to give clear notice that it will pursue an additional allegation of personal physical wrongdoing.

85. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that the error in the Bisesero Indictment regarding the attack at Muyira Hill in June 1994 was not cured by subsequent information. The Trial Chamber therefore erred in relying on this allegation to convict Gérard Ntakirutimana.

e. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Took Part in an Attack on Refugees at Muyira Hill in Mid-May 1994

86. Relying on the testimony of Witness GG, the Trial Chamber found that “[s]ometime in mid-May 1994, at Muyira Hill, Gérard Ntakirutimana took part in an attack on Tutsi refugees.”¹⁶³ There is no suggestion that the Prosecution could not have included this allegation in the Bisesero Indictment, and the Indictment is defective due to the omission. Moreover, the details of this attack are not specifically set out in the Pre-Trial Brief, in Annex B thereto, or in any of GG’s witness statements.

87. The Trial Chamber found, however, that sufficient notice was given that the Prosecution would charge Gérard Ntakirutimana with an attack at Muyira Hill through the “reconfirmation statement” of Witness HH dated 25 July 2001. As stated above, however, that statement was disclosed to the Defence too late for it to be considered as “timely” information regarding the nature of the Prosecution’s case. Since HH’s statement did not provide adequate notice of the allegation for a Muyira Hill attack in June testified to by Witness HH, it no more provides adequate notice of an allegation of a separate Muyira Hill attack in mid-May testified to by Witness GG.

¹⁶¹ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 6.

88. The Appeals Chamber considers therefore that the failure of the Bisesero Indictment to plead an attack at Muyira Hill in mid-May was not cured. The Trial Chamber erred in placing weight on this allegation in convicting Gérard Ntakirutimana.

f. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Participated in an Attack Against Tutsi Refugees at Muyira Hill on 13 May 1994 and Shot and Killed the Wife of Nzamwita

89. Based on the testimony of Witness YY, the Trial Chamber found that Gérard Ntakirutimana “participated in the attack against Tutsi refugees at Muyira Hill on 13 May 1994 and that he shot and killed the wife of one Nzamwita, a Tutsi civilian.”¹⁶⁴ As stated above, attacks at Muyira Hill were not specifically mentioned in the Indictment, nor was the allegation that Gérard Ntakirutimana personally murdered an individual identifiable as “the wife of one Nzamwita.” The Indictment is defective due to these omissions.

90. In determining that the failure to plead these allegations specifically had been cured, the Trial Chamber relied on its prior finding that “the Defence received sufficient notice that they would have to meet allegations relating to both Accused’s participation in attacks against Tutsi refugees at Muyira Hill.”¹⁶⁵ For the reasons given above, the Appeals Chamber finds that this conclusion was erroneous.

91. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in resting a conviction on the allegation of an attack at Muyira Hill on 13 May 1994 and on the allegation that Gérard Ntakirutimana shot and killed the wife of Nzamwita.

g. The Allegations That Gérard Ntakirutimana Participated in an Attack at Gitwe Hill at the End of April or Beginning of May 1994 and That He Shot and Killed One Esdras

92. The Trial Chamber held that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994, and that he killed a person named “Esdras” during that attack.¹⁶⁶ This finding was based on evidence of Witness HH.¹⁶⁷

93. Although the allegation of a Gitwe attack was not included in the Indictment, the Trial Chamber found that the Appellants were sufficiently informed that the Prosecution would allege an

¹⁶² Trial Judgement, para. 665; *see also id.*, para. 633.

¹⁶³ *Id.*, para. 832(v); *see also id.*, para. 635.

¹⁶⁴ *Id.*, para. 642; *see also id.*, para. 832(iv).

¹⁶⁵ *Id.*, para. 640.

¹⁶⁶ *Id.*, para. 832(iii).

¹⁶⁷ *Id.*, paras. 552-559.

attack at Gitwe Hill by Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief, in combination with the witness statement of Witness HH. Annex B states that Witness HH would testify that Gérard Ntakirutimana “formed part of the contingent of attackers who attacked ... almost daily between [May 1994] and June 94” in the Bisesero area.¹⁶⁸ Witness HH’s prior statement contains a detailed description of an attack at Gitwe, which specifies that Gérard Ntakirutimana “still with gun in hand” was one of the attackers who pursued refugees who had fled to “the *colline* [hill] of Gitwe.”¹⁶⁹ The statement adds that “Doctor Gérard NTAKIRUTIMANA was among the persons who chased after us to kill us.”¹⁷⁰ The Trial Chamber concluded that this statement, together with the specific indication in Annex B that Witness HH would testify to attacks in Bisesero, adequately informed the Defence that the Prosecution intended to prove that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in the attack at Gitwe Hill.

94. In light of the principles discussed above, the Trial Chamber’s conclusion was correct. Although the allegation of an attack at Gitwe Hill could and should have been specifically pleaded in the Indictment, the Defence was subsequently informed in a clear, consistent, and timely manner that it had to defend against this allegation.

95. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the allegation regarding Esdras, however, is a different matter. Witness HH’s statement does not name any particular murder victim. The Trial Chamber found that “[t]his information was not available to the Prosecution before the witness gave his testimony.”¹⁷¹ The Trial Chamber concluded that “this is an example of a situation where the sheer scale of the alleged crimes makes it impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such matters as the identity of victims and the dates of the commission of the crime.”¹⁷²

96. As discussed above, however, the “sheer scale” discussion in *Kupreškić* does not apply to situations in which the Prosecution contends that the accused personally killed a specific, identifiable person. The “sheer scale” exception allows the pleading of charges without the names of victims in situations where it would be impracticable to identify them. In this situation, it was clearly practicable to identify Esdras a victim; he was so identified by a witness at trial. Rather, as with the allegation regarding Kidashya Hill, this is a situation in which the Prosecution did not possess the relevant information until Witness HH took the stand.

97. The question, then, is whether it was fair to require Gérard Ntakirutimana to defend against the charge of murdering Esdras without any prior notice. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues in this regard that the revelation of Esdras’s name and identity at trial made it impossible for the Defence to

¹⁶⁸ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 6.

¹⁶⁹ Statement of Witness HH dated 2 April 1996, p. 3.

¹⁷⁰ *Id.*

¹⁷¹ Trial Judgement, para. 558.

determine who Esdras was and if he was in fact dead.¹⁷³ The Prosecution relies on the same arguments it submitted with relation to Kidashya Hill, and adds that the Defence “failed to demonstrate that they ever tried” to investigate Esdras’s death.¹⁷⁴

98. The suggestion that the Defence must show that it attempted to investigate Esdras’s death in order to avoid criminal liability on an allegation that first appeared at trial misstates the law. As stated in connection with Kidashya Hill, the burden of showing that the Indictment’s failure to plead a material fact was harmless, assuming the error is not waived, belongs to the Prosecution. The remaining Prosecution arguments have been addressed in connection with the discussion of Kidashya Hill.

99. The Appeals Chamber considers therefore that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that convictions could be based on the uncharged killing of Esdras. However, it did not err in finding that the Appellants had sufficient notice that Gérard Ntakirutimana would be charged with participation in an attack at Gitwe Hill where he pursued and shot at Tutsi refugees.

h. The Allegation That Gérard Ntakirutimana Participated in an Attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994

100. Relying on testimony of Witness SS, the Trial Chamber found that “Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994 and shot at Tutsi refugees.”¹⁷⁵ This allegation was not included in the Bisesero Indictment.

101. The Trial Chamber concluded that sufficient information was given regarding this allegation due to the summary of Witness SS’s testimony in Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief and one of SS’s prior witness statements, which was disclosed on 7 February 2001. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, this conclusion was correct. Annex B informed the Appellants that Witness SS “will further testify that he saw *Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana* again after the attack at Mugonero complex, attacking Tutsis hiding in Mubuga in Bisesero area.”¹⁷⁶ The witness statement adds even more information, specifically stating that Gérard Ntakirutimana was “shooting at the people hiding in

¹⁷² *Id.*

¹⁷³ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 21.a.

¹⁷⁴ Prosecution Response, para. 2.29.

¹⁷⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 628; *see also id.*, 832(vii).

¹⁷⁶ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 14.

the school.”¹⁷⁷ Although the statement identifies the location as “Mu Mubuga,” the reference to “Mubuga in Bisesero area” in Annex B makes clear the nature of the Prosecution’s allegation.

102. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber therefore did not err in finding that the failure to plead this allegation in the Indictment was cured by subsequent information communicated to the Defence.

i. The Allegation That Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Transported Armed Attackers Chasing Tutsi Survivors at Murambi Hill

103. Also relying on Witness SS, the Trial Chamber found that “one day in May or June 1994, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported armed attackers who were chasing Tutsi survivors at Murambi Hill.”¹⁷⁸ This allegation does not appear in the Bisesero Indictment.

104. As with the allegation of Gérard Ntakirutimana’s participation in the attack at Mubuga School, the Trial Chamber held that the summary of Witness SS’s testimony in Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief and Witness SS’s prior witness statement provided sufficient information regarding the Prosecution’s intent to advance this allegation at trial.¹⁷⁹ The Appeals Chamber agrees. Annex B announced that Witness SS would testify “that he fled to Bisesero and then Gitwe where he saw *Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana* between Gitwe and Ngoma, near Murambi. *The Pastor* was with about twenty-five people who were armed. They chased the witness and others, firing at them.”¹⁸⁰ Witness SS’s statement, in turn, contains the following information: “I saw Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana between Gitwe and Ngoma, near to Murambi. I saw him in a Hilux single cabin vehicle. I saw him through window [sic] but after that I fled away and then I saw him from a distance. The vehicle stopped and the Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana came out of the vehicle. He was with 25-30 people, some of whom came walking and few in his vehicle. Those people started chasing me. The people running behind us were chanting that Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana told them that [sic] ‘God told me that you should kill and finish all tutsis.’ [sic]”¹⁸¹ Annex B, together with the added detail regarding the attack in SS’s witness statement, clearly informed the Accused that the Prosecution would present evidence of the Murambi attack.

¹⁷⁷ Statement of Witness SS dated 18 December 2000, p. 5 (“I saw Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana once again after the attack at Mugonero Complex, when he was attacking the hiding tutsis at Mu Mubuga in Bisesero area. At that time, I was hiding in that area and I saw him chasing the fleeing people with his gun. I was hiding around 40 m away from Mu Mubuga primary school where tutsi were hiding. From there, I saw him shooting at the people hiding in the school and when people started running here and there, he was running after them and shooting at them.”).

¹⁷⁸ Trial Judgement, paras. 579, 828(v).

¹⁷⁹ *Id.*, para. 576.

¹⁸⁰ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 14.

¹⁸¹ Statement of Witness SS dated 18 December 2000, p. 5.

105. The Trial Chamber therefore committed no error in concluding that the Bisesero Indictment's failure to allege Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's transportation of attackers to the Murambi attack was cured by subsequent information communicated to the Accused.

j. The Allegation That Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Transported Attackers and Pointed Out Fleeing Refugees in Nyarutovu Cellule

106. Based on the evidence of Witness CC, the Trial Chamber held that "Elizaphan Ntakirutimana brought armed attackers in the rear hold of his vehicle to Nyarutovu Hill one day in the middle of May 1994" and that "at this occasion, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana pointed out the fleeing refugees to the attackers who then chased these refugees."¹⁸² These allegations were omitted from the Bisesero Indictment.

107. The Trial Chamber concluded that Annex B of the Pre-Trial Brief and the prior statement of Witness CC, disclosed on 29 August 2000, sufficed to inform the Defence of this allegation.¹⁸³ This conclusion was correct. The Trial Chamber's findings make clear that the finding of an attack at Nyarutovu rests on evidence of an attack in that region near the road between Gishyita and Gisovu.¹⁸⁴ The summary of Witness CC's evidence in Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief states that Witness CC would testify that "he saw the *Pastor* [Elizaphan Ntakirutimana] on the road between Gishyita and Gisovu in his white Toyota pick-up. In the car were armed civilians. When the car stopped the *Pastor* and the attackers disembarked. The *Pastor* pointed out groups of Tutsi refugees to the attackers. The attackers went to the said refugees and killed them."¹⁸⁵ Witness CC's statement expands on these allegations:

"I saw [Elizaphan Ntakirutimana] on the road between Gishyita and Gisovu. I think it was somewhere in the middle of the events. I saw him in his car. It was a Toyota pick-up. The colour of the car was white. I saw that the *Pastor* drove the car by himself. There were armed civilians on the car of the *Pastor*. I saw that some of those civilians were armed with guns. Because the *Pastor* was in the car, I couldn't see, if he carried a gun. The civilians were dressed in civilian clothes. I saw that the *Pastor* stopped the car. At that time the distance between the car of the *Pastor* and me was about 100 – 150 meters. I was standing on the steep [sic] of a mountain, so I could see the *Pastor* and his car with the armed civilians, very clear. As soon the *Pastor* stopped the car, I saw that the armed civilians got out of the car. Also the *Pastor* got out of the car. I saw him very clearly. I saw him pointing out groups of Tutsis to the attackers. As soon as he pointed them out, the attackers started to attack them. They killed the Tutsis with guns, machetes and clubs."¹⁸⁶

108. The details in Annex B and the statement of Witness CC notified the Defence that the Prosecution would allege that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported attackers and pointed out Tutsi

¹⁸² Trial Judgement, paras. 594; *see also id.*, para. 828(ii).

¹⁸³ *Id.*, para. 590.

¹⁸⁴ *Id.*, paras. 589, 591.

¹⁸⁵ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 2.

¹⁸⁶ Statement of Witness CC dated 13 June 1996, p. 4.

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refugees near the Gishyita-Gisovu road. The Trial Chamber therefore committed no error in concluding that the Bisesero Indictment's failure to allege these facts was cured.

k. The Allegations That Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Participated in a Convoy of Vehicles Carrying Attackers to Kabatwa Hill and That He Pointed Out Tutsi Refugees at Neighbouring Gitwa Hill

109. Relying on evidence of Witness KK, the Trial Chamber found that "Elizaphan Ntakirutimana participated in a convoy of vehicles carrying armed attackers to Kabatwa Hill at the end of May 1994, and that, later on that day, at neighbouring Gitwa Hill, he pointed out the whereabouts of Tutsi refugees to attackers who attacked the refugees causing injury to Witness KK."¹⁸⁷ These allegations do not appear in the Bisesero Indictment.

110. Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief does not clearly mention these allegations, although it does state that Witness KK would testify that he "saw *pastor Ntakirutimana* ... at the hills, in the company of attackers, almost daily."¹⁸⁸ The Trial Chamber noted, albeit in a different part of the Judgement, that Witness KK's witness statement "contains an explicit reference to an event at Kabatwa Hill."¹⁸⁹ This reference, however, appears to refer to an attack "[t]owards the end of April" and does not mention that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was present at that attack.¹⁹⁰ The statement does mention another attack that is very similar in its distinguishing characteristics to the attack that the Trial Chamber found occurred at Kabatwa Hill "at the end of May 1994":¹⁹¹ it mentions that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana stood near his car while the attack progressed, that *Interahamwe* harvested peas and loaded them into Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's vehicle, and that Witness KK himself was seriously wounded by shrapnel from a grenade. However, the statement describes this event as occurring "around the 4th May 1994" at two unspecified hills in Bisesero.¹⁹² Finally, although Witness KK testified, and the Trial Chamber found, that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had directed the attackers to run after and attack the group of refugees of which Witness KK was a part, the statement attributes this to other attackers, not to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.¹⁹³

111. Annex B and the statement of Witness KK therefore provided sufficient notice that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana would be charged with liability for presence at an attack during which he

¹⁸⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 607.

¹⁸⁸ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 8.

¹⁸⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 547.

¹⁹⁰ Statement of Witness KK dated 8 December 1999, p. 9.

¹⁹¹ Trial Judgement, para. 607.

¹⁹² Statement of Witness KK dated 8 December 1999, p. 10.

¹⁹³ *Id.*, ("On the hill opposite there was another group of attackers. They saw us and shouted, 'Catch them, catch them.' Then a group of Military came downhill after us.").

stood near his car while peas were loaded into it and during which Witness KK was wounded by grenade shrapnel. The information available to the Appellants before trial, however, provided no notice of the location of the event, contained a date that the Trial Chamber found was inaccurate, and did not allege that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had pointed out refugees to attackers during the event. On the other hand, it appears that Witness KK's identification of the location and date of the attack and his allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana directed the attackers were not available to the Prosecution before trial. The question, therefore, is whether it was fair to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana to convict him for this attack given that neither he nor the Prosecution had notice of the correct date or precise location of its occurrence or of a key element of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's alleged participation.

112. As was discussed in relation to the Kidashya Hill allegation, in circumstances where the Prosecution relies on material facts that were revealed for the first time at trial, the Prosecution bears the burden of showing that there was no unfairness to the Accused. The Prosecution does not advance any arguments in this regard other than those already addressed in connection with Kidashya Hill. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that the Prosecution has not carried the burden of showing that no unfairness resulted from the conviction of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana on the basis of an attack the material facts of which were first revealed at trial. The Trial Chamber should not have based its conviction of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana on these allegations.

1. The Allegation That Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Transported Armed Attackers to and Was Present at an Attack at Mubuga Primary School in Mid-May

113. On the basis of evidence of Witness GG, the Trial Chamber found that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana "was present in the midst of the killing of Tutsi at Mubuga in mid-May, that he was in his vehicle transporting armed attackers as part of a convoy which included two buses, all carrying armed attackers."¹⁹⁴ The Trial Chamber noted that these allegations were not specifically mentioned in the Bisesero Indictment, the Pre-Trial Brief, Annex B thereto, or any of Witness GG's witness statements.¹⁹⁵ The best information provided to the Defence regarding this allegation was the statement in Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief that Witness GG "often saw *Pastor Ntakirutimana*, *Dr. Gerard Ntakirutimana*, and the Prefet in Mumubuga [sic] between April and June 1994."¹⁹⁶

114. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber Judgement does not clearly state why it considered that the Appellants had sufficient notice of this allegation. The Prosecution's only

¹⁹⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 614; *see also id.*, 828(iv).

¹⁹⁵ *Id.*, para. 613.

¹⁹⁶ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 5.

argument in this regard is that the witness statement of a different witness, Witness CC, put Elizaphan Ntakirutimana on notice that he “would be charged with several incidents of transporting attackers.”¹⁹⁷ Yet the Prosecution does not argue, and the Trial Chamber did not find, that the specific information that surfaced at trial regarding the date, location, and specific involvement of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana in the Mubuga attack was not available to the Prosecution beforehand. Indeed, the fact that the Prosecution was able to include in Annex B an allegation that Witness GG saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at “Mumubuga” suggests that it possessed more information than was included in Witnesses GG’s or CC’s witness statements, which do not mention Mubuga or “Mumubuga” at all. The lone statement in Annex B, unsupported by any witness statement, that Witness GG saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at “Mumubuga” is not the type of “clear” information regarding the Prosecution’s case that *Kupreškić* holds is essential to cure an indictment’s failure to plead material facts.

115. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber therefore erred in convicting Elizaphan Ntakirutimana based on his alleged presence at and transportation of attackers to an attack at Mubuga.

m. The Allegation That Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Was Part of a Convoy Including Attackers at Ku Cyapa

116. Relying on Witness SS, the Trial Chamber found that “one day in May or June [Elizaphan Ntakirutimana] was seen arriving at Ku Cyapa in a vehicle followed by two buses of attackers” and that he “was part of a convoy which included attackers,” who that day “participated in the killing of a large number of Tutsi.”¹⁹⁸ This allegation is lacking from the Bisesero Indictment and its omission renders the Indictment defective.

117. Annex B to the Pre-Trial Brief contains a brief description of this event in the summary of Witness SS’s testimony: “A few days later [after the Murambi Hill attack] the witness saw *Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana* again. The witness also saw the vehicle of Ruzindana in the area.”¹⁹⁹ Witness SS’s witness statement, however, contains more detail, notably the location: “After [the Murambi Hill attack] again after a few days, when I was crossing the road at Cyapa while I was going to Muyira, a small place in Bisesero area, I saw the Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana going in his vehicle. There were many vehicles, even buses moving in Bisesero area but I could come across

¹⁹⁷ Prosecution Response, Annex A, Row 14.

¹⁹⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 661; *see also id.* para. 828(vi).

¹⁹⁹ Annex B to Pre-Trial Brief, p. 14.

the vehicle of Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana while crossing the road and fleeing to hide myself. That moment, I also noticed the vehicle of Ruzindana in the area.”²⁰⁰

118. The Appeals Chamber notes that neither Witness SS’s statement nor Annex B specifically states that “there was a wide-scale attack at Ku Cyapa” or that the buses travelling with the Appellant were “a convoy which included attackers” who then killed “a large number of Tutsi.”²⁰¹ However, from the context of both the witness statement, which describes several attacks in which Elizaphan Ntakirutimana allegedly participated, and Annex B, which summarizes evidence of attacks in Bisesero, the witness statement’s reference to the vehicles of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Ruzindana in connection with an “incident at Cyapa,”²⁰² and Annex B’s inclusion of it in its summary of facts to be proven at trial, makes clear that the Prosecution intended to present Witness SS as a witness to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’s presence at Ku Cyapa, with a number of other vehicles carrying attackers. The difference between “Cyapa” and “Ku Cyapa” does not appear to be material.

119. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds that the failure in the Bisesero Indictment to allege with specificity that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was in a convoy which included attackers was cured by subsequent information communicated to the Defence.

120. In relation to the fact that these same attackers were subsequently involved in attacks against Tutsi at Ku Cyapa, the Appeals Chamber considers that the failure to plead this with specificity in the Bisesero Indictment was not cured by the information contained in the witness statement and Pre-Trial Brief. That being said, the Appeals Chamber notes that, although the Trial Chamber concluded that these attackers subsequently killed Tutsi at Ku Cyapa, it did not rely on these findings in convicting Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.²⁰³ Thus no prejudice resulted from the error.

n. Challenges to Allegations That Did Not Support Convictions

121. The Appellants assert that the Bisesero Indictment failed to plead facts that did not constitute “criminal conduct for which [the Accused were] convicted,”²⁰⁴ but rather were used only as evidence supporting convictions for other criminal acts in Bisesero area. This category includes the allegation that Gérard Ntakirutimana attended planning meetings in Kibuye²⁰⁵ and the allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was present in the company of assailants during an attack at Gitwa

²⁰⁰ Statement of Witness SS dated 18 December 2000, p. 5.

²⁰¹ Trial Judgement, para. 661.

²⁰² Statement of Witness SS dated 18 December 2000, p. 5.

²⁰³ Trial Judgement, para. 828(vi).

²⁰⁴ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 79.

²⁰⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 720.

cellule in the second half of May 1994.²⁰⁶ Because the Trial Chamber did not find the Appellants criminally responsible for these acts or base convictions thereon, they were not “material facts” the absence of which from the Bisesero Indictment would render the pleading defective. Accordingly, the Appellants’ argument with respect to these facts need not be addressed because, even if successful, it would not state an error of law that would invalidate the decision of the Trial Chamber.²⁰⁷

o. Ambiguity Regarding Number of Attacks

122. Gérard Ntakirutimana finally argues that the allegations and testimony regarding attacks at Mubuga and at Muyira Hill were fatally defective because it was not clear whether the allegations related to a single attack or several separate attacks.²⁰⁸ Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the Prosecution did not make its case clear in this regard, even at trial, and that it was left to the Trial Chamber to decide whether there was only one attack at Mubuga witnessed by Witnesses GG, SS, and HH²⁰⁹ or three separate attacks witnessed by one witness each. Likewise, it was not clear whether the Prosecution was alleging five attacks at Muyira Hill and nearby Ku Cyapa witnessed by Witnesses GG, YY, II,²¹⁰ SS, and HH, or one single attack witnessed by all five. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that, as a result of this imprecision, the Defence “did not know the case it had to meet until the Judgement was received.”²¹¹

123. The Prosecution does not appear to dispute Gérard Ntakirutimana’s argument that the Prosecution’s case was not clarified until the Trial Chamber decided to treat the witnesses as testifying to separate events. The Trial Judgement appears to bear out Gérard Ntakirutimana’s argument that it was the Trial Chamber that finally decided, based on variations between the testimony of the witnesses, to treat each one as testifying about separate events.²¹²

124. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is, of course, incumbent on the Prosecution to be as clear as possible about the factual allegations it intends to prove at trial. However, in this case, it was clear from the beginning that the Prosecution’s case regarding Bisesero was that convoys of attackers, including the two Appellants, went to Bisesero to attack Tutsi civilians “almost on a daily basis for several months.”²¹³ The Prosecution at no point indicated that it planned to treat any two

²⁰⁶ *Id.*, paras. 595-598.

²⁰⁷ See Statute, art. 24(1)(a).

²⁰⁸ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 19, 21.e.

²⁰⁹ The Trial Chamber did not rely on the testimony of Witness HH regarding Mubuga in convicting either Appellant.

²¹⁰ The Trial Chamber did not rely on the testimony of Witness II regarding Muyira in convicting either Appellant.

²¹¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 19.

²¹² Trial Judgement, paras. 611, 635.

²¹³ Bisesero Indictment, para. 4.13.

witnesses as corroborating each other on a specific fact. Gérard Ntakirutimana does not point to any such indication by the Prosecution, nor does he show that he was misled into believing that the witnesses who testified to attacks at Mubuga or at Muyira were testifying to anything other than separate attacks. The Prosecution also points out that counsel for the Defence appear to have proceeded on the assumption that each witness testified to an independent occurrence, in that they challenged the credibility of each witness individually. The Appeals Chamber notes that Gérard Ntakirutimana does not indicate how the defence could have been altered had he been informed that the Mubuga and Muyira witnesses were testifying to separate attacks, as the Trial Chamber found. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Prosecution has shown that any uncertainty regarding whether it was charging single or several attacks at Mubuga and Muyira did not result in any unfairness against the Accused.

p. Concluding Remark

125. It is evident from the foregoing analysis that the Indictments in this case failed to allege a number of the material facts for which the Appellants were tried and convicted. The Appeals Chamber, having accepted many of the Appellant's complaints of a lack of notice resulting in prejudice, stresses to the Prosecution that the practice of failing to allege known material facts in an indictment is unacceptable and that it is only in exceptional cases that such a failure can be remedied, for instance, "if the Prosecution provides the accused with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges against him or her."²¹⁴ The Appeals Chamber emphasises that, when material facts are unknown at the time of the initial indictment, the Prosecution should make efforts to ascertain these important details through further investigation and seek to amend the indictment at the earliest opportunity.

2. The Burden of Proof

126. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber made various errors in assessing the evidence that amounted to errors of law in the application of the burden of proof.

(a) Assessing the Detention of Witness OO

127. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber erred in refusing to draw an adverse inference against a Prosecution witness, Witness OO, who was being detained in Rwanda at the time. Gérard Ntakirutimana claims that the Trial Chamber gave Witness OO "the benefit of the

²¹⁴ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 114.

doubt”,²¹⁵ contrary to the requirement that the Prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, due to the following sentence in the Judgement: “Given the presumption of innocence enjoyed by a detained person awaiting trial, the Chamber will not draw any adverse inference against Witness OO on account of his status as a detainee.”²¹⁶

128. The Appeals Chamber notes that it is not clear from the Trial Judgement why the Trial Chamber invoked the presumption of innocence in this context. The most likely reading is that it was resolving a dispute between the parties as to whether Witness OO was detained because he had been sentenced to prison for committing a crime, as the Appellants argued, or whether he was “detained awaiting trial.”²¹⁷ The Trial Chamber stated that the evidence showed that Witness OO was awaiting trial for “having kept people in [his] home who subsequently died” and for “giving a pistol to a young man who was a civilian.”²¹⁸ In this context, the Trial Chamber’s reference to the “presumption of innocence” may be understood as making clear that Witness OO was a suspect who had not been convicted or sentenced, contrary to the Appellant’s position.

129. Even this explanation, however, does not fully account for the next step of refusing to draw an adverse inference. As Gérard Ntakirutimana points out, a witness who faces criminal charges that have not yet come to trial “may have real or perceived gains to be made by incriminating accused persons” and may be tempted or encouraged to do so falsely.²¹⁹ This risk, when properly raised and substantiated, should be considered by the Trial Chamber. In this case, it appears that the Trial Chamber failed to consider this risk because Witness OO was a suspect who had not yet been convicted, even though suspects who are detained awaiting trial may also have motives to fabricate testimony. This was an error of law.

130. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a party showing an error of law must also explain “in what way the error invalidates the decision.”²²⁰ In this situation, therefore, it is incumbent on Gérard Ntakirutimana to demonstrate that, had the Trial Chamber properly considered whether to draw an adverse inference on account of Witness OO’s detention awaiting trial on criminal charges, it would have done so. Gérard Ntakirutimana does not make any argument in this regard in his Appeal Brief, other than the general suggestion that persons facing criminal charges “may have” motives to fabricate evidence.²²¹ Gérard Ntakirutimana does not assert any basis for concluding that Witness OO did have such a motive or in fact fabricated evidence against him. The bald assertion

²¹⁵ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 27.

²¹⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 173.

²¹⁷ *Id.*

²¹⁸ *Id.* (quoting T. 1 November 2001, pp. 188-191).

²¹⁹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 27.

²²⁰ *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 20.

²²¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 27.

that criminal suspects sometimes lie on the witness stand does not invalidate the Trial Chamber's decision that Witness OO's testimony in this case was credible.

(b) Assessing Uncorroborated Alibi Testimony

131. Gérard Ntakirutimana next argues that the Trial Chamber unfairly assessed the evidence by accepting uncorroborated testimony of Prosecution witnesses and rejecting Defence witness testimony because it lacked corroboration.²²² Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber required the Defence to corroborate its alibi, whereas no such requirement was applied to Prosecution evidence.

132. As Gérard Ntakirutimana acknowledges,²²³ there is no requirement that convictions be made only on evidence of two or more witnesses. Corroboration is simply one of many potential factors in the Trial Chamber's assessment of a witness's credibility. If the Trial Chamber finds a witness credible, that witness's testimony may be accepted even if not corroborated. Similarly, even if a Trial Chamber finds that a witness's testimony is inconsistent or otherwise problematic enough to warrant its rejection, it might choose to accept the evidence nonetheless because it is corroborated by other evidence.

133. Of course, a Trial Chamber should not apply differing standards in its treatment of evidence of the Prosecution and the Defence. Yet, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, Gérard Ntakirutimana's argument that the Trial Chamber committed such an error is not borne out by the Trial Judgement. The three examples that Gérard Ntakirutimana cites in which the Trial Chamber rejected the evidence of alibi witnesses display not the imposition of a blanket requirement of corroboration on alibi witnesses, but rather evaluations of the totality of the evidence presented.

134. Gérard Ntakirutimana suggests that the Trial Chamber rejected his alibi solely because other witnesses did not corroborate his own testimony,²²⁴ but the Judgement is clear that the Trial Chamber viewed other Defence witnesses as actually contradicting Gérard Ntakirutimana's testimony. While Gérard Ntakirutimana testified that he was at his father's house on 15 April and the morning of 16 April 1994, Defence Witnesses 16 and 9 specifically testified that they did not see him at Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's house. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber's analysis shows that it did not require that other witnesses corroborate Gérard Ntakirutimana's testimony; rather, it merely reacted to the fact that Witnesses 16 and 9 undermined Gérard Ntakirutimana's account of events.

²²² *Id.*, paras. 28-30.

²²³ Reply (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 17.

²²⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 29.a.

135. Gérard Ntakirutimana next contends that the Trial Chamber incorrectly rejected the Accused's alibi testimony for the period of the end of April 1994 to July 1994. The Accused testified that they spent that time at Mugonero, except for certain specific trips to other places, and therefore could not have participated in attacks at Bisesero.²²⁵ Gérard Ntakirutimana fastens onto the Trial Chamber's statement that both Accused frequently left Mugonero for "destinations ... about which there is little direct evidence other than the words of the Accused."²²⁶ Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that this phrase indicates that the Trial Chamber "relied on the absence of corroboration to reject defence evidence."²²⁷

136. The Trial Chamber's analysis reveals, however, that the alibi was rejected because the Defence witnesses presented an "implausibly sanitized account of the times, with life at Mugonero existing in a kind of vacuum" in which the Appellants and the people around them supposedly "resumed the normalcy of their pre-April lives ... despite the massive attack at the Complex on 16 April, the subsequent fighting in the neighbouring district of Bisesero, the overall breakdown of law and order and the fact that Rwanda was at war."²²⁸ The Trial Chamber was therefore faced with two accounts of what the Appellants did when they left Mugonero on those occasions: the testimony of the Appellants, which the Trial Chamber had already found implausible, and the testimony of Prosecution witnesses, which the Trial Chamber had found credible. Even though the Appellants testified that they often travelled in the company of other named persons, nobody other than the Appellants gave evidence regarding where they went when they left Mugonero during this period. In this context, the statement that the Defence's account of the Appellant's destinations when they left Mugonero was supported by "little direct evidence other than the words of the Accused"²²⁹ does not reflect a requirement of corroboration unevenly imposed on the Appellants. Rather, the Appeals Chamber finds that it simply summarizes the Trial Chamber's assessment that no witness testified credibly that the Appellants never travelled to Bisesero, whereas several Prosecution witnesses testified credibly that they did.

137. The Appeals Chamber considers that the same is true of the Trial Chamber's rejection of the claim that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was ill during the latter half of April 1994. The Trial Chamber found the claim implausible because Elizaphan Ntakirutimana "did not name his ailment" and "whatever the condition he might have had, it did not seem to prevent him, according to his own account, from going to work six times per week, or traveling to places outside Mugonero."²³⁰

²²⁵ Trial Judgement, paras. 521-528.

²²⁶ *Id.*, para. 530.

²²⁷ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 29 & 29.b.

²²⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 529.

²²⁹ *Id.*, para. 530.

²³⁰ *Id.*, para. 522.

Although the claim of illness was supported by testimony of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's wife, the Trial Chamber found that her testimony was not credible, in part because her testimony regarding the alibi of Gérard Ntakirutimana during the same time period was contradicted by two other Defence witnesses.²³¹ Having found that all testimonies regarding Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's illness during the latter half of April 1994 were not credible, it was quite proper for the Trial Chamber to add that such evidence was not supported by any other Defence witness who could be expected, due to his or her proximity to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at the relevant time, to be in a position to corroborate the claim. Thus, the fact that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's wife's claim that her husband was ill "was not corroborated by Witnesses 16, 7, 6, 12, or 5, who made day-trips to Gishyita"²³² simply reinforces the finding that all of the witnesses who were in a position to testify to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's illness either did not do so or did so in a manner that lacked credibility.

138. Finally, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, it is worth noting that the Trial Chamber used a similar analysis in rejecting the evidence of certain Prosecution witnesses.²³³ Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds Gérard Ntakirutimana's argument that the Trial Chamber took an uneven approach to corroboration is unfounded.

(c) Declining to Make Findings of Fact in Favour of the Accused

139. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber was required to resolve certain factual disputes in the Appellants' favour and erred by simply holding that the evidence was insufficient to make findings against Gérard Ntakirutimana.²³⁴ Specifically, Witnesses XX and FF testified to certain factual allegations that the Trial Chamber concluded were not proven beyond reasonable doubt: that Gérard Ntakirutimana withheld medication from Tutsis, locked up medicine cabinets, kept the only keys to certain rooms at Mugonero Hospital, and that Red Cross vehicles brought patients to the hospital.²³⁵ Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that, had the Trial Chamber taken the additional step of making affirmative findings contrary to the testimony of Witnesses XX and FF, the credibility of the testimony of those witnesses on other points would have been seriously diminished.²³⁶ Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that, by refraining from making affirmative findings in Gérard Ntakirutimana's favour, but rather holding only that the Prosecution had not proven them beyond a reasonable doubt, the Trial Chamber committed an error of law.

²³¹ *Id.*, para. 480.

²³² *Id.*

²³³ *See, e.g.*, Trial Judgement, para. 655 (rejecting testimony of Witness II in part because of lack of corroboration).

²³⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 31.

²³⁵ *Id.*, paras. 31.a-c.

²³⁶ *Id.*, para. 31.

140. Although Gérard Ntakirutimana frames this argument as one of “failing to rule” on the factual disputes regarding Gérard Ntakirutimana’s behaviour at the hospital, the Appeals Chamber considers that it is really a challenge to the credibility of Witnesses XX and FF in their testimony to other factual allegations. Since the accused has no burden to prove anything at a criminal trial, a trial chamber need not resolve factual disputes further once it has concluded that the Prosecution has not proven a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the presumption of innocence does not require the trial chamber to determine whether the accused is “innocent” of the fact at issue; it simply forbids the trial chamber from convicting the accused based on any allegations that were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Gérard Ntakirutimana’s only legal support for his contrary position is a citation to paragraph 233 of the *Kupreškić* Trial Judgement, which does not bear on this issue at all.²³⁷

141. This argument, therefore, fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed an error of law. The question whether the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in crediting the testimony of Witnesses XX and FF on other matters will be considered in the context of the Appellants’ challenges to the factual findings underlying their convictions.²³⁸

(d) Relying on Credible Testimony as Background Evidence

142. Gérard Ntakirutimana next identifies passages in which the Trial Chamber treats testimony that it considered to be credible as relevant to or corroborative of evidence of other events, even though the fact that the Prosecution sought to prove by means of the testimony was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.²³⁹ Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that, unless the fact asserted in a witness’s testimony is found beyond a reasonable doubt, that testimony must be entirely disregarded in the Trial Chamber’s consideration of the evidence.

143. The Appeals Chamber notes that Gérard Ntakirutimana does not cite any authority in support of his argument. Rather, he asserts that “[o]nce a Trial Chamber has expressed doubts about whether a fact has been proven, it contravenes the presumption of innocence ... to continue to rely on it.”²⁴⁰ This abstract statement is correct as far as it goes: the trial chamber may not rely on facts that have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But Gérard Ntakirutimana does not show

²³⁷ *Id.* The cited paragraph recites a factual finding by the *Kupreškić* Trial Chamber and identifies the evidence that the Trial Chamber relied upon in making the finding. *Kupreškić et al.* Trial Judgement, para. 233.

²³⁸ See *infra* section II.B.2.(a), where the Appeals Chamber concludes that, because the convictions based only on the testimony of Witness FF were quashed and that the remaining findings based on Witness FF’s testimony did not ground any conviction, it is not necessary to address Gérard Ntakirutimana’s challenge to Witness FF’s credibility. A similar reasoning is applicable in the case of Witness XX, since no conviction was based on that witness’s testimony.

²³⁹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 32.

²⁴⁰ *Id.*, para. 33.

why the Trial Chamber erred in relying on *testimony* that, while insufficient to prove the fact for which the Prosecution adduces it, is relevant to another fact in the case.

144. Moreover, even if the Appellant had identified an error of law in this context, he has not shown that it would invalidate any part of the decision. Gérard Ntakirutimana finds fault with the Trial Chamber's statement that it would consider testimony of Witnesses YY and KK "as part of the general context in the days preceding the attack on 16 April," but does not show how this "general context" was or could have been used to his disadvantage.²⁴¹ The same is true of the Trial Chamber's statement that it would place "limited reliance" on Witness MM's testimony that he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana taking stock of dead bodies in the basement of Mugonero Hospital.²⁴² If anything, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, the fact that the Trial Chamber concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Gérard Ntakirutimana did anything of the kind²⁴³ indicates that whatever "reliance" was placed on Witness MM's evidence, it was so "limited" as to have no effect on the verdict. Finally, although it is clear that the Trial Chamber had doubts about the accuracy of the testimony of Witness KK, owing to inconsistencies with his prior statement,²⁴⁴ it appears to have treated Witness KK's problematic testimony as cumulative of that of six other witnesses who testified that they saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana driving his car in the Mugonero area on 16 April, five of whom saw him transporting attackers.²⁴⁵ It is clear that the Trial Chamber would have reached the same conclusion had it not treated Witness KK's testimony as corroborative. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber considers that Gérard Ntakirutimana has not shown that this potential error, if error it was, would result in invalidation of any finding in the Judgement.

(e) Reference to Prior Consistent Statements

145. Gérard Ntakirutimana next asserts that the Trial Chamber erred in allowing the introduction of prior consistent statements by Prosecution witnesses as proof of the matter asserted (hearsay) or to bolster the credibility of the witnesses' in-court statements.²⁴⁶ Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that prior consistent statements are only rarely relevant or probative because it is always possible that both the prior statement and the in-court testimony are false or mistaken in a consistent way.²⁴⁷ Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that Rule 89(C) of the Rules should incorporate the common law rule that holds prior consistent statements to be inadmissible when offered to bolster a witness's

²⁴¹ Trial Judgement, para. 120.

²⁴² *Id.*, para. 426.

²⁴³ *Id.*, para. 430.

²⁴⁴ *Id.*, para. 267.

²⁴⁵ *Id.*, para. 281.

²⁴⁶ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 34-36.

²⁴⁷ *Id.*, para. 36.

credibility.²⁴⁸ Gérard Ntakirutimana then points out several situations in which the Trial Chamber noted that a witness's statement was consistent with the witness's in-court testimony and contends that the Trial Chamber used that consistency "as a basis for crediting [his or her] evidence."²⁴⁹

146. The Prosecution does not appear to disagree with Gérard Ntakirutimana's statement of the common law rule regarding prior consistent statements, but asserts that his examples do not reflect an improper use of consistent statements or did not cause prejudice.²⁵⁰

147. Although the jurisprudence of the Tribunal contains several comments on the use of prior *inconsistent* statements to impeach witness testimony,²⁵¹ it has not commented significantly on the proper uses of prior *consistent* statements. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal do not expressly forbid the use of prior consistent statements to bolster credibility. However, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that prior consistent statements cannot be used to bolster a witness's credibility, except to rebut a charge of recent fabrication of testimony.²⁵² The fact that a witness testifies in a manner consistent with an earlier statement does not establish that the witness was truthful on either occasion; after all, an unlikely or untrustworthy story is not made more likely or more trustworthy simply by rote repetition.²⁵³ Another reason supporting this position is that, if admissible and taken as probative, parties would invariably adduce numerous such statements in a manner that would be unnecessarily unwieldy to the trial.²⁵⁴

148. However, there is a difference between using a prior consistent statement to bolster the indicia of credibility observed at trial and rejecting a Defence challenge to credibility based on alleged inconsistencies between testimony and earlier statements. The former is a legal error, while the latter is simply a conclusion that the Defence's arguments are not persuasive. As the following paragraphs indicate, the Appeals Chamber considers that the examples cited in Gérard Ntakirutimana's Appeal Brief are primarily examples of the latter phenomenon.

149. For example, Gérard Ntakirutimana objects to the Trial Chamber's statement that Witness FF's testimony "was generally in conformity with her previous statements to investigators (see below)."²⁵⁵ The "(see below)" reference makes plain that the Trial Chamber is merely summarizing the following paragraph in the Judgement, which rejects various Defence arguments claiming that

²⁴⁸ *Id.*

²⁴⁹ *Id.*, para. 37.

²⁵⁰ Prosecution Response, paras. 4.26-4.27.

²⁵¹ *Akayesu* Appeal Judgement, para. 142; *Musema* Appeal Judgement, para. 99.

²⁵² See, e.g., *Tome v. United States*, 513 U.S. 150, 157 (1995) ("Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited."); *R. v. Beland and Phillips*, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 489 (Supreme Court of Canada 1987).

²⁵³ See 4 J.H. Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law* §1124 (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1972).

²⁵⁴ See *id.*

Witness FF's testimony was not credible because it contained allegations inconsistent with or omitted from her prior statements.²⁵⁶ The Trial Chamber's comment about "conformity with her previous statements" is therefore not a bolstering of credibility, but rather a simplified dismissal of the Defence's arguments of lack of credibility.

150. The same is true of several other examples cited by Gérard Ntakirutimana. The Trial Chamber's comments that Witness XX testified in a manner consistent with her previous statements²⁵⁷ were made in paragraphs that begin with a summary of the Appellants' challenge to Witness XX's credibility, citing directly to the Defence Closing Brief.²⁵⁸ That Brief made reference to Witness XX's prior statements and sought to identify inconsistencies between the two statements and between the statements and XX's testimony, particularly with regard to events in Bisesero.²⁵⁹ It therefore appears that the Trial Chamber's discussion of consistency in Witness XX's witness statements was a refutation of the Defence's assertion of inconsistency, not a bolstering of credibility beyond the indicia of credibility discernible at trial. Likewise, the Trial Chamber's finding that Witness MM's testimony regarding Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's conveying of attackers to Mugonero "was generally in conformity with his previous statements"²⁶⁰ and, in a footnote immediately thereafter, "was also generally in conformity with his statement to African Rights,"²⁶¹ is clearly a prelude to the finding in the next sentence that some "minor discrepancies between his first and second statements" were immaterial.²⁶²

151. The Trial Chamber's discussion of consistency between the prior statements of Witness FF²⁶³ also responds to the Defence's claim that Witness FF's testimony regarding attacks at Murambi and Gitwe Hills did not match her prior statements.²⁶⁴ The same is true regarding FF's testimony regarding an attack at Kidashya Hill.²⁶⁵ The analysis of the statement of HH²⁶⁶ likewise answers the Defence argument that "[t]he witness' prior statement to investigators contradicts" the allegation regarding the killing of Esdras.²⁶⁷ The Defence likewise argued that Witness CC "was not

²⁵⁵ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 37.b (quoting Trial Judgement, para. 127).

²⁵⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 128.

²⁵⁷ *Id.*, paras. 131-132.

²⁵⁸ *Id.*, para. 131 & n. 162 (citing Defence Closing Brief, pp. 70-75).

²⁵⁹ Defence Closing Brief, pp. 71-75.

²⁶⁰ Trial Judgement, para. 228.

²⁶¹ *Id.*, n. 299.

²⁶² *Id.*, para. 228.

²⁶³ *Id.*, para. 541.

²⁶⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 537 (summarizing Defence arguments).

²⁶⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 585 ("It is true, as argued by the Defence, that Witness FF did not mention Kidashya Hill specifically in any of her prior written statements. However, as mentioned above she told investigators in four of her statements that she saw Gérard Ntakirutimana on several occasions in Bisesero." (Emphasis added.)).

²⁶⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 559.

²⁶⁷ *Id.*, para. 551.

credible because of discrepancies between his testimony and his prior statements",²⁶⁸ it was not an improper bolstering for the Trial Chamber to reject the Defence's argument by concluding that Witness CC's testimony was "consistent with the written statement."²⁶⁹

152. Similarly, the Appeals Chamber notes that the reference to Witness DD's prior witness statement responds to the Defence's claim that Witness DD testified to events "not mentioned in his two reconfirmations" and that his testimony "consistently contradicted" his written statements,²⁷⁰ the Trial Chamber concluded that, while there are "some differences between the statement and the testimony," the testimony regarding the material facts at issue was not inconsistent.²⁷¹ Moreover, in its findings of fact, the Trial Chamber rejected Witness DD's evidence on this point because it was "not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Witness DD could recognize Gérard Ntakirutimana in semi-darkness or from his voice."²⁷² Because the Trial Chamber did not make any factual finding in reliance on Witness DD's purportedly bolstered evidence,²⁷³ any error in the treatment of the prior consistent statement could not invalidate the decision.

153. Gérard Ntakirutimana also cites the Trial Chamber's treatment of Witness HH's testimony that Gérard Ntakirutimana asked refugees to leave Mugonero hospital and relocate to the Ngoma Adventist Church.²⁷⁴ Witness HH testified that Gérard Ntakirutimana's reason for giving this request was that "the livestock of the refugees was soiling the hospital"; the Trial Chamber then stated that this reason "is in conformity with his written statement to investigators of 2 April 1996."²⁷⁵ It is not clear whether the Trial Chamber mentioned this consistency as a factor bearing on Witness HH's credibility, or whether the Trial Chamber simply meant to draw a distinction between Witness HH and another witness, KK, who stated a different reason in his earlier statement and no reason at all in his trial testimony.²⁷⁶ More importantly, however, the Trial Chamber did not make a finding as to the reason Gérard Ntakirutimana gave for asking the refugees to relocate. The Trial Chamber found only that "Gérard Ntakirutimana did request the refugees to leave for the Ngoma Church," a fact testified to by Witnesses HH, KK, and MM.²⁷⁷ Accordingly, even if the Trial Chamber did improperly view Witness HH's testimony regarding Gérard Ntakirutimana's reason for his request as bolstered with his prior consistent witness statement, such an error, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, could not invalidate any finding of the Chamber. Similarly, Gérard

²⁶⁸ *Id.*, para. 588.

²⁶⁹ *Id.*, para. 594.

²⁷⁰ Defence Closing Brief, p. 138.

²⁷¹ Trial Judgement, para. 427.

²⁷² *Id.*, para. 428.

²⁷³ *Id.*, para. 430.

²⁷⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 37.a.

²⁷⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 108.

²⁷⁶ *Id.*

²⁷⁷ *Id.*

Ntakirutimana's challenge to the evaluation of Witness II's testimony²⁷⁸ is moot in light of the Trial Chamber's finding that it was "not in a position to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana participated and behaved as alleged by the Prosecution" and as testified to by the witness.²⁷⁹

154. Gérard Ntakirutimana's final example cites to a portion of the Trial Judgement summarizing the Prosecution's argument to the Trial Chamber, not the analysis of the Chamber itself.²⁸⁰

155. Accordingly, although Gérard Ntakirutimana has correctly stated the law regarding the impermissibility of using prior consistent statements to bolster witness credibility, the Appeals Chamber finds that he has failed to show any instance of it by the Trial Chamber that could have invalidated the Judgement. This ground of appeal therefore fails.

(f) Application of the Presumption of Innocence

156. Gérard Ntakirutimana cites several passages in the Trial Judgement that he contends reveal the Trial Chamber's misapprehension of the legal principle that the accused is presumed innocent unless and until the Prosecution proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.²⁸¹ First, Gérard Ntakirutimana cites sentences in which the Trial Chamber rejects Defence arguments because it was not "convinced" or "persuaded" by the Defence argument.²⁸² Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that these formulations indicate that the Trial Chamber placed a burden on the Defence to persuade or convince it of its position, rather than leaving the burden on the Prosecution to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, Gérard Ntakirutimana notes instances in which the Trial Chamber rejected Defence evidence because there was a "distinct possibility" that it was unfounded and accepted Prosecution arguments or evidence because they were "plausible," because they gave the Trial Chamber an "impression," or because the situation "may" or "could well" have unfolded as the Prosecution submitted.²⁸³

157. The Prosecution bears the burden of proving the Accused's criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends, however, that the Trial Chamber's phrasing in the sentences excerpted above shows that the Trial Chamber convicted the Accused because they failed to persuade the Chamber of their innocence.

²⁷⁸ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 37.k.

²⁷⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 655.

²⁸⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 37.e (citing Trial Judgement, para. 362).

²⁸¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 39.

²⁸² *Id.*, paras. 39.a-b, f-g (citing Trial Judgement, paras. 129, 229, 370, 591).

²⁸³ *Id.*, paras. 39.c-e, h-l (citing Trial Judgement, paras. 133, 153, 335, 480, 539, 584, 597, 643).

158. It is necessary to determine whether the word choices identified by Gérard Ntakirutimana indicate that the Trial Chamber made factual findings against the Accused even though the totality of the evidence on the point admitted of a reasonable doubt.²⁸⁴

159. A review of the passages in which the Trial Chamber states that it is not “convinced” or “persuaded” by Defence arguments shows that, rather than imposing a burden on the Appellants, the Trial Chamber merely rejected Defence challenges to witness credibility. The Appeals Chamber considers that nothing in the Trial Chamber Judgement suggests that the Trial Chamber held the witnesses to be credible even though a reasonable doubt remained as to the credibility of the witnesses at issue. Rather, the Trial Chamber found that the Appellants’ arguments seeking to raise a reasonable doubt failed to do so. Thus, the Trial Chamber held that the Defence’s claim that Witnesses FF and MM were part of a campaign to convict the Appellants did not undermine the evidence of Witness FF’s credibility;²⁸⁵ that the discrepancies identified by the Defence between Witness CC’s trial testimony and his prior statement likewise did not affect his credibility;²⁸⁶ and that Witness HH had credibly testified that he was able to see the shooting of Ukobizaba, contrary to the Defence’s argument based on Witness HH’s location at the time.²⁸⁷ The Appeals Chamber considers that nothing in the Trial Judgement suggests that the use of the terms “convinced” or “persuaded” reflected an impermissible burden on the Appellants; rather, these words simply express the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the Prosecution proved that its witnesses were credible beyond a reasonable doubt despite the Defence’s arguments to the contrary.

160. The Appeals Chamber considers that the same is true of the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that, although Witness CC had not mentioned seeing Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at an attack at Gitwa Cellule, “the general formulation according to which the witness saw the Accused at least four times during the attacks in the Bisesero area *could well* include the incident at Gitwa.”²⁸⁸ The Appellants’ had argued at trial that Witness CC’s evidence was not credible because it was inconsistent with his prior statements.²⁸⁹ The Trial Chamber found, however, that the witness was “generally consistent and credible” and that, because there was no necessary contradiction between trial testimony of a specific attack at Gitwa and a prior statement of seeing Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at four attacks in Bisesero generally, the Appellants’ argument of inconsistency failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to Witness CC’s credible testimony. The Appeals Chamber considers that

²⁸⁴ See *Musema Appeal Judgement*, para. 210.

²⁸⁵ Trial Judgement, paras. 129, 229.

²⁸⁶ *Id.*, para. 591.

²⁸⁷ *Id.*, para. 370.

²⁸⁸ *Id.*, para. 597 (emphasis added).

²⁸⁹ *Id.*, para. 588.

Gérard Ntakirutimana has accordingly not shown that the Trial Chamber impermissibly gave the Prosecution the benefit of the doubt.

161. Gérard Ntakirutimana's challenge to the statement regarding a "distinct possibility" rests on a misreading. The Trial Chamber identified contradictions in the alibi evidence that, in its view, gave rise "to the distinct possibility that [three alibi witnesses] were either not aware of all of Gérard Ntakirutimana's movements or were minimising his absences to assist his defence."²⁹⁰ The Trial Chamber was not stating that there was only a "possibility" that the alibi evidence was inconsistent and therefore incredible. Rather, it clearly found that the witnesses did contradict each other; the "possibility" language refers to potential *reasons* for the inconsistency, which though useful in the interest of completeness are not material facts that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Once the Trial Chamber found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alibi witnesses were not credible, it was not required to make findings beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the reasons why witnesses might offer incredible and inconsistent accounts of events.

162. Gérard Ntakirutimana attacks the Trial Chamber's use of the word "plausible" in accepting the testimony of Witness FF.²⁹¹ The context in which the Trial Chamber used this word makes clear that the Trial Chamber simply viewed it as a synonym for "credible." There is no suggestion that the Trial Chamber acted on evidence that it believed could admit of reasonable doubt. The similar complaint regarding Witness II is misplaced, since the paragraph cited refers to a summary of the Prosecution's submission, not the analysis of the Trial Chamber.²⁹²

163. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the Trial Chamber improperly concluded that he "simply abandoned the Tutsi patients" at Mugonero Hospital not because it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but because "[t]he overall impression [left] the Chamber with th[at] impression."²⁹³ The Trial Chamber did not rely upon this in making a finding of fact, but it did state that it "note[d] the element[] as part of the general context."²⁹⁴ Its statement that "[t]his behaviour is not in conformity with the general picture painted by the Defence of the Accused as a medical doctor who cared for his patients" suggests that the Trial Chamber at least relied on the "impression" in forming an opinion of the character of the Appellant. It therefore cannot be excluded that the Trial Chamber acted on an "impression" of the Appellant's behaviour that was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

²⁹⁰ *Id.*, para. 480.

²⁹¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 39.i-j (referring to Trial Judgement, paras. 542, 584).

²⁹² *Id.*, para. 39.k (citing Trial Judgement, para. 643).

²⁹³ Trial Judgement, para. 153.

²⁹⁴ *Id.*

164. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the context of this error, however, reveals its harmlessness. The “impression” received by the Trial Chamber was based on testimony of Gérard Ntakirutimana himself, who “acknowledge[d] that he departed the hospital leaving the Tutsi patients behind” and “did not return to the hospital to inquire as to the condition of patients and staff.”²⁹⁵ The Appellant does not argue that the Trial Chamber could not have found, based on his own testimony and beyond a reasonable doubt, that he “simply abandoned the Tutsi patients.”²⁹⁶ Thus, although it appears that the Trial Chamber based a conclusion regarding the Appellant’s behaviour on an improper standard of proof, it is indisputable that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion when the correct standard is applied. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber considers that this error of law does not invalidate the Trial Chamber’s decision.

165. Gérard Ntakirutimana likewise attacks the Trial Chamber’s statement following its enumeration of several named individuals who were killed in the attack at Mugonero: “(The Chamber did not receive information about the ethnicity of each of these individuals, but it is left with the clear impression that most of them were Tutsi.)”²⁹⁷ Again, the Appellant argues that the Trial Chamber should not have made a finding adverse to him based merely on a “clear impression.” However, it does not appear to the Appeals Chamber that this parenthetical sentence supported a finding regarding the ethnicity of those individuals. Rather, the naming of the deceased opens a discussion of the number of people killed in the Mugonero attack.²⁹⁸ This discussion culminates in the conclusion that “paragraph 4.9 of the Indictments has been made out,” namely that the Mugonero attack resulted in “hundreds of deaths and a large number of wounded.”²⁹⁹ The ethnicity of the dead and wounded is not mentioned in paragraph 4.9 of the two Indictments. Accordingly, while the statement challenged by Gérard Ntakirutimana does not appear to rely on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, its context and the use of parentheses indicate that it was meant as a side comment only. The finding regarding the ethnicity of the persons killed at Mugonero takes place in subsequent paragraphs and does not rest on a mere “impression” of the Trial Chamber.³⁰⁰

166. Finally, Gérard Ntakirutimana challenges the Trial Chamber’s observation, in response to arguments regarding an omission of a fact from Witness DD’s prior statement, that the fact “*may have been omitted during the recording of the interview.*”³⁰¹ This equivocal construction suggests, as Gérard Ntakirutimana points out, that the Trial Chamber was not entirely convinced that the omission was due to a recording error, rather than to Witness DD’s failure to mention it during the

²⁹⁵ *Id.*

²⁹⁶ *Id.*

²⁹⁷ *Id.*, para. 335.

²⁹⁸ *Id.*, paras. 335-337.

²⁹⁹ *Id.*, para. 337 (quoting Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments, para. 4.9).

³⁰⁰ *Id.*, paras. 338-340.

interview.³⁰² The remainder of the Trial Chamber's discussion does not remedy the uncertainty. The Chamber merely states that the witness cannot read and that there were obviously communication problems between Witness DD and the investigators. Therefore, the Appellant appears to be correct that the Trial Chamber was not entirely confident in Witness DD's testimony on this point. However, the Trial Chamber then noted that Witness DD's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.³⁰³ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, this is therefore a situation in which the Trial Chamber, though perhaps not convinced of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on the testimony of one witness, was convinced by the corroboration of that witness's testimony by other witnesses. Whether this conclusion was reasonable is a question of fact to be decided later. At this stage, the fact that the Trial Chamber relied on corroboration in making its finding shows that the Trial Chamber did not base a finding solely on evidence as to which it expressed doubt.

167. In conclusion, it is worth noting that the Trial Chamber's choice of words in these situations could have been more precise in certain situations. However, on review of the specific contexts of each of the phrases challenged by Gérard Ntakirutimana, it becomes evident that the Trial Chamber properly understood and applied the presumption of innocence. This ground of appeal is therefore dismissed.

(g) Consideration of the Alibi

168. Gérard Ntakirutimana next contends that the Trial Chamber erred by rejecting the alibi because it was not "reasonably possibly true."³⁰⁴ The phrase "reasonably possibly true" comes from the Appeals Chamber's Judgement in *Musema*, which adopted the following statement of law:

In raising the defence of alibi, the Accused not only denies that he committed the crimes for which he is charged but also asserts that he was elsewhere than at the scene of these crimes when they were committed. The onus is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the Accused. *In establishing its case, when an alibi defence is introduced, the Prosecution must prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the accused was present and committed the crimes for which he is charged and thereby discredit the alibi defence. The alibi defence does not carry a separate burden of proof. If the defence is reasonably possibly true, it must be successful.*³⁰⁵

169. The Appellant contends, in effect, that the Trial Chamber seized on the words "reasonably possibly true" and ignored the rest, which imposed upon Gérard Ntakirutimana the burden of proving that his alibi was "reasonably possibly true," rather than requiring the Prosecution to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. He raises two arguments: first, that the "reasonably possibly

³⁰¹ *Id.*, para. 133 (emphasis added).

³⁰² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 39.c.

³⁰³ Trial Judgement, paras. 133-134.

³⁰⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 40.

³⁰⁵ *Musema* Appeal Judgement, para. 205 (quoting *Musema* Trial Judgement, para. 108) (emphasis added by *Musema* Appeal Judgement).

true” formulation places an impermissible burden on the Defence, and second, that under that formulation, the Trial Chamber could reject an alibi if it were uncertain about whether the alibi evidence showed that the alibi was “reasonably possibly true,” even though uncertainties should be resolved in favour of the alibi.

170. The context of the *Musema* discussion makes clear that the phrase “if the defence is reasonably possibly true” is equivalent to the phrase “if the defence raises a reasonable doubt.” Shortly before it quoted the above language, the Appeals Chamber stated: “The sole purpose of an alibi, when raised by a defendant, is only to cast a reasonable doubt on the Prosecution case.”³⁰⁶ The Chamber then stated “[W]hen the alibi has been properly raised, the onus is on the Prosecution to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt failing which the Prosecution case would raise a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s responsibility.”³⁰⁷

171. The Appellant does not appear to quarrel with this statement of the law, under which a trial chamber may reject an alibi only if the Prosecution establishes “beyond a reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true.”³⁰⁸ Rather, Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber’s rejection of the alibi because it was not “reasonably possibly true” did not conform to this standard. However, the Trial Chamber articulated the standard in a clear and correct manner when it first considered alibi evidence: “It follows from case law that when the Defence relies on alibi, the Prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was present and committed the crimes for which he is charged and thereby discredit the alibi. If the alibi is reasonably possibly true, it must be successful.”³⁰⁹ None of the paragraphs cited by the Appellant suggest that the Trial Chamber used the phrase “reasonable possibility” in any way other than as a synonym for “reasonable doubt.” Indeed, the Appeals Chamber considers that the context makes clear that the Trial Chamber evaluated the totality of the evidence and concluded that the Prosecution witnesses had proven criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt despite the alibi.³¹⁰

³⁰⁶ *Id.*, para. 200.

³⁰⁷ *Id.*, para. 201.

³⁰⁸ *Id.*, para. 202.

³⁰⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 294.

³¹⁰ *Id.*, paras. 309 (“The Chamber does not find that this evidence, considered together with the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses, raises a reasonable possibility that the two Accused were not present in the vicinity of the Mugonero Complex between 8.00 and 9.00 on 16 April”); 480 (“The evidence does not raise a reasonable possibility that they were not at those locations in Murambi and Bisesero where Prosecution witnesses testify to having seen them in April.”); 530 (“[T]he Chamber need only consider whether the alibi evidence creates a reasonable possibility that the Accused were not at locations at Murambi and Bisesero at certain times alleged by Prosecution witnesses, as summarized at the beginning of this discussion. The Chamber finds that no such reasonable possibility has been established.”).

172. The Appellant's second argument is that the "reasonably possibly true" formulation could result in the giving of the benefit of the doubt to the Prosecution in cases of uncertainty. This argument loses its force when, as here, the Trial Chamber correctly understands the "reasonably possibly true" standard as identical to the standard of "reasonable doubt." It is true that, in borderline cases in which the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude whether the totality of the evidence shows guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Trial Chamber must resolve the uncertainty in the Accused's favour. But there is no suggestion that the Trial Chamber in this case erred in law by doing the contrary.³¹¹ Accordingly, this ground of appeal fails.

(h) Consideration of Allegation of a "Political Campaign"

173. The submissions in relation to the existence of a political campaign are discussed below under Section IV (Common Ground of Appeal on the Existence of a Political Campaign Against the Appellants) of the present judgement.

(i) Consideration of Testimony of Prosecution Witnesses

174. Gérard Ntakirutimana claims that the Trial Chamber erred in law by "crediting the testimony of Prosecution witnesses when, without rational bases, it compartmentalized their testimony so as to insulate those aspects relied upon, from those aspects that were not believed beyond a reasonable doubt."³¹² Although the Appellant frames this ground of appeal as one of law, it is in reality a challenge to various findings of credibility made by the Trial Chamber. Gérard Ntakirutimana does not argue that the Trial Chamber is forbidden, as a matter of law, from concluding that a witness's testimony, though not credible on one point, is credible on others. Rather, Gérard Ntakirutimana takes issue from the Trial Chamber's findings that certain specific Prosecution witnesses were credible as to some portions of their testimony, even though their evidence was rejected on other points. An error in a finding of credibility is an error of fact. An appellant cannot turn an error of fact into an error of law simply by contending that the trial chamber made a similar error in assessing the credibility of several witnesses on several occasions. These arguments will therefore be assessed in the context of reviewing the reasonableness of the Trial Chamber's factual decisions regarding credibility.

³¹¹ The Trial Chamber's assessment of the Appellants' alibi has been addressed more fully in section H of the Appeals Chamber's discussion of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's grounds of appeal.

³¹² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 44.

3. Other Errors of Law Asserted by Gérard Ntakirutimana

175. Gérard Ntakirutimana asserts four remaining grounds of appeal under the heading of “legal errors.” First, he claims that the Trial Chamber committed legal errors in its dismissal of various Defence challenges to the credibility of Prosecution witnesses based on their witness statements.³¹³ The Appellant’s argument is that the Trial Chamber “seized upon rationalizations not grounded in evidence to discount the significance of inconsistencies in the Prosecution evidence.”³¹⁴ Second, he argues that, because four Prosecution witnesses within the same week asked the Trial Chamber to prefer their in-court testimony to their prior statements, the Trial Chamber should have inferred (even though Gérard Ntakirutimana did not raise the issue) that they had been improperly coached by someone familiar with the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal and should have discounted their testimony accordingly.³¹⁵ Third, the Appellant contends that the Trial Chamber had no cogent reasons for rejecting the alibi evidence other than an irrational preference for Prosecution witnesses,³¹⁶ erred in convicting him for attacks that were identified as occurring at a specific time without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no alibi for that time,³¹⁷ erred in failing to reconcile the finding that the alibi left open the “intermittent chance” for the Appellants to travel to Bisesero with the testimony of certain Prosecution witnesses that they saw them in Bisesero on regular occasions;³¹⁸ and erred in failing to consider that the Prosecution’s account that the Appellants repeatedly ventured into Bisesero to participate in attacks was “preposterous.”³¹⁹ Fourth, Gérard Ntakirutimana asserts that the Trial Chamber improperly failed to take account of the Defence’s evidence that the Accused lacked any motive to commit the crimes charged.

176. As discussed above in connection with the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Prosecution witnesses, however, these challenges attack the Trial Chamber’s conclusion regarding the credibility of various witnesses or the conclusion that the evidence as a whole proved criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. These are challenges of fact. These arguments will therefore be assessed in reviewing the reasonableness of the Trial Chamber’s factual decisions, to which the Appeals Chamber now turns.

³¹³ *Id.*, paras. 45-52.

³¹⁴ *Id.*, para. 45.

³¹⁵ *Id.*, para. 53; Reply (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 27.

³¹⁶ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 55.

³¹⁷ *Id.*, para. 56.

³¹⁸ *Id.*, para. 56.

³¹⁹ *Id.*, para. 57.

B. Factual Errors

177. Gérard Ntakirutimana asserts that none of the factual findings on which his convictions rests could have been made by a reasonable tribunal. As aforementioned, the Tribunal's jurisprudence firmly establishes that it is the Trial Chamber's role to make findings of fact, including assessments of the credibility of witnesses.³²⁰ The Appeals Chamber "will not lightly disturb findings of fact by a Trial Chamber."³²¹ The Appeals Chamber will revise them only where the Appellant establishes that the finding of fact is one that no reasonable tribunal could have reached. Furthermore, the erroneous finding will be revoked or revised only if the error occasioned a miscarriage of justice.³²²

178. This deference to the finder of fact is particularly appropriate where the factual challenges concern the issues of witness credibility. These are the kinds of questions that the trier of fact is particularly well suited to assess, for "[t]he Trial Chamber directly observed the witness and had the opportunity to assess her evidence in the context of the entire trial record."³²³

1. Mugonero Indictment

(a) Procurement of Ammunition and Gendarmes (Witness OO)

179. The Trial Chamber relied on Witness OO's testimony to find that Gérard Ntakirutimana attended a meeting with the commander of the Kibuye gendarmerie camp and Obed Ruzindana in Kibuye town on the afternoon of 15 April 1994, and that he procured gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994.³²⁴

(i) Witness OO's Status as a Detainee in a Rwandan Prison

180. The Appellant argues that the evidence supplied by Witness OO is suspect because he had been in custody in Rwanda for seven years awaiting trial and therefore was likely to provide false testimony to curry favour with the authorities. In Gérard Ntakirutimana's submission, the Trial Chamber misunderstood this objection, refusing to draw an adverse inference from the fact that Witness OO was detained on the basis that Witness OO was entitled to the presumption of innocence. The objection, Gérard Ntakirutimana argues, was not that Witness OO was a bad

³²⁰ *Musema Appeal Judgement*, para. 18.

³²¹ *Id.*; see also *Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement*, para. 8; *Krstić Appeal Judgement*, para. 40; *Krnojelac Appeal Judgement*, para. 11; *Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement*, para. 32; *Furundžija Appeal Judgement*, para. 37; *Tadić Appeal Judgement*, para. 35; *Aleskovski Appeal Judgement*, para. 63.

³²² *Krstić Appeal Judgement*, para. 40; *Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement*, para. 8.

³²³ *Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement*, para. 130.

³²⁴ *Trial Judgement* para. 186.

character but that he had a motive to lie even if he was innocent. In addition, Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that Witness OO had previously lied about his status as a detainee in *Niyitegeka*.³²⁵

181. The Trial Chamber considered Witness OO's detention but refused to draw an adverse inference as to the witness's credibility.³²⁶ It must be acknowledged that the reason given by the Trial Chamber – that a detained person enjoys the presumption of innocence (a legal error that has been discussed above) – does not answer the Defence argument that Witness OO had a reason to give untruthful evidence to ingratiate himself with the Rwandese authorities. Nevertheless, the mere fact that an incarcerated suspect had a possible incentive to perjure himself on the stand in order to gain leniency from the prosecutorial authorities is not sufficient, by itself, to establish that the suspect did in fact lie. The authorities cited by the Appellant are not to the contrary: none shows that an in-custody informant must necessarily be treated as unreliable. The Appellant also fails to substantiate his claim with any direct evidence of collusion between Witness OO and the Rwandese prosecutorial or prison authorities, or even with evidence of how Witness OO's testimony could have helped the witness with national authorities in Rwanda. In fact, the available evidence tends toward the opposite conclusion: as the Appeals Chamber has already noted, the witness did acknowledge, when on the stand in *Niyitegeka*, that there may be some benefit in testifying before the Tribunal. The witness, however, denied being motivated by such a possibility.³²⁷ As the Appeals Chamber indicated on that occasion, the Appellant made no showing that would cast the truthfulness of that explanation into doubt.³²⁸

182. Insofar as the *Niyitegeka* transcripts of Witness OO's testimony are concerned, the Appeals Chamber has already explained that these transcripts do not form part of the record in this case, and it has rejected the Appellants' request to admit them as additional evidence.³²⁹ Therefore, it will not consider any references to the *Niyitegeka* transcripts in the determination of the appeals in this case.³³⁰

(ii) Witness OO's Statement on Gérard Ntakirutimana's Presence at the Kibuye Gendarmerie Camp at the End of April or Beginning of May 1994

183. The Appellant argues that Witness OO is not credible because Witness OO testified to seeing Gérard Ntakirutimana at the Kibuye gendarme camp at the end of April or beginning of May, and described the scene in great detail, including that Gérard Ntakirutimana had an ever-

³²⁵ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 63-64 (citing Trial Judgement, para. 173).

³²⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 173.

³²⁷ Decision on Request for Admission of Additional Evidence, 8 April 2004, para. 19.

³²⁸ *Id.*

³²⁹ *Id.*, paras. 24-25.

³³⁰ *Id.*, para. 25.

present military companion. By contrast, the Appellant points out, no other witness testified to this fact. He adds that in *Musema*, Witness OO testified that this event occurred in May 1994; when confronted with this inconsistency, the witness claimed to be testifying about two different yet identically detailed events.³³¹

184. The Appellant's arguments are unpersuasive. Witness OO did indeed state in his statement to investigators of 12 August 1998 that he had seen Gérard Ntakirutimana and others come to the Kibuye gendarmerie camp to collect fuel for a bulldozer and four gendarmes to bury the bodies of killed Tutsi at the end of May 1994, whereas at trial he stated that this happened at the end of April or beginning of May 1994. This discrepancy – even if otherwise left unexplained – does not mean, however, that the Trial Chamber could not have relied on Witness OO's testimony with respect to a different event, which supports the ground of the judgement below. As the settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal establishes, the Trial Chamber may find some parts of a witness's testimony credible, and rely on them, while rejecting other parts as not credible.³³² The event with respect to which the Trial Chamber relied on Witness OO's testimony was Gérard Ntakirutimana's presence at the Kibuye gendarmerie camp on 15 and 16 April 1994, to procure attackers for the assault on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994. The Trial Chamber made no finding with regard to the specific event that the Appellant discusses.

185. As mentioned above, the Appellant also points to the fact that Witness OO stated at trial that Gérard Ntakirutimana arrived at the Kibuye gendarmerie camp after the events of 16 April 1994 with the bulldozer "with a soldier, who accompanied him everywhere,"³³³ even though no other witness ever testified about such an ever-present military companion. As explained above, the Trial Chamber did not base any findings on this part of Witness OO's testimony. Moreover, Witness OO referred to this military companion only once in one sentence at trial and was not further questioned on the matter. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, this statement is therefore not sufficient to find the witness unreliable.

(iii) Witness OO's Testimony on Kayishema's Presence at a Meeting at Charroi Naval Post

186. The Appellant next argues that Witness OO is not credible because he asserted in his witness statement, and later repeated in his testimony in *Musema*, that Kayishema was present at a meeting at Charroi Naval Post, but testified to the contrary at trial here.³³⁴ The issue of Kayishema's

³³¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 65.a.

³³² *Musema* Appeal Judgement, para. 20; *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, paras. 485 and 498.

³³³ Citing T. 1 November 2001, p. 171.

³³⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 65.b.

presence at a meeting at Charroi was not used by the Trial Chamber to support any finding against the Appellant. Even if the Appellant could establish that there is a discrepancy in Witness OO's statement and testimony as to Kayishema's presence at a meeting at Charroi Naval Post, that fact is not sufficient to establish that no reasonable Trial Chamber would have found Witness OO credible with respect to other matters.

(iv) Witness OO's Statements on Gendarmes' Freedoms at the Kibuye Gendarmerie Camp

187. In this contention, the Appellant argues that Witness OO is not credible and that he is self-contradictory because he testified that gendarmes at the Kibuye camp could do what they wanted, while also stating that they could never leave the camp.³³⁵ The Appeals Chamber considers that, contrary to the Appellant's argument, no inconsistency arises from Witness OO's statements at trial that during the war gendarmes at the Kibuye gendarmerie camp would do whatever they wanted and that "no soldier had any right to leave camp." The statements instead suggest that no soldier had any right to leave the camp but that, when within the camp between April and July, they were not subjected to ordinary military discipline.

(v) Witness OO's Claim that Investigators Did Not Maintain the Chronology and that He Did Not Read Through His Statement

188. The Appellant argues that Witness OO was not credible on the basis that, when confronted with an inconsistency in his witness statement, he claimed that he had not read the statement even though he had signed it, believing that he could correct errors in the statement at trial. The Appellant further points out that Witness OO testified that investigators did not maintain a chronology, which is belied by the statement itself. Moreover, the Appellant contends, the Prosecution relied on the statement in its effort to cure indictment errors.³³⁶

189. The Appellant fails to show that no reasonable Trial Chamber would have accepted Witness OO's explanation that the investigators did not maintain the chronology of events. The witness explained that the investigators took notes when they were questioning him and then went to type out his statement, and that they did not maintain the chronology of events.³³⁷ This explanation is entirely plausible, because, as the Appellant acknowledges,³³⁸ the statement refers to specific dates only sporadically, normally employing linking phrases such as "the next morning" or "the following afternoon." This mode of reference makes it difficult if not impossible to confirm precise

³³⁵ *Id.*, para. 65.c, citing T. 2 November 2001, pp. 98, 110.

³³⁶ *Id.*, para. 65.c-d.

³³⁷ T. 2 November 2001, p. 54.

³³⁸ Reply Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 32.

dates for many of the events discussed. As a result, paragraphs could easily have been put “upside down”³³⁹ by the investigators, as the witness had claimed on the stand.

190. The Appellant also fails to show that no reasonable Trial Chamber would have concluded that Witness OO did not lie about the fact that he did not read through his statement. When questioned about this fact by the Trial Chamber, the witness stated that he “did not have the opportunity to read that [the statement] over with [the investigators] to be able to correct that error,”³⁴⁰ and immediately clarified the reason why he signed the statement without reading it first: “I signed that statement all right, but I was told that I was going to come and confirm what I stated before the Trial Chamber. And I said to myself that even if there was a problem with the statement, I was going to solve it since I would be present, myself.”³⁴¹ The Trial Chamber accepted this explanation, and the Appellant fails to show why it would have been unreasonable for a Trial Chamber to credit such an explanation.

(vi) Witness OO’s Alleged Discrepancies About the Timing of Events on 15-16 April

191. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that, even if Witness OO was credible, the Trial Chamber drew unreasonable conclusions from his testimony. From Witness OO’s testimony that he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana sometime before 18 April, the Trial Chamber concluded that he was at the Kibuye gendarmerie camp on 15 and 16 April. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues further that Witness OO’s testimony that there was one day between Gérard Ntakirutimana’s visits to the camp contradicts the Trial Chamber’s finding that he was there on consecutive days (15 and 16 April).³⁴²

192. The Appeals Chamber notes that even though the witness initially testified that “between when [Gérard Ntakirutimana] returned and his first visit, one day had elapsed,”³⁴³ in the next sentence he clarifies that the return “was the following day.” The context in which the witness’s statements are placed shows that the witness was repeatedly and consistently referring to the time of the return as the morning after Gérard Ntakirutimana’s first visit to the camp on 15 April, namely to the morning of 16 April.³⁴⁴ The Trial Chamber’s finding is therefore reasonable.

193. Gérard Ntakirutimana also claims that Witness OO changed his testimony about timing of events to suit his stories. The Appellant lists a number of examples: (a) Witness OO’s pre-trial statement said that the Gatwaro stadium attack occurred after the camp commander (Major Jabo)

³³⁹ T. 2 November 2001, p. 52.

³⁴⁰ *Id.*, p. 54.

³⁴¹ *Id.*, p. 55.

³⁴² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 66 (citing Trial Judgement, paras. 144, 175).

³⁴³ T. 2 November 2001, p. 71.

³⁴⁴ See T. 2 November 2001, pp. 62, 64, 65, 70, 71.

was transferred to Kigali, yet at trial he testified that it happened before the transfer, and when confronted with the inconsistency, he said the attack happened on 14 April, never resolving whether it was before or after the transfer; (b) in *Musema*, Witness OO testified that the Gatwaro attack and an attack on Home St. Jean occurred on the same day, yet in his statement he alleged that the Home St. Jean attack occurred later; (c) in *Musema*, Witness OO claimed that he first saw Musema at the camp at the end of April, yet in his statement he claimed he saw Musema with Gérard Ntakirutimana at a meeting that the Trial Chamber concluded took place on April 15.³⁴⁵

194. The Trial Chamber has expressly considered the inconsistency between Witness OO's pre-trial statement and his trial testimony as to the date of Major Jabo's transfer. Accepting Witness OO's explanation for why he believed his pre-trial statement to have been inaccurate, the Trial Chamber credited the witness's trial testimony instead.³⁴⁶ As already explained, the Trial Chamber's conclusion that the witness provided a creditable explanation for the differences between his pre-trial statement and trial testimony was reasonable, as was the Trial Chamber's decision to credit the chronology of events that the witness provided at trial.

195. As to the alleged inconsistencies in Witness OO's testimony concerning the chronology of the attacks on Gatwaro and on Home St. Jean, the witness, at trial, acknowledged that he was not sure about the exact chronology: "I think it was on the same day and I think it was on the 18th."³⁴⁷ Given this admission, the fact that he gave a slightly divergent testimony on different occasions does not cast doubt upon his credibility or demonstrate that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in relying upon Witness OO's evidence.

196. As to the alleged discrepancy between Witness OO's pre-trial statement and his testimony in *Musema* about the first time he saw Musema, it was – as the Appellant acknowledges – the Trial Chamber and not the witness who concluded that the date of 15 April 1994 was the date on which the meeting between Gérard Ntakirutimana and Musema took place. In his statement to investigators, the witness did not ascribe any precise date to that meeting. Rather, the meeting is one of the events that the witness linked to other events by words such as "the following day." Considering the context of the witness's statement, the meeting seems to have taken place between the middle and end of April 1994. The Appeals Chamber considers that the witness's statement in *Musema* that he had seen Musema for the first time at the camp at the end of April is therefore not inconsistent with his statement to investigators in this case.

³⁴⁵ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 67.

³⁴⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 180.

³⁴⁷ T. 2 November 2001, p. 41.

197. Gérard Ntakirutimana next challenges the Trial Chamber's acceptance of Witness OO's chronology of events on the morning of 16 April. In particular, he points to Witness OO's statement that Gérard Ntakirutimana arrived at the Kibuye camp between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. on 16 April, which would have made it impossible for him to procure gendarmes, return to Mugonero, and leave for Gishyita at 8:30, which was the Prosecution's theory. Therefore, the Appellant argues, Witness OO changed his testimony at trial to state that Gérard Ntakirutimana arrived earlier, between 6:30 and 7:00.³⁴⁸ The Appellant further argues that even this chronology is still impossible because one could not travel the distance involved and accomplish the tasks alleged in 90 minutes.³⁴⁹ Finally, the Appellant points out that Witnesses GG and SS contradicted Witness OO's chronology, since they claim to have observed the house where Gérard Ntakirutimana was staying that morning, yet did not testify that he left between 5:30 and 6:30 a.m., as alleged by the Prosecution.³⁵⁰

198. The inconsistencies in Witness's OO's estimation of time alleged by the Appellant are not of such magnitude that no reasonable Trial Chamber would have accepted Witness OO's trial testimony as truthful. The Appellant provided no evidence which would suggest that the witness was deliberately untruthful in his trial testimony, so as to accommodate the Prosecution's trial theory. In addition, as already explained above, the Trial Chamber carefully considered the witness's explanation for the disparities in chronology between his pre-trial statement and trial testimony, and found the explanation credible.

(vii) Witness OO's Evidence of Vehicles Carrying Attackers, the Identity, Clothing and Number of Attackers

199. Gérard Ntakirutimana challenges the connection made by the Trial Chamber between Witness OO's testimony that he conveyed gendarmes from Kibuye in the hospital vehicle and two other vehicles and the finding that these gendarmes then took part in the Mugonero attack. The Appellant contends that the Trial Chamber was left in doubt as to whether any of the vehicles Witness OO said he saw in Kibuye were ever at Mugonero. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that no witness at Mugonero observed people matching the detailed description Witness OO gave of the gendarmes at Kibuye; contrary to the Trial Chamber's finding, Witness 25 described them very differently. In addition, the Appellant submits, no witness described as many as 15 or 30 gendarmes (which was Witness OO's figure) arriving at Mugonero.³⁵¹ Gérard Ntakirutimana adds that Witness OO's testimony that the gendarmes returned at 5 p.m. is also contradicted by the Prosecution's own

³⁴⁸ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 68.

³⁴⁹ *Id.*, paras. 68-69 (citing Trial Judgement, paras. 161, 195).

³⁵⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 70 (citing Trial Judgement, para. 224).

³⁵¹ *Id.*, paras. 71-72 (citing Trial Judgement, paras. 224, 292).

theory that the fighting continued beyond 5 p.m.³⁵² Finally, he states that Witness OO's testimony is also contradicted by evidence that there was initial fighting between refugees and attackers.³⁵³

200. The Trial Chamber expressly considered the arguments the Appellant now puts forward with respect to the lack of corroboration of Witness OO's evidence concerning the vehicles carrying the attackers. In the Trial Chamber's view, the fact that the vehicles described by Witness OO were not described by any other witness did not cast doubt upon his credibility. As the Trial Chamber explained,

Witness OO did not claim to know from his own experience what happened to the convoy after its departure [from the Kibuye camp]. He relied rather on indirect evidence, provided by the gendarme Nizeyimana, as to what the gendarmes (or at least some of the gendarmes) did after they left the camp. This does not diminish the reliability of the observations made by this witness in relation to the afternoon of 15 April and the morning of 16 April.³⁵⁴

201. The Trial Chamber limited its inquiry to the events that transpired at the Kibuye camp during that time, and to the specific question whether, at that time, Gérard Ntakirutimana applied efforts to procure gendarmes. The Trial Chamber therefore did not assess the broader factual matrix of what happened to the convoy of gendarmes procured by the Appellant after it left the camp. The Trial Chamber acknowledged that the description of the vehicles that arrived at the Mugonero Complex, given by the witnesses to that event, did not conform to the description of the vehicles leaving the Kibuye camp given by Witness OO.³⁵⁵ The Trial Chamber nevertheless dismissed this inconsistency as irrelevant to Witness OO's credibility on the rationale that the witness did not testify first-hand to the events that took place at the Mugonero Complex, and therefore provided no testimony directly inconsistent with the testimony of the other witnesses.

202. The Appeals Chamber considers the Trial Chamber's logic to be puzzling. Implicit in the Trial Chamber's findings and reasoning is the assumption that the vehicles procured by Gérard Ntakirutimana on the morning of 16 April at Kibuye were the same vehicles that arrived afterwards at Mugonero. This sequence of events creates an expectation that the description of the vehicles arriving at Mugonero would be consistent with the description of the vehicles seen leaving Kibuye. There is no suggestion in the judgement or in the testimony of the witnesses that Gérard Ntakirutimana and the accompanying gendarmes switched the vehicles en route from Kibuye to Mugonero. While such a possibility cannot be excluded, it was incumbent upon the Trial Chamber to make appropriate factual inquiry in order to ascertain the complete sequence of events and to assess fully Witness OO's credibility. On the record as it exists, a reasonable trial chamber could

³⁵² *Id.*, para. 73.

³⁵³ *Id.*

³⁵⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 183.

³⁵⁵ *Id.*, para. 182.

not have reconciled the differences in the testimony of Witness OO and the Mugonero witnesses solely on the basis of the fact that Witness OO did not testify directly about the kind of vehicles that had arrived at Mugonero.

203. The question remains, however, whether a reasonable trier of fact could nevertheless have credited Witness OO's testimony about the events that took place at Kibuye on 15-16 April, despite the doubts whether his description of the vehicles was accurate. In finding that there was insufficient evidence that Gérard Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to the Mugonero Complex, the Trial Chamber cast serious doubt upon the credibility of the testimony given by the witnesses who purported to have seen Gérard Ntakirutimana in the Complex on the morning of 16 April.³⁵⁶ For instance, the Trial Chamber was unconvinced by the testimony of Witness HH, who claimed to have seen the Appellant arrive at the Complex in a white Peugeot pickup.³⁵⁷ The Trial Chamber observed that this description of Gérard Ntakirutimana's vehicle was not consistent with the vehicle description given by any other witness. Similarly, the Trial Chamber expressed doubts about the testimony given by Witness KK, who claimed to have seen the Appellant arrive at the Complex in a hospital vehicle.³⁵⁸ The Trial Chamber also expressed doubt about the evidence given by another witness, Witness PP, who claimed to have seen Gérard Ntakirutimana arrive at the Complex in his father's car.³⁵⁹

204. Given the doubts expressed by the Trial Chamber about the evidence of these three witnesses with respect to their observations of the convoy which arrived at Mugonero on 16 April, a reasonable trial chamber could have decided to credit instead the vehicle description given by Witness OO, whom the Trial Chamber found to be a credible witness.³⁶⁰ As already explained, the Trial Chamber is in a unique position to evaluate the demeanour of the testifying witness, to question the witnesses directly about the gaps or inconsistencies in their testimonies, and to evaluate their credibility on the basis of the witnesses' reaction to the difficult questions put to them by the parties or by the judges. The Trial Chamber's decision to find Witness OO's testimony credible is therefore entitled to substantial deference.

205. Furthermore, even if the Trial Chamber had concluded that Witness OO's description of the vehicles was subject to doubt, that conclusion does not necessarily cast doubt upon the rest of his testimony with respect to the events of 15-16 April, which the Trial Chamber found to be detailed

³⁵⁶ Trial Judgement, paras. 286-292.

³⁵⁷ *Id.*, para. 286.

³⁵⁸ *Id.*, para. 287.

³⁵⁹ *Id.*, para. 288. Three other witnesses whose testimony was considered by the Trial Chamber "did not claim that Gérard Ntakirutimana conveyed the attackers," and the Trial Judgement therefore contains no discussion of the description of the arriving vehicles given by these witnesses. Trial Judgement, para. 289.

³⁶⁰ *Id.*, para. 173.

and consistent.³⁶¹ Finally, even if the testimony of Witness OO were to be disbelieved entirely, and if the Trial Chamber's concomitant finding that Gérard Ntakirutimana procured the gendarmes were to be reversed, that reversal alone would not negate the Trial Chamber's finding that the Appellant had the requisite genocidal intent.³⁶² That finding relied, in addition, on the Trial Chamber's findings that the Appellant participated in the attacks at Mugonero on 16 April and shot at refugees, that he killed Charles Ukobizaba, and that he participated in the attack on Witness SS.³⁶³ The Trial Chamber's acceptance of Witness OO's testimony with respect to whether the Appellant procured gendarmes at Kibuye on 15-16 April, even if erroneous, therefore did not result in a miscarriage of justice and need not be set aside.

206. As to the Appellant's arguments with respect to Witness OO's testimony about the identity and clothing of attackers, the Appeals Chamber finds those contentions to be unfounded. Several other witnesses testified to seeing *Interahamwe* take part in the attack on the Mugonero Complex, and these witnesses did not specify how they were dressed.³⁶⁴ Their testimony, therefore, does not cast doubt upon the evidence given by Witness OO on this point. Furthermore, Witness 25, on whose testimony the Appellant relies, in fact stated that while some people were wearing civilian clothing others wore "branches of trees and leaves," which is consistent with Witness OO's description. The fact that Witness 25 did not specify whether these individuals were *Interahamwe* or someone else does not undermine the credibility of Witness OO's evidence. Witness 25 did not testify that these people were not *Interahamwe* or attackers, stating rather that "there were people of all kinds, dressed in all ways."³⁶⁵ Therefore the Trial Chamber was not unreasonable in concluding that Witness 25's statement corroborated Witness OO's statement on the identity and clothing of attackers. In addition, Witness OO's testimony is corroborated, in part, by that of Witness HH, who testified that attackers were wearing military clothes, khaki-coloured clothes or uniforms.³⁶⁶

207. The Appellant's argument that Witness OO's numerical estimate of individuals leaving Kibuye with Gérard Ntakirutimana is higher than the estimate of attackers given by the Mugonero witnesses also fails. First, it is clear from the evidence given by the Mugonero witnesses that the attackers who arrived at the Mugonero Complex were substantial in number. The testimony of Witness HH is consistent with the estimate given by Witness OO, as Witness HH stated that about 15-20 people arrived at Mugonero in one car,³⁶⁷ and that there were at least 100-120 attackers

³⁶¹ *Id.*, paras. 180, 186.

³⁶² *Id.*, para. 793.

³⁶³ *Id.*, para. 791.

³⁶⁴ See, e.g., Witness FF, T. 28 September 2001, pp. 28, 36; Witness KK, T. 4 October 2001, p. 16; Witness DD, T. 23 October 2001, pp. 83, 84; Witness MM, T. 19 September 2001, pp. 92, 93, 115, 150.

³⁶⁵ T. 15 February 2002, pp. 30, 31.

³⁶⁶ T. 25 September 2001, pp. 126-128.

³⁶⁷ *Id.*, p. 125.

altogether.³⁶⁸ Gérard Ntakirutimana's argument as to the timing of the gendarmes' return also fails, as there was evidence that the attackers left the Complex at various times throughout the day.

208. In any event, for reasons explained above, even if Witness OO's testimony had been inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses on the issues of the attackers' identity, clothing and numbers, that does not necessarily invalidate the remainder of his testimony or lead to a miscarriage of justice.

(viii) Reliability of Witness OO's Hearsay Evidence that the Gendarmes Collected by the Appellant Participated in the Attack on the Mugonero Complex

209. The Appellant next argues that the Trial Chamber lacked any evidence establishing that the gendarmes, *Interahamwe* and ammunition he procured were ever in Mugonero.³⁶⁹ The Appellant avers that only hearsay statements alleged by Witness OO suggest that the gendarmes from Kibuye arrived at Mugonero; the Appellant submits that these statements are not reliable. The Appellant first notes Witness OO's claim that Gérard Ntakirutimana told him of the need to "beat the Tutsis who were in the hospital, the church and even the store."³⁷⁰ It is unlikely and unbelievable, so the Appellant argues, that Gérard Ntakirutimana would have made such a statement to a stranger. The Appellant next points out that Witness OO also testified that gendarme Nizeyimana told him that Gérard Ntakirutimana said that the gendarmes took part in the attack. The Appellant argues that this statement, even if made, is unreliable and undermined by the absence of evidence of the vehicles or the gendarmes being at Mugonero.³⁷¹

210. Contrary to the Appellant's argument, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber was not unreasonable in relying on Witness OO's hearsay evidence. The first item of Witness OO's testimony that the Appellant attacks – Witness OO's report that Gérard Ntakirutimana told him of the need to "beat the Tutsis who were in the hospital, the church and even the store" – is a direct testimony by Witness OO as to the words the Appellant had spoken to him. While the Appellant argues that it was unlikely and unbelievable that he would have made a statement of that kind to a stranger, the Trial Chamber found that Witness OO "had known the Accused for about three or four months prior to seeing him at the gendarmerie camp [, and] had visited the hospital and had received treatment from the Accused."³⁷² A reasonable Trial Chamber therefore could conclude that the Appellant would have disclosed his intentions to a member of the gendarmerie from whom he sought to procure soldiers and ammunition, especially given that it was

³⁶⁸ *Id.*, pp. 134, 135.

³⁶⁹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 72.

³⁷⁰ *Id.*, para. 73.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

a gendarme whom the Appellant knew from prior interactions. There is no evidence that the Appellant intended to keep secret the goal with which he arrived at the Kibuye camp.

211. As to Witness OO's testimony about the information he obtained from gendarme Nizeyimana, that hearsay raises greater concerns of reliability, because the truthfulness of that information depends not only on the credibility of Witness OO and the accuracy of his observation, but also on the credibility and reliability of Nizeyimana. The Trial Chamber found that Nizeyimana "reported to the witness that he and Gérard Ntakirutimana had taken part in an attack against Tutsi persons at the Mugonero Complex."³⁷³ This finding, if correct, could support an inference that the gendarmes procured by the Appellant, as well as the Appellant himself, participated in the attack on the Mugonero Complex and the atrocities carried out there. The Trial Chamber, however, rejected the Prosecution's contention that Gérard Ntakirutimana conveyed the attackers to the Mugonero Complex for insufficiency of evidence.³⁷⁴ Nor did the Trial Chamber rely on Witness OO's hearsay evidence about his conversation with Nizeyimana in its finding that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in attacks on 16 April at the Mugonero Complex and shot at refugees. That finding was based on testimony given by other witnesses. In these circumstances, the hearsay evidence reported by Witness OO, even if incorrect or unreliable, has not contributed to the Appellant's conviction and has not led to a miscarriage of justice. The Appeals Chamber finds therefore that the Trial Chamber's acceptance of the hearsay evidence need not be set aside.

(ix) Alibi Evidence

212. Finally, Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that the Trial Chamber was wrong to conclude that he adduced no evidence that he was at his father's house on 15 April and the early morning of 16 April. The Appellant points out that Witnesses XX and 16, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's wife, and the two Appellants all testified in support of the alibi that the Appellants left Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's house in Mugonero for Gishyita at 6:15 a.m. in Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's vehicle, they left Gishyita between 7:10 and 7:30, arrived back in Mugonero at 8:00, were told by a gendarme to leave shortly thereafter, took five minutes to pack and left for Gishyita for the second time. They picked up others on the road and arrived in Gishyita between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. In the Appellant's submission, the Trial Chamber unreasonably relied on Witness OO instead of these witnesses to conclude that Gérard Ntakirutimana was at the Kibuye camp procuring gendarmes.³⁷⁵ The Appellant asserts that, contrary to the Trial Chamber's finding, there is a simple explanation why Witnesses 9, 16, and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's wife did not see Gérard Ntakirutimana early

³⁷² Trial Judgement, para. 166.

³⁷³ *Id.*, para. 186.

³⁷⁴ *Id.*, para. 292.

on the morning of the April 16: Gérard Ntakirutimana's car was parked outside the compound overnight and left for Gishyita in the early morning hours.³⁷⁶

213. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber, which considered the issue of the alibi at length, did not act unreasonably when rejecting the Appellant's alibi evidence. As the Trial Chamber noted, only the Appellant himself and his father, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, claimed that Gérard Ntakirutimana was at his parents' house on the afternoon of 15 April and the morning of 16 April. The Trial Chamber concluded that neither Defence Witness 16 nor Defence Witness 9, who both were at Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's house on that morning, had seen Gérard Ntakirutimana there, and even the wife of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana did not mention her son when describing her activities at the house early on 16 April.³⁷⁷ Although she did see the hospital vehicle, usually driven by Gérard Ntakirutimana, parked on the road outside the compound of her house, she gave the time for that observation as being around 8 a.m., which is not the relevant time.³⁷⁸ To the extent that the Trial Chamber did not credit parts of the testimonies of the Defence witnesses, it acted within the permissible bounds of its discretion in evaluating the credibility of witnesses testifying before the court. In so doing, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Trial Chamber did not rely upon an absence of corroboration to reject defence evidence as alleged by the Appellant.³⁷⁹

(b) The Shooting of Charles Ukobizaba at Mugonero (Witnesses HH and GG)

(i) Witness HH

a. General Challenge to the Credibility

214. Gérard Ntakirutimana lists seven instances where Witness HH testified to certain facts yet the Trial Chamber did not believe him. The Appellant points out that the Trial Chamber noted inconsistencies between Witness HH's testimony and his earlier statement, found that his explanations were "not entirely satisfactory," yet it still credited his evidence. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the Trial Chamber should have had serious concerns about Witness HH's credibility and should have rejected his entire testimony.³⁸⁰

215. As already explained, it is settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal that a Trial Chamber may find some portions of a witness's testimony credible, and rely upon them in imposing a conviction,

³⁷⁵ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 74-76.

³⁷⁶ *Id.*, para. 77.

³⁷⁷ Trial Judgement, paras. 184, 306.

³⁷⁸ T. 10 April 2002, pp. 40, 52.

³⁷⁹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 29.

³⁸⁰ *Id.*, paras. 81-83 (citing Trial Judgement, paras. 249, 251, 256, 258, 286, 419, 556, 619, 620, 669).

while rejecting other portions of the same witness's testimony as not credible. The Appeals Chamber considers that where the Trial Chamber declined to rely upon the evidence given by Witness HH, it did so because of its concerns about the accuracy of his observations.³⁸¹ In no instance where the Trial Chamber disbelieved Witness HH's testimony did it question his sincerity as a witness. The Trial Chamber considered the impact of the instances where it found Witness HH's evidence faulty on his overall credibility, yet reaffirmed that those instances "do[] not render the rest of his evidence unreliable."³⁸² The Appellant has not demonstrated the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in doing so. The Appellant's general challenge to Witness HH's credibility therefore fails.

b. Witness HH's Connection to Persons Interested in the Appellants' Conviction

216. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that evidence shows that Witness HH was connected to persons and groups interested in the conviction of those charged before the ICTR. He asserts that Witness HH lied under oath and was evasive about his connection to Assiel Kabera, thereby raising serious questions about his credibility.³⁸³

217. The Appeals Chamber considered this argument in Section IV of the present Judgement.³⁸⁴ For reasons given in that section, the Appellant's arguments fail.

c. Inconsistencies Between Pre-trial Statements and Trial Testimony

i. Omissions in Pre-trial Statements

218. Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that Witness HH's testimony included new allegations that were absent from his original statement and/or his "reconfirmation statement." The first point raised by the Appellant is that Witness HH never claimed to have seen Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at Mugonero in the original statement, yet this was a major feature of his trial testimony. This challenge is the same as the challenge brought by Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.³⁸⁵

219. Witness HH testified that he saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at the Mugonero Complex with attackers on the morning of 16 April 1994. In his previous witness statement and reconfirmation statement, however, Witness HH made no mention of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveying attackers

³⁸¹ See Trial Judgement, paras. 258, 292, 421, 556, 619, 620, 669.

³⁸² Trial Judgement, para. 258. To the same effect, see Trial Judgement, para. 373 ("other issues relating to the credibility of Witness HH do not reduce his credibility in the present context").

³⁸³ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 84.

³⁸⁴ "Common Ground of Appeal on the Existence of a Political Campaign Against the Appellants."

to Mugonero on 16 April 1994. During his testimony, the witness was asked about this failure to mention Elizaphan Ntakirutimana in his prior statements. The Trial Chamber reviewed the answers provided by the witness about the content of his statements and, although it found them not entirely satisfactory, the Chamber was of the view that they did not cast doubt on his testimony.³⁸⁶

220. The Appeals Chamber notes that, aside from repeating assertions previously made at trial, the Appellants do not attempt to substantiate their submission that the Trial Chamber erred; nor do they in any way address the treatment of the apparent inconsistencies between the witness's statements and his testimony. In particular it should be noted that the Trial Chamber observed generally that it gave "higher consideration to sworn witness testimony before it than prior statements" and concluded that the witness's previous statements were generally about massacres which occurred at the hospital in Mugonero and not specifically about the Appellants.³⁸⁷ In addition, the Trial Chamber reasoned that although the witness's statements contained less information about the Appellant than his testimony, this did not reduce his overall credibility.³⁸⁸ It also took into consideration that Witness HH's testimony regarding the actions of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was consistent with that of other witnesses.³⁸⁹ Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber's conclusion was not unreasonable.

221. Gérard Ntakirutimana next argues that Witness HH never claimed in either statement to have seen Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at Bisesero, whereas at trial he testified to seeing Elizaphan Ntakirutimana there twice. At trial, the witness was asked why he had not mentioned Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's participation in events at Ku Cyapa and Mubuga. He explained that he had not been asked about these events. The Trial Chamber was satisfied with this answer and found the witness to be credible and consistent under cross-examination.³⁹⁰ The Appellant does not advance any arguments to show that the Trial Chamber acted unreasonably. Consequently, this challenge fails.

222. Gérard Ntakirutimana also submits that Witness HH never claimed in either of his statements that he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana approach or enter the main building at Mugonero at sundown.³⁹¹ The Appeals Chamber notes that the entire discussion of the Mugonero attack in Witness HH's April 1996 statement was confined to a single paragraph, which contained no

³⁸⁵ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 14-15.

³⁸⁶ Trial Judgement, paras. 252-260.

³⁸⁷ *Id.*, para. 260.

³⁸⁸ The witness's statement of 1996 is in narrative form, and does not include any questions. Mention is made of Gérard Ntakirutimana and others taking part in the attack on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana is mentioned only in relation to events at Gitwe Hill.

³⁸⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 257.

³⁹⁰ *Id.*, para. 703.

³⁹¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 85.

coverage of any specific events between Ukobizaba's shooting around noon on 16 April and 2 a.m. on 17 April. Nothing therefore indicates that Witness HH was questioned about specific matters during that time period. The fact of Gérard Ntakirutimana's entering the hospital building may not have been viewed as important at the interview stage, but it assumed importance only as a result of the evidence given by other witnesses.

223. The witness was questioned about omissions at trial, and he explained the absence of any mention in his prior statement of Gérard Ntakirutimana transporting attackers to the Complex in the following terms: "You should not think that three months of events could be recorded on a document of a few pages"; and "if at a certain point in time I spoke about the presence of Gérard without mentioning his vehicle, then it's because I was not asked how he got there."³⁹² Because "during the [pre-trial] interview Witness HH did not exhaustively list all attackers of vehicles conveying assailants," the Trial Chamber concluded that "it does not reduce the credibility of Witness HH that the statement provides less information about [] Gérard Ntakirutimana than his testimony."³⁹³ The Trial Chamber did not find Witness HH's responses sufficient to cast doubt on his testimony, concluding that "the witness's statement was about 'the massacres which took place at the hospital in Mugonero' generally, and not specifically about the two Accused."³⁹⁴ In the Appeal Chamber's view, the Trial Chamber's assessment was reasonable.

224. Moreover, the Trial Chamber noted that the witness had failed to mention in his statement seeing the Appellant enter the main building around nightfall on 16 April, and treated his evidence with caution.³⁹⁵ The Appellant has not shown that the approach of the Trial Chamber was unreasonable.

225. The Appellant next argues that Witness HH did not claim in his statements that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Esdras, yet he testified to that effect at trial.³⁹⁶ In particular, the Appellant notes that, in his statement, Witness HH said that Gérard Ntakirutimana "was among the persons who chased after us to kill us. However, it was difficult to see who killed who." Yet, the Appellant avers, Witness HH was able to testify in detail that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Esdras.

226. As explained in Section II.A.1.(b)(ii)g. of the present Judgement, due to the insufficient notice afforded in the Indictment, the Appellant's conviction cannot be premised on the killing of Esdras. Therefore, even if the Appellant were to succeed in showing that Witness HH's evidence

³⁹² T. 26 September 2001, p. 111.

³⁹³ Trial Judgement, para. 257.

³⁹⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 260.

³⁹⁵ *Id.*, para. 421.

³⁹⁶ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 85.

with respect to the killing of Esdras is not credible, this would have no effect on the verdict. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in finding Witness HH generally credible despite his failure to mention explicitly the killing of Esdras in his pre-trial statements. In this connection, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber noted the explanations provided by Witness HH³⁹⁷ and seems to have considered that the statements were reconcilable with Witness HH's testimony at trial.³⁹⁸

ii. Observation of the shooting of Charles Ukobizaba

227. The Appellant next alleges that Witness HH testified at trial that he saw the killing of Charles Ukobizaba from a window, whereas he said in his pre-trial statement that he saw the killing from small holes in the wall while hiding in the ceiling. The Appellant submits that the Trial Chamber should have rejected Witness HH's evidence on this point due to his implausible explanations for the inconsistencies with his statement.³⁹⁹

228. The Trial Chamber considered the alleged inconsistency and Witness HH's assertion that the inconsistency was caused by a misunderstanding on the part of the investigators.⁴⁰⁰ The Trial Chamber noted that the witness "was cross-examined extensively on this issue" and that he "explained that he hid in the building from around noon on 16 April to 2 a.m. on 17 April, that some of his observations were made through the perforated holes in the ceiling, whereas other observations, including the shooting of Ukobizaba, were made from the ground floor."⁴⁰¹ The Trial Chamber then concluded that "the declaration in the written statement did not reduce the credibility of this part of Witness HH's testimony."⁴⁰² The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable. Having observed the witness in person, the Trial Chamber was entitled to accept his explanations and to credit the witness's testimony. Moreover, as the Trial Chamber noted, Witness HH's testimony that the Appellant shot Charles Ukobizaba was also corroborated by Witness GG's testimony.⁴⁰³

229. The Appellant also submits that Witness HH's testimony as to the moment he went to hide in the ceiling was inconsistent.⁴⁰⁴ In this connection, the Appellant avers that the witness first

³⁹⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 555.

³⁹⁸ *Id.*, para. 559.

³⁹⁹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 88.

⁴⁰⁰ Trial Judgement, para. 370.

⁴⁰¹ *Id.*, para. 370.

⁴⁰² *Id.*

⁴⁰³ *Id.*, paras. 371-373.

⁴⁰⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 89.

testified that he went into the ceiling “between 11:00 and 2:00”⁴⁰⁵ and then, when he realized that the Defence was trying to pin him down to an early entry into the ceiling, he said he did not hide in the ceiling between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m., but rather that he went into the ceiling “at about 4 p.m.”⁴⁰⁶ This, says the Appellant, should have impelled the Trial Chamber to reject Witness HH’s testimony.

230. The Appeals Chamber has considered the transcripts of 26 and 27 September 2001 and it is not convinced that the witness attempted to change his answer to avoid being “pinned down.” Witness HH first testified that he went into the building sometime between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. and that he hid into the ceiling about an hour later.⁴⁰⁷ Witness HH’s cross-examination continued the next day. When asked at what time he went into the ceiling, Witness HH replied: “You are asking me questions on time, but I’ve already told you that I didn’t have a watch. And I think this question was put to me yesterday actually, and I gave you an estimate. I think that I left – that I went into the ceiling between 1100 and 1400 hours.”⁴⁰⁸ Moments later, the witness corrected himself, saying that he went into the building between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m., and that it was only an hour or two later that he went into the ceiling, concluding “[s]o I would say that I went into the ceiling at about 4 p.m.”⁴⁰⁹ This was in conformity with his testimony the previous day. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded that the above shows that Witness HH lacked credibility and that the Trial Chamber should have rejected his testimony.

231. Finally, the Appellant contends that certain elements of Witness HH’s testimony on this subject are simply beyond belief and that, as a result, a reasonable trial chamber would have been compelled to reject his testimony.⁴¹⁰ In this connection, the Appellant submits that Witness HH testified that he did not concentrate on how many shots were fired at Ukobizaba, yet he could situate where all attackers were standing and state whether they had guns and in which direction they fired.

232. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the fact that the witness did not concentrate on the number of shots fired bears little relation to his ability (or inability) to observe the shooters. As the Trial Chamber found, the observational conditions for Witness HH were good,⁴¹¹ and it was therefore reasonable for the Trial Chamber to conclude, given the overall evidence before it, that Witness HH could observe the events well enough to describe them in detail, even if he could not recall the number of shots fired at Ukobizaba.

⁴⁰⁵ T. 27 September 2001, p. 9.

⁴⁰⁶ *Id.*, p. 12.

⁴⁰⁷ T. 26 September 2001, pp. 115-116.

⁴⁰⁸ T. 27 September 2001, p. 9.

⁴⁰⁹ *Id.*, pp. 11-12.

⁴¹⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 89.

⁴¹¹ Trial Judgement, para. 371.

iii. General Challenges

233. The Appellant invokes a number of other alleged contradictions between Witness HH's pre-trial statements and his in-court testimony.⁴¹² The Appellant also claims that the difficulties that Witness HH's statements posed had been drawn to his attention prior to testifying and that his responses were rehearsed.⁴¹³ The Appellant further submits that Witness HH's explanations for the inconsistencies between his statements and his testimony were implausible.⁴¹⁴ In addition, the Appellant argues that other parts of Witness HH's testimony were beyond belief and should have impelled the Trial Chamber to reject his testimony.⁴¹⁵

234. The Appellant presents this list of alleged contradictions and inadequate explanations with the goal of attacking three findings made by the Trial Chamber: first, and mainly, the finding that the Appellant shot at Charles Ukobizaba;⁴¹⁶ second, the finding that the Appellant killed Esdras;⁴¹⁷ and, third, that the Appellant headed a group of attackers at Muyira Hill where he shot Tutsi refugees.⁴¹⁸ As explained in Section II.A.1.b.(ii) of the present Judgement, the last two findings cannot serve as predicates of the Appellant's convictions due to the insufficiency of notice. Therefore, the issue of whether the testimony of Witness HH with respect to those findings is credible is now moot insofar as those two findings are concerned.

235. As to the first finding – that the Appellant killed Charles Ukobizaba – the Appeals Chamber has considered above the inconsistencies alleged by the Appellant that relate directly to Witness HH's observation that the Appellant shot Charles Ukobizaba, and concluded that the Trial Chamber was not unreasonable in believing Witness HH's testimony on that issue. The other alleged inconsistencies, contradictions or exaggerations mentioned by the Appellant do not relate directly to Witness HH's observation of the shooting of Charles Ukobizaba and even if true, would not affect the finding that the Appellant killed Charles Ukobizaba.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 86.

⁴¹³ *Id.*, para. 87.

⁴¹⁴ *Id.*, para. 88.

⁴¹⁵ *Id.*, para. 89.

⁴¹⁶ *Id.*, para. 78.

⁴¹⁷ *Id.*, para. 90.

⁴¹⁸ *Id.*, para. 90.

⁴¹⁹ In fact, the Trial Chamber expressly considered how the Defence's various challenges to the credibility of Witness HH's testimony on other issues – the challenges which largely parallel those brought by the Appellant now – affect the credibility of Witness HH on the issue of the shooting of Charles Ukobizaba. The Trial Chamber noted that these challenges “d[id] not reduce [Witness HH's] credibility in the present context.” Trial Judgement, para. 373.

(ii) Witness GGa. General Attack on Credibility

236. Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that Witness GG was not credible because the Trial Chamber rejected many of his claims, including, notably, that the Appellant shot Ignace Rugwizangoga, that he was at Mubuga School, and that he was a leader at the Muyira Hill attack. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that these claims were not mistakes or memory lapses on the part of the witness; rather, they show that Witness GG lied.⁴²⁰

237. An examination of the findings of the Trial Chamber in relation to the instances mentioned by Gérard Ntakirutimana shows that the Trial Chamber did not reject Witness GG's evidence due to credibility concerns,⁴²¹ but rather found that the evidence presented, whether derived from Witness GG's testimony or from elsewhere, was insufficient to prove a fact beyond reasonable doubt.⁴²² The fact that a witness's testimony may not provide sufficient detail to prove a particular fact beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that the witness's testimony should be discredited.

238. The Appellant next challenges the Trial Chamber's finding that Witness GG could not read and its use of this finding to forgive inconsistencies in Witness GG's testimony. In support of his contention, the Appellant asserts that, in *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, Witness GG confirmed his witness statement and signature and never claimed he could not read; yet, in this case, Witness GG indicated that he had not (and could not) read his statement, that he had not signed it, and that someone had probably forged his signature.⁴²³ The Appellant also submits that Witness GG voluntarily spelled out complicated words for the Trial Chamber, even correcting Defence counsel on the spelling of "Nbarybukeye,"⁴²⁴ yet on cross-examination he denied having spelled names during his testimony. Third, the Appellant points out that all four investigators who were involved in taking GG's statements noted that GG could write Kinyarwanda.⁴²⁵

239. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Appellant presented this challenge in an earlier motion to this Chamber.⁴²⁶ The Appellant contended, as he does in his brief here, that Witness GG had personally spelled names of people and places while testifying before the Trial Chamber,

⁴²⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 94-95.

⁴²¹ In fact, the Trial Chamber reiterated several times that Witness GG was credible (*see* Trial Judgement, paras 238, 373, 535, 634, 682).

⁴²² Trial Judgement, paras. 535 (shooting of Ignace Rugwizangoga), 615 (presence of Gérard Ntakirutimana at Mubuga School), 636 (as to whether Gérard Ntakirutimana was a leader at the Muyira Hill attack).

⁴²³ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 96.

⁴²⁴ *Id.*

⁴²⁵ *Id.*

despite having claimed to be illiterate. In response, the Prosecution submitted that it was in fact the court interpreter, and not the witness, who had spelled out the names.⁴²⁷ In support of this argument, the Prosecution presented a "Certification of audio transcripts by Mathias Ruzindana, Reviser; Language Services Section, 3 September 2003," and an internal Memorandum sent by a Prosecution Appeals Counsel to members of the trial team.⁴²⁸ The Appeals Chamber noted in its Decision of 24 June 2004 that there were "legitimate doubts on the accuracy of the [trial] transcript as to whether it was Witness GG or the interpreter who had spelled names during the Witness' testimony before the Trial Chamber."⁴²⁹ In order to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the transcript, the Appeals Chamber ordered the Registry to review the transcript of Witness GG's testimony and to submit to the Appeals Chamber and the parties a newly certified copy of the accurate transcript.⁴³⁰ The Registry complied with these orders on 8 July 2004. The Appellant has not presented any new submission after the receipt of the material from the Registry.

240. Having examined the transcript, as corrected by the Registry, the Appeals Chamber now concludes that the evidence adduced by the Appellant does not establish that the witness has intentionally misled the Trial Chamber as to his literacy. The witness's credibility is therefore not affected.

241. Gérard Ntakirutimana also asserts that Witness GG's "fabricated" statement regarding his literacy prevented him from testing Witness GG's evidence. In this connection, the Appellant submits first that, when asked to identify a location on a sketch, Witness GG replied that he could not read, and that the Presiding Judge thus suggested not using the sketch.⁴³¹ Second, the Appellant contends that, when questioned about material inconsistencies between a prior statement and his testimony, Witness GG replied that he could not read his statement and that he had not signed it or countersigned each page, yet the next day Witness GG admitted that he had signed the statement.⁴³² The Appellant concludes that the Trial Chamber accepted this "ludicrous" claim rather than finding that Witness GG lied to avoid cross-examination.⁴³³

⁴²⁶ "Defence Motion to Strike Annex B from the Prosecution Response Brief, and for Re-Certification of the Record," filed on 2 March 2004.

⁴²⁷ "Prosecution Response to Defence Motion to Strike Annex B from the Prosecution Response Brief, and for Re-Certification of the Record," filed on 11 March 2004.

⁴²⁸ This procedural history, as well as both supporting documents submitted by the Prosecution, are described in the Appeals Chamber's Decision on Defence Motion to Strike Annex B from the Prosecution Response Brief and for Re-Certification of the Record, rendered on 24 June 2004.

⁴²⁹ Decision on Defence Motion to Strike Annex B from the Prosecution Response Brief and for Re-Certification of the Record, 24 June 2004.

⁴³⁰ See *Ibid.* and Decision on Registrar's Submission Under Rule 33B, 7 July 2004.

⁴³¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 97(i).

⁴³² *Id.*, para. 97(ii).

⁴³³ *Id.*, para. 97. In this connection, the Appellant refers to para. 231 of the Trial Judgement, but it does not seem that this paragraph is relevant to the issue at hand.

242. The Appeals Chamber is not convinced that these instances show that the Appellant was prevented from testing Witness GG's evidence under a false pretext. First, as found above, the Appellant has not established that the witness intentionally misled the Trial Chamber as to his literacy. As to the issue of Witness GG's ability to use sketches, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that this is a collateral matter and that the Appellant could test Witness GG's evidence otherwise.⁴³⁴ As to questions relating to Witness GG's answers on the subject of his prior statements, the Appeals Chamber notes that Witness GG initially denied having signed a statement,⁴³⁵ but he subsequently corrected this and recognized his signature.⁴³⁶ It was thus left to the Trial Chamber to determine how this affected Witness GG's credibility. In the Appeals Chamber's opinion, the Appellant has not shown that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in its treatment of GG's testimony on this subject, despite bald assertions to this effect. Accordingly, this argument fails.

243. Finally, Gérard Ntakirutimana points to alleged inconsistencies between Witness GG's testimony in this case and his testimony in *Kayishema and Ruzindana*.⁴³⁷ The Appellant argues that when he was challenged with these inconsistencies before the Trial Chamber, the witness attempted to explain them by claiming that his testimony in *Kayishema and Ruzindana* was not recorded correctly by the court reporters. The Appellant contends that the Trial Chamber erroneously credited his explanations, because it understood these as errors made by investigators, not by court reporters.⁴³⁸ This shows, the Appellant argues, that the Trial Chamber unreasonably ignored the Defence argument and the contradictions in Witness GG's testimonies.

244. While the Appellant is correct that the Trial Chamber erred in treating the omission in question as one made by an investigator rather than a court reporter, that rationale was not the only reason the Trial Chamber credited Witness GG's testimony. The Trial Chamber stated that it accepted his testimony "[a]fter having observed the witness giving evidence."⁴³⁹ Thus, the Chamber credited Witness GG's testimony not only because of the recording error (about which it was mistaken), but also because it was in a position to observe his demeanour and assess his credibility for itself. The Appeals Chamber is loathe to disturb such credibility assessments on review, and the Appellant has not supplied sufficient reasons to doubt that the Trial Chamber's credibility assessment was in error.

⁴³⁴ See T. 24 September 2001, pp. 127 and foll.

⁴³⁵ T. 24 September 2001, pp. 111-114.

⁴³⁶ T. 25 September 2001, p. 68.

⁴³⁷ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 99.

⁴³⁸ *Id.*, para. 99 (quoting Trial Judgement, para. 634).

⁴³⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 369.

b. Shooting of Charles Ukobizaba

245. The Appellant asserts that Witness GG's testimony regarding the shooting of Charles Ukobizaba was confusing and contradicted by his pre-trial statements.⁴⁴⁰

246. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered these alleged contradictions and concluded that Witness GG's testimony concerning the killing of Ukobizaba appeared credible.⁴⁴¹ The Trial Chamber accepted the witness's explanations for the variations.⁴⁴² The Appellant has not submitted any argument to show that the Trial Chamber acted unreasonably in crediting the witness's explanations, and in accepting as credible the evidence he gave in open court. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber's conclusion that those parts of the witness's testimony were credible is not unreasonable.

247. The Appellant also alleges that Witness GG testified in *Kayishema and Ruzindana* that he first saw a gun on 14 May 1994. However, GG testified in this case that he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana with a gun on 16 April 1994.⁴⁴³ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, if the Trial Chamber was effectively presented with this contradiction, it gave more credence to the testimony of GG in this case. The Appellant has not demonstrated that it was unreasonable of the Trial Chamber to do so.

248. As to the Appellant's arguments that Witness GG was more precise about the times of the attack in his *Kayishema and Ruzindana* testimony than in his testimony in this case, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that this suffices to show that the Trial Chamber should not have relied on Witness GG's testimony. Indeed, it is possible that the witness remembered the events more clearly at the time of his earlier testimony in *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, and he might have been more hesitant to give precise times when testifying four years later.

249. Lastly, the Appellant points to Witness GG's testimony that he went to hide on the first floor of the hospital after the shooting and "found people cutting others up." This, the Appellant argues, is contradicted by Baghel, Witness MM and Witness FF, who said the first floor was locked throughout; no witness testified to violence occurring there.⁴⁴⁴

250. The Appeals Chamber considers that the evidence on which the Appellant seeks to rely does not support his contention. While Witness MM did testify that, in the days prior to the attack, the

⁴⁴⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 101.

⁴⁴¹ Trial Judgement, paras. 369, 373.

⁴⁴² *Id.*, para. 369.

⁴⁴³ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para 101(viii).

⁴⁴⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 101.

Appellant closed the first floor of the hospital to the refugees staying at the Mugonero Complex,⁴⁴⁵ this does not necessarily mean that the floor remained inaccessible the day of the attack. As to the Appellant's reliance on the testimony of Witness FF, the citation of the record he provides does not contain any reference to the closure of the hospital's first floor, and therefore cannot help his argument. Finally, the testimony of Witness Baghel was too qualified and imprecise to support an inference that Witness GG was lying when he testified that he hid on the first floor of the hospital.⁴⁴⁶

c. Attack Sometime in Mid-May at Muyira Hill

251. Gérard Ntakirutimana claims that Witness GG's testimony on this subject was confused, and contradicted and inconsistent with his testimony in *Kayishema and Ruzindana*.⁴⁴⁷

252. As discussed in Section II.A.1.(b)(ii)e., the conviction based on these particular allegations has been set aside due to insufficient notice in the indictment. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber considers that the alleged inconsistencies are not of such magnitude that, even if proven true, they could discredit Witness GG's overall credibility to such an extent that no reasonable Trial Chamber would have relied on parts of his testimony to sustain convictions.

d. Witness GG's Testimony that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Participated in an Attack at Mubuga in mid-May, and that He Ordered the Removal of the Murambi Church Roof

253. The Appellant submits that Witness GG's statements regarding the attack at Mubuga further demonstrate his lack of credibility. In this connection, the Appellant points to a number of apparent inconsistencies, including GG's failure to mention the Appellants' involvement at any time prior to trial, the moment of the event, the identity of the victims, and the assertion that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana killed a certain Habayo.⁴⁴⁸ The Appellant also argues that Witness GG's extensive testimony in *Kayishema and Ruzindana* and his statement to African Rights about the removal of the Murambi church roof contradict many parts of his evidence in this case.⁴⁴⁹ Finally, the Appellant asserts that Witness GG first testified that he did not hear Elizaphan Ntakirutimana give

⁴⁴⁵ T. 19 September 2001, p. 56.

⁴⁴⁶ See T. 18 September 2001, pp. 127-128.

⁴⁴⁷ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 102-106.

⁴⁴⁸ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 107-108.

⁴⁴⁹ *Id.*, paras. 109-110.

reasons for ordering the removal of the church roof but later testified that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana said it was to deny shelter to Tutsis.⁴⁵⁰

254. As the Appellant acknowledges, the Trial Chamber made no finding against him regarding a Bisesero-area event based on this evidence.⁴⁵¹ The Appellant relies on the alleged inconsistencies described above only in support of his general challenge to Witness GG's credibility. As already explained, a Trial Chamber is free to accept a portion of a witness's testimony as credible even if it rejects other portions of his testimony. Therefore, even if the Appellant were to succeed in showing that Witness GG could not be believed with respect to the question of whether Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was present during the killings at Mubuga and transported the attackers, it does not follow that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in relying on Witness GG's evidence with respect to other factual findings underlying Gérard Ntakirutimana convictions. An appellant who wishes a court to draw the inference that a particular witness cannot be credited at all on the grounds that a particular portion of that witness's testimony is wrought with irredeemable inconsistencies has a high evidentiary burden: he or she must explain why the alleged inconsistencies are so fatal to the witness's overall credibility that they permeate his entire testimony and render all of it incredible.

255. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Appellant here fails to meet this high evidentiary burden. He fails to argue any connection between the alleged inconsistencies and the supposed untruthfulness of Witness GG in the rest of his testimony. The contradictions on which the Appellant relies are, in any event, not significant enough to cast doubt on the overall truthfulness of the witness. Witness GG's pre-trial statements were very brief, particularly with respect to the Bisesero events, and therefore may not have reflected all of the witness's observations to which he later testified at trial. As for the alleged inconsistency with Witness GG's evidence in *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, that testimony is ambiguous enough to support an inference that it referred to a different Mubuga event. Even if the event was the same, as the Appellants were not at trial in that case, the witness's failure to mention their presence during his testimony is not, by itself, sufficient to cast doubt upon his testimony in this case that the Appellants were present during the same events. The same reasoning applies to the events in Murambi: while the witness did testify in *Kayishema and Ruzindana* about attacks in Murambi generally, he was not asked about events at the church, and so may not have mentioned the Appellants' presence there. The additional discrepancies alleged by the Appellant are also insufficient to show that they infect the entire testimony of Witness GG so that no reasonable Trial Chamber could credit even a portion of it.

⁴⁵⁰ *Id.*, para. 111.

⁴⁵¹ See Trial Judgement, para. 615 ("In relation to Gérard Ntakirutimana the Chamber notes the paucity of evidence and finds that the Prosecution has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he participated in the same attack at Mubuga Primary School.").

e. Witness GG's Political Motivation

256. The Appellant contends that GG was politically motivated to convict the Appellants and that all factual findings based on his testimony are erroneous and produced a miscarriage of justice. For reasons given in Section IV.B.1. below (Common Ground of Appeal on the Existence of a Political Campaign against the Appellants), the Appeals Chamber rejects the claim that Witness GG's testimony was unreliable and not credible because it was politically motivated.

f. Alleged Inconsistencies Between the Evidence of Witness HH and Witness GG

257. The Appellant contends that, apart from credibility concerns as to Witness HH and GG, their accounts contradict rather than corroborate each other on the killing of Ukobizaba. In particular, the Appellant submits the following: (a) While both witnesses said the shooting occurred in a courtyard, each indicated a different courtyard; (b) HH said that Gérard Ntakirutimana was facing Ukobizaba as though having a conversation, that he was holding a gun close to his victim, and that the two men stood with nobody moving for some time, whereas GG said that Gérard Ntakirutimana called out to Ukobizaba and shot him when he turned, which would suggest some distance between them; (c) HH said that Ukobizaba gave a set of keys to Gérard Ntakirutimana after some conversation, whereas GG said that Gérard Ntakirutimana took the keys after Ukobizaba was shot and fell; and (d) although the Trial Chamber found that both witnesses agreed that the shooting occurred "around noon," Witness GG was inconsistent as to the time of the shooting, while Witness HH was not prepared to commit to a time.⁴⁵²

258. The Trial Chamber concluded that the variations between the accounts given by both witnesses were minor and could not outweigh the "overwhelming and convincing similarities" between the two accounts.⁴⁵³ This conclusion was not unreasonable. On the whole, the two witnesses' testimonies corroborated one another: both testified that the Appellant faced Ukobizaba alone in a courtyard, shot him with a pistol, and took an object from him.⁴⁵⁴ The Appellant correctly notes that there are differences between the witnesses' testimonies, but those differences are more atmospheric than substantive. Witness GG observed the shooting of Ukobizaba as he was trying to find a hiding place in the wake of the attack on Mugonero – as he was, in the Prosecution's formulation, "running for his life."⁴⁵⁵ Witness HH, by contrast, witnessed the shooting through a window from inside a building where he was hiding. Both witnesses were under tremendous stress, and although their recollections of minor details may not have been perfectly precise, their memory

⁴⁵² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 91.

⁴⁵³ Trial Judgement, para. 371.

⁴⁵⁴ *Id.*, paras. 365-371.

⁴⁵⁵ Prosecution Response 62, para. 5.82 (citing T. 20 September 2001, pp.143-146).

of important points was clear, and they corroborated one another on these major points. Having considered these factors, the Trial Chamber not unreasonably concluded that the variations in their accounts did not undermine the core of their testimonies or the credibility of their statements.

g. Allegation that Witness HH and Witness GG Colluded

259. The Appellant asserts that, in their statements, both Witnesses HH and GG declare that Gérard Ntakirutimana went to Ukobizaba's office after shooting him. Yet both witnesses disavowed this at trial, HH claiming that he only assumed it, GG denying that he ever said it. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that these supposed errors raise serious concerns about the integrity of the investigation, suggesting that they were collaborators, albeit inefficient ones.⁴⁵⁶

260. The Appellant has not adduced enough evidence to substantiate an inference that the two witnesses collaborated in the preparation of their trial testimony. The aforementioned inconsistencies between the pre-trial statements and the evidence the witnesses gave in court are not sufficient to establish collusion between the witnesses.

(iii) The Absence of Proof of Death of Ukobizaba and Esdras

261. The Appellant contends that the Trial Chamber unreasonably assumed that Ukobizaba and Esdras were killed. He asserts that the evidence of Witness HH only showed that they were shot and fell; however, many people who were shot survived. Absent proof of death, the Appellant argues, the Trial Chamber should not have assumed it. The Appellant adds that the Trial Chamber's finding that MM testified that Gérard Ntakirutimana mentioned "Ukobizaba" as being among the dead⁴⁵⁷ is simply wrong; MM did not testify to that.⁴⁵⁸

262. The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in drawing the inference that Charles Ukobizaba was killed from the testimonies of the witnesses, such as the testimony of Witness HH and Witness GG that the Appellant shot at Ukobizaba. It was reasonable to infer from the circumstances that Ukobizaba did not survive: he was shot at close proximity; he fell to the ground; and Witness MM testified that Mika and Ruzindana mentioned the name Ukobizaba while "taking an inventory of the cadavers."⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁶ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 92.

⁴⁵⁷ Trial Judgement, n. 542.

⁴⁵⁸ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 93.

⁴⁵⁹ T. 20 September 2001, p. 67.

263. As to the argument that there was insufficient proof of the death of Esdras, the Appeals Chamber has disallowed the conviction relying on that factual finding due to insufficient notice, and therefore the Appellant's present contention is moot.

(c) Attack on Refugees at the Mugonero Complex (Witness SS)

(i) General Challenge to the Credibility of Witness SS

264. Gérard Ntakirutimana incorporates the arguments of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Appeal Brief regarding Witness SS and adds further arguments, notably that Witness SS's awareness of Philip Gourevitch's book *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (1998) influenced his testimony and undermined his impartiality, and that his association with the son of Charles Ukobizaba, who has an obvious interest in securing Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction, casts a further doubt over Witness SS's credibility.⁴⁶⁰

265. These arguments are addressed in IV.B.5. of this Judgement.⁴⁶¹ For reasons given there, the Appellant's general challenge to the credibility of Witness SS fails.

(ii) Witness SS's Mugonero Evidence

266. Gérard Ntakirutimana claims that Witness SS gave two different accounts of meeting Gérard Ntakirutimana as Witness SS was fleeing Mugonero. Witness SS testified that he was running through the forest when he encountered Gérard Ntakirutimana and other attackers, whereas according to his statement he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana and the attackers when he was "trying to get into the bush."⁴⁶² The Appellant notes that Witness SS refused to estimate the distance between himself and his attackers because there were no bushes in the courtroom, even though he was able to estimate distances when investigators recorded his statement.⁴⁶³ The Appellant adds that the testimony of Witness SS is unbelievable and cites further aspects of Witness SS's testimony, including his identification of Gérard Ntakirutimana when firing a shot, his description of the smoking gun, and the general unfolding of the events.⁴⁶⁴ The Appellant contends that the Trial Chamber was clearly troubled by Witness SS's testimony and rejected many of his claims, including his observation of the smoking gun and even the claim that Gérard Ntakirutimana shot at him, yet still found the witness's identification of the Appellant to be reliable. The Appellant

⁴⁶⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 117-120.

⁴⁶¹ "Common Ground of Appeal on the Existence of a Political Campaign Against the Appellants."

⁴⁶² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 121.

⁴⁶³ *Id.*, para. 122.

⁴⁶⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 123.

submits that the Trial Chamber failed to grasp that Witness SS was inventing facts in an effort to convince the Chamber of Gérard Ntakirutimana's guilt.⁴⁶⁵

267. Although, as the Appellant argues, Witness SS used different language in describing his encounter with Gérard Ntakirutimana in the witness statement and at trial, the Appeals Chamber considers that this difference does not give rise to an inference of inconsistency. Describing his flight from the Mugonero Complex in his witness statement, Witness SS stated that he "passed by the girls dormitory trying to get to the bush. There, however, I met another group of attackers,"⁴⁶⁶ among whom he claimed to have seen Gérard Ntakirutimana. At trial the witness stated that he met Gérard Ntakirutimana in the forest.⁴⁶⁷ The difference between these two statements is not significant. Furthermore, when confronted with this discrepancy, the witness credibly explained that when talking about "the bush," he meant a place where there was vegetation, and that when giving his prior statement, he was very close to the forest to which he referred.⁴⁶⁸

268. The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded that the witness's difficulty in estimating distances undermines his credibility. The witness consistently refused to estimate distances in his pre-trial statement as well as at trial, explaining that it was difficult for him to estimate distances indoors when the relevant situation had occurred outside. Other passages of his testimony consistently show that he had difficulty in estimating distances.⁴⁶⁹ The distances were estimated by the investigators or by counsel and members of the Trial Chamber. The witness explained that estimating the relevant distance in his pre-trial statement was easier, as he could show the investigators outside, but still stressed that he himself had not estimated the distance, but rather that the investigators had done so.

269. The Trial Chamber was not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Gérard Ntakirutimana shot at Witness SS, because Witness SS did not actually see Gérard Ntakirutimana aim or fire at him and, under the circumstances, it was not very likely that the witness could have seen the smoke come out of the Appellant's gun. In the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, this conclusion does not necessarily imply that the witness was untruthful. Although the witness mentioned the detail of the gun smoke for the first time only at trial and, in the Trial Chamber's considered assessment, was mistaken about having seen the gun fired, the witness's error with respect to this important detail does not suffice to impugn his testimony as a whole. The Trial Chamber, as the assessor of the witness's demeanour, was best placed to ascertain where the witness was embellishing his testimony and to separate these parts from the core of the witness's evidence.

⁴⁶⁵ *Id.*, para. 124.

⁴⁶⁶ Witness statement of 18 December 2001, p. 4.

⁴⁶⁷ T. 31 October 2001, pp. 59 *et seq.*

⁴⁶⁸ *Id.*, pp. 60, 61.

⁴⁶⁹ *See, e.g.*, T. 30 October 2001, pp. 99, 110, 111, 115-117, 124, 135; T. 31 October 2001, pp. 81, 105, 106, 108.

270. The Trial Chamber repeatedly stated that SS was a credible witness,⁴⁷⁰ even though it was not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence presented showed that Gérard Ntakirutimana shot at him.⁴⁷¹ Witness SS said that he had recognized Gérard Ntakirutimana, among others, even if he had just given a quick look to the group of attackers. This statement appears credible, as he had known Gérard Ntakirutimana by sight for several years. Furthermore, the witness explained that, as stated in his witness statement, he believed that the attackers were carrying guns in addition to traditional weapons because he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana carry a gun. An examination of his witness statement discloses that Witness SS first spoke to what kinds of weapons the attackers were carrying before turning to speak more directly about the weapon that Gérard Ntakirutimana was allegedly carrying. As a result, the Trial Chamber could reasonably rely on Witness SS's recognition of Gérard Ntakirutimana as member of the group of attackers even if it rejected Witness SS's submission that Gérard Ntakirutimana shot at him in the forest.

(iii) Witness SS's Sighting of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at Mugonero

271. Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that Witness SS recounted seeing Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at Mugonero three times before the attack, including seeing him receive a letter from refugees seeking protection. However, the Trial Chamber found, and according to Gérard Ntakirutimana the Prosecution accepted, that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was not at Mugonero at that time, but rather was delivering the letter to the *bourgmestre*. The Appellant submits that the Trial Chamber erred when it determined that Witness SS was credible yet failed to explain its reasons for disregarding Witness SS's incorrect testimony on this point when determining that he was generally credible.⁴⁷²

272. In the Appeals Chamber's view, even if Witness SS testified that he saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana on 16 April 1994, before the beginning of the attacks at the Mugonero Complex, this does not necessarily undermine his credibility. Acknowledging once again the deference that is ordinarily accorded to credibility findings of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber in this instance is not convinced that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in crediting Witness SS's testimony on this point.

(iv) Witness SS's Evidence Regarding Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at a Murambi Attack Between May and June 1994

273. Gérard Ntakirutimana asserts that Witness SS's testimony regarding an attack at Murambi is not credible. Gérard Ntakirutimana recalls that Witness SS testified that he encountered Elizaphan

⁴⁷⁰ Trial Judgement, para. 577 (citing paras. 277-285, 388-393, 577-579, 623-628, 658-661, 685-686).

⁴⁷¹ *Id.*, para. 392.

⁴⁷² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 125.

Ntakirutimana in a vehicle filled with attackers at Murambi and that he did not notice it until the vehicle was very close. Witness SS gave two explanations of why he did not hear the vehicle approach until it was very close: that he was "out of his head" because he was on his way to commit suicide, and that he was walking on banana leaves that drowned out the noise. According to Gérard Ntakirutimana, the Trial Chamber unreasonably accepted the explanations of Witness SS.⁴⁷³

274. Gérard Ntakirutimana also takes issue with Witness SS's claim that "later on" he was hiding and heard attackers say that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had told them that God ordered that the Tutsi be killed. Gérard Ntakirutimana submits that it is highly unlikely that attackers would have explained to each other why they had engaged in a chase that was already over. While the Trial Chamber rejected this as hearsay, the Appellant argues that it should have gone further and recognized this as evidence of Witness SS's bias and willingness to lie.⁴⁷⁴

275. In his testimony, Witness SS described in detail his sighting of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at the Murambi attack. His testimony was consistent with his witness statement. He explained that he saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana driving his car carrying attackers when he crossed a road. He could recognize Elizaphan Ntakirutimana because he knew him since long before the attack, because it was daytime, and because he was a short distance away. Witness SS explained that shortly after he started running away from the attackers, he turned around to see what was happening behind him and could see Elizaphan Ntakirutimana standing right next to his car and watching the attackers chasing him.⁴⁷⁵ The witness explained that he had not heard the vehicle approaching because he was walking on dry banana leaves in a plantation, which made a loud noise, and because he was about to commit suicide and therefore had "kind of lost [his] head."⁴⁷⁶ The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in accepting Witness SS's testimony on this.

276. As to Witness SS's assertion that he heard attackers say that Pastor Ntakirutimana had said that God had ordered that the Tutsi should be killed and exterminated,⁴⁷⁷ the Trial Chamber did not rely on this account because Witness SS had not personally heard Elizaphan Ntakirutimana make such a remark.⁴⁷⁸ Therefore, this part of Witness SS's testimony formed no basis for the Trial Chamber's verdict. Moreover, even if Witness SS was untruthful in this part of his testimony, the Trial Chamber could still have found him credible with respect to other parts, on which it did rely in reaching its verdict. The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in its treatment of this part of Witness SS's evidence. The arguments raised by

⁴⁷³ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 126-127.

⁴⁷⁴ *Id.*, para. 127.

⁴⁷⁵ T. 31 October 2001, p. 120.

⁴⁷⁶ T. 31 October 2001, pp. 121, 123.

⁴⁷⁷ T. 30 October 2001, pp. 131.

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana in relation to Witness SS's evidence have been addressed in Section III.C. of the present Judgement.

(v) Witness SS's Evidence of Gérard Ntakirutimana's Presence at a Mubuga School Incident

277. The Appellant alleges that Witness SS claimed for the first time in his testimony that he personally saw Gérard Ntakirutimana kill Tutsi at Mubuga Primary School, whereas his pre-trial statement merely alleged that he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana shooting at people hiding in the school. Gérard Ntakirutimana asserts that Witness SS invented a tale of Gérard Ntakirutimana's going to the door and shooting inside the school. He submits that the Trial Chamber properly ignored this part of Witness SS's testimony but adds that the Trial Chamber should have used this to question Witness SS's credibility. Gérard Ntakirutimana also contends that Witness SS was coached on how to respond to allegations of inconsistencies with his pre-trial statement.⁴⁷⁹

278. In his witness statement and his testimony, Witness SS described that he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana shoot at refugees in and outside of the school. At trial, Witness SS also stated that Gérard Ntakirutimana had in fact killed people and that he later saw dead bodies in and outside of the school. The Appeals Chamber is not convinced that there is a contradiction between Witness SS's pre-trial statement and his testimony. The Appeals Chamber notes that Witness SS's pre-trial statement was very short. Even if, in his statement, Witness SS did not say expressly that the actions of Gérard Ntakirutimana had resulted in the death of people, this could reasonably be inferred in the circumstances. This alleged discrepancy between Witness SS's trial testimony and his prior statement is therefore not sufficient to show that Witness SS had a "demonstrated willingness to lie and embellish,"⁴⁸⁰ and that the Trial Chamber could not reasonably rely on Witness SS's testimony.

(d) Attacks on Refugees at the Mugonero Complex (Witnesses YY, GG, HH, SS)

(i) Witness YY: General Credibility Challenge

279. The Appellant asserts that the Trial Chamber should not have accepted any part of Witness YY's evidence because he evidently invented at trial that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Kagemana and Macantaraga. The Appellant argues that the evidence clearly showed that Kagemana was killed later by unknown persons, and the Trial Chamber itself concluded that Witness YY had not provided sufficient information to warrant a conclusion that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed

⁴⁷⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 578.

⁴⁷⁹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 128-131.

Macantaraga. The Appellant contends that even the Trial Chamber was “not entirely satisfied” with Witness YY’s explanations of inconsistencies between his statement and his testimony, finding them to be “somewhat remarkable.”⁴⁸¹

280. As already explained, the settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal permits a Trial Chamber to accept a witness’s testimony on one issue while rejecting it with respect to another. The Trial Chamber’s decision not to accept Witness YY’s evidence that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Kagemana or Macantaraga⁴⁸² does not necessarily mean that the witness’s evidence could not be accepted on other factual matters. The Trial Chamber concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Kagemana and Macantaraga. The Trial Chamber’s decision not to accept Witness YY’s evidence on this point, however, does not cast doubt upon the credibility of the witness’s overall testimony.

(ii) Witness YY: Credibility Challenge with Respect to the Events in Murambi Church and the Killing of Nzamwita’s Wife at Muyira Hill

281. The Appellant submits that Witness YY’s credibility was damaged by his allegation, made for the first time at trial, that Gérard Ntakirutimana was involved in removing the roof from the Murambi Church and that both Appellants were involved in killings at Murambi Church. The Appellant argues that the Trial Chamber should have concluded, because these allegations had not been made in the witness’s pre-trial statement, that Witness YY was not a trustworthy witness.⁴⁸³ The Appellant adds that this supported by other examples of what he believes was inconsistent or evasive testimony.⁴⁸⁴ The Appellant also submits that other witnesses contradicted Witness YY’s evidence, which further undermines his testimony and his credibility.⁴⁸⁵ Finally, the Appellant avers that Witness YY’s testimony that Gérard Ntakirutimana shot Nzamwita’s wife at Muyira Hill was not plausible.⁴⁸⁶

282. The inconsistencies alleged by the Appellant relate to two issues considered in the Trial Judgement: (a) the attack at Murambi Church and (b) the killing of Nzamwita’s wife in the course of an attack at Muyira Hill. With respect to the first issue, the Appeals Chamber, in Section III.C.4.(a) of this Judgement, analyses an analogous argument of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana to the credibility of Witness YY. The Appeals Chamber concludes that Witness YY’s account of the

⁴⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁴⁸¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 134-137 (quoting Trial Judgement, paras. 274, 357).

⁴⁸² Trial Judgement, para. 404.

⁴⁸³ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 138.

⁴⁸⁴ *Id.*, para. 139.

⁴⁸⁵ *Id.*, para. 140.

⁴⁸⁶ *Id.*, para. 141.

shooting that took place at the Murambi Church was not credible and that no reasonable Trial Chamber would have accepted his testimony on that point. With respect to the second issue, the Appeals Chamber concluded, in Section II.A.1(b)(ii)f. of the Judgement, that the Appellant lacked sufficient notice about the allegation that he shot and killed Nzamwita's wife, and that the Trial Chamber erred in basing his conviction on that finding. Thus, the inconsistencies now alleged by the Appellant, even if true, would only further support the Appeals Chamber's conclusion in Section III.C.4.(a) and would have no effect with respect to the Trial Chamber's conviction invalidated by the Appeals Chamber in Section II.A.1.(b)(ii)f. To be relevant to the remaining findings in the Trial Judgement that are based on the testimony of Witness YY, the Appellant must show how the inconsistencies alleged above cast the overall credibility of the witness into such doubt that no reasonable Trial Chamber would have accepted his testimony on any other matter. The Appellant fails to make that high showing. Moreover, with the exception of the disallowed conviction for the attack on Muyira Hill, any other conviction-relevant factual finding where the Trial Chamber relied on the testimony given by Witness YY was corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses.⁴⁸⁷ Therefore, even if the testimony of Witness YY were altogether excluded as not credible, the Trial Chamber's factual findings would be unaffected.

(iii) Contradictory Evidence as to the Sightings of Gérard Ntakirutimana at Mugonero

283. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that, even if credible, the evidence of Witnesses GG, HH, SS, KK, PP and YY is so confused and contradictory regarding Gérard Ntakirutimana's presence at Mugonero that it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was there.⁴⁸⁸

284. The alleged contradictions at paragraphs 144 and 145 of the Appellant's Brief relate to the arrival of vehicles carrying attackers at Mugonero on 16 April 1994 and to whether Gérard Ntakirutimana accompanied these vehicles. In this connection, the Trial Chamber has concluded that the evidence on these issues "d[id] not provide a sufficiently detailed or coherent picture to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Gérard Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to the Complex on the morning of 16 April 1994."⁴⁸⁹ The contradictions which the Appellant adduces here have no bearing on the Trial Chamber's conclusion that the Appellant was present during and participated in the attack on refugees at Mugonero.

⁴⁸⁷ See Trial Judgement, paras. 365-373 (relying on the evidence of Witnesses HH and GG that the Appellant shot Charles Ukobizaba, and therefore was present during the attack on the Mugonero Complex); paras. 388-393 (finding, on the basis of the testimony of Witness SS, that the Appellant shot at him on the day in question in the vicinity of the Mugonero Complex, a finding further supporting a conclusion that the Appellant was present in the complex on that day); paras. 702-704 (relying on the testimony of Witness HH to find that the Appellant participated in attacks in unspecified locations in Biseseero).

⁴⁸⁸ *Id.*, paras. 143-147.

⁴⁸⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 292.

285. The Appellant also contends that the evidence was contradictory on the question of where Gérard Ntakirutimana might have been at the start of the attack on the Complex.⁴⁹⁰ However, the Trial Chamber made no finding on this issue⁴⁹¹ and the Appeals Chamber considers that, even if the evidence were found inconclusive, this would not affect the finding that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Ukobizaba around midday. Accordingly, this argument fails.

286. The Appellant also notes that Witnesses GG and HH testified that, around midday, Gérard Ntakirutimana was in the hospital courtyard shooting Ukobizaba; however, this seems to contradict the evidence of Witnesses YY and SS who both placed the Appellant elsewhere around that time.⁴⁹² The Appeals Chamber finds that the evidence presented by the witnesses in question is not so conflicting regarding Gérard Ntakirutimana's presence that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was at Mugonero. The fact that several witnesses were in the same general area does not necessarily mean that their observations about the identity and the location of those present have to be identical for the witnesses to be considered credible. The differences in their respective statements can be explained by the place from where these witnesses made their observations, as well as by the fact that the witnesses did not give exact times for their observations. The Appeals Chamber has already rejected the Appellant's argument that the evidence given by Witnesses HH and GG was so contradictory as to make unreasonable the Trial Chamber's finding that he shot Charles Ukobizaba in the Mugonero hospital courtyard on 16 April 1994. This is also sufficient to support a conclusion that the Appellant was present during the attack on the Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994. The Trial Chamber acted reasonably in concluding that "[t]he fact that the Accused was observed in other locations by Witness YY . . . and [Witness] SS . . . does not exclude his presence during the shooting of Ukobizaba."⁴⁹³ The distances within the Complex made it possible for Gérard Ntakirutimana to move from one location to another within a short time.

287. Finally, the Appellant contends that, despite the obvious contradictions between the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses, the Trial Chamber unreasonably disbelieved the evidence of Defence Witness 25 which corroborated the Appellant's alibi.⁴⁹⁴ Witness 25 testified that he saw the Appellants in Gishyita around 1.00-1.30 p.m. from about 80-100 metres, but that he did not approach them because he had been drinking, and he did not want the Pastor to know that since drinking is prohibited for Adventists. The Trial Chamber explained that it was not convinced by this

⁴⁹⁰ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 146-147.

⁴⁹¹ In relation to the events of 16 April 1994 at Mugonero, the Trial Chamber found that i) Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Ukobizaba around midday (para. 384); ii) Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in the attack on that day (paras. 393 and 404).

⁴⁹² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 146.

⁴⁹³ Trial Judgement, para. 384.

testimony.⁴⁹⁵ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Appellant has not demonstrated that this was unreasonable.

2. Bisesero Indictment

(a) The Bisesero Findings Based Solely on Testimony of Witness FF

288. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that no reasonable tribunal could have found Witness FF credible. The Trial Chamber relied upon Witness FF's testimony alone to find that the Appellant (1) pursued and attacked Tutsi with *Interahamwe* at Murambi Hill on or about 18 April 1994; (2) was with attackers and shot at refugees at Gitwe Hill in late April or May; (3) transported attackers and chased and shot Tutsi at Kidashya Hill between April and June 1994; and (4) was with *Interahamwe* and shot at refugees in a forest by a church at Mutiti Hill in June 1994.⁴⁹⁶ The Trial Chamber did not rely on Witness FF's testimony with respect to any other factual findings related to the Bisesero Indictment.

289. For reasons explained in Section II.A.1.(b)(ii) of the present Judgement, the Appeals Chamber has quashed the convictions of Gérard Ntakirutimana based on the four findings listed above due to the insufficiency of notice. This conclusion makes the Appellant's challenge to Witness FF's credibility, insofar as it seeks to invalidate the Trial Chamber's findings with respect to the Bisesero Indictment, moot.

290. The Trial Chamber also discussed the evidence given by Witness FF with respect to some events charged in the Mugonero indictment. The Trial Chamber relied on the testimony of Witness FF in three instances. First, the Trial Chamber used the witness's evidence in finding that Gérard Ntakirutimana said, in the week prior to the attack on the Mugonero Complex, that the Hutu patients should leave the hospital.⁴⁹⁷ Second, the Trial Chamber used the evidence provided by Witness FF to find that, prior to the attack, the Appellant "simply abandoned the Tutsi patients."⁴⁹⁸ The Trial Chamber then observed, "as part of the general context," that "[t]his behaviour [wa]s not in conformity with the general picture painted by the Defence of the Accused as a medical doctor who cared for his patients."⁴⁹⁹ Third, the Trial Chamber relied on Witness FF's testimony that she "saw 'soldiers' on board vehicles and *Interahamwe* on foot arrive at the [Mugonero] Complex at

⁴⁹⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 148.

⁴⁹⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 382.

⁴⁹⁶ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 151.

⁴⁹⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 134.

⁴⁹⁸ *Id.*, para. 153.

⁴⁹⁹ *Id.*, para. 324.

9.00 a.m.” on 16 April, and commenced killings, “progress[ing] from the open areas to the ESI Chapel, and thence to the hospital.”⁵⁰⁰

291. The first two findings based on the evidence given by Witness FF – that the Appellant told the Hutu patients to leave the hospital and that he abandoned his Tutsi patients – were not used by the Trial Chamber, either on their own or as elements of a broader context, to support any of the convictions it imposed, nor to determine the appropriate sentence for Gérard Ntakirutimana after the conviction. With respect to the last observation given by Witness FF – that attackers arrived at the Mugonero Complex on the morning of 16 April and proceeded to kill the refugees congregating there – the Trial Chamber did not use that observation to make any particular finding. Moreover, the evidence as to the beginning of the attack was also given by other Prosecution witnesses, such as Witnesses GG, HH, YY, SS, MM and PP,⁵⁰¹ as well as by a number of Defence witnesses, such as Witnesses 8, 5, 7, 6, 32 and 9.⁵⁰² Any conclusion the Trial Chamber had drawn from these testimonies would have remained the same even if it had disbelieved Witness FF. The credibility of Witness FF is also immaterial with respect to the convictions or the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber under the Mugonero Indictment. There is consequently no need to address the Appellant’s challenge to Witness FF’s credibility.

(b) The Bisesero Findings Based Solely on Testimony of Witness HH

292. Witness HH provided uncorroborated evidence of two Bisesero incidents: (1) that around the end of April or the beginning of May, Gérard Ntakirutimana shot and killed Esdras during an attack at Gitwe Primary School; and (2) that Gérard Ntakirutimana headed a group of attackers at Muyira Hill where he shot at Tutsi refugees in June 1994. The Appeals Chamber has already determined that, for lack of sufficient notice, Gérard Ntakirutimana could not be convicted on the basis of the killing of Esdras or the attack at Muyira Hill in June 1994.⁵⁰³ Therefore, the only remaining finding is that Gérard Ntakirutimana took part in the attack near Gitwe Primary School at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994. For the reasons set out in Section II.B.1.(b) of this Judgement, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber could reasonably rely on the evidence provided by Witness HH to find Gérard Ntakirutimana guilty of genocide under the Bisesero Indictment.

⁵⁰⁰ *Id.*, para. 324.

⁵⁰¹ *Id.*, paras. 322-325.

⁵⁰² *Id.*, paras. 326-331.

⁵⁰³ *See supra* section II.A.1.(b)(ii)

(c) The Bisesero Findings Based Solely on Testimony of Witness YY

293. Gérard Ntakirutimana claims the Trial Chamber unreasonably relied on Witness YY's evidence to find that he had participated in an attack at Muyira Hill and shot and killed the wife of Nzamwita on 13 May 1994. Gérard Ntakirutimana refers to his challenges to Witness YY's credibility in the discussion of the Mugonero events.⁵⁰⁴ For reasons given in Sections II.A.1.(b)(ii) and II.B.1.(d) of this Judgement, the Appellant's challenge to this finding of the Trial Chamber is now moot.

(d) The Bisesero Findings Based Solely on Testimony of Witness GG

294. Gérard Ntakirutimana claims the Trial Chamber unreasonably relied on Witness GG's evidence to find that he took part in an attack on Tutsi refugees at Muyira Hill in mid-May 1994.⁵⁰⁵ For the reasons set out in Section II.A.1.(b)(ii) of this Judgement, the Appellant's challenge to this finding of the Trial Chamber is now moot.

(e) The Bisesero Findings Based Solely on Testimony of Witness SS

295. Gérard Ntakirutimana claims the Trial Chamber unreasonably relied on Witness SS to find that he participated in an attack at Mubuga Primary School and shot at Tutsi refugees sometime in June 1994. This finding was based solely on Witness SS's testimony. Gérard Ntakirutimana refers to his challenges to Witness SS's credibility in the discussion of the Mugonero events.⁵⁰⁶ For the reasons set out in Section II.B.1.(c) of this Judgement, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber could reasonably rely on the evidence provided by Witness SS to find Gérard Ntakirutimana guilty of genocide under the Bisesero Indictment.

(f) Attending Planning Meetings (Witness UU)

296. Gérard Ntakirutimana also argues that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on the evidence given by Witness UU to find that he attended meetings in Kibuye during which the attacks against the Tutsis were planned.⁵⁰⁷ In support, the Appellant asserts a number of challenges to Witness

⁵⁰⁴ *Id.*, para. 164.

⁵⁰⁵ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 165.

⁵⁰⁶ *Id.*, para. 166.

⁵⁰⁷ The Prosecution objects to the inclusion of this material in the re-filed Appeal Brief because it was not included in Gérard Ntakirutimana's original Appeal Brief, and argues that this action contravened the Order of 21 July 2003 issued by the Pre-Appeal Judge, which required Gérard Ntakirutimana to file a new brief, conforming with the 16 September 2002 Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs and Motions on Appeal. That order, the Prosecution notes, did not authorize the Appellant to include a new substantive section. The Appellant acknowledges that the newly included section contained material not present in his original brief, and does not claim that the order permitted him to do so. The Appellant, however, argues that the Prosecution suffered no prejudice because it was able to respond to the issues raised, and in fact did so. While the Appellant's action is in contravention of the Order of 21 July 2003, and the

UU's credibility.⁵⁰⁸ As Gérard Ntakirutimana acknowledges, however, the Trial Chamber has not relied directly on this finding to support any of the convictions.⁵⁰⁹ While the Appellant summarily asserts that this finding "affected the outcome of the case,"⁵¹⁰ he fails to present any argument as to how this finding has influenced the verdict and what impact, if any, the setting-aside of this finding would have on the Trial Chamber's verdict. Where the Appellant "fails to make submissions as to how the alleged error led to a miscarriage of justice," the Appeals Chamber need not consider the Appellant's arguments.⁵¹¹ Accordingly, because the Appellant has presented no argument as to how the reversal of the Trial Chamber's finding that he had attended planning meetings in Kibuye will impact upon the Trial Chamber's verdict, the Appeals Chamber will not consider his arguments.⁵¹²

Appellant is reprimanded for non-compliance, the Appeals Chamber nevertheless agrees that the Prosecution suffered no prejudice and therefore will not disregard the Appellant's arguments on the grounds of non-compliance.

⁵⁰⁸ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 167.

⁵⁰⁹ *Id.*

⁵¹⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹¹ *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 20.

⁵¹² Many of the Appellant's challenges to the credibility of Witness UU were, in any event, considered at length by the Trial Chamber. See Trial Judgement, paras. 707-708, 715-716. The Trial Chamber concluded that the witness was credible, and that decision remains reasonable even in light of the Defence's submissions on Appeal.

III. APPEAL OF ELIZAPHAN NTAKIRUTIMANA

297. The Appeals Chamber now considers the issues raised on appeal by Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.

298. In his Appeal Brief, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends generally that the Trial Chamber committed a number of recurring legal and factual errors in relation to the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments which violated his right to a fair trial, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice and invalidating the Trial Judgement. The Appeals Chamber notes that the submissions of the Appellant are at times unclear, with alleged legal errors being in reality complaints about the Trial Chamber's factual findings. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber has endeavoured to consider all of the submissions presented by the Appellant.

A. The Mugonero Indictment

299. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana challenges the findings of the Trial Chamber made in paragraphs 281 to 283 of the Trial Judgement, and submits that the Trial Chamber erred in its finding that he "conveyed attackers to the Mugonero complex on the morning of 16 April 1994".⁵¹³

300. As the Appeals Chamber found above in relation to the appeal of Gérard Ntakirutimana on the question of the sufficiency of notice, the allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to the Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994 was a material fact which the Prosecution failed to plead in the Indictment. In addition, as the Prosecution did not cure the resulting defect in the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber found the Trial Chamber to have erred in concluding that a conviction could be based on these un-pleaded facts.⁵¹⁴

301. In light of these findings, it is not necessary for the Appeals Chamber to consider the merits of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's submissions on the Trial Chamber's assessment of the evidence of Prosecution Witnesses MM, FF, PP, QQ and UU for the Mugonero Indictment. Even were the Appellant's arguments meritorious, they would have no impact on the findings against him in the Mugonero Indictment. However, the submissions of the Appellant against the Trial Chamber's fact finding process for the Mugonero Indictment are considered, where relevant, in the context of the Appellant's challenges for the Bisesero findings and to the extent that they concern Gérard Ntakirutimana's appeal against his convictions for events in Mugonero and Bisesero.

⁵¹³ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 4-28.

⁵¹⁴ Section II.A.1.(b)(i)(c) of the Judgement.

B. Insufficiency of Evidence to Establish That Tutsi Refugees at Mugonero Complex Were Targeted Solely on the Basis of their Ethnicity

302. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that the Trial Chamber erred in fact and law in finding that Tutsi refugees who were attacked at the Mugonero Complex on 16 April 2004 “were targeted solely on the basis of their ethnic group.”⁵¹⁵ Although the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that a conviction could be based on the unpleaded fact that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to the Mugonero Complex, the Appeals Chamber shall nevertheless consider this ground of appeal as the issues raised also concern Gérard Ntakirutimana.

303. The Appellant argues that “[a] finding that the overwhelming majority of the refugees killed and wounded at Mugonero were Tutsis cannot support a finding that Tutsi refugees were targeted solely on the basis of their ethnic group.”⁵¹⁶ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the finding that the Tutsi seeking refuge at Mugonero were targeted on the basis of their ethnicity has not been shown to be unreasonable. The evidence included testimonies of Witnesses MM, HH, YY, and several others indicating that most of the refugees assembled at the Mugonero Complex were of Tutsi ethnicity.⁵¹⁷ The Trial Chamber was entitled to find from the evidence that these refugees were targeted on grounds of their ethnicity.⁵¹⁸

304. The Appeals Chamber need not consider whether the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the refugees were targeted “solely” for their Tutsi ethnicity because the definition of the crime of genocide does not contain such a requirement.⁵¹⁹ It is immaterial, as a matter of law, whether the refugees were targeted solely on the basis of their ethnicity or whether they were targeted for their ethnicity in addition to other reasons.

305. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

C. Bisesero Indictment

306. In relation to the Bisesero Indictment, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that the Trial Chamber erred in its findings that he was present or that he committed acts on six separate occasions in Bisesero during April through June 1994. The Appellant notes that five of the six

⁵¹⁵ *Id.*, pp. 32-34 (referring to Trial Judgement, para. 340).

⁵¹⁶ *Id.*, p. 33.

⁵¹⁷ See Trial Judgement, paras. 338-339.

⁵¹⁸ See *id.*, paras. 334-340.

⁵¹⁹ See *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, paras. 48-53.

findings are based on the uncorroborated testimony of single witnesses.⁵²⁰ The Appeals Chamber will review the submissions of the Appellant on an event by event basis.

307. As discussed above in the assessment of Gérard Ntakirutimana's submissions on sufficiency of notice, the Appeals Chamber has found that the Trial Chamber erred in convicting Elizaphan Ntakirutimana for (i) his alleged participation in a convoy of vehicles carrying armed attackers to Kabatwa Hill at the end of May 1994, and his pointing out to attackers of the whereabouts of refugees on Kabatwa and Gitwa Hills, and (ii) his alleged participation in events at Mubuga primary school in the middle of May 1994.⁵²¹

308. It remains for the Appeals Chamber to consider the Appellant's submissions on four events for which he was convicted, namely for his participation in events at (i) Nyarutovu cellule and Gitwa Hill, in the middle and second half of May 1994; (ii) Murambi Hill, in May or June 1994; (iii) Muyira Hill - Ku Cyapa, in May or June 1994; and (iv) Murambi Church, in the end of April 1994.

1. Nyarutovu Cellule and Gitwa Hill (Witness CC)

309. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana argues that the Trial Chamber erred by relying on the uncorroborated evidence of Witness CC to find that he participated in events at Nyarutovu cellule and Gitwa Hill in the middle and second half of May 1994.⁵²²

310. In respect of Nyarutovu, the Trial Chamber found:

...that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana brought armed attackers in the rear hold of his vehicle to Nyarutovu Hill one day in the middle of May 1994, and that the group was searching for Tutsi refugees and chasing them. Furthermore, the Chamber finds that, at this occasion, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana pointed out the fleeing refugees to the attackers who then chased these refugees singing "Exterminate them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and get it over with, in all the forests".⁵²³

311. Regarding Gitwa Hill, the Trial Chamber was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that:

... Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was present among armed attackers at the occasion of an attack against Tutsi refugees at Gitwa cellule, and that his car was parked nearby. Although this evidence is limited in respect of the Accused's exact role or conduct in connection with the attack, it corroborates other sightings of the Accused in Bisesero, in the company of attackers, during the time-period relevant to the Bisesero Indictment.⁵²⁴

⁵²⁰ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 36.

⁵²¹ Section II.A.1.(b).

⁵²² Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 37-42.

⁵²³ Trial Judgement, para. 594.

⁵²⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 598.

(a) Sufficiency of Notice

312. In relation to the events at Nyarutovu, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana argues that the Trial Chamber erred when it concluded that although this incident is not specifically mentioned in the Indictment it is summarized as part of Witness CC's anticipated evidence in Annex B of the Prosecution's Pre-trial Brief and is also described in Witness CC's written statement of 12 June 1996.⁵²⁵

313. These submissions have been discussed above in relation to the notice arguments presented by Gérard Ntakirutimana. The Appeals Chamber has concluded that the details in Annex B and the statement of Witness CC notified the Defence that the Prosecution would allege that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported attackers and pointed out Tutsi refugees near the Gishyita-Gisovu road. The Trial Chamber therefore committed no error in concluding that the Bisesero Indictment's failure to allege these facts was cured.⁵²⁶

(b) Discrepancies in the Evidence

314. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that the Trial Chamber erred by disregarding inconsistencies between the witness's written statement and his in-court testimony, by accepting the witness's explanations for these, and by relying on the witness's evidence despite the lack of details and despite the witness's serious allegations against ICTR investigators.⁵²⁷ These arguments, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, seem also to go to the credibility of the witness.

315. In his submissions, the Appellant refers extensively to apparent discrepancies between the witness's written statement and his in-court testimony in an attempt to demonstrate error in the fact-finding process. Most of these alleged inconsistencies were put to the witness during his testimony, raised in the Defence Closing Brief and considered by the Trial Chamber in its Judgement.

316. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it will not lightly disturb findings of fact by a trial chamber, and will substitute the assessment of the trial chamber only if no reasonable trier of fact could have arrived at the same conclusion. The trial chamber has the advantage of observing witnesses in person and is, as such, better positioned than the Appeals Chamber to assess the reliability and credibility of the evidence. The Appeals Chamber emphasises that it is not a legal error *per se* to accept and rely on evidence that varies from prior statements or other evidence. However, a trial chamber is bound to take into account inconsistencies and any explanations offered

⁵²⁵ *Id.*, para. 590.

⁵²⁶ Section II.A.1.(b).

⁵²⁷ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 38-42.

in respect of them when weighing the probative value of the evidence.⁵²⁸ Also, as previously noted, a trial chamber may find parts of a witness's testimony credible and rely on them, whilst rejecting other parts as not credible.

317. The Appellant argues that the Trial Chamber erred in stating that the list in Witness CC's statement of 10 attackers whom the witness recognised during the events was not exhaustive.⁵²⁹ He contends that, had the witness really seen him, his name would have been included in the list, and not at the end of the statement. According to the Appellant, this suggests that the witness "was prompted by the investigator to make allegations against him."⁵³⁰

318. The Appeals Chamber has reviewed the witness's evidence, including his statement of 12 June 1996, and the witness's explanations during cross-examination on the omission of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana from the list, and considers that the Trial Chamber was not unreasonable in concluding that the list was not exhaustive. The Trial Chamber's conclusion finds additional support from the fact that the witness also mentioned in his statement seeing Clément Kayishema during the events yet does not include him in the list of 10 attackers at the beginning of the statement. The Appeals Chamber finds the Appellant's allegation that the witness was improperly prompted by an investigator to make accusations to be wholly speculative and without foundation.

319. Next, the Appellant submits that the Trial Chamber should have impeached the witness as he changed his evidence at trial to fit the Prosecution's case. He adds that the Trial Chamber erred by disregarding discrepancies and by attempting to sanitize the evidence. In support, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana refers to the witness's written statement, in which the witness mentioned seeing only armed civilians with him during the attack at Nyarutovu, whereas at trial the witness testified that there were also *Interahamwe* and soldiers in military uniforms.⁵³¹

320. The Appeals Chamber notes that during cross-examination the witness was asked by the Appellant and the Trial Chamber about the attackers he saw with the Appellant. Questioned as to the differences between his statement and his testimony, the witness explained that at his interview with the investigators he had clearly mentioned the presence of soldiers, as well as civilians, and that the statement was therefore incorrect.⁵³² The Trial Chamber observed the demeanour of the witness and itself questioned the witness on the differences between his testimony and his earlier statement. The Trial Chamber addressed this apparent discrepancy in its findings, concluding that it did not affect the witness's credibility. It also noted that the witness statement included a general

⁵²⁸ See *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 31-32; *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, paras. 95-96.

⁵²⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 591.

⁵³⁰ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 38.

⁵³¹ *Id.*, pp. 38-39.

description of attackers in Bisesero, which included soldiers, civilians and *Interahamwe*.⁵³³ Apart from reiterating that there exists an inconsistency in the witness's evidence, the Appellant does not advance any argument of merit which would justify the Appeals Chamber disturbing the Trial Chamber's findings.

321. The same conclusion applies to the Appellant's submissions regarding the witness's estimates about the time at which the Bisesero attacks began during the events from April to June 1994 and on the distance between the witness's home, Ngoma Church and Muyira Hill.⁵³⁴ The Trial Chamber considered the differences between the witness's testimony, statement and earlier testimony not to be material and of little importance.⁵³⁵ A mere assertion of the Appellant that the Trial Chamber should have accorded more weight to these discrepancies is insufficient to meet his burden on appeal to show error on the part of the Trial Chamber.

322. In addition the Appellant argues that the Trial Chamber erred when it reasoned that "the witness described the Accused's car in a way which corresponded to the description by other witnesses".⁵³⁶ The Appellant suggests that the witness did not know from observation but that someone else had told him of the make and colour of the Appellant's vehicle.⁵³⁷ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, this argument is without foundation and misconstrues the evidence. The Appeals Chamber notes that the witness was consistent in his evidence that the Appellant's vehicle was "whitish", white or near-white.⁵³⁸ Although during cross-examination there appeared to be some discussion about dates, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, placed in proper context, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the witness had been told by another person about the Appellant's car.⁵³⁹

323. The Appellant argues that the Trial Chamber erred in assessing Witness CC's identification evidence for Nyarutovu.⁵⁴⁰ The Appeals Chamber recalls that where a finding of guilt is made on the basis of identification evidence given by a witness under apparently difficult circumstances, the Trial Chamber should provide a "reasoned opinion". As the Appeals Chamber noted in *Kupreškić*, a Trial Chamber should take into account a number of factors such as the duration of the observation, the presence of obstructions, light quality, whether the observation was made in daytime or at night, inconsistent or inaccurate testimony about the defendant's physical characteristics at the time of the event, misidentification or denial of the ability to identify followed by later identification of the

⁵³² T. 9 October 2001, pp. 49-51.

⁵³³ Trial Judgement para. 591.

⁵³⁴ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 40-41.

⁵³⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 593.

⁵³⁶ *Id.*, para. 592.

⁵³⁷ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 40.

⁵³⁸ For instance, T. 9 October 2001, pp. 13, 54.

⁵³⁹ T. 9 October 2001, pp. 54-55.

⁵⁴⁰ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 39-41.

defendant by a witness and the “clear possibility” that the witness may have been influenced by suggestions from others.⁵⁴¹

324. Here, the Trial Chamber considered that the observation was made in broad daylight, that it lasted for about 2 minutes from a distance of about 100 meters, that there was no evidence of persons or vegetation obstructing the witness’s view, that the witness knew the Appellant since 1977, having seen him during religious gatherings, and that his testimony was coherent and consistent with his written statement.⁵⁴² In the view of the Appeals Chamber, it cannot be said that the Trial Chamber unreasonably assessed the identification evidence.

325. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber was careful in its assessment of the evidence, and that all of the inconsistencies raised by the Appellant were reasonably treated by the Trial Chamber. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber dismisses the Appellants’ submissions that the witness’s difficulty in remembering when and how his witness statement was taken, and the lack of details in his evidence raise a reasonable doubt about all his testimony.

2. Murambi Hill (Witness SS)

326. In relation to events at Murambi Hill, the Trial Chamber found:

The testimony of Witness SS is uncorroborated. However, he appeared consistent throughout his testimony about this event, which was in conformity with his statement to investigators of 18 December 2000. The fact that this statement was given more than six years after the events does not reduce his credibility. Consequently, the Chamber finds that one day in May or June 1994, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana transported armed attackers who were chasing Tutsi survivors at Murambi Hill.⁵⁴³

327. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber misapplied the burden of proof on the basis that the record shows that the evidence of Witness SS was contradictory and insufficient to support the finding that the Appellant “transported armed attackers who were chasing Tutsi survivors at Murambi Hill” at some point in May or June 1994.

⁵⁴¹ See *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, paras. 34-40.

⁵⁴² Trial Judgement, para. 594.

⁵⁴³ *Id.*, para. 579.

(a) Lack of Notice

328. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that no mention was made of the events at Murambi Hill in the indictment, the Pre-Trial Brief or the Prosecution's closing arguments, and accordingly seems to argue that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he was put on sufficient notice of the event.⁵⁴⁴

329. This ground of appeal has been addressed in the discussion of the legal arguments presented by Gérard Ntakirutimana. It has been found that the Trial Chamber committed no error in concluding that the Bisesero Indictment's failure to allege that the Appellant transported attackers to the Murambi attack was cured by subsequent information communicated to the Accused.⁵⁴⁵

(b) Insufficiency of Evidence

330. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana questions the evidence of Witness SS that he saw him in his car during the event, and submits that it is insufficient to support the finding that he "transported armed attackers who were chasing Tutsi survivors at Murambi hill". He indicates that Witness SS never mentioned whether he saw him driving the vehicle or whether there was someone else in the vehicle with him. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana adds that the witness gave few details about where he stopped the vehicle, and about whether he had direct sight of him. The Appellant also submits that it would have been doubtful that the witness could have identified him at a distance of 200 meters when he turned around whilst running away from the attackers. Finally the Appellant notes that in a report by *African Rights*, Witness SS did not mention seeing a car or attackers with the Appellant, or that he was chased by the attackers.⁵⁴⁶

331. In making its findings, the Trial Chamber took into consideration observational conditions, the position of the witness in relation to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana when he first observed him, and the fact that he saw attackers alight from the Appellant's vehicle.⁵⁴⁷ The Trial Chamber's assessment of the evidence is in conformity with the witness's testimony.⁵⁴⁸ Moreover, in cross-examination, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana questioned the witness about his sighting of the Appellant's vehicle, the distance from which he saw him, whether he was crossing the road, and the presence of the attackers.⁵⁴⁹

332. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Appellant has not shown that the Trial Chamber erred in assessing the evidence of Witness SS. The Appellant does not directly address the findings

⁵⁴⁴ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 48-49.

⁵⁴⁵ Section II.A.1.(b).

⁵⁴⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 48-49.

⁵⁴⁷ Trial Judgement, paras. 575-576.

⁵⁴⁸ T. 30 October 2001, pp. 127-133

of the Trial Chamber to show their unreasonableness, and merely repeats aspects of the evidence which he deems undermine the witness's credibility. The issue as to the distance from which the witness observed the Appellant was developed by the Appellant during cross-examination and fully considered by the Trial Chamber. It is clear from the evidence that the witness initially saw the Appellant at a distance of approximately 8 meters, and observed him again as he was running to escape the attackers who had alighted from the Appellant's car.⁵⁵⁰ The questions as to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana driving his vehicle, and the presence of anyone else in the cabin of the vehicle, were not specifically put to the witness.⁵⁵¹ The fact that the witness's evidence may have been limited on the event and not greatly detailed has not been shown to undermine its reliability.

(c) Delivery of the Letter

333. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana seems to submit that Witness SS's credibility is undermined as his evidence on the delivery of the 16 April letter from the pastors to the Appellant contradicts the evidence of Witnesses GG, HH, YY and MM.⁵⁵²

334. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellant's submissions here are vague and unclear. He does not develop this argument. It is accordingly dismissed.

(d) Sighting of Gérard Ntakirutimana

335. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that Witness SS's credibility was undermined when he testified that he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana in Mugonero in 1992 and 1993 when, according to the Appellant, Gérard Ntakirutimana was in the United States from January 1991 until March 1993. He adds that the evidence suggests that the witness did not know either the Appellant or Gérard Ntakirutimana, having referred to the Appellant as a "minister" in the *African Rights* report and that he did not live in Mugonero prior to 1994.⁵⁵³

336. During the examination and cross-examination, the witness was extensively questioned on the dates of his studies at the ESI Mugonero and on when he saw Gérard Ntakirutimana. The witness indicated that he observed Gérard Ntakirutimana on a number of occasions prior to April 1994, but that he was not sure of the exact date. Although there appears to have been some confusion during the examination, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana has not shown that this in any way

⁵⁴⁹ T. 31 October 2001, pp. 117-124.

⁵⁵⁰ *Id.*, pp. 128-133.

⁵⁵¹ Although the witness did testify that, "I was about to cross the road. He saw me, he stopped his vehicle, he came out, and the people who were with him started running after me in an attempt to catch me", which suggests that the Appellant may have been driving his vehicle. T. 30 October 2001, p. 128.

⁵⁵² Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 48-51.

⁵⁵³ *Id.*, p. 51.

taints the witness's overall credibility or that the witness was not in Mugonero in 1993 and 1994. The fact that Gérard Ntakirutimana was in the United States until March 1993 is of little significance as, on the basis of the evidence, the witness was present in Mugonero from early 1993 until April 1994, and could therefore have seen Gérard Ntakirutimana after March 1993.⁵⁵⁴ It should be noted that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana does not directly address this evidence in his submissions.

337. Finally, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that the witness's use of the title "minister" when speaking of the Appellant, who was a pastor, is immaterial in showing that the witness did not know the Appellant.

(e) Witness Coaching

338. The Appellant submits that there are too many inconsistencies and discrepancies in the witness's prior statements to repeat in full, but that their frequency and nature reveal fabrication and coaching.⁵⁵⁵

339. The Appellant's arguments on this point are unsubstantiated and are accordingly rejected.

3. Muyira Hill – Ku Cyapa (Witness SS)

340. With respect to events at Ku Cyapa near Muyira Hill, the Trial Chamber found, on the basis of the sole testimony of Witness SS, that:

... one day in May or June the Accused was seen arriving at Ku Cyapa in a vehicle followed by two buses of attackers. The Chamber is convinced that the Accused was part of a convoy which included attackers. The evidence establishes that these attackers among others participated in the killing of a large number of Tutsi. Witness SS declared: "On that day the killings were beyond comprehension, and that is the day most people were killed."⁵⁵⁶

(a) Lack of Notice

341. The Appellant argues that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he had sufficient notice of this event since it was not mentioned in the Prosecution's Closing Brief or in any detail by the witness in his previous written statement.⁵⁵⁷

342. The question of sufficiency of notice has been dealt with above in relation to Gérard Ntakirutimana's arguments on notice. It has been found that the failure to allege the event at Ku

⁵⁵⁴ T. 31 October 2001, pp. 2-16.

⁵⁵⁵ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 50.

⁵⁵⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 661.

⁵⁵⁷ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 51.

Cyapa with specificity in the Bisesero Indictment was cured by subsequent information communicated to the Defence by the Prosecution.⁵⁵⁸

(b) Insufficiency of Evidence

343. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber misapplied the burden of proof as its findings do not follow from the evidence. According to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the evidence of Witness SS lacks necessary details as to the road on which the witness saw the Appellant's vehicle travelling and the direction in which the vehicle was going. The Appellant adds that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the buses the witness saw not far from his vehicle were those which transported the attackers to Ku Cyapa.⁵⁵⁹

344. From a review of the evidence, it has not been shown that the Trial Chamber was unreasonable in concluding that the Appellant was part of a convoy of attackers at Ku Cyapa. Indeed, Witness SS testified that, at about noon on a day in May or June 1994, he saw the Appellant in his vehicle and the vehicle of Obed Ruzindana parking on the Gisovu-Gishyita road in the area of Ku Cyapa. The witness observed the Appellant from a distance of approximately 15 meters. He testified that he did not see "many other people" in the vehicles, and presumed that the persons he saw after having fled must have descended from the buses. Witness SS explained that he observed two green buses further behind with attackers aboard, driving up the hill towards Ku Cyapa. The witness immediately fled. He did not see Elizaphan Ntakirutimana again on that day. Witness SS stated that later in the day there was a massive attack in the Bisesero region. He did not see the Appellant on this occasion.⁵⁶⁰

345. The Trial Chamber relied on the evidence of Witness SS to convict the Elizaphan Ntakirutimana of aiding and abetting in genocide by conveying armed attackers to Bisesero.⁵⁶¹ The evidence of Witness SS does not establish that the Appellant participated in the attack at Bisesero, and in the view of the Appeals Chamber it is insufficient to establish that the attackers the witness saw with the Appellant were later involved in a large scale attack at Bisesero.⁵⁶² Notwithstanding, the Appeals Chamber does not find that the Trial Chamber erred when it relied on the evidence of Witness SS to the extent that, when placed in context, it was consistent with other evidence in the case that vehicles were often followed by buses with attackers.

⁵⁵⁸ Section II.A.1.(b).

⁵⁵⁹ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 51-52.

⁵⁶⁰ T. 30 October 2001 pp. 134-138; T. 31 October 2001 pp. 124-132.

⁵⁶¹ Trial Judgement, paras. 827-830.

⁵⁶² T. 30 October 2001, p. 138.

4. Murambi Church (Witnesses YY, DD, GG and SS)

346. On the basis of the testimonies of Witnesses YY, DD, GG and SS, the Trial Chamber found:

As for the involvement of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana in the removal of the church roof, the Chamber notes that Witnesses DD, GG and YY all identified him as having participated in the removal of the roof, and Witnesses DD and GG testified that he personally gave the order for the removal. Witness SS's testimony regarding his sighting of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's vehicle supports the other witnesses' testimonies. Witnesses GG and YY testified that the church was being used by Tutsi refugees as a shelter, and Witness DD testified that he was himself seeking refuge in the church at the time. The witnesses concur that this incident took place between 17 April 1994 and early May 1994. Witnesses GG and YY saw the iron sheets being removed and placed in Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's car while Witness DD saw the sheeting being placed in one of the two cars. The Chamber finds that there is evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that sometime between 17 April and early May 1994, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was in Murambi within the area of Bisesero, that he went to a church in Murambi where many Tutsi were seeking refuge and that he ordered attackers to destroy the roof of the church.⁵⁶³

347. As for the reasons for the removal of the Church's roof, the Trial Chamber found that this act left the Tutsis unprotected from the elements and visible to attackers, and that given the presence of the attackers "those taking part in these events, including Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, could not have had peaceful intentions". It rejected other interpretations suggested by Elizaphan Ntakirutimana of the act of removal of the roof or of the transportation of the individuals involved.⁵⁶⁴

348. In relation to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's involvement in shooting refugees at the church, the Trial Chamber concluded:

that neither the Pre-trial Brief nor Witness YY's previous statement contains any explicit allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana killed persons at Murambi Church. This was first raised by Witness YY during his testimony. Consequently, the defect in the Indictment was not cured by subsequent timely notice.⁵⁶⁵

(a) Shooting of Refugees

349. Although not convicted of the shooting of refugees at Murambi church, the Appellant contends that the Trial Chamber erred when it concluded that, despite the fact that Witness YY was the only witness to have testified about the shooting, this did "not render his account implausible, insofar as each witness observed the scene from a different vantage point and for a different length of time".⁵⁶⁶ The Appellant adds that the Trial Chamber's finding "questions the ability of the Trial Chamber to find facts rationally".⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶³ Trial Judgement, para. 691.

⁵⁶⁴ *Id.*, para. 693.

⁵⁶⁵ *Id.*, para. 697.

⁵⁶⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 687.

⁵⁶⁷ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 54.

350. Three witnesses, namely Witnesses GG, DD and YY observed the Appellant at Murambi directing people to remove the roof sheeting. Witness SS saw the Appellant's car and observed persons remove the roof. Witnesses DD, GG and SS did not observe or testify about any shooting at the church. Their testimony was consistent that the Appellant was only involved in the removal of the roof.

351. Witness GG testified that that he was able to hear Elizaphan Ntakirutimana tell people to climb atop the church and remove the roofing. He testified that he was able to hear "everything they were saying".⁵⁶⁸ Witness DD also saw Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at the church order people to remove the metal sheeting of the roof. According to the Trial Chamber, the witness, who had an unobstructed view of the church, "observed the entire operation". Although Witness DD testified that he left the church at the time the roof was removed, his testimony in essence is limited to the actions of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, notably: "I saw him come up in the company of other people who came in his vehicle. He ordered them to take off the roofing sheet of the church, in his opinion, to prevent us from the rain. Then he took them away." The witness was approximately 12 metres from the church at the time of his observations. He indicated that the removal and taking away of the sheeting did not take long.⁵⁶⁹

352. Witness SS, from his vantage point on a small hill overlooking Murambi church, was in a position to observe individuals remove the roofing of the church, saw the Appellant's car but was not able to identify individuals.⁵⁷⁰ Witnesses DD, GG and SS did not testify to any gunfire, or that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and other attackers shot refugees in the Church.

353. By contrast, Witness YY testified that the shooting of the refugees occurred before the removal of the roof. The Trial Chamber found that Witness YY's account was not "implausible" as each witness "observed the scene from a different vantage point and for a different length of time".⁵⁷¹ Yet Witnesses DD, GG and SS who all saw the arrival of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana or of his vehicle and the removal of the roof, did not mention any shooting.

354. Witness YY first spoke of the shooting of refugees during the trial. No specific mention is made of this allegation in his previous statement, in the Indictment or in the Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief. On the basis of the evidence, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that Witness YY's account of the shooting at the Church is irreconcilable with the evidence of Witnesses DD, GG and SS. The Trial Chamber therefore erred in reasoning that Witness YY's account was not "implausible".

⁵⁶⁸ T. 24 September 2001, pp. 5-7.

⁵⁶⁹ T. 23 September 2001, pp. 120-125.

⁵⁷⁰ T. 30 October 2001, pp. 123-125; T. 31 October 2001, pp. 103-104.

⁵⁷¹ Trial Judgement, para. 687.

355. However, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced by the Appellant's argument that this error calls into question the overall "ability of the Trial Chamber to find facts rationally", or that the whole fact-finding process is tainted. Although it is indeed unfortunate that the Trial Chamber referred to Witness YY's account of the events as not being "implausible", the Trial Chamber was nevertheless, very cautious in its assessment of the evidence and careful when making its findings. The Appeals Chamber, having reviewed extensively the evidence and findings of the Trial Chamber in assessing the Appellant's numerous grounds of appeal, considers that the Appellant's general proposition against the Trial Chamber, a proposition derived from a single finding of the Trial Chamber, about Witness YY, is devoid of merit.

(b) Removal of the Roof

356. The Appellant also asserts that the evidence of Witnesses DD, YY, GG and SS is insufficient evidence that he was involved in the removal of the roof of Murambi church with the intent to facilitate the killing of the refugees in the church. He suggests that there is no basis for believing that the removal of the roof would make the church a lesser hiding place and suggests that "the walls, if anything, might make it a hiding place". Elizaphan Ntakirutimana further adds that he had "the right and perhaps the duty to remove the roof, to protect church property."⁵⁷²

357. The Prosecution submits *inter alia* that the significance of the removal of the church roof cannot be viewed out of the context of frequent attacks, and that it was clearly one in a series of acts intended to worsen the conditions of the refugees, thereby weakening their resolve against further attacks.⁵⁷³

358. The evidence before the Trial Chamber established beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant and others removed the roofing of the church. The Appeals Chamber has reviewed the testimony of Witnesses DD, GG and SS, and finds that the Appellant has not shown that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was involved in the removal of the Murambi Church roof.

359. The Appeals Chamber likewise finds no merit in the argument of the Appellant that the Trial Chamber erred when it found that the roof was removed so that the church could no longer be used as a hiding place and that the roof was removed with the intent to facilitate the killing. The Trial Chamber's finding was made not in the abstract but on the basis of a number of factors, including the context of the events, the witness's description of "approaching attackers", and that

⁵⁷² Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 55.

⁵⁷³ Prosecution Response, paras. 5.280-5.286.

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Interahamwe armed with machetes were aboard the Appellant's vehicle.⁵⁷⁴ Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that, by the end of April 1994, killings against Tutsis had already commenced in the region. For instance, the attack at the Mugonero Complex occurred on 16 April 1994. Placed in the context of the then prevailing massacres against the Tutsi, the Trial Chamber reasonably inferred that the removal of the roof was intended to deprive the Tutsi of hiding places and to facilitate their killing.

D. Lack of Intent to Commit Genocide

360. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana challenges the findings of the Trial Chamber that the Appellants participated in the attacks at Bisesero with the intent to commit genocide. Specific reference is made to the conclusions of the Trial Chamber in paragraphs 826 and 830 of the Trial Judgement:

826. In Section II.4 above, the Chamber found that a large number of men, women and children, who were predominantly Tutsi, sought refuge in the area of Bisesero from April through June 1994, where there was widespread violence during that period, in the form of attacks targeting this population on an almost daily basis. Witnesses heard attackers singing songs referring to the extermination of the Tutsi. The Chamber concludes that these attacks were carried out with the specific intent to destroy in whole the Tutsi population in Bisesero, for the sole reason of its ethnicity.⁵⁷⁵

830. From his presence and participation in attacks in Bisesero, from the fact that at certain occasions, he was present when attackers he had conveyed set upon chasing Tutsi refugees nearby, singing songs about exterminating the Tutsi, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knew that Tutsi in particular were being targeted for attack, and that by transporting armed attackers to Bisesero and pointing out Tutsi refugees to the attackers, he would be assisting in the killing of the Tutsi in Bisesero. The Chamber has also taken into account his act of conveying to the Mugonero Complex attackers who proceeded to kill Tutsi. Having considered all the evidence, the Chamber finds that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had the requisite intent to commit genocide, that is, the intent to destroy, in whole, the Tutsi ethnic group.

361. According to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the record does not support the Trial Chamber's finding that the Appellants possessed the intent necessary to commit genocide, and contends that the Trial Chamber failed to make factual findings or provide supportive analysis of intent. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana also notes that the Trial Chamber omitted "in part" from its definition of intent, thus requiring a showing of an "intent to destroy, in whole, the Tutsi ethnic group".⁵⁷⁶

362. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber did not make factual findings or "supportive analysis" of the Appellants' intent.⁵⁷⁷ This contention is meritless. The Appeals Chamber notes that in paragraph 828 of the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber outlined the factual findings which led it to conclude, in paragraph 830, that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had the requisite genocidal intent. Similarly, prior to finding that Gérard Ntakirutimana had the specific intent to

⁵⁷⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 693.

⁵⁷⁵ Internal reference omitted.

⁵⁷⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 57-59.

commit genocide, the Trial Chamber recalled in detail the factual findings upon which this conclusion was based.⁵⁷⁸ Consequently, it cannot be said that the Trial Chamber failed to make and analyze factual findings in respect of the Appellants' intent relating to the genocide charge in the Bisesero Indictment.

363. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that the evidence established that the Appellants did not have the intent to destroy Tutsi "solely" because of their ethnicity.⁵⁷⁹ As stated above, the definition of the crime of genocide in Article 2 of the Statute, which mirrors the definition set out in the Genocide Convention, does not require that the intent to destroy a group be based solely on one of the enumerated grounds of nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion.⁵⁸⁰

364. In considering whether a perpetrator had the requisite *mens rea*, regard must be had to his mode of participation in the given crime. Under the Bisesero Indictment, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide while Gérard Ntakirutimana was convicted of committing genocide.⁵⁸¹ The requisite *mens rea* for aiding and abetting genocide is the accomplice's knowledge of the genocidal intent of the principal perpetrators.⁵⁸² From the evidence, the Trial Chamber found that the attackers in Bisesero had the specific genocidal intent.⁵⁸³ Furthermore, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, it is clear that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knew of this intent. The Trial Chamber found that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was present during several attacks on refugees in Bisesero, including situations where the armed attackers sang: "Exterminate them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and get it over with, in all the forests", and "Let us exterminate them", while chasing and killing Tutsis.⁵⁸⁴ It is from this, as well as from his transporting the armed attackers and directing them toward fleeing Tutsi refugees that the Trial Chamber found that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had the requisite intent to commit genocide, convicting him of aiding and abetting genocide. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, it is not necessary to consider whether the Trial Chamber correctly concluded that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had the specific intent to commit genocide, given that it convicted him not of committing that crime, but rather of aiding and abetting genocide, a mode of criminal participation which does not require the specific intent. The Appeals Chamber finds that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knew of the genocidal intent of the attackers whom he aided and abetted in the perpetration of genocide in Bisesero and, therefore, that he possessed the requisite *mens rea* for that crime.

⁵⁷⁷ *Id.*, p. 58.

⁵⁷⁸ Trial Judgement, paras. 832-834.

⁵⁷⁹ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 59.

⁵⁸⁰ See *supra* Section III B. See also *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 53.

⁵⁸¹ See Trial Judgement, paras. 831, 836.

⁵⁸² See *infra* Section V. D.; *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 140.

⁵⁸³ Trial Judgement, para. 826.

⁵⁸⁴ *Id.*, para. 828.

365. The Appeals Chamber also finds no error in the Trial Chamber's conclusion that Gérard Ntakirutimana had the specific intent required to sustain his genocide conviction. In determining whether Gérard Ntakirutimana had the specific genocidal intent, the Trial Chamber properly considered his participation in numerous attacks on Tutsis, including his shooting and killing Tutsi individuals.⁵⁸⁵ This finding is not undermined by the Trial Chamber's conclusion that Gérard Ntakirutimana had the specific intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group "in whole", rather than "in whole or in part" as Article 2 of the Statute prescribes. The record shows that Gérard Ntakirutimana possessed the requisite *mens rea* for committing the crime of genocide.

366. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

E. Aiding and Abetting Genocide

367. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana argues that aiding and abetting genocide was not included in the Genocide Convention and is not punishable under the Genocide Convention or Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal. According to the Appellant, the phrase "or otherwise aided and abetted" in Article 6(1) of the Statute relates only to common crimes, such as murder and rape, as included in Articles 3 (Crimes against Humanity) and Article 4 (War Crimes) of the Statute, of which aiding and abetting is "a frequent part".⁵⁸⁶

368. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana notes that Article 2 of the Statute (which reproduces Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide Convention) includes in the acts punishable as genocide conspiracy, complicity, incitement, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide, but not aiding and abetting. By contrast, neither Article 2 nor Article 4 addresses conspiracy or accessory liability, and it was thus necessary to supplement these articles with Article 6(1) of the Statute. The Appellant concludes that the Security Council had no power to enact or modify the Genocide Convention "or to create a criminal code" by adding aiding and abetting to acts punishable under Article 2 of the Statute.⁵⁸⁷

369. The Prosecution responds that this argument was not raised in the Notice of Appeal, is vague and not in conformity with the Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, and cannot be raised for the first time in the Appeal Brief. The Prosecution submits that the argument should be dismissed without consideration.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁵ Trial Judgement, paras. 832-834.

⁵⁸⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 35.

⁵⁸⁷ *Id.*, pp. 35-36. In support of his arguments, the Appellant refers generally to "opinions" in *Kayishema and Ruzindana* and *Akayesu*, without providing any specific references.

⁵⁸⁸ Prosecution Response, para. 5.326.

370. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Prosecution correctly points out that the present argument was not raised in the Notice of Appeal. The Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement requires an appellant to present in the Notice of Appeal the grounds of appeal, clearly specifying

- (i) any alleged error on a question of law invalidating the decision, and/or
- (ii) any alleged error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice;
- (iii) an identification of the finding or ruling challenged in the judgement, with specific reference to the page number and paragraph number;
- (iv) an identification of any other order, decision or ruling challenged, with specific reference to the date of its filing, and/or transcript page;
- (v) if relevant, the overall relief sought.⁵⁸⁹

In accordance with the Practice Direction, the Appeals Chamber may dismiss submissions that do not comply with the prescribed requirements.⁵⁹⁰

371. In addition to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's failure to properly raise this ground of appeal in the Notice of Appeal, the Appeals Chamber notes that the present submission lacks merit. In essence, the Appellant argues that he could not have been charged and convicted of aiding and abetting genocide because aiding and abetting was not included in the Genocide Convention and is therefore not an act punishable under the Convention or under Article 6(1) of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber does not subscribe to such an interpretation of the Convention or the Statute. As recently held in the *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, the prohibited act of complicity in genocide, which is included in the Genocide Convention and in Article 2 of the Statute, encompasses aiding and abetting.⁵⁹¹ Moreover, Article 6(1) of the Statute expressly provides that a person "who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime." Accordingly, liability for the crime of genocide, as defined in Article 2 of the Statute, may attach on grounds of conduct characterized as aiding and abetting.⁵⁹²

372. Consequently, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

⁵⁸⁹ Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement, para. 1(c).

⁵⁹⁰ See *id.*, para. 13.

⁵⁹¹ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 138, 139.

⁵⁹² *Id.*, para. 139.

F. Lack of Credibility in the Prosecution Case

373. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that after an analysis of all the inconsistencies, revised testimony, falsity and prejudicial motivations reviewed in the Appellants' briefs, it becomes clear that the Prosecution case was not credible. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana reiterates the legal errors that the Trial Chamber is said to have committed, and notes *inter alia*:

(i) that Witness QQ's evidence as to the number of bodies and mass graves at Mugonero and the church office is highly questionable;⁵⁹³

(ii) that the Trial Chamber must deal seriously with the number of dead and body counts at Mugonero and elsewhere in Rwanda from 1994;⁵⁹⁴

(iii) that the Trial Chamber failed to find a single witness unreliable yet unjustifiably disposed of the alibi evidence;⁵⁹⁵ and

(iv) that the Defence had presented compelling testimony of a political campaign against the Appellants, with certain witnesses, namely YY, KK and UU, having participated in activities of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Rwandan Patriotic Army.⁵⁹⁶

374. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana claims that a lack of credibility on the part of all Prosecution witnesses raised a reasonable doubt as to the Trial Chamber's findings.⁵⁹⁷ Elizaphan Ntakirutimana specifically criticizes the Trial Chamber's reliance on Prosecution Witnesses QQ,⁵⁹⁸ KK⁵⁹⁹ and UU,⁶⁰⁰ none of whom Elizaphan Ntakirutimana considers credible. In support of these allegations, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana cites several instances of inconsistency between the testimonies of different witnesses and between these witnesses' testimonies and their pre-trial statements. In summary, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana argues that the Prosecution's case as a whole was "not credible."⁶⁰¹

375. The Appeals Chamber points out the exceedingly broad and non-specific nature of this element of the Appeal. As elsewhere in the Appeal, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana here attempts to discredit the entire trial proceedings in this case in the span of a few pages. To the extent that

⁵⁹³ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 60-61.

⁵⁹⁴ *Id.*, p. 61.

⁵⁹⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁹⁶ *Id.*, pp. 61-62.

⁵⁹⁷ *Id.*, p. 59.

⁵⁹⁸ *Id.*, pp. 60-61.

⁵⁹⁹ *Id.*, p. 62.

⁶⁰⁰ *Id.*

⁶⁰¹ *Id.*, p. 59.

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana has cited specific alleged errors in credibility, the Appeals Chamber addresses them below.

376. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana alleges that Witness QQ's testimony with regards to the number killed at Mugonero was not credible.⁶⁰² He points out that there were discrepancies between QQ's pre-trial statement and his trial testimony. However, the Trial Chamber took this and other inconsistencies regarding estimates of the number killed into account when making its findings. The Trial Chamber stated that it was not convinced by Witness QQ's estimate because the witness "was a lay person with no claimed expertise in ... distinguishing and counting victims on the basis of their decomposed remains" and because QQ's estimates "appear to be based on the number of coffins used and, more critically, on the number of people required to lift a coffin after it had been filled."⁶⁰³ The Trial Chamber nevertheless emphasized that Witness QQ's evidence did establish the existence of mass graves and a large number of skeletons at Mugonero Complex.⁶⁰⁴ Relying on that evidence and the evidence provided by other witnesses, the Trial Chamber found that the attack of 16 April 1994 resulted in hundreds of dead and a large number of wounded, thereby establishing the allegations in paragraph 4.9 of the Indictment.⁶⁰⁵ The Appeals Chamber cannot find any error in this finding or in the Trial Chamber's treatment of Witness QQ's evidence.

377. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana further alleges that the Trial Chamber "did not find a single Prosecution witness unreliable," but "disposed of all the alibi testimony" of the Appellants.⁶⁰⁶ The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber time and again exercised caution in weighing witness testimony.⁶⁰⁷ During the trial, both the Prosecution and the Defence had every opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and the Trial Chamber took into account the totality of witness testimony, as well as challenges from both opposing parties, in assessing witness credibility. In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber extensively reviewed the testimony of each witness, and provided extended reasons when determining the reliability and credibility of individual witnesses. Thus, the Trial Chamber addressed this issue and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana raises no doubts as to the reasonability of its findings. Accordingly Elizaphan Ntakirutimana has not shown that the Trial Chamber erred in this regard.

378. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana specifically challenges the credibility of Witness KK.⁶⁰⁸ The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber approached Witness KK's testimony with extreme

⁶⁰² *Id.*, p. 60.

⁶⁰³ Trial Judgement, n. 477.

⁶⁰⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁰⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 337.

⁶⁰⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 61.

⁶⁰⁷ *See, e.g.*, Trial Judgement, paras. 151, 360, 421, 429, 548.

⁶⁰⁸ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 62.

caution, going so far as to state “[the Trial Chamber] will not place great weight on Witness KK’s testimony because of doubts created by the discrepancies between the testimony and his previous statement”.⁶⁰⁹ Elizaphan Ntakirutimana does no more here than indicate a discrepancy already considered by the Trial Chamber. No new element is presented and the Appellant does not raise any doubt as to the reasonability of the Trial Chamber’s findings. This contention is therefore without merit.

379. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana attempts to introduce new evidence in order to discredit Witness UU.⁶¹⁰ The Appeals Chamber recalls that there is a settled procedure for the introduction of additional evidence on appeal.⁶¹¹ The procedure was not followed here. The Appeals Chamber will therefore not consider the new evidence sought to be introduced by the Appellant.

380. As to the contention that there existed a “political campaign” against the Appellants, this is addressed below.⁶¹²

G. Failure of the Prosecution to Provide Notice

381. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana asserts that, as a rule, the Prosecution failed to give the Defence notice of the acts with which the Appellants were charged, and that as a result the Appellants should not have been tried for acts where notice was not provided.⁶¹³ The Appeals Chamber, has already addressed this issue above.⁶¹⁴

H. Defence Testimony Raised a Reasonable Doubt

1. Mugonero Complex: 16 April 1994

382. Regarding the events on the morning of 16 April 1994, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that the alibi of the Appellants is confirmed by the witness statement of Rachel Germaine.⁶¹⁵ He submits that the claims that he conveyed attackers to the Mugonero Complex have been “devastated” by the Trial Chamber’s findings, concessions of the Prosecution, and the alibi evidence.⁶¹⁶

⁶⁰⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 267.

⁶¹⁰ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 62.

⁶¹¹ ICTR Rules, Rule 115.

⁶¹² See *infra* Section V.

⁶¹³ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 63-64.

⁶¹⁴ See *supra* Sections II.A.(b) and III. C.

⁶¹⁵ Exhibit No. P43B.

⁶¹⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 64-66.

383. These arguments have been rendered moot in light of the Appeals Chamber's findings on the lack of notice for the allegation that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana conveyed attackers to the Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994.

2. Gishyita: From 16 April 1994 to End of April or Beginning May 1994

384. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana asserts that the Trial Chamber had no basis on which to find that the alibi witnesses fabricated their evidence so as to assist the Appellants.⁶¹⁷ Elizaphan Ntakirutimana refers specifically to paragraph 467 of the Judgement which reads in part as follows:

All the alibi witnesses were friends or acquaintances of the Accused, and the Chamber believes that there was a degree of fabrication on the part of most of these witnesses in an endeavour to assist the Accused.

385. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber did not hold that "all eight alibi witnesses (4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 16 and 32, and Royisi Nyirahakizimana) had fabricated their evidence," as alleged by Elizaphan Ntakirutimana in his Appeal Brief.⁶¹⁸ Instead, the Trial Chamber noted its general view that there was "*a degree of fabrication on the part of most of these witnesses....*"⁶¹⁹ However, this does not appear to have been the reason for finding that the alibi evidence did not create a reasonable possibility that the Appellants were not at the locations in Murambi and Bisesero where Prosecution witnesses testified to having seen them during that period. The Trial Chamber evaluated separately the testimony of each Defence witness relating to the Gishyita period of the alibi and then considered whether the evidence as a whole created an alibi for the Appellants. The Trial Chamber found that the alibi witnesses' evidence did not create a reasonable possibility that the Appellants never left Gishyita during the period in question.⁶²⁰ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, neither this finding nor the approach employed by the Trial Chamber to reach it has been shown to be erroneous.

3. Return to Mugonero: End of April to Mid-July 1994

386. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that thirteen Defence witnesses and the Appellants gave evidence in support of the alibi during the period he is said to have travelled almost daily to Bisesero to participate in attacks. He contends that the Trial Chamber disregarded Defence witnesses' evidence because it was either not significant or exaggerated, yet accepted "exaggerated, improbable and unbelievable" testimony presented by Prosecution witnesses. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana additionally contends that, in evaluating the alibi, the Trial Chamber placed undue

⁶¹⁷ *Id.*, pp. 69-70.

⁶¹⁸ *Id.*, p. 70.

⁶¹⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 467 (emphasis added).

⁶²⁰ *Id.*, paras. 469-480.

emphasis on the need for a precise accounting of the time. In conclusion, he asserts that if Defence evidence taken with all the evidence in the case succeeds in raising a reasonable doubt as to his guilt then he must be acquitted.⁶²¹

387. With regard to alibi evidence for the period from the end of April to mid-July 1994, the Trial Chamber evaluated separately the testimony of each Defence witness and then considered whether the evidence as a whole created an alibi for the Appellants. The Trial Chamber has held that the Defence witnesses' evidence for this period did not create a reasonable possibility that the Appellants were not at locations outside Mugonero as alleged by Prosecution witnesses.⁶²²

388. The Defence sought to establish that the daily routine of the Appellants was comprised of a rigid pattern of work and church. However, most of the thirteen witnesses, though testifying that they saw the Appellants on a frequent or daily basis, indicated in their testimonies that there were exceptions and deviations from this pattern. The Trial Chamber has found that the testimonies of the Defence witnesses drew a picture, in accordance with which the Appellants "were at their respective workplaces on weekdays, and at church on Saturday – except when they were not."⁶²³ This is a reasonable assessment of the record.

389. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, it has not been shown that the Trial Chamber erred in assessing whether the alibi evidence created a reasonable possibility that the Appellants were not at the locations outside Mugonero as alleged by the Prosecution witnesses or that the Trial Chamber failed to assess this evidence even-handedly.

4. Error of Law by Drawing an Adverse Inference

390. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends that the Trial Chamber erred in law by drawing an adverse inference from the fact that the Appellants testified at the end of their trial.⁶²⁴ Elizaphan Ntakirutimana submits that such inference is without foundation and necessarily implies that the Trial Chamber was of the view that the Appellants fabricated their evidence, thereby undermining their credibility. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends that this legal error resulted in a miscarriage of justice with respect to all the charges because the Appellants' evidence was not fairly evaluated.⁶²⁵

⁶²¹ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 70-72.

⁶²² Trial Judgement, paras. 481-530.

⁶²³ *Id.*, para. 519.

⁶²⁴ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 72-73.

⁶²⁵ *Id.*

391. In assessing evidence, a trier of fact is required to determine its overall reliability and credibility.⁶²⁶ Writing about a Trial Chamber's assessment of documentary evidence tendered by an accused in support of his alibi, the Appeals Chamber in *Musema* stated the following:

It is correct to state that the sole fact that evidence is proffered by the accused is no reason to find that it is, *ipso facto*, less reliable. Nevertheless, the source of a document may be relevant to the Trial Chamber's assessment of the reliability and credibility of that document. Where such a document is tendered by an accused, a Trial Chamber may determine, for example, if the accused had the opportunity to concoct the evidence presented and whether or not he or she had cause to do so. This is part of the Trial Chamber's duty to assess the evidence before it.⁶²⁷

392. In the present case the Trial Chamber made the following general observation:

The Chamber also notes that the two Accused chose to testify at the very end of the case, and thus did so with the benefit of having heard the evidence presented by the other Defence witnesses. The Chamber has taken this factor into account in considering the weight to be accorded to the evidence given by the Accused.⁶²⁸

393. The Appeals Chamber finds no error in such an approach. In weighing evidence, a trial chamber, must consider, *inter alia*, the context in which it was given, including, in respect of testimony, whether it was given with the benefit of having heard other evidence in the case. When an accused testifies in support of his or her alibi after having heard other alibi evidence, a trial chamber is obligated to take this into account when assessing the weight to be given to such testimony. Along this line, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated the following during contempt proceedings against Mr. Vujin, a former counsel:

The Appeals Chamber also considers it right to say to Mr. Vujin that in case he decides to testify not at the beginning but at some later stage, then the Appeals Chamber, in evaluating his evidence, would have to take into account the fact that he had listened to the testimony given by all the Defence witnesses.⁶²⁹

394. Accordingly, the appeal on this point is dismissed.

5. Alibi of Gérard Ntakirutimana for the Morning of 16 April 1994

395. The last allegation Elizaphan Ntakirutimana makes with regards to the 16 April 1994 findings is that the Trial Chamber shifted the burden of proof in assessing Gérard Ntakirutimana's alibi for that morning. This is merely a repetition of an identical allegation made in Gérard Ntakirutimana's Appeal Brief.⁶³⁰ Elizaphan Ntakirutimana does, however, add one specific

⁶²⁶ *Musema* Appeal Judgement, para. 50.

⁶²⁷ *Id.*

⁶²⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 467. *See also id.* para. 508.

⁶²⁹ *Prosecutor v. Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I-A-R77, Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujic, 31 January 2000, para. 129 ("The Respondent had been told by the Appeals Chamber that, in evaluating his evidence if it were given after that of his own witnesses, it would take into account the fact that he had heard that evidence before giving his own."); T. 9 September 1999, p. 1373.

⁶³⁰ *See* Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 29(a).

allegation, namely that the Trial Chamber failed to acknowledge testimony by Prosecution Witnesses XX and GG, which, in his view, tend to provide Gérard Ntakirutimana with an alibi.

396. The Appellant does not provide sufficient detail to enable the Appeals Chamber to consider his contention that the Trial Chamber failed to acknowledge relevant testimony of Witness GG. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's brief states that "GG has Doctor Gerard at his father's house after the whites left...."⁶³¹ However, the transcript reference given for this quotation in the brief is for a different witness, Witness DD. As has been repeatedly stated: "In order for the Appeals Chamber to assess the appealing party's arguments on appeal, the appealing party is expected to provide precise references to relevant transcript pages ... to which the challenge is being made."⁶³² Absent a specific reference, the Appeals Chamber cannot be expected to consider the given submission.⁶³³

397. The Appellant also argues that the Trial Chamber failed to acknowledge the testimony of Witness XX that Gérard Ntakirutimana began staying at his father's house from 12 April 1994.⁶³⁴ In the section dealing with the alleged denial of treatment of Tutsi patients, the Trial Chamber recalled the testimony of Witness XX that on 13, 14, and 15 April 1994 he did not see Gérard Ntakirutimana at the hospital and that "it was said that he was living at his father's."⁶³⁵ The Appeals Chamber finds no error in the fact that the Trial Chamber did not expressly recall this testimony later in the Judgement when discussing Gérard Ntakirutimana's alibi for 15 and 16 April, as it is clear that the Trial Chamber was aware of and has considered Witness XX's evidence. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

I. Failure to Consider the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss

398. The Appellants submit that the Trial Chamber erred in denying their Pre-Trial Motion to Dismiss.⁶³⁶ The Motion was predicated on the following grounds: (1) that the trial would violate the fundamental rights of the Accused to present their defence and confront witnesses against them;⁶³⁷ (2) that the proceedings against the Accused would violate guarantees of equal protection and prohibitions on discrimination enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;⁶³⁸ (3) that the proceedings would violate

⁶³¹ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 74.

⁶³² *Niyitegeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 10.

⁶³³ *Id.*

⁶³⁴ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 73-74.

⁶³⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 147 citing T. 22 October 2001, pp. 97-99.

⁶³⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 84.

⁶³⁷ Motion to Dismiss, 16 February 2001, p. 13. The Appeals Chamber notes that while the original Motion was raised as a "Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Supplemental Motion for the Production and Disclosure of Evidence and Other Discovery Materials," the Appellants allege error only with regards to the Trial Chamber's rejection of "The Accused's Motion to Dismiss." (Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 84.).

⁶³⁸ *Id.*, p. 24.

guarantees of independence and impartiality in criminal proceedings also guaranteed by the UDHR and the ICCPR;⁶³⁹ and (4) that the Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council to establish a criminal court such as the Tribunal.⁶⁴⁰

399. The Appellants now contend that the Motion to Dismiss should be "continuously considered in light of the developing law and facts," and so should be considered anew by the Appeals Chamber despite its denial at trial.⁶⁴¹ However, the Appellants do not point to any area of law or specific facts that have changed significantly since trial such that renewed consideration of the Motion would be warranted. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber's reasoning in the Motion was sound, and its decision to reject the Motion was in line with established jurisprudence of both the Tribunal and the ICTY. Therefore, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

⁶³⁹ *Id.*, p 30.

⁶⁴⁰ *Id.*, p. 36.

⁶⁴¹ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p 84.

IV. COMMON GROUND OF APPEAL ON THE EXISTENCE OF A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE APPELLANTS

400. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana argue that the Trial Chamber erred by not ruling that physical and testimonial evidence presented at trial demonstrated that there existed a political campaign aimed at falsely incriminating them, and that such campaign created a reasonable doubt in the case of the Prosecution.⁶⁴²

401. In support of this ground of appeal, the Appellants revisit the evidence that they presented at trial, and contend that this evidence proves the very existence of the political campaign. The Appellants rely on Exhibits 1D41A, a film narrated by a certain Assiel Kabera, and P29, a publication by *African Rights* entitled "Charge Sheet No. 3: Elizaphan Ntakirutimana",⁶⁴³ as well as the testimony of Witnesses 9 and 31. The Appellants suggest that Assiel Kabera, a former Prefect of Kibuye, his brother Josue Kayijaho, IBUKA (a survivor's organisation in Rwanda) and *African Rights* campaigned to "vilify and secure the indictment of [Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana] on fabricated charges." They submit that this campaign led Prosecution Witnesses FF, GG, HH, KK, YY, SS, MM, DD, CC and II to make false allegations at trial, thereby calling into question their credibility.⁶⁴⁴

A. Assessment of the Appellants' Witnesses and Evidence

1. Witness 9

402. The Appellants argue that Defence Witness 9 provided incontrovertible proof of the existence of a political campaign against them. The Appellants refer to Witness 9's testimony that he saw the then Prefect Assiel Kabera, Witnesses FF and GG and others attend four closed meetings between November 1994 and March 1995 "to secure indictments against the Appellants", as well as seeing Witness FF at a public meeting during which accusations were levied against three individuals. In addition, the Appellants refer to the witness's testimony that a certain Edison Munyamulinda was allegedly beaten for failing to add his name to a list of persons who were

⁶⁴² *Id.* In the Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber found that "the arguments advanced by the Defense under this section, taken individually or collectively, fail to create a reasonable possibility that the Accused were subject to a campaign of false incrimination, having any bearing on this case." Trial Judgement, para. 177.

⁶⁴³ "Charge Sheet No. 3, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, U. S. Supreme Court Supports Extradition to Arusha", report of African Rights, dated 1 February 2000 and tendered on 2 November 2001 as Exhibit P29.

⁶⁴⁴ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 76.

making false accusations against Gérard Ntakirutimana. They contend that the witness's testimony is corroborated by the evidence of Witnesses QQ, and 31, and Exhibits P29 and 1D41A.⁶⁴⁵

403. The Trial Chamber assessed the evidence of Witness 9 at length in its Judgement. Regarding the closed meetings attended by Witnesses FF and GG and Kabera, it noted that Witness 9 did not personally know what had been discussed during the actual meetings, the witness having testified that he did not attend any of them.⁶⁴⁶ In addition, it reasoned that meetings held during and after November 1994 were not relevant to the Appellants given that they had left Rwanda in July 1994 and that Witness 9 alleged that the objective of the meetings was to plan the arrest of people they did not like within the region.⁶⁴⁷ Finally, the Trial Chamber considered the only evidence which may have suggested that the meetings were held to falsely accuse individuals, that of a confrontation between the witness and an individual – neither Witness FF nor GG – who, having come out of a bar, allegedly tried to obtain more beer by threatening the witness to “do what he had done to others”, citing the name of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.⁶⁴⁸ The Appeals Chamber notes that Witness 9 testified that he did not know what the man intended to do and that the man never said what it was that he would do.⁶⁴⁹

404. The Trial Chamber concluded that even were these events to have occurred as described by Witness 9, “a vague suggestion of false accusation does not ... amount to a reasonable probability that the Accused was a victim of a propaganda campaign.”⁶⁵⁰

405. The Trial Chamber also examined Witness 9's testimony that a man was assaulted for failing to make false accusations against Gérard Ntakirutimana.⁶⁵¹ The Trial Chamber noted however that upon cross-examination Witness 9 testified to an alternative explanation for the assault on Munyamulinda, which was not related to his refusal to accuse Gérard Ntakirutimana.⁶⁵² It added that, in any case, the incident occurred sometime in September 1994 while the meetings involving Kabera and Witnesses FF and GG did not commence until November 1994,⁶⁵³ and that Munyamulinda was not a Prosecution witness. Further, the Trial Chamber noted that Witness 9

⁶⁴⁵ *Id.*, pp. 82-83.

⁶⁴⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 762.

⁶⁴⁷ *Id.*, para. 766.

⁶⁴⁸ *Id.*, para. 761; T. 29 April 2002, pp. 86-88; T. 30 April 2002, pp. 66-69.

⁶⁴⁹ T. 29 April 2002, p. 86; T. 30 April 2002, p. 68.

⁶⁵⁰ Trial Judgement, para. 766. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber used the words “reasonable probability” rather than “reasonable possibility.” However, such word choice, when viewed contextually, appears to be a merely a typographical mistake. The standard adopted and consistently applied by the Trial Chamber is one of reasonable possibility.

⁶⁵¹ Trial Judgement, paras. 764, 767.

⁶⁵² T. 30 April 2002, p. 69, Witness 9 testified, “Now, coming to details, the fact that he was beaten up in public, that was not told to me because I myself was present at the spot. Now, as for what he told me regarding the reason for his beating, he told me that because the person whom he had wronged had pardoned him in public, but later on he was beaten up in public using the same pretext.”

never stated that Munyamulinda was pressured to make “false” accusations.⁶⁵⁴ Accordingly, the Trial Chamber found that the assault was, at most, an isolated incident and did not create a reasonable possibility of a political campaign against the Appellants. It added moreover that no connection had been shown to exist between the assault on Munyamulinda and the Prosecution’s case.⁶⁵⁵

406. In their submissions, the Appellants have merely restated evidence already heard by the Trial Chamber, and sought only to present their interpretation of the evidence without addressing the findings of the Trial Chamber. In light of the evidence, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that the Trial Chamber’s findings are reasonable. As such, the Appeals Chamber sees no reason to disturb the findings of the Trial Chamber in relation to the evidence of Witness 9.

2. Witness 31

407. The Appellants argue that the Trial Chamber erred in ruling that the testimony of Witness 31 did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of the existence of an organized campaign of false incrimination.⁶⁵⁶ They claim that Witness 31 provided clear evidence linking Assiel Kabera to the creation of unsupported, politically motivated lists of alleged *génocidaires* that later led to their indictment.⁶⁵⁷ Additionally, the Appellants point to Witness 31’s testimony that Josue Kayijaho of IBUKA and Rakiya Omaar of *African Rights* visited the Minister of Justice shortly after the publication of the lists.⁶⁵⁸ The Appellants contend that Witness 31’s evidence provides a “direct link” between the *African Rights* report, Exhibit P29, the “propaganda” film, Exhibit 1D41A, and the tainted oral testimony of Witness QQ that was a direct result of these exhibits, and that it corroborated Witness 9’s evidence about the meetings between Witnesses FF, GG and Kabera.⁶⁵⁹

408. The Appeals Chamber notes that, as with much of the Appellants’ appeal on the existence of a political campaign, in their submissions on Witness 31, the Appellants again do not specifically address the findings of the Trial Chamber to show their unreasonableness. Rather, they simply recall the evidence of Witness 31 and suggest conclusions which differ from those of the Trial Chamber.

409. In considering the testimony of Witness 31, the Trial Chamber carefully reviewed the witness’s evidence that, while working for the Rwandan Minister of Justice, Witness 31 handled

⁶⁵³ T. 29 April 2002, p. 119.

⁶⁵⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 767.

⁶⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁵⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 84.

⁶⁵⁷ *Id.*, p. 83.

⁶⁵⁸ *Id.*, p. 84.

⁶⁵⁹ *Id.*

files which contained lists of names received from Kabera and other persons. The Trial Chamber noted that according to the witness the lists were entitled "List of *Génocidaires*" or "Lists of people who were involved in genocide", "who killed", "who raped", "who looted", "those who ate cows", and only had basic identification of individuals. It further noted from the witness's testimony that the Minister of Justice titled the document "List of Alleged *Génocidaires*," and agreed that no charges should be included on the list, as this was the task of a prosecutor. The Trial Chamber remarked that the witness did not mention having seen the names of the Appellants on the list and did not suggest that the lists were false accusations by Kabera or anyone else.⁶⁶⁰

410. The Appellants have raised no new issues relating to this and fail to show that the Trial Chamber unreasonably committed an error in its findings on Witness 31. The Appeals Chamber notes that the evidence of Witness 31 does not support the Appellants' claim of the existence of a political campaign to falsely accuse them. The evidence does show that in the last quarter of 1994, the Ministry of Justice compiled a list of persons who were alleged to have committed offences during the massacres. The names of 400 persons appeared on the list, including former ministers, prefects, members of parliament and authorities. However, although Assiel Kabera provided the Ministry with details of possible suspects, the witness testified that there were many papers in addition to his on which appeared the names of possible suspects. Further, her testimony does not indicate that people on the documents had been falsely accused. More importantly, the witness did not testify to seeing the names of the Appellants.⁶⁶¹ In view of the facts presented, therefore, and absent convincing arguments from the Appellants, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber's evaluation of the lists and of Kabera's relationship to them is reasonable and need not be disturbed.

411. While the Trial Chamber did not find explicitly on the topic of Josue Kayijaho and Rakiya Omaar's purported visit to the Minister of Justice, it is reasonable to assume that the Chamber took this into account in its overall evaluation of the political campaign. The evidence shows that the meeting lasted only long enough for Kayijaho and Omaar to greet the Minister and leave,⁶⁶² and Witness 31 does not testify to their having any known political motivation. The Appellants have simply reiterated their interpretation of the evidence, and do not present a valid challenge to the reasonability of the Trial Chamber's finding. The Appeals Chamber therefore rejects this element of their appeal.

⁶⁶⁰ T. 15 April 2002, pp. 76-94; Trial Judgement, paras. 769-770.

⁶⁶¹ *Id.*, para. 771. The Trial Chamber found "There is no indication that the list from Assiel Kabera was the product of a campaign of false incrimination; there is no evidence connecting Kabera's list to the two Accused; and there is no evidence that the compilation of lists by the Rwandan Minister of Justice in late 1994, as described by Witness 31, has somehow tainted subsequent investigations by the Prosecutor of the Tribunal."

⁶⁶² T. 15 April 2002, p. 111.

3. Film 1D41A

412. The Appellants argue that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to find that film 1D41A showed the possibility of a politically motivated campaign against them.⁶⁶³ They submit that the film was vicious propaganda directed against Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.⁶⁶⁴

413. The Trial Chamber points out that, from the evidence of the Appellants, the film was probably taken in April 1995, although Witness 9 suggested that it may have been produced after July 1995. The Trial Chamber notes that the film opens with a narration, allegedly by Assiel Kabera, stating that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was present during the killings at the ESI Chapel. Prosecution Witnesses FF and MM are seen speaking on the film, but the content of their statements was not made available to the Trial Chamber by the Defence.⁶⁶⁵

414. The Appellants' argument seems to be, first, that the film shows that Kabera intended to falsely incriminate Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, and, second, that Kabera's pronouncements would have had a far reaching effect in a Rwandan society "with an oral tradition of a simple largely illiterate population, where people often do not distinguish between what they see and what they hear and believe".⁶⁶⁶ Yet the evidence would appear to contradict the Appellants' arguments. As the Appellants point out, neither Witness FF nor Witness MM, who appeared on the film, claimed in their witness statements or testimony that they saw either Appellant at the ESI Chapel on 16 April 1994. Although this might suggest that Kabera's statements about Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's involvement may have been untrue, it did not lead Witnesses FF and MM to subsequently incriminate Elizaphan Ntakirutimana. Additionally, as the Trial Chamber noted, Witness 9, who viewed the film prior to testifying, recalled a voice near the middle of the video stating that "Pastor Ntakirutimana had done nothing in regard to the events of 1994."⁶⁶⁷ The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber, that had this film been intended to be part of a campaign of false incrimination, it would not likely have contained exculpatory statements of this kind.⁶⁶⁸

415. In light of the evidence, the Appeals Chamber does not view the Trial Chamber's finding that, even if Kabera made allegations against Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and asked Witness FF to speak about the attack on Mugonero, no other related evidence supports the idea that film 1D41A was part of a campaign of deceit against the Appellants, or that it tainted the Prosecution's case, to

⁶⁶³ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 77-80, 82-84.

⁶⁶⁴ *Id.*, p. 84.

⁶⁶⁵ Trial Judgement, paras. 754, 772.

⁶⁶⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 78; Trial Judgement, para. 772.

⁶⁶⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 772; T. 29 April 2002, p. 156; T. 30 April 2002, pp. 96-97.

⁶⁶⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 772.

be unreasonable.⁶⁶⁹ The Appellants offer no new argument to the contrary. Their contentions on this point are thus rejected.

4. African Rights Booklet P29

416. The Appellants argue that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to find a reasonable possibility of an organized smear campaign from Exhibit P29, a booklet published by *African Rights*.⁶⁷⁰ They submit that the repeated quotes by Prosecution Witnesses FF, GG, HH, II, KK, MM, SS and YY are generally extreme and inconsistent or contradictory with their trial testimony.⁶⁷¹ The Appellants contend that every page of the issue concerning Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contains "obvious editorial and quoted false propaganda," and urge the Appeals Chamber to read the edition with care.⁶⁷² The Appellants finally assert impropriety and collusion in the fact that many of those interviewed by *African Rights* later became Prosecution witnesses.⁶⁷³

417. The Trial Chamber made reasonable findings on each of these issues. Noting the symptomatic nature of witness inconsistencies in Tribunal cases, the Trial Chamber maintained that the Appellants had not demonstrated how such inconsistencies, while pertaining to individual credibility, had genuine bearing on a "concerted effort to fabricate evidence against the Accused."⁶⁷⁴ Despite the Appellants' exhortations, the Appeals Chamber will not review the trial evidence *de novo*. Even if there were some merit in the arguments of the Appellants that the contents of the report are at times extreme and inconsistent with the witnesses' subsequent testimony at trial, this alone does not establish that the Prosecution case was tainted or that the witnesses' evidence was unreliable. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber, as fact finder, made reasonable conclusions based on the evidence presented. All of the witnesses in question who the Appellant submits formed part of the political campaign and who are quoted in the report had their evidence tested by the parties and the Trial Chamber. Additionally, the Trial Chamber found that the Appellants have failed to establish in any non-speculative way how giving an interview to *African Rights* prior to testifying before the Tribunal indicates a campaign of deceit of the sort that would taint the Prosecution's case.⁶⁷⁵ Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber's findings in relation to Exhibit P 29 are reasonable.

⁶⁶⁹ *Id.*, para. 773.

⁶⁷⁰ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 79.

⁶⁷¹ *Id.*

⁶⁷² *Id.*

⁶⁷³ *Id.*, p. 80.

⁶⁷⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 774.

⁶⁷⁵ *Id.*

B. Appellants' Challenges to Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

418. In addition to the argument that there existed a political campaign instigated by Assiel Kabera and others, the Appellants contend that the Trial Chamber erred in its assessment of the credibility of Prosecution witnesses. The Appellants argue that, motivated by political propaganda, Prosecution Witnesses GG, HH, KK, YY, SS, FF, MM, DD, CC and II fabricated allegations, testimony, or both.⁶⁷⁶ The Appellants point to inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony of Prosecution witnesses, and submit that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to "make adverse credibility findings" regarding Prosecution witnesses and in relying on testimony given by such witnesses.⁶⁷⁷

419. The Appellants allege that inconsistencies in testimony of the various witnesses are evidence of political pressure on witnesses, and thus reinforce their contention of a political campaign to falsely incriminate them. Furthermore, the Appellants point to the very identities and associations of the witnesses as evidence of their political motivations. The Appellants' theory is that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on the testimony of these witnesses, whether for their alleged political motivations, or for their inconsistent testimony (in itself evidence of a political campaign, according to the Appellants).

420. As detailed below, the Appellants generally fail to show how individual discrepancies or inconsistencies in testimony prove a concerted propaganda campaign against them. While such inconsistencies may call into question the credibility of a witness's testimony, the Trial Chamber has already dealt with each of the allegations. The same can be said of links between witnesses and groups or individuals seeking indictment or prosecution of the Appellants: while probative of the credibility of a witness's testimony, and duly noted by the Trial Chamber, such alleged associations do not prove the existence of an organized political campaign against the Appellants.

421. The Appeals Chamber reviews below each of the Appellants' challenges to the credibility of said Prosecution witnesses.

1. Witness GG

422. The Appellants claim, *inter alia*, that Witness GG could not have reasonably been found credible since he had long been acquainted with Assiel Kabera.⁶⁷⁸ The Appellants, quoting from the *African Rights* report discussed above, allege that Witness GG made false claims against Elizaphan

⁶⁷⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 76, 79.

⁶⁷⁷ *Id.*, p. 31.

⁶⁷⁸ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 8-9.

Ntakirutimana because of a desire to "destroy [the Appellant Elizaphan], whom he called 'evil'".⁶⁷⁹ They categorize him as an "early participant" in the alleged campaign, eager to have the Appellants convicted on false testimony.⁶⁸⁰ In addition, the Appellants submit that Witness GG had attended IBUKA meetings and talked to IBUKA representatives, although the witness denied this at trial.⁶⁸¹

423. The Trial Chamber found that Witness GG knew Assiel Kabera and met with him in early 1995. However, since the Appellants presented no convincing evidence pertaining to the content of the meetings, the Trial Chamber accepted Witness GG's testimony that he and Kabera had not discussed the war.⁶⁸² Additionally, the Trial Chamber found only "limited significance" in the fact that *African Rights* interviewed Witness GG, noting that in the aftermath of the genocide, many human rights organizations interviewed survivors.⁶⁸³ As the Appeals Chamber noted above, even if Witness GG's statements to *African Rights* were to be deemed questionable, this alone would not suffice to call into question his credibility. The witness's evidence was tested at trial by the parties and the Trial Chamber. The allegations of the Appellants that the witness "wanted to destroy them" as part of a political campaign, were considered by the Trial Chamber who found no basis for such claims. In the absence of any arguments from the Appellants that differ from those presented at trial, the Appeals Chamber finds the Trial Chamber's credibility evaluation of Witness GG reasonable.

2. Witness HH

424. The Appellants claim, *inter alia*, that Witness HH could not have reasonably been found credible since he first denied, then admitted to being a cousin of Assiel Kabera, with whom he met while Kabera was prefect of Kibuye.⁶⁸⁴ The Appellants cast doubt on Witness HH's credibility by stating that he listed Josea Niyibize, a brother of Kabera, as his contact person in a 2 April 1996 witness statement.⁶⁸⁵ They suggest that the witness was intimately involved with people who were determined to destroy the Appellants, and cite a discrepancy between the *reported* contents of an *African Rights* interview with HH and his in-court testimony as evidence in this regard.⁶⁸⁶

425. The Trial Chamber took into account Witness HH's inconsistent testimony regarding his relation to Kabera, noting the fact that Witness HH corrected himself under cross-examination to

⁶⁷⁹ *Id.*, pp. 9, 81.

⁶⁸⁰ *Id.*, pp. 46-47.

⁶⁸¹ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 112-116.

⁶⁸² Trial Judgement, para. 237; T. 25 September 2001, p. 51.

⁶⁸³ Trial Judgement, para. 237.

⁶⁸⁴ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 19.

⁶⁸⁵ *Id.*; Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 46.

⁶⁸⁶ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 19, 81.

state that he was related to Kabera and had known him for a long time.⁶⁸⁷ Recalling that Kabera had been a prominent figure as prefect of Kibuye, the Chamber found no evidence suggesting that meetings between Witness HH and Kabera related to the case against the Appellants. It therefore did not find a basis for concluding that Kabera had influenced HH's witness statements or testimony.⁶⁸⁸ Furthermore, the Trial Chamber included in its analysis the fact that Witness HH listed his cousin, a brother of Kabera and alleged member of IBUKA, as contact reference for his written statement of 2 April 1996.⁶⁸⁹ The witness denied having knowingly communicated with either IBUKA or the RPF, and the Appellants failed to raise contrary evidence at trial.⁶⁹⁰ In regard to the Appellants' argument that Witness HH was part of a group with *African Rights* set on destroying the Appellants, the Trial Chamber stipulated that during Witness HH's testimony, neither the Prosecution nor the Defence addressed his brief statements in *African Rights*.⁶⁹¹ The Trial Chamber concluded its analysis by finding "no support for the Defence contention that Witness HH was part of a political 'campaign' to falsely convict and accuse the two Accused."⁶⁹² The Appellants have raised no new arguments with regards to Witness HH's connection to a political campaign. The Appeals Chamber therefore finds the conclusions of the Trial Chamber to have been reasonable.

3. Witness KK

426. The Appellants claim, *inter alia*, that the Trial Chamber could not have reasonably found Witness KK credible due to discrepancies between statements he gave to *African Rights* and his in-court testimony.⁶⁹³ Additionally, the Appellants claim impropriety in Witness KK's friendship with YY and the fact that both witnesses gave statements to *African Rights* on 17 November 1999, and gave their first statements to the Tribunal in October and November, respectively, of the same year.⁶⁹⁴ The Appellants do not explain how these facts connect Witness KK to a political campaign.

427. The Trial Chamber extensively evaluated Witness KK's credibility and testimony.⁶⁹⁵ It noted, generally, that the Appellants claimed the witness was not credible because of his alleged participation in a political campaign against Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana.⁶⁹⁶ The Trial Chamber also considered the question of the time at which the witness saw Elizaphan

⁶⁸⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 253; T. 27 September 2001, pp. 132-134.

⁶⁸⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 253.

⁶⁸⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁶⁹¹ *Id.*, para. 254.

⁶⁹² *Id.*

⁶⁹³ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 20.

⁶⁹⁴ *Id.*, p. 21.

⁶⁹⁵ Trial Judgement, paras. 261-267, 544-549, 599-608.

⁶⁹⁶ *Id.*, paras. 545, 600.

Ntakirutimana with Obed Ruzindana near the ESI Church, and found the related inconsistencies of little significance in light of the amount of time that had passed since the events.⁶⁹⁷ Additionally, while accepting that Witness KK's testimony on this issue corroborated evidence from other witnesses, the Trial Chamber did "not place great weight on [it] because of doubts created by the discrepancies."⁶⁹⁸ The Appellants do not here substantiate their allegation that such inconsistencies were "[lies] to destroy Pastor Ntakirutimana."⁶⁹⁹ The Trial Chamber demonstrated that it took such allegations into consideration while evaluating Witness KK's credibility and came to a reasonable conclusion.

428. In regards to allegations of improper connections between Witness KK and Witness YY, while the Trial Chamber does not specifically address the issue, it does note that Witness KK and Witness YY listed each other as contact persons, and that Witness YY held public office at the local level and was therefore easy to contact.⁷⁰⁰ While Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Appeal Brief stresses the close relationship between Witness KK and Witness YY, it fails to provide any new evidence of impropriety on the part of Witness KK. Indeed, Witness KK stated at trial that he did not talk to Witness YY concerning the investigation or the Tribunal.⁷⁰¹ The Appellants offer no argument to the contrary, but rather rely on reiterated facts and implications. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber does not find the Trial Chamber's assessment of Witness KK's credibility unreasonable, even in light of the Appellants' allegations of political influence or motivation.

4. Witness YY

429. The Appellants claim, *inter alia*, that the Trial Chamber erred in finding Witness YY credible.⁷⁰² They seem to allege collusion between Witnesses YY, KK and GG based on the temporal proximity with which the three witnesses gave statements to both Prosecution investigators and *African Rights*.⁷⁰³ They claim that Witness YY had a politically motivated "animus and intention to destroy Pastor Ntakirutimana and Doctor Gérard" as evinced by statements to *African Rights* and that he was the leader of a second wave of political witnesses against the Appellants.⁷⁰⁴ Finally, the Appellants cast aspersions on Witness YY, claiming he

⁶⁹⁷ *Id.*, paras. 265-266, "The Chamber is of the view that the variation in time is of little significance (8.00 instead of 7.00-7.30 a.m.), in view of the lapse of time since the events."

⁶⁹⁸ *Id.*, para. 267.

⁶⁹⁹ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 21.

⁷⁰⁰ Trial Judgement, para. 275.

⁷⁰¹ T. 4 October 2001, pp. 41-43.

⁷⁰² Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 24.

⁷⁰³ *Id.*, p. 23.

⁷⁰⁴ *Id.*, pp. 23-24.

reserved his allegations against the Appellants for the last six lines of his witness statement with the intention of "holding his attack until the trial."⁷⁰⁵

430. The Trial Chamber took into account each of these allegations. As with Witness KK, the Appellants fail to bolster their claims linking Witnesses YY and KK or GG; their reliance on suggestion and implication creates neither a new nor a compelling argument. The Trial Chamber addressed the Appellants' claim that Witness YY started a "second wave of politically motivated witnesses."⁷⁰⁶ The Trial Chamber noted the Appellants' assertion that the first evidence of a political campaign took the form of the video recording ID41A,⁷⁰⁷ filmed on or around 16 April 1995. It then noted that Witness YY gave his statement on 25 October 1999, more than four and half years later.⁷⁰⁸ The Appeals Chamber deems reasonable the Trial Chamber's conclusion on this matter: such an extended break between the alleged commencement of the campaign and the "second wave" of allegations is more indicative of the absence of an organized campaign than the existence of one.⁷⁰⁹ With regards to Witness YY's previous statements, rather than viewing Witness YY's brief comments regarding Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana as indicia of animus, the Trial Chamber interpreted the last paragraph as likely evidence that Witness YY's interviewers, in conclusion, specifically asked him about the Appellants.⁷¹⁰ The Trial Chamber noted that were Witness YY involved in a political campaign against the Appellants, he would likely have made more damning statements about the Appellants, rather than merely describing their conduct in a cursory manner.⁷¹¹ Such a conclusion is reasonable in the view of the Appeals Chamber.

5. Witness SS

431. The Appellants claim, *inter alia*, that the Trial Chamber erred in finding Witness SS credible.⁷¹² Gérard Ntakirutimana asserts that Witness SS's awareness of Philip Gourevitch's book⁷¹³ influenced his testimony and undermined his impartiality, making it impossible for the Trial Chamber to accept his testimony.⁷¹⁴ Additionally, the Appellants state that Witness SS listed a hospital co-worker, the son of Charles Ukobizaba, as his contact person; they highlight their

⁷⁰⁵ *Id.*, p. 25; Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 138.

⁷⁰⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 275.

⁷⁰⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁰⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁰⁹ *Id.*

⁷¹⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹¹ *Id.*

⁷¹² Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 119-120.

⁷¹³ Gourevitch, Philip, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*, 1998.

⁷¹⁴ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 120.

incredulity at the witness's statement that he had not discussed the case with this man to whom they attribute "an obvious interest in securing the conviction of Gérard Ntakirutimana."⁷¹⁵

432. The Trial Chamber noted the Appellants' general submission that Witness SS was part of a political campaign.⁷¹⁶ Consequently, the Appeals Chamber deems it reasonable to assume that the Trial Chamber took the allegation into consideration when evaluating the witness's credibility, even if it did not expressly discuss the Appellants' specific allegations against Witness SS. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that in writing a reasoned opinion the Trial Chamber need not address every detail that influences its conclusion. In regard to Gourevitch's book and the letter mentioned therein, the Trial Chamber noted that Witness SS was but one of five Prosecution witnesses (Witnesses MM, YY, GG, HH and SS) who testified concerning the letter.⁷¹⁷ Witness SS only mentioned the book in his statement, and did not mention the book in his testimony. While the Appellants referenced the statement in their Closing Brief,⁷¹⁸ they refrained from cross-examining the witness on this issue. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber found Witness SS generally credible, though it did find portions of his testimony unpersuasive.⁷¹⁹ While the Appellants continue to reject Witness SS's contention that he refrained from discussing the case with Charles Ukobizaba's son, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Appellants submit no evidence to contradict this assertion.

6. Witness FF

433. The Appellants claim, *inter alia*, that the Trial Chamber erred in finding Witness FF credible.⁷²⁰ The Appellants contend that she constituted part of the second wave of witnesses organized by Kabera to falsely incriminate them.⁷²¹ The Appellants link Witness FF to Kabera and the alleged political campaign by evidence that she met with him in late 1994 and 1995 and by her appearance in video recording 1D41A.⁷²² The Appellants point to a scene in the video during which another interviewee, when asked how he knew a fact to be true, pointed to Witness FF and said, "[s]he told me."⁷²³ Gérard Ntakirutimana claims Witness FF's testimony was "influenced or orchestrated," and points specifically to the fact that the witness's statements became increasingly

⁷¹⁵ *Id.*

⁷¹⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 622.

⁷¹⁷ *Id.*, paras. 206-207.

⁷¹⁸ Defence Closing Brief, p. 158.

⁷¹⁹ Trial Judgement, paras. 392-393 (disbelieving SS's testimony that Gérard Ntakirutimana shot at him); para. 578 (finding SS's testimony that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana said that God ordered the killing and extermination of Tutsi).

⁷²⁰ See generally Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 153-161.

⁷²¹ *Id.*, para. 154.

⁷²² *Id.*, paras. 154-155; Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 78-79, 82.

⁷²³ Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 155.

detailed, in some instances implicating Gérard Ntakirutimana in court where the witness had not done so in earlier statements.⁷²⁴

434. As discussed in relation to Witness YY, the Trial Chamber was unconvinced of the existence of a “second wave” of witnesses against the Appellants.⁷²⁵ The Trial Chamber noted the Appellants’ general contention that Witness FF participated in a political campaign.⁷²⁶ However, regarding her association with Assiel Kabera, the Trial Chamber found that the witness denied discussing the genocide with him.⁷²⁷ The Trial Chamber also noted that the witness avoided incriminating Gérard Ntakirutimana when she had insufficient basis to involve him and that she appeared credible in court.⁷²⁸

435. With no new arguments nor a minimum showing of specific contradictory evidence from the Appellants, the Trial Chamber’s credibility conclusions do not seem unreasonable to the Appeals Chamber. Neither does the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Witness FF’s contribution to record 1D41A. The Trial Chamber found nothing to undermine her credibility in the fact that she was interviewed as a survivor of the 16 April 1994 attack on the Mugonero Complex.⁷²⁹ Furthermore, Witness FF testified to having been interviewed by a man named Raymond Rutabayira, not Assiel Kabera, and that she was unaware of anyone else in the film who made reference to her as a source of information.⁷³⁰ Considering that the Appellants did not provide convincing arguments or evidence to refute this testimony, the Appeals Chamber does not find the Trial Chamber’s conclusion to have been unreasonable. Similarly, the Trial Chamber’s failing to find a connection between Witness FF and *African Rights* or any human rights organization⁷³¹ does not seem unreasonable.

436. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber addressed at length the increasing detail and enlarged role of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana presented by Witness FF in her later statements and testimony.⁷³² The Trial Chamber analyzed the claim in relationship to

⁷²⁴ *Id.*, para. 195.

⁷²⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 275.

⁷²⁶ *Id.*, paras. 129, 537, 671.

⁷²⁷ *Id.*, para. 129; T. 1 October 2001, pp. 62-63 “Mr. Medvene: Didn’t Assiel [sic] Kabera speak to you in 1995 about what occurred, to your knowledge, in April of 1994? Witness FF: No, we did not speak about the events that took place in April 1994 ... Mr. Medvene: And is it true, Madam Witness, that sometime in 1995 Assiel [sic] Kabera asked you questions about your knowledge of the occurrences in April of 1994 while you were being videoed? Witness FF: No, I think the person to whom I spoke about these events was the sous-préfet [sic], but that sous-préfet was not from Kibuye originally.”

⁷²⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 542.

⁷²⁹ *Id.*, para. 129.

⁷³⁰ T. 1 October 2001, pp. 68-69, 71-72.

⁷³¹ Trial Judgement, para. 129.

⁷³² See generally Trial Judgement, paras. 127-130; footnote 160 reads “The first statement of 10 October 1995, is a general account of events at the Complex and Bisesero. The second, dated 14 November 1995, consists of responses to questions about Gérard Ntakirutimana. The third declaration of 10 April 1996 gives a description of the events at the

each specific event, finding the witness's testimony regarding events at the Mugonero Complex to have been credible.⁷³³ With regards to events in Bisesero, the Trial Chamber, noting Witness FF's general consistency in placing Gérard Ntakirutimana as a participant in the shootings, specifically found that "the information about Bisesero in Witness FF's written statements and in her testimony does not indicate that she formed part of a campaign to ensure [Gérard Ntakirutimana's] conviction."⁷³⁴ The Trial Chamber reasonably reconciled inconsistencies.⁷³⁵ With regards to events on Mutiti Hill, the Trial Chamber found Witness FF's testimony credible, pointing out that it was "clear and consistent [and] was not shaken under cross-examination."⁷³⁶ In light of the aforementioned explanations and in the absence of conflicting evidence or new arguments on the part of the Appellants, the Appeals Chamber does not find the Trial Chamber's evaluation of Witness FF's credibility and of the Appellants' argument that she formed part of a political campaign to have been unreasonable.

7. Witness II

437. The Appellants claim, *inter alia*, that the Trial Chamber erred in not concluding that testimony from Witness II provided "direct evidence of a witness being used as part of a campaign to falsely incriminate [Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana]." The Appellants point out that the witness bore striking similarities with an individual who gave a statement to *African Rights* on 19 November 1999.⁷³⁷

438. The Trial Chamber addressed the issue of Witness II's credibility.⁷³⁸ It noted the similarities between Witness II and the person interviewed by *African Rights*.⁷³⁹ However, lacking the full statement given to *African Rights* and noting discrepancies in the witness's explanations, the

Complex and in Bisesero. The fourth statement, signed on 21 October 1999, begins with the witness declaring that she had not been asked about rape or sexual offences in previous interviews. However, the interview provided no such information but contains another account of the Complex and Bisesero events. The fifth statement, dated 14 November 1998, relates to Alfred Musema and makes no reference to either Accused in the present case."

⁷³³ Trial Judgement, paras. 128, 130.

⁷³⁴ *Id.*, paras. 541, 542.

⁷³⁵ *Id.*, footnote 898 reads "According to Witness FF's second statement of 14 November 1995, Gérard Ntakirutimana 'had a gun and was shooting people from the top of a hill' in the company of, among others, Mathias Nginshuti. The witness 'saw him several times'. It follows from her third statement of 10 April 1996 that she saw Gérard Ntakirutimana in 'several attacks in Bisesero. He was always armed with a rifle and in company with Mathias Nginshuti', and she saw him in 'one attack actually shooting at people'. The fourth statement of 21 October 1999, which provides most details, refers to two Bisesero events, one in Murambi and one close to 'spring of water' near Gitwe Primary School Gitwe (including the exchange between the Accused and the refugees about him being the son of a pastor)."

⁷³⁶ Trial Judgement, para. 673.

⁷³⁷ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), pp. 79-81.

⁷³⁸ See generally Trial Judgement, paras. 652-655.

⁷³⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 654; "The Chamber notes that the witness and the person interviewed by African Rights bear the same first name and surname, are both farmers from Bisesero born in the same year, and both sustained a machete wound to the left of the head. These are striking similarities."

Chamber concluded that evidence from Witness II did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana participated in the attacks on Muyira Hill.⁷⁴⁰ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, such a conclusion is reasonable, and the Appellants have not presented evidence in support of their argument that the witness was used as part of political campaign to falsely accuse the Appellants.

8. Witnesses CC, DD, MM

439. The Appellants allege inconsistencies in testimony by Witnesses CC, DD and MM, and generally question their credibility.⁷⁴¹ It is unclear how such allegations go specifically to show the existence of a political campaign. Rather, the Appellants seem to collate Witnesses CC, DD and MM into a category of witnesses whose alleged testimonial inconsistencies weaken the Prosecution's case, thereby providing circumstantial evidence that a campaign existed. The alleged inconsistencies were addressed in sections of the Appeal dealing wholly with individual witness credibility. The Appeals Chamber does not consider that these alleged inconsistencies provide circumstantial evidence of a political campaign against the Appellants.

⁷⁴⁰ Trial Judgement, para. 655.

⁷⁴¹ Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana), CC, pp. 37, 76; DD, pp. 53, 76; MM, pp. 5, 76, 79.

V. PROSECUTION'S FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD GROUNDS OF APPEAL

440. Gérard Ntakirutimana was found guilty of genocide, under Count 1 of the Mugonero Indictment and under Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Tribunal's Statute. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was found guilty of aiding and abetting genocide under Count 1 of the Mugonero Indictment, though the Appeals Chamber has quashed this conviction, and under Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment, for aiding and abetting the killing and causing of serious bodily or mental harm to Tutsi in Bisesero pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute.

441. The Prosecution's first, second and third grounds of appeal⁷⁴² allege three errors of law related to the genocide convictions of Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana. The issues raised in these grounds of appeal overlap and the Prosecution has treated them together in the first part of its Appeal Brief. For the sake of clarity, the Appeals Chamber will follow the same approach.

442. First, the Prosecution alleges that the Trial Chamber erred in not applying joint criminal enterprise liability to determine the criminal responsibility of Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.⁷⁴³ Second, the Prosecution claims that the Trial Chamber erred in confining Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for genocide to acts of killing or serious bodily harm that he personally inflicted on Tutsi at the Mugonero Complex and Bisesero.⁷⁴⁴ Third, the Prosecution challenges the Trial Chamber's finding at paragraph 787(iii) of the Trial Judgement regarding the *mens rea* requirement for aiding and abetting the crime of genocide.⁷⁴⁵

443. The Appeals Chamber will address each of the three alleged errors successively. Before considering the arguments of the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber will consider an argument raised by both Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana that these three grounds of appeal are inadmissible.

A. Admissibility of the First Three Grounds of Appeal

444. Gérard Ntakirutimana challenges the admissibility of the Prosecution's first three grounds of appeal arguing that the Prosecution does not claim that the errors alleged would invalidate the Trial Chamber's verdict of conviction for genocide as required by Article 24 of the Statute as well as Article 4(b)(iii) of the Practice Direction on Formal Requirements for Appeals from Judgement.

⁷⁴² Prosecution's Notice of Appeal, 21 March 2003.

⁷⁴³ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.83.

⁷⁴⁴ Prosecution amended Notice of Appeal, Grounds 1 and 2 and Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.18.

⁷⁴⁵ Prosecution amended Notice of Appeal, p. 3 and Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.84.

Rather, he says, these grounds challenge the “bases” for this conviction,⁷⁴⁶ and are not appealable.⁷⁴⁷ Elizaphan Ntakirutimana joins in these arguments.⁷⁴⁸

445. In reply the Prosecution claims that with one partial exception – that is the error related to the correct *mens rea* for aiding and abetting genocide – its first three grounds of appeal raise errors that do have a direct impact on the Trial Chamber’s decisions as to the nature and extent of Gérard Ntakirutimana’s and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana’s responsibility and are *also* matters of general importance.⁷⁴⁹ Its argument is that the Trial Chamber erred in its application of the law to the facts and therefore understated the nature and extent of culpability attributable to Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.⁷⁵⁰ The Prosecution argues that the Defence advances an unduly restrictive interpretation of Article 24 of the Statute that is unfair to all parties and is contrary to the existing jurisprudence. It argues that the phrase, “an error on a question of law invalidating the decision”, is sufficiently broad to cover grounds of appeal alleging errors that invalidate an aspect of the decision that impacts upon the nature or extent of the accused’s culpability.⁷⁵¹

446. Article 24(1) of the Statute refers only to errors of law *invalidating the decision*, that is legal errors which, if proven, affect the verdict. If the first alleged error of law (failure to apply joint criminal enterprise liability to determine the responsibility of Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana) is established and the related ground of appeal is successful, Gérard Ntakirutimana could be held responsible as a co-perpetrator of killings and infliction of serious bodily harm to members of the Tutsi group physically committed by others. Likewise, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana could be held responsible as a co-perpetrator of genocide, and not as a mere aider and abettor of genocide as found by the Trial Chamber. If the second alleged error of law (confining Gérard Ntakirutimana’s conviction for genocide to the acts of killing or serious bodily harm that he personally inflicted) is established a conviction could be entered against Gérard Ntakirutimana for killings and infliction of serious bodily harm to members of the Tutsi group physically committed by others, alternatively

⁷⁴⁶ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 1-6.

⁷⁴⁷ *Id.*, para. 22, which refers to para. 2 of the Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen in the *Akayesu* Appeal Judgement (“Declaration”) distinguishing an “appealable ground” from a “non-appealable issue” in that the former being “an error on a question of law invalidating the decision” while the later “may well raise an error on a question of law, but the error is not one which invalidates the decision. If the Trial Chamber committed an error in stating a proposition of law but the error did not affect the result of the decision, the error does not invalidate the decision; such an error is not an appealable ground.” It further refers to para. 4 of the Declaration which states with respect to non-appealable issues “although the Appeals Chamber cannot proceed as if it were allowing an appeal, it may take notice of the erroneous proposition of law and state its own view as to what is the correct proposition.” According to the Prosecution, Judge Shahabuddeen’s concern was to exclude appeals where the error alleged “did not affect the result of the decision” at all which is not the case here (Prosecution’s Reply, para. 1.12).

⁷⁴⁸ Response (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 3.

⁷⁴⁹ Prosecution Reply, paras. 1.2-1.4.

⁷⁵⁰ *Id.*, paras. 1.7-1.10.

⁷⁵¹ *Id.*, paras. 1.11-1.24. The Prosecution relies in particular on the *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement (paras. 115-121, 216 and 250-257) and the *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement (para. 320).

Gérard Ntakirutimana could be held responsible for aiding and abetting the main perpetrators of genocide.

447. The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that, with the exception of the alleged error of law related to the *mens rea* for aiding and abetting genocide, the first three grounds of the Prosecution's appeal will, if successful, affect the verdict. As to the alleged error of law related to the *mens rea* for aiding and abetting genocide, the Appeals Chamber considers the ground to raise an issue of general importance for the case law of the Tribunal and will consider it on that basis.

B. Alleged Error in Not Applying the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine to Determine the Responsibility of Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana

448. The Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber erred in not applying joint criminal enterprise liability to determine the criminal responsibility of Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana for their participation in the genocide committed at Mugonero and Bisesero.⁷⁵² In making this argument the Prosecution acknowledges that it did not expressly raise this argument at trial,⁷⁵³ but claims that the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments, the Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief and the Prosecution's Closing Brief provide sufficient notice for the Prosecution to raise it on appeal.⁷⁵⁴

449. The Prosecution argues that it is not necessary to specify the precise mode of liability alleged against the accused in an indictment as long as it makes clear to the accused the nature and cause of the charge against him.⁷⁵⁵ It argues that the Indictments put the Accused on notice that the case against them included allegations of participation in crimes involving a number of persons⁷⁵⁶ and that it was clear from the Indictments that the criminal purpose alleged was to kill and wound Tutsis as part of a genocidal plan.⁷⁵⁷ As such, it claims that the absence of an express reference to joint criminal enterprise liability in the Indictments did not create any confusion or ambiguity about the nature and cause of the charges alleged against Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana.⁷⁵⁸

450. The Prosecution also argues that its Pre-Trial Brief, which did not specify a particular mode of responsibility, left it to the Trial Chamber's discretion to find the Accused guilty on the basis of

⁷⁵² Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2.24 and 2.83.

⁷⁵³ *Id.*, para. 2.57.

⁷⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁷⁵⁵ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.58.

⁷⁵⁶ *Id.*, para. 2.65.

⁷⁵⁷ *Id.*, para. 2.64 citing Mugonero Indictment paras. 4.7-4.10 and 5.

⁷⁵⁸ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.66. *See also id.*, para. 2.77, where the Prosecution stresses that the acts to be attributed to both Accused as participants in a joint criminal enterprise are the same that form part of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's conviction for aiding and abetting. That is, responsibility which arises for killing and serious bodily harm inflicted by the attackers with which both Accused acted in concert with at the Mugonero Complex and Bisesero between April and June 1994. Therefore, the Prosecution is not alleging that both Accused should be held responsible for different or new acts but, rather, that another classification of responsibility should be contemplated.

“any action encompassed by Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal”.⁷⁵⁹ It says that the factual allegations in the Pre-Trial Brief revealed the collective nature of the crimes with which Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana are charged and the common criminal plan Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana shared with the other attackers. It says that, taken together, the Indictments and Pre-Trial Brief were sufficient to put the accused on notice that the crimes alleged against them were collective in nature and that joint criminal enterprise liability could be applied.⁷⁶⁰

451. At the Appeal hearing, the Prosecution stressed that there is no requirement that express modes of liability must be pleaded in an indictment and that this was clear from several Appeals Chamber’s decisions such as *Aleksovski*, *Čelebići* and more recently *Krnojelac*. In *Krnojelac*, the Appeals Chamber stated quite clearly that the Prosecution’s obligation to address modes of liability is expressed as an obligation to make clear whether Article 7(1), or in the context of the ICTR Statute Article 6(1), is relied upon or whether Article 7(3) or, in the context of the ICTR Statute, Article 6(3) is relied upon.⁷⁶¹

452. The Prosecution also argues that it is common practice in the jurisprudence of the ICTY for accused to be found liable as participants in a joint criminal enterprise without that mode of liability being expressly pleaded in the indictment. Following this practice, it says it relied on Article 6(1) in general terms and that the reference to commission in Article 6(1) is broad enough to encompass the notion of joint criminal enterprise. It argues that this has been confirmed by the Appeals Chamber on a number of occasions, such as in the *Ojdanić* Joint Criminal Enterprise Appeal Decision.⁷⁶² Further, in its Pre-Trial Brief, it made it clear that the Trial Chamber had the authority to rely on any mode of liability, even if different to that expressly advanced by the Prosecution. It argues that the Appeals Chamber cannot allow an error in the classification of the responsibility of the Accused to stand on the basis that the Prosecution did not expressly label the joint criminal enterprise to describe their responsibility. The Trial Chamber’s duty to apply the law correctly exists independently of the Prosecution’s approach.⁷⁶³

⁷⁵⁹ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.69.

⁷⁶⁰ *Id.*, para. 2.73.

⁷⁶¹ Appeal Hearing, T. 8 July 2004, pp. 50-51.

⁷⁶² *Id.*, p. 51.

⁷⁶³ Appeal Hearing, T. 8 July 2004, pp. 50-54. In support of its argument the Prosecution refers to the *Furundžija* Trial Judgement, para. 189; *Kupreškić* Trial Judgement, para. 746; the *Stakić* Trial Judgement; the *Semanza* Trial Judgement, para. 397; and the *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, paras. 171-172.

453. At the Appeal hearing, the Prosecution also reiterated its argument that the application of joint criminal enterprise liability by the Appeals Chamber would not result in any unfair prejudice in the relevant sense of rendering the trial unfair.⁷⁶⁴

454. At the Appeal hearing, the Prosecution also repeated arguments made in its Appeal Brief that no prejudice would be suffered by the Accused by the application of joint criminal enterprise liability at this stage of the proceedings. It stressed that both Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana advanced a defence of alibi making it difficult to see how the defence would have been conducted differently if the Prosecution had referred specifically to joint criminal enterprise liability. In these circumstances, the Prosecution says that the onus is on the Defence to demonstrate how the Accused would be unfairly prejudiced by the application of joint criminal enterprise liability by the Appeals Chamber.⁷⁶⁵ It argued that the *Aleksovski*, *Čelebići* and *Krnojelac* appeal judgements support the argument that it is only where a failure to expressly plead a theory of liability causes ambiguity or impacts upon the ability of the accused to prepare a defence that a problem arises. It says that this is not the case here. The Accused made no complaint at trial of the Prosecution's pleading of Article 6(1) in its entirety and they cannot now complain that the Indictments were inadequate to advise them that all such forms of liability were alleged.⁷⁶⁶

455. In his response, Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the failure of the Prosecution to raise joint criminal enterprise liability at trial precludes it from being raised on appeal. He submits that the Prosecution is asking the Appeals Chamber to decide the issue *de novo* on appeal and that this amounts to requesting a new trial, which is not within the scope of the appellate function.⁷⁶⁷ Further, and contrary to the Prosecution's arguments that he had sufficient notice that a joint criminal enterprise case was being presented, Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that joint criminal enterprise liability is not specifically mentioned in the Indictments, pleadings, or the Opening and Closing Statements, and therefore that no notice was given of such an argument.⁷⁶⁸ He claims further that, as this mode of liability is rarely addressed by the ICTR, he was not on notice that joint criminal enterprise liability could be an issue.⁷⁶⁹

456. Gérard Ntakirutimana also submits that the Indictments do not meet the standard enunciated in the *Milutinović* Decision regarding the facts that must be pleaded with respect to allegations of

⁷⁶⁴ Appeal Hearing, T. 8 July 2004, pp. 55-56. In support the Prosecution referred to the *Tadić* Appeal Judgement; the *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement; and the *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement.

⁷⁶⁵ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.76.

⁷⁶⁶ Appeal Hearing, T. 8 July 2004, p. 57.

⁷⁶⁷ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 29-30.

⁷⁶⁸ *Id.*, paras. 32-33.

⁷⁶⁹ *Id.*, para. 36. In response to the Prosecution's argument based on the *Ojdanić* case, Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that the *Ojdanić* indictment specified that each of the accused participated in a joint criminal enterprise.

individual responsibility arising from participation in a joint criminal enterprise.⁷⁷⁰ Also, in his view, the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments do not meet the “test for sufficiency of indictments” set out in Article 17(4) of the Statute and enunciated in the *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement.⁷⁷¹ Moreover, Gérard Ntakirutimana claims that the Prosecution’s invitation, in its Pre-Trial Brief, to the Trial Chamber to choose the most appropriate form of liability under Article 6(1) of the Statute, contradicts the position it is now arguing in its Appeal Brief.⁷⁷²

457. For these reasons, Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the Defence could not have anticipated that the Prosecution intended to rely on joint criminal enterprise liability. Therefore, he says that the Prosecution is estopped from raising joint criminal enterprise liability on appeal.⁷⁷³ He asserts that the Prosecution’s new plea of joint criminal enterprise is prejudicial to him because his investigation, questioning of prosecution witnesses and presentation of evidence would have been different if this mode of liability had been raised at trial.⁷⁷⁴

458. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana also argues that the Prosecution cannot seek new findings to be made in relation to a form of responsibility never alleged in the Indictments or the Pre-Trial Brief, never placed in evidence or argued in the Closing Brief. He distinguishes the present case from the *Ojdanić* Joint Criminal Enterprise Appeal Decision in which the accused had notice that he was being charged as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise. Similar to his Co-Accused, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana interprets the Prosecution’s argument based on joint criminal enterprise as a request for new findings of fact that were neither suggested to nor addressed by the Trial Chamber.⁷⁷⁵

459. In reply, the Prosecution claims that the jurisprudence of the Tribunal makes clear that specific modes of responsibility do not have to be pleaded in the indictment. It claims that the Accused acknowledged that the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief put them on notice that the Trial Chamber was at liberty to consider all modes of liability encompassed under Article 6(1) of the Statute⁷⁷⁶ and questions the Defence’s reason for not seeking clarification in the pre-trial or trial phases if it considered this approach to be prejudicial.⁷⁷⁷ The Prosecution submits further that, regardless of the argument presented by the parties, the Trial Chamber has a duty to apply the law

⁷⁷⁰ *Id.*, para. 37 citing *The Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al.*, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion Filed by the Defence for Nikola Šainović, 27 March 2003 (*Milutinović* Decision), p. 4.

⁷⁷¹ *Id.*, para. 38.

⁷⁷² *Id.*, para. 39. Gérard Ntakirutimana contends that having stressed in its Pre-Trial Brief that although there was no substantial difference as to the Accused’s culpability under the different forms of participation the degree of such participation may be considered as a factor in determining an appropriate sentence, the Prosecution is now seeking to frame the case against the Accused pursuant to a particular form of liability.

⁷⁷³ *Id.*, para. 41.

⁷⁷⁴ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 42.

⁷⁷⁵ Response (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 9.

⁷⁷⁶ Prosecution Reply, para. 2.50 (citing Response (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 39 (iii)).

⁷⁷⁷ *Id.*, para. 2.50.

concerning the appropriate characterization of the responsibility of the Accused to the facts of the case.⁷⁷⁸ Therefore, the two Accused have no legal basis to assume that a reference in the Indictment to superior responsibility precludes the application of joint criminal responsibility.⁷⁷⁹

460. Applying factors identified in the *Milutinović* Decision, the Prosecution argues that the Indictments contained the underlying material facts relating to the joint criminal enterprise, namely the timeframe, the participants, the role of the accused and the purpose of the enterprise.⁷⁸⁰ It argues that technical defects in the pleadings will not be fatal if the material facts have been pleaded and the accused suffers no prejudice.⁷⁸¹ Here, the two Accused suffered no prejudice due to lack of notice because, in its closing address at trial, the Prosecution declared that both Accused “participated in one form or the other in the attacks that took place [...]”. This was noted by the Trial Chamber in the Judgement.⁷⁸² Additionally, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana did not articulate what prejudice they claim to have suffered.

1. Law Applicable to the Alleged Error

(a) Joint Criminal Enterprise

461. Article 6(1) of the Statute sets out the forms of individual criminal responsibility which apply to all the crimes falling within the International Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It reads as follows:

Article 6 **Individual criminal responsibility**

1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.

462. This provision lists the forms of criminal conduct which, provided that all other necessary conditions are satisfied, may result in an accused incurring individual criminal responsibility for one or more of the crimes provided for in the Statute. A mirror provision is found in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has previously held that the modes of liability identified under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute include participation in a joint criminal enterprise as a form of “commission” under that Article.⁷⁸³

⁷⁷⁸ *Id.*, para. 2.52.

⁷⁷⁹ *Id.*, para. 2.53.

⁷⁸⁰ *Id.*, para. 2.54-2.55.

⁷⁸¹ *Id.*, para. 2.56.

⁷⁸² *Id.*, para. 2.59.

⁷⁸³ See *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 188 and para. 226, which provides that “[t]he Appeals Chamber considers that the consistency and cogency of the case law and the treaties referred to above, as well as their consonance with the general principles on criminal responsibility laid down both in the Statute and general international criminal law and in

463. In the jurisprudence of the ICTY three categories of joint criminal enterprise have been identified as having the status of customary international law.⁷⁸⁴ The first category is a “basic” form of joint criminal enterprise. It is represented by cases where all co-perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the same criminal intention.⁷⁸⁵ An example is a plan formulated by the participants in the joint criminal enterprise to kill where, although each of the participants may carry out a different role, each of them has the intent to kill. This form of joint criminal enterprise is the only one relevant to the present case and will be the focus thereafter.⁷⁸⁶

464. The second category is a “systemic” form of joint criminal enterprise. It is a variant of the basic form, characterised by the existence of an organised system of ill-treatment.⁷⁸⁷ An example is extermination or concentration camps, in which the prisoners are killed or mistreated pursuant to the joint criminal enterprise.

465. The third category is an “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise. It concerns cases involving a common purpose to commit a crime where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common purpose, is nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of

national legislation, warrant the conclusion that case law reflects customary rules of international criminal law.” To reach this finding the Appeals Chamber interpreted the Statute on the basis of its purpose as set out in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993. It also considered the specific characteristics of many crimes perpetrated in war. In order to determine the status of customary law in this area, it studied in detail the case law relating to many war crimes cases tried after the Second World War (paras. 197 *et seq.*). It further considered the relevant provisions of two international Conventions which reflect the views of many States in legal matters (Article 2(3)(c) of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by a consensus vote by the General Assembly in its resolution 52/164 of 15 December 1997 and opened for signature on 9 January 1998; Article 25 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998 by the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries held in Rome) (paras. 221-222). Moreover, the Appeals Chamber referred to national legislation and case law to show that the notion of “common purpose”, as it then referred to it, was recognised in many national systems, albeit not all of the countries had the same notion of common purpose (paras. 224-225). The *Tadić* Appeals Chamber used interchangeably the expressions “joint criminal enterprise”, “common purpose” and “criminal enterprise”, although the concept is generally referred to as “joint criminal enterprise”, and this is the term used by the parties in the present appeal. See also *Ojdanić* Joint Criminal Enterprise Appeal Decision, para. 20 regarding joint criminal enterprise as a form of commission.

⁷⁸⁴ See in particular *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 195-226, describing the three categories of cases following a review of the relevant case-law, relating primarily to many war crimes cases tried after the Second World War. See also *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, paras. 83-84.

⁷⁸⁵ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 196. See also *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 84, providing that, “apart from the specific case of the extended form of joint criminal enterprise, the very concept of joint criminal enterprise presupposes that its participants, other than the principal perpetrator(s) of the crimes committed, share the perpetrators’ joint criminal intent.”

⁷⁸⁶ For a description of the second and third, respectively “systemic” and “extended”, forms of joint criminal enterprise, see *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 202-204 and *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 98-99).

⁷⁸⁷ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 202-203. Although the participants in the joint criminal enterprises of this category tried in the cases referred to were most members of criminal organizations, the *Tadić* case did not require an individual to belong to such an organization in order to be considered a participant in the joint criminal enterprise. The *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement found that this “systemic” category of joint criminal enterprise may be applied to other cases and especially to serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, para. 89. See also *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 98.

executing that common purpose.⁷⁸⁸ An example is a common purpose or plan on the part of a group to forcibly remove at gun-point members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to effect "ethnic cleansing") with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is shot and killed. While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common purpose, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one or more of those civilians.

466. For joint criminal enterprise liability to arise an accused must act with a number of other persons. They need not be organised in a military, political or administrative structure.⁷⁸⁹ There is no necessity for the criminal purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated. It may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the facts.⁷⁹⁰ The accused's participation in the criminal enterprise need not involve commission of a specific crime under one of the provisions (for example murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common purpose.⁷⁹¹

467. The *mens rea* differs according to the category of joint criminal enterprise under consideration. The basic form requires the intent to perpetrate a certain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators).⁷⁹² The systemic form (which, as noted above, is a variant of the first), requires personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment (whether proved by express testimony or as a matter of reasonable inference from the accused's position of authority), as well as the intent to further this system of ill-treatment.⁷⁹³ Finally, the extended form of joint criminal enterprise, requires the intention to participate in and further the common criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or, in any event, to the commission of a crime by the group. In addition, responsibility for a crime other than the one which was part of the common design arises "only if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly

⁷⁸⁸ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 204, which held that "[c]riminal responsibility may be imputed to all participants within the common enterprise where the risk of death occurring was both a predictable consequence of the execution of the common design and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk." See also *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 99.

⁷⁸⁹ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 227, referring to the *Essen Lynching* and the *Kurt Goebell* cases.

⁷⁹⁰ *Id.*, where the *Tadić* Appeal Chamber uses the terms, "purpose", "plan", and "design" interchangeably.

⁷⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹² *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 196 and 228. See also *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 97, where the Appeals Chamber considers that, "by requiring proof of an agreement in relation to each of the crimes committed with a common purpose, when it assessed the intent to participate in a systemic form of joint criminal enterprise, the Trial Chamber went beyond the criterion set by the Appeals Chamber in the *Tadić* case. Since the Trial Chamber's findings showed that the system in place at the KP Dom sought to subject non-Serb detainees to inhumane living conditions and ill-treatment on discriminatory grounds, the Trial Chamber should have examined whether or not Krnjelac knew of the system and agreed to it, without it being necessary to establish that he had entered into an agreement with the guards and soldiers - the principal perpetrators of the crimes committed under the system - to commit those crimes." See also *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 101.

⁷⁹³ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 202, 220 and 228.

took that risk”⁷⁹⁴ – that is, being aware that such a crime was a possible consequence of the execution of that enterprise, and with that awareness, the accused decided to participate in that enterprise.

468. The Appeals Chamber notes that while joint criminal enterprise liability is firmly established in the jurisprudence of the ICTY this is only the second ICTR case in which the Appeals Chamber has been called upon to address this issue.⁷⁹⁵ Given the fact that both the ICTY and the ICTR have mirror articles identifying the modes of liability by which an individual can incur criminal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the jurisprudence of the ICTY should be applied to the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.

(b) Degree of Specificity Required in an Indictment as to the Form of Responsibility Pleaded

469. Article 17(4) of the Statute provides that the indictment must set out “a concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused is charged”. Likewise, Rule 47(C) of the Rules provides that the indictment shall set out not only the name and particulars of the suspect but also “a concise statement of the facts of the case”.

470. As stated earlier in this Judgement,⁷⁹⁶ the Prosecution’s obligation to set out a concise statement of the facts in the indictment must be interpreted in the light of the provisions of Articles 20(2), 20(4)(a) and 20(4)(b) of the Statute, which provide that in the determination of charges against him or her the accused shall be entitled to a fair hearing and, more specifically, to be informed of the nature of the charges against him or her and to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence. In the case law of both the ICTR and the ICTY, this translates into an obligation on the part of the Prosecution to state the material facts underpinning the charges in the indictment, but not the evidence by which such facts are to be proven.⁷⁹⁷ The question of whether an indictment is pleaded with sufficient particularity is dependent upon whether it sets out the material facts of the Prosecution case with enough detail to inform a defendant clearly of the charges against him or her so that he or she may prepare his or her defence.

471. As the Appeals Chamber discussed above,⁷⁹⁸ the *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement addressed the degree of specificity required to be pleaded in an indictment. It stressed that it is not acceptable for the Prosecution to omit material aspects of its main allegations in the indictment with

⁷⁹⁴ *Id.*, para. 228. See also paras. 204 and 220.

⁷⁹⁵ See *Prosecutor v André Rwamakuba*, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide, 22 October 2004.

⁷⁹⁶ See *supra* section II.A.1(b).

⁷⁹⁷ See also *Niyitigeka* Appeal Judgement, para. 193 and *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement quoting the *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, para. 147.

⁷⁹⁸ See *supra* section II.A.1(b).

the aim of moulding the case against the accused in the course of the trial depending on how the evidence unfolds.⁷⁹⁹ It also considered that a defective indictment may, in certain circumstances, cause the Appeals Chamber to reverse a conviction. The ICTY Appeals Chamber, however, did not exclude the possibility that, in a limited number of instances, a defective indictment may be cured if the Prosecution provides the accused with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges.⁸⁰⁰ In the *Rutaganda* case, the Appeals Chamber found that, before holding that an alleged fact is not material or that differences between the wording of the indictment and the evidence adduced are minor, a trial chamber should generally ensure that such a finding is not prejudicial to the accused.⁸⁰¹ An example of such prejudice would be vagueness capable of misleading the accused as to the nature of the criminal conduct with which he is charged.⁸⁰²

472. At the Appeal hearing, the Prosecution sought to argue that a recent decision of the Appeals Chamber in *Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali*⁸⁰³ had expanded the *Kupreškić* holding. It claimed that, following that decision, in all circumstances a defective indictment can be cured by the provision in another form of timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis underpinning the charges against him or her. The Appeals Chamber does not accept this reading of that decision. Accordingly, the applicable law has not changed since the *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement.

(c) Did the Trial Chamber Err in Failing to Apply Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability to the Accused on the Facts of the Case as Presented by the Prosecution?

473. While the Appeals Chamber accepts that it has been the practice of the Prosecution to merely quote the provisions of Article 6(1), and in the ICTY Article 7(1), the Prosecution has also long been advised by the Appeals Chamber that it is preferable for it not to do so. For example, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the *Aleksovski* case stated that “the practice by the Prosecution of merely quoting the provisions of Article 7(1) in the indictment is likely to cause ambiguity, and it is preferable that the Prosecution indicate in relation to each individual count precisely and expressly the particular nature of the responsibility alleged.”⁸⁰⁴ The Appeals Chamber endorses this statement.

⁷⁹⁹ *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 92.

⁸⁰⁰ *Id.*, paras. 89-114.

⁸⁰¹ *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 303.

⁸⁰² *Id.*, quoting the *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, para. 61.

⁸⁰³ Appeal Hearing, T. 7 July 2004, p. 71, referring to *Prosecutor v. Arsène Shalom Ntahobali and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko*, case No. ICTR-97-21-AR73, Decision on the Appeals of Arsène Shalom Ntahobali and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko against the “Decision on Defence Urgent Motion to declare Parts of the Evidence of Witnesses RV and QBZ Inadmissible”, 2 July 2004.

⁸⁰⁴ *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, n. 319.

474. In the present case, the Trial Chamber does not appear to have considered joint criminal enterprise liability at any time in determining the responsibility incurred by Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana for their participation in the massacres committed at Mugonero and Bisesero.⁸⁰⁵ As such the Appeals Chamber does not accept that the authorities relied upon by the Prosecution lend the assistance the Prosecution claims. In the *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found the accused liable under the third form of joint criminal enterprise for the killing of five men from the village of Jaskići, even though neither this form of liability nor any other form of joint criminal enterprise was expressly pleaded in the indictment.⁸⁰⁶ However, in that case and, unlike here, the trial chamber had considered joint criminal enterprise liability⁸⁰⁷ and, on appeal, the Prosecution was actually arguing that the trial chamber had misdirected itself as to the application of that doctrine.⁸⁰⁸ In the *Furundžija* case, also relied upon by the Prosecution, although the indictment did not expressly include joint criminal enterprise or even co-perpetration as to the charge of torture, the Prosecution pleaded at trial that liability pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute can be established by showing that the accused had the intent to participate in the crime, that his acts contributed to its commission and that such contribution did not necessarily require participation in the physical commission of the crime. The *Furundžija* Trial Chamber found that two types of liability for criminal participation “appear to have crystallised in international law – co-perpetrators who participate in a joint criminal enterprise, on the one hand, and aiders and abettors, on the other”⁸⁰⁹ and found that *Furundžija* was responsible as a co-perpetrator.⁸¹⁰ This was upheld by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.⁸¹¹ Further, the Appeals Chambers notes that in both of these cases the defence does not appear to have raised the issue of lack of notice before the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber.

475. More recently, in the *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, where the Prosecution was specifically challenging the trial chamber’s conclusion that the accused could not be held liable under the third form of joint criminal enterprise set out in the *Tadić* Appeal Judgement with respect to any of the crimes alleged unless an “extended” form of joint criminal enterprise was pleaded expressly in the indictment, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that:

⁸⁰⁵ The only express reference to joint criminal enterprise is to be found in the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief (para. 37), and is repeated in the Prosecution’s closing brief. The Prosecution submits under the section “Requisite *mens rea* under Article 6(1)” that the intent can be direct or indirect and that for a joint criminal enterprise, the required *mens rea* is satisfied when each co-participant is able to predict the result.

⁸⁰⁶ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 230-233.

⁸⁰⁷ *Tadić* Trial Judgement, paras. 681-692.

⁸⁰⁸ *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 172-173.

⁸⁰⁹ *Furundžija* Trial Judgement, para. 216.

⁸¹⁰ *Id.*, paras. 268, 269.

⁸¹¹ *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, paras. 115-121.

[...] The Appeals Chamber reiterates that Article 18(4) of the Statute requires that the crime or crimes charged in the indictment and the alleged facts be set out concisely in the indictment. With respect to the nature of the liability incurred, the Appeals Chamber holds that it is vital for the indictment to specify at least on what legal basis of the Statute an individual is being charged (Article 7(1) and/or 7(3)). Since Article 7(1) allows for several forms of direct criminal responsibility, a failure to specify in the indictment which form or forms of liability the Prosecution is pleading gives rise to ambiguity. The Appeals Chamber considers that such ambiguity should be avoided and holds therefore that, where it arises, the Prosecution must identify precisely the form or forms of liability alleged for each count as soon as possible and, in any event, before the start of the trial. Likewise, when the Prosecution charges the "commission" of one of the crimes under the Statute within the meaning of Article 7(1), it must specify whether the term is to be understood as meaning physical commission by the accused or participation in a joint criminal enterprise, or both. The Appeals Chamber also considers that it is preferable for an indictment alleging the accused's responsibility as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise also to refer to the particular form (basic or extended) of joint criminal enterprise envisaged. However, this does not, in principle, prevent the Prosecution from pleading elsewhere than in the indictment - for instance in a pre-trial brief - the legal theory which it believes best demonstrates that the crime or crimes alleged are imputable to the accused in law in the light of the facts alleged. This option is, however, limited by the need to guarantee the accused a fair trial.

[...]

The Appeals Chamber observes that paragraph 86 of the Judgment, cited in paragraph 137 above, shows that the Trial Chamber reached the conclusion it did precisely because the Prosecution failed to amend the Indictment after the Chamber had unambiguously interpreted the second amended indictment as not pleading an extended form of joint criminal enterprise. Given these circumstances, the Trial Chamber decided "in the exercise of its discretion" that it would not be fair to the Accused to allow the Prosecution to rely upon this extended form of joint criminal enterprise to establish his liability.

The Appeals Chamber further notes that, while the Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief of 16 October 2000, that is subsequent to the decision of 11 May 2000, pleads an extended form of joint criminal enterprise for the first time, the Indictment is silent on the matter.

It must be noted that these circumstances left the Defence in some uncertainty as to the Prosecution's argument. Therefore, even though it is apparent from Krnojelac's Final Trial Brief that he did take the three forms of joint criminal enterprise described in the *Tadić* Appeals Judgement into consideration before concluding that he had not taken part in a joint criminal enterprise, the Appeals Chamber holds that, in view of the persistent ambiguity surrounding the issue of what exactly the Prosecution argument was, the Trial Chamber had good grounds for refusing, in all fairness, to consider an extended form of liability with respect to Krnojelac. (footnotes omitted).⁸¹²

476. Thus, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the present case is distinguishable from the authorities relied upon by the Prosecution, in that in those cases joint criminal enterprise liability was a mode of liability considered at trial. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, the Appeals Chamber will consider whether the Accused had sufficient notice that that mode of liability was being alleged.

477. The Prosecution acknowledges that it submitted in its Closing Brief that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's responsibility regarding the Mugonero Indictment was only for aiding and abetting

⁸¹² *Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement, paras. 138-144.

the attackers at the Mugonero Complex.⁸¹³ Accordingly, the Prosecution has waived the right to allege on appeal that the Trial Chamber erred in omitting to consider joint criminal enterprise liability when determining his criminal responsibility with respect to the events under the Mugonero Indictment. In the following discussion, the Appeals Chamber will limit its review of the content of the Indictments and related parts of the Pre-Trial Brief in order to determine whether Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had sufficient notice from these sources that the case alleged against them included criminal responsibility as participants in a joint criminal enterprise. For Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, this review shall be limited to events alleged in the Mugonero Indictment.

(d) The Contents of the Indictments and the Pre-Trial Brief Did Not Put the Trial Chamber and the Accused on Notice that Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana Were also Charged as Co-Perpetrators of a Joint Criminal Enterprise to Commit Genocide

478. Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana were charged as follows under Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment:

For all the acts outlined in the paragraphs specified in each of the counts, the accused persons named herein, either planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and execution of the acts, or knew or had reason to know that persons acting under their authority and control had committed or were about to commit the said acts and they failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the said illegal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

Count 1A: By their acts in relation to the events referred to in paragraphs 4.4-4.10 above, **Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gérard Ntakirutimana & Charles Sikubwabo** are individually responsible for the crimes alleged below, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

By their acts in relation to the events referred to in paragraphs 4.4-4.12 above, **Gérard Ntakirutimana & Charles Sikubwabo** are individually responsible for the crimes alleged below, pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gérard Ntakirutimana & Charles Sikubwabo, during the month of April 1994, in Gishyita commune, Kibuye Prefecture, in the Territory of Rwanda, are responsible for the killings and causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Tutsi population with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or racial group as such, and have thereby committed **GENOCIDE** in violation of Article 2(3)(a) and punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Under Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment they were charged as follows:

By their acts in relation to the events referred to above, each of the accused are individually responsible for the crimes alleged below pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Tribunal Statute.

⁸¹³ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.81, referring to its Closing Brief, p. 219. Regarding the Bisesero Indictment, the Prosecution argues that it "made a broader submission, namely that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana acted with intent to destroy the Tutsi group [...] which resulted in the death of thousands", thereby implying that such submission encompasses joint criminal enterprise liability (Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.82, referring to its Closing Brief, p. 227).

Count 1: **Elizaphan Ntakirutimana & Gérard Ntakirutimana** during the months of April through June 1994, in the area known as Bisesero, in Gishyita and Gisovu communes, Kibuye Prefecture, in the Territory of Rwanda, are responsible for the killings and causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Tutsi population with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or racial group as such, and have thereby committed **GENOCIDE** in violation of Article 2(3)(a) and punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute of the Tribunal;

479. Review of the Indictments reveals that no express reference was made by the Prosecution to joint criminal enterprise, common plan or purpose – or even to the fact that it intended to charge the Accused for co-perpetration of genocide, *i.e.*, not only for physically committing genocide but also for assisting those who physically committed it while sharing the same genocidal intent. The only express reference to joint criminal enterprise is to be found in the Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief (para. 37) and is repeated in the Prosecution's Closing Brief (page 188). Interestingly however, this reference appears under the section "Requisite *Mens Rea* under Article 6(1)" and illustrates the Prosecution's submission that all forms of criminal participation under Article 6(1) may be performed with direct or indirect intent (*dolus eventualis*).⁸¹⁴ In the Closing Brief, the Prosecution states that "for a joint criminal enterprise, the Appeals Chamber has found that the required *mens rea* for each co-participant is satisfied when a member of the group is able to predict the result."⁸¹⁵ Although the Pre-Trial and Closing Briefs are silent as to what form of joint criminal enterprise it refers to, the Appeals Chamber understands that it can only be the third one – that is the extended form of joint criminal enterprise. In the Appeals Chamber's view, the mere reference by the Prosecution to the joint criminal enterprise illustrating the "*dolus eventualis*" doctrine in its Pre-Trial and Closing Briefs cannot be understood as an unambiguous pleading of participation in the first form of joint criminal enterprise which is the form the Prosecution advances on this appeal.

480. The Appeals Chamber notes further that the Prosecution simply reproduced the text of Article 6(1) and part of Article 6(3) of the Statute in paragraph 5 of the Mugonero Indictment, while paragraph 5 of the Bisesero Indictment only referred to Article 6(1) without even using the word "committing".

481. Both Indictments alleged acts and conduct not limited to killings and causing harm to the Tutsi victims, but included for Gérard Ntakirutimana: separating Tutsi patients from non-Tutsi patients,⁸¹⁶ procuring of arms for the attacks,⁸¹⁷ searching Tutsi survivors⁸¹⁸ and conveying attackers;⁸¹⁹ and for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana: refusing to protect them after receiving Pastor

⁸¹⁴ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 36; Closing Brief, p. 187.

⁸¹⁵ Closing Brief, p. 188.

⁸¹⁶ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 12. Bisesero Indictment, para. 4.6; Mugonero Indictment, para. 4.6.

⁸¹⁷ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 11.

⁸¹⁸ Mugonero Indictment, para. 4.8; *see also* Bisesero Indictment paras. 4.9 and 4.15 for a similar account of the facts.

⁸¹⁹ Pre-Trial Brief, para. 16; Bisesero Indictment, para. 4.15; Mugonero Indictment, para. 4.8.

Sehabe's letter,⁸²⁰ searching for Tutsi survivors,⁸²¹ conveying attackers to the killing sites,⁸²² being present at killing sites, pursuing survivors and inciting attackers to perpetrate killings.⁸²³ The Indictments also charged Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana for planning, instigating genocide as well as aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide. In this context it is not obvious that reference to the above-mentioned acts in the Indictments were intended to be the material facts underpinning a responsibility for co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide. In any event, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that the wording used by the Prosecution was ambiguous.

482. Additionally, and contrary to the *Tadić* and *Furundžija* cases relied upon by the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber obviously did not understand the Indictments to mean that the Accused committed genocide by way of participation in a joint criminal enterprise. As such, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Prosecution did not plead joint criminal enterprise liability, or even its various elements, with sufficient clarity in the Indictments. Further, the Prosecution did not put the Trial Chamber and the Defence on notice that the mode of liability, which it now believes best describes the criminal liability of Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, was as participants in a joint criminal enterprise. On the contrary, the Prosecution expressly limited the scope of "committing" to direct commission by the Accused or their agents. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that the Prosecution left the Trial Chamber and the Defence in some uncertainty as to the case it was advancing at trial.

483. The Appeals Chamber has also reviewed the Prosecution's Closing Brief, which describes the elements of the various forms of liability envisaged under Article 6(1) of the Statute.⁸²⁴ From that review the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Prosecution only alleged commission by the Accused through personal perpetration of all elements of the *actus reus* of the crime or through use of an agent to perform the relevant conduct.⁸²⁵ The Appeals Chamber finds that this pleading

⁸²⁰ Bisesero Indictment, para. 4.5 and Pre-Trial Brief, paras. 10, 13.

⁸²¹ Bisesero Indictment, paras. 4.8, 4.9.

⁸²² Pre-Trial Brief, paras. 16, 20-21; Bisesero Indictment, para. 4.15.

⁸²³ Pre-Trial Brief, paras. 15-16 and 20-21; Bisesero Indictment, para. 4.15.

⁸²⁴ Prosecution's Closing Brief, pp. 191-202.

⁸²⁵ The relevant part of the Prosecution's Closing Brief reads as follows: "The elements of participation through 'commission' through individual perpetration are as follows: 1. *Actus reus*: The accused performed all elements of the *actus reus* of the crime. 2. *Mens rea*: The accused had all elements of the *mens rea* of the crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime would occur as an adequate consequence of his or her conduct. This is the most straightforward form of criminal participation, e.g., for willful killing, the specific *actus reus* is 'conduct resulting in the death of the victim, in the sense that the conduct is a substantial cause of the death of the victim' The conduct of the accused will satisfy the *actus reus* for willful killing if it substantially contributed to the victim's death. (...) An accused could be regarded as having personally performed the elements of the *actus reus*, even though the accused used an agent to perform the relevant conduct [here footnote 1500 of the Closing Brief refers to perpetration by means or intermediate perpetration as well as commission through another person (as per Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute)]. The Appeals Chamber has clarified in the *Čelebići* Judgement that in the case of 'primary or direct responsibility, where the accused himself commits the relevant act or omission, the qualification that his participation must directly and

precludes the Prosecution from relying on joint criminal enterprise liability on appeal. In any case, having reviewed the content of the Indictments and the Pre-Trial Brief, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that it was too ambiguous to put the Trial Chamber or Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana on notice that they were charged for their participation in the first form of joint criminal enterprise.

484. In view of the persistent ambiguity surrounding the issue of what exact theory of responsibility the Prosecution was pleading, the Prosecution has not established that the Trial Chamber erred in omitting to consider whether the liability of the Accused was incurred for their participation in a joint criminal enterprise of genocide. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

485. The Appeals Chamber will now turn to the second error alleged by the Prosecution in relation to Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for genocide.

C. Alleged Error in Confining Gérard Ntakirutimana's Conviction for Genocide to the Acts of Killing or Serious Bodily Harm that he Personally Inflicted on Tutsi

486. The Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber erred in confining Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for genocide to the acts of killing or serious bodily harm that he personally inflicted on Tutsis at the Mugonero Complex and in Bisesero. In doing so, the Prosecution claims that the Trial Chamber ignored its prior factual findings regarding the other acts he performed in furtherance of the genocidal campaign.⁸²⁶ In support of this ground of appeal the Prosecution lists the Trial Chamber's findings regarding Gérard Ntakirutimana's participation in the 16 April 1994 attack on the Mugonero Complex and in Bisesero between April and June 1994.⁸²⁷

487. The Prosecution says that, despite these factual findings, the Trial Chamber referred in its legal findings only to "killing Charles Ukobizaba and shooting at the refugees" at the Mugonero Complex as the basis of Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for genocide pursuant to the Mugonero Indictment. Similarly, his conviction under the Bisesero Indictment was limited to his role in the killing of Esdras and the wife of Nzamwita, as well as the harm caused to the Tutsi refugees that he shot at during the attacks at Bisesero.⁸²⁸ Therefore, in the Prosecution's submission, the Trial Chamber erred in law in basing Gérard Ntakirutimana's liability for genocide on acts that he

substantially affect the commission of the offence' is an unnecessary one. That particular requirement rather applies to lesser degrees of directness of participation which will ordinarily give rise to accomplice liability (Prosecution's Closing Brief, pp. 197-198).

⁸²⁶ Prosecution Amended Notice of Appeal, Grounds 1 and 2 and Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2.15.

⁸²⁷ Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2.15-2.16, 2.18.

⁸²⁸ *Id.*, para. 2.17.

personally carried out and ignored its prior factual findings regarding other acts in furtherance of the genocidal campaign.⁸²⁹

488. In response, Gérard Ntakirutimana claims that the Prosecution does not accurately present the Trial Chamber's findings. He argues that the Prosecution's position is based on misstatements of or omissions from the Trial Chamber's findings.⁸³⁰ As an alternative argument, he argues that the evidence relating to his participation in preparatory acts is from witnesses whose credibility is questionable (Witness UU's testimony).⁸³¹ Gérard Ntakirutimana secondly argues that, if accurately presented, these findings do not support the conclusion that he is guilty. He claims that in order to satisfy the argument of the Prosecution new findings are necessary and argues that making new findings is not the function of the Appeals Chamber.⁸³²

489. In reply, the Prosecution maintains its argument in relation to the Trial Chamber's erroneous omission from his criminal responsibility a range of acts that Gérard Ntakirutimana performed to facilitate the killings and injuries inflicted by other attackers at Mugonero and Bisesero.⁸³³ It also addresses Gérard Ntakirutimana's attacks on Witness UU's credibility.⁸³⁴

490. From the Trial Judgement it is apparent to the Appeals Chamber that the Trial Chamber having found that Gérard Ntakirutimana physically committed genocide by killing and causing harm to Tutsi refugees did not go on to consider whether the acts of assistance it found to be established also constituted a basis for a conviction of genocide either as a co-perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. Indeed, the Trial Chamber expressly found that the alternative Count 1B of the Mugonero Indictment and Count 2 of the Bisesero Indictment for complicity to commit genocide ceased to apply with respect to both Accused in light of its findings in relation to the Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment and Count 2 of the Bisesero Indictment for genocide.

491. The Trial Chamber found 1) in relation to the Mugonero Indictment that, in addition to killing Charles Ukobizaba and shooting at Tutsi refugees at the Complex, Gérard Ntakirutimana's participation in the attacks included procuring ammunition and gendarmes for the attack on the Complex⁸³⁵ and participating in the attack on Witness SS;⁸³⁶ and 2) in relation to the Bisesero Indictment that, in addition to killing Esdras and the wife of Nzamwita, pursuing and shooting at

⁸²⁹ *Id.*, para. 2.18.

⁸³⁰ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 66 (i)-(vii).

⁸³¹ *Id.*, para. 65.

⁸³² *Id.*, para. 28.

⁸³³ Prosecution Reply Brief, paras. 1.7-1.9.

⁸³⁴ *Id.*, paras. 2.65-2.92.

⁸³⁵ Trial Judgement, section II.3.7.3.

⁸³⁶ *Id.*, section II.4.11.3.

the refugees, he transported attackers at Kidashya,⁸³⁷ headed a group of armed attackers at Muyira Hill in June 1994,⁸³⁸ was at Mutiti Hill in June 1994 with *Interahamwe* where they shot at refugees in a forest by a church,⁸³⁹ and participated in attacks in Bisesero during the period April to June 1994.⁸⁴⁰ The Trial Chamber only considered the above acts and conduct of Gérard Ntakirutimana other than killing and shooting at Tutsi in order to determine that he had the requisite intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group.⁸⁴¹ The wording used by the Trial Chamber at paragraphs 794-795 and 835-836 of the Judgement shows that the Trial Chamber limited its finding of guilt of genocide to the killings and harm that Gérard Ntakirutimana had personally inflicted:

794. The Chamber finds that in killing Charles Ukobizaba and shooting at the refugees, Gérard Ntakirutimana is individually criminally responsible for the death of Charles Ukobizaba, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute.

795. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that Gérard Ntakirutimana is guilty of genocide as charged in Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment.

835. In shooting at the refugees and participating in the attacks, Gérard Ntakirutimana is individually criminally responsible for the death of Esdras and the wife of Nzamwita and the harm caused to these Tutsi refugees, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute.

836. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that Gérard Ntakirutimana is guilty of genocide as charged in Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment.

492. In doing so, the Trial Chamber omitted to determine Gérard Ntakirutimana's liability as to the killings and harm inflicted by others to Tutsi, although he was clearly charged under Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment and Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment for acts and conducts not limited to killing and causing serious bodily harm but also including acts of assistance to others who physically committed genocide. This, in the Appeals Chamber's view, constitutes an error on the part of the Trial Chamber.

493. As the Appeals Chamber has already determined that the Prosecution should not be allowed to plead joint criminal enterprise for the first time on appeal, the issue to be determined is whether the Trial Chamber's findings, which have not been reversed on appeal, support a conviction for aiding and abetting genocide. Before doing so it is necessary to turn to the third error alleged by the Prosecution in relation to the genocide conviction of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana regarding the *mens rea* required for aiding and abetting genocide.

⁸³⁷ *Id.*, section II.4.21.3.

⁸³⁸ *Id.*, section II.4.21.3.

⁸³⁹ *Id.*, section II.4.22.3.

⁸⁴⁰ *Id.*, section II.4.24.3.

⁸⁴¹ *Id.*, paras. 793, 834.

D. Alleged Error in Defining the *Mens Rea* Requirement for Aiding and Abetting Genocide

494. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that aiding and abetting genocide, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Statute, requires proof that the accused "had the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or racial group, as such".⁸⁴²

495. According to the Prosecution, the test adopted by the Trial Chamber is drawn from the *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, which has generally not been followed by other cases before the ICTR or the ICTY. It argues that the *Akayesu* test has been expressly rejected by the *Semanza* Trial Chamber and that, in light of ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence, the proper *mens rea* for aiding and abetting genocide under Article 6(1) of the Statute is "knowledge", not intent.⁸⁴³ The Prosecution further contends that the Trial Chamber's adoption of this *mens rea* requirement for aiding and abetting pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute contradicts the one it applied for complicity to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(e) of the Statute, which includes aiding and abetting, since it found that the *mens rea* standard for complicity in genocide is knowledge.⁸⁴⁴ Furthermore, it points out that a survey of the International Law Commission's work and of domestic legislation on the crime of genocide confirms that "knowledge" is the *mens rea* for aiding and abetting irrespective of the underlying offence of the perpetrator.⁸⁴⁵ The Prosecution also points out that, because no distinction is made in the language of Article 6(1) of the Statute between genocide and other crimes within its jurisdiction, the specific intent requirement of Article 2(2) should not disturb the general application of Article 6(1) regarding genocide.⁸⁴⁶

496. In response, Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that adoption of the Prosecution's theory on *mens rea* for aiding and abetting would have the adverse effect of significantly lowering the threshold of liability for genocide, extermination and murder, and thereby potentially prejudice future litigants by affecting convictions.⁸⁴⁷ Elizaphan Ntakirutimana contends further that the Security Council does not have the power to add "aiding and abetting" to the list of acts punishable under Article 2.⁸⁴⁸

497. In its Reply, the Prosecution submits that neither Elizaphan Ntakirutimana nor Gérard Ntakirutimana analyzes the *mens rea* standard for aiding and abetting genocide. In response to

⁸⁴² Prosecution Amended Notice of Appeal, p. 3 and Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2.13, 2.84.

⁸⁴³ Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2.90, 2.92, 2.103. The Prosecution also relies on the *Ojdanić* Joint Criminal Enterprise Appeal Decision, para. 20 (Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 2.104) as well as on the *Kvočka* Trial Judgement (Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2.106-2.108).

⁸⁴⁴ Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 2.100-2.102.

⁸⁴⁵ *Id.*, para. 2.110.

⁸⁴⁶ *Id.*, para. 2.111.

⁸⁴⁷ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 17.

⁸⁴⁸ Response (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 8.

Gérard Ntakirutimana's assertion that the Prosecution's "knowledge" standard would lower the threshold of liability for genocide, the Prosecution argues that the Accused ignores ICTY jurisprudence; "knowledge" has already been adopted by the ICTY for serious crimes (such as persecution).⁸⁴⁹ Contrary to the Accused's suggestion, this standard does not extinguish the specific intent requirement of genocide. To convict an accused of aiding and abetting genocide based on the "knowledge" standard, the Prosecution must prove that those who physically carried out crimes acted with the specific intent to commit genocide.⁸⁵⁰

498. At the Appeal hearing the Prosecution argued that the term complicity as included in the Genocide Convention included the term "aiding and abetting". It claimed that this was clear from the report of the *ad hoc* Committee on genocide. It argued that this understanding was consistent with both civil and common law domestic jurisdictions and was reflected in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. The Prosecution referred to the recent *Krstić* Appeal Judgement which it says clearly establishes that aiding and abetting requires a knowledge standard.⁸⁵¹

499. In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber followed the approach adopted by the *Akayesu* Trial Chamber that the *dolus specialis* required for genocide was required for each mode of participation under Article 6(1) of the Statute, including aiding and abetting. Surprisingly, when considering the *mens rea* requirement for complicity under Article 2(3)(e) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber in *Akayesu* considered that it "implies in general that, at the moment he acted, the accomplice knew of the assistance he was providing in the commission of the principal offence. In other words, the accomplice must have acted knowingly".⁸⁵² "Knowingly" in the context of genocide means knowledge of the principal offender's genocidal intent. The Trial Chamber in *Akayesu* summarized its position as follows:

In conclusion, the Chamber is of the opinion that an accused is liable as an accomplice to genocide if he knowingly aided or abetted or instigated one or more persons in the commission of genocide, while knowing that such a person or persons were committing genocide, even though the accused himself did not have the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.⁸⁵³

The Trial Chamber in *Semanza* took a similar approach holding that: "In cases involving a form of accomplice liability, the *mens rea* requirement will be satisfied where an individual acts intentionally and with the awareness that he is influencing or assisting the principal perpetrator to

⁸⁴⁹ Prosecution Reply, para. 2.12.

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵¹ Appeal Hearing, T. 8 July 2004, p. 68.

⁸⁵² *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 538.

⁸⁵³ *Id.*, para. 545. See also para. 540: As far as genocide is concerned, the intent of the accomplice is thus to knowingly aid or abet one or more persons to commit the crime of genocide. Therefore, the Chamber is of the opinion that an accomplice to genocide need not necessarily possess the *dolus specialis* of genocide, namely the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.

commit the crime. The accused need not necessarily share the *mens rea* of the principal perpetrator: the accused must be aware, however, of the essential elements of the principal's crime including the *mens rea*.⁸⁵⁴

500. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has explained, on several occasions, that an individual who aids and abets other individuals committing a specific intent offence may be held responsible if he assists the commission of the crime knowing the intent behind the crime.⁸⁵⁵ More recently, as the Prosecution argued at the Appeal hearing, in the *Krstić* case the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered that the same principle applies to the Statute's prohibition of genocide and that "[t]he conviction for aiding and abetting genocide upon proof that the defendant knew about the principal perpetrator's genocidal intent is permitted by the Statute and case-law of the Tribunal."⁸⁵⁶ In reaching this conclusion, the *Krstić* Appeals Chamber derived aiding and abetting as a mode of liability from Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, but also considered that aiding and abetting constitutes a form of complicity, suggesting that complicity under Article 2 of the ICTR Statute and Article 4 of the ICTY Statute would also encompass aiding and abetting, based on the same *mens rea*, while other forms of complicity may require proof of specific intent.

501. The Appeals Chamber endorses this view and finds that a conviction for aiding and abetting genocide upon proof that the defendant knew about the principal perpetrator's genocidal intent is permitted by the Statute and case-law of this Tribunal. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber erred in determining that the *mens rea* for aiding and abetting genocide requires intent to commit genocide. It is not disputed that the above-mentioned error did not invalidate the Trial Chamber's verdict in the present case.

502. It is now possible to go back to the Prosecution's allegation that the Trial Chamber erred in confining Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for genocide to the acts of killing or serious bodily

⁸⁵⁴ *Semanza* Trial Judgement, para. 388 (references omitted). See also *id.*, para. 395.

⁸⁵⁵ See *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgement, para. 52 ("the aider and abettor in persecution, an offence with a specific intent, must be aware . . . of the discriminatory intent of the perpetrators of that crime," but "need not share th[at] intent"); *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 142 ("In order to convict [the accused] for aiding and abetting the crime of persecution, the Appeals Chamber must establish that [he] had knowledge that the principal perpetrators of the joint criminal enterprise intended to commit the underlying crimes, and by their acts they intended to discriminate . . ."); see also *Tadić* Appeal Judgement, para. 229 ("In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the principal.").

⁸⁵⁶ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 140. It must be stressed that, in the *Krstić* case, the Appeals Chamber has considered at paragraph 134 of the Judgement that "As has been demonstrated, all that the evidence can establish is that Krstić was aware of the intent to commit genocide on the part of some members of the VRS Main Staff, and with that knowledge, he did nothing to prevent the use of Drina Corps personnel and resources to facilitate those killings. This knowledge on his part alone cannot support an inference of genocidal intent. Genocide is one of the worst crimes known to humankind, and its gravity is reflected in the stringent requirement of specific intent. Convictions for genocide can be entered only where that intent has been unequivocally established. There was a demonstrable failure by the Trial Chamber to supply adequate proof that Radislav Krstić possessed the genocidal intent. Krstić, therefore, is not guilty of genocide as a principal perpetrator."

harm that he personally inflicted on Tutsi at the Mugonero Complex and Bisesero. The issue before the Appeals Chamber is whether the Trial Chamber's findings which have not been reversed on appeal support a conviction for aiding and abetting genocide.

503. In the part of the Judgement dealing with Gérard Ntakirutimana's legal errors the Appeals Chamber has upheld a number of his grounds of appeal arguing that he and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana were given insufficient notice of the material facts of the Prosecution's case and that the Trial Chamber erred in basing a conviction on those material facts.

504. As a result of the errors committed by the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber has quashed the findings of the Trial Chamber supporting Gérard Ntakirutimana's convictions under the Bisesero Indictment that: "on or about 18 April 1994 Gérard Ntakirutimana was with *Interahamwe* in Murambi Hill pursuing and attacking Tutsi refugees" and "in the last part of April or possibly in May, Gérard Ntakirutimana was with attackers in Gitwe Hill where he shot at refugees,"⁸⁵⁷ "sometime between April and June 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana was in Kidashya Hill transporting armed attackers, and he participated in chasing and shooting at Tutsi refugees in the hills,"⁸⁵⁸ "sometime in June 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana was in an attack at Mutiti Hill with *Interahamwe*, where they shot at refugees,"⁸⁵⁹ "one day in June 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana headed a group of armed attackers at Muyira Hill. He carried a gun and shot at refugees,"⁸⁶⁰ "sometime in mid-May 1994, at Muyira Hill, Gérard Ntakirutimana took part in an attack on Tutsi refugees,"⁸⁶¹ "Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in the attack against Tutsi refugees at Muyira Hill on 13 May 1994 and that he shot and killed the wife of one Nzamwita, a Tutsi civilian,"⁸⁶² and that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed a person named "Esdras" during an attack at Gitwe Hill at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994.⁸⁶³

505. The following factual findings made by the Trial Chamber concerning Gérard Ntakirutimana in relation to two separate events under the Bisesero Indictment are upheld, namely: that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994, where he pursued and shot at Tutsi refugees (a finding based on the testimony of HH);⁸⁶⁴ and that Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at

⁸⁵⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 543, *see also id.* para. 832 (i)-(ii).

⁸⁵⁸ *Id.*, paras., 832(vi), *see also id.* para. 586.

⁸⁵⁹ *Id.*, paras., 832(ix), *see also id.* para. 674.

⁸⁶⁰ *Id.*, para. 668; *see also id.*, para. 832(viii).

⁸⁶¹ Trial Judgement, para. 832(v), *see also id.* paras 635-636.

⁸⁶² *Id.*, paras. 642, *see also id.* para. 832(iv).

⁸⁶³ *Id.*, para. 832(iii), *see also id.* para. 559.

⁸⁶⁴ *Id.*, paras. 552-559, 832(iii).

Mubuga Primary School in June 1994 and shot at Tutsi refugees (finding based on the testimony of SS).⁸⁶⁵

506. Additionally, the Trial Chamber's factual finding concerning Gérard Ntakirutimana's involvement in relation to two separate events under the Mugonero Indictment are upheld, namely that whilst participating in the attack at the Mugonero Complex, Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Charles Ukobizaba by shooting him in the chest, from a short distance, in Mugonero Hospital courtyard around midday on 16 April 1994,⁸⁶⁶ and that Gérard Ntakirutimana attended a meeting with the commander of the Kibuye gendarmerie camp and Obed Ruzindana in Kibuye town on the afternoon of 15 April 1994, and that he procured gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on Mugonero complex on 16 April 1994.⁸⁶⁷

507. Under the Bisesero Indictment, the factual findings supporting Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for aiding and abetting genocide consist of pursuing Tutsi refugees at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994, and participating in an attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994 and shooting at Tutsi refugees; under the Mugonero Indictment, a conviction of aiding and abetting genocide is supported by the procurement of gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994.

508. As established above, intent to commit genocide is not required for an accused to be found guilty for aiding and abetting genocide. However, a finding by the Trial Chamber that the accused had the intent to commit genocide and did so by killing and causing harm to members of the group does not per se prevent a finding that he also knowingly aided and abetted other perpetrators of genocide. Accordingly to establish that Gérard Ntakirutimana aided and abetted genocide requires proof that (i) by his acts and conduct Gérard Ntakirutimana assisted, encouraged or lent moral support to the perpetration of genocide by others which had a substantial effect upon the perpetration of that crime, and (ii) Gérard Ntakirutimana knew that the above acts and conduct assisted the commission of genocide by others.

509. It is clear from the Trial Chamber's findings at paragraphs 785 and 826 of the Trial Judgement that it found that the attacks were carried out with intent to destroy, in its whole, the Tutsi population at the Mugonero Complex and in Bisesero. It results further from the Trial

⁸⁶⁵ *Id.*, paras. 628, 832(vii).

⁸⁶⁶ *Id.*, paras. 384, 791.

⁸⁶⁷ *Id.*, paras. 186, 791. Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for committing genocide stands in relating to the killing of Charles Ukobizaba in Mugonero Hospital courtyard around midday on 16 April 1994 as well as shooting at refugees at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994 and at Muguba primary school in June 1994.

Chamber findings at paragraphs 793 and 834 that it found that by his conduct and participation in the attacks Gérard Ntakirutimana had the intent to destroy, in whole, the Tutsi ethnic group. The only reasonable inference from the circumstances described by the Trial Chamber to support the above findings is that Gérard Ntakirutimana had knowledge that his acts and conduct had a substantial effect upon the commission of genocide by others. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that by the other acts of assistance identified by the Trial Chamber Gérard Ntakirutimana incurred criminal responsibility as an aider and abettor to genocide.

VI. PROSECUTION'S FOURTH GROUND OF APPEAL (EXTERMINATION)

510. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana were found not guilty by the Trial Chamber of a crime against humanity (extermination) under Count 4 of the Mugonero Indictment and Count 5 of the Bisesero Indictment.⁸⁶⁸ Count 4 alleges the massacre of civilians during the month of April 1994 in Gishyita commune, Kibuye Prefecture, and Count 5 alleges the extermination of civilians during the months of April through June 1994 in the area known as Bisesero, in Gishyita and Gisovu communes, Kibuye Prefecture.

511. The Prosecution appeals the acquittals under these two counts.

A. Alleged Error for Requiring that Victims be Named or Described Persons

512. In its appeal, the Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber erred in law at paragraphs 813 and 851 of the Trial Judgement when, in addition to the element of mass killing or mass destruction, it held that "victims be named or described persons" in order to impute liability for extermination. The Prosecution argues that this element does not exist in customary international law,⁸⁶⁹ and that the ICTR jurisprudence does not establish that "killing certain named or described persons" is an element under Article 3(b).⁸⁷⁰ Furthermore, it argues that the Trial Chamber's addition of the requirement that victims be named or identified could lead to undesirable consequences, such as rendering many prosecutions impossible when mass graves are discovered years after the killings are perpetrated and identification of victims is difficult.⁸⁷¹ In the alternative, the Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber erred in law in paragraphs 814 and 852 of the Trial Judgement by interpreting this requirement too narrowly to the facts of the case and inconsistently with the Tribunal's case law.⁸⁷² It argues that the victims at the Mugonero Complex and in Bisesero were adequately described according to the case law of the International Tribunal.⁸⁷³ At the Appeal hearing the Prosecution argued that, had the Trial Chamber not included the element of killing certain named or described persons, or given the narrow interpretation that it gave to this element, the Trial Chamber would have come to the inescapable conclusion that the mass element required for the crime of extermination was established. The Prosecution argued that the mass element was

⁸⁶⁸ Trial Judgement, paras. 814, 852.

⁸⁶⁹ Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 3.17-3.18, 3.20, 3.22.

⁸⁷⁰ *Id.*, paras. 3.24-3.33.

⁸⁷¹ *Id.*, para. 3.16.

⁸⁷² *Id.*, paras. 3.37-3.46.

⁸⁷³ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 3.47.

met because at the Mugonero Complex, hundreds of people were killed, and in Bisesero, thousands of people were killed.⁸⁷⁴

513. In response, Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the Trial Chamber's acquittal on the charge of extermination reflects a lack of evidence regarding the killing of a large number of individuals as a result of the Accused's actions.⁸⁷⁵ Therefore, the additional definitional element is irrelevant to Trial Chamber's decision. He argues that the requirement that victims be "named or described" serves as proof that a certain number of people actually died as a result of the Accused's conduct. However, if the Appeals Chamber admits that such element is not a component of the crime of extermination, the matter must be remitted to the Trial Chamber for a new determination.⁸⁷⁶

514. In its Judgement the Trial Chamber made the following legal findings:

The Chamber found above the killing of only one named or described individual, that is, Charles Ukobizaba. The Chamber is not persuaded that the element of "mass destruction" or "the taking of a large number of lives" has been established in relation to the Accused, or that the Accused were responsible for the mass killing of named or described individuals. There is insufficient evidence as to a large number of individuals killed as a result of the Accused's actions. Therefore, the Chamber is not satisfied that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana or Gérard Ntakirutimana planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and execution of a crime against humanity (extermination). Accordingly, the Chamber finds that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana are not guilty of a crime against humanity (extermination) as charged in Count 4 of the Mugonero Indictment.⁸⁷⁷

[...]

The Chamber found above the killing of only two named or described individuals, that is, the killings of Esdras and the wife of Nzamwita, by Gérard Ntakirutimana. The Chamber is not persuaded that the element of "mass destruction" or "the taking of a large number of lives" has been established in relation to the Accused, or that the Accused were responsible for the mass killing of named or described individuals. There is insufficient evidence as to a large number of individuals killed as a result of the Accused's actions. The Chamber is not satisfied that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana or Gérard Ntakirutimana planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and execution of a crime against humanity (extermination). Accordingly, the Chamber finds that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana are not guilty of a crime against humanity (extermination) as charged in Count 5 of the Bisesero Indictment.⁸⁷⁸

515. The acquittal on the charge of personal commission of extermination was motivated by the fact that the Trial Chamber was not convinced, on the evidence, that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana personally killed anyone and that Gérard Ntakirutimana personally killed more than one victim at Mugonero and more than two victims at Bisesero. The basis for their further acquittal on the charge of planning, instigating, ordering or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning preparation and execution of the crime of extermination is less clear. In light of the Trial Chamber's other

⁸⁷⁴ Appeal Hearing, T. 8 July 2004, p. 71.

⁸⁷⁵ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 80.

⁸⁷⁶ *Id.*, para. 83.

⁸⁷⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 814.

findings,⁸⁷⁹ it is conceivable that the Trial Chamber reached this conclusion considering that the requirement that the mass killing be of named or described individuals was not met.

516. In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber followed the *Akayesu* Trial Judgement in defining extermination as “a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals. Extermination differs from murder in that it requires an element of mass destruction, which is not required for murder.”⁸⁸⁰ The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that the crime of extermination is the act of killing on a large scale.⁸⁸¹ The expressions “on a large scale” or “large number” do not, however, suggest a numerical minimum.⁸⁸² As a crime against humanity, for the purposes of the ICTR Statute, the act of killing must occur within the context of a widespread or systematic attack⁸⁸³ against the civilian population for national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.

517. In finding that an element of the crime of extermination was the “killing of certain named or described persons”⁸⁸⁴ the Trial Chamber purported to be following the *Akayesu* Trial Judgement,⁸⁸⁵ which it found had since been followed in *Rutaganda* and *Musema*.⁸⁸⁶ More recently, this element was also stated in the *Niyitegeka* Trial Judgement.⁸⁸⁷ In other judgements issued by ICTR Trial Chambers “certain named or described persons” has not been considered to be an element of the crime of extermination.⁸⁸⁸ Further, none of the judgements of the ICTY which have considered the charge of extermination has identified killing “certain named or described persons” to be an element of the crime of extermination.⁸⁸⁹

⁸⁷⁸ Trial Judgement, para. 852.

⁸⁷⁹ See in particular, Trial Judgement, paras. 785, 788-790, which establish that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was guilty of aiding and abetting genocide for the killings of hundreds of Tutsis identified at the Mugonero Complex.

⁸⁸⁰ Trial Judgement, para. 813 citing *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 591. This position has been endorsed in all the ICTR Trial Judgements: *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement, para. 142; *Rutaganda* Trial Judgement, para. 82; *Musema* Trial Judgement, para. 217; *Bagilishema* Trial Judgement, para. 86; *Semanza* Trial Judgement, para. 340; *Niyitegeka* Trial Judgement, para. 450; *Kajelijeli* Trial Judgement, para. 890; *Media* Trial Judgement, para. 1044; *Kamuhanda* Trial Judgement, para. 691. See also, ICTY, *Krstić* Trial Judgement, para. 503; *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, para. 227; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, para. 639.

⁸⁸¹ Trial Judgement, para. 813 citing *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, para. 232.

⁸⁸² *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement, para. 145; *Bagilishema* Trial Judgement, para. 87; *Kajelijeli* Trial Judgement, para. 891; *Media* Trial Judgement, para. 1044; *Kamuhanda* Trial Judgement, para. 692.

⁸⁸³ While the English version of the ICTR Statute reads “widespread or systematic”, the French version of Article 3 reads “généralisée et systématique”, the French version containing an error in the translation of the English text.

⁸⁸⁴ Trial Judgement, para. 813 citing *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 592.

⁸⁸⁵ *Akayesu* Trial Judgement, para. 592.

⁸⁸⁶ Trial Judgement, n. 1154. It must be noted that this definition was not challenged on appeal in *Rutaganda* and *Musema*.

⁸⁸⁷ *Niyitegeka* Trial Judgement, para. 450.

⁸⁸⁸ *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement, paras. 142-147; *Bagilishema* Trial Judgement para. 89; *Semanza* Trial Judgement, paras. 340-463; *Kajelijeli* Trial Judgement, paras. 891-893; *Media* Trial Judgement, para. 1044; *Kamuhanda* Trial Judgement, paras. 691-695.

⁸⁸⁹ *Krstić* Trial Judgement, paras. 495-505; *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, paras. 216-233; *Stakić* Trial Judgement, paras. 638-661. Although the definition in the *Akayesu* Judgement is mentioned in the *Krstić* Judgement, it should be noted,

518. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that customary international law does not consider a precise description or designation by name of victims to be an element of the crime of extermination. There is no mention of such an element in Article 6(c) of the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, nor was extermination interpreted by that Tribunal as requiring proof of such an element in judgements rendered. The International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind also does not consider a precise description or designation of the victims by name to be an element of the crime of extermination:

“Extermination is a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals. In addition, the act used to carry out the offence of extermination involves an element of mass destruction which is not required for murder. [...] In this regard, extermination is closely related to the crime of genocide in that both crimes are directed against a large number of victims. However, the crime of extermination would apply to situations that differ from those covered by the crime of genocide. Extermination covers situations in which a group of individuals who do not share any common characteristics are killed [...]”⁸⁹⁰

519. Incidentally, that the victims be “certain named or described persons” is not identified as an element of the crime of extermination under Article 7(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.⁸⁹¹

520. In the *Rutaganda*, *Musema* and *Niyitegeka* Trial Judgements, from which the Trial Chamber purported to derive this element, the majority of victims were identified by the Trial Chamber as civilians of Tutsi origin, without designating them by name or describing them with greater precision.⁸⁹² The interpretation they placed upon the requirement that the victims be “certain named or described persons” was met by the identification of civilians of a particular origin. In these cases, the requirement to designate the victims by name or to give a precise description of the victims killed was not extended to embrace the literal meaning, but seems rather to have been understood as expressing the fact that all crimes against humanity under the ambit of the ICTR Statute must be committed because of a victim belonging to a national, political, ethnic, racial or religious group.

521. It is not an element of the crime of extermination that a precise identification of “certain named or described persons” be established. It is sufficient that the Prosecution satisfy the Trial Chamber that mass killings occurred. In this case that element was satisfied by the Trial Chamber’s

however, that the Trial Chamber in *Krstić* did not endorse this definition and preferred to make its own assessment to determine the underlying elements of extermination. It seems, moreover, that the Trial Chamber in *Krstić* decided on the need for identification of the victims (para. 499) as a mere requirement of identification of the victims as civilians.

⁸⁹⁰ Commentaries on the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, *Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, 6 May - 26 July 1996*, Official Documents of the United Nations General Assembly’s 51st session, Supplement no. 10 (A/51/10), Article 18, p. 118.

⁸⁹¹ Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 2 November 2000. The Appeals Chamber notes that with respect to the state of customary international law in 1994, the time at which the crimes were committed, the legal instruments coming into effect after that date are of less legal significance.

⁸⁹² *Rutaganda* Trial Judgement, para. 416; *Musema* Trial Judgement, para. 949; *Niyitegeka* Trial Judgement, para. 454.

findings that hundreds of people were killed at the Mugonero Complex and that thousands of people were killed in Bisesero. To require greater identification of those victims would, as the Prosecution argued, increase the burden of proof to such an extent that it hinders a large number of prosecutions for extermination.

522. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber finds that the crime of extermination requires proof that the accused participated in a widespread or systematic killing or in subjecting a widespread number of people or systematically subjecting a number of people to conditions of living that would inevitably lead to death, and that the accused intended by his acts or omissions this result. Applying this definition, the Trial Chamber erred in law by interpreting the requirement of "killing of certain named or described persons" to be an element of the crime of extermination.

523. The Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber's legal error led to acquittal of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana on the charges of extermination. The Trial Chamber concluded that "[t]here is insufficient evidence as to a large number of individuals killed as a result of the Accused's actions" to establish the criminal liability of the Accused pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Tribunal's Statute. The issue to be examined next by the Appeals Chamber is whether this factual conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber was based upon its legal error that an element of the crime of extermination is that the victims must be "named or described persons".

B. Alleged Error for Failing to Consider that the Accused Participated in a Joint Criminal Enterprise or Aided and Abetted the Crime of Extermination

524. On appeal, the Prosecution argues that both Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana should be found guilty of extermination as participants in a joint criminal enterprise to exterminate predominantly Tutsi civilians who had sought refuge at the Mugonero Complex and in Bisesero.⁸⁹³ Alternatively, the Prosecution argues that Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana should be found guilty as aiders and abettors of extermination.⁸⁹⁴ In its Notice of Appeal, the Prosecution did not advance the ground that the Accused acted as participants in a joint criminal enterprise to exterminate. This ground of appeal was developed in the Prosecution Appeal Brief and argued at the Appeal hearing.⁸⁹⁵ The Appeals Chamber has already rejected the Prosecution's argument that this mode of liability should have been considered by the Trial Chamber in relation to the crime of genocide and those same considerations apply here. Moreover,

⁸⁹³ Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 3.57-3.58; Appeal Hearing, T. 8 July 2004, p. 79.

⁸⁹⁴ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 3.59.

⁸⁹⁵ Prosecution Amended Notice of Appeal, Ground 5, pp. 3-4.

the Prosecution's failure to specify this ground of appeal in its Notice of Appeal is not rectified by the Prosecution's development of that argument in its Appeal Brief. Upon this basis, the Appeals Chamber considers that it has not been properly seized of this ground of appeal, and will therefore limit its consideration to other forms of individual criminal liability, namely direct commission and aiding and abetting the commission of the crime of extermination.

525. In support of its argument that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana were not responsible for the taking of a large number of lives, and that the element of mass destruction had not been met, the Prosecution points to the factual findings made by the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber found that, on 16 April 1994, a massacre occurred at the Mugonero Complex, which "claimed hundreds of lives".⁸⁹⁶ It also found that, from April to June 1994, there were widespread attacks in Bisesero and that Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana intentionally participated in them.⁸⁹⁷ On 13 May 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana was found to have participated in the attack on Muyira Hill. This attack, the Prosecution argues, was considered to constitute extermination in the *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, *Musema* and *Niyitegeka* Trial Judgements.⁸⁹⁸

526. The Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber erroneously removes from its consideration the large number of persons whose killings were aided and abetted by the two Accused.⁸⁹⁹ The Trial Chamber found that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was guilty of aiding and abetting genocide for the killings of hundreds of Tutsis identified at the Mugonero Complex⁹⁰⁰ but that he was not liable for extermination because there was insufficient evidence as to the large number of persons killed as a result of his actions.⁹⁰¹ According to the Prosecution, these findings are irreconcilable and the Trial Chamber erred in failing to consider that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's intentional aiding and abetting of massacres satisfies the mass destruction element of extermination.⁹⁰² In addition, the Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber found that Gérard Ntakirutimana provided assistance and participated in the attack at the Mugonero Complex with the requisite genocidal intent. That attack resulted in killings committed in addition to those that Gérard Ntakirutimana personally committed. Because Gérard Ntakirutimana substantially assisted in killings, the Prosecution argues that the mass destruction element was proven and a conviction for extermination should have been entered.⁹⁰³

⁸⁹⁶ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 3.8 citing Trial Judgement, para. 785.

⁸⁹⁷ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 3.8 citing Trial Judgement, paras. 446, 447.

⁸⁹⁸ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 49 citing *Niyitegeka* Trial Judgement, paras. 451, 413.

⁸⁹⁹ Prosecution Reply, para. 3.12.

⁹⁰⁰ Prosecution Reply, para. 3.13 citing Trial Judgement, paras. 788-790.

⁹⁰¹ *Id.*, para. 3.13.

⁹⁰² *Id.*, paras. 3.13, 3.14.

⁹⁰³ *Id.*, para. 3.14.

527. It clearly appears from the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments, from the Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief⁹⁰⁴ and from the Prosecution's Closing Brief,⁹⁰⁵ that the individual criminal responsibility of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana was founded on Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.⁹⁰⁶ Consequently, the form of responsibility pleaded by the Prosecution for both Accused embraces "having either planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4" of the Statute.⁹⁰⁷

528. As mentioned earlier, the Trial Chamber acquitted the Accused on the charge of personal commission of extermination because it was not convinced, on the evidence, that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana personally killed anyone or that Gérard Ntakirutimana personally killed more than one victim at Mugonero and more than two victims at Bisesero. Why the Trial Chamber failed to consider whether the acts of aiding and abetting which supported the conviction for genocide could also form the basis for a conviction for aiding and abetting the crime of extermination is unclear.

529. One possibility is that the Trial Chamber pronounced these acquittals based solely on its legal error that an element of the crime of extermination required proof that the Accused were responsible for the mass killing of precisely "named or described individuals". The second possibility is that, when the Trial Chamber stated that "there is insufficient evidence as to a large number of individuals killed as a result of the Accused's actions", it meant that aiding and abetting the crime of extermination requires that the acts of assistance provided by the Accused to the main perpetrators effectively resulted in the killing of a large number of people. This interpretation of aiding and abetting would also constitute a legal error.

530. The *actus reus* for aiding and abetting the crime of extermination is that the accused carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of that crime. This support must have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. The requisite *mens rea* is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the crime of extermination committed by the principal. If it is established that the accused provided a weapon to one principal, knowing that the principal will use that weapon to take part with others in a mass killing, as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, and if the mass killing in question occurs, the fact that the weapon procured by the accused "only" killed a limited number of persons is irrelevant to determining the accused's responsibility as an aider and abettor of the crime of extermination.

⁹⁰⁴ Prosecution's Pre-Trial Brief, paras. 23-39.

⁹⁰⁵ Prosecution's Closing Brief, paras. 1085, 1086, 1088, 1109, 1112.

531. The Appeals Chamber will next determine whether the above error invalidates the verdict. As already stated, the Appeals Chamber has quashed a number of the Trial Chamber's factual findings for lack of notice.⁹⁰⁸ Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber must determine whether the remaining factual findings are sufficient to support a finding of criminal responsibility of the Accused for the crime of extermination.

532. With respect to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the remaining findings are: one day in May or June 1994, he transported armed attackers who were chasing Tutsi survivors at Murambi Hill,⁹⁰⁹; one day in the middle of May 1994, he brought armed attackers in the rear hold of his vehicle to Nyarutovu Hill, and the group was searching for Tutsi refugees and chasing them; on this occasion, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana pointed out the fleeing refugees to the attackers, who then chased these refugees singing, "Exterminate them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and get it over with, in all the forests";⁹¹⁰ one day on May or June 1994 Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was seen arriving at Ku Cyapa in a vehicle followed by two buses of attackers, and he was part of a convoy which included attackers;⁹¹¹ and sometime between 17 April and early May 1994, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was in Murambi within the area of Bisesero, and he went to a church in Murambi where many Tutsi were seeking refuge and ordered attackers to destroy the roof of the church.⁹¹²

533. These findings are sufficient to sustain the Trial Chamber's finding of criminal responsibility on the part of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana for aiding and abetting the crime of genocide. The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that in carrying out these acts Elizaphan Ntakirutimana assisted, encouraged or lent moral support to the perpetration of genocide by others, and that his acts had a substantial effect upon the perpetration of that crime, and that he knew that these acts and conduct assisted the commission of genocide by others.

534. The Appeals Chamber finds that in carrying out these acts of participation Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knew that the intent of the actual perpetrators was the extermination of the Tutsi refugees and that he was making a substantial contribution to the acts of mass killing of the Tutsi victims that occurred at Murambi. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber holds that these factual findings support the mass killing element of the crime of extermination, that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had the required *mens rea* for aiding and abetting extermination and accordingly

⁹⁰⁶ Gérard Ntakirutimana was also prosecuted pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

⁹⁰⁷ Prosecution's Closing Brief, para. 1112.

⁹⁰⁸ *Supra*, section II. A.1.(b).

⁹⁰⁹ Trial Judgement, para. 579.

⁹¹⁰ *Id.*, para. 594.

⁹¹¹ *Id.*, para. 661.

⁹¹² *Id.*, para. 691.

finds that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana incurred individual criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting the extermination of the Tutsi as a crime against humanity.

535. With respect to Gérard Ntakirutimana, the remaining factual findings under the Bisesero Indictment are his participation in an attack at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994, where he pursued and shot at Tutsi refugees;⁹¹³ and his participation in an attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994, where he shot at Tutsi refugees.⁹¹⁴ In relation to the Mugonero Indictment the remaining factual findings are his killing of Charles Ukobizaba by shooting him in the chest, from a short distance, in Mugonero Hospital courtyard around midday on 16 April 1994 during an attack at the Mugonero Complex;⁹¹⁵ and his attendance at a meeting with the commander of the Kibuye gendarmerie camp and Obed Ruzindana in Kibuye town on the afternoon of 15 April 1994 and his procurement of gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994.⁹¹⁶

536. The Appeals Chamber has already determined that the factual findings supporting Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for aiding and abetting genocide consist of pursuing Tutsi refugees at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994, and participating in an attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994, where he shot at Tutsi refugees, under the Bisesero Indictment, and procuring gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994, under the Mugonero Indictment.

537. The Appeals Chamber finds that in carrying out these acts Gérard Ntakirutimana knew that the intention of the other participants was the extermination of the Tutsi refugees and that by his acts and conduct he was making a substantial contribution to the acts of mass killing of the Tutsi victims that occurred at Gitwe Hill, Mubuga Primary School and at the Mugonero Complex. The Appeals Chamber holds that these factual findings support the mass killing element of the crime of extermination, that Gérard Ntakirutimana had the required *mens rea* for aiding and abetting extermination, and accordingly finds that Gérard Ntakirutimana incurred individual criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting the extermination of the Tutsi as a crime against humanity. The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that Gérard Ntakirutimana shared the intent to exterminate. However, as pleaded in the Indictment, the actions of Gérard Ntakirutimana alone do not satisfy the

⁹¹³ *Id.*, paras. 552-559, 832(iii).

⁹¹⁴ *Id.*, paras. 628, 832(vii).

⁹¹⁵ *Id.*, paras. 384, 791.

⁹¹⁶ *Id.*, paras. 186 and 791.

mass scale killing element for the Appeals Chamber to be able to enter a conviction for extermination.⁹¹⁷

C. Additional Issues Raised by the Accused in Relation to the Prosecution Fourth Ground of Appeal

538. Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana argued that extermination charges are reserved for persons exercising power and authority or who otherwise had the capacity to be instrumental in the large scale killings.⁹¹⁸ The Accused noted that the Trial Chamber rejected charges under Article 6(3) of the Statute because it found that Gérard Ntakirutimana had no effective control over any persons during the applicable period.⁹¹⁹

539. The argument put forward by both Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana stems from an erroneous interpretation of the *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement. In that case, Trial Chamber II of ICTY did not consider that the accused had to be in a position of authority for the crime of extermination.⁹²⁰ The paragraph of the *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement on which they rely is a simple outline of the policy for the crime of extermination as practised by tribunals after World War II, and has no impact on the definition of the crime.⁹²¹ There was no finding in *Vasiljević* that extermination charges are reserved for persons exercising power and authority or who otherwise had the capacity to be instrumental in the killings of large numbers. As Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana have identified no other authority in support of their argument that the crime of extermination should be reserved for this category of individuals alone, and authorities of this Tribunal and that of the ICTY have established otherwise, this ground of appeal is dismissed as unfounded.

540. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana also argue that cumulative convictions for genocide and extermination based on the same facts are prohibited.⁹²² Gérard Ntakirutimana argues that the *Krstić* Trial Judgement establishes that when facts support a conviction for both extermination and genocide, the verdict of genocide should be upheld because it is more specific.⁹²³ Gérard Ntakirutimana further submits that an extermination conviction, as well as convictions for the murders of Charles Ukobizaba, Esdras and Nzamwita's wife, would be impermissibly cumulative on the basis of the *Rutaganda* Trial Judgement. Gérard Ntakirutimana argues, therefore,

⁹¹⁷ *Id.*, para. 524.

⁹¹⁸ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 84 citing *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, para. 222; Response (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 16.

⁹¹⁹ Trial Judgement, paras. 819-822.

⁹²⁰ *Vasiljević* Trial Judgement, para. 229.

⁹²¹ *Id.*, para. 222.

⁹²² Response (G. Ntakirutimana), para. 86; Response (E. Ntakirutimana), p. 16.

that if a conviction for extermination is entered, the murder conviction should be vacated.⁹²⁴ As the Appeals Chamber has already reversed Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for the murders of Esdras and Nzamwita's wife it will only consider the above argument in relation to the murder of Charles Ukobizaba.

541. In response the Prosecution argues that, in *Musema*, the Appeals Chamber found that convictions for both genocide and extermination based on the same conduct are permissible.⁹²⁵ Furthermore, the Prosecution argues that *Musema* overruled the *Krstić* Trial Judgement because *Musema* was rendered later.⁹²⁶ However, the Prosecution agrees with Gérard Ntakirutimana that an extermination conviction cannot stand cumulatively with the murder conviction if they emanate from the same events because murder is subsumed within the crime of extermination.

542. Following the principles established in *Čelebići*, the Appeals Chamber in *Musema* held that multiple criminal convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision involved has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.⁹²⁷ An element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other.⁹²⁸ Applying this principle, the *Musema* Appeals Chamber held that the crime of genocide under Article 2 of the Statute and the crime of extermination under Article 3 of the Statute each contained a materially distinct element not required by the other. The materially distinct element of genocide is the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The materially distinct element of extermination, as a crime against humanity, is the requirement that the crime was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.⁹²⁹ Upon this basis, the Appeals Chamber held that convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity, based on the same facts, are permissible.⁹³⁰ This conclusion has recently been confirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the *Krstić* case.⁹³¹ Conviction for murder as a crime against humanity and conviction for extermination as a crime against humanity, based on the same set of facts, however, cannot be cumulative.⁹³² Murder as a crime against humanity does not contain a materially distinct element from

⁹²³ Response (G. Ntakirutimana), paras. 87-89.

⁹²⁴ *Id.*, para. 96.

⁹²⁵ Prosecution Reply, para. 3.24, citing *The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision of the Appeals Chamber, 31 May 2000, para. 92.

⁹²⁶ Prosecution Reply, para. 3.25.

⁹²⁷ *Musema* Appeal Judgement, paras. 358-370.

⁹²⁸ *Čelebići* Appeal Judgement, para. 412. The standard was clarified in the *Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 168. See also *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, paras. 135, 146; *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, para. 218.

⁹²⁹ *Musema* Appeal Judgement, para. 366.

⁹³⁰ *Musema* Appeal Judgement, para. 370.

⁹³¹ *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 219-227.

⁹³² See *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement, paras. 647-650; *Rutaganda* Trial Judgement, para. 422; *Musema* Trial Judgement, para. 957; *Semanza* Trial Judgement, paras. 500-505.

extermination as a crime against humanity; each involves killing within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, and the only element that distinguishes these offences is the requirement of the offence of extermination that the killings occur on a mass scale.

VII. PROSECUTION'S FIFTH GROUND OF APPEAL MURDER (MURDER AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY)

543. The Accused were charged with the crime of murder as a crime against humanity under Count 3 of the Mugonero Indictment and Count 4 of the Bisesero Indictment. The Trial Chamber acquitted Elizaphan Ntakirutimana of these counts;⁹³³ Gérard Ntakirutimana was found guilty of the murders of Charles Ukobizaba, Esdras and the wife of Nzamwita.⁹³⁴ Count 3 of the Mugonero Indictment alleged the massacre of civilians during the month of April 1994 in Gishyita commune, Kibuye Prefecture, and Count 4 of the Bisesero Indictment alleged the massacre of civilians during the months of April through June 1994 in the area known as Bisesero, in Gishyita and Gisovu communes, Kibuye Prefecture.

544. The Prosecution contends that the Trial Chamber erred in law in its determination of the elements required for murder as a crime against humanity as applied to both the Mugonero Indictment and the Bisesero Indictment. Specifically, it alleges that the Trial Chamber erred in paragraphs 803 (Mugonero) and 843 (Bisesero) in finding that one of the elements of the crime of murder (crime against humanity) is that the perpetrator personally killed the victim(s).⁹³⁵ According to the Prosecution, this error invalidates the Judgement when the Trial Chamber did not find Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana guilty of murder as a crime against humanity for their participation in the hundreds of killings at the Mugonero Complex and the thousands of killings in Bisesero.⁹³⁶ The Prosecution requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse the verdict and enter convictions for Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana based on Count 3 of the Mugonero Indictment and Count 4 of the Bisesero Indictment.⁹³⁷ This request is submitted, however, in the event that the Appeals Chamber does not convict Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana of extermination.⁹³⁸

545. At the Appeals hearing the Prosecution requested that the Appeals Chamber, even if it granted the Prosecution's fourth ground of appeal, clarify the law with respect to the material element of murder as a crime against humanity by including a finding in the Judgement that it is not a requirement for responsibility under Article 3(a) of the Statute that the accused personally commits the killing. Having found that the Trial Chamber erred in relation to the elements of the

⁹³³ Trial Judgement, paras. 805, 844.

⁹³⁴ *Id.*, paras. 809-810 and 848-849.

⁹³⁵ Prosecution Amended Notice of Appeal, p. 4.

⁹³⁶ *Id.*, pp. 4-5.

⁹³⁷ *Id.*, p. 5.

⁹³⁸ *Id.*

crime of extermination, the Appeals Chamber clarifies the law on the material element of murder as a crime against humanity.

546. Murder as a crime against humanity under Article 3(a) does not require the Prosecution to establish that the accused personally committed the killing. Personal commission is only one of the modes of liability identified under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. All modes of liability under that Article are applicable to the crimes defined in Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute. Similarly, an accused can also be convicted of a crime defined in Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute on the basis of his responsibility as a superior according to Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute.

VIII. SENTENCE

547. In Section II.A.1. above, the Appeals Chamber has upheld a number of Gérard Ntakirutimana's grounds of appeal that he and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana were given insufficient notice of the material facts of the Prosecution's case and that the Trial Chamber erred in basing a conviction on those material facts. In Sections VI.B. and VII., the Appeals Chamber has also upheld the Prosecution's appeal in relation to the elements of extermination as a crime against humanity and confirmed that the *mens rea* for aiding and abetting genocide is knowledge of the perpetrator's genocidal intent. The Appeals Chamber now considers how those errors impact upon the criminal responsibility and sentences of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana. The Appeals Chamber will also assess the merits of the Prosecution's sixth ground of appeal against the Trial Chamber's determination of the sentence to be applied to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana.

A. Prosecution's Sixth Ground of Appeal

548. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute, in determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda. The Prosecution argues that, although the Trial Chamber did refer to the relevant Rwandan legislation on sentencing practices, it did so not for the purpose of determining the general sentencing practices in Rwanda, but rather in support of a principle of gradation discussed in the Trial Judgement. The Prosecution submits that under the general sentencing practice in Rwanda both Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana would have received more severe terms of imprisonment, namely mandatory life sentences.⁹³⁹

549. It is established jurisprudence that the imposition of a sentence is a decision which falls to the Trial Chamber. A Trial Chamber has considerable discretion when determining a sentence and the Appeals Chamber will not intervene unless there has been a discernible error in the exercise of the Trial Chamber's discretion.⁹⁴⁰

550. In its discussion, the Trial Chamber did indeed refer to the principle of gradation of sentences, noting that harsher penalties may be imposed on individuals who committed crimes with "especial zeal or sadism" and that the sentences "consequently stigmatize those crimes at a level that corresponds to their overall magnitude and reflects the extent of the suffering inflicted upon the

⁹³⁹ Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 5.4-5.15. Referring to the Rwandan Organic Law No. 8/96 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990 and the Rwandan Penal Code of 18 August 1977.

victims.”⁹⁴¹ It also noted that this principle could be found in the relevant dispositions of the Rwandan Criminal Code and the practices of Rwandan courts in respect of sentencing.⁹⁴² However, it cannot be said, as the Prosecution suggests, that by invoking such a principle, the Trial Chamber minimised the crimes committed and the conduct of the Accused. Quite the reverse.

551. The Trial Chamber concluded that this principle would allow for imposition of “the highest sentence if the circumstances of the case, after assessment of any individual and mitigating factors, are deemed to require it.”⁹⁴³ The Trial Chamber added that by the same token not all persons convicted of genocide must be given the highest sentence.⁹⁴⁴ The Appeals Chamber understands this to mean that the Trial Chamber could likewise impose a lesser sentence if justified after an assessment of any individual and mitigating factors. The Trial Chamber was therefore positing that the appropriate sentence to be applied to the Accused depended largely on the circumstances of the case, including consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors. This approach is in conformity with Rule 101(A) of the Rules, and within the discretion of the Trial Chamber.

552. The Trial Chamber reached its decision on sentence only after having discussed relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, and after having noted the Prosecution’s submission that both Accused would have received death sentences in Rwanda as they fell under Category I of Rwanda’s Organic Law.⁹⁴⁵ The Appeals Chamber is therefore not persuaded by the Prosecution’s argument that by recalling the principle of gradation of sentence, the Trial Chamber committed a discernible error.

553. The Prosecution also submits that the sentences given to Gérard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana are in disparity with the Tribunal’s sentencing practice in genocide cases and are manifestly disproportionate to the crimes. The Prosecution requests that the Appeals Chamber increase the sentence of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana to 20 years’ imprisonment, and that of Gérard Ntakirutimana to life imprisonment.⁹⁴⁶ Given that the Appeals Chamber has quashed a number of convictions for each Accused, the submissions of the Prosecution in this regard are now moot.

⁹⁴⁰ *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 9; *Krstić* Appeal Judgement, paras. 241-242.

⁹⁴¹ Trial Judgement, para. 884.

⁹⁴² *Id.*, para. 885.

⁹⁴³ *Id.*, para. 886.

⁹⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁹⁴⁵ *Id.*, para. 890.

⁹⁴⁶ Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, paras. 5.16-5.53.

B. Convictions and Sentence for Gérard Ntakirutimana

554. Gérard Ntakirutimana was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. He was arrested on 29 October 1996 in the Ivory Coast and transferred to the Tribunal on 30 November 1996. He has since his transfer been detained in the United Nations Detention Facilities in Arusha, Tanzania.

555. As a result of the errors committed by the Trial Chamber, the following Trial Chamber findings supporting Gérard Ntakirutimana's convictions under the Bisesero Indictment have been quashed:

- (i) "on or about 18 April 1994 Gérard Ntakirutimana was with *Interahamwe* in Murambi Hill pursuing and attacking Tutsi refugees" and "in the last part of April or possibly in May, Gérard Ntakirutimana was with attackers in Gitwe Hill where he shot at refugees;"⁹⁴⁷
- (ii) "sometime between April and June 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana was in Kidashya Hill transporting armed attackers, and he participated in chasing and shooting at Tutsi refugees in the hills;"⁹⁴⁸
- (iii) "Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Mutiti Hill, where he shot at refugees;"⁹⁴⁹
- (iv) "one day in June 1994, Gérard Ntakirutimana headed a group of armed attackers at Muyira Hill. He carried a gun and shot at refugees;"⁹⁵⁰
- (v) "sometime in mid-May 1994, at Muyira Hill, Gérard Ntakirutimana took part in an attack on Tutsi refugees;"⁹⁵¹
- (vi) "Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in the attack against Tutsi refugees at Muyira Hill on 13 May 1994 and [] he shot and killed the wife of one Nzamwita, a Tutsi civilian;"⁹⁵²
- (vii) "Gérard Ntakirutimana killed a person named "Esdras" during an attack at Gitwe Hill at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994."⁹⁵³

⁹⁴⁷ Trial Judgement, para. 543; *see also id.*, paras. 832(i)-(ii).

⁹⁴⁸ *Id.*, para. 586; *see also id.*, para. 832(vi).

⁹⁴⁹ *Id.*, para. 674; *see also id.*, para. 832(ix).

⁹⁵⁰ *Id.*, para. 668; *see also id.*, para. 832(viii).

⁹⁵¹ *Id.*, para. 832(v); *see also id.*, para. 635.

⁹⁵² *Id.*, para. 642; *see also id.*, para. 832(iv).

⁹⁵³ *Id.*, paras. 559, 832(iii).

556. The following factual findings made by the Trial Chamber concerning Gérard Ntakirutimana in relation to two separate events under the Bisesero Indictment are upheld:

(i) Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994 where he pursued and shot at Tutsi refugees;⁹⁵⁴

(ii) Gérard Ntakirutimana participated in an attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994 and shot at Tutsi refugees.⁹⁵⁵

557. Additionally, the Trial Chamber's factual finding concerning Gérard Ntakirutimana's involvement in relation to two separate events under the Mugonero Indictment are upheld, namely:

(i) Gérard Ntakirutimana killed Charles Ukobizaba by shooting him in the chest, from a short distance, in Mugonero Hospital courtyard around midday on 16 April 1994,⁹⁵⁶

(ii) Gérard Ntakirutimana attended a meeting with the commander of the Kibuye gendarmerie camp and Obed Ruzindana in Kibuye town on the afternoon of 15 April 1994 and he procured gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994.⁹⁵⁷

558. Also as found above, the Trial Chamber erred in law in considering that an element of the crime of extermination is that the victims must be "named or described persons". Considering the impact of the error in question on the verdict, the Appeals Chamber found that in carrying out the acts supporting his conviction for genocide and aiding and abetting genocide, Gérard Ntakirutimana knew that the intention of the other participants was the extermination of the Tutsi refugees and that by his acts and conducts he was making a substantial contribution to the acts of mass killing of the Tutsi victims that occurred at Gitwe Hill, Mubuga Hill and at the Mugonero Complex. Therefore, Gérard Ntakirutimana incurs individual criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting extermination of the Tutsi as a crime against humanity.

559. The Appeals Chamber therefore upholds the Trial Chamber's conviction of Gérard Ntakirutimana for Genocide, for his participation to the attack at the Mugonero Complex during which he killed Charles Ukobizaba, as charged in Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment, and the conviction for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 3 of the Mugonero Indictment. For

⁹⁵⁴ *Id.*, paras. 552-559, 832(iii).

⁹⁵⁵ *Id.*, paras. 628, 832(vii).

⁹⁵⁶ *Id.*, paras. 384, 791.

⁹⁵⁷ *Id.*, paras. 186, 791.

reasons explained in Section VI of the present Judgement, for his procurement of gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on the Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994, the Appeals Chamber enters a conviction of aiding and abetting extermination under Count 4 of the Mugonero Indictment. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber enters a conviction for aiding an abetting genocide on the basis of his procurement of gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on Mugonero Complex on 16 April 1994, as charged under Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment.⁹⁵⁸

560. In relation to the Bisesero Indictment, there are no remaining findings that Gérard Ntakirutimana killed or injured individuals during the attacks at Gitwe Hill and Mubuga Primary School. In light of the fact that the Appeals Chamber found that the Prosecution could not rely on the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in this case, a conviction for genocide cannot be entered for Gérard Ntakirutimana's participation in the abovementioned attacks. However, convictions for aiding and abetting genocide, as charged under Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment, and aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity, as charged under Count 5 of the Bisesero Indictment, are warranted here.⁹⁵⁹ Accordingly, in addition to the convictions upheld above, Gérard Ntakirutimana is also guilty of the following:

(i) aiding and abetting genocide for his participation in the attack at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or beginning of May 1994, and in the attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994;

(ii) aiding and abetting a crime against humanity (extermination) for his participation in the attack at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or beginning of May 1994, and in the attack at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994.

561. Gérard Ntakirutimana's conviction for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 4 of the Bisesero Indictment is quashed.

562. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a penalty must reflect the totality of the crimes committed by a person and be proportionate to both the seriousness of the crimes committed and the degree of participation of the person convicted.⁹⁶⁰ In the view of the Appeals Chamber, Gérard Ntakirutimana's convictions for his participation in attacks at Gitwe Hill, near Gitwe Primary School, at the end of April or the beginning of May 1994 and at Mubuga Primary School in June 1994, where he pursued and shot at Tutsi refugees, his killing of Charles Ukobizaba by shooting

⁹⁵⁸ See *supra* para. 500.

⁹⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁶⁰ *Rutaganda* Appeal Judgement, para. 591; *Vasiljević* Appeal Judgement, para. 156, referring to *Furundžija* Appeal Judgement, para. 249; *Aleksovski* Appeal Judgement, para. 182; *Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement, para. 852.

him in the chest, from a short distance, in Mugonero Hospital courtyard around midday on 16 April 1994, and his procurement of gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on the Mugonero Complex, are, taken as a whole, extremely grave. The Trial Chamber's finding that Gérard Ntakirutimana committed these crimes with the intent to destroy in whole or in part the Tutsi group is still applicable.⁹⁶¹ So is the Trial Chamber's finding that these acts were committed with the knowledge that they were part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian Tutsi population.⁹⁶²

563. The Appeals Chamber has also considered the mitigating and aggravating factors discussed by the Trial Chamber, and concurs with the Trial Chamber that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors in Gérard Ntakirutimana's case.⁹⁶³ In particular, the Appeals Chamber has considered the following aggravating factors, namely that Gérard Ntakirutimana (i) abused his personal position in the community to commit the crimes, (ii) personally shot at Tutsi refugees, including Charles Ukobizaba, and (iii) participated in attacks at the Mugonero Complex, where he was a doctor, as well as in other safe havens in which refugees had sought shelter.

564. The Appeals Chamber finds that the revision of the verdict in respect of both the acquittals and the new convictions does not affect the validity of the elements which form the basis of the sentence of 25 years' imprisonment imposed by the Trial Chamber. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber maintains the sentence of 25 years' imprisonment handed down by the Trial Chamber.

C. Convictions and Sentence for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana

565. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He was arrested at the request of the Tribunal on 29 September 1996 and initially detained in Texas, USA. Having petitioned against his arrest and transfer to the International Tribunal, he was released on 17 December 1997 by a US Magistrate on constitutional grounds.⁹⁶⁴ The US State Department petitioned against that decision, and he was ultimately re-arrested on 26 February 1998 and transferred to the United Nations Detention Facilities in Arusha on 24 March 2000.

566. As a result of the errors committed by the Trial Chamber in basing convictions on unpleaded material facts, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's conviction under the Mugonero Indictment, for conveying attackers to the Mugonero Complex is quashed,⁹⁶⁵ and under the Bisesero Indictment, his convictions for his participation in a convoy of vehicles carrying attackers to Kabatwa Hill, where

⁹⁶¹ Trial Judgement, paras. 793, 834,

⁹⁶² *Id.* paras. 808, 848.

⁹⁶³ *Id.*, paras. 908-913.

⁹⁶⁴ In the Matter of Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, U.S. Dist. Ct. Southern Dist. of TX, Laredo Div., Misc. No. L-96-5 (Dec. 17, 1997).

⁹⁶⁵ Trial Judgement, para. 788.

he pointed out Tutsi Refugees at Gitwa Hill, and for transporting attackers to and being present at an attack at Mubuga Primary School in mid-May, under the Bisesero Indictment are quashed. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana remains guilty in relation to four separate events under the Bisesero Indictment, namely:

- (i) "one day in May or June 1994, he transported armed attackers who were chasing Tutsi survivors at Murambi Hill;"⁹⁶⁶
- (ii) "one day in the middle of May 1994, he brought armed attackers in the rear hold of his vehicle to Nyarutovu Hill, and the group was searching for Tutsi refugees and chasing them. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana pointed out the fleeing refugees to the attackers who then chased these refugees singing: 'Exterminate them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and get it over with, in all the forests';"⁹⁶⁷
- (iii) "one day in May or June 1994, he arrived at Ku Cyapa in a vehicle followed by two buses of attackers and he was part of a convoy, which included attackers;"⁹⁶⁸ and
- (iv) "sometime between 17 April and early May 1994, he conveyed attackers to Murambi Church and ordered the removal of the church roof so that it could no longer be used as a hiding place for the Tutsi, and in so doing, he facilitated the hunting down and the killing of the Tutsi refugees hiding in Murambi Church in Bisesero."⁹⁶⁹

567. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber's conviction of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana for genocide for having aided and abetted in the killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm to Tutsi in Bisesero stands in relation to these remaining findings. The Trial Chamber's finding that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had the requisite intent to commit genocide is undisturbed despite the quashing of a number of convictions.⁹⁷⁰

568. Also as found above, the Trial Chamber erred in law in considering that an element of the crime of extermination is that the victims must be "named or described persons". In carrying out the acts supporting his conviction for aiding and abetting genocide, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knew that the intent of the actual perpetrators was the extermination of the Tutsi refugees and that he was making a substantial contribution to the acts of mass killing of the Tutsi victims that occurred at

⁹⁶⁶ *Id.*, para. 828(v).

⁹⁶⁷ *Id.*, para. 828(ii).

⁹⁶⁸ *Id.*, para. 828(vi).

⁹⁶⁹ *Id.*, para. 828(i).

⁹⁷⁰ *Id.*, para. 830.

Murambi Hill and Nyarutovu Hill. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana also incurs individual criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting the extermination of the Tutsi as a crime against humanity.

569. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the remaining convictions against Elizaphan Ntakirutimana are of a serious nature. By these acts, in particular transporting and encouraging attackers, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knowingly participated in the massacres of Tutsis in Bisesero. Although his convictions under the Mugonero Indictment have been quashed, the remaining proven facts establish that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana also had the intent to commit genocide. Despite the seriousness of these acts, the Appeals Chamber agrees that special consideration should be given to his individual and mitigating circumstances, notably his age and his state of health, as discussed by the Trial Chamber.⁹⁷¹

570. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that the revision of the verdict in respect of both the acquittals and the new convictions does not affect the validity of the elements which form the basis of the sentence of ten years' imprisonment imposed by the Trial Chamber. This sentence is maintained.

⁹⁷¹ *Id.*, paras. 895-898.

IX. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons,

THE APPEALS CHAMBER

PURSUANT to Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 118 of the Rules;

NOTING the written submissions of the parties and their oral arguments presented at the hearings on 7, 8 and 9 July 2004;

SITTING in an open session;

With respect to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana,

QUASHES the conviction for aiding and abetting genocide under Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment;

AFFIRMS the conviction for aiding and abetting genocide under Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment;

REVERSES the acquittal for extermination as a crime against humanity under Count 5 of the Bisesero Indictment;

ENTERS a conviction for aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity under Count 5 of the Bisesero Indictment;

DISMISSES the Defence and Prosecution appeals concerning Elizaphan Ntakirutimana in all other respects;

AFFIRMS the sentence of 10 years' imprisonment handed down, subject to credit being given under Rule 101(D) of the Rules for the period already spent in detention;

With respect to Gérard Ntakirutimana,

QUASHES the conviction for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 4 of the Bisesero Indictment;

AFFIRMS the conviction for committing genocide under Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment, in relation to the killing of Charles Ukobizaba;

ENTERS a conviction for aiding and abetting genocide under Count 1A of the Mugonero Indictment, for the procurement of gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on the Mugonero Complex;

AFFIRMS the conviction for genocide under Count 1 of the Bisesero Indictment, but finds that his responsibility was that of an aider and abettor;

AFFIRMS the conviction for murder as a crime against humanity under Count 3 of Mugonero Indictment, in relation to the killing of Charles Ukobizaba;

ENTERS a conviction for aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity under Count 4 of the Mugonero Indictment, for the procurement of gendarmes and ammunition for the attack on the Mugonero Complex;

ENTERS a conviction for aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity under Count 5 of the Bisesero Indictment;


DISMISSES the Defence and Prosecution appeals concerning Gérard Ntakirutimana in all other respects;

AFFIRMS the sentence of 25 years' imprisonment handed down, subject to credit being given under Rule 101(D) of the Rules for the period already spent in detention;


RULES that this Judgement shall be enforced immediately pursuant to Rule 119 of the Rules;

ORDERS, in accordance with Rules 103(B) and 107 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, that Gérard Ntakirutimama and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana are to remain in the custody of the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for their transfer to the State where their sentences will be served.


Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.




Theodor Meron
Presiding Judge




Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba
Judge



Mehmet Güney
Judge



Wolfgang Schomburg
Judge



Inés Mónica Weinberg de Roca
Judge

Signed on the 9th day of December 2004
at The Hague, The Netherlands,
and issued on the 13th day of December 2004
at Arusha, Tanzania.

[SEAL OF THE TRIBUNAL]



ANNEX A : PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. On 21 March 2003, the Appellants and the Prosecution filed their notices of appeal against Trial Chamber I's Judgement and Sentence of 21 February 2003. On 28 March 2003, the Presiding Judge of the Appeals Chamber assigned Judges Theodor Meron, Fausto Pocar, Mohamed Shahabuddeen, David Hunt and Mehmet Güney to the appeal and designated Judge Mehmet Güney to serve as pre-appeal judge.⁹⁷¹ Thereafter, Judge Inés Weinberg de Roca replaced Judge Hunt,⁹⁷² Judge Wolfgang Schomburg replaced Judge Pocar,⁹⁷³ and Judge Florence Mumba replaced Judge Shahabuddeen.⁹⁷⁴
2. The Prosecution's Appeal Brief was filed on 23 June 2003. Following a number of decisions from the pre-appeal judge on requests for extension of page limits and time, Gérard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Appeal Briefs were re-filed on 28 July 2003 and 11 August 2003, respectively. Briefings were complete by 13 October 2003 with the filing of the Appellants' Reply Briefs.⁹⁷⁵ The Appeals Chamber also granted the Prosecution's request for an extension of time within which to file its Appeal Book.⁹⁷⁶
3. On 8 April 2004, the Appeals Chamber rejected Gérard Ntakirutimana's motion for the admission of additional evidence. In the motion, Gérard Ntakirutimana requested pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules an order from the Appeals Chamber for the admission as additional evidence of the transcripts of the public and *in camera* testimony of Witness KJ in the case of *Elisézer Niyitegeka* (Witness OO in the instant case), and also sought an order permitting him to file an addendum to his brief on Appeal. The Appeals Chamber reviewed the transcripts of the witness and concluded that the witness's evidence in *Niyitegeka* was not such that it could have affected the verdict in this case.

⁹⁷¹ Order of the Presiding Judge Designating the Pre-Appeal Judge and Order of the Presiding Judge to Assign Judges, dated 28 March 2003.

⁹⁷² Order of the Presiding Judge Replacing a Judge in a Case before the Appeals Chamber, dated 17 July 2003.

⁹⁷³ Order of the Presiding Judge Replacing a Judge in a Case before the Appeals Chamber, dated 14 October 2003.

⁹⁷⁴ Order of the Presiding Judge Replacing a Judge in a Case before the Appeals Chamber, dated 11 May 2004.

⁹⁷⁵ Order Granting an Extension of time for the Filing of the Appellants' Appeal Briefs, dated 20 May 2003; *Décision* ("Extremely Urgent Defence Motion for a Brief Extension of Four Days for the Filing of the Appellant's Appeal Briefs"), dated 23 June 2003; *Décision sur les demandes en modification des moyens d'appel et les requêtes aux fins d'outrepasser la limite de pages dans le mémoire de l'appelant*, dated 21 July 2003; *Motifs de la Décision du 24 juillet 2003 sur la "Defence Motion for an Extension of Time for the Refiling of the Appellants' Appeal Brief pursuant to the Order Issued by the Appeals Chamber on July 21, 2003"*, dated 28 July 2003; *Reasons for Oral decision of 8 August 2003 in Response to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Request for a Brief Extension to Re-File his Appeal Brief*, dated 12 August 2003; *Decision Regarding the Prosecution's Motion for Extension of Page Limits*, dated 26 August 2003; *Decision on the Prosecution's Extremely Urgent Motion for Extension of Page Limits*, dated 11 September 2003; *Order on the Appellant's Motion for an Extension of Time for the Filing of the Appellant's Reply Briefs*, dated 3 October 2003.

⁹⁷⁶ *Décision relative à la "Urgent Prosecution Motion pursuant to Rule 116 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence"*, dated 6 November 2003.

It also noted that, as the transcripts did not form part of the record and were not to be admitted as additional evidence, it would not consider any references to Witness OO's testimony in *Niyitegeka* although the Prosecution had sought to rely on parts of transcripts in its submissions on appeal in this case.⁹⁷⁷

4. On 24 June 2004, the Appeals Chamber granted in part Gérard Ntakirutimana's motion to strike Annex B from the Prosecution Response Brief and for re-certification of the record. The Appeals Chamber recalled that, in support of one of his grounds of appeal, Gérard Ntakirutimana argued, with reference to the transcript, that Witness GG had personally spelt names of people and places whilst testifying before the Trial Chamber, despite the witness' claim of illiteracy. In its Response Brief, the Prosecution had submitted that the transcript failed to reflect that it was the interpreter, rather than Witness GG, who spelt out the names. The Prosecution presented in Annex B of its Response Brief a "Certification of audio transcripts by Mathias Ruzindana, Reviser; Language Services Section, 3 September 2003." The Appeals Chamber considered that the Certification provided in Annex B raised legitimate doubts on the accuracy of the transcript as to whether it was the Witness GG or the interpreter who spelt names during the witness' testimony before the Trial Chamber and was of the view that, in light of the Appellant's argument regarding the credibility of Witness GG, it would be in the interests of justice to clarify the matter. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber granted the motion in part and ordered the Registry to review the transcript of the testimony given by Witness GG before the Trial Chamber for accuracy and to submit to the Appeals Chamber and the parties newly certified copies of the accurate transcripts in the official languages of the International Tribunal not later than 1 July 2004.⁹⁷⁸

5. On 5 July 2004, the Appeals Chamber dismissed two further motions for the admission of additional evidence filed by the Appellants. In the motions, the Appellants sought notably to have admitted as additional evidence: a statement dated 13 and 14 January 2004; transcripts of the testimony of Witness KJ (Witness OO in the instant case), who testified in the case of *Bagosora et al.* from 19 to 27 April 2004; the transcripts of the testimony of Witness AT (Witness GG in the instant case) who testified in the *Muhimana* case on 19 and 20 April 2004; materials from proceedings before a United States Immigration Court in a case involving several individuals who testified as witnesses at the Appellants' trial; transcripts of the testimony of Witness BH (Witness DD in the instant case), who testified in the *Muhimana* case on 8 April 2004; and transcripts of the testimony of Witness BI (Witness YY in the instant case), who testified in the *Muhimana* case on 8 April 2004. Finding both motions to be timely within the meaning of Rule 115, the Appeals

⁹⁷⁷ Decision on Request for Admission of Additional Evidence, dated 8 April 2004.

⁹⁷⁸ Decision on Defence Motion to Strike Annex B from the Prosecution Response Brief and for Re-Certification of the Record, dated 24 June 2004.

Chamber concluded that the evidence which the Appellants sought to have admitted did not meet the criteria of admissibility under Rule 115. The Appeals Chamber was also not persuaded by the Appellants arguments that it should reconsider its previous Rule 115 decision in this case, wherein the Appeals Chamber dismissed the Appellant's argument that the witness presented inconsistent evidence in this case and in *Niyitegeka*.⁹⁷⁹

6. Appeal hearings in the case were postponed on two occasions. On 20 November 2003, the Appeals Chamber, by majority, granted the Prosecution's request for adjournment of the hearings.⁹⁸⁰ The Prosecution's request to adjourn the hearing until 1 March 2004 was based on the United Nations Security Council's decision to amend Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal to create the new position of Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, separate from the holder of the office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and to appoint a new Prosecutor of the International Tribunal effective 15 September 2003. The Prosecution argued that as a result it was still recruiting staff and that the only appeals lawyer then hired was a senior appeals counsel who was to take up his duties on 8 February 2004. The Prosecution submitted that it was not in a position to argue the Appeals or to assist the Appeals Chamber in any matters to be raised during the scheduled hearing in December.

7. The Appeals Chamber expressed its disappointment that the Prosecution had not been able to make arrangements for it to be adequately represented in this case notwithstanding that it had time to do so. It noted that the Prosecution had been aware of the complex and substantial nature of the Appeals since at least the end of July 2003, when the Appellants' Briefs were filed, and had known of the division of the two Prosecutors' Offices since the Security Council's resolutions were adopted on 28 August and 4 September 2003. The Appeals Chamber also noted that the Prosecution accordingly had two months to assign attorneys already present in the Arusha Office of the Prosecutor to cover the Appeals and to begin work on them even before they were formally transferred from the appeals section of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

8. Despite the regrettable situation, the Appeals Chamber was persuaded that, in light of the complexity of the Appeals and the likelihood of substantial questioning from the bench, the interests of justice narrowly supported an adjournment in the circumstances.

⁹⁷⁹ Decision on Request for Admission of Additional Evidence, dated 5 July 2004, and Reasons for the Decision on Request for Admission of Additional Evidence, dated 8 September 2004.

⁹⁸⁰ Decision on Extremely Urgent Prosecution Application for an Adjournment of the Oral Hearing, dated 20 November 2003.

9. Subsequently, further to a request from Counsel for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, on 5 April 2004, the Appeals Chamber granted a further postponement of the hearings. Counsel for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had suffered an automobile accident which required extensive surgery and necessitated a prolonged post-operative recovery period. He had been advised against long air travel. The Appeals Chamber noted that Mr. Clark was the sole counsel for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and had represented him continuously during the proceedings before the Tribunal. It considered Mr. Clark's participation at the hearing essential to the proper consideration of these Appeals. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber re-scheduled the hearing of the Appeals to Wednesday, 7 July, Thursday, 8 July, and Friday, 9 July 2004.⁹⁸¹

⁹⁸¹ Decision on the Urgent Application by Defendant Elizaphan Ntakirutimana for an Adjournment of the Hearing, dated 5 April 2004.

ANNEX B : CITED MATERIALS/DEFINED TERMS

A. Jurisprudence

1. ICTR

AKAYESU

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998 (“*Akayesu* Trial Judgement”)

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement, 1 June 2001 (“*Akayesu* Appeal Judgement”)

BAGILISHEMA

Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgement, 7 June 2001 (“*Bagilishema* Trial Judgement”)

KAJELIJELI

Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement, 1 December 2003 (“*Kajelijeli* Trial Judgement”)

KAMUHANDA

Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgement, 22 January 2004 (“*Kamuhanda* Trial Judgement”)

KAYISHEMA AND RUZINDANA

Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, 21 May 1999 (“*Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement”)

Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement (Reasons), 1 June 2001 (“*Kayishema and Ruzindana* Appeal Judgement”)

“MEDIA CASE”/ NAHIMANA ET AL.

Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement, 3 December 2003 (“*Media Case* Trial Judgement”)

MUSEMA

Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgement, 27 January 2000 (“*Musema* Trial Judgement”)

Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement, 16 November 2001 (“*Musema* Appeal Judgement”)

NIYITEGEKA

Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgement and Sentence, 16 May 2003 ("Niyitegeka Trial Judgement")

Eliézer Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgement, 9 July 2004 ("Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement")

RUTAGANDA

Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and Sentence, 6 December 1999 ("Rutaganda Trial Judgement")

Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, 26 May 2003 ("Rutaganda Appeal Judgement")

RWAMAKUBA

Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide, 22 October 2004

SEMANZA

The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement, 15 May 2003 ("Semanza Trial Judgement")

2. ICTY**ALEKSOVSKI**

Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000 ("Aleksovski Appeal Judgement")

BLAŠKIĆ

Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Production of Discovery Materials, 27 January 1997

BRĐANIN AND TALIĆ

Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin and Momir Talić, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, 26 June 2001

"ČELEBIĆI CASE"/DELALIĆ ET AL.

Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001 ("Čelebići Appeal Judgement")

FURUNDŽIJA

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, 21 July 2000 ("Furundžija Appeal Judgement")

KRNOJELAC

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, 17 September 2003 (“*Krnojelac* Appeal Judgement”)

KRSTIĆ

Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2001 (“*Krstić* Trial Judgement”)

Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 19 April 2004 (“*Krstić* Appeal Judgement”)

KUNARAC ET AL.

Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 2002 (“*Kunarac et al.* Appeal Judgement”)

KUPREŠKIĆ ET AL.

Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, 14 January 2000 (“*Kupreškić et al.* Trial Judgement”)

Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgement, 23 October 2001 (“*Kupreškić et al.* Appeal Judgement”)

KVOČKA ET AL.

Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-PT, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motions on the Form of the Indictment, 12 April 1999 (“*Kvočka* Decision of 12 April 1999”)

Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, 2 November 2001 (“*Kvočka et al.* Trial Judgement”)

MILUTINOVIĆ, ŠAINOVIĆ & OJDANIĆ

Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – *Joint Criminal Enterprise*, 21 May 2003 (“*Ojdanić* Joint Criminal Enterprise Appeal Decision”)

STAKIĆ

Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Decision on the Defence Rule 98 *bis* Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 31 October 2002 (“*Stakić* Decision on Rule 98 *bis* Motion for Judgement of Acquittal”)

Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003 (“*Stakić* Trial Judgement”)

TADIĆ

Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a "Dule", Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, 7 May 1997 ("Tadić Trial Judgement")

Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999 ("Tadić Appeal Judgement")

VASILJEVIĆ

Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, 25 February 2004 ("Vasiljević Appeal Judgement")

3. Other Jurisdictions

Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157 (1995)

R. v. Beland and Phillips, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 489 (Supreme Court of Canada 1987)

B. Other Material

1. Books/Chapters in Books

4 J.H Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law* § 1124 (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1972)

2. Other

Commentaries on the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, *Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, 6 May - 26 July 1996*, Official Documents of the United Nations General Assembly's 51st session, Supplement no. 10 (A/51/10), Article 18, p. 118.

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, London, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279 ("Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal")

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN doc. A/CONF.183/9* dated 17 July 1998

C. Defined Terms

Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 ("Appeals Chamber" and "Tribunal" respectively)

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana ("Appellant" individually or "Appellants" collectively, or "Accused")

Gérard Ntakirutimana's "Defence Appeal Brief" filed 28 July 2003 ("Appeal Brief (G. Ntakirutimana)").

Gérard Ntakirutimana's "Defence Reply Brief" filed 13 October 2003 ("Reply" or "Reply (G. Ntakirutimana)").

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").

Judgement rendered by Trial Chamber I in the case of *Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana* on 21 February 2003 ("Trial Judgement").

"Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Appeal Brief" filed 11 August 2003 ("Appeal Brief (E. Ntakirutimana)").

"Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's Reply Brief" filed 13 October 2003 ("Reply" or "Reply (E. Ntakirutimana)").

"Prosecution Response Brief", filed on 22 September 2003 ("Prosecution Response").

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal, ("Rules").

Statute of the Tribunal, ("ICTR Statute").