TÉMOIN

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I arrived in Rwanda in November 1993, but I had been in Rwanda for a period of two weeks in August 1993 for the UN Technical Reconnaissance Mission with a multi-disciplinary team from the UN under General Dallaire. During the reconnaissance mission, we had meetings with both parties to clarify aspects and the interpretation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Pasteur Bizimungu led the RPF delegation and Colonel Bagosora led the RGF delegation. There were a number of FAR representatives at these meetings, but Colonel Bagosora was the primary spokesman for the RGF. He did most of the talking, to my recollection and the other members of the RGF delegation deferred to him.

My assignment in Rwanda was to be the assistant military assistant to General Dallaire. My duties included preparing his personal correspondence, organizing meetings, preparing and receiving reports, correspondence, and files, coordinating General Dallaires' schedule, making his appointments and any other duty or task he assigned to me.

General Dallaire was also assisted by a military assistant (LCol Farid from Bangladesh) and an ADC (Capt deKant until March 1994 then Capt van Putten, both from the Netherlands). The ADC was responsible for the General's meetings.
and took notes. On occasion or in his absence I replaced the ADC and took minutes for the General, but this did not happen very often.

I arrived in Rwanda on Monday, 29 November 1993. During that week a number of individuals were killed in North Western Rwanda under hostile circumstances and a number of children had gone missing in the Volcano Mountains. The General and the ADC with a patrol of Tunisians searched an area of the mountains on Wednesday but found nothing. On Friday, the Tunisians reported that they had located the bodies of the children and one child was still alive and had been evacuated to Ruhengeri hospital. General Gallaire tasked me to investigate the massacre. I journeyed to the Volcano Mountains, met the Tunisians and accompanied them and a large number of civilians who claimed to be friends and relatives of the children. After a long walk up a mountain we found the bodies of the children. Each had been strangled by a rope because there was a burn mark around their neck. The girls had been sexually molested. Some of the children had been struck on the head with a blunt instrument. The civilians identified the children by name. In the area of the bodies was a glove of the same material pattern as that worn by the RPF. The civilians
to us through a UNAMIR Rwandese press officer. Based on his translation from Kinyarwanda to French and English, they supposedly accused the RPF of the massacre. I was extremely suspicious of the way in which this man translated my questions and was even more suspicious later on the way home when he gave me a long dialogue on the evils of the RPF and the merits of the RGF which displayed a lack of neutrality. The civilians refused to touch the bodies or to help us to evacuate the bodies down the mountain. As it was approaching darkness, I made the decision to leave the bodies and return the next morning and recover them. I did not want to be mistaken coming out of the mountains after dark as there were numerous government defensive positions at the base of the mountains and the soldiers were nervous after the week's events. At the base of the mountain we met a RGF patrol led by a LCol who identified himself as the RGF commander in the area. We informed the LCol of the names of the children, what we had discovered and that we would return the next day to recover the bodies of the children to return to their families. We told the civilians to meet us the next morning to recover the bodies. We then went to Ruhengeri Hospital to see the girl who was in a coma and suffering spasms from brain damage. She was possibly 6 years and had been raped and shot in the head.
with a blunt instrument like the base of a knife or bayonet. She was under UN guard and the local Doctor stated she had severe brain damage and would die if she were not evacuated to Europe by the Red Cross. We then returned to Kigali. Before we could contact the Red Cross the next morning she had died.

Upon return that evening to Kigali, I reported the facts to General Dallaire. I also offered my suspicion that it was not the RPF who had committed the murders, but rather the commando troops from the RPF. The RPF commando school was only a short distance away whereas the RPF would have had to travel almost 110 kilometers, over some of the roughest terrain in the world, through thick forest without roads, to get to the location of the massacres. In addition, each victim had been strangled and the commandos wore a colored cord around their waist, which could account for the burn marks on the children’s necks. Also, the commandos carried knives with round metal bases, which would account for the indentations on the skulls of the children who had been struck on the head. General Dallaire tasked the Tunisians to recover the bodies the next day (Saturday). When the Tunisians returned to the rendezvous the next day, there were no government soldiers and only one civilian.
was recognized as the father of the dead boy in the group. As they retraced our route on a very narrow path, the man stepped on a landmine. Despite first aid he later died. The patrol was cancelled and General Dallaire ordered the Belgian Contingent engineers to examine the remnants of the mine, which they identified as a type used by the RGF. It is inconceivable to me that a group of almost 50 persons on Friday could traverse this trail up and down and not detonate the mine. It was my suspicion that the RGF soldiers who knew we were returning set the mine to deter our investigation. General Dallaire measured the risks and the investigation of the site was cancelled.

Around the same time, we also had to investigate two other incidents concerning murders of other moderate members of the MRND in the Ruhengeri/Gisenyi area. I was not involved in these investigations. General Dallaire proposed a joint investigation by members of the political and military staff of UNAMIR with representatives of the RGF and RPF to investigate this entire series of incidents to determine who was responsible for these killings. All sides agreed and UNAMIR and the RPF rapidly appointed members of the board of inquiry but the RGF consistently procrastinated on appointing its members to the board. As a result of RGF
delays the Board did not commence its investigation until January 1994 and it did not complete its investigation until March 1994. By then considerable time had passed and with the political tensions of the period the board could not uncover who was responsible for the actions. The UNAMIR military member of the board (LCol Farid) informed me that he suspected that RGF extremists and soldiers had conducted the assassinations of moderate members of the MRND. There had been a terror campaign to blame on the RPF and strengthen anti-RPF feelings and adversely affect the confidence of the general populace in the peace agreement. However, conclusive proof of this suspicion could not be secured.

KWSA

The Arusha Accords contained an agreement to have a RPF Battalion and RPF officials stationed in Kigali to establish the Broad Based Transitional Government and to provide close protection to their officials. In order to achieve this goal, General Dallaire wanted to implement a program that would guarantee the RPF's security or at least minimize the risk of violence between the two belligerents. He therefore initiated the negotiations for the KWSA or
Kigali Weapons Secure Area Agreement in December 1993 as a precursor to the movement of the RPF delegation and escort to Kigali known as OPERATION CLEAN CORRIDOR. Colonel Marchal conducted the initial negotiations, which established the framework of the agreement. General Dallaire conducted the negotiations to finalize the agreement while Col Marchal completed the planning for CLEAN CORRIDOR. I was one of the officers present when the negotiations took place in NIGONDORE in mid-December. The negotiations commenced after lunch and went well past midnight. Colonel Bagosora and our RGF Liaison Officer Colonel Rwabalinda represented the RGF side. The RPF delegation was led by Andrew Rwigamba accompanied by several RPF officers. Colonel Bagosora did most of the talking for the RGF. One of the major obstacles to the agreement was the issue of possession of weapons by civilians. The personnel of certain private security companies (such as "Cobra") had been allowed to carry weapons without registration. Colonel Bagosora insisted that they should be allowed to continue carrying weapons. General Dallaire and the RPF insisted that all weapons in the hands of civilians should be secured and the weapons of legitimate security forces like the RGF and Gendarmerie had monitored. After considerable discussion during which
General Dallaire refused to concede on this demand. Colonel Bagosora finally conceded. He had nevertheless strongly pursued the position that unofficial security forces should be allowed to be armed. Once the KWSA was signed we were able to conduct Operation Clean Corridor and move the RPF delegation and their escort to Kigali where they were installed under our supervision and guard in the CND complex. The next task was to formally establish through swearing in of the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) as stipulated in the Arusha Peace Agreement so that the demobilization could then commence.

On 5 January 1994, I was at the parliament for the swearing-in ceremony of the BBTG. There were numerous problems that day, because a series of demonstrations took place to prevent the delegates from the LANDO wing of the Liberal Party from getting into the parliament buildings. The Presidential Guard Commander was preventing Lando's delegates from entering the QND and was letting in only the delegates of the Mugenzi wing who were not recognized by the RPF. The situation finally ended in a series of riots and only the President was sworn in and the ceremonies were terminated without the establishment of the BBTG.
From this date there were periods of riots, infrequent ethnic attacks, grenade attacks and other increasingly violent acts on a frequent basis as the political situation stalemated. The security situation continually deteriorated throughout the first quarter of 1994.

In January 1994, an Interahamwe leader informed Captain Frank Claey's (UNAMIR Military Information Officer), one of our officers, who subsequently reported to General Dallaire with myself in attendance, of the location of arms caches, the training of Interahamwe and a plan to kill the Tutsis and 10 Belgian soldiers. I clearly remember the number of Belgians who were to be killed because, on 7 April 1994, exactly that number were killed. Subsequently, to verify the credibility of the informer, one of our officers (Capt Deme-Senegal) went with him and identified the location of a cache and confirmed that weapons, ammunition and grenades were hidden at least at one location. The building was the MRND Party Headquarters, which was located in a building owned by General Augustin Ndindilyimana. The informer told Capt Claey's that there were four major locations of arms caches, and that he was under a great deal of pressure from the President of the MRND Party to distribute the weapons. The informer told Capt Claey's that they had a very
well organized system of communication and that orders were disseminated from top to bottom in a pyramid fashion. He stated the Tutsis were being targeted for killing and he could not support killing innocent people. While he clearly stated he hated the RPF, he did not support widespread killing of innocent civilians. He stated the organization of killing was well advanced and that on order a 1000 Tutsis could be killed in 20 minutes. He also stated members of the Interhamwe had been and still were under training at Gabiro and Bigogwe Army Camps by the RGF. This information raised our suspicions that the RGF/FAR was actively cooperating with arming and training the Interhamwe and that this could only be undertaken with support from the top of the military and the ministry of defense. I prepared the report that General Dallaire approved and sent to UN New York. The report contained the information the informant had provided to us along with the UNAMIR intention to conduct cordon and search operations to seize the illegal weapons in accordance with the Kigali Weapon Secure Area Agreement. UN HQ in New York cancelled the operations.

At first, General Dallaire, Capt Claeys and myself were very suspicious of the informer and thought he could be
enticing us into a trap to embarrass, discredit or provoke UNAMIR. However, when our officer confirmed the presence of arms, at least at one location, and after the informer provided Capt Claeys with a video recording of a rally, where he demonstrated an important role within the Interhamwe organization, we believed the information he gave us was true. The informant told Capt Claeys to be very discreet regarding his collaboration because, according to him, UNAMIR had been infiltrated and one of our Franco-African UN officials was passing information to the RGF and the Interhamwe through the President of the MRND. It was also suspected that the Gendarmerie had been infiltrated and in some cases was actively supporting the Interhamwe. In addition with the information on Nkimilinyumana, it was no longer clear who we could trust. It was extremely difficult to conduct joint operations with a leader and a force that was under considerable suspicion of being actively in collaboration with the Interhamwe.

The informant requested protection for himself and his family, exchange of his Rwandese currency for foreign capital and passports and transportation to a friendly western nation. UN HQ could not provide the above demands and the informant broke off contact with us. However,
increasingly other information, reports and SITREPs from other sources was received that indicated that something serious was about to happen. This information paralleled the continual deterioration in the security situation. Grenade blasts which had occurred at a rate of one per week in January became several per night by March. There were also attacks on UNAMIR installations (i.e. Kigali Sector Headquarters), patrols (i.e. an ambush outside Kigali in Feb) and personnel (i.e. two UNMO’s mugged in Kigali) in addition to attacks on innocents (i.e. a tutsi family at the NT in January) and moderate officials (i.e. a grenade attack in LANDO’s restaurant in March and the assassination of Gatabazi in Feb). I proceeded on UN leave for most of the month of February 94.

I returned from vacation in late February 1994, on the very day that Gatabazi the Minister of Social Affairs (a member of the PSD and a well-known and highly vocal moderate hutu leader) was assassinated. I just arrived at our house, which was very near Gatabazi’s house, and suddenly I heard a large volume of automatic fire followed by single shots. I believed our house was under attack and I reported the attack to Force Headquarters by telephone. After I hung up, the phone rang and Gatabazi told he had been
ambushed on his way home and that persons were trying to kill him. I telephoned the information to Force Headquarters. General Dallaire and an escort of Belgian soldiers arrived and at his home discovered he had died from his wounds in his living room.

This assassination initiated a week of rioting in the city. In late February 1994, a UNAMIR escorted RPF convoy from Mulindi was ambushed by persons unknown near the Quadaffi crossroads. One RPF soldier was fatally wounded in the incident and another body of a Rwandese civilian was found near the ambush site.

In accordance with the Kigali Weapons Secure Area Agreement, which UNAMIR had negotiated in December 1993 with the RGF and RPF, UNAMIR was entitled to perform safe operations in collaboration with the Gendarmerie. The first operation was not a success. There were many problems of command, control, communication, logistics and coordination by the Gendarmerie. A second operation was planned for the morning of 7 April 1994 but, given the situation, this operation did not take place.
On the evening of 6 April, I was with General Dallaire and the ADC, Captain Robert Van Putten, at our home. We had just finished supper around 8:00PM when it was reported from the airport over the Force HQ radio net that there had been a loud explosion in the area of Kigali Airport. This started a large volume of radio and telephone traffic as we attempted to clarify the situation. At first we were informed that an ammunition depot at Camp Kanombe had exploded but later we were told that it was an airplane crash. Subsequently, we were informed that the President's plane had been scheduled to return from Dar Es Salam and that it may have been the President's plane. General Dallaire ordered Kigali Sector to dispatch a patrol to locate and secure the crash site. At approximately 10:00PM, we received a call from Lt Col Rwabalinda, the RGF liaison officer at our headquarters, who informed us of a meeting at the RGF Headquarters and requested General Dallaire attend the meeting. We were also receiving phone calls requesting information from moderate leaders like PM Agathe and Mr Lando etc.

The three of us proceeded by vehicle to RGF Headquarters. There was very little movement on the streets although reports were coming in over the radio.
Guards firing at vehicles and establishing roadblocks. We did not encounter any threat on our way to the RGF Headquarters. When we arrived at the Headquarters, we were ushered to a conference room. In the compound were many armed soldiers and some armored vehicles. What surprised me is that their weapons appeared to be brand new RP4/Galil assault rifles, which I had never seen the RGF forces equipped with before. This raised the question how these weapons had come to Rwanda since the KWSA agreement was in effect. The armored vehicles belonged to the Reconnaissance Battalion.

Upon entering the conference room, a number (approximately a dozen) of officers were seated in a semi-circle with Colonel Bagosora at the center and with Chief of Staff (COS) of the Gendarmerie (Augustin Nindiliyimana) on his left. We sat at the end of the semi-circle and one officer sat next to me. Besides Colonel Bagosora, the COS Gendarmerie and an officer I believed to be the G3 of the Army, I did not recognize the other officers. The only person who spoke during the meeting for the RGF was Colonel Bagosora and a short statement at the end by the COS Gendarmerie. The other officers deferred to Colonel Bagosora who spoke for them.
Bagasora opened the meeting by stating that the President's plane had crashed at Kigali Airport and that the COS Army in addition to others was on board. Bagasora asked General Dallaire "Who should take Power"? He did not wait for an answer and stated that these officers represented the Army and the Gendarmerie and should take power for the country and for peace. He requested General Dallaire's approval and collaboration. General Dallaire emphasized that there was a legitimate government under the PM Agathe and that only the head of state was dead. Bagasora was adamant that the PM did not have the credibility to govern the nation. The officer next to him made a rude comment about the PM Agathe. General Dallaire asked why the radio station was no longer broadcasting in French and only in Kinyarwanda, which we could not understand. He did not receive any power to his question. General Dallaire confirmed that the RGF Officers believed that there was a power vacuum in the nation. However, he continually emphasized that there was a legitimate government in Rwanda led by Prime Minister Agathe. Colonel Bagosora as adamantly emphasized that there was no legitimate government.
At 11:07 PM, the officer who I thought was the G3 of the army took a telephone call that confirmed that the President of Burundi had been on the airplane. Colonel Bagosora continued his explanation that they (the group of officers) did not want permanent power but only to control the situation and someone should speak to the nation. General Dallaire emphasized that it should be Prime Minister Agathe. Colonel Bagosora categorically refused stating that she no longer had any credibility. At 11:30 PM, General Dallaire telephoned Mr. Booh-Booh, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of UNAMIR to brief him in the meeting. General Dallaire attempted to get Colonel Bagosora to call the political leaders and solicit their views. Colonel Bagosora refused to call the Prime Minister. General Dallaire also emphasized that the RGF troops should stay in their barracks and the Presidential Guard should be confined to their camp in accordance with the Kigali Weapons Secure Area Agreement. General Dallaire emphasized that the Gendarmerie should maintain law and order. Weak assurances were received that this might happen when the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie stated he wanted to send out four patrols to various locations in the city.

In my opinion, this was a weak assurance of the Gendarmerie to maintain law and order. General Dallaire and Colonel...
Bagosora then proceeded by vehicle with the ADC to Mr Booh-Booh's house. I stayed at the Rwandese Army HQ. While I waited for General Dallaire to return I saw much personnel movement in and around the HQ and witnessed one armored vehicle leave the compound in violation of the Kigali Weapons Secure Area Agreement. At about this time Col Marchal the Belgian Commander of Kigali Sector arrived at the HQ. When General Dallaire returned at approximately 1:00AM, he and Col Marchal went into another meeting with Colonel Bagosora and the officers that I did not attend. When they emerged from the meeting, General Dallaire ordered Col Marchal to send a patrol to PM Agathe's residence and be on call to escort her to the radio station to address the nation. General Dallaire emphasized throughout this time the importance of the PM speaking on the radio station to the nation to calm the situation.

At approximately 2:00 AM, I proceeded with General Dallaire and the ADC to Force Headquarters to file a report to New York. At the Headquarters, I realized that I had forgotten the ADC's telephone book at the Rwandese Army HQ and the ADC and I returned to retrieve it. The streets were deserted except for abandoned vehicles and the sounds of sporadic gunfire. Near the Ministry of Defense, we
encountered a roadblock covered by an armored car of the recce battalion. The soldiers refused to permit us to pass and threatened us with their weapons. One soldier pointed his rifle at me to emphasize that we would not be permitted to go to Army HQ. We tried other routes but they were all blocked to the center of the city. This took place at approximately 4:00 AM. We then returned to the headquarters.

Upon returning to Headquarters, I manned the phone in the General's office. The phone was ringing continually as scores of people who were afraid for their lives called for information, protection or evacuation. I directed their requests to Mugali Sector, which was also subjected to continual calls. Only 7 officers out of 54 made it into our headquarters due to roadblocks, mobs and sporadic violence throughout the city. The Chief of Staff Operations supervised the command post and I manned the General's Phone, which was our only communications link to New York. By early morning, we received reports that the Lando family and other moderate leaders and their families had been abducted by the Presidential Guard. We received reports of killings by militia and military personnel. Our Chief Military Observer and his UNMO's at Military Observer Group
HQ watched militia proceeding systematically in the area surrounding their building, with lists in hand, killing families in their homes. We received reports that roadblocks were preventing UNAMIR movement in the city. We received a report that the patrol dispatched to secure the crash site had been taken captive. For a period we were confused between this patrol and the patrol that had been sent to secure the PM Agathe. A large number of our headquarters military and civilian personnel were unaccounted for and we attempted to confirm the location and security of our headquarters personnel.

We were informed by radio that a patrol of Belgian soldiers had been released and this turned out to be the patrol to the crash site. The PM Agathe's patrol was unaccounted for. We received a call from UNDP that they had a VIP in location and evacuation. We attempted to send an Armored Personnel Carrier but it was blocked from the building. The VIP turned out to be PM Agathe who was subsequently killed near UNDP. About midday, one of our Armored Personnel Carriers returned to the HQ with PM designate Faustin Twagiramungu. He had been saved by his Gendarmerie guards and our APC patrol. He was provided sanctuary in our Headquarters. Our headquarters was rapidly
filled with over 200 European and Rwandese civilians who felt their lives were in danger. They reported killings of moderates and Tutsi throughout the Remera area.

Our biggest problems were the absence of our headquarters staff and the nature of our communications system. UNAMIR Force Headquarters did not have a direct line of communication to our troops in the field and all communications had to go through Kigali Sector Headquarters, which was also short staffed and over burdened with confusing reports. All information had to be relayed through Kigali Sector.

Throughout 7 April, I remained in the Headquarters answering the telephone and assisting the CSS Ops in attempting to account for all of our personnel. From my location in the headquarters, I could see gangs of men with machetes prowling the streets and attempting to block access to our Headquarters and the stadium to people who were attempting to flee to these locations. Our patrols assisted where possible. That evening, General Dallaire returned to Headquarters. We had not been in communication throughout the day, as he did not carry a radio. He reported that Belgian soldiers, who had been guarding
the PM, had been killed. He also reported that his vehicle had been deliberately ambushed on his return to HQ. We worked until very late sending a report to New York. He also had telephone conversations with New York.

The number of refugees at the stadium swelled throughout the day and the days that followed until it reached almost 10,000 persons. On 8 April 1994 a large riotous mob of hundreds of persons blocked the entrance to the stadium when a Belgian patrol arrived with European civilians. The Bangladeshi guards on the gate did not open the gate and the Belgian vehicles were surrounded by the mobs. Civilians armed with machetes, clubs, and traditional weapons surrounded the Belgian unit. From my position over 600 meters away I watched as civilians acted as a Belgian soldier engaged the crowd in dialogue. I saw him shoot someone in the crowd. I cannot confirm whether he was acting in self defence, deliberately or from panic. Firing broke out simultaneously as the Belgians opened fire into the air and rushed the civilians into the compound. The mob dispersed and the Belgian group climbed the stadium fence to get to safety. 

22/27
From 8-10 April, my duties were to account for members of the mission and coordinate the execution of the evacuation plan. I led patrols to pickup UN civilian staff. On these patrols, we encountered increasing numbers of roadblocks. There was a pattern to the manner in which they were manned. Near the front line with the RPF they were manned by soldiers, behind the line by Gendarmerie and well in the rear by militia. The atmosphere at the roadblocks varied. Sometimes those manning them were aggressive, and sometimes they left us alone. It was impossible to go to the center of town without seeing or passing through numerous roadblocks.

On one occasion around 14 April, when we went to get the nuns in Remera, there was a roadblock at about 50 meters from their residence and my driver mistakenly accelerated instead of braking and thus ran the fork. When we came back, a para-commando soldier was at the roadblock with the militia. It was obvious that he was in charge and he very aggressively questioned our nationality. He stated that if we were Belgian they would have “eaten our flesh and drank our blood”. After negotiation, he allowed us to proceed to the convent. The civilians at the roadblocks were armed with grenades, mortars, claymores, usually not more than a
few guns. The commander of the roadblock inevitably carried a gun and it is with him that we would negotiate if we were not passed through. The roadblocks were openly tolerated by the army and by the Gendarmerie who occasionally jointly manned the locations or who openly fraternized with the militia. After mid-April, we increasingly noticed that the roadblocks were the locations where killings were being conducted as they could check identification cards and determine the Tutsi. Increasingly corpses were seen in the vicinity of roadblocks. This situation was openly tolerated by the army and the police.

GIKONDO

On 9 April 1994, I was asked to accompany two Polish Majors in evacuating two Polish UNMOs and some Polish priests from the church at Gikondo. The UNMOs were living with the priests in their residence. When we arrived I saw numerous bodies of children and the body of at least one woman along the external wall of the nearby school. Major Mark Pazik who accompanied me to the scene went inside the residence to find the Polish UNMOs and priests. Major Stefan Stec went into the church covered by myself and the gunner on the APC. In the church we found numerous bodies of civilians. Some of them were alive and were
groaning. The Polish UNMOs and priests arrived from the residence and Major Richard Marek told us that the day before the army had cordoned the area and the Gendarmerie armed with a list went from house to house rounding up the Tutsis who were taken to the church. The Polish UNMOs and priests had been held at gunpoint in the Church while the police had removed the identity cards from the people and had handed them over to the militia who killed them with machetes. Some were only wounded and as we did not have the room to take them with us we left our first aid kit and water with the priests and we promised to return the next day to retrieve them. The priest said there were 166 people in total in the church, both the living and the dead. Stefan decided to video the scene and while so doing a Gendarmerie jeep passed rapidly by. It did not stop at the scene of the massacre despite the fact that there were numerous children's shoes clearly visible near the body.

This incident was reported to General Dallaire as it was the first major occasion where there was clear evidence of collaboration between the civil service (who I suspect provided the list of Tutsis and their addresses), the army (who conducted the cordon of the area), the police (who rounded up the Tutsis and stripped them of the identity cards) and the militia (who killed the 166).
conducting the organized killings of these innocent Tutsi civilians. The next day, when the Polish UNMOs returned the Polish priests stated the militia had returned and had killed the survivors and removed the bodies which they burnt nearby. The priests were subsequently evacuated.

From this date until I left Rwanda in early May 1994, reports steadily increased of massacres first in Kigali and later throughout the country. At first we thought they were primarily political, as the targets seemed to be moderate hutu and tutsi leaders. However, after 11-April they increasingly became more ethnically motivated as all tutsis were targeted. The killing of innocent men, women and children, far behind the lines based solely on their ethnicity is genocide. This was also a genocide, which was conducted with the collaboration and active support of the army and the Gendarmerie.

After 10 April, my duties were primarily confined to the Headquarters as General Dallaire used me to maintain the communications link to the outside world and to prepare his reports to New York. I occasionally accompanied General Dallaire to meetings but I never saw Bagosora again. On each occasion as we went into the city it was incre
deserted as fighting escalated in the city and the number of bodies of civilians at roadblocks was increasing.

I have only knowledge of one incident regarding the RPF. Around mid-April, I was in the Headquarters and heard a long burst of automatic weapon fire. I was subsequently informed that an RPF patrol forced its way into the stadium and picked up about 15 persons who the refugees in the stadium (at least 5 witnesses per accused) stated had committed murder. The 15 were taken from the stadium and firing was heard. Later their bodies were found.

Done in Ottawa
On the 8th day of March 2000

[Signature]

Major Brent Beardsley